April 28, 1946

Dear Joe:

I think the article is very good and thought provoking. It seems to me unthinkable, however, that Mr. Wallace should have made that speech if it had been discussed in the Cabinet. However, you may know that it was.

I have been a little horrified lately to find that so many of the troubles seem to arise from the fact that there is too little general discussion and too little general knowledge among the top people.

Slowly I have been coming to much the same feeling that you have on Russia with one exception, namely, that I do not feel there has been enough plain speaking among the people in our countries. Since Harry Hopkins, I do not believe that anyone has talked "turkey" to Mr. Stalin personally, and certainly most of us haven't talked honestly with people like Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Vishinsky, etc. I am going to make a great effort to get to know Mr. Gromyko and tell him a few of the things I feel.

I think the difficulty with them is to make them see that they have to trust for safety to the United Nations. Otherwise there is no safety for anybody. They are doing exactly what you describe but I think they are doing it because they have no conception of what a strong United Nations might mean in security for all, and no trust in any one. However, we have no more trust than they have and neither has Great Britain.

There is much that I would like to talk to you about but I do think the article is excellent and I would not change any of it, but I would like to see it qualified and expanded for the sake of clarity.

Affectionately,
Dear Cousin Eleanor,

Herewith I send you the article about which I told you on the telephone. I do so for two reasons. First, I shall be deeply interested in your opinion, because with perhaps less patience and good temper than you, I think along precisely the same line that you do. Second, as you will see, the President figures rather largely in the article, and I should hate to feel that I had misrepresented him, either by sins of omission or commission.

The article itself may be right or wrong -- I think, on the whole, that it states the case clearly, but for reasons of space is incomplete. (I could only make my one point, and had to leave out certain qualifying points which I should have liked to make also, in order to round out the picture.) One thing seems certain to me, however: the subject of the article is of vital importance, to the world, to the country and indeed, to you and me as individuals.

I cannot tell you how much I look forward to taking you to dinner on Sunday week. I shall be there at 7:15 in my best bib and tucker. It will be wonderful to see you again.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
29 Washington Square West,
Apartment 15,
NEW YORK CITY.
The American Liberal movement is in danger of self-destruction, as the result of a bitter internal conflict over the role of the United States in the postwar world. How grave the practical results of this conflict can be, is best illustrated by an ominous of our foreign relations.

Long before the war ended, the American military authorities had rightly or wrongly concluded that in the age of the new weapons, outlying bases in the Atlantic were essential to our security until a working world organization could assure permanent peace. Of these, the most important base was that in Iceland. The Icelanders are a proud and independent people. When negotiations were initiated to give us permanent use of our wartime installations there, American Minister Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., had an uphill task to persuade Icelandic Premier Olafur Thors that Icelandic sovereignty would not be infringed upon. Never the less, the diplomatic courtship was well conducted, and by last March the outlook for an agreement with Iceland was exceedingly hopeful.

Then, late in March, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace blundered onto the stage of this small but intensely significant international drama. He gave a newspaper interview, sharply condemning the continued presence of American troops in Iceland, and stating categorically that the Soviets must naturally assume that threatening them was the only purpose of the Iceland base. It mattered nothing that the sole purpose of the base was to assure American security; that the Constitution of the United States virtually forbids this country to become an aggressor;
and that therefore, if the base was to be used at all, it could only be used after we had been attacked. As a member of the Truman Cabinet, speaking presumably from official information, Wallace declared that the Soviets must regard the base as purely aggressive. Premier Troue instantly informed Minister Dreyfus that the Wallace statement had altered the views of the Icelandic government. After what Wallace had intimated, the Icelanders wanted no part of the proposed agreement with us.

Efforts were made to convince the nervous Icelanders that the voice of Wallace was not the voice of America, and to restore the favorable atmosphere of the negotiations. But these efforts received a series of setbacks from such expressions of opinion here as the remarkable speeches in which Claude Pepper of Florida echoed Wallace on the Senate floor. In April, the "Win the Peace" conference, held in the Commerce Department auditorium, and attended by such notable Congressional Liberals as Senator Harley Kilgore and Representative Helen Gahagen Douglas, adopted a resolution again asserting that the American program for overseas bases was aggressive and anti-Soviet, and loudly demanding the evacuation of Iceland. Almost simultaneously, the Icelanders broke off the negotiations.

Possibly the Icelanders will change their minds. But if they remain firm in their resolve, and a time ever comes when this country needs outlying Atlantic bases, Wallace, Pepper and their associates are not likely to remember with pride this thing that they have done. Concerning Wallace at least, one cannot doubt that he acted from the best and highest motives. Nor is it necessary to suppose that
the military authorities were right in insisting upon an overseas bases program, in order to feel that Wallace did wrong. The point is that, whether the strategists were wrong or right, their plan had been accepted as the agreed policy of the American government, approved by the President, the Secretary of State, and all other relevant advisors. By an irresponsible intervention in a matter of great delicacy and seriousness, Wallace defeated his own government's policy. He did it, moreover, as a member of the Cabinet. He had a right to his opinion, but if he could not make his opinion prevail at Cabinet meeting, his only alternatives were to resign or to remain silent. That this man, so obviously patriotic and even painfully virtuous, should have chosen the only course which was plainly indefensible, is a symptom of the terrible confusion which now afflicts American liberalism.

What is the nature of this confusion? Its manifestations are simple enough. The majority of Liberals are so preoccupied with foreign policy that they have ceased to think constructively about the pressing problems of the domestic economy, and are merely content to advocate the domestic program they have inherited from Roosevelt. The reason for the confusion is also simple. It is the Liberal attitude towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has deeply stirred the Liberal imagination, first by its vast experiments in social and economic planning, and then by its magnificent struggle against the Wehrmacht. When the war ended, an idealized picture of the Soviet state had formed in the minds of American Liberals.

Unfortunately, the tough, brilliant leaders of the Soviet
state are not Liberal idealists. They are realists, and unlike most Liberals they fully understand that power is the basic unit of all politics — whether the politics of the DAR, or of Bumcombe County, or of the world. When the war ended, they embarked upon an experiment in imperialism as bold as it was novel. Every advantage gained from the war was exploited, and every new technique was brought into play, from the war of nerves to political infiltration and territorial encirclement. In blunt truth, all the methods which were condemned most bitterly when employed by the new imperialism of Germany, now began to be used to extend the sphere of Soviet domination.

Already Poland, the Baltic States, Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Albania are behind the iron curtain. Huge armies held Hungary and half of Germany and Austria. Czecho-Slovakia and Greece are encircled and in the West a victory of the Communist party in the spring election in France may conceivably carry the limits of Soviet political control to the shores of the Channel. In the Middle East, the Soviets are driving Southward. Iran has been reduced to puppet-ood and Turkey and Iraq are threatened. And in the Far East, the Kuriles and half Korea are occupied, and Manchuria has been stripped, and left in a condition to be transformed at will into another Azerbaijan. The process still goes on. One can only admire the Soviet leaders' iron nerve and precision of will execution, but one must also wonder if they/ultimately be satisfied with less than dominion over Europe and Asia.

No such impartial judgment has been possible for the American Liberals, however. They have had to relate the reality of Soviet policy
the ideal picture of the Soviet Union which they cherish in their minds. The consequence has been a frantic, almost comic effort by the Liberals to disguise the hard reality in conformity with the charming mental picture. Some have blamed ourselves (as Henry Wallace did) arguing that Soviet realpolitik can be cured by lovingkindness. Others assert the Masters of the Kremlin are motivated only by fears for their own security, without defining what extent of conquest will permit them to sleep easy o' nights. Others irrelevantly declare that the new Soviet imperialism is no worse than the old British imperialism, or attribute Soviet foreign policy to the lustness of a young organism, as fond mammas excuse the doings of their offspring because "boys will be boys". It is painful to hear these laborious apologetics from good men, for one has heard them before — in 1937, 1938, and 1939. Furthermore, it is tragic. For no political movement can retain its strength which fails to respond to the major challenges of its time. The major challenge of our time is the need to organise a stable, prosperous, and above all, peaceful world. This can hardly be attempted successfully by men who will not, or dare not face the facts about one of the world's two great powers. That is the Tragedy of American Liberalism.

But before continuing this inquiry, it will probably be well to define the term "Liberalism", as used in the present discussion. Some readers may already share the indignation at the connotations here given to Liberalism, which was once expressed to one of your correspondents by the late Ogden L. Mills. He had been called a "Conservative". He asserted with some heat that he was nothing of the sort — he was a Liberal,
and a better Liberal than most, being a staunch believer in the theories of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and the other thinkers who shaped the beginnings of British 19th century Liberalism. But a political grouping is not like a church, with an immutable creed. Jeremy Bentham or no Jeremy Bentham, free enterprise or no free enterprise, Ogden Mills was a conservative of conservatives, and about the ablest of his contemporaries.

In contrast, one of your correspondents also heard Franklin Delano Roosevelt bitterly complain against the attacks upon him as a "Radical". He was not a radical, he said; he was not even a Liberal. He conceived of himself, rather, as a "Conservative", seeking to "conserve" what was best in American society by making essential concessions to the forces of the time. As Mills looked back to Bentham, so Roosevelt also reached into British history for a comparison, claiming that his New Deal hardly differed from the repeal of the corn laws by the great Tory, Sir Robert Peel. Peel or no Peel, Roosevelt was also talking nonsense, for he was no more Conservative than Mills was Liberal.

There were many early shared experiences between Mills and Roosevelt (who heartily disliked each other from their boyhood at Hyde Park and Staatsburg on the Hudson). What is interesting, is the difference between them, which provides a practical, non-ideological definition of Liberalism. That difference was a difference in attitude towards social change. Mills thought first of the ramifying vested interests which social change invariably discommoded. He was contented with the world as he found it, and while he was too intelligent not to realize change was inevitable, he wanted change to be as slow as possible.
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He was a Conservative. Roosevelt, on the other hand, thought first of the large group who are always slighted in any society's distribution of its leavings and fishes. He was discontented with the existing order; positively liked social change, and wanted it to be rapid. He was a Liberal.

Healthy Conservatism and Healthy Liberalism are both essential to the health of a free society, since both are needed to insure that desirable social changes are accomplished in a practical manner and without undue delay.

American Liberalism has now entered a period of ill health, to which the behavior of the first Truman Congress is testimony enough.

What are the reasons for the decline of this movement which dominated the political scene from 1932 until 1946? One answer was given long ago, in a conversation in Tom Corcoran's office, when the New Dealers were trying to build up Robert H. Jackson as Roosevelt's successor. Then the future seemed to glow with a promise of ever recurrent, ever novel New Deals.

But one cynic remarked: "It's no good this. FDR is like the Upas tree, in the old travellers stories. He kills everything that shelters under him."

There was truth in that, for while he lived, Roosevelt did the thinking for American Liberalism; and now that he is dead most Liberals find it hard to think for themselves, which is why it is still a central fact in the problem that Roosevelt died a year ago. He was the giant, the great figure, who both gave strength to, and dwarfed everyone on his side. While he lived, his strength-giving power was his vital quality. But he is dead, and it is now necessary to pay for his way of making his followers seem to be more pygmies.
Certainly Roosevelt's successor was not designed to be the standard-bearer of a faith. He is not the man to sound the clarion call, and to awaken the United States from our semanambulist reaction towards "normalcy", which is making us flaccid and befuddled in a time when sleep-walking was never more dangerous. Roosevelt's White House was a place of power, where the winds of destiny blew through the corridors, and one heard the voice of the future. The White House of Harry S. Truman, for all his modesty, patriotism and good will, is more like the lounge of the Lions Club of Independence, Mo., where one is conscious chiefly of the odor of ten cent cigars and the easy laughter evoked by the new smoking room story. Among the Liberal influences which still act upon Truman the ghost of Roosevelt is by far the strongest; and it is often difficult for a more shade to carry conviction when George S. Allen is also there in the excessively solid flesh, telling his jokes and knowing precisely what he wants.

To all intents and purposes indeed the American Liberal cause is all but leaderless. Its best servants are a handful of courageous administrators — Wilson Wyatt, Paul Porter, Chester Bowles, and Fred Vinson — but they are servants. For the rest, there are the labor chieftains, like Walter Reuther, Philip Murray and Sidney Hillman, whose sphere is restricted by their professional attachments. There is Wallace, too worldly to lead, and there are the men like Pepper who have achieved conspicuousness without attaining to leadership. And there are the asserted Justices of the Supreme Court who, have to cast off their dark garments, break forth from their tomb, and rise again as politicians in order to be leaders in a true sense.
As a result, in the past year, the seminal center of American Liberalism has passed from Washington to New York, where Liberal intellectuals congregate, where the Liberal press is strongest, and where the most significant organizations of the Left of center, such as the CIO-PAC, have their headquarters. The consequences have not been happy, for consciousness of political realities does not flourish in New York. There is a tendency there to think about politics in large, meaningless abstractions; to make simple, agreeable assumptions and reason from them to pin neat but inaccurate labels upon opponents and thus to dispose of their arguments.

Not long ago, one of your correspondents was present at a discussion in which Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' "patience and firmness" towards the Soviets were explained away, on the facile ground that the State Department was a mere haven of elegant reactionaries. A certain inconsistency between this view and the Department's Argentine policy was humbly suggested. Whereas an ordinarily intelligent Liberal female replied, with something close to a knowing leer, that she had good reason to believe that this policy was a mere mask for a secret understanding between the Departmental spats-bearers and Colonel Peron. This preposterous announcement was greeted with interested credulity. No one was coarse enough to mention the ample, irrefutable evidence that an understanding with Peron was in fact, at that very moment, being urgently sought not by our spats-bearers but by a Soviet mission in Buenos Ayres.

Nor is this curious habit of self-delusion limited to the unappetising type of Liberal who throbs with elevated feelings in the stimulating atmosphere
of the Stork Club. Immense and able editors, publicists, labor
leaders, and others of real influence in the Liberal movement, share it
to the full. Consequently, for example, the Soviet objective in Iran
was anxiously but misleadingly explained as bringing no more than oil,
although oil had been offered by Molotov by Stettinius and Eden at Yalta,
two years before, and again offered by Bevin to Stalin when the Iran
dispute threatened.

This is because the facts and atmosphere of Soviet policy
and Soviet-American relations are simply not known in New York. It is
only wise to take the business of politics as one hears of such straws in the wind as the conversation between Andre' Vishinsky and an American travelling with him on Mediterranean
Commission business. This used to be something of a by-word in the White
House in Roosevelt's last year. It came at the end of a fairly cheerful
evening. As though deciding at last to solve a bothersome puzzle,
Vishinsky suddenly inquired why the United States did not "take South
America". The startled American replied that we did not want South America.
Vishinsky, in a rather worried way, urged that we must at least desire to
establish our Empire over Central America. Again the American protested
that the occupation even of Central America was not part of our postwar
plan. "But I can assure you," said Vishinsky, as though removing the only
possible reason for this strange self-denial, "my government would not have
horror the slightest objection". One can imagine the number of Liberal thinkers
who argue that there is no difference between our ownership of the Panama
Canal and the Soviet desire for the Dardanelles, if anyone in this country
took the Vishinsky view of our national interests.
It must finally be added, with all frankness, that the liberal tendency towards self-delusion is vastly increased by the singular liberal attitude towards the American Communists and fellow-travellers. The horror of "red-baiting" is as natural as it is admirable; for the future will be dark indeed if this country ever indulges in another orgy of violence and suppression of liberties such as we experienced under Attorney General Mitchell Palmer. The Communists have an entire right to hold and to express any views they choose. But there is all the difference in the world between stoutly defending that right, and being so fearful of an honest assessment of the Communist position that mentioning the word "Communist," comes close to being a breach of etiquette. There is, in truth, an element of snobbism — of gentle regard for correct deportment — in this liberal attitude towards the Communists, which can produce downright ludicrous results.

One such was a laughable episode in the liberal veterans' organization, the American Veterans' Committee. One of the finest aspects of the AVG's fine record has been its fight against racial discrimination. Not long ago, an all-Negro post from Harlem applied for admission to the AVG. A violent row ensued, in which fists were pounded, voices were raised, and AVG leaders hurled charges of "Hitlerism" at one another. In appearance, the issue was whether the new post, being all-Negro, was practicing racial discrimination against whites. But the row really started because the AVG leaders all knew but dared not mention that the all-Negro post was dominated by party-liners, and feared the well-known consequences of Communist penetration into Liberal organizations. The sturdy AVG will of course
survive this momentary eccentricity, but the liberal movement as a whole will suffer if many Liberals continue to give way to their peculiar snobism. Intelligent thinking about world affairs is impossible, so long as any realistic Liberal assessment of the Communist and the Soviet positions is instantly halted by a sharp word from "The Daily Worker", or a hint that this is the line of Colonel Robert R. McCormick (an all-powerful prescription, although the McCormick-Patterson press is almost as vociferous the "Worker" in decrying firm dealings with the Soviets.)

In truth self-delusion, practiced for all the foregoing reasons, is at the very heart of the tragedy of American Liberalism. One cannot help but wonder whether this self-delusion would have been practiced if Roosevelt, who was both a great leader and a great realist, had kept his life and health. There is a good deal of evidence that he would not have permitted it. During his last year, for example, Roosevelt let those close to him know that his concessions to the Soviet Union were a wartime expedient, which would be abandoned for a firmer policy when the war ended. Before his own untimely death, Harry Hopkins made the same point to several of his friends, and even stated that firmness would have been shown much earlier by Roosevelt than by Truman. While he still lived, Roosevelt was following a Polish policy which plainly foreshadowed a change in this direction. Firmness in short was one aspect of Roosevelt's postwar plan. Another was indicated by his constant, strong insistence on this country's responsibility to use its great wealth to rebuild the devastated areas and assist the backward nations. Still another was revealed in the significance he attached to the United Nations,
Roosevelt fully understood that both Germany and Russia were ruthless police states, but believed you could do business with Russia, where you could not with Germany, because the basic concept of Nazism was barbaric, while the basic concept of Sovietism is the purpose to improve the lot of all men. But Roosevelt also knew, and said, what the Liberals do not know; that appeasement is always wrong, in whatever connection, since it always eventually results in a situation where you must fight or knuckle under forever. He knew, and said, that wars were asserted not by weakness and coquettishness, but by firmness and strength. And he knew, and pointed out, the vital import to this country of the world power relationship. Would this man, who led the United States into the most terrible war in history to prevent the domination of Europe and Asia by two powers, have been complacent before the possibility that one power alone would reach this position of unchallengable predominance?

It is useless to speculate on what the details of Roosevelt’s policy might have been today, however clearly one may feel one understands his guiding principles. But there is a fine Rooseveltian ring to the policy which, it is known, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes would now like to pursue, if he could be given the tools for the job. As outlined on sound authority, this policy is as follows:

1. All-out support for the United Nations, as a working world organization capable of providing practical solutions of world problems. This implies determined rejection of the Soviet view, that UN is little better than a bureau for registering the rare agreements of the major powers.

2. Internationalization of the terrible new weapons under UN control, and sponsorship of sound measures of disarmament, under UN
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direction. This is planned both to remove the hideous threat of a new, atomic war, and to infuse into the UN the elements of sovereignty which it must acquire to function as a permanent world organization.

3. Firmness in all dealings with the Soviet Union, in order to halt the process of Soviet expansion.

4. The broadest effort of relief and reconstruction all over the world. This both serves humanitarian ends, and removes the conditions which now actually tempt the Soviets to imperialist adventures. Famine is a vacuum and poverty, feudalism and economic chaos create political vacuum. If a vacuum is not filled in one way, it will be filled in another. Short of war, no display of American firmness can permanently halt the Soviets' onward march, so long as conditions everywhere constitute an open invitation to the Masters of the Kremlin. Nor is it enough to offer a few billions in loans to selected good risks. After the incalculable cost of the war, that is a way of saving a penny to lose a pound. There must be much larger loans. There must be far more generous relief. And there must be many more programs like the Yangtze Dam, which would give 100 million Chinese something like a decent life, or the Jordan Valley Authority, which would end the conflict between Jew and Arab by providing plenty for them both.

The purpose of the program as a whole is not to risk war with the Soviet Union, but to remove the danger of war, by creating a world in which the United States and the Soviet Union can live at peace together without the terrible mutual suspicion, the deepening division between Russia and the West, which now mark all our relations. Confronted with such
a program, the astute leaders of the Soviet state would understand their inability to compete, and would develop a new policy of progress by internal development, and equal partnership in the United Nations. And thus, eventually, time would remove suspicion and division, and peace would be assured or last.

The tragedy of American Liberalism may well be the tragedy of the United States, for a very simple reason. The foregoing is a minimum program, as any honest high official of the State Department will freely admit. And it is essentially a Liberal program. American Conservatives will not insist upon American acceptance of such huge responsibilities. You do not beat the drum for Yangtze Dams and Jordan Valley Authorities, if you have only just reconciled yourself to the TVA. It is therefore the Liberals who must speak out. But nations rarely act from pure, humanitarian motives. The American people, suspicious even of the British loan, will never shoulder greater responsibilities unless they are convinced that the alternatives are deeply dangerous to them. That special conviction of our danger can only be conveyed by men who have faced up realistically to the nature of the Soviet-American competition. The Liberals have not taken that plunge, and thus the Liberals, who must speak out, cannot carry conviction. The whole nation is whipumed, as it were, by the Liberal tragedy.

That is one side of the medal. The other side, on which one may read the future of American Conservatism, is no less discouraging. For the attraction of the extremists for the moderates is just as strong on the political right as on the political left. Already one hears more and
more good American burghers talking the poisonous drivel of anti-Semitism.

Already one hears more and more discussions of the Labor movement by formerly reasonable men, who now use the language of Colonel McCormick and Representative John Rankin. That is stranger still, one also hears, more and more often, the absolute isolationism of the Patterson-McCormick press.

What does it mean, coming from those men who can hardly enjoy a Soviet triumph? One cannot avoid the suspicion that it implies subconscious acceptance of the Vichinskian analysis, and a visceral anticipation of an ultimate deal with Moscow, under which each of the two great powers will dominate its area, and reduce to enslaved dependency all other, weaker peoples within its imperial sphere. Incidentally, an almost open invitation to precisely such a deal was thrown out only the other day, by General Galaktionov, military commentator of "Prawda."

Let no American Liberal deceive himself. It is not the left which will gain strength if the march of Soviet imperialism is not halted. It is not the Liberals who will then acquire followers, if they continue to publish to all and sundry the extent of their self-delusion. In the spasm of terror which will seize this country, if we awaken one morning with the sudden sensation of encirclement, it is the right --- the very extreme right --- which is most likely to triumph. If that time ever comes, it will be as detestable to honest Conservatives as to honest Liberals. A friend well said to Henry Wallace, after one of his pro-Soviet speeches: "Henry, has it ever occurred to you that you're taking a big risk? You're talking the language of Chamberlain and Simon. If you're wrong about Soviet
intentions, won't you and your friends do to American Liberalism what Chamberlain and Simon did to the British Conservative party?" Very briefly, that gave him pause.
December 29, 1946

Dear Joe:

I was very much interested in your letter of December 17th. I do not agree with you that any young people can be considered solely as attached to their parents. If Elliott had not served, and served with distinction in the war, and had not made a place for himself both before and since, the fact that he is our son might make him open to a certain amount of attack, but it would not really matter because he would not be doing anything that made it important.

Of course, I very much want to see you and I think you and Stewart owe it to both Elliott and to me to come the next time you are in New York, either separately or together, and talk this whole idea which you have formed about Elliott over with him. I am not planning to intervene in any way, I would simply like to be the audience.

You do not know Elliott and have not known him for a very long time. You know the things which have been said in the press about him. You know things which people have said about him, even perhaps his own brothers may have said things about him, but that is not knowing Elliott and I think in fairness, you owe it to him to come, having marshalled all of your facts, put them before him and allow him the opportunity of talking it over with you. You may have exactly the same feeling afterwards as you have now, but at least I think you will have done the air thing to Elliott and incidentally, I think to his Father.

I am glad you do not feel differently about me, and I certainly have every desire to continue what I look upon not simply as a cousinly relationship, but a really friendly one between us. I am fond of you and I am not trying to change your opinion, if when you know the facts, you still feel the same way. I am quite capable of liking people even when we differ.

Affectionately,
Dear Cousin Eleanor,

Before answering your letter, I have thought a long time, wavering between the impulse simply to apologize, and my wish to explain my position to you. I think I had better do the latter.

As a public personality, I consider that Elliott has no existence independent of yourself and his father. The attacks on him in the old days were really attacks through him on you and the President. I felt only scorn for his attackers, and I still do.

The present situation is, however, entirely different. As I see it, Elliott is using his close relationship to the President to confer authenticity upon a thoroughly dangerous and unpleasant kind of attack on his father's memory. In this case he is, in fact, the attacker. I began my work as a political observer without either deep belief or strong feeling, except the feeling so common among people educated as we have been, that politics is a dirty business and that the people are a set of boobs. By slow stages (and to the day of my death I shall feel guilty that they were so slow), the President's example infused a certain meaning and seriousness into my work. I have a sense of personal gratitude to him which I shall never lose, and his memory means a great deal to me---as it does to many millions of other Americans. Consequently, what Elliott has done fills me with inexpressible distaste.

As to Elliott's book, my view of it is very simple. I never knew the President intimately, but I knew him well enough to understand how he talked when he was at ease. I have no doubt that he said most of the things Elliott attributes to him, although there are some which I find difficulty in crediting. On the other hand, I am even more certain that Elliott's total picture of the President is crudely and shockingly distorted. I feel this certainty for two reasons.

First, the book makes a fool of the President, and gives an air of superficiality, vanity and cheapness to his whole great achievement. I have very few illusions, but one belief I am not prepared to abandon is my belief that the President was a genuinely great man, human withal, but possessing true profundity and largeness of spirit. No distorted selections from his private talk, however smoothly covered with the
varnish of a slick party-line interpretation, is going to take
that belief away from me. Second, my brother and I, being out-
raged by the book, did some rather careful research into the
facts presented by Elliott and his deductions therefrom. Both
the men who worked closely with the President, and the parts
of the actual diplomatic record which we were permitted to inspect,
flatly give the lie to Elliott’s position, although not perhaps
to his reporting of this or that scrap of the President’s con-
versation. Furthermore, certain episodes in the book have been
grossly misrepresented by the unanimous testimony of everyone else
who was present. You might ask Elliott, for example, to tell
you the unadorned story of his talk with Stalin at Tehran. If
published in parallel columns with the description of the same
event in the book, it would not be creditable to Elliott.

My brother and I were determined to spread on
the record the exceedingly damaging facts we had uncovered
about the book, until I learned that it would distress you if
we did so. I owe you much also, as we all do; and Stew and I
concluded that we had best keep silent, and hope that Elliott
would not do it again. I feared the hope would be disappointed
as soon as I heard he was going to Moscow. I need not comment
upon what he did there; except to say that I very carefully
checked the whole story, and am of the opinion that the ver-
son printed here under—rather than over-painted the enormity
of Elliott’s behavior. The character of his denials (which
were not denial) convinced me that no good purpose would be
served by waiting to talk to Elliott. Moreover, if the inci-
dent was to be usefully dealt with, it had to be dealt with im-
mediately. Accordingly, I wrote the column which so disturbed
you. My purpose, let me repeat, was not to have a shot at
Elliott, who is much too easy a mark, but to defend the memory
of about the only man for whose memory I truly care.

Let me add one more word. I have known Eli-
ott most of my life, and have always liked him. I do not
doubt his sincerity. Instead, I suspect that he has very poor
judgment, and perhaps because he was an unhappy boy, is now a
man unusually open to being used by unscrupulous people who are
ready to flatter him. Paul Porter once remarked to me about
that miserable business of the loan and the radio stations,
that if you studied the record you found that others were now
inpossession of an extremely profitable radio chain, while
Elliott got out of it only his dog and a quantity of public
obloquy. I assume that he is being used today in the same way,
but by another type of person; and what I have learned of the
history of the manuscript of his book strongly confirms that
assumption. But while bad judgment in private matters can be
readily condemned, it seems to me almost unforgivable when it
beats such public fruit as the book and the
Moscow trip. If you are going to behave like a public man, as
Elliott is now doing, you must be prepared to take the conse-
quences. I can assure you, of my own knowledge, that many reviewers and commentators either wrote softly of the book or did not write at all for the same reason that led me to throw away my data—respect and affection for you. But it is too much to ask that Elliott should be sheltered in this manner forever.

I am most grateful to you for writing to me, if only because it gave me the opportunity to send you this completely frank explanation of my viewpoint and motives. Believe me, what distresses me most about the whole business is the fact that it has distressed you. But what would you have me do? Keep silent, pretend that all is well, while the man who gave meaning to my whole working life (insofar as it has any) is turned into a laughing stock and a cheap lay figure of propaganda?

This letter is already too long, but I cannot close it without expressing the hope that you will at least be convinced of the honesty of my intentions. Perhaps I was unfair, although I still do not think so. If unfairness there was, I can only say it was committed in the heat of intense indignation. Whatever happens, nothing will change my feeling about you.

Always affectionately,

J.R.A.

I shall not intrude myself on you, but I should much like to see you when you are here for the UDA conference.
Dear Joe:

I am quite horrified by the piece which you wrote about Elliott. I assure you that I can corroborate the actual things which he said in his book, and so can a good many other people because they were told many times. He may have misinterpreted but that is a matter of opinion.

As to the experience in Moscow I think it would have been more sporting to wait until you had a chance to inquire from Elliott as to what happened and what had not happened.

You are entirely wrong in thinking that a telegram was sent by the family in the way that you suggest. Franklin, junior, must have told you that I sent a cable, but not for the reason that you attribute to me, but because I wished Elliott to know that he was being quoted and that probably the Republicans were going to bait him on everything that an inconspicuous person could say without any notice being taken of it. My cable could not have reached Elliott before he made his first and second statements, and you attribute the latter to the receipt of my cable, which was not sent until after his two statements appeared in the papers.

You may or may not think that Elliott is an admirable person. I happen to know that he has ideals and that he is doing what he is today from an idealistic feeling about his Father and his Father's policies. He is not a communist, but he is trying to be fair and to carry out the friendly spirit that he feels his Father had. I think we will get further that way, and those of us who are put in the position where we have to come in contact head on because of the subject matter, still try in every way possible to show that we are not unfriendly to the people themselves. I would have you read the end of my speech to Mr. Vishinsky.

I am old and it makes no difference to me what any body says or thinks, either in praise or in blame, but when you are young, if people are unfair, I think it does make a difference and I think you should have waited before condemning Elliott for
his side of the story. I know Ambassador Smith was not in Moscow, so he sent no message, but I am also aware that someone else did. Things in cold print are often very different from the spoken word, which you know as well as I do.

I have often differed with my children. I have always tried to recognize their motives which lay behind what they said or did, that is something that we owe to those whom we love. I make no comparison between any of my children - that have different qualities and different abilities, but I do not think that Elliott is dishonest. I think he is quite conscious of the mistakes which he has made in life. As you grow older, you will realize that there are always two sides to every story and that sometimes people sin, but they rarely sin alone.

I have rarely been more indignant than I was on reading the beginning of your column. I am devoted to you, and for that reason, I feel that I must tell you truthfully how I feel about your not waiting to write until Elliott was back in the country and you could talk to him or he could at least answer you. Writing for money is no sin, which you well know, only dishonest writing is a sin

Affectionately,
Dear Joe:  

I am quite horrified by the story which you wrote about Elliott.  I assume you that I can corroborate the actual things which had an influence, and not that the story is so contra to reality that people believe them.  I have told many times that we have misinterpreted the President's policy that is a matter of opinion.  We are not the ones who are responsible for the fact that we didn't have the world's way.  And so I say that you are entirely wrong in thinking that a telegram was sent by the family in the way you suggest.  Franklin, Junior, may have sent you what I sent to you by cable, but not for the reason that you attribute to us, but the President's political policy, as it had been stated and that probably the President himself, was responsible for.  Therefore, the President himself was not responsible for sending Elliott before he had his first conversation at the White House and you attribute the letter to the White House, which was not sent until after his two statements appeared in the papers.

You may or may not think that Elliott is an admirable person.  It is only to know that he has ideals and that he is doing that he is today from an idealistic feeling about his father and his father's policies.  He is not a communist, but he is trying to do fair and to carry out the friendly spirit that he feels his father had.  I think we will get further that way, and those of us who are put in the position where we have to come in contact and on because of the subject matter, still try in every way possible to show that we are not unfriendly to the people themselves.  I would have you read the end of my speech to Mr. Vishinsky.

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people sin, but they rarely sin alone.

I have rarely been more impatient than I was on
reading the concluding paragraph, I am sure you must
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I must tell you truthfully how I feel about what you said
not willing to write until Eliot was back in
the country and you could talk to him or hear
at least answer you. Writing for money is no sin,
which you will know, only dishonest writing is sin.

Affectionately,
Dear Joe:

I am quite horrified by the piece you wrote about Elliott. I assure you that thought has may have misinterpreted according to the ideas of his Father's advisers, that I can corroborate the actual things which he said/so can a good many other people because they were told him many times. Now people may interpret them differently but you can not say that they were not said.

As to the experience in Moscow, I think it would have been more sporting to wait until you had a chance to inquire from Elliott as to what had happened and what had not happened.

You are entirely wrong in thinking that a telegram was sent by the family in the way you suggest. Franklin must have told you that I sent a cable, but not for the reason that you attribute to me but because I wished Elliott to know that he was being quoted and that probably the Republicans were going to bait him on everything that an inconspicuous person could say without any notice.

It is impossible: My cable could not have reached Elliott before he made his first statements which you attribute as a result of my cable, since it was not sent until after his first statements appeared in the papers.

You may or may not think that Elliott is an admirable person. I happen to know that he has ideals and that he is doing what he is doing today from an idealistic feeling about his Father and his Father's policies. He is not a communist but he is trying to be fair and to carry out the friendly spirit that he feels his Father had. I think we will get further that way, and those of us who are put in the position where we have to come in contact headon because of the subject matter, still try in every way possible to show that we are not unfriendly to the people themselves and I would have you read the end of my speech to Mr. Vishinsky.
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I have often differed with my own children. I have always tried to recognize their motives, which lay behind what they said or did, that is something that we owe to those for whom we care. I make no comparison between any of my children, they have different qualities and different abilities but I do not think that Elliott is not honest. I think he is quite conscious of the mistakes which he has made in life. Though you grow older you will realize that there are always two sides to every story and that sometimes people sin but they rarely sin without the blame being equally shared by someone else.

I have rarely been more indignant than I was on reading the beginning of your column. I am devoted to you and for that reason I feel that I must tell you truthfully how I feel about your not waiting to write until Elliott was back in the country and you could talk to him. He could at least excuse you. Writing for money is important which you well know, perhaps for want writing is a vice.
Dear Cousin Eleanor,

Herewith I send you the article about which I told you on the telephone. I do so for two reasons. First, I shall be deeply interested in your opinion, because with perhaps less patience and good temper than you, I think along precisely the same line that you do. Second, as you will see, the President figures rather largely in the article, and I should hate to feel that I had misrepresented him, either by sins of omission or commission.

The article itself may be right or wrong -- I think, on the whole, that it states the case clearly, but for reasons of space is incomplete. (I could only make my one point, and had to leave out certain qualifying points which I should have liked to make also, in order to round out the picture.) One thing seems certain to me, however; the subject of the article is of vital importance, to the world, to the country and indeed, to you and me as individuals.

I cannot tell you how much I look forward to taking you to dinner on Sunday week. I shall be there at 7:15 in my best bib and tucker. It will be wonderful to see you again.

Yours sincerely,

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
29 Washington Square West,
Apartment 15,
NEW YORK CITY.
and that therefore, if the base was to be used at all, it could only be used after we had been attacked. As a member of the Truman Cabinet, speaking presumably from official information, Wallace declared that the Soviets must regard the base as purely aggressive. Premier Ture instantly informed Minister Dreyfus that the Wallace statement had altered the views of the Icelandic government. After what Wallace had intimated, the Icelanders wanted no part of the proposed agreement with us.

Efforts were made to convince the nervous Icelanders that the voice of Wallace was not the voice of America, and to restore the favorable atmosphere of the negotiations. But these efforts received a series of setbacks from such expressions of opinion here as the remarkable speeches in which Claude Pepper of Florida echoed Wallace on the Senate floor. In April, the "Win the Peace" conference, held in the Commerce Department auditorium, and attended by such notable Congressional Liberals as Senator Harley Kilgore and Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas, adopted a resolution again asserting that the American program for overseas bases was aggressive and anti-Soviet, and loudly demanding the evacuation of Iceland. Almost simultaneously, the Icelanders broke off the negotiations.

Possibly the Icelanders will change their minds. But if they remain firm in their resolve, and a time ever comes when this country needs outlying Atlantic bases, Wallace, Pepper and their associates are not likely to remember with pride this thing that they have done. Concerning Wallace at least, one cannot doubt that he acted from the best and highest motives. Nor is it necessary to suppose that
the military authorities were right in insisting upon an overseas bases program, in order to feel that Wallace did wrong. The point is that, whether the strategists were wrong or right, their plan had been accepted as the agreed policy of the American government, approved by the President, the Secretary of State, and all other relevant advisors. By an irresponsible intervention in a matter of great delicacy and seriousness, Wallace defeated his own government's policy. He did it, moreover, as a member of the Cabinet. He had a right to his opinion, but if he could not make his opinion prevail at Cabinet meeting, his only alternatives were to resign or to remain silent. That this man, so obviously patriotic and even painfully virtuous, should have chosen the only course which was plainly indefensible, is a symptom of the terrible confusion which now afflicts American Liberalism.

What is the nature of this confusion? Its manifestations are simple enough. The majority of Liberals are so preoccupied with foreign policy that they have ceased to think constructively about the pressing problems of the domestic economy, and are merely content to advocate the domestic program they have inherited from Roosevelt. The reason for the confusion is also simple. It is the Liberal attitude towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has deeply stirred the Liberal imagination, first by its vast experiments in social and economic planning, and then by its magnificent struggle against the Wehrmacht. When the war ended, an idealized picture of the Soviet state had formed in the minds of American Liberals.

Unfortunately, the tough, brilliant leaders of the Soviet
state are not liberal idealists. They are realists, and unlike most liberals they fully understand that power is the basic unit of all politics—whether the politics of the DAR, or of Buscombe County, or of the world. When the war ended, they embarked upon an experiment in imperialism as bold as it was novel. Every advantage gained from the war was exploited, and every new technique was brought into play, from the war of nerves to political infiltration and territorial encirclement. In blunt truth, all the methods which were condemned most bitterly when employed by the new imperialism of Germany, now began to be used to extend the sphere of Soviet domination.

Already Poland, the Baltic States, Rumania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Albania are behind the iron curtain. Huge armies held Hungary and half of Germany and Austria. Czechoslovakia and Greece are encircled and in the West a victory of the Communist party in the spring election in France may conceivably carry the limits of Soviet political control to the shores of the Channel. In the Middle East, the Soviets are driving southward. Iran has been reduced to puppet-hood and Turkey and Iraq are threatened. And in the Far East, the Kuriles and half Korea are occupied, and Manchuria has been stripped, and left in a condition to be transformed at will into another Azerbaijan. The process still goes on.

One can only admire the Soviet leaders' iron nerve and precision of will execution, but one must also wonder if they will ultimately be satisfied with less than dominion over Europe and Asia.

No such impartial judgment has been possible for the American Liberals, however. They have had to relate the reality of Soviet policy
to the ideal picture of the Soviet Union which they cherish in their minds. The consequence has been a frantic, almost comic effort by the Liberals to disguise the hard reality in conformity with the charming mental picture. Some have blamed ourselves (as Henry Wallace did) arguing that Soviet realpolitik can be cured by lovingkindness. Others assert the Masters of the Kremlin are motivated only be fears for their own security, without defining what extent of conquest will permit them to sleep easy at night. Others irrelevantly declare that the new Soviet imperialism is no worse than the old British imperialism, or attribute Soviet foreign policy to the lustiness of a young organism, as fond mammas excuse the doings of their offspring because "boys will be boys". It is painful to hear these laborious apologies from good men, for one has heard them before — in 1937, 1938, and 1939. Furthermore, it is tragic. For no political movement can retain its strength which fails to respond to the major challenges of its time. The major challenge of our time is the need to organize a stable, prosperous, and above all, peaceful world. This can hardly be attempted successfully by men who will not, or dare not face the facts about one of the world's two great powers. That is the tragedy of American Liberalism.

But before continuing this inquiry, it will probably be well to define the term "Liberalism", as used in the present discussion. Some readers may already share the indignation at the connotations here given to Liberalism, which was once expressed to one of your correspondents by the late Ogden L. Mills. He had been called a "Conservative". He asserted with some heat that he was nothing of the sort — he was a Liberal,
and a better Liberal than most, being a staunch believer in the
theories of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and the other thinkers who shaped
the beginnings of British 19th century Liberalism. But a political group-
ing is not like a church, with an immutable creed, Jeremy Bentham or no
Jeremy Bentham, free enterprise or no free enterprise, Ogden Mills was a
conservative of conservatives, and about the oblast of his contemporaries.

In contrast, one of your correspondents also heard Franklin
Delano Roosevelt bitterly complain against the attacks upon him as a
"Radical". He was not a radical, he said; he was not even a Liberal.
He conceived of himself, rather, as a "Conservative", seeking to "con-
serve" what was best in American society by making essential concessions
to the forces of the time. As Mills harked back to Bentham, so Roosevelt
also reached into British history for a comparison, claiming that his New
Deal hardly differed from the repeal of the corn laws by the great Tory,
Sir Robert Peel. Peel or no Peel, Roosevelt was also talking nonsense,
for he was no more Conservative than Mills was Liberal.

There were many early shared experiences between Mills and
Roosevelt (who heartily disliked each other from their boyhood at Hyde
Park and Staatsburg on the Hudson). What is interesting, is the
difference between them, which provides a practical, non-ideological de-
finition of Liberalism. That difference was a difference in attitude
towards social change. Mills thought first of the restraining vested in-
terests which social change invariably discommodes. He was contented
with the world as he found it, and while he was too intelligent not to
realise change was inevitable, he wanted change to be as slow as possible.
He was a Conservative. Roosevelt, on the other hand, thought first of the large group who are always slighted in any society's distribution of its lesser and fishes. He was discontented with the existing order; positively liked social change, and wanted it to be rapid. He was a Liberal. Healthy Conservatism and Healthy Liberalism are both essential to the health of a free society, since both are needed to insure that desirable social changes are accomplished in a practical manner and without undue delay.

American Liberalism has now entered a period of ill health, to which the behavior of the first Truman Congress is testimony enough. What are the reasons for the decline of this movement which dominated the political scene from 1933 until 1945? One answer was given long ago, in a conversation in Tom Corcoran's office, when the New Dealers were trying to build up Robert H. Jackson as Roosevelt's successor. Then the future seemed to glow with a promise of ever recurrent, ever novel New Deals. But one cynic remarked: "It's no good, Son. FDR is like the Upan tree, in the old travelers stories. He kills everything that shelters under him."

There was truth in that, for while he lived, Roosevelt did the thinking for American Liberalism; and now that he is dead most Liberals find it hard to think for themselves, which is why it is still a central fact in the problem that Roosevelt died a year ago. He was the giant, the great figure, who both gave strength to, and dwarfed everyone on his side. While he lived, his strength-giving power was his vital quality. But he is dead, and it is now necessary to pay for his way of making his followers seem to be mere pygmies.
Certainly Roosevelt's successor was not designed to be the standard-bearer of a faith. He is not the man to sound the clarion call, and to awaken the United States from our comatose reaction towards "normalcy", which is making us flaccid and befuddled in a time when sleep-walking was never more dangerous. Roosevelt's White House was a place of power, where the winds of destiny blew through the corridors, and one heard the voice of the future. The White House of Harry S. Truman, for all his modesty, patriotism and good will, is more like the lounge of the Lions Club of Independence, Mo., where one is conscious chiefly of the odor of ten cent cigars and the easy laughter evoked by the now smoking room story. Among the liberal influences which still act upon Truman the ghost of Roosevelt is by far the strongest; and it is often difficult for a mere shade to carry conviction when George S. Allen is also there in the excessively solid flesh, telling his jokes and knowing precisely what he wants.

To all intents and purposes indeed the American Liberal cause is all but leaderless. Its best servants are a handful of courageous administrators -- Wilson Wyatt, Paul Porter, Chester Bowles, and Fred Vinson -- but they are servants. For the rest, there are the labor chieftains, like Walter Reuther, Philip Murray and Sidney Hillman, whose sphere is restricted by their professional attachments. There is Wallace, too many worldly to lead, and there are the men like Pepper who have achieved conspicuousness without attaining to leadership. And there are the assorted Justices of the Supreme Court who have to cast off their dark cre mantas, break forth from their tomb, and rise again as politicians in order to be leaders in a true sense.
As a result, in the past year, the seminal center of American Liberalism has passed from Washington to New York, where Liberal intellectuals congregate, where the Liberal press is strongest, and where the most significant organisations of the Left of center, such as the CIO-PAC, have their headquarters. The consequences have not been happy, for consciousness of political realities does not flourish in New York. There is a tendency there to think about politics in large, meaningless abstractions, to make simple, agreeable assumptions and reason from them, to pin neat but inaccurate labels upon opponents and thus to dispose of their arguments.

Not long ago, one of your correspondents was present at a discussion in which Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' "patience and firmness" towards the Soviets were explained away, on the facile ground that the State Department was a mere haven of elegant reactionaries. A certain inconsistency between this view and the Department's Argentine policy was humbly suggested. Whereas an ordinarily intelligent Liberal female replied, with something close to a knowing leer, that she had good reason to believe that this policy was a mere mask for a secret understanding between the Departmental spat-bearers and Colonel Peron. This preposterous announcement was greeted with interested credulity. No one was coarse enough to mention the ample, irrefutable evidence that an understanding with Peron was in fact, at that very moment, being urgently sought not by our spat-bearers but by a Soviet mission in Buenos Ayres. Nor is this curious habit of self-delusion limited to the unappetising type of Liberal who throbs with elevated feelings in the stimulating atmosphere.
of the Stork Club. Immeasurable and able editors, publicists, labor leaders and others of real influence in the Liberal movement share it to the full. Consequently, for example, the Soviet objective in Iran was anxiously but misleadingly explained as being no more than oil, although oil had been offered to Molotov by Stettinius and Eden at Yalta, two years before, and again offered by Bevin to Stalin when the Iran dispute threatened.

This is because the facts and atmosphere of Soviet policy and Soviet-American relations are simply not known in New York. It is only cabled to them and the business of politics is carried on that way. As one hears of such straws in the wind as the famous conversation between Andre' Vishinsky and an American travelling with him on Mediterranean Commission business. This used to be something of a by-word in the White House in 1937-38 it's last year. It came at the end of a fairly cheerful evening. As though deciding at last to solve a boresome puzzle, Vishinsky suddenly inquired why the United States did not "take South America". The startled American replied that we did not want South America, Vishinsky, in a rather worried way, urged that we must at least desire to establish our Empire over Central America. Again the American protested that the occupation even of Central America was not part of our postwar plan. "But I can assure you," said Vishinsky, as though removing the only possible reason for this strange self-denial, "my government would not have the slightest objection". One can imagine the horror of Liberal thinkers who argue that there is no difference between our ownership of the Panama Canal and the Soviet desire for the Dardanelles, if anyone in this country took the Vishinsky view of our national interests.
It must finally be added, with all frankness, that the liberal tendency towards self-delusion is vastly increased by the singular liberal attitude towards the American Communists and fellow-travellers. The horror of "red-baiting" is as natural as it is admirable; for the future will be dark indeed if this country ever indulges in another orgy of violence and suppression of liberties such as we experienced under Attorney General Mitchell Palmer. The Communists have an entire right to hold and to express any views they please. But there is all the difference in the world between stoutly defending that right, and being so fearful of an honest assessment of the Communist position that mentioning the word "Communist," comes close to being a breach of etiquette. There is, in truth, an element of snobism --- of genteel regard for correct deportment --- in this liberal attitude towards the Communists, which can produce downright ludicrous results.

One such was a laughable episode in the Liberal veterans' organization, the American Veterans' Committee. One of the finest aspects of the AVG's fine record has been its fight against racial discrimination. Not long ago, an all-Negro post from Harlem applied for admission to the AVG. A violent row ensued, in which fists were pounded, voices were raised, and AVG leaders hurled charges of "Hitlerism" at one another. In appearance, the issue was whether the new post, being all-Negro, was practicing racial discrimination against whites. But the row really started because the AVG leaders all knew but dared not mention that the all-Negro post was dominated by party-liners, and feared the well-known consequences of Communist penetration into Liberal organizations. The sturdy AVG will of course
survive this momentary eccentricity, but the liberal movement as a whole will suffer if many liberals continue to give way to their peculiar snobbism. Intelligent thinking about world affairs is impossible, so long as any realistic liberal assessment of the Communist and the Soviet positions is instantly halted by a sharp word from "The Daily Worker", or a hint that this is the line of Colonel Robert R. McCormick (an all-powerful pressman, although the McCormick-Patterson press is almost as vociferous the "Worker" in decrying firm dealings with the Soviets.)

In truth self-delusion, practiced for all the foregoing reasons, is at the very heart of the tragedy of American Liberalism. One cannot help but wonder whether this self-delusion would have been practiced if Roosevelt, who was both a great leader and a great realist, had kept his life and health. There is a good deal of evidence that he would not have permitted it. During his last year, for example, Roosevelt let those close to him know that his concessions to the Soviet Union were a wartime expedient, which would be abandoned for a firmer policy when the war ended. Before his own untimely death, Harry Hopkins made the same point to several of his friends, and even stated that firmness would have been shown much earlier by Roosevelt than by Truman. While he still lived, Roosevelt was following a Polish policy which plainly foreshadowed a change in this direction. Firmness in short was one aspect of Roosevelt's postwar plan.

Another was indicated by his constant, strong insistence on this country's responsibility to use its great wealth to rebuild the devastated areas and assist the backward nations. Still another was revealed in the significance he attached to the United Nations,
Roosevelt fully understood that both Germany and Russia were ruthless police states, but believed you could do business with Russia, where you could not with Germany, because the basic concept of Nationalism was barbaric, while the basic concept of Sovietism is the purpose to improve the lot of all men. But Roosevelt also knew, and said, what the Liberals do not know; that appeasement is always wrong, in whatever connection, since it always eventually results in a situation where you must fight or kneel under forever. He knew, and said, that wars were asserted not by weakness and acquisitition, but by firmness and strength. And he knew, and pointed out, the vital import to this country of the world power relationship. Would this man, who led the United States into the most terrible war in history to prevent the domination of Europe and Asia by two powers, have been complacent before the possibility that one power alone would reach this position of unchallengeable predominance?

It is useless to speculate on what the details of Roosevelt's policy might have been today, however clearly one may feel one understands his guiding principles. But there is a fine Rooseveltian ring to the policy which, it is known, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes would now like to pursue, if he could be given the tools for the job. As outlined on sound authority, this policy is as follows:

1. All-out support for the United Nations, as a working world organisation capable of providing practical solutions of world problems. This implies determined rejection of the Soviet view, that UN is little better than a bureau for registering the rare agreements of the major powers.

2. Internationalisation of the terrible new weapons under UN control, and sponsorship of sound measures of disarmament, under UN
direction. This is planned both to remove the hideous threat of a new, atomic war, and to infuse into the UN the elements of sovereignty which it must acquire to function as a permanent world organisation.

5. Firmness in all dealings with the Soviet Union, in order to halt the process of Soviet expansion.

6. The broadest effort of relief and reconstruction all over the world. This both serves humanitarian ends, and removes the conditions which now actually tempt the Soviets to imperialist adventures. Vast imperial vacuum. If a vacuum and poverty, feudalism and economic chaos create political vacuums are not filled in one way, it will be filled in another. Short of war, no display of American firmness can permanently halt the Soviets' outward march, so long as conditions everywhere constitute an open invitation to the Masters of the Kremlin. Nor is it enough to offer a few billions in loans to selected good risks. After the incalculable cost of the war, that is a way of saving a penny to lose a pound. There must be much larger loans. There must be far more generous relief. And there must be many more programs like the Yangtze Dam, which would give 100 million Chinese something like a decent life, or the Jordan Valley Authority, which would end the conflict between Jew and Arab by providing plenty for them both.

The purpose of the program as a whole is not to risk war with the Soviet Union, but to remove the danger of war, by creating a world in which the United States and the Soviet Union can live at peace together without the terrible mutual suspicion, the deepening division between Russia and the West, which now mark all our relations. Confronted with such
a program, the astute leaders of the Soviet state would understand their inability to compete, and would develop a new policy of progress by internal development, and equal partnership in the United Nations. And thus, eventually, time would remove suspicion and division, and peace would be assured at last.

The tragedy of American Liberalism may well be the tragedy of the United States, for a very simple reason. The foregoing is a minimum program, as any honest high official of the State Department will freely admit. And it is essentially a Liberal program. American Conservatives will not insist upon American acceptance of such huge responsibilities. You do not beat the drum for Yangtze Dams and Jordan Valley Authorities, if you have only just reconciled yourself to the NVA. It is therefore the Liberals who must speak out. But nations rarely act from pure, humanitarian motives. The American people, suspicious even of the British loan, will never shoulder far greater responsibilities unless they are convinced that the alternatives are deeply dangerous to them. That special conviction of our danger can only be conveyed by men who have faced up realistically to the nature of the Soviet-American competition. The Liberals have not taken that plunge, and thus the Liberals, who must speak out, cannot carry conviction. The whole nation is whip-sawed, as it were, by the Liberal tragedy.

That is one side of the medal. The other side, on which one may read the future of American Conservatism, is no less discouraging. For the attraction of the extremists for the moderates is just as strong on the political right as on the political left. Already one hears more and
more good American burghers talking the poisonous drivel of anti-Semitism. Already one hears more and more discussions of the Labor movement by formally reasonable men, who now use the language of Colonel McCormick and Representative John Rankin. What is stranger still, one also hears, more and more often, the absolute isolationism of the Patterson-McCormick press. What does it mean, coming from these men who can hardly enjoy a Soviet triumph? One cannot avoid the suspicion that it implies subconscious acceptance of the Vishinskian analysis, and a visceral anticipation of an ultimate deal with Moscow, under which each of the two great powers will delineate its area, and reduce to enslaved dependency all other, weaker peoples within its imperial sphere. Incidentally, an almost open invitation to precisely such a deal was thrown out only the other day, by General Galaktionov, military commentator of "Prawda."

Let no American Liberal deceive himself. It is not the left which will gain strength if the march of Soviet imperialism is not halted. It is not the Liberals who will then acquire followers, if they continue to publish to all and sundry the extent of their self-delusion. In the spasm of terror which will seize this country, if we awaken one morning with the sudden sensation of entrenchment, it is the right — the very extreme right — which is most likely to triumph. If that time ever comes, it will be as detestable to honest Conservatives as to honest Liberals. A friend well said to Henry Wallace, after one of his pre-Soviet speeches: "Henry, has it ever occurred to you that you're taking a big risk? You're talking the language of Chamberlain and Simon. If you're wrong about Soviet
intentions, won't you and your friends do to American Liberalism what Chamberlain and Simon did to the British Conservative party?" Very briefly, that gave him pause.
December 8, 1946

Dear Joe:

I am quite horrified by the piece which you wrote about Elliott. I assure you that I can demonstrate to you that the actual things you alleged are not true. I have read a good many of the people because they were told many times. He may have interpreted them that is a matter of opinion.

As to the experience of Lincoln, I think it would have been more sporting to allow the audience to inquire from Elliott as to what had happened and what had not happened.

You are entirely wrong in thinking that a telegram was sent by the family in the way you suggest. Franklin, junior, must have been present and medal winner of Lincoln was present to me, but because his father was present, he was being quoted and that probably the Republican party man and everyone else. The speaker being taken for granted. I made no statement to the effect that Elliott before he made his first and second statements, and you attribute the latter to the receipt of my cable, which was sent until after his two statements appeared in the papers.

You may or may not think that Elliott is an admirable person. I happen to know that he has ideals and that he is doing what he is today from an idealistic feeling about his Father and his Father's policies. He is not a communist, but he is trying to be fair and to carry out the friendly spirit that he feels his Father had. I think we will get further that way, and those of us who are put in the position where we have to come in contact head on because of the subject matter, still try in every way possible to show that we are not unfriendly to the people themselves. I would have you read the end of my speech to Mr. Vishinsky.

I am old and it makes no difference to me what any body says or thinks, either in praise or in blame, but when you are young, if people are unfair, I think it does make a difference and I think you should have waited before condemning Elliott for
his side of the story. I know Ambassador Smith was not in Moscow, so he sent no message, but I am also aware that some one else did. Things in cold print are often very different from the spoken word, which you know as well as I do.

So, my dear people, you have seen the end of it all, and I hope the end is good. I have been so long in the position of a bystander that I have often tried to recognize the motives which lay behind what they say and do, and have tried to understand the men who did it. This has taught me a very slight thing, but I do not think that Elliot is right. I think the idea of the mistakes which he has made in life. As you grow older, you will realize that there are always two sides to every story and that sometimes people sin, but they rarely sin alone.

I have rarely been more impatient than I was on hearing of your decision. I am sorry that you will be devoured by your sins, and I hope that you will not wait to write until Elliot is back. I must tell you that I am not waiting to write until Elliot is back, but you will have to write to him, or the world will think you are not thinking of him. Writing for money is no sin, and writing for money only is no sin. Writing for money is no sin, and writing for money only is no sin. Writing for money is no sin, and writing for money only is no sin.

Affectionately,

[Signature]
Dear Joe:

I am quite horrified by the piece which you wrote about Elliott. I assure you that I can corroborate the actual things which he said in his book, and so can a good many other people because they were told many times. He may have misinterpreted but that is a matter of opinion.

As to the experience in Moscow I think it would have been more sporting to wait until you had a chance to inquire from Elliott as to what happened and what had not happened.

You are entirely wrong in thinking that a telegram was sent by the family in the way that you suggest. Franklin, junior, must have told you that I sent a cable, but not for the reason that you attribute to me, but because I wished Elliott to know that he was being quoted and that probably the Republicans were going to bait him on everything that an inconspicuous person could say without any notice being taken of it. My cable could not have reached Elliott before he made his first and second statements, and you attribute the latter to the receipt of my cable, which was not sent until after his two statements appeared in the papers.

You may or may not think that Elliott is an admirable person. I happen to know that he has ideals and that he is doing what he is today from an idealistic feeling about his Father and his Father’s policies. He is not a communist, but he is trying to be fair and to carry out the friendly spirit that he feels his Father had. I think we will get further that way, and those of us who are put in the position where we have to come in contact head on because of the subject matter, still try in every way possible to show that we are not unfriendly to the people themselves. I would have you read the end of my speech to Mr. Vishinsky.

I am old and it makes no difference to me what any body says or thinks, either in praise or in blame, but when you are young, if people are unfair, I think it does make a difference and I think you should have waited before condemning Elliott for
his side of the story. I know Ambassador Smith was not in Moscow, so he sent no message, but I am also aware that someone else did. Things in cold print are often very different from the spoken word, which you know as well as I do.

I have often differed with my children. I have always tried to recognize their motives which lay behind what they said or did, that is something that we owe to those whom we love. I make no comparison between any of my children - that have different qualities and different abilities, but I do not think that Elliott is dishonest. I think he is quite conscious of the mistakes which he has made in life. As you grow older, you will realize that there are always two sides to every story and that sometimes people sin, but they rarely sin alone.

I have rarely been more indignant than I was on reading the beginning of your column. I am devoted to you, and for that reason, I feel that I must tell you truthfully how I feel about your not waiting to write until Elliott was back in the country and you could talk to him or he could at least answer you. Writing for money is no sin, which you well know, only dishonest writing is a sin.

Affectionately,

Dear Joe:

I am quite horrified by the piece you wrote about Elliott. I assure you that thought has may have misinterpreted according to the ideas of his Father's advisers. (That I can corroborate the actual things which he said so can a good many other people because they were told many times.) Now people may interpret them differently but you cannot say that they were not said.

As to the experience in Moscow, I think it would have been more sporting to wait until you had a chance to inquire from Elliott as to what had happened and what had not happened.

You are entirely wrong in thinking that a telegram was sent by the family in the way you suggest. Franklin must have told you that I sent a cable, but not for the reason that you attribute to me but because I wished Elliott to know that he was being quoted and that probably the Republicans were going to bait him on every thing that an inconspicuous person could say without any notice.

My cable could not have reached Elliott before he made his first statement which you attribute as a result of my cable, since it was not sent until after his first statement appeared in the papers.

You may or may not think that Elliott is an admirable person. I happen to know that he has ideals and that he is doing what he is doing today from an idealistic feeling about his Father and his Father's policies. He is not a communist but he is trying to be fair and to carry out the friendly spirit that he feels his Father had. I think we will get further that way, and those of us who are put in the position where we have to come in contact headon because of the subject matter, still try in every way possible to show that we are not unfriendly to the people themselves and I would have you read the end of my speech to Mr. Vishinsky.
I am old and it makes no difference to me what anybody says or thinks, either in praise or in blame, but when you are young if people are unfair, I think it does make a difference and I think that you (before condemning Elliott) should have waited for his side of the story. I know Ambassador Smith was not in Moscow, so he sent no message but I am also aware that some one did. Things in cold print are often very different from the spoken word, which you know as well as I do.

I have often differed with my own children. I have always tried to recognize their motives, which lay behind what they said or did, that is something that we owe to those for whom we care. I make no comparison between any of my children, they have different qualities and different abilities but I do not think that Elliott is dishonest. I think he is quite conscious of the mistakes which he had made in life, though he will grow older you will realize that there are always two sides to every story and that sometimes people sin but they rarely sin without the blame being equally shared by someone else.

I have rarely been more indignant than I was on reading the beginning of your column. I am devoted to you and for that reason I feel that I must tell you truthfully how I feel about your not waiting to write until Elliott was back in the country and you could talk to him. I could at least assure you, having been involved with you and writing for money is somewhat which you will know, right?

"No, but his writing is a sin"
ALSOP

To forward for
Mrs. Abbot
Captain 95 with IV
flown mid
and Mrs. Joseph ALSOP
Avon
Count

to reach Feb 17
Can papers -and that time report -
in some letter another time-
Probably all papers are destroyed.
And there may have been no letters.
Anyway, let's keep looking.

London has sent a message
letter from something or other. And there is a reply.
See from letter last week. The Delphian
travels starts in the Summer.

Recent time.

Dedication.

C.P.Q.