

Box

President's Secretary's File

Confidential File

State Dept Jan-May 1943

74

7

*(B.F.)
State*

JUN 15 1943

Great and Good Friend:

I have received Your Majesty's communication of April 30, 1943, relating to matters affecting Palestine, and I appreciate the spirit of friendship you have manifested in expressing these views to me.

x700

I have noted carefully the statements made in this communication, as well as those contained in Your Majesty's letter of November 19, 1938, and the oral message conveyed to Mr. Kirk, the American Minister, at the conclusion of his recent visit to Riyadh.

29th?

Copy of the President's reply dated 1/9/39, filed 3500.

Your Majesty, no doubt, has received my message delivered by Mr. Moore to His Highness the Amir Faisal. As I stated therein, it appears to me highly desirable that the Arabs and Jews interested in the question should come to a friendly understanding with respect to matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts prior to the termination of the war. I am glad of this opportunity, however, to reiterate my assurance that it is the view of the Government of the United States that, in any case, no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

x4180

Mr. Turner does not have message.

x76-6
x3500

I renew my expressions of best wishes for Your Majesty's good health and for the well-being of your people.

Your Good Friend,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Majesty
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, xPP77960
King of Saudi Arabia.

*In Saudi State
+ new State Dept
sent 6-15-43*


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 14. 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of June 4, 1943, there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a letter addressed to King Ibn Saud in reply to his communication addressed to you on April 30, 1943.

The enclosed letter to the King reiterates the assurances given in your recent telegram to him and incorporates substantially the same phraseology contained therein.



Enclosure:

To King Ibn Saud.

(1168)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE STATE DEPARTMENT *x20*

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, 4/30/43,
together with translation of same, which refers
to situation regarding the Jews and the Arabs.

REPRODUCED FROM HOLDINGS AT THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

As per request for return of
translation of King Ibn Saud's
letter of April 30, 1943


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 29. 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a communication addressed to you by King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, which has been transmitted to the Department for delivery to you by the American Minister at Cairo. There is attached an English translation of the King's letter, which is written in Arabic.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'A. M. N. N. N.', written in a cursive style.

Enclosures:

1. Letter from King Ibn Saud.
2. Translation of the letter.

The President,
The White House.

C
O
P
Y

T R A N S L A T I O N

Pres. in USFR,
1943, IV,
pp. 773-75

In the Name of God
the Merciful and Compassionate

From Abdel Aziz, Ibn Abdel Rahman El Faisal,
King of Saudi Arabia.

To His Excellency Franklin Roosevelt, President
of the United States of America.

Excellency,

In this great world war in which nations are shedding their blood and expending their wealth in the defence of freedom and liberty, in this war in which the high principles for which the Allies are fighting have been proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, in this struggle in which the leaders of every country are appealing to their countrymen, allies and friends to stand with them in their struggle for life, I have been alarmed, as have other Moslems and Arabs, because a group of Zionists are seizing the opportunity of this terrible crisis to make extensive propaganda by which they seek on the one hand to mislead American public opinion and, on the other hand, to bring pressure upon the Allied Governments in these critical times

-2-

times in order to force them to go against the principles of right, justice and equity which they have proclaimed and for which they are fighting, the principles of the freedom and liberty of peoples. By so doing the Jews seek to compel the Allies to help them exterminate the peaceful Arabs settled in Palestine for thousands of years. They hope to evict this noble nation from its home and to install Jews from every horizon in this sacred Moslem Arab country. What a calamitous and infamous miscarriage of justice would, God forbid, result from this world struggle if the Allies should, at the end of their struggle, crown their victory by evicting the Arabs from their home in Palestine, substituting in their place vagrant Jews who have no ties with this country except an imaginary claim which, from the point of view of right and justice, has no grounds except what they invent through fraud and deceit. They avail themselves of the Allies' critical situation and of the fact that the American nation is unaware of the truth about the Arabs in general and the Palestine question in particular.

On November 19, 1938 (Shawal 7, 1357 H.) I wrote to Your Excellency a letter in which I set forth the true situation of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. If Your Excellency would refer to that letter, you will find that
the

-3-

the Jews have no right to Palestine and that their claim is an act of injustice unprecedented in the history of the human race. Palestine has from the earliest history belonged to the Arabs and is situated in the midst of Arab countries. The Jews only occupied it for a short period and the greater part of that period was full of massacres and tragedies. Subsequently they were driven out of the country and today it is proposed to re-install them in it. By so doing the Jews will do wrong to the quiet and peaceful Arabs. The Heavens will split, the earth will be rent asunder, and the mountains will tremble at what the Jews claim in Palestine, both materially and spiritually.

Having sent to Your Excellency my above-mentioned letter, I believed, and I still believe, that the Arab claim to Palestine had become clear to you, for in your kind letter to me dated January 9, 1939 you made no remark about any of the facts which I had mentioned in my previous letter. I would not have wasted Your Excellency's time over this case nor the time of the men at the head of your government at this critical moment but the persistent news that these Zionists do not refrain from bringing forth their wrong and unjust claim induces me to remind Your Excellency of the rights of Moslems and Arabs in the

Holy

-4-

Holy Land so that you may prevent this act of injustice and that my explanation to Your Excellency may convince the Americans of the Arabs' rights in Palestine, and that Americans whom Jewish Zionism intends to mislead by propaganda may know the real facts, help the oppressed Arabs, and crown their present efforts by setting up right and justice in all parts of the world.

If we leave aside the religious animosity between Moslems and Jews which dates back to the time when Islam appeared and which is due to the treacherous behavior of the Jews towards Moslems and their Prophet, if we leave aside all this and consider the case of the Jews from a purely humanitarian point of view, we would find, as I mentioned in my previous letter, that Palestine, as every human creature who knows that country admits, cannot solve the Jewish problem. Supposing that the country were subjected to injustice in all its forms, that all the Arabs of Palestine, men, women and children, were killed and their lands wrested from them and given to the Jews, the Jewish problem would not be solved and no sufficient lands would be available for the Jews. Why, therefore, should such an act of injustice, which is unique in the history of the human race, be tolerated, seeing that it would not satisfy the would-be murderers, i.e., the Jews?

In

-5-

In my previous letter to Your Excellency I stated that if we consider this matter from a humanitarian point of view, we would find that the small country we call Palestine was crammed at the beginning of the present war with nearly 400,000 Jews. At the end of the last Great War they only constituted 7% of the whole population but this proportion rose before the beginning of the present war to 29% and is still rising. We do not know where it will stop, but we know that a little before the present war the Jews possessed 1,000,332 donams out of 7,000,000 donams which is the sum total of all the cultivable land in Palestine.

We do not intend, nor demand, the destruction of the Jews but we demand that the Arabs should not be exterminated for the sake of the Jews. The world should not be too small to receive them. In fact, if each of the Allied countries would bear one tenth of what Palestine has borne, it would be possible to solve the Jewish problem and the problem of giving them a home to live in. All that we request at present is that you should help to stop the flow of migration by finding a place for the Jews to live in other than Palestine, and by preventing completely the sale of lands to them. Later on the Allies and Arabs can look into the matter of assuring the accomodation of those

-6-

those of the Jews residing in Palestine whom that country can support provided that they reside quietly and do not foment trouble between Arabs and the Allies.

In writing this to Your Excellency I am sure that you will respond to the appeal of a friend who feels that you appreciate friendship as you appreciate right, justice, and equity, and who is aware that the greatest hope of the American people is to come out of this world struggle, rejoicing in the triumph of the principles for which it is fighting, i. e., to ensure to every people its freedom and to grant it its rights. For if--God forbid!--the Jews were to be granted their desire, Palestine would forever remain a hotbed of troubles and disturbances as in the past. This will create difficulties for the Allies in general and for our friend Great Britain in particular. In view of their financial power and learning the Jews can stir up enmity between the Arabs and the Allies at any moment. They have been the cause of many troubles in the past.

All that we are now anxious for is that right and justice should prevail in the solution of the various problems which will come to light after the war and that the relations between the Arabs and the Allies should always be of the best and strongest.

In

-7-

In closing, I beg you to accept my most cordial greetings.

Written at Our Camp at Roda Khareem on this the 25th day of Rabi'Tani, of the year 1362 Hegira corresponding to April 30, 1943.

*C. F.
State*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

X
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXX
XXXX

Signed 5/26/43

~~April 27, 1943~~

AMERICAN LEGATION,
CAIRO.

Your 723, April 7, 10 a.m.

*x700
x76-ko*

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE MINISTER.

Please arrange for the transmission of the following message from the President to King Ibn Saud through the confidential media he indicated:

*x3500
x1877960*

QUOTE The American Minister, Mr. Kirk, has communicated to me Your Majesty's expression of friendship for the United States and sympathy for the United Nations' cause, which I am most grateful to receive. He has informed me also how Your Majesty has manifested this friendship and sympathy by remaining silent in regard to issues affecting the Arab peoples among whom Your Majesty is revered as a distinguished leader.

In conveying my appreciation of Your Majesty's sympathetic understanding and helpful cooperation, I wish to express my thorough agreement with Your Majesty's considered opinion that continued silence with respect to such matters would prove most helpful to the United Nations

Returned to Secretary of State, May 26, 1943.

- 2 -

in their bitter struggle to preserve the freedom of mankind. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews should reach a friendly understanding in regard to matters affecting Palestine through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, however, I assure Your Majesty that it is the view of the Government of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I take this opportunity to express my best wishes for Your Majesty's good health and for the well-being of your people. Franklin D. Roosevelt. UNQUOTE

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

890F.00/81 Conf.

NE:WLP:EML PA/M

signed 5-26-43

L. F. State file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I refer to your telegram of May 26, 1943, addressed to King Ibn Saud regarding the status of Palestine. *EB.*

The Legation at Jidda has informed the Department that this message was forwarded to the Amir Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, who transmitted it promptly to King Ibn Saud. The Amir Faisal has requested the Legation to express to you the King's gratitude for your friendly communication.

Faithfully yours,

A. Nelson

x 3500
x 700

The President,
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

x-418
There is enclosed a copy of a telegram from the American Minister at Cairo conveying to you an important confidential message from King Ibn Saud. Expressing his personal interest, as an Arab and Moslem leader, in the Arab question, with particular reference to Palestine and Syria, the King states that, although urged to make representations to this Government respecting Palestine, he has refrained from doing so only because of his desire not to embarrass the United States at this time or to prejudice the United Nations cause by taking a step likely to increase Arab-Jewish antagonisms. He desires to ascertain, therefore, whether you approve of his attitude of silence and, if so, whether he will be advised in advance of any steps of an affirmative character contemplated by the Government with respect to this question.

The necessity of replying to the King's message and of providing him with the assurances which he

requests

- 2 -

requests is emphasized by the receipt of a further telegram from Mr. Kirk, a copy of which also is enclosed, stating that the King has delivered to him for transmission to you a personal letter regarding the Palestine question constituting substantially a reiteration of the King's views expressed in his previous oral message delivered by Mr. Kirk and in his letter addressed to you in 1938.

Accordingly, there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a message addressed to King Ibn Saud conveying to him substantially the viewpoint expressed in the proposed statement on Palestine which you approved on May 10, 1943. *Filed b. F. State.*

CH
x 20

Enclosures:

1. Telegram no. 723, April 17, 10 a.m., from Cairo.
2. Telegram no. 857, May 10, 5 p.m., from Cairo.
3. Draft telegram to Cairo.

COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SC)

Cairo

Dated May 10, 1943

Rec'd 4:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

857, May 10, 5 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

My 723, April 17, 10 a.m. and Jidda's 40, May 3, 7 p. m.

Shaikh Youssef Yassine who is now in Cairo en route to Syria has delivered to me for forwarding a sealed personal letter from King Ibn Saud to the President regarding Palestine question, together with copy thereof for Legation files of which translation has been made to accompany Arabic original.

In general, letter constitutes reiteration of King's views as set forth in my telegram under reference and his previous letter to President in 1938. Following are principal points covered:

One. Confidence of Arabs in high principles of Allies is being shaken by Zionist attempts to profit by stress of war to spread false propaganda in United States and other Allied countries having as purpose elimination

of

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

of peaceful Arabs in Palestine and replacement by Jews who have no valid claims on country.

Two. In his letter of November 19, 1938 to President, King explained rights of Arabs as contrasted with Jews in Palestine and disastrous consequences which would follow fulfillment of Jewish designs. King's remarks were presumably clear to President since latter made no comment thereon in his reply of January 19, 1939.

Three. King would not importune President by bringing up matter again now were it not for reports of renewed Zionist activity and necessity that President and American people should know facts in order to avoid a great injustice to Arabs.

KIRK

x 4180

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated May 10, 1943

Rec'd 7:55 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State

Washington

857, May 10, 5 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Leaving aside matter of traditional animosity between Jews and Arabs and viewing matter from purely humanitarian standpoint it is obvious that Jewish problem cannot be settled by colonization in Palestine since country could not absorb sufficient number of Jews even if all Arabs in country were exterminated. As it is Jewish population and land holdings increased tremendously.

Five. Elimination of Jews from Palestine is not demanded but merely that immigration should be stopped by finding other refugees for the land, that further land purchases be prohibited. If each of Allied countries were prepared to bear one tenth of burden of Palestine problem could be settled. Subsequent Allies and Arabs could discuss accommodation in Palestine of Jews now resident there in light of absorptive capacity of country.

Six. Trusts that President will respond to this appeal of a friend who respects principles for which American people are fighting because if Jewish desires should be fulfilled in Palestine a permanently disturbed situation would result which would create difficulties for the Allies in general and Great Britain in particular.

All

- 2 -

All that is desired now is the assurance that right and justice will prevail in the solution of post war problems and that Arab Allied relations may remain of the best.

Original letter is being transmitted by next pouch. I would appreciate advice as when President's reply to matter presented in my telegram under reference may be expected.

KIRK

(COPIED:NE:EML)
890F.00/81 Conf.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

VCH

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated April 17, 1943

Rec'd 9:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER
SECRETARY

The greater part of my conversation with Ibn Saud and his advisors during my visit at his desert camp midway between Ryadh and Dahran was confined to supply and Lend-Lease matters and to an exchange of cordialities which this time were especially marked on the part of the Saudi Arabians. On the day of my departure, however, the King sent for me and in a private audience said there was a matter which he desired to discuss with me personally and in strictest confidence and which he would request that I bring to attention of President. He referred, he said, to the Arab question and particularly to certain aspects thereof in respect of Palestine and Syria.

Turning first to Palestine he said situation there was of more concern to him than to any other Arab leader because Jews had been hostile to Arabs from time of Prophet Mohamed to present and he, Ibn Saud, as the leading Arab and Moslem, therefore, had a special interest in developments in Palestine where, because of vast wealth

at

-2- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo

at their disposal and their influence in Britain and the United States Jews were steadily encroaching on Arabs. If this trend was allowed to continue it could only be expected that Jewish-Arab conflict would become more acute, which would be deplorable from Arab standpoint and would also cut across Allied war effort.

Recently he had heard of representations in respect of Palestine made to American Government by Egyptians and certain Arabs had urged him to do likewise, but he had hitherto refused for following two reasons:

One. He had made his views on subject known to President on a previous occasion and had received President's reply.

Two. He did not want to do anything at present time which would cause difficulty to United States at a time when it needed to devote its undivided attention to prosecution of war. Thus should he write the President and receive a reply favorable to Arabs, Jewish antagonisms would develop and, should reply be favorable to Jews or no reply at all made, Arabs dissatisfaction would be aroused. Were it not for these considerations arising out of war he would feel obligated to act, but under existing circumstances his sympathy for the United Nations' cause and his friendship for the United States had led him to conclude that it would be preferable to remain silent.

Although

-3- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo

Although Palestine received the chief emphasis the King also referred to question of Syria and said Syrians were his friends and independence of country was of great personal concern to him. He had noted in this connection the announced intention of the Allies to give Syria complete independence and he felt he must believe in their sense of justice and fidelity to their given word. In this case, like that of Palestine, he had desired, therefore, to maintain silence in order to avoid causing embarrassment to Allies.

In adopting this policy of silence, however, he said that it was obvious that he, as the leading Arab and Moslem, would be placed in a difficult position if the American Government should respond favorably to the overtures of others since it might be made to appear that his silence had been motivated by lack of interest on his part, whereas the contrary was the case. He, therefore, wished to be advised whether President concurred in his views regarding the maintenance of silence for the time being. Should such not be the case, he had certain plans for action clearly in mind. On the other hand, should President agree, he would appreciate being so advised and at same time receiving an assurance that he would be informed in advance of any affirmative steps which American Government might contemplate taking in response to
overtures

-4- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from Cairo

overtures by other Arab persons or agencies in order that he might consider possible adjustments in his policy. Since his own decision in matter had been taken in deference to our vital interests he hoped he could count on our being equally understanding of his position.

KIRK

NPL

(Section Two appears on following page)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FMH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated April 17, 1943

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Turning from specific question of Syria and Palestine, King said he had heard indirectly of recent proposal to call Arab conference but that he had not been approached by sponsors of idea who had apparently been guided by knowledge of his policy of not desiring to do anything to make trouble for Allies. Whether he was or was not invited in this particular instance was a matter of relative indifference to him because he knew full well that no bona fide Arab conference could achieve any important results without his participation. He was, however, concerned by the fact that much of this present Pan Arab agitation emanated from Iraq and had as its ultimate purpose the extension of Hashemite power. Ibn Saud emphasized that he had no personal territorial ambitions outside his own country but merely wished to see Syria and Palestine attain individual independence and take their place along side Saudi Arabia and Iraq in a balanced comity of Arab states; in other words Syria for the Syrians, Palestine for the Palestinians, et cetera. There was, however,

-2- #723, April 17, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from Cairo

however, strong indication (mentioning Nuri Abdul Illah and Abdullah by name) that an effort was being made to use Pan Arabism as a means for formation of Iraq, Palestine and Syria into a Hashemite bloc. Such a development he could only view with gravest apprehension in view of traditional hostility of Hashemites to House of Saud and King trusted Allies would not countenance materialization of such a serious threat to Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion King stressed confidential nature of his observations and asked that they be revealed to no one not even the British although latter were cognizant of his general views. He also requested that any reply of President to question regarding his present policy of silence in respect of Palestine and Syria should be transmitted only to Prince Feissl or Shaikh Youssef Yassine. King referred on several occasions in course of his remarks to friendly private and official relations which had so happily developed between Saudi Arabia and United States and suggested that American interests in Saudi Arabia were such as to justify its occupying a special place in the formulation of American policy in Near East.

In transmitting this message from Ibn Saud for the President, it is difficult if not impossible without incurring the criticisms of hyperbole or even emotionalisms,

adequately

-3- #723, 10 a.m., April 17 (SECTION TWO) from Cairo

adequately to reflect the sincerity of the King and his profound conviction in the virtue of his own judgment. He is simple, honest and decisive and these qualities transcend the limited formula of his special experience. He believes that we are his friends and to him friendship bespeaks complete confidence. Compromise is inadmissible. He truly feels that his problems are ours and ours are his and in giving this message for the President, he confirmed throughout an absolute faith in the justice of the democracies and a conviction that the order which is to follow their victory will justify that faith.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KIRK

LMS .

Apr - 1943

mem



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

PSF

file

C.F.

February 19, 1943

State

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

With reference to the President's memorandum of February 5th addressed to the Under Secretary, Colonel Juan Beigbeder arrived in Washington this morning and is at the Statler Hotel.

- * Will you be good enough to check with the President and let me know when he desires to see Colonel Beigbeder? In this connection will you also let me know whether the President wants to see Colonel Beigbeder alone or to have him accompanied by the Spanish Ambassador.

George T. Summerlin
George T. Summerlin

[2-19-43]

PSF

C.F.

State

6.- Summerlin advises that Colonel Juan Beigbeder has arrived in Washington. He is the Spaniard about whom Ambassador Hayes wrote you (His confidential letter attached). You wrote Sumner Welles that you wanted to see Beigbeder when he arrived.

26 mem

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Col.

I want to see Juan Beigbeder
who is coming over from Spain and
will be here during February and
March.

F. D. R.

(Request made as a result of letter
from Ambassador Hayes - Jan. 21, 1943
before Mr. Beigbeder comes in, the
President wants Amb. Hayes' letter
to refresh his memory - file in
Mr. Turner's Diplomatic File)

copy of this memo + Hayes'
letter gotten from Miss
Turner's file 2-25. 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By J Date FEB 22 1972

Personal and [REDACTED] ||

Madrid, January 21, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

The "Peninsular Campaign" proceeds fairly well. Our only set-backs during the past month have been: (1) Franco's message to Hitler wishing him success against Communism, (2) a slight increase of Axis propaganda in the Spanish press, and (3) the present ceremonial visit of the Secretary of the Falangist Party, Señor Arrese, to Berlin.

But these are not taken too seriously by the general run of Spaniards, and on the other hand there are some substantial gains for us: (1) the formation of the "Iberian Block", followed by the recent publication of a Spanish "red book" about it, which is currently called "Spain's Declaration of Independence from the Axis"; (2) the instructions of the Foreign Office to its agents throughout the Americas to have nothing to do with Falangist organizations or activities; (3) Count Jordana's latest assurance that he has told Germany that if its forces attempt to enter Spain Spain will resist; (4) the recall of the German and Italian ambassadors, the former "in disgrace" for his "failure"; (5) the obvious satisfaction of both the Foreign Office and the non-Falangist press with the cordial call of our General Patton on General Orgaz in Spanish Morocco; (6) the prominent and extensive publicity given throughout Spain to your great message to the Congress; and (7) the recent steps taken by the Government here, the result, at least in large part, of our promptings, to improve conditions in Miranda and the other prisons and concentration camps

and

The President,
The White House.

x4675
x422
x is. State World War II

-2-

and to release numerous categories of refugees and internees. We have just been enabled, for example, to obtain the release of some "interned" American aviators and to transport them to Gibraltar. In connection with the general refugee problem, I am eagerly awaiting the arrival of the promised representatives of the American Red Cross.

The recall of the German Ambassador, von Stohrer, who had been here since 1940, was the result, I am told, of Hitler's violent denunciation of his "weakness". The new Ambassador, von Moltke, is a nominal Catholic with eight children! I have only two!

One of the most interesting Spaniards I have met is Colonel Juan Beigbeder, who will leave shortly by clipper for the United States. He is very "Latin" -- impulsive and voluble, -- a good soldier, and a very good friend of ours and of the British. In 1939-40, before the meteoric rise (and descent) of Serrano Suñer, he was Foreign Minister and helped to deter Franco from imitating Mussolini's example and plunging into the war on the side of Germany. Indeed he somewhat scandalized Franco by openly describing Hitler as "Antichrist". He is a devoted Catholic and Monarchist and he hates the Falange.

Moreover, Beigbeder knows a vast deal about North Africa and has a large following among the Moroccan tribesmen. He was High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco for several years, and in addition to learning Arabic (which he speaks fluently) he has personally explored all the lands from Tangier to Cairo.

He now goes to America as a special military observer for the War Minister, General Asensio. The latter can't fully believe what our radios and our Madrid Embassy tell him about our gigantic war production and determination, and he wants Beigbeder to find out if we aren't "bluffing" a bit. Beigbeder expects to be in the States during February and March and to be able, through his reports, to overcome Asensio's doubts.

Beigbeder warns us that he is loyal to the present Spanish régime -- so long as it stays out of the war -- and that he should not be given any secret or confidential information about our war-plans. He adds, however, that, in the highly improbable event of Franco's letting the Germans come into Spain or failing to resist them vigorously, he will lead a revolt here and in Spanish Morocco and will join forces with us. A very entertaining man!

With

-3-

With cordial greetings,

Faithfully yours,

Carleton J. H. Hays

x 4848

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By _____ Date FEB 22 1972

C. F.
State

February 27, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date SEP 22 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

x
You will probably recall that about a year ago a Mr. Walter G. Ross gave me a map that had been torn from a bill post board in Madrid, and which interested you very much as it was an appeal to the Spaniards to side with the Germans. The same Mr. Ross came in Saturday to see me, as he was disturbed by reading in a Spanish newspaper that the President had received Colonel Juan Beigbeder.

x
Mr. Ross was Acting Military Attache in Lisbon during the last war. He has also lived in Spain for a long time. He is further vouched for by my old classmate, Colonel Robert Fletener, former Military Attache at Madrid.

x
Mr. Ross left with me a calling card bearing the full name of Colonel Beigbeder, which is "Juan Beigbeder Atienza".

x
When Ross was in Spain Colonel Beigbeder was Foreign Minister, having received this appointment from Franco when he took over in Madrid. It is Mr. Ross's opinion that at that time Beigbeder was working with the Germans. Before his appointment as Foreign Minister Beigbeder was in charge of troops in North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and according to Ross, the Colonel probably knows more about North Africa than any other man.

When asked what he could tell me concerning Colonel Beigbeder's background, Mr. Ross asserted his greatest weakness was women, and it was because of this that he was returned to North Africa by Franco. Ross stated that while Foreign Minister, Beigbeder lived with a beautiful English girl named Rosamond Fox, whom the Germans claimed was a British spy. The Germans finally compelled Franco to force her to leave the country and she went to Portugal. Two weeks later, Serrano Suner, with whom Beigbeder had many fights, persuaded Franco to send Colonel Beigbeder back to North Africa.

Mr. Ross explained that he understood that Colonel Beigbeder did not come to the United States through the Spanish Ambassador, but was sent here by Franco. Ross felt that as he was here as a private citizen we should know his background, as he, Ross, felt Beigbeder would give to the Germans any

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information he received in this country. Ross says that when he knew him in Spain as Foreign Minister, Beigbeder very definitely favored the German Embassy.

When I told this information to the Chief of the Spanish Desk in the State Department, he said that he didn't agree with Mr. Ross, as he thought probably Ross was exaggerating the Colonel's German proclivities. However, my classmate Colonel Fletcher, insists that he would believe anything that Ross said as he, Ross, was intensely patriotic. But, of course, he might make an error in judgment.

E.A.W.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 22

March 10, 1943.

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

At the direction of the President I am forwarding to you herewith, confidential memorandum concerning Colonel Juan Beigbeder.

See
e. f. State

EDWIN M. WATSON
Secretary to the President.



REPRODUCED FROM HOLDINGS AT THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

WASHINGTON

March 5, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Tell this to Sumner Welles.

F.D.R.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
Eu

March 18. 1943

My dear General Watson:

I have received your memorandum of March 10, 1943
in regard to Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza. E.P.

At the time when Colonel Beigbeder was Foreign Minister of Spain, he had inevitably to transact business with the Germans. I think you will agree that this need not necessarily reflect a pro-German bias. In fact it is our information that while in office as Foreign Minister the subject was reputedly pro-British, and it was popularly believed in Spain that his dismissal from office was brought about principally by a too active contact with the British Embassy.

The Department has no information concerning a connection with Miss Rosamond Fox. If this story is true the behavior attributed to the Germans and Serrano Suñer would scarcely tend to endear them to him.

It appears to be correct that Colonel Beigbeder did not come to the United States through the Spanish Ambassador, but that the Spanish War Minister, rather than General Franco, arranged his present mission.

Colonel Beigbeder has stated voluntarily that he will feel it his duty toward the War Minister to report what he sees in this country, and has asked that care

be

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.




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be taken not to show him anything we should not like to be communicated to our enemies. He has explained that this does not signify any doubts respecting the War Minister himself, but an uncertainty in his own mind respecting the loyalty of certain subordinates in the War Ministry.

In view of the above, I do not feel that the report of Mr. Ross is entirely justified.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a large, stylized initial 'H' followed by a horizontal line and a large, stylized initial 'N' with a trailing flourish.

CH
OIC
JDR
5-10-43

C. F.

State
131

May 7, 1943

This is a decision
have anything
on this.

My dear Mr. President:

You will recall last October your insistence that an American mission should go to the Near East to assist the cause of the United Nations by taking advantage of the goodwill that exists for the United States in that area. The final agreement with the British was for Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S., and one officer to make a survey trip.

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Colonel Hoskins has now returned after three and one-half months in which he visited all of the Near East and North Africa.

During the course of his visit he saw and talked to British, French, and American military and political officials, and to a large number of the leading Arab and Jewish officials and prominent persons in that area.

A copy

The President,
The White House.

C.F.

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- 2 -

A copy of his report is attached.

I believe that at least the summary warrants your careful reading. I also trust I may have your approval for further efforts along the lines indicated and for the wording of the proposed United Nations' declaration attached hereto, which, if you concur, we could first discuss with the British and subsequently with other United Nations.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

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1. Summary of Colonel Hoskins' report on the Near East.
2. Proposed United Nations' declaration.

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FH

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

cf: *style*

SUMMARY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOSKINS' REPORT ON THE NEAR EAST

Part I gives the outstanding facts developed in the course of his three and one-half months' trip through the Near East and North Africa and may be summarized as follows:

(1) The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded, as their only effective means of protest, into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists, by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine, have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that, unless they do something, they will be faced, when the war is over, with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly and effectively harped.

(2) The Jews feel that with their increased numbers and with their increased stocks of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American military forces.

(3) There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated.

(4) There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an

overwhelming

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overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France.

In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.

(5) Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower. The unenthusiastic, and in some places uncooperative, attitude of the North African Arab populations reflects hostile propaganda that has claimed that American successes in North Africa would aid the Jewish cause in Palestine.

Obviously the security of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a critical stage. But the situation is definitely unhealthy. The experiences of British troops during their retreat in Burma are a grave and recent warning of the serious effects that a hostile, rather than friendly, native population can have on our military operations.

(6) Since Zionist propaganda in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine.

It should be very clear to the American people, therefore, that only by military force can a Zionist State in Palestine be imposed upon the Arabs.

Part II notes some of the effects of the Arab-Jew conflict in Palestine on the United States.

Our domestic disunity is aggravated by dissension among American citizens of various foreign born groups and increasing conflicts among various Jewish groups, as well as increasing anti-Semitism.

An unfortunate effect for the Jews themselves has resulted from mixing together two problems that should be kept quite separate. Support for all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe, on which there can be no difference of

opinion

opinion, should not be diminished by tying it up with the extremely controversial proposal to establish a Jewish political state in Palestine.

Part III suggests a specific step toward winning wartime support for our United Nations' cause of the 60 million Arabs in North Africa and the Near East.

(1) By the issuance now of a brief statement by the United Nations (or at least by the four major powers) giving assurances regarding the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only restate as official policy of the United Nations, in regard to Palestine what the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only consist of two points: (1) that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war; (2) that any post-war decisions will be taken only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

A statement along these lines issued as soon as possible would go far to relieve existing tension in the Near East and would, in the opinion of officials in that area, be the military equivalent of at least several extra divisions of troops.

Part IV outlines a post-war solution.

The existing population of one million Arabs and one-half million Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is to form a bi-national state within a proposed Levant Federation. This independent Levant Federation would be formed by the re-uniting of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after the last war, had for years been one natural economic and political unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa and Bethlehem, are to be an enclave under United Nations' control. The cession of some specific territory other than Palestine for a Jewish State is proposed -- possibly northern Cirenaica, which is now virtually uninhabited.

The Jewish refugee problem is met to the extent that, under the proposed plan, the Jews could put another half million in Palestine so as to reach parity with the Arabs and up to a half million Jews in northern Cirenaica.