

DILLON MYER  
1943 - 1944

160  
March 4, 1945

Dear Mr. Myer:

I am sending you a letter I have  
received from ~~Miss E. Harriet Gipson,~~  
Seattle, Washington, on the subject of  
Japanese-American evacuation.

I would appreciate your letting  
me know what the position of the War  
Relocation Authority is for the future.

Very sincerely yours,

Hon. Dillon S. Myer  
Director, War Relocation Authority  
Washington DC

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C.

March 1, 1943

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt  
White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

This is in reply to your note of February 20, 1943 requesting my opinion as to the truth of a letter and report sent to you by Miss E. Harriet Gipson of Seattle, Washington.

Some of the statements made by Miss Gipson refer to judgments of various individuals which cannot be precisely weighed. I should say that Miss Gipson's report is substantially to the point in showing that treatment of the Japanese-Americans does not accord with the objectives we have set in fighting this war.

To cite a few facts: It is true that rumors of sabotage by Japanese residents of Hawaii during the attack on Pearl Harbor have no foundation in fact. It is true that the Japanese were evacuated from the West Coast to forestall possible sabotage in the event of an invasion and not because evidence of sabotage was already at hand. It is true that Japanese were lumped indiscriminately in assembly centers without regard to age or background and given a nominal wage or subsistence.

When the Committee reported on the evacuation, we took the position that military necessity must be accepted as a final fact and we urged, with anxious regard for the future, that

*3/4/43*  
*how was Saboteur*  
*definitely what*  
*is this practice*  
*for the future*

the Japanese be resettled in communities so organized as to utilize their full skills and talents in war employments and to facilitate their ultimate, complete participation in normal American life.

The War Relocation Authority in undertaking to transfer as many as possible of the Japanese to private employment in non-military areas is pursuing a policy which admits that satisfactory resettlement communities cannot be achieved.

The evacuation itself and subsequent developments to date have not tended to clear up the confusion and doubt in the public mind concerning loyalty of the Japanese-Americans.

I take the liberty of enclosing the Committee's Fourth Interim Report which states our official position in regard to the evacuation problem. In the event that you should wish further information with respect to this matter, I should be glad to have one of the members of the Committee's staff talk to you or your secretaries.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

*John H. Tolan*

John H. Tolan

Enclosure

100

March 15, 1945

Dear Mr. Myer:

Thank you very much for your letter of March 13. I am interested to see your recommendation to the Secretary of War and I agree with you.

Sincerely yours,

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Hon. D. S. Myer  
Director, War Relocation Authority  
Washington, D.C.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

I have your note of March 4, with the attached copy of letter from Miss E. Harriet Gipson of Seattle, Washington. I was very much interested in the presentation made by Miss Gipson and Miss Wolfe.

You know, of course, that the evacuation was carried out under authority of the President provided in Executive Order 9066, because it was determined by the War Department that the evacuation was a military necessity. The War Relocation Authority was then established under Executive Order 9102, some weeks after the first evacuation was ordered.

The War Relocation Authority is in agreement with much that is said in the mimeographed statement signed by Miss Gipson and Miss Wolfe. It is our opinion, however, that criticism of the evacuation at this late date accomplishes little and may prejudice the positive steps that should be taken to overcome some of the problems caused by evacuation. The ten relocation centers were established because the evacuated people at the time of evacuation had no place to go where they would be accepted. The leave policy of the War Relocation Authority provides that anyone may request leave provided they have a place to go and can take care of themselves, if investigation indicates they are not dangerous to the internal security of the country, and if the community to which they wish to go is not generally antagonistic to their presence. We also require those who are given indefinite leave to keep us informed regarding their address.

Within the past few days I have sent to Secretary Stimson a confidential letter, a copy of which is enclosed, outlining something of the history and problems of the War Relocation Authority, and making a recommendation regarding plans for the future. The only reason for making this letter confidential is the fact that part of my recommendation provides that many of the evacuees may return to the evacuated



*act 3-15-*  
*Handwritten notes and signatures in the top right corner, including a date stamp "MAR 13 1943" and various illegible scribbles.*

*Handwritten notes and signatures in the bottom right corner, including the name "J. P. Stimson" and other illegible scribbles.*

area after being properly cleared by a joint board. Because this procedure would require a change in the evacuation orders, I do not care to make it public until we have had an opportunity to discuss it fully with the War Department. I hope you will find time to read this letter, even though it is rather long.

In your reply to Miss Gipson you may wish to refer to the recent hearings of the Senate Military Affairs Committee which have been published in two parts and include the general policies of the War Relocation Authority. Copies of these two publications are attached in case you should want to send them to Miss Gipson.

If after reading the letter addressed to Secretary Stimson you are interested in pursuing the matter further, I would be very glad to discuss the policies and problems of the War Relocation Authority with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

*D. S. Myer*  
Director

Enclosure

# WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

## HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

### S. 444

A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN  
FUNCTIONS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

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JANUARY 20, 27, AND 28, 1943

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs



UNITED STATES  
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WASHINGTON : 1943

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# WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

## HEARINGS

BEFORE A

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FIRST SESSION

ON

### S. 444

A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN  
FUNCTIONS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

PART 2

FEBRUARY 11, 1943

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1943

8266

70  
April 13, 1945

Dear Mr. Myer:

Mrs. Roosevelt asks me to send you the enclosed letter from Mr. Ross W. Kusian, 1205 West 26th Street, Vancouver, Washington, and to say that she would appreciate your having someone advise Mr. Kusian.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary to  
Mrs. Roosevelt

Honorable Dillon S. Myer  
Director, War Relocation Authority  
Washington, D.C.

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Wife in relocation camp as she is of Japanese ancestry - he could not go with her as he had to stay with his mother, whose physical condition would not allow her too to go. Wife may not return home because she has no children. He is in an essential industry and any change would cause his reclassification into 1-A.

70

May 18, 1945

Dear Mr. Myer:

Mrs. Roosevelt asks me to send you the enclosed letter from Mrs. Theresa Takayoshi, of Minidoka Center. Mrs. Roosevelt thinks that Mrs. Takayoshi and her children should be allowed to return to Seattle.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary to  
Mrs. Roosevelt

Honorable Dillon Myer  
Director, War Relocation Authority  
Washington, D.C.

Her mother Irish father Japanese - husband Japanese descent - children three-fourths Jap. Chose to go to Rel. Camp with husband, though she might have remained in Seattle. Husband now joining combat unit and she wants to go back to Seattle, where her mother assumes responsibility. She can go, but children will not be permitted to leave - they are 3 and 7 yrs. old

May 31, 1943

100

Dear Mr. Myer:

I would appreciate your letting me know if Secretary Stimson's recommendation on the alien Japanese is being considered now?

Very sincerely yours,

0

Hon. Dillon Myer  
War Relocation Authority  
Washington, D.C.

X JAPANESE POPULATION

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

*Handwritten notes:*  
Add to file by letter  
for...  
War Relocation Authority  
3/31

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

I have delayed answering your letter of March 20 pending more complete development of War Department policies with respect to our Japanese population. I have spent much time and thought on the problem, which is a difficult one at best. The problem is not aided by the fact that there are several antagonistic minority groups in state legislatures and elsewhere who are disposed to consider all persons of Japanese ancestry inherently disloyal to this country. I enclose a typical pamphlet recently received.

While the resettlement of the evacuees is the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority, the War Department interposes no objection to the immediate release from relocation centers of all loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry so that they may be free to lead normal lives and to participate in the war effort in the same manner as the rest of our population. To this end, the War Department has recently established a regimental combat team to be composed of Japanese-American volunteers. The response to this plan was most enthusiastic in Hawaii where, as you know, most of the Japanese-Americans have been treated like anyone else. The response from the relocation centers, on the other hand, has been far from satisfactory, although at Minidoka, the relocation center situated near Eden, Idaho, over 17 per cent of the male citizens of military age volunteered.

The War Department has also set up a Japanese-American Joint Board, composed of representatives of the Army and Navy intelligence agencies and of the War Relocation Authority. The purpose of this Board is to clear appropriate individuals for employment in vital war plants, and generally to assist the War Relocation Authority in determining the loyalty of evacuees and their eligibility for release from relocation centers on indefinite leave. It is hoped that the work of this Board will help to expedite the restoration of loyal Japanese-Americans to useful war employment.

Unfortunately, a rather marked deterioration in evacuee morale appears to have occurred at the relocation centers. While this is certainly in part the natural result to be expected from confinement, I believe that the activities of pro-Axis minorities in each center have been a major factor in promoting unrest and destroying confidence in this country among the evacuees. The War Department has urged on several

occasions that the undesirables be segregated out and kept by themselves, but little has as yet been accomplished in this direction.

I understand that Mr. Myer of the War Relocation Authority sent you a copy of his letter to me of March 11, which goes into our Japanese problem at length. You may find my reply of interest, and I therefore enclose a copy.

Relative to your inquiry concerning the colored flying unit at Tuskegee, there are three kinds of flying training going on down there. Preflight instruction is being given at the College, and primary and basic flying at the Army field. After completion of training, qualified individuals will be selected for eventual use in combat. The 99th Fighter Squadron, for example, was moved from Tuskegee some time ago and is now in an active combat theater.

Please let me know if I can give you any further information.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*  
Secretary of War.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures - 2

C O P Y

May 10, 1943

Dear Mr. Myer:

I have given careful consideration to your letter of March 11, 1943, in which you review the history of the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas on the West Coast, and subsequent developments. Your letter also analyzes certain problems which the War Relocation Authority is presently encountering, and you outline three alternate plans in solution thereof on which you solicit my comments and recommendations.

While under Executive Order 9102 promulgated March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority has been charged with exclusive responsibility for the care and resettlement of persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from the West Coast, the Army has been in contact with several aspects of the program at first hand. For instance, the Army ran the assembly centers to which the evacuees were initially transferred, pending construction of the relocation projects by Army engineers. The Army supervised the movement of the evacuees from their homes to the assembly centers and from the assembly centers to the relocation projects. Recently the Army teams visited the relocation centers to procure, in cooperation with the War Relocation Authority, the accomplishment of loyalty questionnaires. In addition, there have been from time to time numerous consultations between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department on such miscellaneous matters as attendance of Japanese evacuees at educational institutions, entry of evacuees into critical defense areas, and the maintenance of order in the relocation centers themselves. I am glad to give you the views of the War Department based on this accumulated experience.

A serious deterioration in evacuee morale has been noted in recent months. This unsatisfactory development appears to be the result in large measure of the activities of a vicious, well-organized, pro-Japanese minority group to be found at each relocation project. Through agitation and by violence, these groups gained control of many aspects of internal project administration, so much so that it became disadvantageous, and sometimes dangerous, to express loyalty to the United States. The fact that

these groups were permitted to remain in power not only shook the confidence of the loyal ones in their Government, but also effectively stifled the expression of pro-American sentiment. It has been, and remains, the opinion of the War Department, already frequently expressed to you, that much trouble could have been avoided if these trouble makers had been removed from the relocation centers and placed in rigorous confinement.

To be sure, there were other reasons for the decline in evacuee morale, some of which you have touched upon in your letter. There is little incentive at the projects to work. Relations between parent and child are difficult, with the child no longer dependent upon his parents for shelter, for food, or for clothing. Absence of the normal outlets for youthful enthusiasm brings an increase in juvenile delinquency.

I am compelled, however, to the conclusion that failure to take aggressive action against those individuals who were actively working against the interests of this Government is a primary cause for the marked deterioration in evacuee loyalty. You will understand, of course, that my purpose is not to criticize, but to lay the basis for intelligent future action.

It is the War Department's considered opinion that the War Relocation Authority should take immediate steps to screen out from the centers and segregate in close confinement all individuals appearing to have pro-Japanese sympathies. This would include the already substantial number of individuals who have applied for repatriation, as well as the trouble makers. It is significant that the evacuees themselves propose segregation as a necessary step too long delayed, and volunteer the opinion that the situation will grow worse at an accelerated rate if action is not taken immediately. It seems clear to me that the problem of resettlement of persons of Japanese ancestry loyal to this country would be measurable simplified through segregation, as it would constitute assurance to the American public that the bad actors had been effectively dealt with.

The importance which the War Department attaches to segregation renders premature any consideration of relaxing the restrictions in force in the Western Defense Command against persons of Japanese ancestry, as suggested in your Plans B and C. The War Department, however, is not necessarily committed to a policy of maintaining these restrictions for the duration of the war. The question can easily be reconsidered after the results of segregation have been observed.

In the meantime, the War Department will continue to do all it can to assist the War Relocation Authority in the permanent resettlement of all persons of Japanese ancestry loyal to the United States, so that their services may be profitably utilized in the war effort. In this connection, the reinstatement of general Selective Service procedures is being actively considered. The recent establishment by the War Department of the Japanese American combat team should prove helpful in procuring general public acceptance for loyal Japanese Americans. Similarly, the operations of the Japanese American Joint Board initiated by the War Department, will clear the way to the employment of many loyal Japanese Americans in War industry.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director  
War Relocation Authority  
Room 822, Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

DRAKE UNIVERSITY  
DES MOINES, IOWA

March 16, 1943

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

We, the Student-Faculty Council of Drake University with a general sense of responsibility for the continuance of our country on a democratic basis, do protest Concurrent Resolution Number 20 which was passed by the Iowa Senate on February 25, and by the Iowa House of Representatives on February 26.

We protest this resolution with personal knowledge of the unquestioned national loyalty and the fine scholarship record of the twenty-eight Americans of Japanese extraction now on our campus.

We unequivocally feel a very special sense of responsibility for their citizenship rights and believe that they should have full educational opportunities within the United States that they might better understand and spread our democratic way of living.

Further, we instruct our secretary to send copies of this protest to the following:

Governor Bourke Hickenlooper  
The Iowa House of Representatives  
The Iowa Senate  
President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
Guy Gillette, Senator from Iowa  
Paul Cunningham, Representative from Iowa

Bob Spiegel

President, Drake Student-Faculty Council

# Joint Resolution on Japanese-Americans

To the Editor:

Because the public does not know the language nor purpose of concurrent resolution No. 20, adopted unanimously by the senate, Feb. 25, I am asking that it be printed in full.—C. V. Findlay, state senator, 27th district, Des Moines.

## Text of Concurrent Resolution, No. 20

Whereas, upon the shoulders of American boys, 18 years of age or over, has been placed the responsibility of forming a part of the armed forces engaged in the present titanic struggle for world liberty, and

Whereas, apart from the physical aspect of the sacrifice our younger men are thus called upon to make is the matter of their education. It is a serious and a momentous thing, to them and their country, to interrupt, perhaps to prevent, their academic and professional training; and

Whereas, it now appears that it is the purpose of the War Relocation authority of the United States to accord eligibility to some 2,500 young Japanese-American students, located in war relocation centers, to leave

such centers and enter any of the large number of colleges and universities—in other words, to accord the privileges of higher education to a group of young people, citizens by virtue of their birth in this country, whose loyalty and patriotism are rendered doubtful because of their racial extraction, thereby unfitting them to be soldiers, while denying a similar opportunity to our own young men of unquestioned loyalty, and

Whereas, it is admitted that practically all of the Japanese-Americans to whom higher education is to be afforded are physically fit and capable of performing services which would be useful to the war effort, where their patriotism might be demonstrated without placing them in a position where possible disloyalty might be perilous.

Therefore Be It Resolved by the Senate, the House Concurring: 1. That no discrimination be shown in the matter of educational advantages, between America's young citizens, of whatever race or nationality—in short, while young men of undoubted loyalty and Caucasian extraction are required to serve in the armed forces, that these young men of Japanese ancestry and less certain loyalty be given opportunity to serve the war effort in ways in which their racial extraction will prove no impediment.

2. That steps be taken, through executive intervention or order, or by means of legislation if necessary, to prevent allowing Japanese-American youths the privileges of leaving concentration centers and securing an education in American colleges and universities, while the same privilege is denied to loyal American young men called to military service.

3. That if any Japanese-American youths have already been given the privilege of attending colleges and uni-

versities, they be returned to their relocation camps, and

Be It Further Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to the president of the United States, also to the two Iowa senators, and to the eight Iowa members of the house of representatives, and that they thus be petitioned to use their influence and best offices that the injustices mentioned may be avoided.

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** We gladly reprint Senator Findlay's resolution. It emphasizes, we think, the tragic misunderstanding that prevails in some quarters with respect to the problem of American citizens of Japanese ancestry. How, for example, is any loyal American's patriotism rendered "doubtful" merely because of his racial extraction? Who says these youths are "unfitted to be soldiers?" (Certainly not the United States army, which is forming them into army combat teams!) In what way does the use of college facilities for these boys and girls deny any opportunity to anyone else? On what ground does Senator Findlay's committee assume that these Japanese-American citizens are not jumping at every chance to be "useful to the war effort"? (Thousands of them are begging for a chance!) In what way could observation of their activities be better assured than in institutions of learning?

Does the committee have any conception of what is going to happen to our 70,000 or so Americans of Japanese extraction if they are imprisoned in concentration camps indefinitely, in contemptuous disregard for their loyalty to us and their simple rights as citizens?

We urge, indeed, the reading of this resolution, and the dispassionate consideration of its "blind spots."

What Shall We  
Do With the  
Japanese

?

from Curton  
360 Soquel Ave  
San Jose, Calif.



RECEIVED  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

1943 APR 2 PM 4:39



To Hon. Henry Stimson

Secretary of War.

War Department

Washington

D.C.

## WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE JAPANESE?

To the Editor:

What shall we do with and with respect to them, after this war is ended?

With the conclusion of the present conflict we shall be faced with a number of serious problems.

To some of us it appears that the highest note we shall have to strike will be little or no consideration by those who are busily engaged in planning our destiny.

There are a number of starry-eyed "Utopians," such as the distinguished gentleman, from Iowa, Vice President Wallace, who seem to think that our chief occupation, after the war, will be to regiment all the peoples of Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and the Islands of the Sea, to set up for them the form of government which in our distant view will best suit their needs and so to finance their operations that their standard of living will thenceforth be equal to that by which we are living in these piping times.

We do hear something on the subject of the little chore of finding employment for five to eight million soldiers and eight to ten million additional "defense workers."

But little or nothing has been said as to just how we shall pay off our two hundred and fifty-billion dollar debt.

Still less is being said as to how we are going to convince a few hundred thousand fellow citizens that they should find some occupation other than that of pushing the rest of us around—that is, while we are to be so nobly occupied by determining the self-determination of the distant peoples of the earth, we are concerned nothing as to what is to be done to preserve to ourselves the freedom of action which we have believed to be responsible for most of our accomplishments.

These are notes that we are going to have a try at. They are pretty vital to us. As far as Mr. You and Mr. I are concerned they are certainly of a lot more import than the job of wiping out the slums for the Hottentots.

Important as all these problems are, there is another that to us, the people of California, which in the long view involves considerations of greater significance than all the others combined. And that is the question as to what shall be done with and with respect to the one hundred sixty thousand Japanese who have moved in on us and/or been born native to the Pacific coast states.

These people are members of a radically different race; a race that never has been and never will become assimilated. So long as they remain here they necessarily will be a race apart, living a different life, recognized by a foreign country as its citizens, for a thousand years born and trained to a living habit and economy such as to enable them to compete on an unfair basis with our own people; their forebears fanatically devoted to their God Emperor, such loyalty has been bred into the flesh and bone of the succeeding generations; smart, ambitious, cunning, with little conception of business honor; members of the race and claimed, at least, as citizens of the nation which for more than ten years has afforded history's worst example of deliberate, selfish, inexcusable and inhuman aggression; the nation which is now engaged in torturing our boys as prisoners and killing them in battle, which, after practicing it for twenty-odd years climaxed its career of international deceit by its vicious attack upon us under cover of a supposed peaceful negotiation.

They breed like rabbits. If they be allowed to remain in this country and to return to their former

## WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE JAPANESE?

habitat, within 50 years there will be a million or more of them voters in the state of California. Naturally they will (as they now do) vote as a block. As such they will hold the balance of political power. Which means that for all practical purposes they will be able politically to dictate the destiny of our state and people.

Economically, they constitute an equally serious threat. For years the alien Japanese have been beating the devil round the bush by acquiring and by leasing agricultural lands in the names of their minor native born children. When, a year ago, the army came to move them out of the coastal region, it was startling to any thoughtful person to learn what a tremendous acreage of the choicest agricultural lands in California had passed into their control. As the native born increase in number, the areas so controlled are constantly being extended. In agriculture we could have no more unhealthy condition. That our food producing industry should pass into the hands of an alien, never to be assimilated race, would be a tragedy.

In the early history of the American colonies, negroes were imported into this country for use as slaves. Eventually this was the prime cause of our great Civil War. With the closing of that conflict thousands of these slaves were freed and were made citizens of the United States.

The African negro, too, was a race so radically different that it was and yet is impossible of assimilation.

In the beginning the presence of the negro gave no promise of constituting a serious problem. But consider to what consequences the importation of a few black men, as slaves, has led. To a great Civil War, in which hundreds of thousands of our citizens died. To an economic loss of billions of dollars. And the members of the race now increased to many millions, we have, in the southern,

rapidly spreading to the north Atlantic and to the mid-western states, the most serious race problem ever presented to any nation.

If we permit the Japanese to remain in our country, there is no doubt the job of breeding little brown "citizens" the result will eventually be that we shall have another race problem beside which that presented by the negro will dwindle into insignificance.

We brought the negro over here. We are responsible for the problem his presence has created and must deal with it.

We didn't bring the Japs into our country. They came here of their own choice and for entirely selfish purposes. No Jap ever chose to make his home on our shores to escape persecution. No Jap ever came here seeking a place where he might have freedom of religion, of speech or of action. None ever came with any thought but to accumulate a fortune.

We owe them nothing, save the rights guaranteed to them by treaties entered into with their government. Deliberately, grossly and with only evil intent they have broken every such treaty. Now, we see the mistake it has been to have any dealings with them or to admit them into our country on any terms. Now is the time to correct our error. The opportunity to save ourselves from at least one threatening catastrophe is here. If we act, and act promptly, it may be done. If we fail to act now, then we are building up a great trouble for ourselves and for our future generations.

The remedy is at hand. The things necessary to be done are few and simple. It requires only that we be realistic, that we and our representatives have a supply of moral courage and a lot of energy—a realization of our dangerous situation, of the opportunity

## WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE JAPANESE?

at hand, and the determination that we shall correct this mistake before it is too late.

Definitely, what should we do? Forthwith, Congress should adopt a resolution so to amend the Constitution of the United States that:

(1) At the end of this war, we shall be in a position lawfully to return to Japan all Japanese, alien or native born;

(2) That no person of Japanese ancestry shall ever be or become a citizen of the United States; and

(3) That members of that race be forever excluded from anything in the nature of permanent residence here.

Who should object to such a program but those of the Japanese race? It is with that race we are now at war. Not merely the Japanese government, not merely its army and navy. We have been attacked by and are at war with the Japanese race. Against that race we are fighting for our continued existence. There is no occasion for us to be tender of the feelings of any person of that race.

This is the time to rid ourselves of those people. It is the accepted time. If our people and the people of our sister states—the fathers and mothers, the wives, the sisters, the brothers, the preachers and the friends of those of our youth who have been slain, or who are up for slaughter by the Nips, or who have suffered perhaps the worse fate of capture, will speak their minds, it can be done. If it be not done now—if we wait until the war's end to speak our piece, it will be too late.

TO EVERY REPRESENTATIVE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE CONGRESS THIS MESSAGE SHOULD GO. THAT NEXT AFTER HIS DUTY TO SUPPORT THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO CARRY ON AND WIN THIS WAR, IS HIS DUTY TO CARRY ON A CRUSADE FOR THE ADOPTION OF

MEASURES SUITABLE TO ATTAIN THIS DESIRABLE END. OUR PEOPLE AS ONE MAN SHOULD JOIN IN THIS DEMAND.

The congressman from this district is John E. Anderson, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Our senators are Hiram W. Johnson and Sheridan Doremy, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

JUST CONSIDER WHAT IS AND TELEGRAMS, LETTERS AND/OR POST CARDS ON THIS SUBJECT, FROM THE PEOPLE OF ONE LITTLE VALLEY OF CALIFORNIA, WOULD MEAN, IF YOU SEND YOURS AND I MINE AND DO IT NOW (AND IT CAN BE DONE FOR A ONE CENT STAMP) IT MAY BE YOUR MESSAGE OR MINE THAT WILL DO THE JOB. LET'S DO IT TODAY!

J. E. GARDNER.

To Resist Release of Native and Foreign Born Japanese:—

Write or Write to—

Hon. Henry Steiwer  
Secretary of War  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

Senator Sheridan Doremy  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Senator Hiram W. Johnson  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Hon. John E. Anderson, M. C.  
House Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Hon. George W. Colford, M. C.  
House Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

# Resolution Against Jap Program

Following is the resolution adopted Tuesday night by the Pajaro Valley and Watsonville Defense council:

Whereas it has been announced through the press:

1. That the Secretary of War contemplates that some 28,000 native-born Japanese shall be incorporated into the United States army in separate combat units; and

2. That the Federal authorities contemplate the release of from 25,000 to 40,000 Japanese from Relocation camps where they are now restrained, with no announced provision for adequate surveillance or control; and

Whereas, the Pajaro Valley and Watsonville Defense Council, the membership of which is made up of representatives of all civic organizations in the community, at a meeting held for the purpose of considering these matters, has officially expressed its opinion that such contemplated action would be inimical to the best interests and to the welfare and effective defense of our country;

Be it resolved that we most vigorously and earnestly protest against the above proposed actions and each of them; that we convey this protest to the Secretary of War, to the War Relocation board, to our congressmen and senators and to the President of the United States.

That we urge upon these authorities the following reasons, based upon an extensive experience with the Japanese, for more than 40 years, an intimate knowledge of their character, and our observation of what occurred on December 7, 1941, and immediately thereafter:

(1) Following Pearl Harbor and for the defense of the West Coast against attack and sabotage the Army wisely moved the Japanese from the Pacific Coast. NOW TO PERMIT THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR FORMER HABITAT

WOULD SUBJECT US AGAIN TO THE DANGER OF SERIOUS SABOTAGE AND DIFFICULTY IN DEFENDING OUR SHORE LINE IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK.

(2) DUE TO THE TEMPER OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SINCE THE DASTARDLY ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, we feel that IT WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE JAPANESE THEMSELVES TO ALLOW THEM TO RETURN FOR RESIDENCE ON THE WEST COAST, and that difficult additional policing problems would be presented thereby in effecting their safety.

(3) IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LOYAL AND DISLOYAL JAPANESE. We are in no position to judge the emotions of the Japanese inasmuch as they have maintained their own schools and religion, and in many cases, dual citizenship with their main allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.

(4) IF JAPANESE WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THIS AREA WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE COOPERATION OF PRESENT AGRICULTURAL OR INDUSTRIAL LABORERS ALREADY ENGAGED IN THE WAR EFFORT IF THEY WERE CALLED UPON TO WORK WITH JAPANESE EVACUEES.

(5) TO ALLOW YOUNG JAPANESE TO LEAVE RELOCATION CAMPS FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES IN OUR COLLEGES WOULD BE UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE AS IT AFFECTS OUR OWN AMERICAN BOYS WHO HAVE BEEN TAKEN OUT OF COLLEGE AND ARE SO LOYALLY SERVING THEIR COUNTRY in the armed forces to the detriment of their education and employment.

## RESOLUTION AGAINST JAP PROGRAM

(6) IT IS THE OPINION of this council that these Japanese should be contributing substantially to the war effort but we feel that it should be in areas removed from the Pacific Coast and by group movement UNDER FULL AND PROPER CONTROL AND SUPERVISION BY THE ARMY. IN NO EVENT SHOULD THEY BE DISBURSED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITHOUT PROPER PROVISION FOR ABSOLUTE SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT THE JAPANESE, BOTH ALIEN AND AMERICAN BORN SHOULD BE RETAINED IN RELOCATION CENTERS FOR THE DURATION UNLESS THEY ARE PLACED UNDER DIRECT AND ABSOLUTE SUPERVISION AND FULL CONTROL OF ARMY AUTHORITY and engaged in the furtherance of our war effort.

THIS RESOLUTION ADOPTED this 23rd day of February, 1943, by the PAJARO VALLEY AND WATSONVILLE DEFENSE COUNCIL.

Attest: J. E. GARDNER,  
Chairman

O. B. LARSEN,  
Secretary of said  
council

C. H. BAKER,  
Mayor of the city of  
Watsonville, Ex-officio  
chairman of  
the Watsonville Defense  
Council.

It was further ordered that copies of this resolution be sent to other defense councils in California and that our local civic organizations be urged to join in this protest.

O. B. LARSEN, Secretary.

*This question, as to the disposition of the Japanese is, for us on the Pacific Coast, the major problem arising out of the war.*

*People in the East do not appreciate the danger involved. Manifestly Washington has no conception of the import of what is proposed to be done.*

*We of the Western Coast must stir ourselves now and let Washington know the truth and our sentiments.*

**DEMAND ACTION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE**

Reprinted from

WATSONVILLE REGISTER-PAJARONIAN  
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Friday, February 26, 1943

WATSONVILLE PRESS 118 WALL STREET

SEND

**All Japs  
BACK  
to Japan**

M1 - M2

100

July 24, 1945

Dear Mr. Myer:

Thank you very much for your letter of July 19, replying to my inquiry about Mr. Townsend. I have great sympathy with you. Having employees of this type must be exasperating beyond belief.

Very sincerely yours,

Mr. D. S. Myer  
War Relocation Authority  
Washington, D.C.

0

thank very much for letter. I have great sympathy  
with you. Having employees of this type must be  
exasperating beyond belief.

e.r.



STATEMENT ON TESTIMONY OF HAROLD H. TOWNSEND BEFORE THE HOUSE  
OF REPRESENTATIVES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,  
MAY 26, 1943, 2:00 P. M.

Harold H. Townsend, formerly chief Supply and Transportation officer at the Poston, Arizona Relocation Center, appeared under oath before the subcommittee in an executive session on May 26. Some time prior to June 10, 1943, a transcript or excerpts from Townsend's testimony were supplied the press by the committee. Later a transcript was given the Project Director of the Poston Center. The Director and staff of the center have reviewed the Townsend testimony carefully and have prepared documentary evidence bearing on most of Townsend's assertions. We wish to take this opportunity to present for the record the comments of the War Relocation Authority on Townsend's testimony.

There is scarcely a page of this testimony that does not contain one or more false, misleading or exaggerated statements. While some of these statements are of comparatively trivial consequence, there are many others that misinform the Committee on fundamental aspects of administration at the Poston Center. It is on these latter comments in particular that the War Relocation Authority has prepared detailed comment.

Townsend's complete unreliability as a witness is revealed in his opening statement to the Committee when, in response to the direct question, "Have you ever served in the United States Army?", he replies, yes, for six months in France in 1918. As a matter of fact, Townsend never served in the Army. For the entire period of American participation in the first World War, Townsend was employed as a superintendent of guards by the Carter Oil Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma. In February 1919, three months after the Armistice, Townsend was sent as a YMCA worker to France where he served for six months as a hut secretary.

Of much greater seriousness, from the point of view of the committee before which Townsend appeared, is the false and misleading picture Townsend presented of conditions at the Poston Relocation Center, particularly during the period from November 18 to 24, 1943, during which one of the three camps at Poston experienced a sit-down strike and mass demonstration by a number of evacuees against certain policies of the War Relocation Authority and certain conditions at the center. During the strike Townsend became so emotionally upset and frightened that he reported a great many imaginary dangers, talked so irresponsibly to other members of the administrative staff that he threatened to spread panic among them, and finally left the center in a government automobile.

\* \* \* \* \*

Presented before Costello Subcommittee of House Committee on Un-American Activities July 7, 1943.

After the strike Townsend returned and in an interview with the Project Director (of which a stenographic record was made) admitted that he had been wrong in his actions during the strike, admitted that he had greatly exaggerated the seriousness of the situation, and acknowledged that he was wrong in leaving his post of duty. Townsend's record prior to the strike had been poor. That record, together with his conduct during the disturbance caused the Project Director to ask for his resignation.

After Townsend realized that he had been dismissed, he took the course not infrequently followed by disgruntled employees. He prepared a long and highly emotional statement purporting to be a description of conditions in the Poston Center. This he broadcast throughout the country. One copy came into the possession of the War Relocation Authority in April 1943.

This same statement formed the basis of the testimony before the sub-committee. As a matter of fact, there is ample internal evidence in the testimony itself that Townsend's hearing before the Committee consisted simply of Townsend reading this prepared statement into the record with appropriate leading questions from time to time by the Committee's investigator. There was no cross-examination, and every statement, no matter how clearly fantastic, was accepted for the record at face value.

On June 18, 1943, when the sub-committee visited the Poston Center, the Project Director, having reviewed Townsend's testimony, asked for the privilege of making a statement on it for the record. The sub-committee refused to hear him. We have, therefore, in the interest of presenting the facts for the record, reviewed the testimony at length and prepared the attached summary of false statements made by Townsend together with an outline of the facts of each situation. All comments made on the following pages are fully documented in the records of the War Relocation Authority.

Attachment

FALSE STATEMENTS OF HAROLD H. TOWNSEND BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,  
MAY 26, 1943, 2:00 P.M.

1. Page 2

Question: "Have you ever served in the United States Army?"

Answer: "Yes."

Question: "When?"

Answer: "1918."

Question: "Did you serve in France?"

Answer: "Six months in France."

Comment

Records of the War Department of men who served in the United States Army during the last war contain no record of military service by Harold H. Townsend. Records of the Carter Oil Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma, show that Townsend was employed by that company as a Superintendent of Guards from March 1, 1917 to January 15, 1919. Records of the YMCA indicate that Townsend served in France as a YMCA hut worker after the last war, from February, 1919 to August, 1919.

2. Page 9

Question: "Do they have a hospital in Poston?"

Answer: "They have a very fine hospital, a very large hospital, modern in every respect. Large enough to handle approximately 600 people and is usually filled."

Comment

The official rated capacity of Poston General Hospital is 250 beds with 120 beds available for occupancy. The average daily census of the hospital from July, 1942 to May 31, 1943, is given in the following table. The average daily census of patient for this period is 98.1.

<u>Patient Days in</u>	<u>Hospital Days</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>
July	2285	73.7
August	2827	91.2
September	2886	96.2
October	3115	100.4
November	3285	109.5
December	3407	109.9
January	3457	111.5
February	3157	112.7
March	2913	93.9
April	2785	92.8
May	2777	89.6

3. Page 10

Question: "Do you recall how much food was consumed daily?"

Answer: "We, by actual count, supplied 58 tons of subsistence per day."

Comment

During the month of December, 1942 -- the last month when Mr. Townsend was on duty at the project -- the average quantity of food delivered to evacuee mess halls was 27 tons per day. The evacuee population in the center at that time was approximately 18,000.

4. Page 11

Question: "The amount of the food and the type of food was determined by the WRA in Washington; is that correct?"

Answer: "Largely so, yes, sir."

Comment

During the period when Mr. Townsend was on duty at the Poston Relocation Center, supervision over the requisitioning of food by the center was exercised by the regional office of the War Relocation Authority in San Francisco, California. Since January, 1943, similar supervision has been exercised by the Washington office.

5. Page 12

Mr. Townsend: "The information that was furnished me by certain friendly groups was that they had placed different types of emergency food in secret cellars under the mess halls for the invasion armies and parachute

troopers. But in addition to that they had large caches of food throughout the desert, buried, that could be used for similar purposes. And this information was furnished by friendly Japanese who were endeavoring to get special favors, and we were constantly trying to find out what was happening to certain supplies, and we always had a number of Japanese that would give us information for an exchange of favors."

Comment

This story is entirely without foundation and was never mentioned by Mr. Townsend during the time he was employed at Poston. It is impossible that the evacuees could have stored food under the desert conditions at Poston in a manner to preserve it more than a few days.

6. Page 13

Mr. Townsend: "At numerous times we had these thieves caught, and produced evidence and information about the process of the entire thieving ring. The matter was placed before Mr. Empie, and Mr. Head, and Mr. Gelvin, and the M. P. authorities, and it was always stopped, because there was no way that they could see that we would be benefited by trying to prosecute them. We then established a daily loss of approximately \$500 through the thefts within the camp, which was agreed upon by all of us, and even at that they would not take any action towards prosecution."

Comment

Records of the Poston Internal Security Office indicate that Mr. Townsend made only three complaints about what he considered illegal activities within the project area. One was concerned with the fact that property of an evacuee was missing from a shipment received from the Salinas, California Assembly Center. Another had to do with three small Japanese boys playing hide-and-seek in Mr. Townsend's car. The third had to do with an evacuee securing scrap lumber from the salvage depot without authorization.

7. Page 16

Question: "Was the food that you served to the Japanese at Poston as good or better than that being served to the Army?"

Answer: "It was superior in every way ....."

Comment

Food at Poston was and is requisitioned through the Quartermaster Corps. In quality it is equal to or lower than that served at training camps and other Army centers. In quantity it is substantially less than that provided by the Army as evidenced by the ration cost, which has not exceeded 45¢ per person per day.

8. Page 17

Question: "Were the Japanese served ice cream at Poston?"

Answer: "Yes, sir, we had ice cream brought to us every day from the Golden State Creamery Company."

Comment

With regard to this statement, we have the following comment submitted by Mr. Joe A. Petta who has served as Assistant Chief Steward at the Poston Center since June, 1942:

"No ice cream has ever been purchased with government funds for evacuees. Ice cream received at Poston is paid for in one of the following ways:

- "1. It is purchased by the community stores using evacuee funds, for re-sale to evacuees.
- "2. Small quantities were purchased occasionally for the personnel mess during the summer of 1942. The personnel mess is operated as a government mess, and its expenses are paid by employees."

9. Page 17

Question: "And milk?"

Answer: "Milk orders run from 8,000 to 12,000 quarts of homogenized milk every day."

Comment

Milk received at the center has never exceeded 8,000 quarts daily. Deliveries reached this figure during part of December 1942 and January 1943 as a result of increased requisitions authorized by Mr. Townsend without consulting the Project Steward.

The current contract calls for maximum deliveries of 6,264 quarts daily, but there is an agreement with the vendor that deliveries to the center are contingent upon the needs of military establishments in the area and upon the requirements of other consumers. The vendor has recently notified the center that deliveries are likely to be reduced drastically in the near future.

10. Page 17

Question: "And butter?"

Answer: "We had the finest grade of Challenge butter and other high-grade butter that we could buy."

Comment

On January 28, 1943, the War Relocation Authority instructed all centers to discontinue the purchase of butter and to substitute oleomargarine. When point rationing on meats and fats was initiated on March 9, 1943, the restriction on the purchase of butter was lifted, with the proviso that two conditions must be met: (1) that the regular civilian allowance of 16 points per week for meats and fats should not be exceeded; and (2) that in the event of civilian shortages, butter purchases should be discontinued. Throughout this entire period, the Poston Center has continued to use oleomargarine because of its lower ration point value and lower cost.

11. Page 17

Question: "Was there plenty of meat and sausage of all kinds supplied?"

Answer: "The finest cuts and grade A meats; quarters and full carcasses of lambs and pork, and the best cuts of beef were brought in; on an average of one refrigerator car a day."

Question: "I believe you stated that all of it was of the very best grade?"

Answer: "The finest grade that we could get."

Question: "Was the grade of food better than that obtained by our own citizens in the markets and stores?"

Answer: "Very much better than you can buy in the open market."

Comment

Meats procured at Poston and other relocation centers have generally been U. S. Commercial (third) grade or lower. As a matter of

policy the War Relocation Authority avoids procurement of commodities known to be scarce in the markets where purchases are made. In November, 1942, voluntary meat rationing was introduced in the six western centers. This program was extended to the four eastern centers in January, 1943. All mandatory rationing restrictions of the Office of Price Administration are being and have been applied at all centers.

12. Page 19

Question: "What was done with the garbage?"

Answer: "Sir?"

Question: "What was done with the garbage?"

Answer: "It was taken -- we would load it onto equipment and dig ditches and throw it into the ditches and cover it up."

Question: "What happened with reference to the idea of feeding it to the hogs?"

Answer: "Up until January 30th there was nothing done at all. About January 30th Washington wrote the director and asked him how many hogs they had to use the 9 or 10 tons of garbage that we had in the camp, and we had been out trying to buy hogs, and we had every hog in southern California--through this same group that was building this \$25,000,000 corporation, we had every hog farm and every cattle farm tabulated, and we knew all the hogs available, so he had this hog man check the hogs, and at the time the letter was received there wasn't a hog in the camp. They then, without any knowledge on the part of the supply department, ordered in 200 200-pound hogs, and they answered Washington by telling them that we had 200 hogs.

"I would like to enlarge a little bit upon that. If you know anything about hogs, you know you wouldn't want to start feeding 200-pound hogs. They are ready for the market. They bought 200 200-pound hogs and paid 25 cents a pound for them. The same herd of hogs, as listed in the market, could have been bought for 17 cents a pound, and they were hogs that we were considering buying for butchering for pork. They were too old to be handled for feeders, and that order should have been for hogs that would have cost \$10 or \$15, to feed the garbage to, instead of paying 25 cents a pound. Now they have this number of hogs down there, weighing 300 or 400 pounds, and they are not fit for anything except lard."

Comment

During December, 1942, pursuant to a general policy adopted by the War Relocation Authority on December 3, 1942, steps were taken to establish a swine project at the Poston Center. Three hundred pigs were purchased January 13, 1943, in accordance with standard governmental procurement procedure. The pigs averaged 145 pounds each. Since then, 325 more pigs, averaging 115 pounds each, have been purchased. All were garbage broke, double vaccinated feeder pigs.

13. Page 21

Question: "Mr. Townsend, how many warehouses did you say were under your jurisdiction at Poston?"

Answer: "180"

Question: "180?"

Answer: "180 warehouses."

Comment

There were 90 warehouses on the entire project, including six at the Parker railhead.

14. Page 21

Question: "How many Japanese were employed in the warehouses?"

Answer: "2700, I believe, in the -- now, wait a minute! In the warehouses, no. I think there were----"

Question: "An approximation will be all right."

Answer: "There were 600 Japanese and 4 white supervisors in the warehouses."

Comment

The maximum number of Japanese ever to be employed in the warehouses was 300. They were employed during the month of December, 1942, and distributed as follows:

Unit No. 1	133
Unit No. 2	107
Unit No. 3	60

15. Page 22

Mr. Townsend: "Now, as for the furniture, of course, the Poston development includes a very marvelous Caucasian personnel center. The plan showed 54 modern bungalows, and two dormitories, three stories, one for women and one for men, and the administration homes, which would cost somewhere between fifteen and twenty thousand dollars. There were to be four of them, and a beautiful park area, with swimming pools, and so forth. And this furniture was purchased for that purpose, to furnish those. It was all bought from Barker Brothers, and the prices on it were not reasonable. They were very, very high in consideration of the many, many carloads. We must have had, oh, at least 20 carloads of that type of furniture."

Comment

Quarters provided for the administrative staff at Poston include eight four-room cottages built during the initial construction period by the Army; twenty-four housekeeping apartments of from two to six rooms in one-story barracks-type buildings of temporary construction, similar to the theatre-of-operations construction found throughout the center; and 158 rooms size 7 x 14 feet in barracks-type dormitories. Each barracks dormitory contains a bathroom and from ten to twelve rooms.

There are no three-story buildings, no modern bungalows, and no individual administration homes other than the eight cottages built by the Army.

In accordance with the customary practice in public or private projects in such isolated locations as Poston, staff quarters are fitted with essential furniture. Furniture for the quarters at Poston was not all purchased from Barker Brothers, but in fact was secured from a number of vendors, chiefly in Los Angeles where the purchases were made by the Office for Emergency Management.

All staff members pay rent to the government based upon the size and character of accommodations furnished.

16. Page 22

Question: "In addition to the food stored in the warehouses, what else was stored there?"

Answer: "There were supplies and equipment of every conceivable type in the numerous warehouses. The C.C.C. had sent in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment. We had warehouses that we moved the stuff into and locked up, and they hadn't been opened for months, because it was just miscellaneous equipment. We didn't know what it was."

Comment

The Civilian Conservation Corps has not shipped in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment. It is estimated that two (2) miscellaneous carloads (100,000 pounds) would hold all the surplus items, such as tools. The C.C.C. automotive equipment that has been received did not exceed, at the most, ten (10) carloads. All warehouses are opened and inspected regularly in the ordinary course of business.

17. Page 24

Mr. Townsend: ".....Then there is another thing that occurs to me. We were very anxious to get school buses. We brought in -- we had 400 teacher, ....."

Comment

Elsewhere in the testimony (page 34) Mr. Townsend states that there are 100 Caucasian teachers and 200 or more Japanese teachers. In fact, on December 19, 1942, there were 203 teachers in the Poston schools: 83 were Caucasian and 120 were Japanese. These figures include not only elementary and secondary teachers, but also the Director of Education, three high school principals, one elementary principal, and twelve other supervisory educational personnel.

18. Page 25

Question: "Going back to the fleet of dump trucks bought in Los Angeles, do you recall the name of the firm those trucks were purchased from?"

Answer: "I think it was Finkelstein. Finkelstein is another one of the swindlers that we bought hundreds of thousands

of dollars of equipment from -- this firm of Finkelstein, and always there was a kick-back to the procurement representative."

Question: "Is Finkelstein located in Los Angeles?"

Answer: "He is here, yes."

Question: "Is that his firm name?"

Answer: "Finkelstein and Company, one of these big salvage companies."

Comment

No trucks of any kind were purchased by the Poston Center from Finkelstein.

19. Page 31

Question: "Were many of these Kibei on the internal police force?"

Answer: "I didn't get that."

Question: "I asked you, were many of the Kibei on the internal police force?"

Answer: "Yes, a large number of them were."

Question: "They composed the so-called goon squads that you have referred to?"

Answer: "Yes, sir. The police force was largely built up of the gootapo, as I have called them, because they tell you that they have trained under the German agents, and they were, in my estimation, the men that were guilty of the malicious beating up and all the malicious agitation in the camp, because the police force would not permit any decent American-born Japanese to take part, because he might expose some of their under-cover work."

Comment

At the time of Mr. Townsend's presence in Poston, there were three evacuated officers in charge of the police departments in the three units. All of these men were Nisei, or American-born/American-educated Japanese. The officers who assisted them and who held the rank of Captain or Lieutenant in the local police departments were all Nisei Japanese; only one of these had ever been to Japan at any time. This man held the rank of Captain in the police department of Unit Two and his loyalty and ability were unquestionable. A few Kibei were taken in to each

of the police departments as patrolmen, particularly because of their ability to speak Japanese and to deal with some of the older evacuees who had difficulty understanding English. These men were picked very carefully, and there has never been any indication that any of them were involved in troublemaking or subversive activities.

As to the testimony regarding the German training of any of the young men employed as policemen in Poston, Mr. Ernest L. Miller, Director of Police at Poston, reports that "such information has never been forwarded to me and I have to date seen no practice which would indicate any such training. I might add that, having spent some months in Germany in 1936 and surveyed Nazi police practices, I am thoroughly familiar with German methods of training and mannerisms, and I have never seen any evidence of such training or contact among any of the Japanese in Poston."

20. Page 33

Question: "Who is the head of the education department at Poston?"

Answer: "Mr. Cary."

Question: "Do you know anything about Mr. Cary's background?"

Answer: "Yes. Mr. Cary and most of the Caucasian staff were imported from Honolulu, and he was the principal of the McKinley High School there."

Comment

Out of a total of eighty-three Caucasian school personnel at Poston, four (including Dr. Cary) were previously employed in Honolulu.

21. Page 35

Mr. Townsend: "Well, Dr. Cary and his assistant, Miss-- her name has slipped my mind -- they drew up the plan of education and put into effect, and the textbooks were ordered-- part of them were shipped in from Honolulu and part of them were ordered through the School Board in Los Angeles, and then a number of them were secured from various other schools throughout southern California. They were discarded school books that we were asked to go out and pick up, and I had a letter from Dr. Cary asking me to pick up textbooks from at least eight or ten different communities around California."

Comment

The first orders for textbooks were taken from the official textbook lists used in the Indian Service. Shortly after Christmas, the way was cleared to purchase textbooks through the local procurement office. All textbooks used are standard texts, used by our American public schools, and printed by reputable printing houses. None of the textbooks was secured through the Los Angeles school authorities. No textbooks were shipped in from Honolulu. Fifty thousand textbooks were donated to the schools by twelve California school districts.

22. Page 39

"The Chairman: Was there any produce raised around the camp and used there?"

"The Witness: There wasn't when I left there. If there was, it was put in there since."

Comment

In addition to products harvested and used from seventy-two acres farmed within the residential blocks between the barracks, there were 89,720 pounds of vegetables harvested on the acreage farmed by the Agricultural Division up to January 1, 1943. Since that time, agricultural production has been increased so that on June 1, 1943, there was a total of 228 acres being farmed in addition to the acreage in the blocks. The June first report shows a total of 901,896 pounds of sixteen different types of vegetables harvested by the agricultural department.

23. Pages 47-82

Most of the last half of Mr. Townsend's testimony is devoted to a lurid and imaginative description of what Townsend calls a riot at Poston Center during the period from November 18 to November 24, 1942. He states that government property was destroyed, that a violent mob took possession of the center, that the lives of the administrative personnel were endangered, etc.

Comment

A number of his specific statements are dealt with in detail below. However, it should be pointed out that there was no riot at Poston, no violence or destruction of government property, and no harm to Caucasian employees or their families.

Camp I at Poston experienced during the period in question a sit-down strike, accompanied by a demonstration and mass meetings of evacuee representatives. This was not a unified pro-Japanese movement as Mr. Townsend has represented. In fact, Camps II and III were in no way affected by the incident. Only a part of the activities at Camp I were suspended by the strike. Essential services were maintained, and while there was considerable tenseness for a time in the relations between evacuees and the administrative staff over the grievances which were in question, there was no violence or disorder.

Immediate cause of the strike and demonstration was the arrest of two evacuees suspected of having beaten other evacuees. Leaders of the striking evacuees insisted that the two held were innocent, that they were held more than seventy-two hours without charges, and that they should be given a trial under the regulations of the Community Council. Actually, in the judgment of competent observers who have investigated the strike thoroughly, the protest about the arrest of the two evacuees was merely the immediate cause of the disturbance which had its origin in many causes, among them bitterness resulting from evacuation; inability of the Authority to provide school buildings, heating stoves for the barracks, and other facilities which had been promised at the time of evacuation, frustration resulting from the discomforts of

camp life, and similar causes. Agitation by actual pro-Japanese persons may have contributed, but there is no evidence that it was a particularly important factor in the incident.

With regard to the sensational report of the strike presented by Mr. Townsend, the following statement was signed by sixty-one employees and members of employees' families who lived at Poston Camp I throughout the strike:

"We, the undersigned, are living in Poston, Arizona in barracks or houses provided by the government for the administrative staff employed by the Colorado River War Relocation Project. These quarters are located in Block 34 of Unit 1, which is inside the compound of the Colorado River War Relocation Project. We further certify that we were occupying these quarters in November, 1942, at which time there was a disturbance in Unit 1 of Poston.

"There have been several charges and allegations, made under oath, such as the 'poor simperton covering Caucasian employees, (were) standing around like whipped children, lucky to be spared and allowed to live from hour to hour with ambulances filled with disguised soldiers with machine guns guarding their sleep so that they would not be slaughtered or burned as hourly threatened.' We wish to testify that there was no terrorism or violence at any time, nor were we afraid of bodily injury at any time. To further substantiate this, those of us with children felt at ease to have our children remain in Poston throughout the disturbance. We continued to move freely throughout the camp in the course of our regular assigned duties."

The best evidence showing the falsity of the statements Mr. Townsend presented to the committee, however, is provided by Townsend himself. During the strike Townsend became emotionally upset. He spread wild rumors among his administrative associates. At the height of the strike he left his post of duty without authorization and went to Los Angeles. He returned to Poston about November 29. On December 1, 1942, Townsend was interviewed by the Project Director, Wade Head. There follows a stenographic transcript of that portion of the interview bearing upon the period of the strike:

Head: "Good morning, Mr. Townsend.

Townsend: "Good morning. I just got your memorandum and want to discuss it with you. Please let me apologize for my actions during the strike. I must have been so upset I didn't realize what I was doing. I was afraid that I and the other employees were going to be slaughtered by the Japs.

Head: "Mr. Townsend, if you do not mind, I am going to have notes kept on this conversation, inasmuch as your actions of the last few days have been such that they cause me to doubt your honesty and reliability. Do you object?"

Townsend: "I don't blame you for wanting a record of everything I have to say."

Head: "Now, Mr. Townsend, you said you were frightened; did you actually see, personally, any signs of violence on the part of the people or the destruction of any government property?"

Townsend: "Since having time to calm down I realize that there was no sign of violence, and now that the trouble has been settled and I have had time to look around, it is easy to see the crowd must have been peaceful all the time and there was no sign of any damage to any government property."

Head: "Do you consider that sufficient reason for leaving the project and failing your duties during the time of trouble?"

Townsend: "I don't know what I meant. I lost my head, I guess. I would have done more harm here than good in that condition."

24. Page 50

Mr. Townsend: "..... The M. P.'s were not allowed to be in uniform on our side of the highway, so Captain Dougherty took the hospital ambulance and mounted machine guns on it, and set the ambulance at the rear of our Caucasian sleeping quarters, with soldiers in civilian clothes to keep the Japanese from approaching the barracks and burning them up, as they said they would. And we were only comfortable when those ambulances were sitting out there. But they were not in uniform."

Comment

The hospital ambulance was in the charge of the Chief Medical Officer of the center and was at no time used by Captain Dougherty or any other officer of the M. P. company. No machine guns were mounted on it. It was not stationed in the rear of the Caucasian sleeping quarters and was not manned by soldiers of the United States Army, either in uniform or in civilian clothes. Captain Dougherty was not at Poston during the strike but had been transferred from this station several days prior to the period in question.

25. Page 51

Mr. Townsend: "Now, I don't know that I mentioned it in here, but there are over one thousand Japanese soldiers and Japanese officers in that camp and I have talked to them and have been told very definitely about their program, that this group of men on Terminal Island were in that category. And they will tell you if you ask them. They are the most indifferent fellows. If you ask them, 'Were you fellows organizing on the West Coast?' they say, 'yes, we had our program all set up.' I have asked them, 'What were you going to do?' and the answer was, 'As soon as our soldiers came over, we were going to help them.' They tell you right off that they were going to win the war. And that is the type of man that is drilling over there almost daily in military tactics, right under our noses in that camp. They drill them in various ways, but still drill them, and they are making soldiers out of them, and they are not kidding about it. They don't even presume to hide it.

"For instance, I can take you down to an admiral down there. He was our chef in Camp 3. I can't quite recall his name. I talked to him. I know he was an admiral in the Japanese Navy, and he was running a fishing boat at San Pedro. I said to him, 'Is it a fact that your boats were equipped for military purposes?' "He said, 'Yes, all of our boats were equipped so we could convert them.' He said that all the Japanese fishermen are military men. He is a fine Jap, if you can stomach that sort of stuff."

Comment

This story is entirely without foundation. It is significant that Mr. Townsend had not reported such a situation while he was employed at Poston and has presented absolutely no evidence in support of his statements. Specifically, he has not supplied the name of the alleged admiral.

26. Page 55

Mr. Townsend: "..... Schools closed, the hospital was ordered to close by the mob, but remained open against orders ....."

Comment

Schools were not closed. Two teachers out of 101 in Camp I dismissed classes the afternoon of November 18. The next day, and all remaining days of the strike, all classes were in session. Camps II and III were at no time affected by the strike. There was no interference with the employees of the hospital or with the operation of the hospital in any manner whatsoever.

27. Page 60

Mr. Townsend: "Now that condition came about because the milk truck came in, and the Japanese met the milk truck. It was driven in by truck and trailer from the Golden States Dairy, and the driver was in the habit of taking the milk directly to the warehouses. They met the milk truck and jumped on the truck and diverted it."

Question: "Was there a white man driving the truck?"

Answer: "Yes, the Golden States Dairy delivery man, driving a refrigerator truck. He refused to drive the truck over to the group, so they started to unload the truck, and did unload the truck and started to throw it out. I went into the dispatcher's office, and there was a carton of milk thrown through the window."

Comment

Elsewhere Mr. Townsend says "cases of milk were dumped and cartons of milk thrown at everyone on the highway and around the camp." The Golden States Dairy Company denied that part of this statement having to do with stopping and diverting the milk truck. With regard to the rest of the story, we have the following statement from Dr. Edward H. Spicer, a member of the administrative staff at Poston:

"I went over to the motor pool about 7:00 P.M. on November 18. Mr. Townsend and the Truck Dispatcher were there. Mr. Townsend in an excited manner told me that two cases of milk had been dumped somewhere in camp and that a can of milk had been thrown through the window of the Truck Dispatcher's office. Dr. Leighton, who was with me, asked where the milk can was. Mr. Townsend pointed to a cardboard quart carton about thirty feet from the Dispatcher's office. It was empty lying on the ground, and there was no evidence of milk having been spilled around it. It appeared to have been tossed there empty. There was no evidence of any window having been broken by this or any other milk container."

28. Page 64

Mr. Townsend: "At 9:00 o'clock, in front of the Caucasian barracks, the chief of the fire department and his assistant — the chief of the fire department, Mr. Fien, and his assistant, Mr. Woodhouse, were accosted by a group of Japanese policemen and a fight started because the fire department car had been driven into a part of the camp. It was necessary for more than a dozen Caucasians with pea-shooters to go out and stop the attempt made by the police department to beat up the fire chief and his first assistant. This created a considerable disturbance, and it was thought it would be necessary to move the Caucasian personnel over to the military quarters."

Comment

The fire chief and his assistant were stopped while driving in excess of the speed limit through the project area by evacuee policemen on traffic duty. They were not molested; there was no fight; and it was not necessary for other administrative personnel to rescue them.

29. Page 64

Mr. Townsend: "...One of the most disturbing things was the removal of our flags from all parts of the camp and the need of our Caucasians putting up the large flag at the office, under threats that it would be removed, with all replaced by the 'Rising Sun.'

"Loudspeakers, stolen from the warehouses, had been installed, and during day and night the Japanese national anthem was heard through the length and breadth of the camp, with wild cheers and loud demonstrations toward setting fire to the whole camp, which they had threatened to do if the military forces were brought in, or crossed the highway. That is the way they put it."

Comment

Elsewhere in his testimony Mr. Townsend states that the American flag was taken down and the Japanese flag flown. We have affidavits from eight responsible officials of the Poston Center that the two American flags which customarily were flown over Camp I were flown all day and every day during the period of the strike, November 18 to 24, and thereafter. No guard was placed over either flag and neither was lowered except at the customary hour of sunset.

With regard to the assertion that the Japanese flag was flown during the strike and that the Japanese national anthem was played over a loudspeaker system, we have positive evidence that the claim is without foundation. Included in the evidence is the following statement from Father Clement, M. M., of Parker, Arizona:

"This is to make known and to testify that in the recent mass meetings of the strike, which were held at Block #28 in Poston, the banners and flags that were used and seen, were signs to signify merely the presence of representatives of the different blocks of the camp, and in no way were these flags or banners used to denote a pro-Axis sentiment.

"Likewise, in regard to Japanese music that was played over the public address system at these meetings, there was no martial or Japanese patriotic music played. It has been alleged, however, that one song, 'Aikoku-Ko-Shinkyoku' usually played for departing soldiers had been played. This can be readily explained, however, by the fact that it is my certain knowledge that minors who could not read Japanese titles, selected records at random, from the large assortment which included this record.

"As a Catholic priest and Chaplain working for the welfare and morale of the whole camp, I testify that I have neither seen the Japanese flag used, nor heard martial music played during the recent emergency. From having interviewed many Japanese, I do not believe that such music has been played, nor the Japanese flag displayed.

(Signed) Father Clement, M.M.  
(Maryknoll Missioner)  
Parker, Arizona"

30. Page 65

Mr. Townsend: "About 12:00 o'clock midnight on the third day of mob control about 200 of the mob advanced to the motor pool, where they reached the highway across from the pool. They were halted by the M.P., and advised they were not allowed to cross the highway. They started to move forward, and the M.P. fired over their heads. His orders were to fire over their heads, and then into them. He was at once supported by another M.P. with a machine gun. The mob that had advanced in regular military wedge formation stopped, and in a few minutes the entire M.P. company was there in trucks with fixed bayonets ready for action. The Japs retreated.

"..... Standing behind the M.P., seeing the determined look and the immediate response of his buddies, all heavily armed, and the angry mob facing their first setback, defiant and ugly but still without a leader, make things look pretty near a crisis."

Comment

With regard to the above, we have the following statement by Mr. Ernest L. Miller, Chief of Internal Security, and Mr. Leonard L. Nelson, Unit I Administrator, Poston:

"On the night of November 18th, about 11:00 P.M., Chief Kiyoshi Shigekawa and six of his men came to the administration building and asked if it would be possible to get another truck for patrol. While the Chief was inside discussing the matter with Chief of Internal Security Miller and Acting Project Director Evans, the six boys apparently thought they might as well go and pick up the truck, as they must have been over-confident that the truck would be given to them. Mr. L. L. Nelson was walking toward the motor pool at this time and saw the police approaching the M.P. guard stationed in front of the pool. There were four or five M.P.'s standing by the pool and a weapon carrier loaded with six or eight more soldiers drove up at this moment. The soldiers ordered the police to halt which they did. They said they were from the police department and were supposed to pick up a truck. The soldier told them not to come across the road but they started to cross. They said it was all right as they had permission. One M.P. shot over their heads and the policemen ran back to the administration building."

31. Page 66

Mr. Townsend: "..... Many of the Caucasians had left with their families, who had been confined to their barracks."

Comment

Mr. Townsend, himself, is the only employee definitely known to have left his post of duty on the project during the strike.

32. Page 67

Mr. Townsend: "....., and at 8:15 the goon squad went into the barracks of one of the Japanese informants that had been working with the F.B.I. and the young man being absent, this goon squad beat up his mother and father to a point where they were not expected to live,

breaking the arm and ankles of the father, and breaking both arms and fracturing the skull of the mother, and bruising her in nearly every portion of her body."

The Chairman: "Do you have the names of those Japanese?"

Mr. Townsend: "I have in the records some place."

The Chairman: "How long did they remain in the hospital?"

Mr. Townsend: "I went in to see them the following morning after this had happened, or, I went in the next evening, and the next morning or about mid-day the following day there were other victims put in the hospital, and these people had disappeared."

The Chairman: "In two days they had disappeared from the hospital?"

Mr. Townsend: "Disappeared from the hospital."

The Chairman: "Did you ever see them afterwards at the camp?"

Mr. Townsend: "No, I never saw them, and the riot followed soon after that, because this squad, this goon squad, went out and wanted to beat up everybody that had given any information to these F.B.I. men."

Comment

The following information is taken from the records of the hospital concerning all patients submitted to the hospital as a result of the beatings in question:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Admitted</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	<u>Treatment</u>	<u>Condition on Discharge</u>
Seta, Francis Joe	10-18-42	Laceration of scalp	Suture wound	10-26-42 Fully recovered
Kurisaki, Lyle	11-1-42	Laceration of head Contusion of body	Suture wound	11-5-42 Fully recovered
Nishimura, Kay	11-15-42	Concussion of brain Multiple of laceration	Suture wound	11-30-42 Fully recovered

<u>Name</u>	<u>Admitted</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	<u>Treatment</u>	<u>Condition on Discharge</u>
Yamada Sawa	11-15-42	Laceration of hand	Suture laceration	11-20-42 Fully recovered
Yamada, Jisuko	11-15-42	Laceration of skull	Suture wound	11-20-42 Fully recovered
Yamada, Hatsumi	11-22-42	Neurosis due to fear	Sedation	11-26-42 Improved
Kido, Saburo	1-31-43	Contusion of head and face. Laceration of hand	Suture wound	2-15-43 Fully recovered

These patients were discharged upon full recovery and completion of treatment. During their stay in the hospital, visitors were restricted to immediate members of the family, police and project officials upon direct authorization of the Chief Medical Officer. Strict orders were given that no one was to be admitted except on a pass signed by the Chief Medical Officer. A complete record of all visitors was kept. This record indicates that Mr. Townsend at no time visited these patients nor requested to visit them.

33. Page 70

Mr. Townsend: "The mob had used five thousand gallons of gasoline the first two days."

Comment

During the first two days of the strike, November 18 and 19, the total amount of gasoline used in Unit I was 1,728 gallons. This included gasoline for trucks carrying supplies from Parker to Poston, distribution of food and other supplies in the unit, ambulances, water trucks, and other normal functions. The consumption of gasoline on the 11th and 12th of November, two normal work days previous to the strike, was 2,030 gallons.

34. Page 75

Mr. Townsend: "..... Up to date there has been no prosecution for any offense, or for any outlawry or crime in any of the camps. On the Poston battlefronts the Japs have won all battles up to January, 1948."

Comment

Up to the present time, our records indicate that there have been eight (8) men tried in the State of Arizona courts for state offenses, seven (7) of these men were found guilty and sentenced. There have also been five (5) men taken to the Federal courts in Phoenix, Arizona, tried for Federal offenses, and convicted. This number does not, of course, include persons tried on the project for violations of project rules and regulations, or persons transferred to internment camps because of evidences of loyalty to Japan or because their activities were such that their presence was detrimental to the welfare of the project.

35. Page 76

Question: "How many so-called pleasure cars did you have at Poston?"

Answer: "About 70 or 80."

Question: "Were they all owned by the government?"

Answer: "All government sedans."

Question: "Government sedans. Were those automobiles used by the Japanese at night?"

Answer: "Exclusively."

Question: "What did they use them for?"

Answer: "Pleasure, running around the camp in the remote areas, for scooters, and playing around, as would be expected!"

Comment

From the beginning motor equipment has been handled at Poston through a centralized motor pool, with passenger cars on permanent assignment only to the police force, the hospital, and one or two key administrative persons. There is absolutely no foundation for the statement that evacuees were allowed to use official cars at night or at any other time for pleasure driving.

36. Page 76

Mr. Townsend: "By pooling the trucks, we saved 1,775 gallons of gasoline in the first weekend, Saturday night, Sunday and Sunday night, and continued to save 1,000 gallons per day, by actual pump records. That is by the trucks that were impounded. Then later on, if you want to bring in the cars, we did the same thing and saved 300 gallons a day by taking the cars away from them."

Comment

The assertion that 1,000 gallons of gasoline per day were saved by establishing a pool system while Mr. Townsend was at the center has no foundation of fact.

37. Page 77

Question: "While you were at Poston did the Japanese who were interned there make automobile trips to visit their relatives and friends in the Midwest and East?"

Answer: "They did, with written orders by Mr. Head to supply them with transportation."

Question: "What was the reason for these trips?"

Answer: "Any excuse. Sickness in the families or for the purpose of looking after a sold automobile that payments had not been made on, being unable to make collections on crop sales or various agricultural ideas, and for any miscellaneous excuse the Japanese were allowed to take government equipment and make trips up to 2,500 miles, using government credit cards."

The Chairman: "All their own cars had been left at their homes by the evacuees?"

The Witness: "Oh, yes. They didn't have their own cars, except those which we leased from them, you see."

The Chairman: "And they used the government equipment?"

The Witness: "They used to use them, these big sedans, and drive them into these metropolitan centers out there. With soldiers sitting out there in the desert and seeing a load of Japanese going by in the big government cars and giving the boys a big horselaugh. It was terrible, and is still going on, but not quite so viciously, because the camp has been under quarantine."

Question by Mr. Steedman:

"You say that some of the cars traveled as high as 2,500 miles. Did the speedometers indicate that when they returned?"

Answer: "Yes. In starting them on the trip it was usual to give them a credit card and to keep a complete record, so we took the speedometer reading upon their leaving and upon their returning."

Comment

No evacuee has ever been allowed to take a government car on a trip outside the project on personal business. No evacuee has ever been authorized to use a government credit card. Evacuees have in some instances been taken to Los Angeles and Phoenix for special medical treatment, or for similar purposes involving serious emergency. In all such cases the evacuees were accompanied by Caucasian escorts. On two occasions, March 20 and June 3, 1943, Thomas Masuda was sent in a government car from Poston to Phoenix, Arizona, to transact official business for the center with officials of the State. Since he entered no restricted zone, he made the trip without escort.

During the period Mr. Townsend was employed at Poston, no evacuee was permitted to leave the project area without an escort. No trip of as much as 2,500 miles has been taken from Poston in a government car, except one unauthorized trip to Oklahoma City which Mr. Townsend, himself, took without the knowledge or permission of the Project Director.

\*Re: Provost Marshall's office desbarring a few evacuees from working in war plants without giving any reason for such action. States that the American citizen of Japanese ancestry is an American and has great potentialities of becoming an alert liberal American if he is given the opportunities to contribute to the mosaic of American life, etc.

December 14, 1943.

My dear Mr. Myer:

X I am enclosing a letter from Mr. Mich Kunitani, The Cleveland Hostel, 2429 Prospect Avenue, Cleveland (15), Ohio, and inviting your attention to the last page.

Mrs. Roosevelt asks if you will take this up or should she write to Attorney General Biddle?

The return of the enclosed letter with your reply will be appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary to  
Mrs. Roosevelt.

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
910 Seventeenth Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

VDS

100.1  
✓  
✓  
January 3, 1944

Dear General Gullion:

Mrs. Roosevelt has taken up with the War Relocation Authority the problems outlined in the enclosed letter from Mich Kunitani, but she is told that your office might improve the situation. She is, therefore, referring this letter for any consideration that you can give it.

Very sincerely yours,

Secretary to  
Mrs. Roosevelt

Major General A. W. Gullion  
The Provost Marshal General  
U. S. Army  
Washington, D. C.

O:HY

Enc. 3

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON

DEC 29 1944

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DEC 29 1944

Miss Malvina C. Thompson  
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Thompson:

I have your note of December 14 and the accompanying letter from Mich Kunitani, of Cleveland. I appreciate very much the fact that Mrs. Roosevelt is interested in the problems raised by Mr. Kunitani and would like to see the necessary steps taken to remove discrimination against loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry.

This is something which we have been concerned with for a long time. I have protested several times to the War Department against practices which I feel are discriminatory, not only in employment in war plants but also in the Army itself. Our efforts to gain fair and equal treatment for nisei at the hands of the Civil Service Commission have been unceasing, but have met with only limited success. The Commission approves generally the principle of non-discrimination, but in actual practice there are many delays in obtaining the necessary clearance for evacuees to be appointed to Federal positions.

I seriously doubt if the Attorney General would be the appropriate official with whom the problem should be taken up. The discriminatory acts are in opposition to the fair employment practices which the President himself has delineated. It would seem that the Provost Marshall's office and the Civil Service Commission are the agencies that might improve the situation if they so desired.

Sincerely,

*D. S. Myers*

Director

*Write them enclosing  
Copy of the main  
letter*



DEC 29 1942

Miss Malvina C. Thompson  
Secretary to Mrs. Roosevelt  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.


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Sincerely,



Director

Copies sent to: (Jan. 1, 1943)  
General Gullion  
Mrs. McMillin

December 8, 1943

DEC 9 1943

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt  
White House  
Washington D.C.

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you again for making it possible for me to see you at the White House on Nov. 20.

With reference to your suggestion, I shall attempt to point out some of the problems faced by the evacuees, both by those still in the relocation centers and by those who have already relocated and who are in the process of resettlement. But before I get to the specific problems themselves I would like to preface my statements by saying that I view the difficulties of the evacuees only in the light of the hardships faced by the other people in the world as a result of this war.

When we take into consideration the plight of the Jewish people in the occupied countries of Europe, the starving hundreds in India, the English, Chinese and Russian people who have lost their loved ones and their homes and the privation of the Negroes and others in the South, the problems of the evacuees occupy only a very small band of the social spectrum.

Many intelligent and sincere people who are concerned with minority or any other kind of problem become so engrossed in their particular crusade that they tend to lose proper perspective and begin to believe that their program is the most important thing in the world. I've tried all through my work to view this program in proper focus. I am working with the problem of the Japanese in America not because I happen to be of Japanese descent but because I believe fundamental democratic issues are involved and I am interested in the preservation and furtherance of civil liberties which I believe to be the protoplasm of our democratic institutions.

I make these introductory remarks merely to indicate to you my position with regard to the program, so that it might help you to evaluate whatever I might say.

The records of the War Relocation Authority reveal that approximately 15,000 people have left the centers on indefinite leave and 6000 more on seasonal leave which means that a great majority of the single young adults between the ages of 19-35 have left. The 80,000 evacuees who are still in the centers

are composed of old folks who are above fifty years of age and their children who are under eighteen. As we attempt to relocate this 80,000 the resettlement problem becomes more complex since families are involved. Housing which is so difficult to find for the single people will be three times as difficult for family groups since they are not as mobile or flexible.

The occupational skills of many of the employables still in the centers lie in truck farming and though there is a great shortage of farm laborers in America the evacuees prefer employment as farm operators and not as laborers since they were skilled operators back on the West Coast but opportunities for operators of truck gardens have not as yet presented themselves. If the War Relocation Authority with the help of the Farm Security Administration and possibly the Resettlement Administration could provide opportunities for groups of farm families to resettle on undeveloped lands, e.g., the Grand Coulee territory with long term loans and low interest rates, I believe many of the evacuee farmers would take advantage of it.

Those who are not farmers were formerly small shop keepers, operators of service establishments, retail clerks, hotel operators and middle men in the marketing of farm produce. Some of these people would relocate if they could get people to sponsor them for perhaps a year in return for their services around the house. This arrangement would give them an opportunity to survey the community for possible business ventures and more permanent employment.

The evacuees who are over fifty years of age of which there are approximately 20,000 comprise the first generation of the Japanese in America and for the most part though they understand English they cannot speak it with facility. This handicap together with the fact that they are enemy aliens and cannot become naturalized citizens precludes them from many types of employment.


As far as the problems of the evacuees who have already resettled are concerned I can only draw conclusions from my experiences in Cleveland where 750 have resettled. Since January of this year when the War Relocation Authority opened its offices here in Cleveland the emphasis of the resettlement program has passed through four different and distinct stages. First the problem was community relations, then it shifted to employment, then to housing and now the problem is how to integrate the evacuees into the local community where they can find function and status. A great deal of the success of the assimilation problem lies in the hands of the evacuees themselves and I have discovered that the greatest obstacles to the community integration program are the attitudes held by the evacuees towards the community. As yet the young evacuee has not reached the psychological stage where he can take the initiative in making new friends,

Even though the emphasis is now on integration it does not imply that community relations, employment and housing problems are all settled. One of the most serious impediments in the employment phase of the program is the matter of the evacuees receiving special clearance from the Provost Marshall General's office in order to work in war plants after they have received indefinite leave from the War Relocation Authority. The time taken to secure this special clearance takes anywhere from three to six months. The Provost Marshall's office has disbarred a few evacuees from working in war plants without giving any reason for such action. I believe this matter should be brought to the attention of someone like Roger Baldwin. Along this same vein the Civil Service Commission has set up a special procedure for the evacuees quite different from the procedure followed by other applicants. These measures and others like them are subtle implications that the evacuees are not to be trusted like other Americans and hinders the whole relocation program.

The American citizen of Japanese ancestry is an American and he has great potentialities of becoming an alert liberal American if he is given the opportunities to contribute to the mosaic of American life. I believe I know how you feel about this program and I would appreciate anything that you can do to further and hasten the solution to this problem.

If at any time I can be of service to you I shall be only too glad to respond and I wish to express my appreciation again for your sincere interest in this matter.

Very sincerely yours,



Mich Kunitani