PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

MR. H. HOPKINS.

You asked me to send you a reminder about Tube Alloys - disclosure of information to United Kingdom and Canada.

9.17.17

25.1.43
Mr. Forster:

If this is what the President wants, and I think it is, I'll see that it gets done. The Army is agreeable to doing it this way. I judge the President will probably initial and return my note, so that I will have definite instructions to proceed.

V. Bush.
February 2, 1943

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

This memorandum is in response to your note of December twenty-eighth, in which you ask that I indicate now you might appropriately approach the Budget in connection with the special program which you authorized at that time.

My suggestion is that you direct the Army to include the matter with its other requests for appropriation as a contingent percentage for reserves for one of the larger items. No detailed justification would be submitted, but a general justification could be made confidentially to the Chairman of each Appropriation Committee and to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

If you wish the matter handled in this way, I will be glad to so inform the appropriate officers in the Army.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) V. BUSH

V. Bush,
Director.

"V. B.
O.K.
F.D.R."
REMEMBER TO SPEAK TO GENERAL SOMERVILLE ON THIS NEXT THREE OR FOUR DAYS

2/19/43
From: London
To: President of the United States
Unnumbered February 16, 1943.

Prime Minister to Hestor Harry Hopkins, personal and (signed Prime).

Do you remember our conversation about that very secret matter we called "Tube Alloy" which you told me would be put right as soon as the President got home? I should be very grateful for some news about this, as at present the American War Department is asking us to keep them informed of our experiments while refusing altogether any information about theirs.

Prime
FEBRUARY 24, 1943.

TELEGRAM

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

FROM: HARRY L. HOPKINS

Appropo of your request to me regarding tube alloys, I have made some inquiry here. It would be very helpful if Anderson could send me by pouch a full memorandum of what he considers to be the basis of the present misunderstanding, particularly the copies of the original memoranda or any references or conversations which form the bases of the misunderstanding. In a casual inquiry here I find that our people feel that there has been no breach of agreement, but I want to go into it thoroughly and a memorandum from Anderson would help.

I do hope you are feeling better.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Following our conversation, I have gathered together the material from my file bearing on interchange with the British. I enclose it, although I doubt whether you will care to go over it in detail, as it does not give a clear definition of where we stand. In fact, it seems to me that interchange needs to be considered in three ways: first, on scientific research; second, on military devices themselves; and third, on the manufacturing processes involved in making them. My Office is primarily concerned with the first. The matter that we discussed is now in military channels and concerned with the second and third. There may of course be other documents that I do not know of.

I judge that the full documents will be found to be somewhat general, however, and that procedure has been established largely by practice in interpretation. The practice has certainly not been to exchange without any limit whatever. To pick one example, the British have a Whittle engine development where they have told us something about the properties of the device but have declined to let the committee on this subject in the NACA have the full details. Their reason is the desire for high security. The committee in question contains representatives of industrial organizations. This particular case, where interchange has been interpreted by them in a restricted fashion, seems to me to be parallel in many respects with the case which we considered. I judge that on this matter, as far as the properties of the weapon and its utilization are concerned, the approach would be through regular military channels.

I will be glad to delve into this whole matter with you further whenever you may wish.

V. Bush,
Director.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered, March 20, 1943

From Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins, personal and confidential:

I am hoping to receive a reply to my telegram to you of February 27 about tube alloys. Time is passing and collaboration appears to be at a standstill. We have made some progress in the last three months.

Prime
FROM: Washington
TO: The Prime Minister
March 20, 1943
From Mr. Harry L. Hopkins to the Prime Minister
personal and
confidential

We have been having very satisfactory talks with Eden.

I am working on tube alloys and will let you
know as soon as I know something definite.

We are looking for good news from Tunisia and
I think we are going to get it.

All well here

Harry
From the Office of

Y. BUSH

Dear Harry,

You will probably wish to confer on this, and Smart and I will stand by.

A.B.

Ann 31.

Tube alley
27th
PM 7th
Ann. 7th
H.B.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Harry Hopkins.
FROM: V. Bush.
RE: Interchange on S-1.

March 31, 1943.

On March twenty-fourth the President passed me the accompanying file on interchange with the British on S-1, and instructed me to prepare a reply, undoubtedly by suggesting material for a reply to you, since the attached cables are marked for your attention.

There is no longer any assertion of breach of agreement. The objection of the British must hence be either to the adopted policy or to the way in which it is being applied. I have discussed this matter again with the Military Policy Committee on the subject, and briefly with Secretary Stimson. None of us can see that the present policy, which was approved by the President after it had had the careful review and approval of General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and Vice President Wallace, is in any way unreasonable, or such as to impede the war effort on this matter. Neither can we see that the application is at present unwise. I believe, therefore, that it will be necessary to determine more explicitly why the British object, before any modification could be recommended. It is true, as indicated in the last paragraph of CCWD 1744, that a prompt resolution of this matter is desirable. However, the present unwillingness of the British to conduct certain scientific interchange, to which we have invited them, merely means that our scientists do not have for the moment the benefit of their collaboration in the studies constantly being conducted. This is of much less importance than a clear understanding on a matter of the unique significance of this. I will therefore review the policy and its application, and I suggest that you request the British for explicit criticism.
The adopted policy is that information on this subject will be furnished to individuals, either in this country or Great Britain, who need it and can use it now in the furtherance of the war effort, but that, in the interests of security, information interchanged will be restricted to this definite objective.

There is nothing new or unusual in such a policy. It is applied generally to military matters in this country and elsewhere. To step beyond it would mean to furnish information on secret military matters to individuals who wish it either because of general interest or because of its application to non-war or post-war matters. To do so would decrease security without advancing the war effort.

The application of this principle is in no way unilateral. In applying the policy in this instance full over-all information has been withheld, for example, from our own Naval Research Laboratory. This has been done with the concurrence of appropriate Naval authority, and in spite of the fact that the Naval Research Laboratory would like to have full information. That laboratory, like other laboratories engaged on the subject, is furnished with all the technical information necessary for full progress on the part of the program which it is carrying forward. To go further would decrease security, and security on this subject is important. In this connection it should be remembered that the Naval Research Laboratory was engaged on aspects of this research very early, in fact I believe as early as any group anywhere, under the guidance of a special committee appointed by the President. This committee was reorganized under NDRC when the latter was formed.

This same policy is applied throughout the OSRD organization. The principle is that no individual receives secret information except as it is necessary for his proper functioning in connection with his assigned duties. It is used by the British themselves, and they occasionally ask us to apply special restrictions on information they furnish us, beyond current practice, when especially secret matters are involved.
I find it hard to believe, therefore, that the present British objection is to the policy. However, the last two paragraphs of CCWID 1807 Z are very pertinent in this connection. The first of these states the principle, and the second states that the application made is a logical result of the principle. It then goes on to say that this "destroys the original conception of 'a coordinated or even jointly conducted effort between the two countries'." If the application is logical, then the objection must be to the principle itself. To step beyond this principle would, however, involve giving information to those who could use it, not for the best prosecution of the war effort, but rather for other purposes, such as after-the-war commercial advantages.

I have to conclude, therefore, that the British objection arises because of our withholding information which they consider might be of value in connection with their post-war situation. If that is really their position, then presumably it should be duly considered in connection with the entire post-war relationship between the two countries. It should be considered on its merits, and in due perspective to other relations. To transmit such information for such a purpose would involve our giving to Great Britain information obtained by this country as a result of great expense and effort, and, while we freely transmit for the purpose of furthering our joint war effort, we can hardly give away the fruits of our development as a part of post-war planning except on the basis of some over-all agreement on that subject, which agreement does not now exist. The proper conduct of the secure development of a potentially important weapon should not be modified to produce this further result simply as an incident. In this connection I draw your attention to the enclosed memorandum by Dr. Conant.

My recommendation, therefore, is that the reply to the appended telegrams should attempt to fix the issue upon this point, if this is indeed, as I am inclined to believe, the point which is primarily in the mind of the British, in order that it may be considered in due time in connection with the broad problem of post-war relationships.
Specific points of application of the principle other than this are not, I believe, prominently in the British mind. However, it will be well to review them briefly; for they are consistent with the policy, applicable without distinction to UK and US groups, and, I believe, reasonable, and adapted to best progress with due regard to security.

There has been, from the beginning, full scientific interchange wherever scientific groups are working, in the two countries, on the same aspect or the subject. This it is proposed to continue. Recent failure to do so has been due entirely to British refusal thus to collaborate, while a policy to which they object stands.

Thus, there is a group in Chicago working on one part of the program, and a group on the same phase is being formed in Canada. We proposed complete scientific interchange between these groups as far as scientific research is concerned, but not on the details of the manufacturing process which we alone are prepared to carry on. Similarly there are groups on the scientific aspects of diffusion, and we proposed continued interchange here on a similar basis.

On the other hand, we have long worked at California on an electromagnetic process, and the British have not worked along these lines. We see no need for furnishing them information on our scientific results on this phase. They do not, I feel, object. They could not use such information, and our scientific group on this phase is fully adequate, and now includes as many scientific men as should work on this phase, at the expense of other scientific phases of the war effort.

We propose shortly to gather a special scientific group at an isolated site to work on some of the phases involved in actual bomb construction. It is essential that this be kept from the enemy at all costs. It is exceedingly difficult in this field, where the general background was known to all sorts of scientists all over the world before the work was brought under control, to secure adequate secrecy. Hence we propose to isolate this
group, by special measures, from the rest of the world, including the bulk of our own scientists and of British scientists. However, we are quite willing to invite a British scientist or two to join the group, and have so indicated, provided they will render themselves subject to the same rigid control, for a period which may be several years, as apply to the American scientists that we invite.

We are now erecting manufacturing plants. The information gathered in reducing the manufacture to practice will be extensive, and many inventions will result in patent applications assigned to the United States Government. This is being handled through American companies in which we have confidence. We do not propose to make these manufacturing plans available to any group, British or American, unless it is fully necessary thus to extend information in order to maintain full speed. British commercial interests would like to have these plans, and an account of the operations of plants. So would, undoubtedly, various American companies that are not bound under contract to extend patent rights to the U. S. Government on any invention made by them in this connection.

Finally, there is the matter of military use. This will not come into question for some time. If the war is not of long duration, if there is no danger that the method may be used against us with disastrous results, it may never come into question. When it does, there will undoubtedly be set up special military channels for appropriate consideration of strategy, tactics, and use. I feel sure there is no concern in the minds of the British on this point.

In conclusion, before making a final reply, it is my recommendation that you again state the case briefly, and inquire where the specific objection now rests.
From the Office of

Y. BUSH

Dear Harry —

You will probably wish to confer on
this, and soon. I

and I will stand

by.

C.B.

Jan 31.

Music ally

NN N 1-13

A.M. 2nd
MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Harry Hopkins.
FROM: V. Bush.
RE: Interchange on S-1.

On March twenty-fourth the President passed me the accompanying file on interchange with the British on S-1, and instructed me to prepare a reply, undoubtedly by suggesting material for a reply to you, since the attached cables are marked for your attention.

There is no longer any assertion of breach of agreement. The objection of the British must hence be either to the adopted policy or to the way in which it is being applied. I have discussed this matter again with the Military Policy Committee on the subject, and briefly with Secretary Stimson. None of us can see that the present policy, which was approved by the President after it had had the careful review and approval of General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and Vice President Wallace, is in any way unreasonable, or such as to impede the war effort on this matter. Neither can we see that the application is at present unwise. I believe, therefore, that it will be necessary to determine more explicitly why the British object, before any modification could be recommended. It is true, as indicated in the last paragraph of CCWD 1744, that a prompt resolution of this matter is desirable. However, the present unwillingness of the British to conduct certain scientific interchange, to which we have invited them, merely means that our scientists do not have for the moment the benefit of their collaboration in the studies constantly being conducted. This is of much less importance than a clear understanding on a matter of the unique significance of this. I will therefore review the policy and its application, and I suggest that you request the British for explicit criticism.
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The application of this principle is in no way unilateral. In applying the policy in this instance full over-all information has been withheld, for example, from our own Naval Research Laboratory. This has been done with the concurrence of appropriate Naval authority, and in spite of the fact that the Naval Research Laboratory would like to have full information. That laboratory, like other laboratories engaged on the subject, is furnished with all the technical information necessary for full progress on the part of the program which it is carrying forward. To go further would decrease security, and security on this subject is important. In this connection it should be remembered that the Naval Research Laboratory was engaged on aspects of this research very early, in fact I believe as early as any group anywhere, under the guidance of a special committee appointed by the President. This committee was reorganized under NDRC when the latter was formed.

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I have to conclude, therefore, that the British objection arises because of our withholding information which they consider might be of value in connection with their post-war situation. If that is really their position, then presumably it should be duly considered in connection with the entire post-war relationship between the two countries. It should be considered on its merits, and in due perspective to other relations. To transmit such information for such a purpose would involve our giving to Great Britain information obtained by this country as a result of great expense and effort, and, while we freely transmit for the purpose of furthering our joint war effort, we can hardly give away the fruits of our development as a part of post-war planning except on the basis of some over-all agreement on that subject, which agreement does not now exist. The proper conduct of the secure development of a potentially important weapon should not be modified to produce this further result simply as an incident. In this connection I draw your attention to the enclosed memorandum by Dr. Conant.

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Thus, there is a group in Chicago working on one part of the program, and a group on the same phase is being formed in Canada. We proposed complete scientific interchange between these groups as far as scientific research is concerned, but not on the details of the manufacturing process which we alone are prepared to carry on. Similarly there are groups on the scientific aspects of diffusion, and we proposed continued interchange here on a similar basis.

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group, by special measures, from the rest of the world, including the bulk of our own scientists and of British scientists. However, we are quite willing to invite a British scientist or two to join the group, and have so indicated, provided they will render themselves subject to the same rigid control, for a period which may be several years, as apply to the American scientists that we invite.

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Finally, there is the matter of military use. This will not come into question for some time. If the war is not of long duration, if there is no danger that the method may be used against us with disastrous results, it may never come into question. When it does, there will undoubtedly be set up special military channels for appropriate consideration of strategy, tactics, and use. I feel sure there is no concern in the minds of the British on this point.

In conclusion, before making a final reply, it is my recommendation that you again state the case briefly, and inquire where the specific objection now rests.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

FROM: London
DATED: April 1, 1943
REC'D: 6:26 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT
2326, April 1, 10 p.m.

Embassy has received for transmission the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins:

"One. Many thanks for yours of thirtieth. I look for good and speedy results in Tunisia. I do trust you will give careful consideration to my proposal for a meeting. There are so many things that I want to talk over with you.

"Two. I am much concerned at not hearing from you about tube alloys. That we should work separately would be a sombre decision."

MATTHEWS

S FED:MCW
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I suppose this is self-explanatory to you.

NHM
March 31, 1943.

Mr. Marvin H. Mcintyre,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Mcintyre:

When I lunched with the President last Wednesday he inquired concerning a military establishment in the State of Washington. It appears that one of the Senators from Washington had taken up with him the question of whether this establishment would not unduly interfere with agricultural efforts in the region. At the time I did not know all the facts, and I hence told the President that I would look it up.

I find that the establishment in question, which is near Pasco, is indeed one connected with a development that I have had something to do with. Accordingly, I discussed the entire affair with the Army engineers involved and examined particularly into the question of interference with crops. I came to the definite personal conclusion that every care has been used to render this interference minimum.

A very careful search was made before choosing the site. No other site in the entire country could be found that combined the rather strict needs of this project for power, water, and isolation. A representative of the Department of Agriculture looked over the site with the Army representatives and stated that he knew of no other site where less damage would be done to agriculture in view of the needs. The extent of the tract occupied and the general arrangements have been based on the recommendations of engineers that I consider highly competent, and I believe their stated requirements are essential for the best success of the effort and could not safely be decreased.
I also find that definite steps have been taken to insure that this year's crops will be taken off except where the area is actually in use, and the used area will be a small part of the tract. The efforts to keep the interference with agriculture in the region at an absolute minimum consistent with Army needs seem to me to have been handled with every inclination to protect the agricultural effort as far as possible.

I think that the President did not wish me to do anything further than to examine into the situation independently and form an opinion as to whether it was being well handled. This I have done with the above conclusions. If, however, there is anything further he would care to have me do in this connection, you will of course let me know.

Cordially yours,

V. Bush,
Director.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Dr. Conant and I met Saturday with Dean Mackenzie, who is the Canadian scientist primarily concerned with the subject we discussed, on which the British have objected to our decision regarding the extent of interchange. Dean Mackenzie is on his way to England to discuss this matter. I rather think that he agrees entirely that our decision is reasonable, and I believe that he will urge the British to withdraw their objections. I will of course let you know if anything further develops.

V. Bush,
Director.
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  

No. 374, June 10, 1943  

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins  

personal.  

As you will remember, the President agreed that the exchange of information on tube alloys should be resumed and that the enterprise should be considered a joint one to which both countries would contribute their best endeavours. I understood that his ruling would be based upon the fact that this weapon may be developed in time for the present war and that it thus falls within the general agreement covering the inter-change of research and invention secrets. 

I am very grateful for all your help in getting this question settled so satisfactorily. I am sure that the President's decision will be to the best advantage of both our countries. We must lose no time in implementing it. 

I have asked the Lord President to make sure that the right people are on the spot and ready to resume active collaboration as soon as the President has given the necessary instructions. I should be grateful if you would telegraph me as soon as this has been done so that our people can be instructed to proceed to Washington and be at your disposal.

PRIME
PERSONAL AND FROM HARRY HOPKINS TO THE PRIME MINISTER

IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE VISIT OF MARSHALL AND KING WILL BE POSTPONED FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS OR EVEN LONGER. THEY HAVE NO DEFINITE PLANS NOW ABOUT GOING.

THE MATTER OF TUBE ALLOYS IS IN HAND AND I THINK WILL BE DISPOSED OF COMPLETELY THE FIRST OF THE WEEK.

THE VISIT OF MAX HAS BEEN VERY USEFUL AND PLEASANT
June 17, 1940

The President has named the following to be members of the new National Defense Research Committee:

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman
President, Carnegie Institute of Washington

Dr. J. B. Conant,
President, Harvard University

Dr. Richard C. Tolman,
California Institute of Technology

Dr. Karl Compton,
President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mass.

Hon. Conner P. Coe,
Commissioner of Patents, Commerce Dept.

Dr. Lyman J. Briggs,
Director, National Bureau of Standards.

Dr. F. B. Jewett,
President, National Academy of Sciences, New York City

The Secretary of War

The Secretary of the Navy
My dear Harry,

I was so sorry not to see you again on Tuesday to make my adieu, especially as I wanted to thank you for all you had done to make my stay pleasant and profitable.

I understand that the matter we discussed was concluded satisfactorily and I am sure that this is largely due to your efforts. I am very glad, as it is certainly to everyone's advantage that the old conditions should be restored.

It was a great pleasure to have an opportunity of talking to the President and Vice-President on Post-war topics and I was delighted to find how closely I agreed with their line of thought. For arranging this once again, I am sure I must thank you.

I trust you will forgive this hasty typed note; it will at any rate save you the trouble of trying to decipher my handwriting.

In the hope that we may meet again soon, believe me, once more with best thanks and souvenirs affectueux

Harry Hopkins Esq.

The White House,
Washington, D.C.
June 28, 1943

Dear Prof:

It was so good to hear from you and I am glad you thought the trip worthwhile. We certainly enjoyed ever so much, having you.

It may be that I will see you before the summer is over.

Cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

The Right Honorable,
The Lord Cherwell,
Christ Church,
From: London, England
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 354 9 July 1943

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt
personal and Number 354.

Since Harry's telegram of 17th June I have
been anxiously awaiting further news about Tube Alloys.
By experts are standing by and I find it increasingly
difficult to explain delay. If difficulties have a-
risen, I beg you to let me know at once what they are
in case we may be able to help in solving them.

No Sig.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

The President wishes you to prepare an answer to the attached message to-day.

Respectfully,

Chester Hammond
From: London, England
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 354 9 July 1943

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt
personal and most secret. Number 354.

Since Harry's telegram of 17th June I have been anxiously awaiting further news about Tube Alloys. My experts are standing by and I find it increasingly difficult to explain delay. If difficulties have arisen, I beg you to let me know at once what they are in case we may be able to help in solving them.

No Sig
Mr. President

Does this go to Admiral Brown to file or keep it in our secret files here? 

EST
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

What should I do about this
and the reply to Churchill's wire?

F.D.R.

Ltr. 6-30-43, from Harry Hopkins to
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institution,
1570 P St., N.W., re discussion with the
Prime Minister re question of exchange of
information re a tube alloys, including the
building project.

The above ltr. 6/30/43, from Mr. Hopkins
+ orig. of this memo sent to Mr. Bush,
7/14/43.
MEMORANDUM FOR
MISS GRACE TULLY

The President has read this and it can now be filed.

H.L.R.

Encl.
file from Dr. V. Bush re tube alloys

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1943
The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.  

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your instructions contained in your letter of July twentieth, I have proceeded to arrange for further interchange with the British on the subject of tubealloy.

This matter was, in fact, raised by the Prime Minister while I was in London and there were conferences there in which Secretary Stimson participated. In response to your cable to the Prime Minister, Sir John Anderson arrived in this country this week and there have been further conversations here. We asked him to indicate definitely the way in which the present American policy should be altered or supplemented in order to provide for interchange as desired by the British, and he has done so in a letter, a copy of which I enclose. I have replied to this, and enclose a copy of my reply, the substance of which has been approved by Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. Unfortunately, Mr. Wallace has been out of the city this week so that I could not consult him, but I feel sure that he will also approve the arrangements. I have also informed the members of the Military Committee on this subject, General Styer and Admiral Furnell, of developments. Finally, I enclose a copy of a brief letter dated August 6, in which Sir John Anderson indicates that our agreement is satisfactory to him.

In my opinion this exchange of letters provides adequately for appropriate interchange, with due regard to the maintenance of security, and with the object of providing the British with all of the information which they can utilize in this connection in the prosecution of the war, in return for the benefit of the deliberations of their own scientific and technical groups.

Sir John Anderson has now written me a further letter concerning details of interchange, but I feel this should go before the Combined Policy Committee as soon as it is formed.
You will note that my reply gave no comments concerning the first four points, which are matters of broad international agreement. I understand that the Prime Minister has advised Secretary Stimson of these suggestions. There has, of course, been some discussion of these during the course of my consultations, and I have encountered some strong opinions concerning them, but you will undoubtedly wish to consult on this broad aspect of the matter directly rather than through me.

I have attempted to bring about the extended and renewed interchange which you desire, in an appropriate and effective manner, without introducing any step which could be regarded as either improper or improvident. Our thought has been guided by the conviction that all steps taken at this time should be solely for the purpose of winning the war at the earliest possible moment. I trust you will feel that this attempt has been successful, and that we may have your further instructions.

At your convenience I shall of course be happy to report to you upon other aspects of my recent journey.

Respectfully yours,

V. Bush,
Director.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
AEC & Director F-ORL
2-12-70
6th August, 1943.

My dear Dr. Bush,

Thank you so much for your letter of the 6th August which is entirely satisfactory from my point of view.

I am of course quite ready to make the small amendment which you suggest in the first clause of the draft agreement, and I am now proposing to submit the draft, with this alteration, to the Prime Minister for his consideration. I assume therefore that you will similarly submit it to the President.

As regards the point made regarding the interpretation of sub-paragraph (b) in the 5th clause of the draft, I agree, of course, that it will not be for the combined Policy Committee to interfere with the control of the American programme by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army. My thought is that the members of the combined Policy Committee should have such information as may be necessary to enable all of us to be satisfied that we are making the greatest possible contribution towards bringing the project to fruition at the earliest possible moment.

I am afraid that, owing to the short notice which it was possible to give of my visit, you have been put to considerable inconvenience, and I am most grateful to you for the great trouble you have taken to round the matter off in the limited time which I have been able to spend here.

My visit has given me great pleasure personally and I hope we may meet again soon.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) JOHN ANDERSON

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Office of Scientific Research & Development,
1530 P. Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
Sir John Anderson,
Lord President of the Council,
British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Sir John:

I was glad to receive your letter of August 4 and I believe that it presents an excellent basis for settlement of the question of interchange of information which we discussed. It is evident that the subject matter of the suggested agreement falls into two categories. The first four points are concerned with matters of international understanding quite beyond the definite problem of appropriate arrangements for interchange. These four points, therefore, are for the consideration of the President and the Prime Minister.

I have reviewed the fifth point only, which is concerned with arrangements for full and effective collaboration on the research and development program, with Mr. Stimson and with General Marshall and have, of course, discussed it quite fully with Dr. Conant. All of us are in agreement that it presents a procedure by which interchange on this subject can now be carried on for the purpose of the most rapid possible development of this affair. Mr. Wallace, the remaining member of the Policy Committee to which the President referred the general handling of this subject, is absent from the city and I have not been able to discuss the matter with him. I am, however, confident that he will agree. The matter, therefore, appears to be now in form for presentation to the Prime Minister and to the President, and it is to be hoped that they will agree that a suitable solution has been reached.

The object of the arrangement is so to interchange information, as you state, as to bring the project to fruition at the earliest possible moment. This
has in fact been definitely in the minds of our Policy Committee from the outset, and was in fact the basis for our recommendation that interchange should be made wherever the receipt of the information would definitely advance the project as a war measure. The implementation of this in its detail has in fact become confused in recent months, but I am glad to say that I now feel that on the basis of your memorandum we have arrived at a position where all possible misunderstandings may be promptly cleared away, and fully effective collaboration restored. In order that we may be sure that there is now no misunderstanding I will comment on a few points.

There is one very small point in your first clause of the draft. You state that a very much greater expense will fall upon the United States. I suggest that this might now be put in the past tense. The fact is, of course, as you know, that the United States has already committed itself to the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars, and has employed the services of thousands of scientific and technical men on the project. It might, therefore, be well in the final draft to signify this fact by a minor change at this point.

As you state, the acceptance of this draft of principles will soon need to be followed by steps for implementing the arrangements in detail. I have now received your letter of August 5 along these lines, but have not placed it before our policy group. As a matter of procedure the first step after the formation of the Policy Committee would certainly seem to be the presentation to that Committee by American and British scientists the over-all picture of the current situation in their respective countries and the plans for the future. On the basis of the evidence thus presented the Policy Committee would agree as to the method of providing specific interchange to carry out the provisions of the agreement.

One very important early step will be the selection of the Combined Policy Committee to which we will proceed to give thought immediately. The most important
result of the creation of this Committee will, I think, be that it will provide for a thorough understanding of the general status and progress of the effort at the top level in the two Governments. It is our understanding that while the members of the Policy Committee will have access to all general information about all phases of the effort, the interchange of information about the detail of manufacture or construction of plants or of any final weapon will be governed by the provisions of (d), and that your suggested provision (b) merely is intended to provide that members of the Committee may interchange with their immediate scientific advisers the information they may have, in view of the fact that in some cases members of the Committee may not themselves be scientists. It is, of course, clear that this Committee is concerned with general policy, especially as to the extent and procedure on the interchange; and that its existence will not interfere with the control of the American program by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army. I trust that we may find it possible to select a very strong group indeed for this purpose.

I trust that you will present this matter to the Prime Minister when you meet, and if you will let me know that you intend to do so, I will simultaneously transmit our exchange of letters to the President, so that they may both be fully informed of the successful outcome of our discussions when they meet. I hope very much we will find that they are also in agreement on the procedure at which we have now arrived.

Very truly yours,

Vannevar Bush.
My dear Dr. Bush,

Many thanks for your letter of the 3rd August and the documents which you kindly sent me with it.

As you know, the Prime Minister prepared some draft Heads of Agreement after our meeting in London and sent a copy of them to Mr. Stimson. I have been working on this document in the light of our talk and I now send you an expanded version of it which I have entitled: "Draft articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys".

My idea is that we should try to reach agreement on a draft along these lines and submit it as soon as possible to the President and the Prime Minister for their consideration.

You will see that in the draft articles I have dealt with the broad principles on which interchange of information should be conducted. I contemplate, however, that there should be a second memorandum setting out with greater precision and detail the arrangements which should govern the direct interchange of information between the groups in our two countries working on each section of the project. If the wording of the document dated the 15th of December 1942, and enclosed in your letter, were altered to make it clear that it applied to interchange on this level only, I agree with you that it might well serve as a basis for this second memorandum. The details would, of course, need modification in the light of the programme of work agreed by the combined Policy Committee; but I imagine that you always intended that these arrangements should be reviewed and amended in the light of alterations made from time to time in our respective programmes.

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development.
The draft articles have been prepared in a form suitable for an agreement between the U.S.A. and the U.K. only. We shall, I think, have to discuss together and with the Canadians the question of Canadian participation which would, of course, necessitate appropriate changes in the form and wording. But we need not let that delay us in our immediate task of settling the kind of clauses which should be contained in the agreement, whether the Canadians come in or not.

Finally, may I thank you very much for sending me the statement on the possible use of radio-active material in warfare. This is a matter to which we also have given some attention. I shall look forward to receiving the more detailed report to which you refer, and I will, on my return, at once have the results of our studies checked against yours.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) JOHN ANDERSON

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Office of Scientific Research and Development,
1530 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
Draft articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys.

1. Whereas it is vital to our common safety in the present War to bring the Tube Alloys project to fruition at the earliest moment; and whereas this may be more speedily achieved if all available British and American brains and resources are pooled; and whereas owing to war conditions it would be an improvident use of war resources to duplicate plants on a large scale on both sides of the Atlantic and therefore a far greater expense will fall upon the United States;

It is agreed between us

First, that we will never use this agency against each other.

Secondly, that we will not use it against third parties without each other's consent.

Thirdly, that we will not either of us communicate any information about Tube Alloys to third parties except by mutual consent.

Fourthly, that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.

And Fifthly, that the following arrangements shall be made to ensure full and effective collaboration between the two countries in bringing the project to fruition:

(a.) There shall be set up in Washington a Combined Policy Committee composed of:-
The functions of this Committee, subject to the control of the respective Governments, will be:

(1) To agree from time to time upon the programme of work to be carried out in the two countries.

(2) To keep all sections of the project under constant review.

(3) To allocate materials, apparatus and plant, in limited supply, in accordance with the requirements of the programme agreed by the Committee.

(4) To settle any questions which may arise on the interpretation or application of this agreement.

(b) There shall be complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project between members of the Policy Committee and their immediate technical advisers.

(c) In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field.

(d) In the field of design, construction and operation of large-scale plants, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated by such ad hoc arrangements as may, in each section of the field, as appear to be necessary or desirable if the project is to be brought to fruition at the earliest moment. Such ad hoc arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the Policy Committee.
SECRET

JULY 23, 1943

July 23, 1943

IN REPLY TO YOUR 354. I HAVE ARRANGED SATISFACTOFLY FOR
326th PERSONAL AND MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL IN THE U.S. NAVY IN 1918.

In reply to your 354, I have arranged satisfactorily for
Tube Alloys. Unless you have the proper person in this country
now, it might be well if your top man in this enterprise comes over
to get full understanding from our people.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1735, EWT, July 26, 1943.

Chester Hammond,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the
President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date Nov. 1, 1971

Map Room. Rawl
#326

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

JULY 26, 1943

IN REPLY TO YOUR 354. I HAVE ARRANGED SATISFACTORILY FOR TUBE ALLOYS. UNLESS YOU HAVE THE PROPER PERSON IN THIS COUNTRY NOW, IT MIGHT BE WELL IF YOUR TOP MAN IN THIS ENTERPRISE COMES OVER TO GET FULL UNDERSTANDING FROM OUR PEOPLE.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Stewart
Date Nov. 1, 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 28, 1943.

For the President:

Col. Sexton, in General Marshall's office, called to say that Dr. Conant is not in town today but is expected between 10:00 and 10:30 tomorrow morning. He may then be reached at Dr. Bush's office -- Dupont 6400.

djb

11/16 - where?
July 28, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 20th to Dr. Bush concerning exchange of information with the British Government regarding tube alloys. I have informed Dr. Bush, who is now in England, concerning the substance of your letter.

Tomorrow I shall also bring your letter to the attention of Dr. James B. Conant upon his return to Washington. He is now in Chicago on business related to this project, on which he acts as Dr. Bush's deputy.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll L. Wilson
Executive Assistant
to Dr. Bush

The President
The White House
Washington
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1943

Dearest Franklin:

Mr. Irving S. Lowen, the man about whom I telephoned will be in Washington tomorrow.

Mr. Lowen says that Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant would be of absolutely no use because they have been too close to the project that they have perhaps lost the sense of urgency which these younger men have.

There is they believe, a chance that a very brilliant man who is working on this in Germany may have been able to develop to the point of usefulness. The Germans are desperate and would use this if they have it ready. It is imperative that we proceed quickly to perfecting it and these young scientists believe that they are already two years behind all that they might have accomplished if they had been allowed to progress.

They want an investigation by an impartial outsider who can see the possibilities of what might happen, but who is not a scientist, perhaps a man of judicial temperament who will weigh the possibilities.

Mr. Lowen thinks you might want to speak to some of the other men:

Professor H.C. Urey, Columbia
Professor Wigner
Professor Szilard
Professor Fermi
Professor Oppenheimer
Dr. Gale Young
Professor A. H. Compton,

all of various parts of the project.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR. CRIM:

Mr. Irving Lowen is to have an appointment with the President. Will you tell whoever should be told so he can be admitted? I do not know whether the President will see him at the house or at the office. Mrs. Roosevelt spoke to the President and Mr. Lowen is to ask for General Watson.

m.c.t.

Re: Family folder for letter from Mrs. K., 7/27/32. Lowen.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1943.

REMINDER FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At 10.45 a.m., today, you wish to be reminded to call up Dr. Conant in Dr. Vannevar Bush's office (Dupont 6400) to ask Dr. Conant to see Mr. Irving J. Loen.

Mr. Loen will telephone General Watson's office at 11.15 to find out when Dr. Conant can see him.

E. M. W.
President called me in at 2:40. Re- 

in his office. Lewis has been notified 

Jack Romansna

7/29/43
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Irving Lowen 'phoned my office this morning from New York, re his possible appointment with Dr. Conant. He said that due to bad case of food poisoning he found it necessary to return to New York yesterday instead of waiting here. He further stated that while he could come back to Washington today if it was felt necessary, he hoped he could have an appointment with Dr. Conant later on. (71 Wash. Sq. S., Gram. 5-2673)

Jack Romagna: We have told Mr. Lowen that the President would have some information this afternoon for him. He, the President, has been unable to contact Dr. Conant re an appointment for Mr. Lowen.
I was not being twenty six a.m. I saw had by Gen.  Ruge that Ruge  Rumen's  and was  at  plans  she would be to the place and of the town  I can pick up some  in such places of them.  I don't think it with summary. He stands that badly  I would she made  provided  I have  all there anything she could also could compensate for  from youroting  that 790.

[Signature]

I agree  year  the cause. Nile speeches he with his own anxiety.
April 15, 1943

Dear Edward:

Could you send this
to Anthony for me?

Cordially yours,

encl. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Cable

His Excellency
The Right Honorable
Viscount Halifax
British Embassy
Washington, D.C.
April 15, 1943

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO ANTHONY EDEN FROM HARRY HOPKINS

YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING SECRET MATTER RECEIVED.
I AM GOING TO SEND YOU ON MONDAY A FULL TELEGRAM
ABOUT THE MATTER.

ON FURTHER INQUIRY I FIND IT HAS MANY
RAMIFICATIONS AND I THEREFORE AM ANXIOUS TO SEND
YOU MY VIEWS FULLY.

DELIGHTED THAT YOU RETURNED SAFELY.

HARRY
My dear Harry,

Anthony has asked me to give you the following message from him:

"Have you any news for me about very secret matter we discussed? You will realize we have various decisions to take if there has to be separate development.

Kindest regards."

I was proposing to write him a secret word about the larger issues we raised together last night, so that nobody but he would see it, and explain why for that reason you had nothing to say at the present moment. But you may like to send some message of your own in reply to this.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honourable

Harry L. Hopkins,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.
May 26, 1943.

Mr. Hopkins:

Have I summed it correctly?

If so, you may wish to initial so that we may each have a record in the file.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH MR. HARRY HOPKINS AND LORD CHERWELL AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 25, 1943.

Mr. Hopkins called me on the telephone and told me that the Prime Minister had formally raised the question of interchange on S-1, and asked me to confer with Lord Cherwell in his office to see if there could be a meeting of minds.

I met Mr. Hopkins and Lord Cherwell at 3:30. Lord Cherwell asked that I state why we had altered our policy in regard to interchange on this subject. In reply, I traced the entire subject from the standpoint of its organization, beginning with the Briggs Committee and going through the NDRC handling, the taking over by the military, the existence of the Military Committee, and the Policy Group consisting of the Vice President and others. I then outlined the way in which the present policy had been adopted by these groups, making it clear that a new policy was needed at the time that the matter went into production in the hands of the Army, inasmuch as OSRD previously had had to do only with the scientific angles. I then outlined the principle which was adopted and outlined its application. I then asked Lord Cherwell whether they disagreed with the principle itself or with the way in which it was being applied. He stated that he disagreed with the principle itself.

We then had a considerable discussion in which I outlined that this was a principle that was applied generally. I also made it clear that the reason for the restriction of information to those who could use it in this war was for security purposes. I made it clear that this was being applied impartially and that there were groups such as the Naval Research Laboratory which wished much more information but were not being given it because they could not utilize it in this war.

Incidentally, in discussing the reasons for a restricted policy, namely security, I told Lord Cherwell that, if we were to furnish the manufacturing information freely at all points to the British, we could not then very well refuse to pass similar information from one American company to another, that we had at the present time each company confined to its proper field, that no information was being passed beyond that necessary for each company to operate properly therein, and that we would feel that it was undesirable from a security standpoint.
to pass the information around more freely than this in American companies. He stated that of course if we furnished the manufacturing information it would be to the British Government, and I stated that of course I would assume that the British Government would immediately have to work with some company such as I.C.I. in order to utilize the information effectively, which he did not contest.

On my insistence that, under the present plans, the British could not use for the purposes of this war the information on the manufacturing process, Lord Cherwell agreed that this was true as far as the present plans go. He also stated, however, that, unless this manufacturing information was furnished to the British, they might feel impelled to alter the plans and go into manufacturing themselves, to the disadvantage of the balance of the war effort. I pressed him on the question as to whether they would expect in this way to attain results useful in this war, and he did not insist that they could. The matter finally came down to the point where he admitted rather freely that the real reason they wished this information at this time was so that after the war they could then at that time go into manufacture and produce the weapon for themselves, so that they would depend upon us during this war for the weapon but would be prepared after this war to put themselves in a position to do the job promptly themselves. He disclaimed the commercial aspects. He felt that it would be five or ten years before the matter came into use commercially, and that if commercial usage was indicated after study the British could readily go into that aspect of the subject. It was quite clear, and Mr. Hopkins reiterated it and emphasized it, that the reason the British wish the information was so that in the period immediately after this war they would be able to develop the weapon for themselves very promptly and not after a considerable interval.

The matter having gotten very definitely boiled down to this one point, I took the point of view, in which Mr. Hopkins joined me, that delivery of information to the British for after-the-war military reasons was a subject which needed to be approached quite on its own merits, and that this question is tied up with the large problem of international relations on this whole subject from a long-term viewpoint. Lord Cherwell stated that there was a connection, because unless the British could now be assured that they would have this information for the above purpose they might have to divert some of their war effort in order to get it. He stated that
he did not wish to say that they would do this, that it was up to the Prime Minister, but that they might feel that they were constrained to do so in order that their position immediately after the war might be properly secure. He made it clear, of course, that he did not mean secure as against the United States, but rather as against some other country which might have it far developed at that time. Mr. Hopkins said some things about one administration not being able to commit a succeeding one, except where the matter was incorporated in a treaty.

In conclusion, Mr. Hopkins stated that he now had the point very definitely in mind for the first time, and that he understood now exactly what was the point at issue. He evidently intends to talk to the President about it, although he did not say so. I asked him whether he wished me at this time, in view of the new angle of the matter, to discuss it in any way with Mr. Wallace or Mr. Stimson. He stated that there was nothing further that he wished me to do, that he did not think that I should take the matter up with either of those men at the present time, and I said to him that I would sit tight and do nothing unless and until I heard from him further on the matter.

V. Bush.
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V. Bush.
July 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

I think you made a firm commitment to Churchill in regard to this when he was here and there is nothing to do but go through with it.

H.L.H.

encls.
File on tube alloys
JULY 20, 1943

PERSONAL AND TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

IN REPLY TO YOUR 354. I HAVE ARRANGED SATISFACTORY FOR TUBE ALLOYS. UNLESS YOU HAVE THE PROPER PERSON IN THIS COUNTRY NOW, IT MIGHT BE WELL IF YOUR TOP MAN IN THIS ENTERPRISE COMES OVER TO GET FULL UNDERSTANDING FROM OUR PEOPLE.
29 July 1943

From: American Embassy London
To: The President of The United States
No. 388  Filed: 2922172

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
personal and [most secret] No 388.

Your No. 326. I am most grateful to you for your news. The Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson, has been responsible for handling this matter on our account for the last 2 years. I am sending him over by air immediately. He should arrive in Washington on Monday or Tuesday. He will make contact with our technical expert, Akers, and thereafter be at your disposal to discuss with anyone you wish. He will endeavour to meet Colonel Warden at Abraham on August 10 or 11 on his way home.

Prime

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. McIntyre:

I transmit a letter for the President which I have received from Dr. Oppenheimer, but which I think it is quite appropriate to transmit without my review. It is in reply to the President's recent letter to Dr. Oppenheimer.

V. Bush.
July 9, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your generous letter of June 29th. You would be glad to know how greatly your good words of reassurance were appreciated by us. There will be many times in the months ahead when we shall remember them.

It is perhaps appropriate that I should in turn transmit to you the assurance that we, as a group and as individual Americans are profoundly aware of our responsibility, for the security of our project as well as for its rapid and effective completion. It is a great source of encouragement to us that we have in this your support and understanding.

Very sincerely yours,

J. R. Oppenheimer

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
DR. CONANT

Dr. Bush asked that the enclosed letters be sent to you for safe delivery.

Grace G. Tully
PRIVATE SECRETARY

(Enclosures)
June 27, 1943

My dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly important and secret program of research, development and manufacture with which you are familiar. I was very glad to hear of the excellent work which is being done in a number of places in this country under the immediate supervision of General L. R. Groves and the general direction of the Committee of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the problem is of the utmost importance to the national safety, and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted cooperation of all concerned.

I am writing to you as the leader of one group which is to play a vital role in the months ahead. I know that you and your colleagues are working on a hazardous matter under unusual circumstances. The fact that the outcome of your labors is of such great significance to the nation requires that this program be even more drastically guarded than other highly secret war developments. I have therefore given directions that every precaution be taken to insure the security of your project and feel sure that those in charge will see that these orders are carried out. You are fully aware of the reasons why your own endeavors and those of your associates must be circumscribed by very special restrictions. Nevertheless, I wish you would express to the scientists assembled with you my deep appreciation of their willingness to undertake the tasks which lie before them in spite of the dangers and the personal sacrifices. I am sure we can rely on their continued wholehearted and unselfish labors. Whatever the enemy may be planning, American science will be equal to the challenge. With this thought in mind, I send this note of confidence and appreciation.
Though there are other important groups at work, I am writing only to you as the leader of the one which is operating under very special conditions, and to General Groves. While this letter is secret, the contents of it may be disclosed to your associates under a pledge of secrecy.

Very sincerely yours,

Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer,
Post Office Box 1663,
Santa Fe,
New Mexico.
June 29, 1943

My dear General Groves:

I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly important and secret program of research, development and manufacture with which you are familiar. I was very glad to hear of the excellent work which is being done in a number of places in this country under your immediate supervision and the general direction of the Committee of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the problem is of the utmost importance to the national safety, and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted cooperation of all concerned.

I am writing to you as the one who has charge of all the development and manufacturing aspects of this work. I know that there are several groups of scientists working under your direction on various phases of the program. The fact that the outcome of their labors is of such great significance to the nation requires that this project be even more drastically guarded than other highly secret war developments. As you know, I have therefore given directions that every precaution be taken to insure the security of your project. I am sure the scientists are fully aware of the reasons why their endeavors must be circumscribed by very special restrictions. Nevertheless, I wish you would express to them my deep appreciation of their willingness to undertake the tasks which lie before them in spite of the possible dangers and the personal sacrifices involved. In particular, I should be glad to have you communicate the contents of this letter to the leaders of each important group. I am sure we can rely on the continued wholehearted and unselfish labors of those now engaged. Whatever the enemy may be planning, American Science will be equal to the challenge. With this thought in mind, I send this note of confidence and appreciation.

Very sincerely yours,

Brigadier General L. R. Groves,
Room 5120, New War Department Building,
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.
June 27, 1943

My dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly important and secret program of research, development and manufacture with which you are familiar. I was very glad to hear of the excellent work which is being done in a number of places in this country under the immediate supervision of General L. R. Groves and the general direction of the Committee of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the problem is of the utmost importance to the national safety, and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted cooperation of all concerned.

I am writing to you as the leader of one group which is to play a vital role in the months ahead. I know that you and your colleagues are working on a hazardous matter under unusual circumstances. The fact that the outcome of your labors is of such great significance to the nation requires that this program be even more drastically guarded than other highly secret war developments. I have therefore given directions that every precaution be taken to insure the security of your project and feel sure that those in charge will see that these orders are carried out. You are fully aware of the reasons why your own endeavors and those of your associates must be circumscribed by very special restrictions. Nevertheless, I wish you would express to the scientists assembled with you my deep appreciation of their willingness to undertake the tasks which lie before them in spite of the dangers and the personal sacrifices. I am sure we can rely on their continued wholehearted and selfless labors. Whatever the enemy may be planning, American science will be equal to the challenge. With this thought in mind, I send this note of confidence and appreciation.
Though there are other important groups at work, I am writing only to you as the leader of the one which is operating under very special conditions, and to General Groves. While this letter is secret, the contents of it may be disclosed to your associates under a pledge of secrecy.

Very sincerely yours,

Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer,
Post Office Box 1663,
Santa Fe,
New Mexico.
June 29, 1943

My dear General Groves:

I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly important and secret program of research, development and manufacture with which you are familiar. I was very glad to hear of the excellent work which is being done in a number of places in this country under your immediate supervision and the general direction of the Committee of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the problem is of the utmost importance to the national safety, and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted cooperation of all concerned.

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Very sincerely yours,

Brigadier General L. R. Groves,
Room 5120, New War Department Building, 21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C.
Mr. Forster:

When I lunched with the President last Thursday I suggested two letters for his signature to help improve the morale of the scientists on an important matter, and he seemed to think this was desirable. I take the liberty of enclosing drafts, one to Oppenheimer who is in charge of one important group, and the other to General Groves which he can in turn take up with several groups. I group it in this way to avoid the necessity of numerous letters, and I think these two will take care of it.

I will appreciate it if you will have these typed and lay them before the President. If this is done after I leave, which will be on Wednesday, they can be delivered to Dr. Conant at 1530 P Street, who will take care of them for me.

V. Bush.
My dear Dr. Oppenheimer:

I have recently reviewed with Dr. Bush the highly important and secret program of research, development and manufacture with which you are familiar. I was very glad to hear of the excellent work which is being done in a number of places in this country under the immediate supervision of General L. R. Groves and the general direction of the Committee of which Dr. Bush is Chairman. The successful solution of the problem is of the utmost importance to the national safety, and I am confident that the work will be completed in as short a time as possible as the result of the wholehearted cooperation of all concerned.

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Very sincerely yours,
Brigadier General L. R. Groves,
Room 5120, New War Department Building,
21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

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Very sincerely yours,
MEMORANDUM for The President:

Tubealloy - Interchange with the British.

We await your instructions regarding interchange with the British on this subject as a result of correspondence with Sir John Anderson recently placed in your hands through Mr. Hopkins. A report on the present status of the whole project has just been forwarded to General Marshall.

The next steps, if you approve the correspondence regarding interchange, are to convene a combined committee, which will lay down rules for security and arrange conferences between scientific groups as needed to expedite the program fully.

I suggest, before you leave the Prime Minister, one step to accelerate matters. It would help if a top British scientist, accepted and of sound judgment, could be sent here as chief liaison under Sir John Anderson, to help make arrangements for the committee's work. He should be of the caliber of Sir Henry Dale or Sir Henry Tizard, and not one of the group working experimentally on a single phase of the problem.

I hasten to make this suggestion for the following reason. In previous negotiations difficulty was encountered because the British representative was an industrialist, Mr. Akers of International Chemical Industries. This same man is now here, apparently to make similar arrangements. He recently, and without consulting us, brought four eminent British scientific workers here for interchange. As we cannot use them until the combined committee has laid down the rules, they are likely to think us reluctant to interchange, whereas the exact opposite is true and we are anxious to get appropriate interchange going in an orderly fashion, so that relations will not this time become tangled. Akers is a very able man, but not the one to handle this matter.

We will proceed promptly with the whole affair on receiving your instructions.

V. Bush
PRIME MINISTER.

Tube Alloys.

1. May I send the President the attached set of telegrams in amplification of what you told him about the visit by Sir Edward Appleton?

2. In the Articles of Agreement signed at Quebec it was stated that the United States members of the Combined Policy Committee should be the Secretary of War, Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant. Mr. Stimson spoke to you about this after luncheon yesterday, but I did not hear clearly what he said. Do you wish to make any record of his remarks or inform the Lord President?

9.17.17.

9.9.43

Mr. Hopkins to see Mr.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM TO PRIME MINISTER FROM LORD PRESIDENT.
August 28, 1943.

Tube Alloys. Reference your WElFARe 450.

I am distressed at this report on Akers, who has rendered most excellent service as our Chief Executive on Tube Alloys and about whose integrity and ability I have not the slightest doubt. During negotiations in Washington there was a suggestion that the United States authorities would not regard Akers as a suitable person to represent us on the Combined Policy Committee, an attitude which could be understood having regard to the fact that his work lies in the field of technical rather than political direction. No objection was however then raised to our using him for the sort of purpose for which he is now in the United States - namely, to co-ordinate the views and activities of the representatives of our individual scientific groups and to act as Chief Technical Assistant and Adviser to our representatives on the Policy Committee.

I should add that the four eminent British Scientific workers were sent over on my instructions. This step was clearly necessary if time was not to be unnecessarily wasted and was in accordance with the following passage taken from the 5th paragraph of Dr. Bush's letter of the 6th August to me:

"As a matter of procedure the first step, after the formation of the Policy Committee, would certainly seem to be the presentation to that Committee by American and British Scientists of the overall picture of the current situation in their respective countries and the plans for the future; on the basis of the evidence thus presented the Policy Committee would agree as to the method of providing specific interchange to carry out the provisions of the agreement."

Evidently however Akers's inclusion among our representatives on Tube Alloys in Washington has caused trouble in the past and is likely to continue to do so, and this is a fact which, in the interests of the prosecution of that project as a joint enterprise, we cannot afford to ignore. I accordingly suggest for your consideration that you should propose to the President that Sir Edward Appleton should at once go out to Washington on a short visit. The purpose of his visit would be first to help to arrange
for launching of the Combined Committee, and secondly to submit to me recommendations regarding any adjustments which he may consider that the establishment of the Combined Committee makes necessary in our present arrangements for the technical direction of our work on the project.

In the latter connection an important factor to which we have every right to give full consideration is the general cohesion and contentment of our workers on the project. I doubt whether the recommendations which Appleton will have to make will affect anything more than our representation on the technical level in Washington, but even in that respect he will have to bear in mind the position of our team in Canada who have hitherto been accustomed to look to Akers for technical direction. I do not think that either Dale or Tizard would be suitable for this Mission, indeed I am convinced that Appleton is the only man for it. Besides having the scientific eminence apparently required, he is also the permanent Head of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, of which the Directorate of Tube Alloys is a part. He thus has some general responsibility in the matter and also intimate knowledge of all the personalities involved on our side. I have every reason to believe that he will be acceptable to the American Scientists, with whom he has always been on the best of terms. I should be grateful if you could telegraph as soon as possible whether Appleton should go.

We cannot possibly hope to be able to conceal from Akers the fact that objection has been taken to him from the American side, though we need not, of course, make any specific mention of Bush.
FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM LORD PRESIDENT.

September 2, 1943.

There is an excellent opportunity of sending Appleton by fast boat due to reach New York towards the end of next week, but this will involve his leaving London tomorrow night September 3rd.

After careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that, even if immediate difficulties about Akers's personal position should be cleared up otherwise, it would still be very valuable for Appleton to pay a visit to Washington at this stage. Combining as he does a general knowledge of the whole field of Anglo-American co-operation on scientific matters with a particular responsibility, as head of the D.S.I. R.N. for the scientific side of tube alloys, he is better qualified than anyone to get on to such terms with the American scientists in tube alloys as to ensure that there shall be no further difficulties or misunderstandings. I have accordingly decided to take advantage of this special opportunity and have asked Appleton to leave tomorrow.
FOR LORD PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER.
September 2, 1943.

I am glad Appleton is coming.
APPLETON, Sir Edward Victor, K.C.B. cr. 1941; M.A., D.Sc., Hon. L.L.D. (Aberdeen), F.R.S. 1927; Secretary Department of Scientific and Industrial Research since 1939; b 6 Sep. 1892; s. of Peter Appleton, Bradford, Yorks; m. Jessie, d. of late Rev. J. Longson; two d. Educ. Hanson School, Bradford; St. John's College, Cambridge (Scholar and Exhibitioner); Natural Science Tripos, Parts I and II (Physics), 1913 and 1914; Wiltshire Prizeman 1913; Hutchinson Research Student, 1914. Served European War 1914-18, West Riding Regt. and Capt. R.E.; Assistant Demonstrator in Experimental Physics, Cavendish Laboratory, 1920; sub-lector, Trinity College, 1922; Wheatstone Professor of Physics, University of London, 1924-36; Jacksonian Professor of Natural Philosophy, Cambridge University, 1936-39; formerly Fellow of St. John's College Cambridge; Chairman of British National Committee for Radio-telegraphy; Morris Liebmann Memorial Prizeman (1929) and Vice-President (1932) American Inst. Radio Eng.; Hughes Medallist of Royal Society, 1935; President International Scientific Radio Union. Publications: various original papers on electricity and the scientific problems of wireless-telegraphy. Address: 4, Exeter House, S.W.15. Club: Athenaeum.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

Dear Jim:

I am sorry to trouble you but do you mind looking into this man Lowen again?

As ever yours,

Dr. James B. Conant,
President, Harvard University,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts.

(Enclosure)

Letter from Irving S. Lowen, Physics Department, New York University, NYC, 10/23/43, to Miss Tully, with letter of same date for the President, in re possibility of the enemy's completing his Uranium project before ours is completed and before he is defeated. Desires interview to discuss the matter.
Miss Grace Tully
One Lane St.
Dear Miss Tully:

Once again I must ask your kindness to see that the enclosed letter is delivered to the President. I understand how you must be assailed on all sides by people stressing the urgency of their own particular project, so I will not say anything about the urgency of this matter. But privately, I think that for every minute the delay of this to the President is speeded up, so many times must your name be blessed by all the Saints in Heaven.

Sincerely yours

Ira Iraig S. Lowen

Saturday Dec. 4.
One Van. St.
New York, N.Y.

The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Dear Mr. President:

As a result of your request to limit, based
I gather in my letter to you, I am seeing Mr.
Grant Week, Dec. 8, in New York.

Unfortunately, some of the leading
scientists in the Uranium project, fear that
the Germans are about to use the weapon
we all fear. Whether they are or not, opinion
still persists that we are less prepared than
we might be with different scientific and
administrative leadership on our project.

In case you have not yet seen it,
I am enclosing a N.Y. Times clipping which
I am afraid may not be bluff.

I should not take this step before the
interview with Grant, if I did not believe he
lacks competence in the matter, as I would
hesitate to level such a charge against
any one, except in the face of this necessity,
of the danger to the country.

I again respectfully repeat my request for an interview with yourself. I am prepared to bring objective evidence, fairly assayed, I think, to enable you to judge whether or not there is any validity in the charge that bad administration has resulted in policies delaying the work in the past and likely to delay its completion in the future unless remedied.

Very truly yours,

Irving S. Lomer.

P.S. My home telephone number is Chelsea 3-1806.

I may also be reached on a message left at
New York University, Washington Sq. East.
The Telephone is Sprague 7-2000 Ext. 5220391.
Huge Reprisal Blow Threatened by Nazis

By The Associated Press.

LONDON, Dec. 3 — Again threatening retaliation for the air war upon Germany, the Berlin radio said today that the German High Command "intends by one fell, drastic stroke to end the unbridled mass murder," and added that "mankind is not far from the point where it can at will blow up half the globe."

The broadcast quoted the periodical Reich as saying that "the commencement of retaliation no longer depends on technical matters, but solely on the object which is to be attained by it."

"The retaliation," it continues, "will be so powerful and will be started at such a psychologically opportune moment as to influence the development of the war. It would be superfluous to retaliate for ruins with ruins. The sense of retaliation will find quite a different and surprising expression spiritually as well as politically."

RUSSIANS TIGHTEN

OF BON
This Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D.C.

Special Delivery
Via Air Mail
Return receipt requested

I. S. Lowe
One Pine St.
New York, N.Y.
November 17, 1943

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

Following your directions, contained in your brief note of November 8, I shall endeavor to see Mr. Irving S. Lowen at the earliest moment and have a talk with him about the matters which he referred to in his letter of October 29 and which you referred to me. I will report to you in writing the result of my conversation.

Very sincerely yours,

James B. Conant
December 30, 1943

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letters sent you by Mr. Irving S. Lowen shortly before you went away. You may recall that you asked me to see this man once again on your behalf. This I did a few weeks ago. I discovered, however, that he had already been in Washington and had seen numerous people, including Mr. B. N. Baruch. I understand from my conversation subsequently with Mr. Baruch that he is taking care of Mr. Lowen.

I should like to take this opportunity to tell you that in my opinion, based on intimate knowledge of this whole project, everything is going as well as is humanly possible. I believe we are very fortunate in having in General Groves, the Director of the enterprise, a man of unusual capability and force. Criticisms like Mr. Lowen's are based on an incomplete view of the total picture on the one hand and on the other represent the inevitable emotional reactions of human beings involved in an enterprise of this sort.

Very sincerely yours

James B. Conant

Enclosures
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

Dear Jim:-

I am sorry to trouble you but do you mind looking into this man Lowen again?

As ever yours,

[Signature]

Dr. James B. Conant,
President, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

(Enclosure)
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Miss Tully:

In an interview with the President this past summer, he instructed me, should I desire to send him a personal message, intended for his eyes only, to address a covering note to you with the letter for him enclosed in another envelope. Accordingly, may I request that the enclosed letter be delivered to him as soon as conveniently possible.

Very truly yours,

Irving S. Bowen
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Physics Department
Washington Square
New York, N.Y.

October 29, 1943

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am compelled to address this note to you, the first since the interview you so kindly granted me at midsummer, because of my inability to quiet my fears that the country is still in danger through the possibility of the enemy's completing his Uranium project before ours is completed and before he is defeated.

These fears are enhanced through the conviction that there has been no material improvement in those conditions on the project which caused me to seek that interview. These conditions, in the opinion of a number of people, constitute not merely a menace to the present safety of the country but to its future welfare as well, and for the same reasons.

In the interview mentioned above, you may recall you referred me to Mr. Conant, mentioning your inability to judge these technical matters. I feel, however, that the chief difficulties are largely administrative rather than technical and may be understood without going into technical details.

For these reasons, I request, if possible, another interview of sufficient length to permit a presentation of a view of those conditions which many on the project feel to be a danger to the country. I feel a personal interview rather than a written report, would be desirable, since the former would permit a more vivid picture. Should another kind of report, if any, be preferred however, may I express a wish that you consider my services at your disposal.
Finally, I should like to add, as the above address indicates, that I have been compelled to return to New York University to resume my regular duties there and may be reached there whenever desired.

Sincerely yours,

Irving S. Lowen

Irving S. Lowen
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
DR. V. BUSH

Many thanks for your letter of August twenty-eighth, together with the accompanying report on the operations of The Office of Scientific Research and Development.

I am delighted to have this and I feel that you are absolutely on the right track.

I am referring the recommendation for termination when peace comes to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy personally, and I will let you know as soon as I hear.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
and
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please read this very interesting report of Dr. Bush in regard to The Office of Scientific Research and Development and its termination, and let me have your judgment, especially in regard to pages 57 to 61.

F. D. R.

Original of report and copy of Dr. Bush's letter to the P 8/29/44 sent to SecWar 9/20/44 - Sealed in envelope and given to Major Culie to deliver to the Secretary's office personally.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a further report on the operations of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. It touches on some highlights of accomplishment, and recites changes in organization.

There is a section on plans for termination, for OSRD is a war agency, and should plan to go out of existence in an orderly manner at the proper time. I hope you will find opportunity to look at this section, for I would like to announce the plans to our personnel soon, and I trust you will caution me if you see anything wrong with the plans. I have taken them up with the Secretaries of War and Navy, and feel sure I will have their assent.

I have included a section on military organization for research, for my experience of the past four years has left strong convictions as to the manner in which it should be conducted post-war. Undoubtedly I will be called on to say what I think on this subject at some time, and I believe that my thinking on the matter is not far from your own. Still I would appreciate it enormously if you should find time to consider my statements on this subject and to advise me where you think I am on the wrong track. The sections of the report which deal with termination and post-war organization bear tabs for ready reference.

It is pleasant indeed to look forward to the time when it will be possible to drop off my present burden, although it has certainly been a privilege and a pleasure to serve under your command. You may be assured that, while we plan for termination, we will not leave anything undone which may help in bringing the whole war to an early and successful conclusion.

Respectfully yours,

V. Bush,
Director.
October 18, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I have read Dr. Bush's long report with the greatest interest.

I have especially noted his proposal for dealing with the Office of Scientific Research and Development after the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, the appropriate Army officers have had extended conferences with Dr. Bush as to the working out of this program.

It will require careful handling to be sure that the scientific effort in the Office of Scientific Research and Development will continue to be fully effective in helping to bring about the final defeat of Japan, but those who have the particular responsibility in the Army are confident that Dr. Bush's plan can be so worked out in practice as to accomplish this result.

Faithfully yours,

Secretary of War.

The President,

The White House.
February 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I suggest that you might sometime ask Mr. Conant to see Professor E. Wigner, Dr. L. Szilard, and Professor E. Fermi, who are with the Metallurgical Laboratories, University of Chicago, to tell about their work which has such important implications for the future.

E. R.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I return the letter from Irving S. Lowen, enclosed with your note of March second. This is the young man who is much stirred up about the special project.

Dr. Conant tells me that you mentioned this matter in passing last Friday, and that he told you that Mr. Baruch had been brought into the subject. All three men noted in the memorandum which I return have now been seen.

Conant had a long talk in Chicago with Fermi and Wigner, and tells me they are quite satisfied with the arrangements now in effect and do not share Lowen's views. I spent about all day with Szilard yesterday. His criticisms boil down to the feeling that his group have not been fully used. There has, of course, been a reluctance to introduce scientists of foreign origin to the full knowledge of a matter of potentially great military importance. There is also a matter of early patent applications which has its difficulties.

My conclusion is that there have been no more mis-steps or delays than ought to be anticipated on a matter of this novelty and complexity, and that the organization is sound and in capable hands.

I suggest that Lowen be advised to see Mr. Baruch again. Baruch will turn to Conant if he needs further information.

Respectfully yours,

V. Bush,
Director.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ROOSEVELT:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

[Signatures and notes]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I suggest that you might sometime ask Mr. Conant to see Professor
E. Wigner, Dr. L. Szilard, and Professor E. Fermi, who are with the
Metallurgical Laboratories, University of Chicago, to tell about their
work which has such important implications for the future.

E. R.
Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

The purpose of this note is twofold: first to summarize the present situation, as far as I know it, in these matters you have been so kind as to show an interest in; and second, to express again my gratitude for the great aid you so generously extended to me in the fight for an improvement in these affairs.

As far as the situation at present is concerned from the little I have been able to gather, there has been no appreciable improvement. I gather that the prevailing opinion of the scientific and technical personnel is still the same: that the war may be ended before either side develops the weapon, or indeed that we may develop it first but that in any event unjustifiable risks have been and are being taken.

Also in this connection, I seem to be pretty effectively stopped from doing any more fighting. This has been accomplished through my being cut off from all information via secrecy regulations which take effect against me since I do longer have any official connection with those projects. For the time being I do not see any sure plan to continue the fight and until that seems no prospect of the
situations changing in that respect, it seems I am never
less out of the running for good.

Should you have any reason to desire more current
information than I can supply, I think the following
men would probably be happy to come to Washing-
on at your request to supply it. Their names & addresses
are:

Prof. E. Wigner x  
Univ. of Chicago

Dr. L. Szilard x  
Chicago, Ill.

Prof. E. Fermi x

Metalurgical laboratories

The first two men were responsible for starting the
Chicago project, having proposed the idea to the President
and Prof. Einstein. The third, a Nobel Prize winner,
discovered the phenomenon on which the development
is based. The first man, Wigner, is leaving the project
in July.

In conclusion, may I say, that if there should
be any way in which I might be of use in this matter,
I stand ready to do anything I can. Finally, if in any
way I can be of service to yourself, may I express the
hope that you accept the great honor of calling me.

Most sincerely yours

Erniz S. Loven
December 30, 1943

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letters sent you by Mr. Irving S. Lowen shortly before you went away. You may recall that you asked me to see this man once again on your behalf. This I did a few weeks ago. I discovered, however, that he had already been in Washington and had seen numerous people, including Mr. B. M. Baruch. I understand from my conversation subsequently with Mr. Baruch that he is taking care of Mr. Lowen.

I should like to take this opportunity to tell you that in my opinion, based on intimate knowledge of this whole project, everything is going as well as is humanly possible. I believe we are very fortunate in having in General Groves, the Director of the enterprise, a man of unusual capability and force. Criticisms like Mr. Lowen's are based on an incomplete view of the total picture on the one hand and on the other represent the inevitable emotional reactions of human beings involved in an enterprise of this sort.

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES B. CONANT

ENCLOSURES
For the President

[Signature]

4/4/44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ROOSEVELT:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

Letter from Dr. V. Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, 3/7/44, to the President, returning letter which Mrs. Roosevelt received from Irving S. Lowen, 1 Jane St., NYC, 2/15/44, together with copy of letter which Dr. James B. Conant addressed to the President under date of 12/30/43, in reference to a certain secret project. Dr. Bush suggests that Mr. Lowen be advised to see Mr. Baruch again.
March 2, 1944.

Dear Van:

This young man has bothered us twice before and I think Jim Conant has seen him. I fear, too, that he talks too much. Do you think we should refer the matter to Conant?

Always sincerely,

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Office of Scientific Research and Development,
1530 P Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Letter which Mrs. Roosevelt received from Irving S. Lowen, 1 Jane St., NYC, 2/15/44, in re project, the name of which he does not mention, but suggests that Professor E. Wigner, Dr. L. Azilard and Professor E. Fermi, all of the metallurgical Laboratories of the University of Chicago, would be willing to come to Washington to discuss the matter. Attached is Mrs. Roosevelt's memorandum of 2/25/44 to the President reading "I suggest that you might sometime ask Mr. Conant to see Professor E. Wigner, Dr. L. Azilard, and Professor E. Fermi, who are with the Metallurgical Laboratories, University of Chicago, to tell about their work which has such important implications for the Future".
Dear Bant:

After my recent talk with you, it occurred to me that, if by chance it should not be possible for you to see Professor Hielo Bohr, you might like to have on paper the directions of his thoughts, in so far as these could be put on paper. Here is the memorandum which he wrote exclusively for this use by me. Indeed, as I told you, he had not prepared to a speech about these aspects of the matter to anyone except me on this side of the ocean—nor even to the Danish Minister. He is, in fact, a man whose mind is always occupied with abstract language for security reasons. Not even have I made a
Copy of this memorandum.

Since leaving Washington, I have learned that President Bohlen's stay here has been extended. He will be in Washington through Saturday, July 15.

But I hope that you won't have to stew in that hell's hole. Notice, used to speak of the "peculiar" heat of Washington. It sure is peculiar from all that one can gather from the papers. The visit of Venizelos Cleopatra came off last week. Read that grand speech from the floor.

Take care of yourself! There's a lot more to come. I send my affectionate regards.

Ever yours,
MEMORANDUM.

The project of releasing, to an unprecedented scale, the energy bound in matter is based on the remarkable development of physical science in our century which has given us the first real insight in the interior structure of the atom.

This development has taught us that each atom consists of a cluster of electrified corpuscles, the so-called electrons, held together by the attraction from a nucleus which, although it contains practically the whole mass of the atom, has a size extremely small compared with the extension of the electron cluster.

By contributions of physicists from nearly every part of the world, the problems of the electron configuration within the atom were in the course of relatively few years most successfully explored and led above all to a clarification of the relationship between the elements as regards their ordinary physical and chemical properties.

In fact all properties of matter like hardness of materials, electric conductivity and chemical affinities, which through the ages have been exploited for technical developments to an ever increasing extent, are determined only by the electronic configuration and are practically independent of the intrinsic structure of the nucleus.

This simplicity has its root in the circumstance that by exposure of materials to ordinary physical or chemical agencies, any change in the atomic constitution is confined to distortion or disruption of the electron cluster while the atomic nuclei are left entirely unchanged.

The stability of the nuclei under such conditions is in fact the basis for the doctrine of the immutability of the elements which for so long has been a fundament for physics and chemistry. A whole new epoch of science was therefore initiated by the discovery that it is possible by special agencies, like the high speed particles emitted by Radium, to produce disintegrations of the atomic nuclei themselves and thereby to transform one element into another.

The closer study of the new phenomena revealed characteristic features which differ most markedly from the properties of matter hitherto known, and above all it was found that nuclear transmutations may be accompanied by an energy release per atom millions of
times larger than the energy exchanged in the most violent chemical reactions.

Although at that stage no ways were yet open of releasing for practical purposes the enormous energy stored in the nuclei of atoms, an immediate clue was obtained to the origin of the so far quite unknown energy sources present in the interior of the stars, and in particular it became possible to explain how our sun has been able through billions of years to emit the powerful radiation upon which all organic life on the earth is dependent.

The rapid exploration of this novel field of research in which international co-operation has again been most fruitful led within the last decadums to a number of important discoveries regarding the intrinsic properties of atomic nuclei and especially revealed the existence of a non-electrified nuclear constituent, the so-called neutron, which when set free is a particularly active reagent in producing nuclear transmutations.

The actual impetus to the present project was the discovery made in the last year before the war, that the nuclei of the heaviest elements like Uranium by neutron bombardment, in the so-called fission process, may split in fragments ejected with enormous energies, and that this process is accompanied by the release of further neutrons which may themselves effect the splitting of other heavy nuclei.

This discovery indicated for the first time the possibility, through propagation of nuclear disintegrations from atom to atom, to obtain a new kind of combustion of matter with immense energy yield. In fact a complete nuclear combustion of heavy materials would release an energy 100,000,000 times larger that obtainable by the same amount of chemical explosives.

This prospect not only at once attracted the most wide-spread interest among physicists, but of its appeal to the imagination of larger circles I have vivid recollections from my stay in U.S.A. in the spring of 1939 where, as guest of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton, I had the pleasure to participate together with American colleagues in investigations on the mechanism of the fission process.

Such investigations revealed that among the substances present in natural ores, only a certain modification of Uranium fulfils the conditions for nuclear combustion. Since this active substance always occurs mixed with a more abundant, inactive Uranium modification, it was therefore realized that in order to produce devastating explosives, it would be necessary to subject the available materials to a treatment of an extremely refined and elaborate character.
The recognition that the accomplishment of the project would thus require an immense technical effort, which might even prove impracticable, was at that time, not least in view of the imminent threat of military aggression, considered as a great comfort since it would surely prevent any nation from staging a surprise attack with such super weapons.

Any progress on nuclear problems achieved before the war was, of course, common knowledge to physicists all over the world, but after the outbreak of hostilities no further information has been made public, and efforts to exploit nuclear energy sources have been kept as military secrets.

During my stay in Denmark under the German occupation nothing was therefore known to me about the great enterprise in America and England. It was, however, possible, due to connections originating from regular visits of German physicists to the Institute for Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen in the years between the wars, rather closely to follow the work on such lines which from the very beginning of the war was organized by the German Government.

Although thorough preparations were made by a most energetic scientific effort, disposing of expert knowledge and considerable material resources, it appeared from all information available to us, that at any rate in the initial for Germany so favourable stages of the war it was never by the Government deemed worth while to attempt the immense and hazardous technical enterprise which an accomplishment of the project would require.

Immediately after my escape to Sweden in October 1943, I came on an invitation of the British Government to England where I was taken into confidence about the great progress achieved in America and went shortly afterwards together with a number of British colleagues to U.S.A. to take part in the work. In order, however, to conceal my connection with any such enterprise, post-war planning of international scientific co-operation was given as the object of my journey.

Already in Denmark I had been in secret connection with the British Intelligence Service, and more recently I have had the opportunity with American and British Intelligence Officers to discuss the latest information, pointing to a feverish German activity on nuclear problems. In this connection it must above all be realized that if any knowledge of the progress of the work in America should have reached Germany, it may have caused the Government to reconsider the possibilities and will not least have presented the physicists and technical experts with an extreme challenge.
Definite information of preparations elsewhere is hardly available, but an interest within the Soviet Union for the project may perhaps be indicated by a letter which I have received from a prominent Russian physicist with whom I had formed a personal friendship during his many years stay in England and whom I visited in Moscow a few years before the war, to take part in scientific conferences.

This letter contained an official invitation to come to Moscow to join in scientific work with Russian colleagues who, as I was told, in the initial stages of the war were fully occupied with technical problems of immediate importance for the defense of their country, but now had the opportunity to devote themselves to scientific research of more general character. No reference was made to any special subject, but from pre-war work of Russian physicists it is natural to assume that nuclear problems will be in the center of interest.

The letter, originally sent to Sweden in October 1943, was on my recent visit to London handed to me by the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy who in a most encouraging manner stressed the promises for the future understanding between nations entailed in scientific collaboration. Although, of course, the project was not mentioned in this conversation I got nevertheless the impression that the Soviet Officials were very interested in the effort in America about the success of which some rumours may have reached the Soviet Union.

Even if every physicist was prepared that some day the prospects created by modern researches would materialize, it was a revelation to me to learn about the courage and foresight with which the great American and British enterprise had been undertaken and about the advanced stage the work had already reached.

What until a few years ago might have been considered a fantastic dream is at the moment being realized in great laboratories erected for secrecy in some of the most solitary regions of the States. There a group of physicists larger than ever before assembled for a single purpose, and working hand in hand with a whole army of engineers and technicians are producing new materials capable of enormous energy release and developing ingenious devices for their most effective use.

To everyone who is given the opportunity for himself to see the refined laboratory equipment and the huge production machinery
it is an unforgettable experience of which words can only give a
poor impression. Truly no effort has been spared and it is hardly
possible for me to describe my admiration for the efficiency with
which the great work has been planned and conducted.

Moreover it was a special pleasure to me to witness the
complete harmony with which the American and British physicists,
with almost everyone of whom I was intimately acquainted through
previous scientific intercourse, were devoting themselves with
the utmost zeal to the joint effort.

I shall not here enter on technical details, but one cannot
help comparing with the Alchemists of former days, groping in the
dark in their vain efforts to make gold. To-day physicists and
engineers are on the basis of well established knowledge directing
and controlling processes by which substances far more precious
than gold are being collected atom by atom or even built up by
individual nuclear transmutations.

Such substances must be assumed to have been abundant in the
early stages of our universe where all matter was subject to
conditions far more violent than those which still persist in the
turbulent and flaming interior of the stars. Due, however, to
their inherent instability the active materials now extracted or
produced have in the course of time become very rare or even
completely disappeared from the household of nature.

The whole enterprise constitutes indeed a far deeper inter-
ference with the natural course of events than anything ever
before attempted and its impending accomplishment will bring about
a whole new situation as regards human resources. Surely, we are
being presented with one of the greatest triumphs of science and
engineering destined deeply to influence the future of mankind.

It certainly surpasses the imagination of anyone to survey
the consequences of the project in years to come, where in the long
run the enormous energy sources which will be available may be
expected to revolutionize industry and transport. The fact of
immediate preponderance is, however, that a weapon of an unpara-
lleled power is being created which will completely change all
future conditions of warfare.

Quite apart from the questions of how soon the weapon will
be ready for use and what role it may play in the present war,
this situation raises a number of problems which call for most
urgent attention. Unless, indeed, some agreement about the con-
trol of the use of the new active materials can be obtained in due
time, any temporary advantage, however great, may be outweighed
by a perpetual menace to human security.
Ever since the possibilities of releasing atomic energy on a vast scale came in sight, much thought has naturally been given to the question of control, but the further the exploration of the scientific problems concerned is proceeding, the clearer it becomes that no kind of customary measures will suffice for this purpose and that, especially the terrifying prospect of a future competition between nations about a weapon of such formidable character can only be avoided through a universal agreement in true confidence.

In this connection it is above all significant that the enterprise, immense as it is, has still proved far smaller than might have been anticipated and that the progress of the work has continually revealed new possibilities for facilitating the production of the active materials and of intensifying their effects.

The prevention of a competition prepared in secrecy will therefore demand such concessions regarding exchange of information and openness about industrial efforts including military preparations as would hardly be conceivable unless at the same time all partners were assured of a compensating guarantee of common security against dangers of unprecedented acuteness.

The establishment of effective control measures will of course involve intricate technical and administrative problems, but the main point of the argument is that the accomplishment of the project would not only seem to necessitate but should also, due to the urgency of mutual confidence, facilitate a new approach to the problem of international relationship.

The present moment where almost all nations are entangled in a deadly struggle for freedom and humanity might at first sight seem most unsuited for any committing arrangement concerning the project. Not only have the aggressive powers still great military strength, although their original plans of world domination have been frustrated and it seems certain that they must ultimately surrender, but even when this happens, the nations united against aggression may face grave causes of disagreement due to conflicting attitudes towards social and economic problems.

By a closer consideration, however, it would appear that the potentialities of the project as a means of inspiring confidence just under these circumstances acquire most actual importance. Moreover the momentary situation would in various respects seem to afford quite unique possibilities which might be forfeited by a postponement awaiting the further development of the war situation and the final completion of the new weapon.

Although there can hardly be any doubt that the American and British enterprise is at a more advanced stage than any similar
undertaking elsewhere, one must be prepared that a competition in the near future may become a serious reality. In fact, as already indicated, it seems likely that preparations, possibly urged on by rumours about the progress in America, are being speeded up in Germany and may even be under way in the Soviet Union.

Further it must be realized that the final defeat of Germany will not only release immense resources for a full scale effort within the Soviet Union, but will presumably also place all scientific knowledge and technical experience collected in Germany at the disposal for such an effort.

In view of these eventualities the present situation would seem to offer a most favourable opportunity for an early initiative from the side which by good fortune has achieved a lead in the efforts of mastering mighty forces of nature hitherto beyond human reach.

Without impeding the importance of the project for immediate military objectives, an initiative, aiming at forestalling a fateful competition about the formidable weapon, should serve to uproot any cause of distrust between the powers on whose harmonious collaboration the fate of coming generations will depend.

Indeed, it would appear that only when the question is taken up among the United Nations of what concessions the various powers are prepared to make as their contribution to an adequate control arrangement, it will be possible for anyone of the partners to assure themselves of the sincerity of the intentions of the others.

Of course, the responsible statesmen alone can have the insight in the actual political possibilities. It would, however, seem most fortunate that the expectations for a future harmonious international co-operation which have found unanimous expression from all sides within the United Nations, so remarkably correspond to the unique opportunities which, unknown to the public, have been created by the advancement of science.

Many reasons, indeed, would seem to justify the conviction that an approach with the object of establishing common security from ominous menaces without excluding any nation from participating in the promising industrial development which the accomplishment of the project entails will be welcomed, and be responded with a loyal co-operation on the enforcement of the necessary far reaching control measures.
Just in such respects helpful support may perhaps be afforded by the world wide scientific collaboration which for years has embodied such bright promises for common human striving. On this background personal connections between scientists of different nations might even offer means of establishing preliminary and non-committal contact.

It needs hardly be added that any such remark or suggestion implies no underrating of the difficulty and delicacy of the steps to be taken by the statesmen in order to obtain an arrangement satisfactory to all concerned, but aim only at pointing to some aspects of the situation which may facilitate endeavours to turn the project to lasting advantage for the common cause.

Should such endeavours be successful, the project will surely have brought about a turning point in history and this wonderful adventure will stand as a symbol of the benefit to mankind which science can offer when handled in a truly human spirit.
MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. Vannevar Bush
From: James B. Conant
Re: Some thoughts concerning the correspondence between the President and the Prime Minister on S-1

It seems to me of the greatest importance to be sure that the President understands the basic issue. The question is whether or not British representatives shall have full access to plans for the design and construction of the manufacturing plants which we are now building and full knowledge of their operation. There is no contention on the British side, I believe, that this knowledge will be of use to them in the construction and operation of their own plants, since they admittedly do not propose to build such plants during this war. Granting such access to our designs and operations at the manufacturing level can only increase the risks of the enemy learning these secrets and can neither assist the war effort nor allow a more effective use of the joint resources of the two countries.

From the point of view of the security of the United States, knowledge of the design, construction and operation of these plants
is a military secret which is in a totally different class from anything the world has ever seen if the potentialities of this project are realized. Therefore, the passing of this knowledge to any ally under conditions whereby the ally cannot profit directly in this war would seem to raise a question of national policy comparable at least to alienation of control of a fortress or strategic harbor. I take it it is not for you or more or the Military Policy Committee to pass judgment on such an issue, but it is our duty to see to it that the President of the United States, in writing, is informed of what is involved in these decisions.

That the British themselves have not been unaware of these implications is evident from two quotations which I supply from their reports. From a draft report of the Maud Technical Committee dated June 23, 1941, which came to us through the courtesy of one member of the Committee unofficially, I quote: "... It is becoming important to know how far we should rely on American help. There are obvious advantages in locating the plant in Canada or the United States. The creation of such a large plant in this country would necessarily interfere to some extent with other parts of the war effort; .... On the other hand, by having it here, we should keep full control of what may well prove a major weapon; ...."

The President should realize the difference in the industrial situation between the two countries. In England the I.C.I. (Chemical Trust) is very nearly a monopoly and any chemical work the Government should undertake to do of this nature would have to be undertaken by
this Company. Therefore, even if the British hold the patent rights in Government hands within the British Empire, this country is certain to profit by exploitation by the British of the knowledge of the manufacture and use of this material, particularly the operation of what we call the power plant process. Again I quote from a British document,—namely, the report of the Maud Committee which came to our hands officially dated July 15, 1941. Appendix 1—"Nuclear Energy as a Source of Power—Note by Messrs. I.C.I. .... (1) The use of nuclear energy for power production is being studied in many countries. If this problem is solved, it will lead to new sources of power which will affect the distribution of industry over the world, because this source of energy will be so easily transportable compared with coal, oil or electricity. It is essential that Great Britain should take an active part in this research work so that the British Empire cannot be excluded by default from future developments."

In this country, in contrast to Great Britain, there are a number of powerful competing chemical companies and public opinion would demand that licenses be granted to all of them for the development of these matters in a commercial way. Furthermore, three of the big companies are already involved in this process in different phases. While it is true that the industry of the country might benefit as a whole by the retaining of the knowledge of these matters in the United States, no one company is in a position to profit as is the I.C.I. in Great Britain. From my point of view at least, possible
benefit to American industry is a very minor consideration. The major consideration must be that of national security and post-war strategic significance. It should also be pointed out that in the policy making of this United States effort no one with industrial connections has been concerned. Even at the technical level, the only man who has been brought in from industry has been Dr. Murphree of the Standard Oil Development Company of New Jersey, and his company is not in a position to benefit by American rights. At the policy level and in negotiations with the British, the Americans involved had no industrial connection and no reason to favor American industry. On the other hand, the two representatives of England who have been here in the last eight months have both been high in the I.C.I. Councils, and from all we can gather have had important voices in determining the policy in Great Britain. Indeed, in my opinion, this whole controversy might never have arisen if the negotiations had been in the hands of British scientists comparable to yourself and if those British scientists had had the same voice in determining policy in Great Britain as you have had here in the United States.

Referring to the particular documents C.C.W.D. February 27, 1943 1741Z and C.C.W.D. February 27, 1943 1807Z, it seems to me that the history of the British-American relations is essentially accurate. I should dispute the fourth paragraph in the first document signed by the Prime Minister, and I believe this point is important. The American development has proceeded so far that,
except in one or two aspects, there is little to be gained by our bringing British scientists and technicians into the work. In these one or two aspects, we are delighted to make such arrangements, and it is not over these arrangements which the British have raised objection but over our unwillingness to open up the details of our design, construction and manufacture.

It seems to me that all through the negotiations and exchange of information with the British there has run one basic assumption; namely, that we were both going to continue actively the work. I question very much whether if at some stage we had said that we were going to abandon all scientific activity, the British would still have been willing to pass information to us. I believe they would have quite properly said since you cannot use this information now why take the risks of disseminating it further. We have now reached a stage of development of these processes which presents us with a similar situation at the next stage, namely, manufacture. Therefore, the basic underlying assumption of collaboration has ceased to exist. At the present stage of the project, the British are not in a position to carry on the work which is at issue, namely, manufacturing of the material in question. This is the basic fact which destroys the argument in regard to fair play.

As far as the argument as to joint effective use by the American and British scientists is concerned, I would submit that our proposition to Mr. Akers and Dean Mackenzie provided for such maximum use. If the British will accept our terms, the group in Canada
can be used in connection with one aspect of the manufacturing, and we have already offered to exchange information on the diffusion process, provided they proceed with the erection of a pilot plant.

As to the construction of the bomb, I am of the opinion that it would be in the best interests of the total war effort to have Professor Chadwick and perhaps one or two other British subjects come to the United States and join Dr. Oppenheimer's work, with the understanding they would be subject to the same limitations as to movement and secrecy as the American group. I suggest that the Military Policy Committee authorize such an official invitation, which is only an extension of the invitation already extended to Dr. Chadwick to come over and take part in a series of conferences. Indeed, the suggestion of having Dr. Chadwick come on the basis I have just proposed was discussed informally with Mr. Akers, but, unfortunately, rejected. The decision to make this definite offer should, however, be authorized by the President with the full realization that if the British join us in this phase of the work, they will have gained knowledge about one extremely secret and vital aspect of this new weapon. It might be the equivalent to joint occupation of a fortress or strategic harbor in perpetuity rather than alienating complete control!
February 24, 1943

To: Dr. V. Bush

From: Carroll L. Wilson

Re: Legal and Policy Basis for OSRD's Interchange of Scientific Information with the British

The legal aspects of this interchange are traced in some detail in the accompanying memorandum prepared by Mr. John T. Connor, Chief of our Legal Section, dated February 6, 1943, (Appendix 1).

I shall endeavor to trace briefly the policy basis for this interchange. On September 12, 1940, the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote to you (Appendix 2) calling attention to the British Technical Mission under the leadership of Sir Henry Tizard and suggesting that you and your associates contact Sir Henry Tizard and his staff and discuss with them all problems that had to do with national defense.

Subsequently you were informed of the position of the Navy Department and in view of the differences between the positions of the War and Navy Departments, you addressed identical communications to General Marshall and Admiral Stark under date of September 30, 1940, (Appendix 3) requesting that the positions of the Departments be more clearly defined for your guidance to the NDRC in its conduct of interchange with the British Scientific Mission.

Under date of October 24, 1940, you received a letter signed jointly by the Secretaries of War and Navy (Appendix 4) setting forth the joint policy of these two Departments. The following excerpt sets forth this position:

"It is agreed that all devices, instruments, or systems in use, developed for use or under development by the War and Navy Departments will be offered for release to the representatives of the British Government except the following:
Pertaining to the Army: Bomb ballistic tables.

Pertaining to the Navy: The bombsight and the antenna mine with two-way firing device.

"Should the British Government request drawings, specifications, performance data, and any other detailed information relating to items available for release, such information will be furnished by the Department concerned."

This letter also called attention to a provision whereby the British Government should obtain rights to manufacture devices which were the invention of American inventors.

Subsequent to receipt of information of the position of the War and Navy Departments on this interchange, a statement of the proposed interchange plan to be followed by NDRC with Great Britain and Canada was formulated and submitted to Professors Fowler and Cockcroft, representing the British Scientific Mission, and to Dean C. J. Mackenzie, Acting President of the National Research Council of Canada, and this memorandum of general procedure was accepted by them (Appendix 5).

Inasmuch as the joint letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy (Appendix 4) related specifically to Britain and did not include Canada, you subsequently wrote to the Secretary of War, under date of October 30, 1940, (Appendix 6) acknowledging the joint letter of October 24th and inquiring as to the inclusion of Canada in this interchange arrangement. Under date of November 20th, 1940, a joint letter, signed by the Acting Secretaries of War and Navy, confirmed your assumption that the arrangements described in the joint letter of October 24th were intended to be applicable to Canada as well as Great Britain (Appendix 7).

At the time, it was proposed that Dr. Conant go to England as a member of a scientific mission to work out interchange procedures in detail with the British, Dr. Conant undertook this mission at the request of the President, and under date of February 4, 1941, the President wrote to you as follows:
February 4, 1941

Dear Dr. Bush:

I am delighted at the prospect of Dr. Conant going to England as a member of a Mission to interchange technical information with the British. He will do a grand job.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman
National Defense Research Committee
of the Council of National Defense
1530 F Street
Washington, D. C.

There is one other aspect of this matter which might be included. On September 28, 1940, after initial discussions with Sir Henry Tizard's Mission, you wrote to Admiral Anderson (Appendix 8) with reference to the interchange of scientific information with the British in the field of the work of the Uranium Committee. Verbal telephone confirmation of the appropriateness of inaugurating such an interchange was followed by Admiral Anderson's letter of October 1, 1940, (Appendix 9) to which was appended a copy of the letter from the Secretary of Navy to the Chiefs of various Bureaus and other officers, setting forth the position of the Navy Department with reference to exchange of technical information with the British Government.
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1530 P, Street, N. W.
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

February 6, 1943

TO: Mr. Carroll L. Wilson
FROM: John T. Connor
SUBJECT: Foreign Liaison Activities of NDRC and OSRD

I think that it will be helpful to have in our files the following outline of the Liaison Office activities which we have been discussing recently.

I. PERIOD PRIOR TO LEND-LEASE ACT

Facts. (1) Pursuant to the authority given by the President (Lord Lothian Aide Memoir dated July 1, 1940, and President Roosevelt’s letter to Dr. Bush dated February 4, 1941, concerning Dr. Conant’s mission to England) and pursuant to the policy fixed by the Army and Navy (joint letter to Dr. Bush from Secretaries Stimson and Knox dated October 24, 1940), NDRC commenced a broad interchange of scientific and technical defense information with the British Government. A summary of the details of the broad interchange plan was revealed to the Army and the Navy (letters dated October 30, 1940, from Dr. Bush to Secretaries Knox and Stimson), and it was specifically pointed out that the procedure planned would involve the interchange of defense information through the media of memoranda, reports and conferences and by personal visits to research laboratories. Also, it was stated that it was assumed that the proposed interchange procedure applied to the Canadian Government.

(2) This extension to the Canadian Government was approved as a matter of policy by the Army and Navy (joint letter dated November 20, 1942, addressed to Dr. Bush by acting Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal).

(3) As a result of these negotiations, a Liaison Officer for NDRC was appointed by Dr. Bush to administer the broad interchange of defense information.

(4) Thereafter, under authority given by the President (President Roosevelt’s letter to Dr. Bush dated
February 4, 1941, concerning the Conant Mission) and with the Army and Navy’s approval as to policy (letters construing instructions to military and naval attaches in London by Secretaries Knox and Stimson dated February 7, 1941, and February 11, 1941, respectively), the OSRD London Liaison Office was established in March, 1941, to facilitate the broad interchange of defense information.

Conclusions. (1) NDRC could properly interchange scientific and technical defense information with the British and Canadian Governments through the media of memoranda, reports, conferences, personal visits and, impliedly, by the transmission of models which are utilized primarily as a vehicle for conveying information.

(2) NDRC could not dispose of defense articles to foreign governments.

II. PERIOD FROM LEND-LEASE ACT TO ESTABLISHMENT OF OSRD.

Facts. (1) The Lend-Lease Act was enacted by Congress and approved by the President on March 11, 1941. Under said Act Congress gave the President power to authorize the disposition of defense articles and the communication of defense information pertaining thereto to the Governments of countries whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) The Australian Government was accredited by the State Department as a participant in the interchange of defense information (Welles’ letter to Casey dated June 11, 1941)*.

Conclusions. (1) NDRC’s authority for the transmission of defense information not pertaining to defense articles remained unchanged.

(2) NDRC still was not authorized to dispose of defense articles.

III. PERIOD FROM ESTABLISHMENT OF OSRD TO ESTABLISHMENT OF OILLA.

Facts. By Executive Order No. 8807 the President established the Office of Scientific Research and Development on June 28, 1941.

*Later the Government of the Union of South Africa was also accredited (as indicated by letter dated September 22, 1941, from South African Minister to Dr. Bush).
Paragraph 2 (g) of the Order authorized OSRD to:

"Initiate and support such scientific and medical research as may be requested by the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States under the terms of the Act of March 11, 1941, entitled 'An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States'; and serve as the central liaison office for the conduct of such scientific and medical research for such countries."

This was interpreted (Administrative Order No. 1, dated August 20, 1941, approved by the President) to authorize the establishment of the OSRD Liaison Office under the supervision of a Senior Liaison Officer whose duties "shall be the conduct of scientific liaison with" "Lend-Lease countries."

Conclusions. (1) OSRD could properly continue the same broad procedure for the interchange of scientific and medical defense information started by NDRD (memorandum dated November 20, 1942, to Dr. Bush from Oscar Cox, General Counsel for O. E. M.).

(2) OSRD could not dispose of defense articles.

IV. PERIOD FROM ESTABLISHMENT OF OLLA TO SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1943.

Facts. (1) Under an Executive Order approved October 28, 1941, the President authorized and directed the Lend-Lease Administrator to exercise any power or authority here-tofore or hereafter conferred on the President by the Lend-Lease Act, the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, and any acts amendatory or supplemental thereto. Acting pursuant to the provision of the Lend-Lease Act (Sec. 3 (b)) governing reciprocal aid, the Lend-Lease Administrator delegated to OSRD the duty of keeping "accurate records of the defense information which is received under the Lend-Lease Act", with the requirement that copies of all lists of reports received by OSRD be transmitted to the Lend-Lease Administrator (letter dated November 18, 1941, from Major General James H. Burns to Dr. Bush; letter dated December 2, 1941, from Dr. Bush to Major General Burns; letter dated December 17, 1941, from E. R. Stettinius, Jr. to Dr. Bush; letter dated December 19, 1941, from Dr. Bush to Mr. Stettinius; letter dated December 23, 1941).

*This authorization was continued under Administrative Order No. 2, dated September 24, 1942.
30, 1941, from Mr. Stettinius to Dr. Bush). Although the Lend-Lease Administrator was put on notice as to procedure being followed by OSRD in transmitting scientific and medical defense information to the British, Canadian, Australian and South African Governments (letter dated December 2, 1941, from Dr. Bush to General Burns), no question was raised concerning its propriety or concerning the method of keeping records.

(2) OSRD was authorized (letter dated June 22, 1942, from Dr. Bush to Mr. McCabe; Mr. McCabe's reply to Dr. Bush dated July 1, 1942; and Mr. Young's letter to Dr. Bush dated September 10, 1942) to dispose of technical and scientific defense articles, and services in connection therewith, using Lend-Lease funds under the procedure set up in accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act.

Conclusions. (1) OSRD could continue its broad procedure for the interchange of scientific and medical defense information. (See Cox memorandum to Bush dated November 20, 1942). Any possible doubts as to jurisdictional conflicts between OSRD and OLLA in the field of information received by the United States as reciprocal aid were resolved by the delegation of the authority from OLLA to OSRD.

(2) OSRD could dispose of technical and scientific defense articles, and services in connection therewith, under the Lend-Lease procedure.

V. PERIOD FROM SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1943 TO DATE.

Facts. (1) Title II of said Act (Pub. Law 763, 77th Cong., approved October 26, 1942) provides that funds appropriated to the President for Lend-Lease purposes shall be available retroactively as well as prospectively for the procurement, disposition or furnishing of any defense information or defense services under the Lend-Lease Act, whether or not such information or services are necessary to or connected with the procurement or disposition of any defense article. Also, said Title II provides that the authority to dispose of defense articles granted in designated appropriation acts (not including the First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1943, from which the OSRD appropriation is derived) "shall be deemed to include the authority to procure, dispose of, or furnish any defense information or defense service under said Act of March 11, 1941, whether or not such information or service is necessary to or connected with the procurement or disposition of any defense article".
Conclusions. The provisions in Title II of the Second Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act, 1943, clear up any possible doubts concerning the propriety of using Lend-Lease and defense aid appropriations for furnishing under the Lend-Lease Act information and services not connected with defense articles. However, it seems that OSRD's authority to interchange scientific and medical defense information is unaffected. Any possible doubts on this point should be settled by interchange of letters between Dr. Bush and Mr. Stettinius wherein Mr. Stettinius can agree to the continuance of OSRD's interchange procedure.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 12, 1940.

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Chairman, National Defense
Research Committee,
1530 P Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Bush:

It is the hope of the War Department
that you and your associates will take the opportunity of
getting in touch with Sir Henry Tizard and the members of
his staff and will discuss freely with them all problems
that have to do with national defense. It is thought that
a free interchange of views will be most beneficial.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Robert P. Patterson
Robert P. Patterson,
The Assistant Secretary of War.
AS SENT TO:

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Admiral Harold R. Stark
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.

My dear [Name]:

The National Defense Research Committee has conferred with Sir Henry Tizard’s mission on the scientific aspects of defense research, and these interchanges have been valuable in the interests of national defense.

In these conversations the Committee has been guided by the expressed wishes of the War and Navy Departments. These have differed widely; the War Department expressing no restrictions, and the Navy Department indicating a list of subjects on which, in accordance with their wishes, no conversations have been held. This list includes subjects of interest to both services.

Sir Henry Tizard recently presented to the Committee a plan for continuing interchange for the period of the emergency. The Committee is in accord with the interchange plans proposed; but feels that the scope should be more clearly defined than at present.

The Committee wishes, of course, to conduct its interchange strictly in accordance with the understanding under which the British Scientific Mission made its visit. It finds itself in a quandary because of the apparently different interpretations placed by the two Services upon this understanding. It considers that it is not sufficient merely to follow in the future the more restricted interpretation, as in so doing it may fail to provide desirable interchange within the correct scope of the understanding. It feels strongly that direct conversations between scientists is essential for full benefit on important developments not yet arrived at application. It
considers that while scientific interchange has so far been much limited, it will be possible to provide for adequate contact with later visitors and by sending carefully selected scientists to confer with groups which cannot be spared for visits here.

The Committee accordingly directed me to request the War and Navy Departments to more clearly define the scope of the understanding for the guidance of the Committee. This appears to be a matter of such importance and nature as to warrant the attention of the Secretaries of War and Navy. I am entirely at your service in this connection.

Very truly yours,

V. Bush
Chairman
October 24, 1940

Dr. V. Bush, Chairman,
National Defense Research Committee,
1530 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Dr. Bush:

In accordance with your request, dated September 30, 1940, to General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, regarding exchange of technical information with the British Government, the matter has been considered by the War and Navy Departments which have agreed upon the following joint policy.

It is agreed that all devices, instruments, or systems in use, developed for use or under development by the War and Navy Departments will be offered for release to the representatives of the British Government except the following:

**Pertaining to the Army:** Bomb ballistic tables.

**Pertaining to the Navy:** The bombsight and the antenna mine with two-way firing device.

Should the British Government request drawings, specifications, performance data and any other detailed information relating to items available for release, such information will be furnished by the Department concerned.

In all cases of exchange, it must be understood that the information to be furnished relates to the existence and the operation of specific given devices; and that should the British Government desire to manufacture or have manufactured by other than the patentees or the original manufacturers thereof any such given devices, or to incorporate features of such given devices in other instruments or systems they may devise, the British Government must make such arrangements as may be necessary with the patentees or the original manufacturers of the given devices for the reproduction or use of any features of such given devices,
for the reproduction or use of any features of such given devices, guaranteeing to said manufacturers or patentees a right to establish a claim against the British Government for entire and reasonable compensation for such reproduction and/or use of the given devices or any of their features where such arrangements have not been satisfactorily concluded prior to such reproduction and/or use; and further, the British Government must agree to protect the rights of such manufacturers or United States patentees against the filing of applications for Letters Patent in Great Britain, its Dominions or Colonies, on any such given devices or any features thereof.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Frank Knox  
Secretary of the Navy.

/S/ Henry L. Stimson  
Secretary of War.
MEMORANDUM on Interchange of Scientific Information between the National Defense Research Committee and Great Britain and Canada.

Summary of Proposed Interchange Plan

1. Professor Fowler is stationed at Ottawa. He and his staff will be fully informed of British and Canadian developments. He will act as the channel of communication between NDRC and corresponding bodies and research establishments in England and Canada. In order to facilitate such interchange all reports and memoranda containing technical subject matter should be transmitted by NDRC through the chairman who will forward such material to Professor Fowler. Similarly, reports and memoranda concerning British or Canadian technical developments should be transmitted through Professor Fowler's office to the Chairman of NDRC who will see that such material reaches the appropriate Division or Section of NDRC.

2. Subject matter for interchange is to be sub-divided into the more important fields of science and engineering, both to facilitate liaison and to relieve individuals from the responsibility of handling information outside their principal fields of competence. Information for transmittal to Professor Fowler by the NDRC must necessarily be limited to subject matter of which the NDRC has cognizance.

3. Information is to exchanged through the media of memoranda, reports and conferences and through visits both by Prof. Fowler and/or his representatives to laboratories in U. S. where NDRC is sponsoring work and by NDRC representatives to research establishments in England and Canada. Designation of a representative by either party will be accepted as certification that he is a competent man in his field and a suitable person to receive information.

4. NDRC will arrange for visits by Prof. Fowler and/or his representatives to laboratories where NDRC work is underway and for full disclosure of such work. Prof. Fowler will do likewise for NDRC representatives in England and Canada.

5. Consistent with the scope and functions of NDRC which are to support and correlate scientific research on mechanisms and devices of warfare except for research on problems of flight and medicine, such interchange will supplement and not supplant other information interchange channels such as military and naval attaches.

10-25-40
October 30, 1940

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of the joint letter signed by yourself and the Secretary of the War, dated October 24, 1940, defining the policy which has been adopted by the Navy and Army in regard to interchange of scientific and technical information with Great Britain. This communication was presented to the National Defense Research Committee at its meeting on October 25th and its substance recorded in the minutes of that meeting. This Committee, in its interchange of information with Great Britain, will be guided by the same restrictions as have been imposed by the Navy and Army. We believe that the close relationships which exist between this Committee and the Armed Services will facilitate the close coordination of policy and procedure of this Committee with those of the Navy and Army with regard to interchange matters. As an initial procedure in handling interchange of such information this Committee, at its recent meeting, adopted a plan which is described in the enclosed memorandum. [See appendix 57]

Unless we hear from you to the contrary we are assuming that the interchange of information with Great Britain implies a similar disclosure to Canada since the British and Canadians are working in intimate collaboration and freely disclosing information to each other.

Based on our experience to date in regard to the valuable information which has already been obtained by our Committee from the members of the
British Technical Mission, we are hopeful that this interchange plan will prove of continuing value to this Committee and therefore to the Navy and Army.

Very sincerely yours,

Vannevar Bush
Chairman

The Honorable Frank Knox
Secretary of Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

CC: Admiral H. R. Stark
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

CLW:mf
October 30, 1940

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of the joint letter signed by yourself and the Secretary of the Navy, dated October 24, 1940, defining the policy which has been adopted by the Army and Navy in regard to interchange of scientific and technical information with Great Britain. This communication was presented to the National Defense Research Committee at its meeting on October 25th and its substance recorded in the minutes of that meeting. This Committee, in its interchange of information with Great Britain, will be guided by the same restrictions as have been imposed by the Army and Navy. We believe that the close relationships which exist between this Committee and the Armed Services will facilitate the close coordination of policy and procedure of this Committee with those of the Army and Navy with regard to interchange matters. As an initial procedure in handling interchange of such information this Committee, at its recent meeting, adopted a plan which is described in the enclosed memorandum.[See Appendix 5]

Unless we hear from you to the contrary we are assuming that the interchange of information with Great Britain implies a similar disclosure to Canada since the British and Canadians are working in intimate collaboration and freely disclosing information to each other.

Based on our experience to date in regard to the valuable information which has already been obtained by our Committee from the members of the British Technical Mission, we are hopeful that this interchange plan will prove of continuing value to this Committee and therefore to the Army and Navy.

Very sincerely yours,

Vannevar Bush
Chairman

The Honorable H. L. Stimson
Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

cc General G. C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
War Department
Washington, D. C.
November 20, 1940

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman,  
National Defense Research Committee,  
1530 P Street, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Dr. Bush:

Replying to your letter of October 30, 1940, you are advised that the joint policy of the War and Navy Departments on the interchange of technical information with British representatives, as stated in our joint letter of October 24, 1940, was intended to be applicable to Canadian representatives also. Therefore, your assumption that the Canadians are to be included in the collaborations between the American and British representatives, has the approval of the two Departments.

Sincerely,

/S/ Robert P. Patterson  
Acting Secretary of War.

/S/ James Forrestal  
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Admiral Anderson:

I have received your letter of September twenty-fourth, and in accordance with that letter there is one point in regard to the interchange with Sir Henry Tizard's mission on which I need further advice.

This mission would like to confer with the Uranium Committee of the National Defense Research Committee early this next week. You will remember that the Uranium Committee was appointed by the President before the NDRC was formed and later transferred to its jurisdiction. I consider that the interchange would be helpful in the interests of national defense. Will you kindly let me know whether there is any reason why such interchange should not be arranged?

The National Defense Research Committee at its meeting yesterday considered future long-range relationships along these general lines, and I was instructed to take the subject up definitely so that future relations may be entirely clarified. This I will do early next week.

Very truly yours,

V. Bush,
Chairman.
Dear Dr. Bush:

In confirmation of my telephone conversation, I am enclosing herewith for your information a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter, Serial No. 0227516, dated 29 September, on the subject of the exchange of technical information with the British Exchange Committee.

Yours very truly,

/S/ W. S. Anderson

W. S. Anderson
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director of Naval Intelligence

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman
Nat'l Defense Research Committee
Carnegie Institution,
16th and P Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
From: The Secretary of the Navy
To: Chief of Bureau of Ships
     Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
     Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics
     Director of War Plans Division
     Director of Naval Communications
     Director of Fleet Training Division
     Technical Aide to Secretary of the Navy

SUBJECT: Exchange of Technical Information with the British Government

References:
(a) DNI Memorandum, Serial No. 0124216 for CNO, dated 23 July 1940 (copies to all addressees).
(b) DNI Memorandum, Serial No. 0125016 for CNO, dated 25 July 1940 (copies to all addressees).
(c) CNO letter, Serial No. 0187416, to all addressees, dated 4 September 1940.
(d) CNO letter, Serial No. 0210216, to all addressees, dated 20 September 1940.
(e) War Department Memorandum, G-2, SM/TDF, dated 19 September 1940.

1. The restrictions imposed on the exchange of certain items in classes of technical information with the British Government, as set forth in references (a), (b), (c) and (d) are hereby cancelled.

2. Because of the advantages that will accrue to the country in the matter of procurement and combat tests, all devices, instruments, or systems in use, developed for use or under development by the Navy Department will be offered for release to the representatives of the British Government except the following:

   (a) the bombsight;
   (b) the antenna mine with two-way firing device.

3. Should the British Government, as a result of these offers, request drawings, specifications, performance
data and any other detailed information on this matter, they shall be furnished this information.

4. In reference (e), the Navy Department was informed that the War Department does not, of its own accord, desire to exclude from discussion with representatives of the British Technical Mission any items now under development.

5. In all cases of exchange, it must be understood that the information to be furnished relates to the existence and the operation of specific given devices; and that should the British Government desire to manufacture or have manufactured by other than the patentees or the original manufacturers thereof any such given devices, or to incorporate features of such given devices in other instruments or systems they may devise, the British Government must make such arrangements as may be necessary with the patentees or the original manufacturers of the given devices for the reproduction or use of any features of such given devices, guaranteeing to said manufacturers or patentees a right to establish a claim against the British Government for entire and reasonable compensation for such reproduction and/or use of the given devices or any of their features where such arrangements have not been satisfactorily concluded prior to such reproduction and/or use; and further, the British Government must agree to protect the rights of such manufacturers or United States patentees against the filing of applications for Letters Patent in Great Britain, its Dominions or Colonies, on any such given devices or any features thereof.

6. The Head of the British Technical Mission has been informed of the contents of paragraph 5 above, as a general proviso governing all applicable cases coming under the exchange of information.

Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy

CC: N.A. London
War Department
TUBE ALLOYS

Aide-memoire of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944.

1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a "bomb" is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.

2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.
From: London
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

February 27, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal immediate

In my immediately following telegram I send you brief
memorandum summarizing history of US UK relations on project known
as S-1 or tube alloys. If any of documents quoted therein are not
available to you, please let me know at once so that I can send
you copies by air.

There is no question of breach of agreement. Basis on
which all interchange of information has taken place up to this
time has been one of complete mutual confidence and of conviction
that the most certain and most rapid realization of the project can
be obtained only through complete cooperation. Suggestion for
formal agreement made from our side in August last was concerned more
with joint control and post war arrangements than with wartime
collaboration in actual work which, after the President's approach
to me in October 1941, had always been taken for granted.

We believe that no one will dispute that the American and
British scientists and technicians working together as a joint team
must achieve success in this difficult and novel project more
quickly and efficiently than either group working separately.

When the President and I talked of this matter at Hyde
Park in June 1942, my whole understanding was that everything was
on the basis of fully sharing the results as equal partners. I
have no record, but I shall be very much surprised if the President's
recolletion does not square with this.

I base my request to you to review the position and restore
the original policy of joint work on my conviction that this is
necessary if the joint resources of the two countries are to be used
most efficiently. But I think that memorandum in my immediately
following telegram will show you that, if I had to justify my case
on grounds of fair play, I should have little difficulty in doing so.

I must ask you to let me have very soon a firm decision on
US policy in this matter, as urgent decisions about our programme here
and in Canada depend on the extent to which full collaboration between
us is restored.
From: London  
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.  
No. # February 27, 1943.  

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal immediate and  
My immediately preceding telegram.  

Following is memorandum summarizing history of US UK  
relations on project known as S-1 or tube alloys. (Memorandum  
begins.)  

After the discovery in Germany in December 1938 of the  
mission of U 235, research proceeded in France, USA and Britain on  
the possibility of using this as a source of energy both for power  
generation and as a military explosive.  

From the middle of 1940 the work in USA was organized under  
the S-1 Committee of N D R C and in UK under the M A U D Committee of  
M A P and information was freely exchanged both in written documents  
and verbally.  

Rainbridge and Lauritsen of N D R C attended M A U D Committee  
meetings in April and July 1941 at which complete reviews of the  
British work were given.  

In a letter dated October 11, 1941 President Roosevelt  
suggested to Prime Minister that they should soon correspond or  
converse "In order that any extended efforts may be coordinated or  
evén jointly conducted."  

In December 1941 the Prime Minister replied "I need not  
assure you of our readiness to collaborate with the US administration  
in this matter".  

Meanwhile British work had been reorganized and greatly  
expanded under a "director of tube Alloys" directly responsible to  
the Lord President. Similar reorganization took place in USA.  

Professors Pagram and Urey visited Britain in November  
1941. They were allowed free access to all our laboratories, so  
that they could study our work and new organization in detail.  

Full information was also exchanged in writing (Letters  
from Dr. Bush to Sir J. Anderson of December 23, from Mr. Brook to
From: London
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. # February 27, 1943

Mr. Hoare of January 20, from Sir J. Anderson to Dr. Bush of March 23 and from Dr. Bush to Sir J. Anderson of April 20.)

All these communications assured both sides complete collaboration at all stages of the project.

This policy was fully confirmed when Mr. Akers, British Director of Tube Alloys, accompanied by Professors Simon, Halban and Pierls, visited America between February and June 1942. They gave full and detailed information about all our progress and plans and were able to discuss all aspects of the project with US scientists with complete frankness on both sides.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the question generally at Hyde Park in June 1942, and it is the Prime Ministers clear recollection that the whole basis of the conversation was that there was to be complete cooperation and sharing of results.

Between June and October 1942 correspondence took place between Dr. Bush and the Lord President with the object of finding the most efficient way of using the combined industrial and scientific resources of the two countries to realize the Tube Alloy project in the best interests of the United Nations.

The Lord President suggested that this would best be achieved by arranging for the joint effort to be used in building a plant in North America.

The proposal to build a plant in North America rather than in Britain was not due to any technical inability on the part of the British but to the conviction that this was best on strategic grounds and would involve the minimum interference with the joint war effort.

Throughout this correspondence there is no hint that Dr. Bush contemplated any restriction in interchange of technical information. Wording shows that object of both parties at that time was still to find best means of forwarding a joint cooperative effort.

Contemporaneously with this correspondence there was also an exchange of letters between the Lord President and Dr. Bush in which the former emphasized his conviction that the closest cooperation and exchange of technical information was essential and should be safeguarded by an agreement between the two governments for joint execution of the project and joint wartime and post war control.

At Dr. Bush's invitation Dr. Akers visited USA from November 1942 to end of January 1943 to inform him of latest results and to
discuss the interlocking of the programmes of the two countries.

After being informed that the US Army was now responsible for all work beyond laboratory research and that it was proposed to tighten up exchange of information solely in the interests of secrecy, Dr. Nierson was eventually, on January 7, 1943, given by Dr. Conant a memorandum on the interchange with the British and Canadians on S-1.

This memorandum is stated to derive from the basic principle "That interchange on design and construction of new weapons and equipment is to be carried out only to the extent that the recipient of the information is in a position to take advantage of this information in this war."

The memorandum sets out the logical result of applying this principle to all phases of the S-1 project, in the light of the respective American and British programmes then envisaged. It limits drastically interchange of technical information and entirely destroys the original conception of "A coordinated or even jointly conducted effort between the two countries."

Prime

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
AEC to Director FDRL
2-12-70
23 August 1944

To: President of the United States
Mr: No Number

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins, personal, private, and top-secret.

For Stage 2 I should require to have with me Chancellor of Exchequer Anderson, Oliver Lyttelton and Lord Cherwell. These complicated discussions could take place side by side with military topics. It might also be well for Anderson and Cherwell to contact your people on TA.

For President's most secret personal information Alexander is going to make a considerable push in the near future, with what he has got left. You know, Harry, that I have here the Army of British Empire, British Canadian, Australian, South African, and Indian. The airborne army is so representative of whole Empire. They are in grand fettle in spite of unsettlements caused to all ranks by pulling out of key elements, which has gone on for three months, but I hope their action will remind you they cannot possibly be left on side line during later phase.
of war. I could never consent to this.

I shall now probably come by Boeing, which gives me four or five days more in London and France, to which I must pay a visit.

Foresee enemy present policy of holding on to all ports to utmost while withdrawing under strong rearguard to Swiss frontier - Dijon - Paris line or farther make it most necessary we shall obtain port facilities and not be jammed up against au tetum and winter sales, as is evidently the desire of Schickel-gruber.

Looking forward so much to seeing you and our great friend in near future.

End

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date: JAN 24 1973
Dear [Name]:

Here is a letter from one of my Jewish friends.

From many long talks with him, I gather that there are three solid reasons for believing that knowledge of the pursuit of our project can hardly be kept from Russia:

1. They have very eminent scientists, particularly Peter Kapitza, entirely familiar through past experience with these problems;

2. Some leakage, even if not of results and methods, must inevitably have trickled to Russia;

3. Geologists have been similarly being, and knowledge of their endeavors will soon be open to the Russians. Therefore, to
In a word, the argument is that appropriate Caesar would, in all very little, withholding on the other hand, might have grave consequences. There may be answers to these considerations. I desire to believe, having thought a good deal about it, that in due course, these questions are very serious.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a further report on the operations of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. It touches on some highlights of accomplishment, and recites changes in organization.

There is a section on plans for termination, for OSRD is a war agency, and should plan to go out of existence in an orderly manner at the proper time. I hope you will find opportunity to look at this section, for I would like to announce the plans to our personnel soon, and I trust you will caution me if you see anything wrong with the plans. I have taken them up with the Secretaries of War and Navy, and feel sure I will have their assent.

I have included a section on military organization for research, for my experience of the past four years has left strong convictions as to the manner in which it should be conducted post-war. Undoubtedly I will be called on to say what I think on this subject at some time, and I believe that my thinking on the matter is not far from your own. Still I would appreciate it enormously if you should find time to consider my statements on this subject and to advise me where you think I am on the wrong track. The sections of the report which deal with termination and post-war organization bear tabs for ready reference.

It is pleasant indeed to look forward to the time when it will be possible to drop off my present burden, although it has certainly been a privilege and a pleasure to serve under your command. You may be assured that, while we plan for termination, we will not leave anything undone which may help in bringing the whole war to an early and successful conclusion.

Respectfully yours,

V. Bush,
Director.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. V. BUSH

Many thanks for your letter of August twenty-eighth, together with the accompanying report on the operations of The Office of Scientific Research and Development.

I am delighted to have this and I feel that you are absolutely on the right track.

I am referring the recommendation for termination when peace comes to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy personally, and I will let you know as soon as I hear.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
and
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please read this very interesting report of Dr. Bush in regard to The Office of Scientific Research and Development and its termination, and let me have your judgment, especially in regard to pages 57 to 61.

F. D. R.

Original of report and copy of Dr. Bush's let to the P 3/29/44 sent to SecWar 3/29/44 - Sealed in envelope and given to Major Culle to deliver to the Secretary's office personally.
October 18, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I have read Dr. Bush's long report with the greatest interest.

I have especially noted his proposal for dealing with the Office of Scientific Research and Development after the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, the appropriate Army officers have had extended conferences with Dr. Bush as to the working out of this program.

It will require careful handling to be sure that the scientific effort in the Office of Scientific Research and Development will continue to be fully effective in helping to bring about the final defeat of Japan, but those who have the particular responsibility in the Army are confident that Dr. Bush's plan can be so worked out in practice as to accomplish this result.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,

The White House.
Grace Tully told me to give this to you to be put in the safe.

#2590

O.F.10-B
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. VANNEVAR BUSH

Dear Van:-

This from Edgar Hoover will interest you. Probably it should be followed up.

F. D. R.
Honorable Harry L. Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

A German espionage agent presently in the United States under the control of this Bureau advised that he was instructed to obtain, among other subjects, information concerning (1) the progress made by the United States since 1941 with respect to the development of atomic explosives, (2) whether "heavy water" is used instead of helium in their manufacture, (3) the type of container in which the atom of uranium is split, and (4) the probable reaction of the people of the United States if Germany used the explosive power obtained through the splitting of the uranium atom.

This information is being made available to you as possibly indicating the degree to which the Germans have progressed in the development of atomic explosives. There are two other recent developments of possible interest in this connection. The first of these is that the Germans have recently made numerous inquiries of other espionage agents controlled by this Bureau concerning the exact size, number of employees, and location of various armament plants in the United States. For example, the following inquiry was received from Germany by a double agent controlled by this Bureau:

"OF GREAT INTEREST IS SIZE, FLOOR AREA, TOTAL EMPLOYEES OF HUL, BOEING, BRENGER, BRiggs, Budd, Chrysler, Con-
solidated Vultee, Curtiss Wright Airplane Division,
Douglas, Eastern, Fisher Body, Ford, Goodyear, Grumman,
Higgins, Hudson, Kaiser Factories. CONTINUATION FOLLOWS."

The continuation of the above message has not as yet been received.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(3)(b)
Justice Dept. Letter, 9-31-73
By RHP, MLD, Date Aug 23 1973
The second recent development of interest is the receipt of an inquiry from the Germans through a controlled double agent channel indicating that the Germans are desirous of determining the extent of off-shore coastal protection on the Atlantic seaboard of the United States and particularly as to any areas where this protection may have been curtailed.

With expressions of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
B. B.,

I believe Lillian Wrenn has sent you for special filing the previous on this.

Yes  A.C.T.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Your note of November 21 to Dr. Bush with the accompanying copy of Mr. Hoover's letter to Mr. Hopkins has come to me in Dr. Bush's absence. We appreciate having the German interest in this matter brought to our attention, and I am taking steps at once to see what action, if any, is necessary on our part.

Respectfully yours,

J. B. Conant,  
Acting Director.
From: U. S. Military Attaché, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Mr: B11. Filed 26/10372
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and No. B11.

Cherwell has told me how very kind the U. S. Army and Navy were in
showing him their latest developments in many fields and in entertaining him
at their various establishments. Perhaps if you thought it well, you would
transmit my thanks to them and especially to General Groves who went to so
much trouble to show Cherwell the latest developments in his particular
field.

Perhaps you might also think fit to express my gratitude to the TUVE
establishment at Silver Springs whose work on the proximity fuses has proved
so valuable in defending London against the robot bombs.

MAP ROOM NOTE: TUVE establishment named for Dr. Merrill A. Tuve, a professor
from Carnegie Institute of Technology. - His work is in the laboratory of
Terrestrial Magnetism Department of OSRD. (Organization of Scientific Research
and Development) - He is in Section T which comes under the Navy and to which
he is attached for this purpose. In Section T he is engaged in Applied Physics,
apparently working on the type of fuse mentioned above. - He evidently took
Lord Cherwell under his wing when he was on his visit here.

Red 2613302
1PVU

TOP SECRET

MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

DATE: 831, 26 Nov 44.

SUBJECT: Expression of thanks.

ACTION:

1. To the President via usher.
2. No reply code to the P4 by the President.
14 January 1945

From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: President of the United States
Nr: 887    Filed 141027Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
Number 887.
Tube Alloys.
I should like Field Marshal Wilson to succeed Field Marshal Dill on the Combined Policy Committee and hope that this will be agreeable to you.

End

RRH/rh

RESGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By H. E. Parks      Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER TO: THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL or FILE NO. #887, 14 January 1945
DATE: 14 January 1945
SUBJECT: Marshal Wilson's appointment to Combined Policy Committee, Tube Alloys.

ACTION:

1. Answered by PRES-PM #701, 14 January 1945.
Churchill & Roosevelt
The Complete Correspondence

III. Alliance Declining
February 1944 – April 1945

EDITED WITH COMMENTARY BY
Warren F. Kimball

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
as is necessary to insure passage to the Black Sea without delay or interference of the "Naval auxiliary Catoctin, not a combatant vessel" and also four smaller Naval vessels which are really mine sweepers and which the Navy wishes to send to the Black Sea.

We will have Steinhärdt give the Turks identical information regarding the passage of American airplanes to be used by my party and for daily mail trips. Roosevelt [WDL]

[MR*, FRUS, Yalta Conf., p. 35.]

The Combined (Anglo-American) Policy Committee on Atomic Energy had been established as a result of agreements reached by Churchill and Roosevelt during the Quebec Conference in 1943. TUBE ALLOYS was the codename for the atomic energy programs being conducted jointly by Great Britain and the United States.

C-887

London [via U.S. Army]
Jan. 14, 1945, 1027 Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

TUBE ALLOYS.

I should like Field Marshal Wilson to succeed Field Marshal Dill on the Combined Policy Committee and hope that this will be agreeable to you.

[MR*, R&C]

R-761

Hyde Park, N.Y. [via U.S. Navy]
Jan. 14, 1945, 1837 Z

Top Secret and Personal, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Reference your Number 887. Delighted to have Wilson on the Combined Policy Committee. Roosevelt

[MR*]

In October 1944 the Yugoslav Partisan leader, Marshal Tito, met with the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Ivan Subasić, to discuss the formation of a unified government. Since Tito's forces controlled large segments of Yugoslavia and also had the clear, if unspoken, support of the Soviet Union, the best Subasić could do was to accept a compromise which
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 701, 900-TH AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Reference your Number 887. Delighted to have Wilson on the
Combined Policy Committee.

ROOSEVELT

Released 141837 January 1945.

BOYCE P. PRICE, CAPTAIN, C.E.
I

THE PRESIDENT
TO
THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO.  #701, 14 January 1945

DATE

SUBJECT:
Harshal Wilson's appointment to Combined Policy Committee.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #287, 14 Jan 45.
2. No answer.

FROM

TO

ACTION

1. Answers PM-PRES #287, 14 Jan 45.
2. No answer.

DATE

ACTION

1. Answers PM-PRES #287, 14 Jan 45.
2. No answer.

ACTION

1. Answers PM-PRES #287, 14 Jan 45.
2. No answer.

ACTION
February 9, 1945

Honorable Harry L. Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Harry:

As you are well aware, the Army for the past two years has been vitally interested in a highly secret project for the development of an atomic explosive. This explosive, as you know, involves the release of energy through the shattering of atoms of heavy elements.

During the period that the Army has been engaged in the supervision of this experimentation, numerous efforts have been made by the Soviets to obtain the highly secret information concerning the experimentation and this Bureau has been actively following such Soviet efforts.

The German Government has also been interested in the same type of experimentation in Germany and has attempted to get information regarding the atomic experimentation in the United States.

Recently, in connection with the operation of a radio station by a German agent under control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation but which station the Germans believe to be a free station, an inquiry was received from Germany containing the following questions regarding the status of atomic explosive experimentation in the United States:

First, where is heavy water being produced? In what quantities? What method? Who are users?

Second, in what laboratories is work being carried on with large quantities of uranium? Did accidents happen there? What does the protection against Neutronic Ray consist of in these laboratories? What is the material and the strength of coating?
Third, is anything known concerning the production of bodies or molecules out of metallic uranium rods, tubes, plates? Are these bodies provided with coverings for protection? Of what do these coverings consist?

We have already advised the appropriate authorities in the War Department concerning these German inquiries.

I thought the foregoing would be of considerable interest to the President.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,
Dear Elizabeth:

There is attached a copy of the file copy of a memorandum sent by James Byrnes to President Roosevelt on March 3, 1945. Mike Simmons found it in the records of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. This document was handed by President Roosevelt to Secretary Stimson, and the signed original is now in the records of the Manhattan project in the custody of the World War II Records Division in Alexandria. As the document was declassified in 1957, I thought you might wish a copy for FDR's papers. This document is cited and discussed on pages 339-340 of Hewlett and Anderson’s The New World, 1939-1946.

Sincerely yours,

Herman Kahn
Assistant Archivist
for Civil Archives

Enclosure
August 7, 1963

Dr. Elizabeth B. Drewry
Director
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Hyde Park, New York

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Assistant Archivist for Civil Archives

Enclosure
March 2, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: James F. Byrnes

I understand that the expenditures for the Manhattan project are approaching 2 billion dollars with no definite assurance yet of production.

We have succeeded to date in obtaining the cooperation of Congressional Committees in secret hearings. Perhaps we can continue to do so while the war lasts.

However, if the project proves a failure, it will then be subjected to relentless investigation and criticism.

I know little of the project except that it is supported by eminent scientists. Even eminent scientists are subject to the continuance of a project rather than to concede its failure. Also, it may be feasible to continue the experiment on a reduced scale.

In any event, no harm could come from an impartial investigation and review by a small group of scientists not already identified with the project.

Such a review might hurt the feelings of those now engaged in the project. Still 2 billion dollars is enough money to risk such hurt.

A favorable finding would justify continuance. An unfavorable finding would at least indicate the need for further justification by those who are responsible for the project.

In any event, it would be clear that we were mindful of the tremendous expenditure of men and materials.

Changed as per attached copy.
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A favorable finding would justify continuance, regardless of future success or failure. An unfavorable finding would at least indicate the need for further justification by those who are responsible for the project.

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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
OF THE UNITED STATES
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March 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. VANNEVAR BUSH:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

"F.D.R."F.D.R.

Copy/Confidential memorandum, 2/12/45, re Utilization of Scientific Manpower, from Mrs. Roosevelt, which discusses the unwarranted usurpation of manpower by the National Research Defense Committee and the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the use of that power to protect the pecuniary interests of individual scientists at the expense of the war effort; mentions particularly the loss of the services of men in the Minesweeping Section (620) of the Bureau of Ships.
I believe this is a matter for consideration by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

M. C. L.

Miss Truitt wants to know to whom this should be referred — JGB
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Miss Fields

To the President

from

Mrs. Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1945.

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Miss Cully -

I believe this is a matter for consideration by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

M. C. L.

- Dr. Latta -

Miss Cully wants to know to whom this should be referred —

29B
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Miss Dooley
In the President
From
Mrs. Roosevelt
The attached clipping shows what can happen when control is loose and security insufficient. It gives sufficient basis in itself for insistence that knowledge be based only to those who really need it. Perhaps you will wish to ask how come?

V. Bush

25
Mr. Harry Hopkins,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntyre (MC) USN
Surgeon General, U.S. Navy
Room 1072-A, Navy Building
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ross:

This follows up my letter of September 9th relative to Naval medical share in the evacuation of prisoners of war. As previously reported, I attended a POW conference in YOKOHAMA September 5th. The great hue and cry, created by the conditions noted in the first POW’s evacuated, elevated to the highest priority evacuation of all prisoners of war, to be accomplished if possible prior to the moving in of the Sixth Army, scheduled to occupy Western JAPAN. To expedite matters, two seaports, WAKAYAMA and NAGASAKI were named as evacuating points for Western JAPAN. All prisoners were to be diverted to these two seaports, fortunately clear of serious mine hazards. Evacuation was scheduled for September 12th, to be completed if possible in ten days.

At the conference the Army officials were disturbed over the scarcity of Army medical recovery teams and did not think they could get them up from MANILA by the 12th. I was very pleased to offer full Naval medical support of the plan, to include all responsibility for medical processing at both WAKAYAMA and NAGASAKI. I also volunteered Navy medical officers to accompany the Army recovery teams into the various POW camps. This the Army gratefully accepted. Admiral Spruance supported me wholeheartedly and gave me complete medical supervision at both ports.

At WAKAYAMA he placed Rear Admiral Riggs on the cruiser MONTPELLIER as Officer-in-Charge, and at NAGASAKI Rear Admiral Fairman on the WICHITA in similar position. We estimated that approximately 10,000 prisoners would be processed through each port. At WAKAYAMA I placed the CONSOLATION and SANCTUARY as my major medical units as no docking facilities were available there. At NAGASAKI I placed the HAVEN, with the HOPE or SANCTUARY to move there later. Thus I had a beautiful, splendidly equipped, floating hospital for each port. The CONSOLATION at WAKAYAMA, the HAVEN at NAGASAKI, with the SANCTUARY and HOPE in the backfield. These could handle all our seriously ill. The big problem was to get out the mass of ambulatory prisoners not requiring hospitalization. The original plan was to evacuate the POW’s after unloading the transports bringing in the army of occupation troops. These transports, of course, were not available, being mounted in the PHILIPPINES, the MARIANAS and HAWAII.
My experience in YOKOHAMA convinced me that the Japanese intended no further resistance and that the great fire support and air cover planned for the landing of the Army could be curtailed to a minimum show of force. I recommended that CVE's be stripped of their planes and used as transports for shuttle runs between our evacuating ports and OKINAWA. Admiral Spruance concurred.

I stripped OKINAWA of all excess doctors, thanks to the hearty cooperation of Albright and Templeton. I was thus able to augment the hospital ships and our "converted transports" with additional medical personnel. I also placed six medical officers as processing and medical examiners at WAKAYAMA and the same number at NAGASAKI. These two teams were to work at the docks where all prisoners were to be screened. I declared a basic principle that all prisoners were to be considered patients until cleared by my medical examiners. This gave me medical control of the situation for delousing, screening of communicable disease, and immediate hospitalization to the hospital ships of all the seriously ill.

I called a conference of all the medical officers involved, aboard the NEW JERSEY, and briefed them on the general medical evacuation plan. All were enthusiastic and I was very pleased with the opportunity for the Naval Medical Department to put on an urgently worthwhile show.

I sent Lieutenant Harvey (HC) as my representative to WAKAYAMA and took Lieutenant (jg) Cressit (H-S) with me to NAGASAKI. At WAKAYAMA no ship could reach the dock so evacuation of all sick and ambulatory type prisoners was made by boat. The CONSOLATION served as a floating hospital to remain until all patients had been cleared. The SANCTUARY to carry the less seriously ill by shuttle trips to OKINAWA, and the CVE's to carry the well. This worked splendidly. Total of 2578 prisoners were evacuated from WAKAYAMA, far less than anticipated.

At NAGASAKI the HAVEN tied up at the dock and in the midst of stench and wreckage, a very practical medical processing station was established. The atomic bomb damaged all dock buildings severely and I shall never forget the nauseating odor and accumulated filth in these buildings. We had to remove dead Japanese, teeming with flies and maggots, clear wreckage and really build from scratch our processing station. We built showers on the dock, using hot water supplied by the HAVEN, and screened off sections of a great warehouse into delousing, dressing and examining rooms. Fortunately, a spur track came directly to the dock and a great portion of our prisoners were brought to us by very good train service. We arrived NAGASAKI the morning of the 11th and in 30 hours had our processing and medical plant ready for reception of the prisoners. We employed
300 Japanese laborers as a working party and after repeated "hosings" finally removed the stench and filth.

From NAGASAKI I dispatched ten medical officers and ten corpsmen with Army recovery teams to the prison camps scattered throughout KYUSHU. The Army had Colonel Griffin in charge of the NAGASAKI area and Major Maloney in charge at WAKAYAMA. Cordial cooperation with the Army officials was instantly established and maintained. At NAGASAKI I invited Colonel Griffin aboard the HAVEN and Captain Parsons graciously included us in his private mess.

I am pleased to report that although we found many heartbreaking and pitiful cases and many authenticated instances of Japanese cruelty and ruthless brutality, on the whole over 90% of the prisoners were in very fair condition and able to be evacuated without hospitalization. The exact figures are not yet determined but I can assure you that most careful screening and medical examination indicates serious hospital cases to be running less than 8%.

I am very proud of the HAVEN, CONSOLATION and SANCTUARY. Captains Parsons, Newhauser and Davis supported me wholeheartedly and developed the details of my processing plans in a most efficient manner. The staff doctors on the two cruisers, Commander R. H. Holcomb on the MONTPELIER, and Commander J. J. Timmes on the WICHITA, did outstanding work as liaison officers between the hospital ships and Admirals Riggs and Fahrion. The nurses met all demands, working indefatigably. The Red Cross cooperated wholeheartedly and added a very cheerful aspect to the picture. All did excellent work and the evacuation was completed within the ten-day period. From WAKAYAMA 2,578 POW's were evacuated and from NAGASAKI just under 10,000.

You will hear much of the brutality and cruelty of the Japanese in charge of the prison camps. I know of many authenticated cases indicating extreme cruelty. The Jap military are very hard taskmasters, even with their own people. Corporal punishment is a common procedure for petty offenses. Many are really sadistic and undoubtedly performed numerous acts of brutality and cruelty. However, I invariably found on close questioning that the prisoner had been caught for some infraction of prison rules such as smoking out of hours, sitting on bunks or slacking in work. Many of the prisoners were caught pilfering sugar or food while working at the docks. The Japs made surprise inspections and when pilfering was discovered punishment was prompt and severe. In fairness, I must say that a number of the older men in the camps told me that the treatment, while most rugged, was on the whole

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOC FILE 5660.9 (9/37/56)
not bad. They expected quick punishment when caught in some act and got it.

One case in particular shocked me. A Dutch soldier was made to squat five and one-half hours, as punishment for a petty offense, with a bamboo stick placed in and held in the flexed popliteal spaces. Ischemic paralysis developed (Volkman's type) and he was delivered to us with both legs amputated at the knee.

The HAVEN has many heartbreaking stories. Many of the prisoners carried certified statements of harsh and cruel treatment.

Our medical screening was planned so that every prisoner was routed past a battery of trained nurses and interpreters where a check-off questionnaire was made on each man. This included a brief summary of military and naval experience, date of capture, sickness in camp, mistreatment or punishment in camp, and a check as to the quality and quantity of food, whether worked or not, and the prisoner's reaction as to whether he considered his imprisonment had been fair, no complaint, brutal or cruel. The HAVEN has over 9,000 of these carefully prepared records in addition to complete medical and clinical records of those requiring hospitalization. I considered it a rare opportunity for a factual summary covering over 9,000 prisoners. It was an extra load put on the HAVEN but Parsons saw my point and cooperated enthusiastically. The clinical records will include full laboratory findings, blood, stool (the first 40 stools examined showed over 70% infestations with ascaris, E. histolytica and hookworm), urine, etc., electrocardiograph and X-ray of chest when indicated. The HAVEN is assembling all this data which the Bureau will receive in good time.

Another case which may be brought to your attention is one of a Javanese-Dutch soldier. Last November he had been removed from POW Camp No. 2 by the Japanese officials with a diagnosis of leprosy, to a leprosarium in Southern KUSHU. I investigated his record and concluded that he was entitled to full POW consideration. He had been confined many months in JAPAN and was allegedly free of the disease at time of capture. I insisted that the Japanese bring him back to us which they did and I placed him on the HAVEN. We were collecting a great number of British, Australian and Dutch nationals, many of them very sick, and it was my thought that as soon as the evacuation was completed at NAGASAKI we would divert the HAVEN to JAVA and AUSTRALIA where the leper could be returned home and the sick British and Dutch nationals transferred without delays at OKINAWA or MANILA. Cincpac now rules that all hospital ships are urgently needed to transfer American sick from Pacific ports to the U.S. and has denied my request for the HAVEN's special trip. We have the leper quarantined on the HAVEN but will transfer him to the Army Reamp Evacuating Facilities at OKINAWA and I shall...
probably be shot. I could not see the poor devil left in JAPAN. I consider his case line of duty as much as any war or camp wound.

Now, a special preliminary report which I believe will prove to be of great clinical importance:

At the earliest moment upon arrival at NAGASAKI, I inspected the great section of the city destroyed by the atomic bomb. It was appalling. The official records indicate from 30 to 40 percent of the city destroyed. I consider the destruction far greater as much of the buildings which remain standing are severely damaged. In my judgment, less than 20% of the buildings of NAGASAKI escaped injury. Forty percent were utterly destroyed.

The main hospitals and the NAGASAKI Medical College were completely ruined and practically all medical equipment destroyed. Twelve out of twenty-one medical professors, including the president of the NAGASAKI Medical College, and about three-fourths of the medical staff were reported killed. This left NAGASAKI with practically no hospital facilities. A partially demolished school building had been converted into an emergency hospital with a capacity of about 300 bed patients, plus a very active out-patient service.

I contacted the superintendent of this hospital and requested permission to do some clinical work that would support their clinical findings. I stressed support so as not to offend them. The superintendent was very respectful and apparently anxious to please me. He stated they were still receiving about 20 new cases daily, patients who, apparently uninjured at the time of the bomb explosion, now noted falling out of the hair and a great weakness. They were found to be suffering from severe anemia, both white and red cells extremely low. They became progressively weaker and many died within a few days or weeks. The actual mortality and morbidity rate I was unable to establish as the improvised hospital maintained no cross index or summary of the anemic cases, treating all cases simply as atomic bomb victims. The new admissions to the hospital were now largely of two types: one, patients without apparent injury at time of the explosion but who were reporting because of loss of hair, extreme weakness and the failure of any new laceration, boil or lesion to heal; second, delayed or incomplete healing of injuries received at the time of the bomb explosion. The superintendent declared that an average of 16 cases a day were dying.

I requested permission to perform autopsies on recent dead. He hesitated and again I stressed the importance of supporting the autopsy findings. With embarrassment, he then said I was welcome to anything I desired but that he was so sorry that his knives were so dull, his equipment...
so scanty. I then saw the light and told him what I wished to do was purely humanitarian and that I would be very happy to supply him with urgently needed vitamins, plasma, special drugs, and DDT to clear his hospital of swarming flies and mosquitoes which were awful. I told him that we had on the HAVEN a fully equipped hospital with a staff of fine specialists, that I was in a position to bring over a portable X-ray (they had no X-ray equipment) and equipment for performing biopsies, special blood work and complete autopsies. The superintendent and his chief of staff were delighted and gave me complete entree.

Again Captain Parsons supported me wholeheartedly and his staff were enthusiastic. Commander Barbeck brought over the portable X-ray and checked lungs, bones, etc. Lieutenant Commander James Beck, an excellent pathologist from Templeton's outfit at OKINAWA, and Lieutenant Meiser of the HAVEN alternated days at a time performing autopsies and collecting specimens.

I personally witnessed two autopsies and was impressed with general negative findings. Both were anemic cases, one 15 years and the other 21, males. Bone marrow did not show any aplastic findings but the pathologist stressed that the peripheral blood exhibited hypoplasia. The cells appeared to be retarded and immature, simulating a type of pernicious leukopenia or agranulocytosis. The spleen was small, the liver not enlarged nor reduced in size but showed some cloudy swelling. Kidneys, no gross pathology. Lymph nodes not enlarged, if anything smaller in size, reddish, soft and edematous. Lungs were negative, heart negative. Bone, cancellous portion purple red, semi-liquid and non-granular. Eyes, none of the cases I saw had severe eye symptoms. Those close enough to have had their eyes affected by the blinding flash were killed instantly or died soon after, I was told. Blood findings, red cells two million and in the second case one million; white cells fifteen hundred and in the second case five hundred.

The WICHITA dentist examined the teeth of several patients and was impressed with the possible relationship to those findings in jawbones and teeth which had been reported in cases of high radiation. There was marked atrophy of the alveoli resulting in loosening of teeth, and hemorrhages. These dental defects were not from malnutrition or old age as they occurred even in young children suffering with this strange delayed anemia resulting from exposure to the bomb or within the bombed area.

Summary of findings: anemia most conspicuous; petechial hemorrhages into the skin, mucous membrane and other parts; changes in bone marrow and spleen suggesting atrophy or hypoplasia. Cause of death considered to be a hypoplastic type of anemia. These remarks may have to be revised after complete study of tissue removed at autopsies has been accomplished on the HAVEN and at the Naval Medical Center.
The dead and missing at NAGASAKI now exceed 19,500. These are official Japanese figures. Number of wounded is a variable figure approaching 50,000. I was informed that almost all those who were within a radius of one kilometer of the center of the atomic bomb explosion were killed immediately or have died since. A few who were in shelters within this radius survived. Most of the patients now in the hospitals are burn and fracture cases and the delayed anemic cases. These anemic cases, at both NAGASAKI and HIROSHIMA, are still coming in but in diminishing numbers.

I requested and directed that the completed study of these cases be forwarded to the Bureau as soon as possible. Specimens will be forwarded to the Naval Medical School (please inform Captain Pugh that I did not forget him).

During my stay at NAGASAKI, Generals Farrel and Newton, special War Department bomb investigators arrived. I had them on board the HAVEN for breakfast. They remained in NAGASAKI only a few hours. They seemed very pleased with our findings and requested that we confer with Colonel Warren due to arrive soon with a medical section of his committee. I explained to General Farrell that we were not trespassing upon the War Department's prerogatives. That the clinical findings from radioactivity were diminishing and varying by the hour and that with the availability of the HAVEN I considered it highly important to make this clinical investigation.

We checked sections of the bombed area for radioactivity and brought back specimens of the earth but got essentially negative results after exposure on X-ray film eleven hours. General Farrell made tests September 14th with his special instruments and reported no radioactivity.

A confidential report sent in by Colonel Warren September 23rd revealed low activity at selected spots near the center of the explosion but no activity a few miles away, on the perimeter of the destroyed area.

I departed NAGASAKI September 17th to inspect the POW work then being completed at WAKAYAMA. I started by train as I was anxious to pick up any news of potential epidemics in Western HONSHU. I was caught in a very severe typhoon at MOJI and had to detour, never did get to WAKAYAMA and finally joined the NEW JERSEY at YOKOSUKA after a five-day, wild trip by train, Japanese minesweeper across the Inland Sea, finally picking up the TOKYO express at OSAKA. (I do not wish to bore you with so much detail but as I was really the first Naval officer to invade the Inland Sea I am sending you a copy of my special report to Admiral Spruance.)
This trip gave me an opportunity to check the bomb victims at HIROSHIMA. Here again I noted the same type of delayed anemia. The number of new cases was rapidly falling off however and no radioactivity could be found in the devastated area. The superintendent of the Red Cross hospital stated that people who entered HIROSHIMA within one week after the bomb exploded and who were not in the city on the tragic day, were affected by loss of hair and a low white blood count. He does not believe that anybody was injured by radioactivity after the first week.

I was again impressed at HIROSHIMA with the tragic loss of medical equipment and personnel and I do believe, Ross, that the HAVEN's availability at NAGASAKI permitted the first factual and scientific approach to the study of this delayed type of anemia occurring in victims of the lethal rays from the atomic bomb. I am sure Captain Parsons and his staff will render you a most complete report. Once I had made contact at the hospital, the HAVEN staff followed through in fine form.

I am also enclosing outline of notes covering the health conditions noted in KYUSHU, HONSHU and SHIKOKU, and reported conditions in HOKKAIDO. You will note that there are really no epidemic diseases now prevalent in JAPAN except water-borne, - dysentery and typhoid. There is no cholera and no serious mosquito-borne disease. Like England and the U.S., Japan has come through the war with a surprisingly low incidence of epidemic diseases.

As you know, the Fifth Fleet has taken over all Japanese territorial waters, having relieved the Third Fleet which departed for the homeland.

We are now in the midst of landing the Sixth Army in Western JAPAN. This includes the Fifth Marine Corps which will occupy the NAGASAKI area. Headquarters of the Sixth Army will be at KYOTO, with the Eighth Army and SCAP at Tokyo and YOKOHAMA. The NEW JERSEY will remain at Yokosuka (Yokohama), former naval base of the Japanese fleet, for an indefinite period.

I am making a complete survey of medical personnel of the Fifth Fleet, to include the Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA. I am sure we have excess medical personnel and will recommend early return of as many medical officers as possible consistent with the operational phase involved in landing the army of occupation. The landings are proceeding in a very orderly manner with no Japanese resistance. Our own mine fields and the current typhoon season constitute the main hazards. The landings are scheduled to be completed by mid-October.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

M. D. WILLCUTTS
Commodore (MC) USN
Personal & BY HAND

Miss Grace Tully

c/o The Archivist of the United States,
National Archives Bldg.,
Wash., D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1945.

Personal and

Dear Miss Tully:

I will appreciate it very much if you will be good enough to make available to the Secretary of State, all correspondence and papers in the files of President Roosevelt, relating to the atomic bomb.

With kindest personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Henry Wallace

Miss Grace Tully,

c/o the Archivist of the United States
National Archives Building,
Washington, D. C.
November 9, 1945.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

At the request of the President of the United States, I have taken from the files of the late President Roosevelt the enclosed papers relating to the atomic bomb, which he directed me to send to you.

The late President received reports from time to time from Dr. Bush but these were returned to Dr. Bush as soon as the President had read them. On a few occasions, the President directed me to give certain reports and correspondence, sent to him by Dr. Bush, to Admiral Brown to lock up in the safe in the Map Room. I understand from Commander [redacted] that these were all returned to the War Department.

With my very kindest regards,

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

(Enclosures)
LIST OF PAPERS REMOVED FROM THE FILES
OF THE LATE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AT
THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 9, 1945

1. Draft of letter to the Hon. Winston Churchill (no date)
2. Confidential memorandum to Dr. Vannevar Bush from the President, dated October 11, 1941 (original and copy)
3. Copy of memorandum to the President from Dr. V. Bush, dated October 13, 1941.
4. Copy of letter sent to The Honorable Winston Churchill by the President on October 11, 1941.
7. Letter to the President from Dr. V. Bush, dated March 16, 1942.
8. Copy of memorandum from Dr. V. Bush to Endolphe Forster, dated March 16, 1942.
9. Copy of memorandum to Dr. Bush from the President, dated March 20, 1942.
10. Letter to the President from Dr. V. Bush, dated June 17, 1942.
11. Secret memorandum to Dr. Bush from the President, dated July 11, 1942.
The story of the development of the atomic bomb by the combined efforts of many groups in the United States is a fascinating but highly technical account of an enormous enterprise. Obviously military security prevents this story from being told in full at this time. However, there is no reason why the administrative history of the Atomic Bomb project and the basic scientific knowledge on which the several developments were based should not be available now to the general public. To this end this account by Professor H. D. Smyth is presented.

All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time without violating the needs of national security is contained in this volume. No requests for additional information should be made to private persons or organizations associated directly or indirectly with the project. Persons disclosing or securing additional information by any means whatsoever without authorization are subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act.

The success of the development is due to the many thousands of scientists, engineers, workmen and administrators — both civilian and military — whose prolonged labor, silent perseverance, and whole-hearted cooperation have made possible the unprecedented technical accomplishments here described.

L. R. Groves
Major General, USA

War Department
Washington, D. C.

August 1945
A Talk With Einstein

CREDIT for the publication of Professor Einstein's views on the implications of the atomic bomb belongs to one of the most highly regarded broadcasters in the United States, Raymond Swing. Mr. Swing's nightly discussions of world affairs command so much respect that he might appropriately be described as the commentator's commentator.

He felt so strongly about the implications of atomic discoveries and the developments made as a result of the war, that last August, he started devoting one talk a week to this subject. Ever since then he has dealt exclusively with this problem on Friday evenings. Some of his observant listeners believed Einstein so much that the letter wrote to him.

As a result, Mr. Swing spent the better part of a day at Princeton University discussing the matter with Einstein. Before leaving he said he would like to write out a summary of Einstein's views. It is this summary, duly edited by the famous professor, which is published on this page today.

Their conversation, which started in the morning and lasted until well into the afternoon, was, I hear, conducted entirely in English. Mr. Swing remarks that Einstein's command of the language is now remarkably good.

EINSTEIN FEAT

ARMS RACE

ATOM SECRET VITA

From our own Correspondent

NEW YORK, Monday

Professor Einstein, in a comment today on his article in yesterday's Daily Transcript on the atomic bomb—which was published simultaneously in this country—emphasized that in the present situation nothing was more important than to create an atmosphere of confidence between the Great Powers, so that the problem of the abolition of competitive armaments could be solved.

"It is my belief," he said, "that in view of the present situation and the danger of another war, the problem of the abolition of competitive armaments could be solved. When I said that the question of the secret of the atomic bomb should not be thrown away, I was meaning that the atom bomb should not be thrown away, it was my intention to express strongly that everything—especially knowledge about the destructive weapons—ought to be used to bring about a better understanding between nations."

The article itself has received great interest in the United States.
List of papers sent by Frank Hurley to State Dept.
Nov 9 45

2. FDR to VB Oct 11 41
3. Memo & FDR to VB Oct 13 41
4. FDR to WC Letter Oct 14
5. Report of Natl Def Research Group June 27 41 & June 28 41

On June 29 R wrote to JRO similar letter

July 9 JRO " " R

Hopkins goes a great deal about the project fo the beginning
B wrote to R re interchange discussions Aug 43
"no step either improper or imprudent"

In letter of Aug 43 Sir JA to push
an urgent Heads of Agreement + thanks
for info on possible use of radioactive
In Letter of 6 Aug 43, Scissors B

"it will not be for the CPC to interfere with the control of the DAE program by the Corps of E
of the US Army"

HH Box 24

B- 4 scientists sent over before R. Peters CPC was organized - Who were they?

PM to Pres. Feb 27 43 gave a complete history of project from British viewpoint - (Very accurate)

Bush letter to HH Mar 31 43 gave all sessions discussed in MPC and between Coudert and me
as interchange. (A very able letter) and one of which Bush can be very proud.
Please include in my notes:

Photostat of attached 2 double address.

Again this would be a great convenience to me in my work. Not for quotation or really as source material but as a memory refresher. This is a splendid exposition of our views at that time.

The Coar Council memo of Mar 25 43 falls into the same category. Possibly if for some reason the Bush letter should not be supplied we the Council memo would still be of great assistance.
Please include in my notes
photo copy of attached letter, heading and signature.
Blank out first two lines also 6th line (but letter dated on first page)
7th line
also on second page 3rd line (The President -- --)

This would be a great convenience to me in my work. Not for quotation or as a
source material, but as a memory refresher. With a few small exceptions it is a
stupendous resume of the British thinking as expressed to me by Dr. Akers in
Jan 42 and Jan 43.
MEMORANDUM

TO:       Ambassador Winant
FROM:    Maurine Milliner
SUBJECT:  Suggested Action in Connection with Mr. Atlee's Conference in Washington.

Do you think it would be helpful to Secretary Byrnes and his staff, in preparing the President for the conference with Prime Minister Atlee, if you sent him a memorandum listing the points on which discussion at this time might contribute to increased good will and understanding between the two governments, and to closer cooperation for world security and prosperity. The memorandum could be prepared from the suggestions put forward by your key staff members who are working on pending matters with the U.K. Government. You might also wish to include some broader matters concerning which a better understanding between the two governments is desirable.

Even though you may go to Washington for these discussions, I nevertheless believe such a memorandum would be the most useful if it were sent to the Secretary as early as feasible so the staff there could use it in making their preparations.

Here are some items which might be usefully discussed, providing the scope of the conference goes beyond that of the first one:

1. Development and control of atomic energy.
2. Method to be followed in developing peace treaties or settlements.
   A. Continuation of Council of Foreign Ministers.
   B. Seeking solutions through United Nations Organization within the framework of the Charter.
   C. Calling a peace conference.

JOHN G. WINANT PAPERS, BOX 183, Ambassador to Great Britain, ATTLEE, C. R.
3. Basic relief for Europe this winter - understanding on government support for UNRRA and prompt implementation of that support.


5. Financial and commercial arrangements between the two governments.


7. U.K., U.S. adherence to the agreement to withdraw economic officials from Middle East.

8. Refuge for the Jews.


10. Expanding and facilitating exchange of students between U.K. and U.S. (A noncontroversial item like this would permit a pleasant, affirmative, and fundamentally constructive meeting of minds.)

Undoubtedly there are more important matters pending than many of those listed, which are known by the staff members handling them.

You could submit simply a list of the significant matters to the Secretary and say that you will be glad to furnish him a brief statement of the facts available here, or the thinking of this staff, on those matters which he would like to have expanded for possible use.

LONDON, October 31, 1945
The Honorable Franklin Delano Roosevelt
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I am writing you to introduce Dr. L. Szilard who proposes to submit to you certain considerations and recommendations. Unusual circumstances which I shall describe further below induce me to take this action in spite of the fact that I do not know the substance of the considerations and recommendations which Dr. Szilard proposes to submit to you.

In the summer of 1939 Dr. Szilard put before me his views concerning the potential importance of uranium for national defense. He was greatly disturbed by the potentialities involved and anxious that the United States Government be advised of them as soon as possible. Dr. Szilard, who is one of the discoverers of the neutron emission of uranium on which all present work on uranium is based, described to me a specific system which he devised and which he thought would make it possible to set up a chain reaction in unseparated uranium in the immediate future. Having known him for over twenty years both from his scientific work and personally, I have much confidence in his judgment and it was on the basis of his judgment as well as my own that I took the liberty to approach you in connection with this subject. You responded to my letter dated August 2, 1939 by the appointment of a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs and thus started the Government's activity in this field.

The terms of secrecy under which Dr. Szilard is working at present do not permit him to give me information about his work; however, I understand that he now is greatly concerned about the lack of adequate contact between scientists who are doing this work and those members of your Cabinet who are responsible for formulating policy. In the circumstances I consider it my duty to give Dr. Szilard this introduction and I wish to express the hope that you will be able to give his presentation of the case your personal attention.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]
Text of Roosevelt's Atomic Pact

LONDON, April 5 (Reuters)—
Following is the text of the 1945 agreement between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on the atomic bomb, as revealed by the Prime Minister today. Publications were approved by President Eisenhower, but the White House said the agreement now no longer in effect:

1. We will never use this agency against each other.
2. We will not use it against third parties without each other's consent.
3. We will not, either of us, communicate any information about Tube Alloys (the code name for atomic bomb) to third parties except by mutual consent.

4. In view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of the war division of war effort, the British Government recognizes that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain, on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.

5. The following arrangements shall be made to insure full and effective collaboration between the two countries in bringing the project to fruition:

A. There shall be set up in Washington a combined policy committee composed of the Secretaries of War (U.S.), Defense (U.S.), Dr. vannevar Bush (U.S.), Dr. J. Conant (U.S.), Field Marshal Sir John Dill (United Kingdom), Col. J. H. Lewis (U.K.), and G. D. Howe (Canada).

The functions of this committee, subject to the control of the respective governments, will be:

1. To agree from time to time upon the program of work to be carried out in the two countries.
2. To keep all sections of the project under constant review.
3. To allocate materials, apparatus, and plant, in limited supply, in accordance with the requirements of the program agreed to by the committee.
4. To settle any questions which may arise on the interpretation or application of this agreement.

B. There shall be complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project between members of the policy committee and their immediate technical advisors.

C. In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field.

D. In the field of design, construction and operation of large-scale plants, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated by such ad hoc arrangements as may, in each section of the field, appear to be necessary or desirable if the project is to be brought to fruition at the earliest moment. Such ad hoc arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the policy committee.
DENMARK HOLDS GENERAL ELECTION TO-MORROW

CHALLENGE TO SOCIALISTS FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT COPENHAGEN, Sunday. About 2,000,000 of the 2,300,000 Danes eligible to vote are expected to go to the polls in Denmark on Tuesday, when the country's first free general election since the spring of 1939 will be held.

An election held in 1943, when the country was still occupied, gave an undemocratic result as the Communist party was banned by the Germans. The Danes used the election to vigorously show the Germans that the Danish Nazi party had been defeated.

After a record poll the National Socialist party got three seats with the Nazi-influenced Peasant party, second, with six. The Social Democrats, third, have 33.

Autumn Salon in Paris

PARIS, Sunday. All Paris frescoes through the doors of the famous Salon des Artistes. The Salon has been divided into sections for the display of works by the artists of the Salon des Artistes, the Salon des Peintres, and the Salon des Sculpteurs.

ARTISTS THE NAZIS COULD NOT COERC

PARIS, Sunday. All Paris frescoes through the doors of the famous Salon des Artistes. The Salon has been divided into sections for the display of works by the artists of the Salon des Artistes, the Salon des Peintres, and the Salon des Sculpteurs.

CONSERVATIVES CLOSE WATCH

MR. ASHETON ON OPPOSITION ROLE

CANDIDATES

DAILY TELEGRAPH REPORTER

In his address to the City of London by-election, Mr. Asheton declared that the Coalition Government's only role was to provide a strong, united Opposition.

"If you elect me, I shall, in common with the rest of the Coalition, act as a united Opposition, and if the present position is maintained, that the Coalition Government provide a strong united Opposition."
Admiral Halsey tells us that the Russians were first to report the success and improve the atomic bomb and work upon it.

The United States conducted its first successful experiment at Alamo, Nevada, within eight months ago. The first hydrogen explosion in Russia took place on Aug. 12, 1945, and its precursors were recorded and notes by instruments recording both to the United States and Britain.

According to the best intelligence, the Soviets were well aware of what the main effects would be, for the first time, the agreement which I made in 1943 with President Roosevelt, as far as we can tell, was not to surrender to us and until Congress ratified it.

We have no agreement with the United States on any point of joint importance. They are sitting entirely within their limits as agreed between them and the joint government. Whether we like it or not, that is the position which we found when we came into office and until the United States first said that they would have to do anything.

Reveals Fact With Roosevelt...I feel that I will be in the case and can do nothing but good on both sides of the Atlantic, if I make public what I know. That is the way that the future of the United States is bound by the law unless and until Congress ratifies it.

It is difficult to say why we should be blamed. When the United States was first for the election of Mr. Roosevelt, I had held during the war, our position was very different. I was told to be prepared to discuss the possibility of joint action. They are sitting entirely within their limits as agreed between them and the joint government. Whether we like it or not, we have no news but friendly presentation of facts and figures to the United States either to express from their sphere of experiments, even if we desired to discuss their views until Congress ratifies it.

The President is asking from Congress, more faith in the application of the McMahon Act. I trust that nothing has happened since that time to affect the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The President is asking from Congress, more faith in the application of the McMahon Act. I trust that nothing has happened since that time to affect the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Yesterday, Mr. [Richard] Crossman (a left-wing Socialist, M.P.) in one of the Sunday papers wrote: "On Monday when the American will be Seoul, Winston must tell Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles that they can either accept the new armistice terms and join with Britain in the plan for high-level talks or else face the prospect of going it alone." (The New York Times, Friday, April 6, 1951.)

If friendly personal relations could be established between us, and we could have a clearer vision of what was then called to the British, I am still in favor of that, but the topic has changed.

I cannot doubt that we were in these circumstances to which the United States came. I cannot doubt that we were in these circumstances to which the United States came.
As we go forward down the difficult road, we shall always be guided by two main aims of our policy. One is to lose no opportunity of convincing the Soviet leaders that we cannot accept them, the Russian people, that the democracies of the West have no aggressive designs on them. The other is to ensure that until that purpose has been achieved we have the moral and psychological weapon necessary to deter any aggression from them and to ward it off if it should come.

We shall continue at the same time to seek by every means open to us an assurance in international tension and a more secure foundation on which the peoples of the world can live their lives in security and peace.

Mr. Attlee

I move this motion for Churchill (Eisenhower-Malenkov talks) in no party spirit. I do not seek any party advantage. Nor do I offer any criticism of this or any other Government. I move it without any feeling of panic, because we do not panic in this country. I move it because I believe that there is need for a continued and realistic appreciation of the situation of the world today and a realistic approach means that urgent action is necessary. We believe that civilization today is in grave danger. We have said that the bomb could have put an end to the metropolis of London, Moscow, Paris, Sydney. Any other city in the world's great cities. We know that the United States has this weapon; we believe that the U.S.S.R. has it and in a few years it may be that many other states will have this weapon. When it was in the offing the hydrogen bomb was considered as something in the realm of the remote future, but now it has come and there seems to be a growing anticipation of the times at which we imagine these developments will take place.

We do not know what other developments may be in store for us. Our modern civilization expresses itself, particularly in the great cities, and they are targets of immense vulnerability.

The White Paper on defense envisaged atomic warfare and thereafter broken-back warfare. I think warfare between cities armed with the hydrogen bomb will be succeeded by broken-back civilization.

Let us consider what is the effect of this weapon. Does it make war more or less likely? I think that is a question which merits very close examination. Since the U.S.S.R. got the bomb it has been a weapon that has drawn the world into the grip of a new form of tension. Are we to accept that new form of tension?

The hydrogen bomb is a deterrent. What is its effect on world problems? We have to consider what the effect of this weapon is on the superpowers. It makes war less likely. It makes war more likely.

If I were to say that this weapon is an advantage to the side that gets its blow first, it would be a terrible decision. For any leader to take in the launching of this weapon, we must remember that in history the invention of the atomic weapon was a turning-point in world history, a turning-point in world civilization, a turning-point in world religion, a turning-point in world politics, a turning-point in world economics, and we are faced with the possibility of a war that will affect the whole world, a turning-point in world history, it is not too late.

More than once Britain's courage and initiative have saved Europe. British initiative may well save world civilization.
Atomic Energy Is Potential Boon but Actual Menace

A WORLD GOVERNMENT REQUIRED NOW BEFORE U.S. MONOPOLY IS LOST

By Professor ALBERT EINSTEIN

The release of atomic energy has been hailed as a great triumph. It has been said that the dawn of the new atomic era has dawned. The United States has entered the “atomic age.”

I do not consider myself the father of the development of atomic energy. My part in it was quite insignificant. I did not in my position that it would be released in my time. I believed only that it would be theoretically possible.

It became practical, through the continuous development of new and better methods, that it was not something I could have predicted. It was discovered by Henry Moseley in 1913, and it was his special mission to work on the development of the atomic bomb. He was a natural scientist, and when he died, he was the first to work on the development of a new and better method.

It is not yet clear to me how this development will proceed, but my belief is that it is not yet clear how this development will proceed. My belief is that it is not yet clear how this development will proceed. My belief is that it is not yet clear how this development will proceed. My belief is that it is not yet clear how this development will proceed.

I have no doubt that the development of the atomic bomb will be an important step in the development of the world. It will be a great step in the development of the world. It will be a great step in the development of the world. It will be a great step in the development of the world.

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From the Office of
V. BUSH

Mr. Harry Hopkins

The attached letter shows what can happen when control is loose and security insufficient. It gives insufficient basis in itself for insistence that knowledge be known only to those who really need it.

Perhaps you will wish to ask "how come."

[Signature]  

V. Bush
Mr. Harry Hopkins,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
NAZI 'HEAVY WATER' LOOMS AS WEAPON

Plant Razed by 'Saboteurs' in Norway Viewed as Source of New Atomic Power

AMERICAN FORMULA USED

Super-Explosive Indicated—British Counter-Action Seen in Paratroop Activity

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES
LONDON, April 2—"Heavy water," derived by an electrochemical process from ordinary water, with hidden atomic power that can be used for the deadly purposes of war as well as the happier pursuits of peace, apparently has become a source of anxiety for those Allied leaders who plan attacks against enemy targets.

Reports reaching Norwegian circles in London cite German sources as having announced on Wednesday that as a result of the work of "saboteurs," a big electrochemical plant at Rjukan, Norway, had been blown up in what is said to have been one of three recent raids against that enemy-occupied country.

The importance of Rjukan as a target for destruction is that it is a huge plant on a wild river, from the waters of which queer chemical known as "heavy water," the discovery of which won a Nobel Prize in 1924 for Professor Harold Urey of Columbia University, is produced, and it can be used in the manufacture of terrifically high explosives.

Use in Explosives Seen

Heavy water or, more correctly, heavy hydrogen water, is believed to provide a means of disintegrating the atom that would thereby release a devastating power. While it is not believed here that the Germans, even with all their extensive chemical knowledge, have developed some fantastic method of hurling the shattering force of split atoms at Britain, it is known that heavy water, when added to other chemicals, gives a powerfully destructive force, just as it can help in the production of new types of gasoline, new sugars, new textiles and numerous other utilitarian as well as medical developments.

Consequently, Norwegians living in London studied with interest the report emanating from Stockholm Wednesday that Rjukan had been so heavily attacked by "saboteurs" that the Germans had declared a state of emergency. They considered that if the plant had been destroyed the Germans had suffered a severe loss in their output of ammunition.

At Rjukan one quart of heavy water can be produced from 6,000 gallons of ordinary water by an electrochemical process, the formula for which was given to the world by American scientists.

Rjukan is just south of a 3,500-square-mile area in a barren mountain plateau region known as "Triangulavida", which the Germans shut off to all civilians April 12. Recent German reports have stated R. A. F. transport planes and gliders have dropped paratroops around that area.
February 9, 1945

Honorable Harry L. Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

As you are well aware, the Army for the past two years has been vitally interested in a highly secret project for the development of an atomic explosive. This explosive, as you know, involves the release of energy through the shattering of atoms of heavy elements.

During the period that the Army has been engaged in the supervision of this experimentation, numerous efforts have been made by the Soviets to obtain the highly secret information concerning the experimentation and this Bureau has been actively following such Soviet efforts.

The German Government has also been interested in the same type of experimentation in Germany and has attempted to get information regarding the atomic experimentation in the United States.

Recently, in connection with the operation of a radio station by a German agent under control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation but which station the Germans believe to be a free station, an inquiry was received from Germany containing the following questions regarding the status of atomic explosive experimentation in the United States:

First, where is heavy water being produced? In what quantities? What method? Who are users?

Second, in what Laboratories is work being carried on with large quantities of uranium? Did accidents happen there? What does the protection against Neutronic Rays consist of in these Laboratories? What is the material and the strength of coating?
Third, is anything known concerning the production of bodies or molecules out of metallic uranium rods, tubes, plates? Are these bodies provided with coverings for protection? Of what do these coverings consist?

We have already advised the appropriate authorities in the War Department concerning these German inquiries.

I thought the foregoing would be of considerable interest to the President.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,
REMINISCENCES OF LOS ALAMOS
1943—1945

Edited by

LAWRENCE BADASH
Dept. of History, University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

JOSEPH O. HIRSCHFELDER
Dept. of Chemistry, University of Wisconsin, U.S.A.

and

HERBERT P. BROIDA
Dept. of Physics, University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A.

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
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To refresh my memory about Los Alamos I read a couple of books on the wartime period but got confused and irritated because they certainly didn't jibe with my recollections. Everything in books looks so simple, so easy, and everybody was friends with everybody. But even more annoying was that none of my young associates, who did most of the work, were even mentioned. So I got in touch with people who were there and who are now in the vicinity of Boston, and did some telephoning to my former associates in other cities. In a way, what follows is a group recollection, but I take full responsibility for it.

Before coming to Los Alamos I was probably the senior expert in the whole explosives division of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC). I began research on explosives in June 1940 (when NDRC was organized) and by 1942 thought I knew something about them. I was also involved in a National Academy of Sciences committee late in 1941, which advised President Roosevelt that the atomic bomb was feasible.

The man who deserves full credit for developing the concept of implosion, necessary to explode a plutonium weapon, is S. Neddermeyer. He and his assistant visited our NDRC Explosives Research Laboratory in Breacton, near Pittsburgh, in the summer of 1943. We made the first implosion charges for them, fired them off, and the visitors went away rather pleased with themselves and with us. The reason that I went to Los Alamos was that James R. Conant, who was chairman of NDRC and knew my views on military high explosives (that they could be made into precision instruments, a view which was very different from that of military ordnance), was also the effective policy maker of the Manhattan District, as the co-chairman of the so-called military policy committee guiding General Groves. I began going to Los Alamos as a consultant in the Fall of 1943, and then pressure was put on me by Oppenheimer and General Groves and particularly Conant, which really mattered, to go there on full time. I didn’t want to, partly because I didn’t think the bomb would be ready in time and I was interested in helping to win the war. I also had what looked like an awfully interesting overseas assignment all fixed up for myself. Well, instead, unwillingly, I went to Los Alamos. That gave me a wonderful opportunity to act...
One of the key operators in the implosion project, Lindhitz, Koski, Kauzmann, Herpin, Jackson, Paraff and others, later Roy. I found a very small operation under Neddermeyer—only a few people working—and a continuing angry conflict between Neddermeyer, who is now a professor at the University of Washington, and his boss, Captain Parsons, later Admiral Parsons, now unfortunately dead, who was the head of the Ordnance Division. I was put in the middle, between them by Oppenheimer, and that was a very uncomfortable place. So uncomfortable that two or three months later I wrote a memo to Oppenheimer, asking to be released from the project. That didn’t work and instead I got a more authoritative job.

By the summer of 1944 I was supposedly the boss of all the implosion work, but, as I was still under Parsons, the conflicts continued. Theoretically, the official channel of communications was from Neddermeyer to me, to Parsons, to Oppenheimer. Well, it didn’t work that way. Basically, Neddermeyer believed that the implosion research should be done by a small group, in a consecutive set of experiments until the right way of doing it was achieved. Now, I don’t know whether you know what implosion is. We ended with a spherical charge of high explosives, almost five feet in diameter with a metallic pit in the middle. In the center of the pit was the plutonium fissionable material. Our job was to compress it, and the plutonium to be compressed in an orderly fashion under the extreme pressure of a detonation wave, many millions of pounds per square inch, into something very much smaller than it normally was, whereupon it would become supercritical. A nuclear reaction would then spread and a big bang follow. Neddermeyer believed that this had to be discovered in a scientific, orderly fashion. Captain Parsons was an Ordnance Corps officer, accustomed to developing mass products, and therefore felt very differently about how the work should be done. Soon after I arrived Captain Parsons brought to Los Alamos a Mr. Busby, an old Navy ordnance civilian to be in charge of explosives manufacture. And so the issue very soon became who, Busby or Kistiakowsky? I knew more about explosives. Busby was a little difficult because when you disagreed with him about what was safe and what was unsafe, he would say “and have you ever picked up a man on a shore?” So Mr. Busby designed and had built the first explosives casting plant. It was a monstrosity from our point of view. Actually, what he had built in the spring of 1944 was never used afterwards.

Then came the summer of 1944. I insisted that we build another plant.

According to our concepts and proposed a completely new site for it, in Pajarito Canyon. Captain Parsons rejected that and insisted that the existing S-site be expanded and that’s where the work went. But it was built according to our designs, and it worked. One of the reasons I didn’t like the S-site was that to get the raw explosives there they had to be trucked all the way over the mesa, right through the center of the Los Alamos project, with the whole theoretical division sitting in offices on one side of the road, Oppenheimer’s office (and mine) on the other, and with hundreds of wild WAACs and GIs driving trucks and jeeps there. I can assure you that a truck loaded with a ton of high explosive (H.E.) going off there would have wiped out 90% of the brains in those temporary buildings. The roads leading from the main project to the S-site, which was a few miles south of them, were dangerously rough. Once, so an apocalyptic story goes, when General Groves visited Los Alamos, I took him to the S-site in my jeep that had the springs made inoperative by wooden blocks inserted under them. General Groves was rather rotten in shape. As a result of that trip the roads over which H.E. were moved were improved.

We had developed in NDRC complete different notions from those of the Ordnance Corps about what was dangerous and what was safe in handling high explosives. At Los Alamos we handled them by the ton, whereas one gram of explosive going off in your hand will finish off the whole hand. By the end of the war we had cast and machine, following our rules of safety, tens of thousands of H.E. castings without a single accident. And we did it without barricades, which are required by ordinance rules. There was no time to build barricades. So we just worked. The S-site was managed by the Army Captain Jerry Ackerman, a civil engineer before the war, with a few very young Navy lieutenants and ensigns, like Hopper, Wilder, Chapell and a large number of GIs, who were called SEs (Special Engineer Detachment), doing most of the work. Also there were quite a few civilians such as Price and Gurinsky, who were mostly in a development section, to find how to cast these explosive slurries. They were mixtures of explosives, a so-called Composition B and another explosive, Baratol, which we had developed at the Brueton (Pittsburgh) NDRC Explosives Laboratory, and which was used for lesions. Up to 25 tons of H.E. was trucked up the hill monthly during the most active period. The manufacture of the H.E. charges was really hard, tough and dirty work. A lot of people thought it was also very dangerous and because of that I went to S-site very infrequently and tried out new operations simply to show confidence in what we were preaching.

One of the very important contributors to our success was Master Sergeant
Tenney, in peacetime a doctor of physics, who developed non-destructive X-ray inspection of castings. Before the middle of 1944 all we could do was to cut a casting with a saw to see whether it was homogeneous or had bubbles and cracks. Gradually Jerry Tenney's project grew into a mammoth operation with millions of X-ray and gamma-ray sources to inspect all the castings.

The implosion experimentation involved exploding the castings and trying to find out whether they did what they hoped they would do to the metatube. It was originally carried on by Neddermeyer, Greisen, Lynch, Kaufmann, and an increasing number of SkD assistants. What became more and more clear was that if an explosive charge was detonated simultaneously from several points then trouble developed. Remember that detonation waves are like acoustic waves, more or less, but they develop enormous pressures and travel through the explosive at a speed of seven to eight thousand meters per second (five miles per second). At the point where two detonation waves meet, a metal core is squeezed into a high velocity jet and complete chaos develops.

In other words, this sort of thing makes implosion impossible. To solve that trouble, first Linschitz, then Koski, then Jim Tuck, a member of the British technical mission who was staying in our work, began experiments with explosive lenses. I wouldn't go into details except to say that the principle on which these lenses is based is just like that of the optical lenses, where you have two media of different refractive index, such as air and glass, and therefore a different velocity of light in each. If you have two explosives with different detonation velocities, and you put them together in the right way you can shape the wave, and instead of having it expand, make it converge. It's not simple, but it can be done. And I arranged with the Brookhaven NORD laboratory, particularly with Dr. MacDougall and Ryster, to develop an explosive, Baratol, for the slower component of the lens.

There is an interesting story about Baratol. Lord Cherwell, who was originally professor of physics Lindemann at Oxford, and was the science advisor to Winston Churchill, came to Los Alamos in 1944. He had been a very kind and helpful host when I spent part of the spring and summer of 1944 in England learning about explosives technology from the British. He was very considerate then, and took me to his 'private' explosives research laboratories. His staff there was developing tricks things for the British command. Very interesting ideas. Well, so he fancied himself as an explosives expert. I was trying to be extra polite, so I took him around Los Alamos and gave him absolutely the whole story. He listened to me and told me that Baratol was going to be no good for the lens, that I should use commercial dynamite. I explained to him why, on theoretical grounds, dynamite couldn't work and we parted friends. A little later Oppenheimer called me in to tell me about Churchill's personal cable to Roosevelt saying that certain people, specifically Kistiaxowsky at Los Alamos, are backing up the wrong tree, since Baratol is not going to work, and that they should use dynamite. I suggested to Oppenheimer that he could tell the sender to go to hell. Naturally it tended by my agreeing to set up a group to study dynamite lenses. So I went through a rather long G (Explosives) Division personnel list, singled out individuals who hadn't contributed anything, constituted a group out of them, and so dynamite didn't delay the project in the slightest.

Because of organizational difficulties and the growing importance of implosion, in July and August 1944 there was a big reorganization. Persons continued to head the Ordnance Division but two new divisions were created, X and G. I ran the X, which did the high explosive charges development work and the experiments with the already developed observational methods on implosion dynamics, also less development, and some other tasks. We ran this division in a very democratic fashion, with frequent meetings for discussing the results of what we had done, scheduling new experiments, allocating the output from the Sante and so on. Unfortunately, my young associates like Linschitz, Koski, Anzum, Tenney, and others were regarded as high above, as too young to be made into group leaders because then they would be on a par with people like Edwin McMillan, Luis Alvarez, and Edward Teller. So they were made into section leaders, and Commandant Norris Bradbury, professor of physics at Stanford, was brought in August from the Dahlgren Naval Proving Grounds to head group Act, which was consolidated of about five sections headed by these youngsters. They operated the sections in a very autonomous fashion because each had his own experimental site for safety reasons -- maybe as much as a mile apart. And the lads were fairly self-contained, perhaps even possessing a lathe, a few盛宴 and so on.

The G (Gadget Physics) Division, Robert Tulsier being put in charge of it, undertook to develop new experimental methods of observing the movements of the pit after being struck by the detonation wave, and also to design the pit, including of course the plutonium sphere, which added to this reorganization was partly due to the theoretical conclusion that implosion was the only way in which an effective plutonium bomb could be made. I welcomed this separation of functions because by then the total implosion staff became much too difficult to manage. But in a few months' time our relations with the G Division became not very happy because the G groups put tremendous demands on the Sante to provide them with tricky explosive castings, which
the S-site simply could not meet without stopping supplies for the X Division experiments and interfering with its own development of better casting methods. So we as a group began to feel that the G Division was merely delaying the progress of the implosion project by working on such complex experimental methods that they would never yield anything useful in time. I must admit that G Division people didn’t share our views. Since Bob Bacher is not a shrinking violet, he and I had some very heated arguments. Oppenheimer, I think, backed him more than me—maybe Bob Bacher has a different view—and so Oppie even brought Charles Lauritsen from Cal Tech to Los Alamos to help the X Division as his, Oppenheimer’s, personal assistant. That added to my troubles, because the key source of delay in providing more castings was that we couldn’t get enough molds in which to make castings. These molds were really precision devices because the shapes into which explosives had to be cast were such that we could not machine rough shaped castings with the tools available at the S-site. They had to be cast into precise shapes. Some were not small. For instance, full-sized castings weighed up to 100 pounds or so. Some X Division people, especially Bob Henderson and Earl Long, were of tremendous help in providing precision molds. Gradually huge machine shops were created at Los Alamos for this and other purposes—more than 500 machinists and toolmakers were working there at one time.

I think that certainly not the least factor in our success was Master Sergeant Fitzpatrick (SED), our X Division procurement and scrounging wizard. We learned early in the game that if we followed the rules of the Manhattan District, we wouldn’t get anywhere. The slow facility construction and procurement delays, and the shortages of all kinds of materials were a real problem. When Charlie Lauritsen came to Los Alamos he was critical of our procurement efforts. So Charlie said that his Cal Tech Navy rocket project staff will solve our molds problems; they didn’t in time, and so the spring of 1945 was very short on molds and very rich in recriminations.

By late 1944 so much pessimism was developing about our ability to build satisfactory lenses that Captain Parsons began urging (and he was not alone in this) that we give up lenses completely and try somehow to patch up the non-lens type of implosion. So, in early 1945 we had a top-level meeting with General Groves present in which a kind of fusion royal was fought, in a friendly way, between Parsons and me because I felt that we couldn’t just patch implosion without lenses and he felt we couldn’t make the lenses. Oppenheimer in the end decided for the lenses and that was that.

In the early days of the implosion project, to get detonation started all over a sphere of explosives there was one electric detonator firing a branching circuit of Primacord. Primacord is a rope-like detonating fuse which transmits the detonation wave at a speed of some three miles per second. The ends of this circuit were embedded at appropriate points in the explosive charge. The use of multiple electric detonators, or blasting caps, was objected to by Parsons’ Ordnance Division because the Army-Navy rules require that there be a mechanical ‘gate’, that is, a piece of metal, between a detonator and the main explosive charge which has to be withdrawn before firing. For instance, in an artillery shell, the ‘gate’ is withdrawn by centrifugal force after the spinning shell leaves the muzzle of the gun. This makes the shell safer to handle before firing, because detonators are dangerously sensitive to impact and heat. To install as many such gates as would be necessary in the implosion device was just an engineering nightmare. Furthermore, the electric detonators then in existence had horribly poor timing, so that to explode them simultaneously looked, to us at least, absolutely impossible. Mind you, since detonation waves travel almost a centimeter per micro-second, the timing we were concerned about were fractions of a millionth of a second.

We did a lot of experimenting with Primacord ordered in fancy, expensive, special batches. Lt. Shafer did most of this work. The Primacord just wasn’t good enough.

Luis Alvarez in the summer of 1944 started experimenting with electric detonators and, I must say, completely to my surprise, found a way of setting them off in such a way that the simultaneity was very acceptable. Then new detonators were designed by Alvarez with my help, that we were able to persuade Captain Parsons to drop the requirement of ‘mechanical gates.’ So we abandoned Primacord. Then Bainbridge, Fussell, and Hurlin in our division began work on what we called the X-unit, an electric device to fire these new detonators simultaneously. Alvarez moved to other problems in the G Division, Bainbridge went to head the Alamogordo Trinity test site, and Greisen in our division took over the detonators in the spring of 1945.

That turned out to be a very nasty and unfinished problem because we couldn’t get reproducibility with the Alvarez detonators. Most of them worked fine, but since one had to have many for each implosion, and even the failure of one could be a catastrophic failure, everyone in the circuit didn’t give adequate assurance. So Kistiauskas and Jackson did a very clever piece of physico-chemical research on the explosive charge in the detonators and found a way of making them reproducible.

To test or not to test the plutonium bomb was a very hot issue in the fall of 1944. Oppenheimer and I were pleading with General Groves that there had to be a test because the whole scheme was too uncertain, but General
By the way, a sad story about Jumbo. Groves was very sensitive about Jumbo and kept accusing me personally about it. Once he said to me, "Now you are responsible for Jumbo, and it is not being used, so what am I going to tell the Senate? Look here, we got that cyclotron from Harvard for Los Alamos. How about you convincing Commissary that when he goes back to the presidency of Harvard he should accept Jumbo in trade for the cyclotron at Los Alamos?" Actually Jumbo had a very sad end after the war. In the fall of 1945 Groves suddenly remembered that ghastly thing and told his aide-de-camp to arrange for a test. So he would be able to tell the Senate committee that the thing had been used. Well, you know the way it is in the Army. The orders filtered down, down from Washington to Albuquerque, Albuquerque to White Sands Proving Grounds, and so on. It ended with some poor lieutenant taking a box of high explosive and instead of suspending it in the center of Jumbo, putting it on the bottom of Jumbo and firing it. Naturally, the high explosive knocked out a nice clean hole in Jumbo, so that was the end of the matter. The U.S. Senate never caught on to the Jumbo extravaganza and its battered remains are still there, half buried near the Trinity site.

The Special Engineering Detachment (SED) was very important. General Groves insisted that, in distinction to technical staff civilians, most of whom lived quite comfortably in a highly hierarchically organized society, the enlisted personnel be given only what the Army regulations stipulated as the minimum comforts: minimum housing, minimum recreation, minimum food facilities. And this meant 40 square feet per man in the barracks, including part of the recreation area. Try to recreate yourself in that area. So the poor SEDs, of whom we had more than a thousand at the end of the war, really felt themselves the pariahs of Los Alamos. And moreover the commanding officer of the SED detachment was a South Bostorian. You must have read a little about South Boston in the Fall of 1974 when the Boston schools opened. Well, he was a true South Bostorian and besides he had been wounded in the heel, in fact the back of the heel, on the first day of Eisenhower's African landing. As a result, he simply hated the world, and especially the long-haired scientists, notably those from Harvard. Since he was not told, as many other military weren't (nor the machinists, of course), what the purpose of Los Alamos was, he loudly described all of us as draft dodgers who were just escaping Army service and having fun here. He insisted that the SEDs be awakened by a reveille and be mustered daily and do calisthenics and keep the barracks in order and even wear caps and salute officers on the streets. These were insulting ideas to most of the SEDs. Since my division had the most SEDs and we had very good relations, there finally came to me an SED delegation who said they were going to complain to the War Department unless that officer was removed. I said, "Look, this is silly in war time—don't," but they said "Then do something about it." So I naturally went to Oppenheimer and he, not for the first time, argued with General Groves—probably no avail. Later, when Groves came again to Los Alamos I asked permission to talk to him. He said, "Yes, while I am being driven back to Albuquerque." So after midnight I got into my car and we went on that 24-hour trip to Albuquerque and argued about SED. Of course Groves immediately told me that as a civilian I had no business to tell him anything about Army matters. And I said that the SEDs were part of my technical staff, they had to report to me, they had to work for me, and therefore I had the authority. Well, I got absolutely nowhere. I then used my ultimate weapon: I said I would resign. Still seemingly no effect. Well, I didn't have time to resign, because in a little while the South Bostonian became the Manager of the Office's Mess and the SED got a new commanding officer, a very nice tall Texan, who made absolutely no disciplinary demands and spent most of his time drinking in the company of a very cute WAAC. Eventually both slid with them down a canyon-side, but that was after the war. And they didn't get hurt, they were so relaxed.

The Trinity test was the climax of our work. The site is 200 miles south of Los Alamos in a part of a bombing range called Jornada del Muerto desert, not very near Alamogordo, but in that region. The G Division and Oppenheimer insisted that a perfect replica of the charge to be exploded at the
Trinity test be fired at Los Alamos using the so-called magnetic method observation technique. We were desperately short of adequate H.E. castings. A few days, maybe a week, before the test, after borrowing an electrician's drill, I spent most of a night drilling holes in imperfect castings where Sergeant Tenney had discovered bubbles of air. It reached the bubbles and then poured molten explosives into these channels to fill the bubbles and drill holes and in that way make the castings better, because we knew that when there were bubbles the detonation wave became distorted. Just like the bubbles in an optical lens, or scratches do, in that way we repaired enough castings so that the two assemblies, each weighing several tons, were assembled, with Norris Bradbury in charge of this particular job.

The assembly to be fired at Trinity had to be trucked through Santa Fe and Albuquerque and a lot of people outside the X Division thought that these assemblies were far more dangerous than ordinary iron aircraft bombs, which they really weren't at all. So I rather vividly remember that I got on a truck with a loaded assembly and drove it around the Los Alamos roads which were certainly worse than any roads we would encounter on the trip to the Alamogordo site, just to show that nothing would happen. A few minutes past midnight on Friday the 13th, my choice, because I believed in omens, but Bradbury and I took the assembly in a convoy to the Trinity site.

Bainbridge had been in charge of planning and then developing the Trinity test site since 1944. But in 1945, as this project expanded and became more and more tense, he was separated from the X Division and became head of a new TK Division. This grew of course to a very large size, because so many experiments and observations were being tested for and at the Trinity site. Hornig, about July 10, 1945, (six days before actual test), took several X units to Trinity because several observational instruments had to be triggered by the firing of the X unit for simultaneity. And so they had to use the X unit to assure synchronisation. A day or two later there came a violent storm and the X unit being used fired prematurely by itself. Well, a human storm followed over Hornig's head for incompetent design because people imagined this happening when it was connected to the bomb. Until, that is, Hornig discovered that the grounding wire was pulled off or burned or something and the X unit got a huge static charge from the lightning. That sort of relieved the human storm.

We arrived two days later, early on Friday, to encounter another emotional scene. The second X unit failed dismally the evening before and Don Hornig spent most of the night being grilled - and the word is grilled, not questioned - by Oppenheimer and Bacher, being accused of incompetent work and so on. As soon as we arrived I was told what they thought of me as a manager of these incompetent youngsters. So Don Hornig and I went finally to look at the X unit which was located under the bomb tower and discovered that the people who were using it while testing their instruments, horribly abused the unit. The unit was designed to be used only once, and it was tested about ten times to make sure that it worked fine. Well, these characters used it in rapid succession hundreds of times and overheated it so that some soldered joints melted. This discovery relaxed the atmosphere in the headquarters. But Saturday morning another awful thing happened. A telephone message came from Los Alamos that the G Division's magnetic method group found their H.E. assembly's detonation so bad that they could guarantee the failure of the bomb at Trinity. So of course I immediately became the chief villain and everybody lectured me - Oppenheimer, Groves, Bush, who was there by then with Conant. Did they tell me what was wrong with me! Only Conant was reasonable. Sunday morning another phone call came with wonderful news. Hans Bethe spent the whole night of Saturday analyzing the electromagnetic theory of this experiment and discovered that the instrumental design was such that even a perfect implosion couldn't produce a bubble of air, which was what we were supposed to do. So I became again acceptable to local high society.

On Friday or Saturday, Bacher and his group inserted the plutonium into the pit, then Bradbury and a couple of SEDs replaced the H.E. castings, which had been taken out to be able to get into the pit. The bomb was hustled to the top of the hundred-foot tower. There Hornig installed a fresh X unit and Linschitz and Kalevka, an SED in our division, finally inserted the detonators into the charge. I had very little to do the last two days, just watch others. Sunday night I spent partly up on the bomb tower with Bainbridge and two others below me because weather was bad for the test which therefore had to be delayed and Groves insisted that there was danger of sabotage to the bomb - a perfectly idiotic idea. So we were supposed to watch it with a sub-machine gun in the hands of Captain Bush and that sort of thing. Finally, the decision to fire was made at five-thirty in the morning. We drove back, first unlocking the box containing the safety switch and all of us solemnly watching as Bainbridge closed the switch and locked the box. Then we drove a mile, repeated the operation on a switch box in a trench, and finally got to the locked box in the control bunker six miles away, opened it and closed dust switch. The thing was ready to be fired. I had nothing to do and so just before the time counting came to zero I went up to the top of the control bunker, put on dark glasses and turned away from the tower. I didn't
think anything would happen to me, although I was sure that improvisation would work, because I was rather convinced that the physicists exaggerated what would happen from a nuclear point of view. Well, I was as wrong as they were on Saturday. As soon as the explosion took place, Oppenheimer and others rushed to join me and I slapped Oppenheimer on the back and said, “Oopie, you owe me ten dollars” because in that desperate period when I was being accused as the world’s worst villain, who would be forever damned by the physicists for failing the project, I told Oppenheimer, “I bet you my whole month’s salary against ten dollars that improvisation will work.” I still have that bill, with Oppenheimer’s signature. Now, there is something more to that story, because after VJ day there was a lot of nonsense published in Santa Fe and other more or less local papers about the Trinity test, that I was, as they put it, a temperamental Russian who lost his self-control and embraced and kissed Oppenheimer, whereas all I did was slap him on the back and say, “Oopie, you owe me ten bucks.” So, after VJ day, when we had a sort of post-mortem, and all the group leaders of the project must have been there, Oppie said, “You must have read those stories; I want to testify that they are wrong, George never kissed me, but I am now going to kiss him.” He did that and gave me the ten dollar bill.

Let me now make a few remarks of a more personal nature. General Groves was really a terror to his subordinates. He was a skillful manager, but he always did things so as to make life difficult for the subordinates. However, he and I had perfectly good relations. I think he saw me as more or less the effete physicist because of my improvisations. I was to him a sort of kindred spirit.

I had very good relations also with Oppenheimer. He had an incredible ability to have all the threads of this enormous project in his mind and to make the right technical decisions. As to his managerial skills, that’s a little different story. Conant regularly came to the project because he was the really active member of the Military Policy Committee, and he and I usually had private technical conversations. I met several times with Niel Bohr when he was at Los Alamos but only because he wanted to know from me how improvisation was progressing. I naturally dealt a lot with the British group – Chadwick, Piers, Tuck, Penney. The man who eventually turned out to be a spy, Fuchs, managed to put himself into a very important position. He was a member of the Theoretical Physics Division, like Professor Hirschfelder, but he also arranged to be appointed as the liaison between Theoretical Physics and X Division, so that he sat in on all our discussions and planning meetings.

At Los Alamos I was treated like a VIP. I had special housing, a tiny little store cabin that used to be a diesel station before the war. Oppenheimer said me, for a nominal sum, one of his saddle horses, a beautiful Quarter horse named Crisis. The Army maintained a horse stable in Los Alamos and for a small fee took care of a half-dozen or so private horses. We never worked on Sundays, that was a hard and fast rule, so on Sundays I rode horseback in the mountains. In the winter of 1944-1945 we built a ski slope nearby using explosives to cut down the trees. We had a lot of surplus plastic explosive, the demolition explosive, and if one builds a half necklace around the tree, then the explosion cuts it as if you had a chain saw – and it’s faster. A little noisier, though. Then we scavenged equipment to build a rope tow and it became a nice little ski slope. From my friends in Washington, I got a couple of skimobiles which weren’t like the modern skimobiles but more like jeeps on tracks. They weren’t very good but we managed to use them to go skiing further out. I played a lot of poker with important people like Johnny Von Neumann, Stan Ulam, etc. You see, before coming to Los Alamos, I went through a very rigorous and expensive poker training school in Washington, headed by Roger Adams, NDRC member and my boss. So when I came to Los Alamos I discovered that these people didn’t know how to play poker and offered to teach them. At the end of the evening they got annoyed occasionally when we added up the chips. I used to point out that if they had tried to learn violin playing, it would cost them even more per hour. Unfortunately, before the end of the war, these great theoretical minds caught onto poker and the evening’s accounts became less attractive from my point of view.

We did quite a lot of partying on Saturday nights, but there was one big party after VJ day in Bacher’s house, and by the time we had quite a few refreshments my physicist friends started telling me that I must arrange for a 21 gun salute. Of course I didn’t have the guns. Finally, I got into my jeep and got one of my younger friends out of bed, who then insisted on driving the jeep. We went to the H.E. magazines, got out 21 boxes of Composition B (50 pounds each), laid them out on the field (I was stumbling a little because the field was very rough) and fired them off. It was a very impressive performance but when I got back to the party those bastards told me I fired 22 shots.

DISCUSSION

Question: What field did Von Neumann work in during those days?

Kistiakowsky: Von Neumann throughout the war was a consultant to Los Alamos. He spent, toward the end, I think, as much as half of his time there.
When he was there he was a member of the Theoretical Physics Division. But even earlier, you see, he did the important job of convincing Oppenheimer and others who questioned Neumann that if the implosion were perfect, the forces acting on the pit would be such as to compress the plutonium to a density that one would presumably find near the center of a star or something like that, and thereby very rapidly change it from a sub-critical, in the nuclear sense, to a highly supercritical assembly. Von Neumann was very much in favor of implosion. In 1947-1942 he did some important theoretical work for the explosives division which I headed in NDRC (Division B). So his interest in explosives was genuine.

Question: Some of the information passed by the Rosenbergs to the Russians concerned the lens and your aspect of the project. How critical was that information?

Kistiakowsky: That is something I have been asked about before. From reading Mr. Khmaladze's memoirs and some other information, I gather that the Russians had started the atom bomb project quite early in the war. For instance, there is the story that when Stalin met with Truman in July of 1945 and Truman told him of a successful Trinity test the day before, Stalin acted as if it were of no interest to him at all. According to Khmaladze, however, he immediately sent a message to Moscow to put Beria in charge of the project. So the project must have been going. Under those conditions the very crude sketches of Greenglass could not have been of great importance. Maybe of no importance whatever. I think what probably was far more important is what Fuchs transmitted because he was able to send detailed results of calculations and also the information on problems of timing the detonation and a lot of other things like that. I think though that even this did not make a tremendous difference, because if turned out that to cause the implosion is a much easier job than we thought it was. But it might have accelerated the Russian bomb by a year or two. This would be my guess. But it's only a guess.

Question: I have often wondered how much sooner World War II would have been over if there had been no atom bomb project and so many of our scientists and resources had not been shifted from conventional arms to the atom bomb. Surely this would have speeded up the German part of the war and probably the Japanese.

Kistiakowsky: Well, it's a speculation in which I will not engage. After all, the Manhattan District, which was active during the war, was not a very large project — two billion dollars in three years — at a time when the total war effort was costing nearly a hundred billion dollars a year. So when you refer to resources, you mean the very special resources that were in tremendous demand, but whether they would have altered the war's progress, I don't know. Whether Japan would have delayed surrendering is also an unsolved question. I think that what one now knows suggests that they would have surrendered anyway. We were told, and I am not sure whether the military intelligence people came to Los Alamos or whether Oppenheimer brought the news from Washington, that according to our Naval Intelligence (as you know there are several kinds of intelligence: there is human intelligence, there's animal intelligence, there's the military intelligence), that according to Naval Intelligence, Japan was ready to continue fighting the war and that we would have to go through with our plan of invading the main Japanese islands in November 1945 and that there would probably be a million casualties before the war ended. That information had a tremendous impact on me, on my thinking about the military use of the bomb. Since then, it's become pretty clear that Japan was ready to continue fighting the war even if we did not drop the bomb.

Question: Do you think that it is easy for a small group of terrorists to construct nuclear weapons?

Kistiakowsky: That is an estimate which I've heard advanced by Dr. Theodore Taylor. I don't think so. Perhaps I am too proud of our work. I think you couldn't build a reliable bomb without doing some experimentation with explosives and that experimentation is more than a small private group could undertake. On the other hand, it would not require the resources of a Soviet Union or India to build a bomb. It could be done on very much of a shoestring. The bomb wouldn't perform as well, but there is quite a leeway. Certainly nothing approaching the complexity of the Trinity bomb and of the implosion bomb dropped over Japan, I would say, would require a very major effort. Assuming you already have the fissionable material, I would estimate several million dollars worth of effort and a couple of years. One could build a much cruder bomb, but even then it would require some resources. Let's say a country possessing one technical university and some military forces and some kind of proving grounds could do it.

Question: What does a lens have to do with implosion? Is it a lens like the lens in my glasses?

Kistiakowsky: It's not an optical lens, though it functions similarly. The explosive lens bends the explosion wave going through the explosive. To an
innocent it looks like another piece of explosive. It’s made out of two different explosives, and that’s the secret of it.

**Question:** Were the scientists at all disturbed that Truman decided to drop the bomb on a population center instead of testing the bomb in an uninhabited area? Did the scientists have anything to say about how the bomb would be used?

**Kistiakowsky:** Well, the scientists in the Chicago part of the Manhattan District — the Met Lab, which by the spring of 1945 was almost inactive because it had done its job — became extremely active trying to stop the military use of the bomb over a city, urging a harmless demonstration instead.

At Los Alamos we had some conversations on the subject and I must admit that my own position was that the atom bomb is no worse than the fire raids which our B-29s were doing daily in Japan, and anything to end the war quickly was the thing to do. Other people felt differently but there was no organized movement at Los Alamos to stop the bomb use. I changed my mind afterwards but I was very much influenced by the military intelligence estimate of what would happen that summer. I won’t go into detail of some of the more technical arguments against making a demonstration, but it looked unfavourable to me.

**Question:** Was the second bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki necessary? Didn’t it just a very minor point in the surrender terms remain, namely the safety of the Emperor?

**Kistiakowsky:** The Japanese position was that they could not surrender unconditionally because that would probably mean that the Emperor would be deposed and maybe even executed. They were willing to surrender if the monarchy would be retained. I think our excuse for dropping the second bomb was very weak. As I recall it, the argument was let’s drop them quickly — one, two — to give the Japanese government the idea that we have an unlimited supply. We only had two. It would have been at least a month, or maybe two, before another bomb could be produced and dropped over Japan. But, of course, we at Los Alamos had absolutely no control over their use once the bombs were shipped overseas. This happened within ten days or so after Trinity, as soon as we manufactured the new set of H-bomb castings. The other type of bomb, the gun type, which was used over Hiroshima, was shipped overseas even before the Trinity test. After that, there was nothing we could change.

**Question:** You said that you had to cut through red tape, to cut corners in order to make any progress. I wonder if you would describe some of those methods.

**Kistiakowsky:** Now, sir, they will remain secret. Well, let me tell you this much. There was an extraordinary elaborate procurement system for military security purposes. We had to order everything from an office in Los Angeles. That office, acting as a part of the University of California, and not of Los Alamos, which was secret, then ordered things from all over the country. These things were shipped to Los Angeles and then were delivered from there to Los Alamos. That resulted in terrible delays and errors. We found ways of getting around them.

**Question:** Was there any awareness in your group of German progress along the same lines?

**Kistiakowsky:** The development of German progress was the thing that was nagging us. But by the end of 1944 it became pretty obvious that the Germans didn’t have the bomb and wouldn’t have it in time. Then the argument presented to us became that we must end the war with Japan as quickly as possible. But in earlier days it was a very real fear that the German bomb would be built and would win the war for them. As a matter of fact, that interesting job assignment abroad I missed because of going to Los Alamos had to do with trying to find out what the Nazis were doing on the A-bomb.

**Question:** Was there just one piece of plutonium in the bomb?

**Kistiakowsky:** We had plutonium cast into two hemispheres that fitted very neatly together. And we had no more plutonium at Los Alamos. The plutonium, however, was being manufactured very rapidly at Hanford and so within a relatively short time after Trinity a second sphere was made at Los Alamos and taken to Tinian Island.

**Question:** What effect did the ending of the war with Germany have on Los Alamos?

**Kistiakowsky:** We celebrated it.

**Question:** I mean in terms of your feelings about the project, its motivation, things like that.

**Kistiakowsky:** Well, naturally it became less important, the whole thing became less intense, but we began to realize that we were certain to win the war. But, as I said, the feeling was conveyed to us that Japan was very far from surrender, that the war would continue for a long time. That continued to provide, I think, the emotional cohesion of the laboratory staff.
V-3?

The terrible novelty of V-3 had by no means worn off yet, but London last week was already abuzz with speculation about V-3—supposedly an atomic bomb. Allied bombers renewed their attentions to Rjukan, Norway, the site of a heavy-water plant which the Nazis have recently rebuilt after its destruction by the R.A.F. and Norwegian patriots last year. Meanwhile, British censors passed a London dispatch giving the most circumstantial account to date of atomic bomb possibilities. According to this account, the Nazis may have discovered an entirely new approach to atomic explosives. Before wartime censorship blacked out all talk of atomic experiments, it was known that most scientists put their atom-smashing hopes mainly in cyclotron bombardment of atoms with deuterons—the heavy hydrogen nuclei derived from heavy water. Individual atoms have been smashed, but in a bomb atoms must explode in quantity, each disintegrating atom setting off others. The new Nazi experiments are said to be along lines suggested by the composition of the "White Dwarf," companion of Sirius, which is the densest known star.

The White Dwarf is so dense (specific gravity: 16,690) that a cubic inch of its substance weighs about one ton. Physicists believe that ordinary atoms could not be compressed to such density, and they suppose that the tremendous pressures and high temperature of the White Dwarf have broken up its atoms, letting their space-hungry electrons escape and leaving only the much more compact atomic nuclei. The speculative London report suggested that the Nazis are using the same pressure principle to crush atoms. The crusher: A "Neuman" demolition charge, which explodes inward instead of outward. Used in a sphere, the Neuman charge might develop pressures of tens of thousands of tons per square inch at the center, perhaps enough to disintegrate an unstable atom such as uranium and release its explosive atomic energy. British scientists believe that such an explosion, though not far-reaching in area, would develop unheard-of violence at the point of impact.

What is V-2? Last week V-2 was still almost as great a mystery as V-3. If the British had recovered any clues for examination, they were keeping mum about it. Some Hollander claimed they had seen V-2 launched from bare ground; others, from 80-ft. concrete pits. Some experts thought it could have been launched from barges off the Dutch coast. V-2 was variously reported to be guided by radio, by gyro compass, by fans, by spanning. But on one thing experts agreed: V-2 is a self-contained rocket, carrying its own oxygen and traveling at such speed (3,500 m.p.h.) that ordinary antiaircraft defenses are useless against it.

The consensus: V-2 is probably propelled by alcohol or gasoline and liquid oxygen. It has a warhead with about a ton of explosive, a supply of compressed gas (perhaps nitrogen) to force the fuel into the combustion chamber, and fins to keep it on a set course. It is believed to carry at least seven times the weight of its explosive in fuel. It probably has a series of jets, operated in succession to keep the rocket going on its long course (and perhaps helpful also in steering). One plausible reconstruction, by Martial & Scull, Manhattan industrial designers, indicated a steering mechanism in the tail (see cut). It seems unlikely that V-2 is steered by radio, since it is not and, at the heights to which V-2 climbs (60 miles or more), accurate observation to correct its deviations from the set course would be difficult. With a trajectory like that of a long-range shell, dropping sharply from its peak height, V-2 is probably launched at about a 30° angle from the ground for its 250-300 mile flight.

Glimpses of the Moon. Last week Britain's famed Jack-of-all-sciences, J. B. S. Haldane, philosophically predicted a big postwar future for V-2, which he thought could rise to 200 miles if fired vertically. Mixe Haldane: "It could take photographs . . . or . . . If the sun and perhaps Venus. . . . For the cost of a day of war, it should be practicable to send a series of rockets round the moon and photograph its far side."

Whither, Swift?

The chimney swift is one of the swiftest small birds alive (up to 130 m.p.h.), Until last week no one had ever been able to say where it was going in such a hurry, when it took off for the winter. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has banded 375,000 swifts, never tracing one to its winter hideout. For lack of a better theory, some naturalists surmised that the swifts buried themselves in swamps to hibernate. Indian hunters in a South American jungle produced the first evidence of the swift's winter whereabouts—13 bands taken from birds they had killed. The place: the Vasyaco River valley in Peru. The birds had been banded in Tennessee, Illinois, Connecticut, Alabama, Georgia, Ontario. Cried Frederick C. Lincoln, official U.S. observer of bird migrations: "One of the most important ornithological discoveries in at least two decades."

Ornithologist Lincoln added that the swift discovery left only one North American bird-mapping mystery unsolved: where nests the bristle-thighed curlew? No one has ever found its nest or eggs.

Superman of the Waldorf

The late Nikolas Tesla was a spectacular, eccentric scientist and showman. Sure that his name will outlive Thomas Edison's, Tesla's admirers hold that he and Michael Faraday were the greatest electrical discoverers of modern times. Last week one admirer, who according to the inventor himself understood him "better than any man alive," published the first Tesla biography—Prodigal Genius (Ives Washburn; $3.75). The author: John J. O'Neill, science editor of the New York Herald Tribune.

O'Neill, throwing off journalistic reserve, describes Tesla as "a superman—unequaled by one of the world's greatest geniuses."

O'Neill credits him not only with inventing the polyphase alternating current generator and Tesla induction motor, which . . . No one has ever found its nest or eggs.

TIME, NOVEMBER 27, 1944
NOW IT CAN BE TOLD

THE STORY OF THE MANHATTAN PROJECT

BY LESLIE R. GROVES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED

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We wished, too, to avoid any widespread mention of such places as Hanford or Oak Ridge and all mention of Los Alamos, as well as any reference to the MED. We also did not want any mention of my name that might arouse the interest of a foreign agent in my activities. Yet to have banned all reference in the near-by papers to Oak Ridge or Hanford would have been neither practical nor desirable, for it would only have tended to attract attention locally. We did try to keep Los Alamos entirely out of the news, but the Knoxville papers were permitted to carry items—mostly in the nature of social notes—about employees and events at Oak Ridge, though nothing, of course, that would help the average reader determine the purpose of the project or its importance. The same leeway was given to the papers close to Hanford.

We did have several unfortunate security breaks, but none of them, so far as we could ever find out, attracted any particular interest. The one with the worst potential for damage was a radio program that discussed the possibilities of an atomic explosion. The script for this had been prepared for the regular news reporter on a network program; he himself had had nothing to do with writing it. Unfortunately, in order to meet his travel schedule, he delivered it from a small affiliated station, where apparently it had not been reviewed to make certain that it did not violate press censorship rules.

From all that we could ever discover, there had been no deliberate breach of security. The information on which the talk was based came from a scientist who was not connected with the project in any way but who evidently had an inkling of what was going on, gleaned, we thought, from some of the project’s scientists at the large laboratory in his city. The actual text was written for the reporter by a friend of the scientist. There was never any question in my mind but that the reporter delivered it in good faith. The failure of the radio station to stop it was attributable to plain carelessness.

Another incident that concerned us greatly was the appearance in a national magazine of an article hinting at the theory of implosion. While it did not violate any rules, it was most disturbing. A thorough investigation indicated that it resulted from the work of an alert and inquisitive reporter in another country.

There was one unfortunate happening not too long before the bombing, when a Congressman, in discussing an appropriations bill, commented on the importance of the Hanford Project. This item was picked out of the Congressional Record and was republished in a newspaper without any comment. I could never disabuse myself of the feeling that this newspaper did it with the deliberate intent of letting me know that our security prohibitions were not so effective as we thought.

After the war the excellent cooperation of the American press continued. Articles written by anyone with access to classified information were invariably cleared with my office. In one instance a newspaper learned of a rather large construction job in progress and wrote a series of articles about its most unusual character. Although the publisher of the paper completely disagreed with me, he canceled the articles before publication when I said that I thought it would be injurious to the best interests of the United States to publish them.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Oct. 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
MRS. ANNA ROSENBERG:

Will you check on this again?

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Union organizational activities in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California.

The Army officers in charge of an important and secret project are inquiring as to the status of the Unionization activities at the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California and the possibility of the cessation of such activity. I enclose herewith a copy of my memorandum to you of September 9th and would greatly appreciate it if you could advise me whether results can be accomplished along this line in order that the security of the project may be protected.

(Penned notation) You will remember that I explained to you personally the seriousness of this danger and the extreme urgency of action.

s/ HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War

Encl: Copy memo. to the President, 9/9/43.
September 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: FAFCT Organizational Activities in the Radiation Laboratory.

1. There has been a marked increase recently in union organizing activity in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California in Berkeley which is engaged upon one of the most important phases of the work on uranium fission. This organizational activity is being carried on by the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (CIO) Local No. 25. In the furtherance of their organizational activity this union is assembling lists of the scientific and technical personnel of the laboratory, and necessarily acquiring considerable information with respect to the work being carried on there.

2. The paid organizer of Local No. 25, Rose September, and the local FAFCT International Vice-President, David E. Adelson, are definitely Communists. They are close associates of and receive the constant counsel of one Steve Nelson, who is a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and the head of the Communist Party in Alameda County, California. Nelson induced Joseph Weinberg, a member of the staff of the Radiation Laboratory, to furnish him secret information concerning the work with the announced intention of transmitting it to the U.S.S.R. and it is believed he has done so.

3. Lists of the persons employed upon this Project are classified as secret because information as to the nature and extent of the work could be deduced therefrom. The security of the work has already been compromised by the activities of the union. Continued union activities will be extremely dangerous not only to security but to the speedy completion of the work and it is unquestionable that the union organization will be used to further espionage activity of agents of a foreign power.

4. It is urgently recommended that at the earliest opportunity you have a personal conference with Mr. Philip Murray, the head of the CIO, and request him in the strongest terms to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the FAFCT immediately cease, for the duration of the war, all union activity whatsoever with respect to the Radiation Laboratory, University of California, at Berkeley. This should include disbanding the laboratory organization of Local No. 25. There is no objection, however, to employees of the laboratory retaining membership in the union, provided it is in a wholly inactive status during the war.

Respectfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War.
FROM

The Morgenthau Diaries

Years of War

1941-1945

BY JOHN MORTON BLUM

ILLUSTRATED WITH PHOTOGRAPHS

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY BOSTON

1967
the nation," had the strength to perpetuate that extraordinary subsidy, the strength even to prevent the Treasury from selling its enormous hoard of silver for less than 71.11 cents an ounce, the artificial domestic price. Nevertheless, small quantities were sold for engine bearings, military insignia, and soldiers. The Treasury itself consumed 38,900,000 ounces by increasing the percentage of silver in the five-cent piece so as to release nickel and other base metals for crucial industrial purposes. More important, new legislation permitted the release of 410 million ounces to foreign governments receiving Lend-Lease assistance.

Even the statute of 1934 did not forbid domestic loans of silver. In response to a request of the War Production Board, Morgenthau in the spring of 1942 had his staff contrive a scheme by which the department could furnish silver for electric conductors in government-owned aluminum and magnesium plants. That silver would not be consumed but preserved and later returned to the Treasury. This use of the maimed silver, beyond the small portion needed for backing silver certificates, would "release large quantities of copper for other war needs." Moved especially by that consideration, Roosevelt endorsed the plan, which the Attorney General also approved. On May 9, 1942, the Treasury leased to the Defense Plant Corporation 40,000 of the available 97,000 tons of unpledged bullion. The Senate Silver Committee did not object, but it soon prevented similar loans of the silver bullion earmarked for reserve against circulating certificates.

Six thousand tons of the silver loaned to industry went into silver wire for electromagnetic at the top-secret plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, producing U-235 and plutonium. Morgenthau knew only that the War Department was utilizing the silver in some secret way. Indeed at no time in his years in office did he have any knowledge about developments in atomic energy. On one occasion Secretary of War Henry Stimson told him that in connection with a "very secret matter" he wanted to put $12 million in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, for which he needed the Treasury's consent. Morgenthau replied that the War Department had always before told him what was going on, but Stimson said that the matter was "so much more secret than anything else that I've ever had that I don't feel able to do that." Morgenthau was hurt. "If the Secretary of the
Treasury can’t be trusted,” he said, “he oughtn’t to be Secretary of the Treasury.” But Stimson, while sorry to have shocked his associate, insisted that rather than bring the President into the question, he would deposit the funds in a private bank. “He won’t trust me,” Morgenthau exploded when the conversation ended. “To hell with him. I am sick and tired of it, anyway.” But within a week he was persuaded of the advantages of having the War Department turn to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York rather than to a private bank, and he then assured Stimson that he would arrange the details with the appropriate officer, who turned out to be General Leslie Groves. Even after talking with Groves, Morgenthau had only “got the impression that it’s some secret weapon.” Twenty years later he surmised that Roosevelt, knowing of his opposition to poison gas, was unwilling to tell him about the atomic bomb, the use of which he would have questioned.

While Morgenthau also disapproved of the continuing diffusion of federal authority over war production, he had no mandate from Roosevelt to intercede. Within the reach of Treasury policy, the Secretary did what he could. As the President knew, he had other absorbing duties, not the least the responsibility for raising the money to pay the enormous costs of the battle against the Axis.

4. A Tremendous Program

Financing the costliest war in history imposed severe strains on the Treasury. One involved an exhausting effort to persuade the balky Congress to raise taxes high enough to cover one-half the expenses. Another related to the “tremendous program,” as Morgenthau put it, to defray the balance of expenses by borrowing. A third grew out of continual controversy with various federal agencies about Morgenthau’s effort to keep the purchase of government bonds on a voluntary basis. Persisting difficulties arose, too, from the attempt to hold down interest rates on federal securities without thereby increasing wartime inflation.

With the federal government accumulating a huge wartime debt,

* Chapter II deals with the Treasury’s wartime tax proposals, their failure in Congress, and their implications for the problem of inflation. That chapter also covers the debate about voluntarism in the bond program.
preview of Treasury policy toward General Aniline in Diary 484:232; for Morgenthau’s conversation with the President on that issue, see Diary 484:238. The conversation with Bullitt is from Diary 491:1; for Mack’s views, see Diary 492:64–70; on the vesting and the ensuing Treasury orders, see Diary 498:127; Diary 497:134; 166–69; Morgenthau’s remarks to Hopkins are from Diary 500:222–53; his report of the Cabinet meeting of February 27, from Diary 502:7–10. Roosevelt’s directions of March 5 are in Diary 504:70–72; Morgenthau’s letter to McConnell, in Diary 506:128–30. For the Executive Order of March 11, 1942, see Diary 507:51. For Morgenthau’s conversation with Rosenman on July 7, 1942, see Presidential Diary of that date.

3. Producing for War, pp. 11–14

For the episode of the trucks, see Diary 479:1–3, which includes Morgenthau’s conversation with Patterson about general procurement problems. For further discussions of those problems among the principals from government and labor, see Diary 480:42–45, 63. The Executive Order establishing the WPB is in Diary 485:310. On silver policy, see A. S. Everest, Morgenthau, the New Deal and Silver (New York, 1950). Chapter VIII, and Diary 511:165–66, 341; Diary 512:81–88; Diary 514:68–70, 246; Diary 521:273–82; Diary 512:14–17; Diary 563:321 — the last reference relates to Oak Ridge. Morgenthau’s crisp talk with Stimson about secrecy, and the ensuing developments, are from Diary 782:111–16; Diary 785:1–6; Diary 788:24–27.

4. A Tremendous Program, pp. 14–16

This section and the following sections of this chapter owe much to H. C. Murphy, National Debt in War and Transition (New York, 1950). For Morgenthau’s remarks to Bell on December 23, 1941, see Diary 477:57. Eccles’s reply to Time is in Diary 380:3–6.

5. Voluntarism — Treasury Style, pp. 16–22

Roosevelt’s remarks about the bond program and the G. M. plan are from Presidential Diary, April 15, 1942, as is Morgenthau’s statement about war-mindedness. Smith’s comments, along with other miscellany, are in a file on “War Savings” in the Morgenthau MSS