July 22, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT

TO REPLY TO OR PREPARE
REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Telegram from Rabbi Menashe Margolis, et al, Assembly of Hebrews, Orthodox Rabbis of U. S. and Canada, N.Y.C. 7/20/35 - asking that the strength of this country be expressed to lead the persecuting nations such as Germany away from the oppression of Jews.

B.
July 16, 1935

Respectfully referred to the State Department for consideration and appropriate action.

LOUIS L. ROSE
Secretary to the President

WIRE:

NESHOW, Morton J., New York City 7-16; re inequities sanctioned by Germany against Jewish people.
UNION OF ORTHODOX RABIS OF U. S., Belmar, N. J., 7-17; do

LETTER:

FRY, Stafford, 49 4638 Sherbrooke St., Westmount, Montreal, Canada, 7-16 following prev. corresp. now writes on subject of Brazil bonds and dishonest dealings.
(1 encl. - printed Letter of Transmittal)

GORZUCHOESKI, Mrs. Mary, Newport Beach, Box 215, Calif. In effort to support 2 young children, former Russian refugee begs work in translation; formerly emp'd at Russian Embassy, Wash., D.C., Speaks 5 languages.
July 26, 1935.

Respectfully referred to the Secretary of State.

LOUIS McH. HOWE
Secretary to the President.


Congressman Cochran encloses telegram to him from Abraham Levin, President, Committee on Public Relations, 815 Chestnut St., St. Louis, Mo., protesting anti-Jewish movements in Germany.

Original Memo filed 198-A
AUGUST 30, 1935

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The publisher of the Kansas City Star has asked me to give you this series of articles written by H. J. Haskell, editor of the Star, on the German -- Hitler -- Nazi -- Jewish -- policies and problems.

STEPHEN EARLY

Original memo filed - Kansas City Star
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Understand lists being used by Zeratsky do not include any of the Jewish faith. He says this was discussed at Hyde Park and it was decided there to omit Jews. I think this would be a mistake and letters certainly should go to all faiths. Please advise.

STEPHEN EARLY
BROWN, Walter T. - Sec. to Gov. H.H. Lehman of N.Y.
Albany, N.Y.
June 3, 1935

Writes Mr. McIntyre asking him to advise Gov. a few days in advance of time when it is convenient for President to receive Committee for presentation of new issue of stamps of Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Attached in file, is letter of Prof. Felix Frankfurter, of June 3, from Dr. Alfred E. Cohn, of NYC, re Luxembourg stamps, saying, in part, that the active person on Committee is Mlle. Marie Ginsberg, a Librarian of the League in charge of Government documents. Mr. McIntyre wrote Mr. Brown June 6 that the appointment is arranged for Tues., June 18, and if head of committee will telephone about 10:30 he will name definite hour. Mr. Brown wrote Mr. McIntyre on June 13 thanking for note, saying he has advised James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for German Refugees, to telephone, as instructed, on June 18th. He understands Jos. P. Chamberlain will make presentation. Mr. McDonald wrote Mr. McIntyre on June 13 also, re this. Mr. McIntyre wired Mr. McDonald on June 14, saying it has been suggested to include Dr. Stephan P. Duggan in the Presentation Committee. Says it is agreeable here if he desires to do so.

SEE - PPF 2569

76-C
SEE 146-A for copy of petition relating to the religious rights of American citizens in Mexico and signed by two hundred and fifty members of the Congress of the United States. There is also attached a memorandum to the President signed by Representatives John P. Higgins and Clare Gerald Fenerty with respect to the petition of the members of the Voluntary Congressional Sub-Committee on Mexico with particular reference to the religious rights of American citizens.

Received by the President July 16, 1935.
RICHARDS, Bernard G., Esq.,
Washington, D. C.
July 23, 1935

Writes Col. McIntyre regarding the disturbing conditions which are now developing in Germany; states that for many years he has dealt with the problems which have now become more acute than ever, and is still identified with several of the large national Jewish organizations, and may be able to be of service to Col. McIntyre in connection with the questions which will come up.

See 198-A
McDONALD, James C., Esq.,
London, England
July 24, 1935

Wrote Mrs. Roosevelt regarding the question whether or not the time has not come when, in harmony with many precedents in American history, the American Government should take the initiative in protesting against the prevailing violations of elementary civil and religious rights in Germany. Calls attention to the maltreatment of the Jews in Germany and says that it not only affects the Jews but the Catholics and Protestants as well, and that the determination of the Reich is to establish a State Church, loyalty to which would take priority over any other religion.

Feels that countries like America would be greatly affected by the refugees from Germany, and that they cannot sit passively by while Germany precipitates this tragedy.

See 198-A
CELLER, Hon. Emanuel
House of Representatives
August 1, 1935

Wrote President he is sorry to have caused any embarrassment at press conference July 31st, as result of his speech in N.Y. at an anti-Nazi rally. Says he was careful in remarks at meeting, and clearly indicated the required limitations of the Presidential office in matters of this sort. He says he stated, upon his own authority, and without implying that he was either quoting the President or the State Department, or anyone connected with the Administration, that he knew the President was doing everything in his power not only to protect the interests of American citizens in Germany of Jewish or Catholic origin, but that the President deeply sympathized with the aims and the aspirations of all those who believe in religious liberty. ----- President Aug. 6th wrote Rep. Cellar telling him that it was good of him to write in explanation of the statements he made in his N. Y. address, and that everything is all right.
August 1, 1935.

Respectfully referred to the Secretary of State.

LOUIS MCH. HOWE
Secretary to the President


Original Memo filed 198-a
HENNINGS, Hon. Thomas C., Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Oct. 3, 1935

Wants the President that he has been requested by a number of local organizations to write to him in an endeavor to have him instruct the State Department to register a formal protest with the German Government in connection with their abusive treatment of Jewish citizens.

Attached is a letter from Mr. Richard Southgate, State Dept. to Mr. Forster referring to their telephone conversation and stating that he is returning the above communication for the reasons set forth in the conversation.

See 198-A
STATE, The Secretary of

November 1935.

President referred for draft reply a letter, of Nov. 1, from Gov. Herbert H. Lehman of Albany, N. Y., who writes President, enclosing letter of Oct. 10, written Felix M. Warburg, NYC, from Prof. James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and others) coming from Germany, London, and England, re immigration quota as it affects the German Jews. - Gov. Lehman asks that State Dept. increase quota of German Jews from 2,500 to 5,000 so that refugees may be permitted to enter this country. - Sec. Hull replied Nov. 13, enclosing draft, which the President sent that date. Gov. Lehman replied Nov. 18 thanking the President for his letter saying he would send a copy of it to Prof. McDonald, so he may be advised of the situation.

SEE - 133
STATE, The Under Secretary of  
Nov. 22, 1935

Mr. Hassett wrote memo to the Under Secretary of State re Rev. David Latshaw, representing Rev. Dr. S. Parkes Cadman, Chairman of the American Christian Committee for German Refugees, who called in person and requested that President interest himself in appeal which Committee is making to raise funds. Transmits folder, setting forth plans and purposes of Committee, and Mr. Hassett requests draft of reply, if Presidential letter commending this undertaking is deemed advisable. -- Mr. Bohlen, Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, advised Mr. Hassett Nov. 22 that in his opinion President could not properly write a letter for an undertaking of this character. -- Mr. Hassett wrote Mr. Latshaw Nov. 26, advising President is unable to write letter requested. -- Rev. Latshaw wrote Mr. Hassett Nov. 29, enclosing resolution adopted at Executive Committee meeting of Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America on Nov. 22, and again requesting message from President expressing sympathy and interest for German Christian refugees scattered over Europe. -- Rev. Latshaw was advised that Mr. Hassett wrote him Nov. 26, copy of which he enclosed with this letter. -- Attached is release, apparently submitted by Rev. Latshaw, entitled "The Flight from Germany".

SEE - 198-A
STATE, The Secretary of
December 6, 1935

Writes the President returning draft reply for attached letter of
Nov. 15, addressed to the President by Gov. Herbert Lehman of Albany, N.Y.,
together with its inclosed letters, one from Prof. James C. Mcdonald of Oct. 29
to Felix M. Warburg, and the other Mr. Warburg's letter to Gov. Lehman of Nov. 8
concerning the question of immigration of German Jewish refugees into the U.S.
Sec. Hull says apparently Gov. Lehman's letter crossed the President's letter of
Nov. 15 re this subject. Attaches suggested draft, which the President sent the
Governor re this topic on Dec. 10th.

SEE - 20
11/29/40

Em. Rescue Com.       Doris Fromen

19 East 21st St.
Bronx, N.Y.

Husband a Rumanian citizen now in Jugoslavia and in great danger. She has been here a year.
John Wiley Papers
Box 4
Diplomatic Files: Estonia and Latvia.
1938-1941. Official and Miscellaneous
JUDEN IN POLEN

Die siegreichen Armeen der verbundenen Grossmachte Deutschland und Oesterreich-Ungarn sind mit Gottes Beistand in Polen eingefallen.

Der Krieg, den wir jetzt führen, ist kein Krieg gegen die Bevölkerung, sondern nur gegen die russische Tyrannie. Der russische Despotismus ist unter den starken Schlägen unserer tapferen Heere zusammengebrochen.


Lasst Euch nicht durch falsche Versprechungen der Russen betören! In Jahren 1905 gab Euch Russland das heilige Versprechen der Gleichberechtigung. Brauchen wir Euch zu erinnern, Euch erzählen, wie der Moskowiter Wort gehalten hat? Denkt an Kischinew, Homel, Bialystok, Odessa, Siedlis und hundert andere blutige Pogrome!

Erinnert Euch an die Massenausweisungen und - Vertreibungen. Ohne Erbarmen mit menschlichen Leiden hat der Peiniger Euch mit Weib und Kind wie die wilden Tiere gejagt und getötet.

Vergesse nicht des Beilisprozesses und anderer Blutbeschuldigungen, da die russische Regierung selbst von amts wegen die niederträchtige Lügenanklage des Ritualmordes erhob.


Und jetzt ist Russland wieder in Not und deshalb begann es Euch mit neuen Versprechungen zu füttern.

Ihr auch. Unser Feind ist auch Euer Feind. Die Macht unseres gemeinsamen Feindes mussen durch Aller Weisheit zerstört werden. Wir erwarten, dass Ihr durch die Tat beweisen werdet, was Eure Intelligenz und Euer Eifer zu leisten instande sind.

Von unseren braucht Ihr nichts zu befurchten. Kein Haar wird Euch gekrümmt werden. Was Ihr uns liefern werdet, werden wir Euch bar und gut bezahlen. Und wenn Ihr ein Anliegen habt, so wendet Euch vertrauensvoll an die Befehlshaber, die Kommandanten unserer Truppe.

Helfet bei der Niederrung des Feindes und arbeitet fuer den Sieg von Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit!

Die Generalkommanden der Vereinigten Armeen Deutschlands und Oesterreich-Ungarns.

An die Juden in Polen:


Eure heiligste Pflicht ist es nun, alle Kräfte zusammenzu-nehmen und mitzuarbeiten bei der Befreiung. Wir erwarten, dass Ihr nach Möglichkeit mitteil. Bringt den Kommandanten unseres Miltärs das grösste Vertrauen entgegen in den Orten, die Euch am nächsten sind. Damit den Weg, den Feind im ganzen zu bezwingen und den Sieg der Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit zu bringen!

Die oberste Leitung von den verbündeten deutschen und oesterreichischen Armeen.
4-5

a) Germany
b) Allies
c) Russia

d) German treatment - from political, economic

e) attitude of people to political leaders
f) Status of Russel in Russian and why they suppressed him in February?
g) Hungarian attitude to Transylvania
h) Jokes & Correspondence
i) true on fronts, other cases, formality of influence
j) Evidence of acceptance of P. A. B. for hospital

k) yes, I'm sure it's a doctor for field and hospital

l) Supplies of fire and food etc. c/s: indeed & others

m) Things for 5 guns

n) Main problems

o) conditions in concentration camps e.g. another has the

a) straining & m.p.s. in computers generally

p) In Italy, etc.

- Remembrs for history & R.G.C.

q) If Germans lose, what is the future of Europe?

r) Opinion by V. S.

s) Women & civil work

5-6
(7) Nationality of local police and prison "Constabulary."
(8) Kind and construction of police and prison "Constabulary."
(9) Details of command arrangements.
(10) List of all different elements of police forces.

3) Constabulary - (1) Methods of interrogation.
   (2) Address of offices.
   (3) Uniform.

4) Evidence of operation between Constabulary and judiciary.
Most Hungarians dislike the Germans intensely. Although Hungary has been an independent state for the last twenty-two years, the people have not forgotten the long period of Austrian domination which lasted from the expulsion of the Turks to 1918. During the last fifty years of this period, Hungary was a distinctly junior partner of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and before that was governed directly from Vienna. The Hungarians feel that during the last war they were exploited by the Germans, and that at the Peace Conference they were abandoned by everybody.

As a general thing almost all classes of Hungarians have been at one time or another annoyed and incommode by German conceit and arrogance. Although a small people they have retained their national feeling, their language and cohesion through good and bad times, mostly bad, for a thousand years, and resent expressions of superiority from a people whose nationality dates from 1870.

Hungary has been for a great many generations one of the few countries of Europe which exported foodstuffs, and always in the worst of times the Hungarian people have had enough to eat. Recently discovered oil wells have provided Hungary with all the petroleum products that it needed. Today, there is a shortage of everything and all Hungarians, from top to bottom, know who to charge this to. The Hungarian peasant, accustomed to white bread
and plenty of meat, resents being obliged to eat black, hard, heavy, soggy bread, and practically no meat at all. The richer classes and the people of the cities do not like the idea of foreign control. The restrictions on their automobiles and the increased price of most of their comforts make a great deal of discontent. All around Budapest, for example, people, with the exception of the really poor class, have built little houses with gardens all of which have, because of the lack of adequate transportation, become practically uninhabitable to those who work in town. They all recognize that these inconveniences are the inevitable result of a condition brought about by the German Government for its own benefit.

The comparatively few soldiers which the Hungarians sent to the war were badly treated by their German commanders and have returned with a feeling of hostility to their masters.

The only people in Hungary who support the Germans are:

1st. A group of business men who believe they will get immediate profit and hope, for no intelligent reason, that they will be able to escape the fate imposed on their fellows in the other occupied countries and even in Germany itself.

2nd. A small privileged group terrified of communism and which does not realize that private property is as inevitably doomed under Nazism as it is under the most recklessly communistic system.

3rd. Certain out of place politicians, hopeless of office, who believe that a compromise with the Germans could be affected to their personal gain.
4th. And most respectable: A good many Army officers who hope that German domination would give them a chance of promotion, and are certain that Nazi control would raise the importance of the Army.

(b) Hungarian attitude toward the allies.

A good many of the upper class of Hungarians have travelled in England and have made English friends, but it would be absurd to believe that national feeling has been tremendously affected by the pleasant memories of a few sporting nobles or that it has been much changed by the experience of emigrants to the United States, or by the American wives of a small number of Hungarians. The few people inspired by these things are extremely vocal and make a certain effort to approach English and American visitors and are likely to make an undue impression on them.

The people at large know and care only slightly more about America and England than the English and Americans in general know or care about Hungary. Their friendly feeling is based on something far more solid than casual liking or pleasant recollection. They know that Germany is, of all the great Powers in the world, the one which can most easily overawe them and that the English and Americans cannot possibly do them any harm. It is manifestly to their interest that the strongest power should be the one which can do them the least injury, rather than the one which must be continually placated. The fact that their present state of unwilling hardship, and even more unwilling war, has been forced on them by Germany because of the inability of Great Britain or the United States to help them is the best possible argument for the hope with which
they look to an ultimate German defeat. Their preference of England to Germany will remain as long as it is possible for the Germans to send divisions down the Danube and impossible for England to send battleships up the river.

(c) Roumania

The Hungarians dislike Roumania and distruct its people and its government. Immediately after the last war Roumanian soldiers occupied almost all of Hungary and looted liberally. At the same time the Roumanians occupied a large part of Transylvania, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and which the Hungarians regarded as a legitimate part of Hungary. There can be no doubt that a war between Hungary and Roumania would be fought with the greatest enthusiasm and zeal, which is a lot more than can be said about the present war against Russia.

(d) Italy

Most Hungarians look on the Italian Army with contempt and on Italian diplomats with aversion. This feeling has been strengthened by the attitude of the Italian Minister, who flaunted his mistress before Budapest society, which, although not squeamish, does preserve certain decent appearances. Ciano's conduct has not helped. He has made several visits to Budapest, during which his main occupation appears to have been drink and sleazy amours. They have not forgotten that the Italians took Trieste and Fiume from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and deprived them of their only access to salt water.

II

Russian War

Up to the time I left Budapest there was absolutely no visible enthusiasm for the war against Russia. A few people who looked on
Bolshevism as a danger thought that it was necessary, but no one looked on it as desirable. There was a great deal of complaint when men were taken from farm work and put into the Army, and an immense rejoicing when they returned. At the time of the British declaration of war, as I informed the British Government, there were no Hungarian soldiers at the front and only a few on guard duty in the rear. The soldiers who returned almost all expressed a dislike of their German associates. The general public took very little interest in the conduct of the war in spite of posters and other forms of anti-Russian propaganda.

III.

German Exploitation

All of the press in Hungary is controlled indirectly by the German Government. No news or editorials may be printed without permission. Although both news and editorials are treated with contempt, they have an influence on the people who have no other source of information. However, the most casual reports of third-hand gossip about news from foreign radios are usually considered far more reliable than anything printed in the newspapers.

The German political influence is extremely strong. Nazi representatives crudely and openly threaten annihilation to any government which will not follow their wishes. It has long been impossible for any responsible statesman seriously to advocate anything more than a policy of slowness and perhaps inefficiency in the execution of German orders; eventually these orders must be obeyed. During the early course of the Russian war the Hungarian authorities and the people at large did everything possible to delay the departure and to facilitate the return of the soldiers.
The British declaration of war on Hungary was a Godsend for the Germans. Manifestly it could not be followed up by any hostile act and it made the position of those opposed to Germany far more dangerous and their work less efficient. It promoted the subservience of the Hungarian Government to Germany. This effect was so apparent, even in a short time, that it was an important reason to make the Germans force the Hungarians to break relations with the United States, even though it would have been of manifest interest to the Germans to maintain in Washington legations of other Axis nations after they themselves had declared war.

The system of economic exploitation applied by Germany to Hungary is less ruthless than the method practiced in France but it is equally thorough. The Hungarian factories, which are few, must produce that which the Germans want. Their fields are stripped of grain and cattle to be sent to Germany; their railroad cars are taken by the German authorities; practically nothing is left to the Hungarians except what the Germans at the moment do not desire.

IV.

Attitude of people to political leaders.

About a year ago Hungary signed a friendship pact with Yugoslavia. In the early spring the war between Yugoslavia and Germany broke out. The Germans insisted on sending troops through Hungary to Yugoslavia and offered Hungary certain Yugoslavian provinces which had been part of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. This the Hungarian Government felt unable to refuse. (The Prime Minister, Teleki, committed suicide and for this act has been treated as a national hero.) At the time it would have been impossible for the Government to do otherwise.
Huge German divisions and clouds of aeroplanes rushed through and over Hungary; tanks and armored cars dashed through the city of Budapest in a solid line. They would have had no trouble in wiping out any possible Hungarian resistance in a few days.

The successor of Teleki was Bardossy, a very cultivated man with a great deal of diplomatic experience but extremely weak, who had no possible alternative to a policy of wriggling out of the inevitable as long as possible.

The Regent is universally respected as a good honest man and a patriotic Hungarian who does what he can to preserve the dignity and independence of his country. I think this opinion is justified. All during last summer, and especially during the Regent's illness in the autumn, it became apparent that a successor should be prepared for his office. The Germans were supposed to prefer Archduke Albrecht, who was very unpopular among the Hungarians; those opposed to Germany wanted the Regent's son, Istvan Horthy, a pleasant boy whose youthful faults are more than balanced by a fairly solid head and a genuine devotion to his country. I was more or less in on this campaign. I always urged the utmost rapidity because it was apparent that German influence was on the increase. Eventually, just after I left, he was elected. If he succeeds to the office, he will be, like his father, considerate first of the interest of Hungary, and can be counted on to do what is possible to prevent his country being overawed.

V.

Estimates of casualties in Russian War

The Hungarian losses were very small up till the time we left in January. The small number of troops sent to the front and their
rapid return will account for this. They were mostly engaged in parts of the southern advance and did very little fighting.

VI.

Jokes and gossip in country

All during the time I was in Hungary there was a great traffic in what the Germans call Hitlerwitzen. Most of these, as far as I could see, originated in Germany. Almost everyone coming back, particularly from Vienna or Berlin, arrived with a supply of new ones, of which a surprising small proportion were indecent and a surprisingly large proportion really funny. Of course, a great many were resurrected, slightly altered stories which I heard about the Kaiser, and which my ancestors probably heard about Napoleon or the British Generals in the Revolution. One story told of a Jew in Vienna who was seen at a cafe reading "Der Sturmer", the most violent antisemitic newspaper in Germany. When asked why he preferred it to other journals he said, "When I read the other papers they tell me that Hitler did this, Stalin did so and so and Roosevelt did something else, but in "Der Sturmer" it says that everything is done by the Jews". Another story is of a man who when passing a crucifix raised his hand like a Nazi and said "Heil Hitler". His companion asked him why he had adopted this peculiar form of salutation and was told that it was quite natural--"If it were Hitler on the cross I should have said, 'Gott sei gelobt'".

VII

Prices, shortage and inflation

The general cost of living for all classes in Hungary has gone up considerably in the last few months, and is in the aggregate today about 200 per cent more than in times of peace. There is
an almost complete lack of imports. Good cloth, silk or cotton goods are practically unobtainable and when found are usually in small quantities and very expensive. Sporting equipment, golf balls, tennis balls, etc. are completely off the market. One rich family which gave frequent house parties was able to get only nine tennis balls for the entire season. On the golf course when a ball is hit into the rough the game is stopped and the entire party turns up until it is found. All forms of imported preserved food are rare and expensive; foreign wines and liquors, all forms of tobacco, chocolate, tea and coffee are hard to get and usually adulterated; leather, especially for the soles of shoes, is rationed and very expensive; bread and other foodstuffs are also rationed and are usually of a low quality; oil of all sorts, particularly gasoline, is allocated in very small amounts. The Hungarians all realize that this shortage is caused not only by the difficulties of import but by the enormous mass of their own products which the Hungarians are obliged to export to Germany.

I do not think there is very much inflation in Hungary. The price of American money has risen on the so-called black market not because of the redundancy of Hungarian currency but because of the confidence of most people in American victory. They feel that all Axis money will become practically useless as it did after the last war. A certain reserve of the real stuff appears to many people as being a desirable investment and to make such an investment they are willing to pay nearly double the official rate for dollar bills. The real opinion of the people of Hungary, and of most other European countries, can be seen in the enormous rise
in the price of gold and of American money. It is perfectly certain that, in the event of a German victory, the value of gold will fall considerably, and of American money even more. No Axis Government has dared to allow the free sale of either gold or U. S. currency on its market since the beginning of the war, and there is no Axis Government of which the money cannot be bought sub-rosa in large quantities at better than official rates by anyone offering dollars.

VIII.

Evidence of reception of British propaganda

British news is not found to any extent in the newspapers which rely entirely on German sources of information. British broadcasts are frequently listened to and freely quoted in conversation with much greater confidence than those coming from Germany or other Axis countries. As a rule they are relied on for news not because they are perfect but because they are better than any other available course of information. British comment, however, is generally considered childish and the Hungarian broadcasts are practically useless. They very frequently take the form of vicious, personal attacks on the Regent, who is respected and admired throughout Hungary, and is usually considered an honest man, seriously working for the preservation of his country in extremely difficult times. The British propaganda seems to suggest that it is an iniquitous thing for Hungary to do anything except pitch headlong into a war on the British side, notwithstanding the fact that Great Britain could in no way help Hungary, and such a war would last only a few days, ending in the complete annihilation of the country. There seems to be no realization that Hungary
thinks first of Hungarian interests, and there is certainly no understanding of the fact that a Government, sixty percent German is far less harmful to British interests than would be an entirely subservient rule. There can be no question of Hungary rushing out to suicide, but a great deal could have been done to encourage the group which wishes at any cost, less than the independence of the country, to minimize Hungarian assistance to Germany.

IX.

Supplies of key materials

Rubber, steel products, a great deal of leather and almost all manufactured articles come in, when they come at all, from Germany. There are great shortages in all these things. Tires, and even rubber heels and erasers for pencils are hard to find. Oil, which is produced in Hungary, is immediately seized by the Germans to such an extent that automobile traffic has practically ceased.

X.

Transportation

The shortage of oil and rubber has cut the bus and taxi transportation to less than a half what it was before; railroad cars and engines have been taken by the Germans for military purposes; they are not properly maintained and are all going down hill very rapidly. It was with considerable difficulty that the Hungarian Government assembled a train of food cars for the use of the American Legation staff leaving Budapest for Port Bou. The necessity was such that after two days steady running this train left the Spanish frontier, on its way back to Hungary, only a couple
of hours after the Americans got out. Engines, cars, railroad
stock, Danube shipping, and every other means of transportation
are worked too hard and repaired too infrequently.

XI

Man power problem

Hard work and animal traction are the rule in Hungary. The
production of foodstuffs and of manufactured articles requires
a far greater number of man hours than it would in the United States.
The making of necessities takes a greater proportion of the population
than with us. General mobilization, therefore, works a greater hardship
on them, which was especially noticeable this year during the
harvest when men had to be released from the Army to go back and work
on the farms.

XII

Concentration camps

Concentration camps have been established for refugees, particu-
larly Polish, and also for Jews. In these the condition is usually bad,
although they do not display the sadistic exaggeration of those in
Germany. In a community where the average standard of living is as
low as it is in Hungary, and where the distinction between the
poor and the rich has always been so great, prison life of any kind
will be pretty bad. It must always be remembered in considering
this question that the people of the eastern part of Europe do not
regard the liberty of others, or even their own liberty, comfort
or convenience, as seriously as we do. This can be seen in numberless
little ways. I have seen prominent business men whose offices were
up two flights of dirty, dark, worn, wooden stairs; the most in-
adequate and inefficient telephone service is accepted without
complaint; they suffer from cold or heat with far greater equanimity than we do; they will cool their heels in dark, dirty, uncomfortable waiting rooms. It is only natural, where the richest accept such conditions without complaint, that temporary places of forceable detention will be rather awful.

Most of the atrocity stories that came to us about Germans, although, of course, there are plenty of Hungarians ready to indulge in practices which are brutal, even according to the rougher standard of Eastern Europe.

Serious enforcement of the German anti-Semitic rules would be practically impossible. The great Nazi politician, Imredy, for example, had a Jewish grandfather; rich Jews have married into many of the big Hungarian families, and a very large proportion of the best doctors, lawyers and scientists are Jews.

XII.

Military matters

When I arrived in Hungary at the end of the war with Yugoslavia, German troops in transit were very frequently seen on the Hungarian roads, and there was a great number of them going through the city of Budapest. Sometime before I arrived, at the time of the invasion, I was told that there was a solid line of big German mechanized units crossing through the town. When we left, and most of the time when we were there, German cars and German officers were frequently visible, and, although they made no effort to make themselves conspicuous, they certainly did not try to conceal their presence. Along the roads the Germans had put up signs in German for the benefit of their military drivers. Outside the hotel where I lived there was, more frequently than not, one or two German Government automobiles.
These cars, and German equipment generally, seemed to be of very good quality, able to stand rough work and hard usage. I have been told that their military equipment is as good as can be.

The greatest fear of Hungary, if Germany loses, is of the retreating Germans who undoubtedly will retire along a line of their own frightful destruction. My opinion is that they will burn every city in Europe which they control, and every house and factory; they will destroy the mines, farms, cattle, everything, making every effort to turn Europe into a desert.

XIV.

Nationality of local police and administrative control

The local police are all Hungarian, but there is, of course, a considerable number of Gestapo men and of German secret agents going all over the city. Local and civil ordinances are left pretty well to the Hungarian police and courts, but international or political questions usually are under Gestapo supervision. German agents have travelled over the country to such an extent that it is probably true that German statistics on the resources of the country are better than those of the Hungarian Government itself. I heard a story, which may or may not be true, of some farmers who with the connivance of the local Hungarian authorities concealed a part of their produce to save it from going to Germany. They were immediately discovered because German agents had previously appraised the possible yield of their fields.

It seems evident from my observation of Hungary, from that which I saw while motoring across Europe, and from what I have heard
first-hand, that the Germans have lost all hope of establishing a Nazi order in Europe. Their desire was to divide the world into three or four groups, with Germany in the first class, providing all the soldiers and controlling all military, naval and air force, and dominating manufactures, especially of goods of military value. All higher education would be at German universities, almost entirely limited to German students. The policies of all nations would, of course, be subject to the consent of Germany. The rest of Europe they destined to supply raw material for the support of Germany. A somewhat similar, but still subservient, fate was reserved for both North and South America. Japan, although ultimately subject to Germany, and dependent on Germany for raw materials, would probably be left slightly more independent than other countries. This grandiose scheme has lost all hope of execution. The Germans themselves do not believe that they will be able to carry it out. The New Order will remain a blueprint.

There is no use, however, in imagining that German defeat will re-establish old conditions. That was the mistake made by the victorious Allies twenty years ago. In the United States it was, "Back to Normalcy". The business administration of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover was directed by men whose constructive experience had been acquired between 1890 and 1914. They tried to rebuild out of the wreck the social structure with which they had been familiar in their youth.

They were given all the cards in the deck. In the four years, 1914 to 18, the United States, from being the world's greatest debtor, became the only creditor nation. Our manufacturing plants, under the impetus of the war, enormously increased their productivity.
In the eyes of the world we were no longer a distant golden vision but the greatest reality on earth. In every country, among the allies, among the neutrals, and even in Germany, we were looked to by all men, who had anything but a blind fear of the future, as an almost inspired source of hope.

In less than a decade the magnificent structure was shattered. We had, to use Harding’s phrase, "More business in government and less government in business". We continued on Coolidge’s principle, "The business of this country is business".

During that time I was in continuous opposition to the National Government and spent a good deal of time travelling abroad. I saw the opinion of the United States held by foreigners change, from that properly given to a source of inspiration and hope, to bewilderment, to despair, and finally to downright hostility. It was the last debauch of the 19th Century, but fortunately for us the crash, when it came, was purely economic. When we were flat on our back there was no one to jump on our face. That was the result of trying to re-organize the economic policies of the 19th Century after the war.

The political dominance of the world, which we returned to England, was lost in the same way, but it took twenty years to do it. Practically from the time that the ink was dry at Versailles British policy seems to have been directed with the single object of building up the German menace as rapidly as possible. Again, as in the United States, we see the control of old men inspired by ideas of the past. They failed to realize that the balance of power was a different thing when England and France had about forty million inhabitants apiece and united Germany sixty, than it had been when France had
twenty five million, Great Britain ten or twelve and Germany was divided into a multitude of small states, most of which were for sale or rent. The policy of Pitt, who supported Frederick the Great against Louis XV and assisted him in organizing allies where he could find them, was right in principle but was wrongly applied, when merely to preserve names and to avoid thinking it was used to strengthen Germany with sixty million inhabitants and to weaken the alliances of France which had twenty five.

France too went in for this carnival of reaction. The Army was dominated by men who hated the Republic because of Captain Dreyfus, and commercial life by men who thought, when they thought at all, in terms of the 19th Century.

The German leaders are not particularly efficient men, but they understand that the 19th Century (which did not end in a burst of glory for the Fatherland) is over and done with.

I was elected to Congress in 1918. The election was a few days before the Armistice. I remember many people telling me that I was most fortunate in beginning my career in the Congress which would shape the destinies of the nation and of the postwar world. One old gentleman even went so far as to say that the Congress to which I had been elected would be the most important that ever sat since the first. As a matter of fact, the members of that Congress did absolutely nothing except play politics, preparing for the election of 1920—laying plans for the business administration of Coolidge, Harding and Hoover to protect the revival of greed and selfishness. No such thing as this must be allowed to occur again. The 19th Century
economic theories will not do for the present time.

I do not mean for a moment to suggest that in their time they did not serve a valuable purpose. It was under their operation in the 19th Century that the White race settled all of North America west of the Alleghanies, enormous parts of South America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The conditions of human life improved more in the 19th Century than they had since the time of Caesar. Nevertheless, they have served their purpose—their time is past.

We cannot expect, nor could we intelligently hope for, a revival of the golden age philosophy of the last twenty years, when we were told to look back on past days as models of future attainment. No one but a congenital idiot can seriously believe that the people will again tolerate the mockery of overproduction.

Today the people of England and of the United States are doing without many luxuries and comforts to which they have been accustomed, but they are not facing suffering and danger to re-establish Insullism and bull markets. If they are told that they must cut down on sugar because there is not enough to go around, or on automobiles because the factories are needed for other purposes, they will make these sacrifices cheerfully and without complaint, but they will not again tolerate such atrocious mismanagement of national resources in the interest of private greed as we saw during the twenties.

I remember only a few years ago a thousand hills throughout the country covered with sheep, the wool of which could find no market. In the East, factories with all the machinery necessary for spinning and weaving were empty. The sidewalks were covered with men standing idle who were anxious to work in the factories. All
this time there were millions of people in the United States in need of blankets and woollen clothes. All of this because no one individual could see for himself any profit in the wool business. This is a thing which the people will not peaceably suffer again. I should think less of my countrymen than I do, if I believe that they would once more calmly allow themselves to be mocked. Our factories and our natural resources will work, and our intelligence must be used, for the good of the nation. We must realize that the purpose of a factory is production rather than profit. If the present system cannot maintain production, it cannot hope to continue to live. We must devise a means to make the most of our great resources, not only during the war but at all times. It is debatable whether the world owes every man a living, but there can be no doubt that we must find a real use for the labor of every man or woman who is willing to work.

There are only two possible things that can happen. One is that intelligent, farsighted and patriotic men will lead their courageous and hopeful fellow citizens to the full use of all our resources and establish the greatest civilization known to history. The other is, that selfish and unscrupulous demagogues deluding the hopeless and the cowardly will, by the promise of one last spree, take us back to ineluctable chaos.
Morgenhan Diary, Vol. 694: "Acquiescence" Memo,
Personal Report to the President, and Related
Documents, Jan. 13-16, 1944

31 pp.
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE ACQUIESCENCE
OF THIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MURDER OF THE JEWS.

One of the greatest crimes in history, the slaughter
of the Jewish people in Europe, is continuing unabated.

This Government has for a long time maintained that
its policy is to work out programs to save those Jews of
Europe who could be saved.

I am convinced on the basis of the information which
is available to me that certain officials in our State De-
partment, which is charged with carrying out this policy,
have been guilty not only of gross procrastination and wilful
failure to act, but even of wilful attempts to prevent action
from being taken to rescue Jews from Hitler.

I fully recognize the graveness of this statement and
make it only after having most carefully weighed the shock-
ing facts which have come to my attention during the last
several months.

Unless remedial steps of a drastic nature are taken, and
taken immediately, I am certain that no effective action will
be taken by this Government to prevent the complete extermina-
tion of the Jews in German controlled Europe, and that this
Government will have to share for all time responsibility for
this extermination.

The tragic history of this Government's handling of this
matter reveals that certain State Department officials are
guilty of the following:

(1) They have not only failed to use the Governmental
machinery at their disposal to rescue Jews from Hitler, but
have even gone so far as to use this Government machinery to
prevent the rescue of these Jews.

(2) They have not only failed to cooperate with private
organizations in the efforts of these organizations to work
out individual programs of their own, but have taken steps de-
signed to prevent these programs from being put into effect.
(3) They not only have failed to facilitate the obtaining of information concerning Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews of Europe but in their official capacity have gone so far as to surreptitiously attempt to stop the obtaining of information concerning the murder of the Jewish population of Europe.

(4) They have tried to cover up their guilt by:

(a) concealment and misrepresentation;

(b) the giving of false and misleading explanations for their failures to act and their attempts to prevent action; and

(c) the issuance of false and misleading statements concerning the "action" which they have taken to date.

Although only part of the facts relating to the activities of the State Department in this field are available to us, sufficient facts have come to my attention from various sources during the last several months to fully support the conclusions at which I have arrived.

(1) State Department officials have not only failed to use the Governmental machinery at their disposal to rescue the Jews from Hitler, but have even gone so far as to use this Governmental machinery to prevent the rescue of these Jews.

The public record, let alone the facts which have not as yet been made public, reveals the gross procrastination and wilful failure to act of those officials actively representing this Government in this field.

(a) A long time has passed since it became clear that Hitler was determined to carry out a policy of exterminating the Jews in Europe.

(b) Over a year has elapsed since this Government and other members of the United Nations publicly acknowledged and denounced this policy of extermination; and since the President gave assurances that the United States would make every effort together with the United Nations to save those who could be saved.
(c) Despite the fact that time is most precious in this matter, State Department officials have been kicking the matter around for over a year without producing results; giving all sorts of excuses for delays upon delays; advancing no specific proposals designed to rescue Jews, at the same time proposing that the whole refugee problem be "explored" by this Government and Intergovernmental Committees. While the State Department has been thus "exploring" the whole refugee problem, without distinguishing between those who are in imminent danger of death and those who are not, hundreds of thousands of Jews have been allowed to perish.

As early as August 1942 a message from the Secretary of the World Jewish Congress in Switzerland (Riegner), transmitted through the British Foreign Office, reported that Hitler had under consideration a plan to exterminate all Jews in Germany controlled Europe. By November 1942 sufficient evidence had been received, including substantial documentary evidence transmitted through our Legation in Switzerland, to confirm that Hitler had actually adopted and was carrying out his plan to exterminate the Jews. Sumner Welles accordingly authorized the Jewish organizations to make the facts public.

Thereupon, the Jewish organizations took the necessary steps to bring the shocking facts to the attention of the public through mass meetings, etc., and to elicit public support for governmental action. On December 17, 1942, a joint statement of the United States and the European members of the United Nations was issued calling attention to and denouncing the fact that Hitler was carrying into effect his oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.

Since the time when this Government knew that the Jews were being murdered, our State Department has failed to take any positive steps reasonably calculated to save any of these people. Although State has used the devices of setting up inter-governmen tal organizations to survey the whole refugee problem, and calling conferences such as the Bermuda Conference to explore the whole refugee problem, making it appear that positive action could be expected, in fact nothing has been accomplished.
Before the outcome of the Bermuda Conference, which was held in April 1943, was made public, Senator Langer prophetically stated in an address in the Senate on October 6, 1943:

"As yet we have had no report from the Bermuda Refugee Conference. With the best good will in the world and with all latitude that could and should be accorded to diplomatic negotiations in time of war, I may be permitted to voice the bitter suspicion that the absence of a report indicates only one thing -- the lack of action.

"Probably in all 5,703 years, Jews have hardly had a time as tragic and hopeless as the one which they are undergoing now. One of the most tragic factors about the situation is that while singled out for suffering and martyrdom by their enemies, they seem to have been forgotten by the nations which claim to fight for the cause of humanity. We should remember the Jewish slaughterhouse of Europe and ask what is being done -- and I emphasize the word 'done' -- to get some of these suffering human beings out of the slaughter while yet alive.

"* * * Perhaps it would be necessary to introduce a formal resolution or to ask the Secretary of State to report to an appropriate congressional committee on the steps being taken in this connection. Normally it would have been the job of the Government to show itself alert to this tragedy; but when a government neglects a duty it is the job of the legislature in a democracy to remind it of that duty. * * * It is not important who voices a call for action, and it is not important what procedure is being used in order to get action. It is important that action be undertaken."

Similar fears were voiced by Representatives Celler, Dickstein, and Klein. Senator Wagner and Representative Sadowski also issued calls for action.

The widespread fears concerning the failure of the Bermuda Conference were fully confirmed when Breckinridge Long finally revealed some of the things that had happened at that Conference in his statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House on November 26, 1943.

After Long's "disclosure" Representative Celler stated in the House on December 20, 1943:
"He discloses some of the things that happened at the so-called Bermuda Conference. He thought he was telling us something heretofore unknown and secret. What happened at the Bermuda Conference could not be kept executive. All the recommendations and findings of the Bermuda Conference were made known to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in existence since the Evian Conference on Refugees in 1938 and which has been functioning all this time in London. How much has that committee accomplished in the years of its being. It will be remembered that the Intergovernmental Committee functions through an executive committee composed of six countries, the United States, the United Kingdoms, the Netherlands, France, Brazil, and Argentina. True, no report of the Bermuda Conference was made public. But a strangely ironical fact will be noted in the presence of Argentina on this most trusted of committees, Argentina that provoked the official repri\-mand of President Roosevelt by its banning of the Jewish Press, and within whose borders Nazi propagandists and falangists now enjoy a Roman holiday. I contend that by the very nature of its composition the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees cannot function successfully as the instrumentality to rescue the Jewish people of Europe. The benefits to be derived from the Bermuda Conference like those of the previous Evian Conference can fit into a tiny capsule."

One of the best summaries of the whole situation is contained in one sentence of a report submitted on December 20, 1943, by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, recommending the passage of a Resolution (S.R. 203) favoring the appointment of a commission to formulate plans to save the Jews of Europe from extinction by Nazi Germany. The Committee stated:

"We have talked; we have sympathized; we have expressed our horror; the time to act is long past due."

The Senate Resolution had been introduced by Senator Guy M. Gillette in behalf of himself and eleven colleagues, Senators Taft, Thomas, Radcliffe, Murrey, Johnson, Guffey, Ferguson, Clark, Van Nuys, Downey, and Ellender.

The House Resolutions (H.R.'s 350 and 352), identical with the Senate Resolution, were introduced by Representatives Baldwin and Rogers.
The most glaring example of the use of the machinery of this Government to actually prevent the rescue of Jews is the administrative restrictions which have been placed upon the granting of visas to the United States. In the note which the State Department sent to the British on February 25, 1943 it was stated:

"Since the entry of the United States into the war there have been no new restrictions placed by the Government of the United States upon the number of aliens of any nationality permitted to proceed to this country under existing laws, except for the more intensive examination of aliens required for security reasons." (Underlining supplied)

The exception "for security reasons" mentioned in this note is the joker. Under the pretext of security reasons so many difficulties have been placed in the way of refugees obtaining visas that it is no wonder that the admission of refugees to this country does not come anywhere near the quota, despite Long's statement designed to create the impression to the contrary. The following administrative restrictions which have been applied to the issuance of visas since the beginning of the war are typical.

(a) Many applications for visas have been denied on the grounds that the applicants have close relatives in Axis-controlled Europe. The theory of this is that the enemy would be able to put pressure on the applicant as a result of the fact that the enemy has the power of life or death over his immediate family.

(b) Another restriction greatly increases the red tape and delay involved in getting the visa and requires among other things two affidavits of support and sponsorship to be furnished with each application for a visa. To each affidavit of support and sponsorship there must be attached two letters of reference from two reputable American citizens.
If anyone were to attempt to work out a set of restrictions specifically designed to prevent Jewish refugees from entering this country it is difficult to conceive of how more effective restrictions could have been imposed than have already been imposed on grounds of "security".

It is obvious of course that these restrictions are not essential for security reasons. Thus refugees upon arriving in this country could be placed in internment camps similar to those used for the Japanese on the West Coast and released only after satisfactory investigation. Furthermore, even if we took these refugees and treated them as prisoners of war it would be better than letting them die.

Representative Dickstein stated in the House on December 15:

"If we consider the fact that the average admission would then be at the rate of less than 58,000 per year, it is clear that the organs of our Government have not done their duty. The existing quotas call for the admission of more than 150,000 every year; so that if the quotas themselves had been filled there could have been a total of one-half million and not 580,000 during the period mentioned.

"But that is not the whole story. There was no effort of any kind made to save from death many of the refugees who could have been saved during the time that transportation lines were available and there was no obstacle to their admission to the United States. But the obstructive policy of our organs of Government, particularly the State Department, which saw fit to hedge itself about with rules and regulations, instead of lifting rules and regulations, brought about a condition so that not even the existing immigration quotas are filled."

Representative Celler stated in the House on June 30:

"Mr. Speaker, nations have declared war on Germany, and their high-ranking officials have issued pious protestations against the
Nazi massacre of Jewish victims, but not one of those countries thus far has said they would be willing to accept these refugees either permanently or as visitors, or any of the minority peoples trying to escape the Hitler prison and slaughterhouse.

"Goebbels says: 'The United Nations won't take any Jews. We don't want them. Let's kill them.' And so he and Hitler are marking Europe Judenrein.

"Without any change in our immigration statutes we could receive a reasonable number of those who are fortunate enough to escape the Nazi hellhole, receive them as visitors, the immigration quotas notwithstanding. They could be placed in camps or cantonments and held there in such havens until after the war. Private charitable agencies would be willing to pay the entire cost thereof. They would be no expense to the Government whatsoever. These agencies would even pay for transportation by ships to and from this country.

"We house and maintain Nazi prisoners, many of them undoubtedly responsible for Nazi atrocities. We should do no less for the victims of the rage of the Huns."

Again, on December 20, he stated:

"According to Earl G. Harrison, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, not since 1862 have there been fewer aliens entering the country.

"Frankly, Breckinridge Long, in my humble opinion, is least sympathetic to refugees in all the State Department. I attribute to him the tragic bottleneck in the granting of visas.

"The Interdepartmental Review Committees which review the applications for visas are composed of one official, respectively, from each of the following Departments: War, Navy, F.B.I., State, and Immigration. That committee has been glacier-like in its slowness and coldbloodedness. It takes months and months to grant the visas and then it usually applies to a corpse.

"I brought this difficulty to the attention of the President. He asked Long to investigate at once. No, there has been no change in conditions. The gruesome bottleneck still exists."
(2) State Department officials have not only failed to cooperate with private organizations in the efforts of these organizations to work out individual programs of their own, but have taken steps designed to prevent these programs from being put into effect.

The best evidence in support of this charge are the facts relating to the proposal of the World Jewish Congress to evacuate thousands of Jews from Rumania and France. The highlights relating to the efforts of State Department officials to prevent this proposal from being put into effect are the following:

(a) On March 13, 1943, a cable was received from the World Jewish Congress representative in London stating that information reaching London indicated the possibility of rescuing Jews provided funds were put at the disposal of the World Jewish Congress representation in Switzerland.

(b) On April 10, 1943, Sumner Welles cabled our Legation in Bern and requested them to get in touch with the World Jewish Congress representative in Switzerland, whom Welles had been informed was in possession of important information regarding the situation of the Jews.

(c) On April 20, 1943, a cable was received from Bern relating to the proposed financial arrangements in connection with the evacuation of the Jews from Rumania and France.

(d) On May 25, 1943, State Department cabled for a clarification of these proposed financial arrangements. This matter was not called to the attention of the Treasury Department at this time.

(e) This whole question of financing the evacuation of the Jews from Rumania and France was first called to the attention of the Treasury Department on June 25, 1943.

(f) A conference was held with the State Department relating to this matter on July 15, 1943.

(g) One day after this conference, on July 16, 1943, the Treasury Department advised the State Department that it was prepared to issue a license in this matter.

(h) The license was not issued until December 18, 1943.
During this five months period between the time that the Treasury stated that it was prepared to issue a license and the time when the license was actually issued delays and objections of all sorts were forthcoming from officials in the State Department, our Legation in Bern, and finally the British. The real significance of these delays and objections was brought home to the State Department in letters which you sent to Secretary Hull on November 24, 1943, and December 17, 1943, which completely devastated the "excuses" which State Department officials had been advancing. On December 16 you made an appointment to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull on December 20. And then an amazing but understandable thing happened. On December 16, the day after you sent your letter and the day on which you requested an appointment with Secretary Hull, the State Department sent a telegram to the British Foreign Office expressing astonishment with the British point of view and stating that the Department was unable to agree with that point of view (in simple terms, the British point of view referred to by the State Department is that they are apparently prepared to accept the possible -- even probable -- death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of "the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued"). On the same day, the State Department issued a license notwithstanding the fact that the objections of our Legation in Bern were still outstanding and that British disapproval had already been expressed. State Department officials were in such a hurry to issue this license that they not only did not ask the Treasury to draft the license (which would have been the normal procedure) but they drafted the license themselves and issued it without even consulting the Treasury as to its terms. Informal discussions with certain State Department officials have confirmed what is obvious from the above mentioned facts.

Breckinridge Long knew that his position was so indefensible that he was unwilling to even try to defend it at your pending conference with Secretary Hull on December 20. Accordingly, he took such action as he felt was necessary to "cover up" his previous position in this matter. It is, of course, clear that if we had not made the record against the State Department followed by your request to see Secretary Hull, the action which the State Department officials took on December 16 would either never have been taken at all or would have been delayed so long that any benefits which it might have had would have been lost.
(3) State Department officials not only have failed to facilitate the obtaining of information concerning Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews of Europe but in their official capacity have gone so far as to surreptitiously attempt to stop the obtaining of information concerning the murder of the Jewish population in Europe.

The evidence supporting this conclusion is so shocking and so tragic that it is difficult to believe.

The facts are as follows:

(a) Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State requests confirmation of Hitler's plan to exterminate the Jews. Having already received various reports on the plight of the Jews, on October 5, 1942 Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State sent a cable (2314) for the personal attention of Minister Harrison in Bern stating that leaders of the Jewish Congress had received reports from their representatives in Geneva and London to the effect that many thousands of Jews in Eastern Europe were being slaughtered pursuant to a policy embarked upon by the German Government for the complete extermination of the Jews in Europe. Welles added that he was trying to obtain further information from the Vatican but that other than this he was unable to secure confirmation of these stories. He stated that Rabbi Wise believed that information was available to his representatives in Switzerland but that they were in all likelihood fearful of dispatching any such reports through open cables or mail. He then stated that Riegnor and Lichtheim were being requested by Wise to call upon Minister Harrison, and Welles requested Minister Harrison to advise him by telegram of all the evidence and facts which he might secure as a result of conferences with Riegnor and Lichtheim.

(b) State Department receives confirmation and shocking evidence that the extermination was being rapidly and effectively carried out. Pursuant to Welles' cable of October 5 Minister Harrison forwarded documents from Riegnor confirming the fact of extermination of the Jews (in November 1942), and in a cable of January 21, 1943 (482) relayed a message from Riegnor and Lichtheim which Harrison stated was for the information of the Under Secretary of State (and was to be transmitted to Rabbi Stephen Wise if the Under Secretary should so determine). This message described a horrible situation concerning the plight of Jews in Europe. It reported mass
executions of Jews in Poland; according to one source 6,000 Jews were being killed daily; the Jews were required before execution to strip themselves of all their clothing which was then sent to Germany; the remaining Jews in Poland were confined to ghettos, etc.; in Germany deportations were continuing; many Jews were in hiding and there had been many cases of suicide; Jews were being deprived of rationed foodstuffs; no Jews would be left in Prague or Berlin by the end of March, etc.; and in Rumania 130,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria; about 60,000 had already died and the remaining 70,000 were starving; living conditions were indescribable; Jews were deprived of all their money, foodstuffs and possessions; they were housed in deserted cellars, and occasionally twenty to thirty people slept on the floor of one unheated room; disease was prevalent, particularly fever; urgent assistance was needed.

(c) Sumner Welles furnishes this information to the Jewish organizations. Sumner Welles furnished the documents received in November to the Jewish organizations in the United States and authorized them to make the facts public. On February 9, 1943 Welles forwarded the horrible message contained in cable 432 of January 21 to Rabbi Stephen Wise. In his letter of February 9 Welles stated that he was pleased to be of assistance in this matter immediately upon the receipt of this message, the Jewish organizations arranged for a public mass meeting in Madison Square Garden in a further effort to obtain effective action.

(d) Certain State Department officials surreptitiously attempt to stop this government from obtaining further information from the very source from which the above evidence was received. On February 10, the day after Welles forwarded the message contained in cable 432 of January 21 to Rabbi Wise, and in direct response to this cable, a most highly significant cable was dispatched. This cable, 354 of February 10, read as follows:

"Your 432, January 21

"In the future we would suggest that you do not accept reports submitted to you to be transmitted to private persons in the United States unless such action is advisable because of extraordinary circumstances. Such private messages circumvent neutral countries' censorship and it is felt that by sending them..."
we risk the possibility that steps would necessarily be taken by the neutral countries to curtail or forbid our means of communication for confidential official matter.

Hull (SW)"

Although this cable on its face is most innocent and innocuous, when read together with the previous cables I am forced to conclude it is nothing less than an attempted suppression of information requested by this Government concerning the murder of Jews by Hitler.

Although this cable was signed for Hull by "SW" (Sumner Welles) it is significant that there is not a word in the cable that would even suggest to the person signing it that it was designed to countermand the Department's specific requests for information on Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews. The cable appeared to be a normal routine message which a busy official would sign without question.

I have been informed that the initialled file copy of the cable bears the initials of Atherton and Dunn as well as of Durbrow and Hickerson.

(e) Thereafter Sumner Welles again requested our Legation on April 10, 1943 (cable 877) for information, apparently not realizing that in cable 354 (to which he did not refer) Harrison had been instructed to cease forwarding reports of this character. Harrison replied on April 20 (cable 2460) and indicated that he was in a most confused state of mind as a result of the conflicting instructions he had received. Among other things he stated: "May I suggest that messages of this character should not (repeat not) be subjected to the restriction imposed by your 354, February 10, and that I be permitted to transmit messages from R more particularly in view of the helpful information which they may frequently contain?"

The fact that cable 354 is not the innocent and routine cable that it appears to be on its face is further highlighted by the efforts of State Department officials to prevent this Department from obtaining the cable and learning its true significance.
The facts relating to this attempted concealment are as follows:

(i) Several men in our Department had requested State
Department officials for a copy of the cable of February 10
(354). We had been advised that it was a Department communi-
cation; a strictly political communication, which had nothing
to do with economic matters; that it had only had a very limited
distribution within the Department, the only ones having any-
thing to do with it being the European Division, the Political
Adviser and Sumner Welles; and that a copy could not be furnish-
to the Treasury.

(ii) At the conference in Secretary Hull's office on
December 20 in the presence of Breckinridge Long you asked
Secretary Hull for a copy of cable 354, which you were told
would be furnished to you.

(iii) By note to you of December 20, Breckinridge Long
enclosed a paraphrase of cable 354. This paraphrase of cable
354 specifically omitted any reference to cable 482 of Janu-
ary 21 -- thus destroying the only tangible clue to the true
meaning of the message.

(iv) You would never have learned the true meaning of
cable 354 had it not been for the fact that one of the men in
my office whom I had asked to obtain all the facts on this mat-
ter for me had previously called one of the men in another
Division of the State Department and requested permission to
see the cable. In view of the Treasury interest in this matter
this State Department representative obtained cable 354 and the
cable of January 21 to which it referred and showed these cables
to my man.

(4) The State Department officials have tried to cover
up their guilt by:

(a) concealment and misrepresentation

In addition to concealing the true facts from and
misrepresenting these facts to the public, State Department of-
fficials have even attempted concealment and misrepresentation
within the Government. The most striking example of this is.
the above mentioned action taken by State Department officials to prevent this Department from obtaining a copy of cable 354 of February 10 (which stopped the obtaining of information concerning the murder of Jews); and the fact that after you had requested a copy of this cable, State Department officials forwarded the cable to us with its most significant part omitted, thus destroying the whole meaning of the cable.

(b) the giving of false and misleading explanations for their failures to act and their attempts to prevent action.

The outstanding explanation of a false and misleading nature which the State Department officials have given for their failures to work out programs to rescue Jews, and their attempts to prevent action, are the following:

(i) The nice sounding but vicious theory that the whole refugee problem must be explored and consideration given to working out programs for the relief of all refugees -- thus failing to distinguish between those refugees whose lives are in imminent danger and those whose lives are not in imminent danger.

(ii) The argument that various proposals cannot be acted upon promptly by this Government but must be submitted to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. This Committee has taken no effective action to actually evacuate refugees from enemy territory and it is at least open to doubt whether it has the necessary authority to deal with the matter.

(iii) The argument that the extreme restrictions which the State Department has placed on the granting of visas to refugees is necessary for "security reasons." The falsity of this argument has already been dealt with in this memorandum.

The false and misleading explanations, which the State Department officials gave for delaying for over six months the program of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of thousands of Jews from Rumania and France, are dealt with in your letter to Secretary Hull of December 17, 1943.
A striking example is the argument of the State Department officials that the proposed financial arrangements might benefit the enemy. It is of course not surprising that the same State Department officials who usually argue that economic warfare considerations are not important should in this particular case attempt to rely on economic warfare considerations to kill the proposed program.

In this particular case, the State Department officials attempted to argue that the relief plan might benefit the enemy by facilitating the acquisition of funds by the enemy. In addition to the fact that this contention had no merit whatsoever by virtue of the conditions under which the local funds were to be acquired, it is significant that this consideration had not been regarded as controlling in the past by the State Department officials, even where no such conditions had been imposed.

Thus, in cases involving the purchase, by branches of United States concerns in Switzerland, of substantial amounts of material in enemy territory, State Department officials have argued that in view of the generous credit supplied by the Swiss to the Germans "transactions of this type cannot be regarded as actually increasing the enemy's purchasing power in Switzerland which is already believed to be at a maximum". It is only when these State Department officials really desire to prevent a transaction that they advance economic warfare considerations as a bar.

(c) the issuance of false and misleading statements concerning the "action" which they have taken to date.

It is unnecessary to go beyond Long's testimony to find many examples of misstatements. His general pious remarks concerning what this Government has done for the Jews of Europe; his statement concerning the powers and functions of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees; his reference to the "screening process" set up to insure wartime security, etc., have already been publicly criticized as misrepresentations.

A statement which is typical of the way Long twists facts is his remarks concerning the plan of a Jewish agency to send money to Switzerland to be used through the International Red Cross to buy food to take care of Jews in parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Long indicates that the Jewish agency requested that
the money be sent through the instrumentality of the Intergovernmental Committee. I am informed that the Jewish agency wished to send the money immediately to the International Red Cross and it was Long who took the position that the matter would have to go through the Intergovernmental Committee, thereby delaying the matter indefinitely. Long speaks of an application having been filed with the Treasury to send some of this money and that the State Department was supporting this application to the Treasury. The facts are that no application has ever been filed with the Treasury and the State Department has at no time indicated to the Treasury that it would support any such application.

The most patent instance of a false and misleading statement is that part of Breckinridge Long's testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House (November 26, 1943) relating to the admittance of refugees into this country. Thus, he stated:

"* * * We have taken into this country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 550,000 refugees. The whole thing has been under the quota, during the period of 10 years -- all under the quota -- except the generous gesture we made with visitors' and transit visas during an awful period."

Congressman Emanuel Celler in commenting upon Long's statement in the House on December 20, 1943, stated:

"* * * In the first place these 550,000 refugees were in the main ordinary quota immigrants coming in from all countries. The majority were not Jews. His statement drips with sympathy for the persecuted Jews, but the tears he sheds are crocodile. I would like to ask him how many Jews were admitted during the last 3 years in comparison with the number seeking entrance to preserve life and dignity. * * * One gets the impression from Long's statement that the United States has gone out of its way to help refugees fleeing death at the hands of the Nazis. I deny this. On the contrary, the State Department has turned its back on the time-honored principle of granting havens to refugees. The tempest-tossed get little comfort from men like Breckinridge Long. * * * Long says
that the door to the oppressed is open but that it is has been carefully screened.' What he should have said is 'barlocked and bolted.' By the act of 1924, we are permitted to admit approximately 150,000 immigrants each year. During the last fiscal year only 28,725 came as immigrants. Of these only 4,705 were Jews fleeing Nazi persecution.

"If men of the temperament and philosophy of Long continue in control of immigration administration, we may as well take down that plaque from the Statue of Liberty and black out the 'lamp beside the golden door.'"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES:

January 16, 1944

There was a meeting at the White House today at 12:45 attended by the President, Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Pehle. Secretary Morgenthau had requested the appointment to discuss the problem of saving the remaining Jews in Europe.

The conference lasted about twenty minutes. Secretary Morgenthau advised the President that he was deeply disturbed about the failure of the State Department to take any effective action to save the remaining Jews in Europe. He explained that the Treasury Department, in connection with the operation of the Foreign Funds Control, had uncovered evidence indicating that not only were the people in the State Department inefficient in dealing with this problem, but that they were actually taking action to prevent the rescue of the Jews. The Secretary then asked John Pehle to explain to the President the facts which the Treasury had uncovered. The President listened attentively and seemed to grasp the significance of the various points. He also glanced at the proposed Executive Order and suggested that perhaps the Secretary of War should be on the Board. The President inquired as to why Mr. Crowley was put on the Board and did not seem satisfied that there was any reason to put Mr. Crowley on the Board. The President asked whether Mr. Stettinius had been consulted and referred to the fact that Stettinius had recently reorganized the State Department and that nowhere in the organization chart was there any indication that any particular division was charged with this problem. The Secretary indicated that we had been dealing with Mr. Hull on the general matter and had hesitated to put Stettinius instead of Hull on the Board. Nevertheless, the President indicated that he would like to have the matter taken up with Mr. Stettinius and indicated that he thought Stettinius would be sympathetic. He said he would also like to have Judge Rosenman brought into the picture. The Secretary said he had already talked to Judge Rosenman about the matter.

During the conference the following points were brought out:

(1) The Secretary said he was convinced that effective action could be taken and referred to the results that his father, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., had obtained when he was Ambassador to Turkey in getting the Armenians out of Turkey and saving their lives. The President said he agreed that some effective action could be taken and referred particularly to the movement of Jews through Rumania into Bulgaria.
and out through Turkey. He said he thought such channels were wide open at the present time, but that they would not be open if Turkey entered the war.

(2) The President referred to the possibility of getting people over the Spanish and Swiss borders.

(3) The President seemed disinclined to believe that Long wanted to stop effective action from being taken, but said that Long had been somewhat soured on the problem when Rabbi Wise got Long to approve a long list of people being brought into this country many of whom turned out to be bad people. Secretary Morgenthau reminded the President that at a Cabinet meeting Biddle had indicated that only three Jews of those entering the United States during the war had turned out to be undesirable. The President said that he had been advised that the figure was considerably larger. In any event he felt that Long was inclined to be soured on the situation.

Following the meeting with the President and while still at the White House, Secretary Morgenthau called Mr. Stettinius and Judge Rosenman and arranged a meeting at the Secretary's home at 5:30.

The 5:30 meeting was attended by the Secretary, Mr. Stettinius, Judge Rosenman, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Pehle. The Secretary told Mr. Stettinius in plain words that he was convinced that people in the State Department, particularly Breckinridge Long, were deliberately obstructing the execution of any plan to save the Jews and that forthright immediate action was necessary if this Government was not going to be placed in the same position as Hitler and share the responsibility for exterminating all the Jews of Europe. At the Secretary's request Pehle then explained in detail the facts that had been uncovered by the Treasury. Stettinius seemed shocked by these facts although he said he was not surprised about Breckinridge Long since Long had fallen down just as badly and in an equally shocking way in the handling of the exchange of prisoners. Stettinius was very frank in his views on Long's failures and pointed out that in the reorganization of the State Department.
which he had worked out the only remaining function assigned to Breckinridge Long is "Congressional relations\". Stettinius said that in the new reorganization Berle's responsibilities had been very much limited, but included in the area of operations under Berle's control was the Special War Problems Division, which handles the problem of the rescue of the Jews, and the Visa Division. Stettinius said he recognized that this problem could not be handled effectively by Berle and that there were grounds for believing that Berle might be even worse than Long. At this point the proposed Executive Order was discussed. Stettinius read it over and when asked for his views said: \"I think it's wonderful.\" He then said that the Secretary of War should be on the Committee instead of Mr. Crowley who was already having considerable difficulty running FEA. This was agreed to particularly in light of the President's similar reaction. It was decided that the Executive Order should be amended accordingly, as should the memorandum to Harold Smith and the memorandum to Cordell Hull and the amended documents delivered to Judge Rosenman by 9:15 the following morning.

The Secretary suggested that the Executive Director of the Board should be John Pehle and Judge Rosenman and Mr. Stettinius indicated agreement.
January 20, 1944

Memorandum for the Files:

The attached memorandum was signed by the Secretary and taken by him to the President for possible use in the Sunday conference.

The President preferred that the facts be summarized to him orally, which was done, and the President handed the memo back to the Secretary. The President did not read through the memorandum.

[Signature]
PERSONAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

One of the greatest crimes in history, the slaughter of the Jewish people in Europe, is continuing unabated.

This Government has for a long time maintained that its policy is to work out programs to save those Jews and other persecuted minorities of Europe who could be saved.

You are probably not as familiar as I with the utter failure of certain officials in our State Department, who are charged with actually carrying out this policy, to take any effective action to prevent the extermination of the Jews in German-controlled Europe.

The public record, let alone the facts which have not yet been made public, reveals the gross procrastination of these officials. It is well known that since the time when it became clear that Hitler was determined to carry out a policy of exterminating the Jews in Europe, the State Department officials have failed to take any positive steps reasonably calculated to save any of these people. Although they have used devices such as setting up intergovernmental organizations to survey the whole refugee problem, and calling conferences such as the Bermuda Conference to explore the whole refugee problem, making it appear that positive action could be expected, in fact nothing has been accomplished.

The best summary of the whole situation is contained in one sentence of a report submitted on December 20, 1943, by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, recommending the passage of a Resolution (S.R. 203), favoring the appointment of a commission to formulate plans to save the Jews of Europe from extinction by Nazi Germany. The Resolution had been introduced by Senator Guy M. Gillette in behalf of himself and eleven colleagues, Senators Tait, Thomas, Radcliffe, Murray, Johnson, Guffey, Ferguson, Clark, Van Nuys, Downey and Ellender. The Committee stated:
"We have talked; we have sympathized; we have expressed our horror; the time to act is long past due."

Whether one views this failure as being deliberate on the part of those officials handling the matter, or merely due to their incompetence, is not too important from my point of view. However, there is a growing number of responsible people and organizations today who have ceased to view our failure as the product of simple incompetence on the part of those officials in the State Department charged with handling this problem. They see plain Anti-Semitism motivating the actions of these State Department officials and, rightly or wrongly, it will require little more in the way of proof for this suspicion to explode into a nasty scandal.

In this perspective, I ask you to weigh the implications of the following two cases which have recently come to my attention and which have not as yet become known to the public.

I.

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PROPOSAL TO EVACUATE THOUSANDS OF JEWS FROM RUMANIA AND FRANCE

On March 15, 1943, the World Jewish Congress representative in London sent a cable to their offices here. This cable stated that information reaching London indicated it was possible to rescue Jews provided funds were put at the disposal of the World Jewish Congress representative in Switzerland.

On April 10, 1943, Sumner Welles cabled our Legation in Bern and requested them to get in touch with the World Jewish Congress representative in Switzerland, who Welles had been informed was in possession of important information regarding the situation of the Jews.

On April 20, 1943, the State Department received a cable from Bern relating to the proposed financial arrangements in connection with the evacuation of the Jews from Rumania and France.
On May 25, 1943, State Department cabled for a clarification of these proposed financial arrangements. This matter was not called to the attention of the Treasury Department at this time although the Treasury has the responsibility for licensing all such financial transactions.

This whole question of financing the evacuation of the Jews from Rumania and France was first called to the attention of the Treasury Department on June 25, 1943.

A conference was held with the State Department relating to this matter on July 15, 1943.

One day after this conference, on July 16, 1943, the Treasury Department advised the State Department that it was prepared to issue a license in this matter.

It was not until December 18, 1943, after having interposed objections for five months, that the State Department, precipitously and under circumstances revealing the fictitious character of their objections, instructed Harrison to issue the necessary license.

During this five months period between the time that the Treasury stated that it was prepared to issue a license and the time when the license was actually issued delays and objections of all sorts were forthcoming from officials in the State Department, our Legation in Bern, and finally the British. The real significance of these delays and objections was brought home to the State Department in letters which I sent to Secretary Hull on November 23, 1943, and December 17, 1943, which completely devastated the excuses which State Department officials had been advancing.

On December 18 I made an appointment to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull on December 20. And then an amazing but understandable thing happened. On the very day I made my appointment the State Department issued a license notwithstanding the fact that the objections of our Legation in Bern were still outstanding and that the British had indicated their disapproval for political reasons.
State Department officials were in such a hurry to issue this license that they not only did not ask the Treasury to draft the license (which would have been the normal procedure) but they drafted the license themselves and issued it without even consulting the Treasury as to its terms. Informal discussions with certain State Department officials have confirmed what is obvious from the above-mentioned facts.

This wasn't all that my letter and appointment precipitated. I had told Secretary Hull that I wished to discuss the British objections — in simple terms, the British were apparently prepared to accept the probable death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of "the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued". Accordingly, on that day of "action" for our State Department, December 18, they sent a telegram to the British Foreign Office expressing astonishment at the British point of view and stating that the Department was unable to agree with that point of view.

Breckinridge Long, who is in charge of such matters in the State Department, knew that his position was so indefensible that he was unwilling even to try to defend it at my pending conference with Secretary Hull on December 20. Accordingly, he took such action as he felt was necessary to cover up his previous position in this matter. It is, of course, clear that if we had not made the record against the State Department followed by my request to see Secretary Hull, the action which the State Department officials took on December 18 would either never have been taken at all or would have been delayed so long that any benefits which it might have had would have been lost.

II

SUPPRESSION OF FACTS REGARDING HITLER'S EXTERMINATION OF JEWS IN EUROPE

The facts are as follows:

Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State requests confirmation of Hitler's plan to exterminate the Jews. Having already received various reports on the plight of the
Jews, on October 5, 1942, Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State sent a cable (2314) for the personal attention of Minister Harrison in Bern stating that leaders of the Jewish Congress had received reports from their representatives in Geneva and London to the effect that many thousands of Jews in Eastern Europe were being slaughtered pursuant to a policy embarked upon by the German Government for the complete extermination of the Jews in Europe. Welles added that he was trying to obtain further information from the Vatican but that other than this he was unable to secure confirmation of these stories. He stated that Rabbi Wise believed that information was available to his representatives in Switzerland but that they were in all likelihood fearful of dispatching any such reports through open cables or mail. He then stated that World Jewish Congress officials in Switzerland, Riegner and Lichtheim, were being requested by Wise to call upon Minister Harrison; and Welles requested Minister Harrison to advise him by telegram of all the evidence and facts which he might secure as a result of conferences with Riegner and Lichtheim.

State Department receives confirmation that the extermination was being rapidly carried out. Pursuant to Welles' cable of October 5, Minister Harrison forwarded documents from Riegner confirming the fact of extermination of the Jews (in November 1942), and in a cable of January 21, 1943 (482) relayed a message from Riegner and Lichtheim which Harrison stated was for the information of the Under Secretary of State (and was to be transmitted to Rabbi Stephen Wise if the Under Secretary should so determine). This message described a horrible situation concerning the plight of Jews in Europe. It reported mass executions of Jews in Poland; the Jews were required before execution to strip themselves of all their clothing which was then sent to Germany; in Germany deportations were continuing; many Jews were being deprived of rationed foodstuffs; no Jews would be left in Prague or Berlin by the end of March, etc.; and in Rumania 150,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria; about 60,000 had already died and the remaining 70,000 were starving; living conditions were indescribable; Jews were deprived of all their money, foodstuffs and possessions; they were housed in deserted cellars, and occasionally twenty to
thirty people slept on the floor of one unheated room; disease was prevalent, particularly fever; urgent assistance was needed.

Summer Welles furnished this information to the Jewish organizations. Summer Welles furnished the documents received in November to the Jewish organizations in the United States and authorized them to make the facts public. On February 9, 1943 Welles forwarded the messages contained in cable 482 of January 21 to Rabbi Stephen Wise.

The receipt of this message intensified the pressure on the State Department to take some action.

Certain State Department officials attempt to stop this Government from obtaining further information from the very source from which the above evidence was received. On February 10, the day after Welles forwarded the message contained in cable 482 of January 21 to Rabbi Wise, and in direct response to this cable, a most highly significant cable was dispatched to Minister Harrison. This cable, 354 of February 10, read as follows:

"Your 482, January 21

"In the future we would suggest that you do not accept reports submitted to you to be transmitted to private persons in the United States unless such action is advisable because of extraordinary circumstances. Such private messages circumvent neutral countries' censorship and it is felt that by sending them we risk the possibility that steps would necessarily be taken by the neutral countries to curtail or forbid our means of communication for confidential official matter.

Hull (SW)"

The cable was signed for Hull by "Sw" (Summer Welles). But it is significant that there is not a word in it that
would even suggest to the person signing that it was designed
to countermand the Department's specific requests for infor-
mation on Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews. The cable
has the appearance of being a normal routine message which
a busy official would sign without question. On its face it
is most innocent and innocuous, yet when read together with
the previous cables is it anything less than an attempted
suppression of information requested by this government
concerning the murder of Jews by Hitler?

It is also significant that the message which pro-
voked the ban on further communications of this character
was not addressed to private persons at all but was addressed
to Under Secretary Welles at his own request and the infor-
mation contained therein was only to be transmitted to the
World Jewish Congress if Welles deemed it advisable.

Thereafter on April 10, 1943, Sumner Welles again
requested our Legation for information (cable 377).
Apparently he did not realize that in cable 354 (to which
he did not refer) Harrison had been instructed to cease
forwarding reports of this character. Harrison replied on
April 20 (cable 2460) and indicated that he was in a most
confused state of mind as a result of the conflicting in-
structions he had received. Among other things he stated:

"May I suggest that messages of this
character should not (repeat not) be sub-
ject to the restriction imposed by your
354, February 19, and that I be permitted
to transmit messages from R more particu-
larly in view of the helpful information
which they may frequently contain?"

The fact that cable 354 is not the innocent and
routine cable that it appears to be on its face is further
highlighted by the efforts of State Department officials to
prevent this Department from obtaining the cable and learning
its true significance.

The facts relating to this attempted concealment are
as follows:
(i) Several men in our Department had requested State Department officials for a copy of the cable of February 10 (354). We had been advised that it was a Department communication; a strictly political communication, which had nothing to do with economic matters; that it had only had a very limited distribution within the Department, the only ones having anything to do with it being the European Division, the Political Adviser and Sumner Welles; and that a copy could not be furnished to the Treasury.

(ii) At the conference in Secretary Hull's office on December 20 in the presence of Breckinridge Long I asked Secretary Hull for a copy of cable 354, which I was told would be furnished to me.

(iii) By note to me of December 20, Breckinridge Long enclosed a paraphrase of cable 354. This paraphrase of cable 354 specifically omitted any reference to cable 462 of January 21 — thus destroying the only tangible clue to the true meaning of the message.

(iv) I would never have learned the true meaning of cable 354 had it not been for chance. I had asked one of the men in my Department to obtain all the facts on this matter. He had previously called one of the men in another Division of the State Department and requested permission to see the relevant cables. In view of the Treasury interest in this matter, this State Department representative obtained cable 354 and the cable of January 21 to which it referred and showed these cables to my representative.

The facts I have detailed in this report, Mr. President, came to the Treasury's attention as a part of our routine investigation of the licensing of the financial phases of the proposal of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of Jews from France and Rumania. The facts may thus be said to have come to light through accident. How many others of the same character are buried in State Department files is a matter I would have no way of knowing. Judging from the almost complete failure of the State Department to achieve any results, the strong suspicion must be that they are not
This much is certain, however. The matter of rescuing the Jews from extermination is a trust too great to remain in the hands of men who are indifferent, callous, and perhaps even hostile. The task is filled with difficulties. Only a fervent will to accomplish, backed by persistent and untiring effort can succeed where time is so precious.

Henny Weymouth

Jan. 16, 1944