PROPOSED DECLARATION

The United Nations, having in mind the terms of their Declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such a degree as to create undue anxieties among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the United Nations have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. Accordingly, the United Nations declare it to be their view that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be considered until after the conclusion of the war. When the matter is considered, both Arabs and Jews should be fully consulted and their agreement sought.
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE
NEAR EAST

REPORT BY: LT. COLONEL HAROLD B. HOSKIN
AUS
I. THE FACTS
April 20, 1943

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART I - THE FACTS

I. Purpose of Memorandum

The object of this memorandum is to summarize the facts and information collected during three and one-half months (November 1942 to March 1943) when, in compliance with instructions from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, I visited the Near East.

II. My Mission

1. Itinerary.

Although physically familiar with most of the areas visited on this trip, I had not been in the Near East since the spring of 1939. Fortunately, it was possible on this visit not simply to hit the high spots in whirlwind fashion but actually to spend approximately two weeks in each country—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. I also visited Turkey and Iran in order to get first-hand information on the attitude of these neighboring states toward the Arab world. In addition I motored over 800 miles through Egypt and Cirenaica along the coast from El Alemein to Bengazi. My return flight to the United States took me along the rest of North Africa via Tripoli, Algiers, and Casablanca to Marrakech and Dakar.
2. People Seen.

The facts and information given in this memorandum reflect conversations with:

(a) British and Fighting French military and diplomatic representatives in the various countries.

(b) American consular, diplomatic, and military representatives.

(c) American missionary and educational leaders.

(d) Arab leaders both in and out of political office.

In my contacts with Arab leaders I was assisted by a list especially prepared for me by President Bayard Dodge of outstanding graduates of the American University of Beirut living in the areas visited. I also renewed contact with many friends of my father and mother who had served as missionaries in Syria for 50 years.

3. Procedure.

In all my contacts I explained that I was there to collect information not to give it, to listen and not to talk. I hoped that they cared to give me their views as the information which I was collecting was not for publication in any way but for the benefit of the United States Government. In gathering first-hand information I was naturally aided to a great extent by my ability to converse in Arabic or, where necessary, in French or German.

III. Background - American Interests and Standing in the Near East

Although American interests in the Near East
have centered primarily on the importation of tobacco and dates, and our exports have centered on films and automobiles, our main interests in the Near East, due to 100 years of missionary and educational efforts, have remained in the cultural field. The facts that these missionary and educational efforts were supported entirely by private philanthropic contributions rather than by Government funds has added to the prestige that the United States gained from these efforts. The standing and influence, for example, of the American University of Beirut and of Robert College in Istanbul and of their graduates is hard to realize except after a first-hand visit to the area.

As a result, American prestige has for many years been extremely high throughout the whole Near East. This situation was strikingly confirmed in 1919 when, from the Crane-King Commissions' investigation, over 60 per cent of the petitions submitted by the people of this area gave the United States as their first choice for a mandatory power. This was over four times the request for Great Britain, which was the second power suggested.

At the same time, the fact must also be clearly recognized that American prestige has declined considerably in recent years and is still declining. Some of the reasons for this decline are suggested in the later sections of this memorandum.
IV. Outstanding Facts:

The outstanding facts developed in the course of my trip may be summarized as follows:

1. The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded as their only effective means of protest into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that unless they do something, when the war is over, they will be faced with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly harped.

2. There is clearly a hardening of feeling on both sides which is reflected in an increasingly unyielding
attitude by the extremist leaders of both Arabs and Jews in regard to any compromise solution. Both sides are armed and indicate a willingness to fight.

It is common knowledge that the Zionist undercover military organization, the Hagana, has made plans and has stocks of tommy guns and machine guns as well as small arms. Much of this equipment was bought from French Vichy troops in Syria and has, during the past two years, been smuggled into Palestine.

The Jews particularly feel that their increased numbers and with their increased stock of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American Military forces.

3. It is also increasingly clear that the growing interest of Jews and Moslems in all parts of the world in the Palestine settlement is now so large that it makes quite impossible any purely domestic or local solution that might otherwise have been arrived at by the Arabs and Jews living in Palestine itself.
4. The outbreak of internal conflict in Palestine is obviously one of the major objectives of Nazi propaganda in this area. It is aimed at precipitating Arab-Jewish fighting at a moment when combat troops of the United Nations can least readily be spared for putting down domestic insurrection. Furthermore, Axis propaganda in this area has of late become increasingly effective because the Nazis have played down reference to Axis interests and have laid their main emphasis on the one fact that, if the United Nations win the war, the Arabs can be certain that they will lose Palestine to the Jews. Nothing could be simpler or more readily understandable to the average Arab than the Axis three-point program which in their daily broadcasting promises:

(a) the elimination of all alien control, whether British or French;

(b) the liquidation of the Jews in Palestine; and

(c) "complete independence".

5. Traveling through Palestine one clearly realizes that it is not an unpopulated area into which an indefinite additional number can immediately be poured. For quick comparison, Palestine in area is a little smaller than the State of New Hampshire and already has a population four times as large. The figures, which, like all Near Eastern statistics, are only approximations, indicate
the large growth that has taken place:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>670,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated. The Zionist press in Palestine claims the support of public opinion in Britain and the United States for its aspirations and the Arab press makes no effective denial.

Although the State Department has taken no official position in the dispute as to the correct interpretation of the Balfour Declaration calling for a "national home for the Jews", the recurring petitions of members of both houses of Congress have been interpreted both by Zionists and by Arabs as indicating clearly where American sympathies lie. Furthermore, it should be clearly realized that every American statement in favor of Zionism is within a few hours widely broadcast by the Axis radio to the whole Arab world in support of its main propaganda theme that a United Nations victory means for the Arabs the certain loss of Palestine to the Jews. For example, the
December 1942 petition supporting the Zionist position signed by 67 Senators and 180 Congressmen was very widely broadcast by the Axis radio throughout all the Near East. It was, of course, referred to not as a petition but an expression of government policy. It resulted in unprecedented demonstrations against the United States that culminated in Damascus in the closing of the bazaars for several days as a protest against the United States.

7. There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France. As a result many pro-American supporters in Syria have for years felt the displeasure of the French and claim that since that time they have been discriminated against or passed over in Government appointments.

In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.
8. Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower. On my return to the United States via North Africa I found in both the Eighth Army and the First Army American officers responsible for the security of American troops who were increasingly disturbed by the unenthusiastic, and in some places hostile, attitude on the part of the North African Arab populations toward the United States. They expressed fear of still further difficulties if the issues of a Jewish political state and of a Jewish Army continue to be pressed at this time. The uncooperative attitude of the North African Arabs reflected, in their opinion, the irritation of the Arabs at the behavior of some of the local Jewish populations in North Africa as well as the effectiveness of hostile propaganda which continued to claim that United States' successes in North Africa would only give greater support to the Jewish claims in Palestine.

9. From my trip through North Africa I also got the impression that American political efforts had, quite naturally and perhaps of necessity, concentrated on the problems of our relations with the various French groups or factions. The effect of our military occupation on the Arabs who form approximately 95% of the population and their attitude toward the United States had
as a result not been given the attention it deserved. Furthermore such information on the attitude of the Arabs as was available to American officers had almost invariably been received at second hand from the local French authorities.

Obviously the situation of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a very critical stage. But it is definitely unhealthy and now is the time when steps should be taken to prevent a further deterioration. The unfortunate British experience during their retreat in Burma is only too recent an example of the serious effects that a hostile rather than friendly native population can have on military operations.

10. Since Zionist propaganda and political pressure in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine. The Arabs in Palestine have on many occasions fought both the Zionists and the British military forces sent against them, and there is absolutely no basis for assuming that they will not again fight when they feel it necessary. It should therefore be very clear that a Zionist State in Palestine can only be imposed upon the Arabs by military force.
II. U.S. & PALESTINE PROBLEM
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART II - THE UNITED STATES AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

In view of the difficulties involved, the United States might well prefer, if it were possible, to keep out of any responsibility for a part in the settlement of the complicated problem of Palestine. However, the facts outlined above are already having repercussions on the United States and must therefore be considered for their effects on:

(1) Our military situation -- aid for our United Nations war efforts and particularly the security of American troops in North Africa.

After a visit to these areas there can be no question about the lack of enthusiasm, suspicion, and, in some instances, passive resistance toward the United States in different parts of the Near East and North Africa. Unless steps are taken to correct it, this situation can deteriorate further and develop into native hostility such, for instance, as that from which the British suffered so heavily during their retreat in Burma.

(2) Our domestic unity in wartime.

Jewish leaders in the United States should in fairness be advised of the effects both at home and abroad of continued agitation for a Jewish State in Palestine.
any denial of their constitutional freedom of speech, these leaders might decide, in the interests of their cause as well as in the interest of domestic unity in wartime in the United States, to curtail at least for the duration their efforts to achieve political Zionism.

(3) Dissension among different racial groups in the United States.

The United States in its domestic life is affected by the Zionist demand for a Jewish State in Palestine from two clearly defined angles. On the one hand there are five million Jews in this country who, along with the rest of the population, are being subjected to a steady stream of propaganda in favor of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State.

On the other hand there is the relatively inarticulate opposition of several hundred thousand American citizens of Syrian and Arab racial descent, as well as the considered opinion of the overwhelming majority of these Americans who have made a deep study of the Palestine problem and who feel that the Zionist solution is not a sound or correct one for this area. As far back as the report of the Crane-King Commission in 1919, there is the statement in their report that the Commissioners had reluctantly come to the conclusion that a Jewish State in Palestine was inadvisable, although they had "begun their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor".
(4) Development of divisions and conflicts among Jews in the United States.

At a time when the primary effort of everyone must be centered on winning the war there would seem to be some question whether now is the time for an active Jewish minority to put pressure for the support of political Zionism on the majority of American Jews who, while remaining Jews by religion, do not think it advisable to support political Zionism. Like other American citizens they should be free to make their decision and when they have made it they should not be subject to a continuing pressure that in not supporting political Zionism they are virtually forsaking their faith.

(5) Anti-Semitism in the United States.

There seems to be little question that if this active minority of American Jews continues to agitate for a Jewish Army and a Jewish State in Palestine it will add fuel to the anti-Semitic charges already rife that the primary loyalty of American Jews is to political Zionism and not the United States. This will be particularly unfortunate if, in addition, it is felt that such agitation has an unfavorable effect on our military efforts and the security of American troops abroad.

(6) Effect on all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe.

Not only in the United States but in the Near East
and, in fact, in every part of the world there is the important job of keeping the desire of everyone to aid in alleviating the suffering of the Jews in Europe from being diminished by tying up this problem, on which there can be no difference of opinion, with the extremely controversial one in regard to the establishment of a Jewish political state in Palestine. These are two very different issues and, for a proper solution of each, should be kept apart.

(7) **American influence in the Near East.**

The people of the United States must be made to understand more clearly the seriousness of the Arab-Jew conflict in the Near East and the influence which, perhaps unconsciously, they wield in this area. For example, when American citizens or members of Congress sign petitions advocating the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, they should realize that, for all practical purposes, they are asking the American Government to commit itself to the use of American armed force in the Near East after the war. Based on British experience this means that American soldiers will be killed in Palestine in the enforcement of such policy. Whether the American people, if they realized more fully this implication, would still favor its adoption may be a matter for debate. At least,
however, they should be clearly informed that only by force can a political Zionist policy in Palestine be made effective and, as a result, they should have a chance to express themselves on such an issue before they are committed to such a serious step.

(8) A sound solution in Palestine and post-war peace.

A sound solution for the problem of Palestine must be found since otherwise there will be a continuation after this war of the conflicts that for centuries have plagued the Near East. For the United States, as for the rest of the world, such conflicts must be prevented since, if they continue, they contain the seeds of a possible third World War with its inevitable consumption of American money, materials, and most valuable of all, American lives.

(9) Basis of any peaceful solution.

Without at the moment attempting to outline detailed suggestions for a peaceful solution, one basic fact must be taken into account. Palestine now contains one million Arabs and a half million Jews. The great majority of neither group wishes to be moved and can only by force be transferred elsewhere. Any proposed solution, therefore, if it is not to cause still greater injustices to either one side or the other, does not start with a
"tabula rasa", but must assume the continuation in Palestine
of both the Arabs and the Jews that are there.

(10) The need for a definition of American policy toward
Palestine and the Near East and the announcement of
a decision on the part of the United States Government
to help find a proper solution of this problem.

Since it seems clear that we in the United States
cannot on the one hand wash our hands of all responsi-
bilities in the Near East nor on the other hand even
escape domestic repercussions of the Arab–Jew problem,
is it not advisable for us to apply our best energies
and intelligence in helping to find a sound and peaceful
solution?

The problem is indeed difficult but not insoluble.
April 20, 1943

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART III - WINNING WARTIME SUPPORT OF ARAB WORLD FOR

THE UNITED NATIONS’ CAUSE

(1) Uncertainty the main cause of Arab-Jew tension.

As noted in Part I of this memorandum, uncertainty as to the future of Palestine is at the present time perhaps the major cause of rising tension between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In the rest of the Arab or Moslem world -- North Africa, the Middle East, and India -- this problem is primarily reflected in the indifference or lack of active support of the Arabs for the cause of the United Nations.

(2) A United Nations’ assurance regarding the post-war settlement of Palestine.

Fortunately this rising tension can be relieved and considerable progress can be made toward winning greater support for our United Nations’ war effort from the 60 million Arabs that inhabit North Africa and the Near East. Furthermore, such a result can be accomplished without the necessity of announcing now any final solution to the Palestine problem. It would consist in the issuance by the United Nations (or at least by its four major members) of a statement giving assurances regarding
the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only re-state as official policy of the United Nations with regard to Palestine what the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only say that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war and then only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. A statement along these lines, issued as soon as possible, would go far to relieve existing tension and would, in the opinion of officials in the Near East, be the military equivalent of at least several extra divisions of troops.

Here is a practical, concrete step on which the Foreign Office in London might be promptly consulted. Then with their agreement, the matter might be referred to Russia and China for their approval and joint action.

(3) Suggestion that group of Arab leaders and moderate Jewish leaders meet in U.S. to discuss and attempt to arrive at a settlement of Palestine problem.

As a further step and in an endeavor to have the Arab as well as the Zionist position presented to the American people, it is suggested that Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan or some other Arab prince, following the precedents set
by the visits of George of Greece and Peter of Yugoslavia, be allowed to visit the United States. He should be accompanied by five or six moderate-minded Arab representatives from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan. Such a group could contain Christian as well as Moslem members.

At the same time certain moderate Jewish leaders from Palestine who recognize the necessity of arriving at a peaceful solution with the Arabs might also be allowed to visit the United States. This group should include among others Dr. Judah L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who, in the January 1943 issue of Foreign Affairs, outlined a middle of the road program for a possible Arab-Jew settlement.

While in the less heated atmosphere of this country, these two groups, together with representatives of both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish organizations as well as of various Christian church groups, might be urged to meet and attempt to work out a peaceful post-war settlement for the age-long conflict over Palestine.
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

PART IV - A PLAN FOR PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST

The principle has been suggested previously that, since we cannot escape repercussions from an unsound solution of the Arab-Jew problem, we had better use our best efforts toward finding a sound solution. A concrete plan for post-war peace in the Near East is offered below at least as a starting point for discussion and consideration. It does not represent the opinion of any one group but is a composite of ideas and suggestions obtained by the writer from many varied sources during his three and one-half months' tour of the Near East between November 1942 and March 1943.

Also, as mentioned in a previous section, this proposed plan starts with the assumption that the one million Arabs and the half million Jews who are already in Palestine and wish to remain there shall be allowed to do so. An injustice in one area cannot be righted by causing a corresponding injustice in another area.

In the interests of brevity a knowledge of the basic facts is assumed and only conclusions, without the detailed
reasoning back of each point, are therefore given:

(1) Reunion in a Levant Federation of the four existing states of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Trans-jordan

Prior to the decisions of the Peace Conference in 1919 the territories of these four states formed one political and economic area. The efforts to split this area four ways have not been successful and have always been contrary to the basic interests of the people themselves. Since no single unit is large enough or economically capable of standing alone, these four areas must again be united in a full economic union; fundamentally this means at least no customs barriers and as many other joint government activities (such, for instance, as defense, currency, and postal services) as can be agreed upon.

Politically, after almost 25 years of fragmentation there can and probably must be, at least to begin with, considerable local political autonomy for the various sections of the proposed federation, although Trans-jordan might be joined to existing Syria and thus reduce the number of political sections to three -- Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Suggestions on the practical details of such a federation have been worked out by several British officials long resident in this area, and a copy of one of these plans is attached as annex to this report.

(2) Abolition of both French and British Mandates

In Syria and the Lebanon, France has failed so completely and has lost so much prestige that only by force can she remain. On the other hand, Britain has not been much more successful in Palestine where Arab-Jew conflicts have continued to break out at intervals and a large and expensive bureaucracy has been saddled on the country. It would not help the cause of the United Nations, not be fair to the people of these areas, nor in line with the promises of the Atlantic Charter to transfer control of Syria and the Lebanon from France to Great Britain, or even to an Anglo-American control, were such a thing feasible.

(3) Complete Independence for this Area

The people of this area are as capable and
perhaps more capable of self-government than some of the neighboring states that are already independent. Admittedly, independence will result in mistakes and mismanagement but from this experience in self-government, these peoples will learn better and more soundly than if they continue to be controlled in most of their activities by foreign powers. Furthermore, independence has been promised to them by France and Britain and these promises should be lived up to.

(4) Foreign Technical Assistance Only as Requested
And Paid for by the Arab States Themselves

To the extent that any foreign technical assistance is given, this should come through whatever form of postwar organization is set up by the United Nations. Such technical assistants should not serve as watchdogs for the interests of the foreign power that urges their appointment, but they should be employed and paid by the local state and be responsible only to it, along the lines already adopted for the employment of Americans in Iran.

(5) Freedom for an Eventual Federation of Arab States If Desired

After the Levant Federation has been formed and the choice left to the people of that area both as to the extent of political federation and the form of government -- whether a monarchy or a republic -- then, and perhaps not even then, such a federated state might decide on economic and political collaboration with neighboring Arab states such as Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, and Egypt. It should be clear from the start that if any of these states eventually found it to their advantage to join or form such a federation of Arab states, they should be free to do so, even though the immediate prospects for the formation of such a federation may not appear very bright.

(6) External Boundaries to Remain as They Are

Fortunately no serious boundary disputes exist in this Near East area and no external boundary changes need be contemplated unless, perhaps, Turkey were willing to cede back to Syria the small but purely Arab area in the Hatay south of the Amanus Range, which includes the ancient city of Antioch. Such a cession would still leave Turkey the Amanus Range as a sound strategic frontier and give back to Syria an area racially and economically Arab.
Internal boundaries between Lebanon and Syria might also, at least to begin with, be left as they are. Greater Lebanon contains almost 50 per cent Moslems, but this may prove an advantage rather than otherwise, since as a result there will be little likelihood of persecution of minorities. Furthermore, with the economic union that must be developed, the question of internal boundaries, where no customs barriers exist, becomes much less important.

(7) **Palestine, a Bi-National State within the Levant Federation**

The question of Palestine is, of course, the most difficult and the most controversial feature of this whole problem but is one the solution of which must be frankly and firmly undertaken. As a first step, a statement by the United Nations should be issued stating that Palestine is not to become either a purely Arab or a purely Jewish state but a bi-national state to which Jews migrate up to but not to exceed parity in numbers with the Arabs. Were such a policy to be established it would allow for the further settlement in Palestine after the war of approximately half a million Jews. Any migrations of Jews into Lebanon, Syria, or Trans-jordan should be subject to the consent of the people of those areas. Such a solution for Palestine will, of course, not have the support of either the extremist Arabs or the extremist Jews but can be justified as a necessary compromise to prevent Palestine remaining a festering sore capable of continuing to infect not only the Near East, but virtually all of the Moslem world from Casablanca to Calcutta.

(8) **The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Jaffa, to be an Enclave under United Nations' Control**

In the conflict between the Arab Moslems and the Jews, the even stronger numerical claim of the Christian peoples of the world to a share in the administration of Jerusalem and the Holy Places has tended to be overlooked. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the Vatican with its world-wide influence will not favor any settlement that allots Jerusalem exclusively to either the Moslems or the Jews. An international administration of an enclave
containing Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Jaffa under the United Nations will more nearly solve this long-standing problem since it will assure free access to the Holy Places and particularly to Jerusalem to the believers of all three religions.

(9) **The Proposed Settlement to Include an Offer of a Cession of Territory -- Possibly Northern Cyrenaica -- For a Jewish State**

As part of a further effort to assist the Jews driven from their homes in Europe and to satisfy the demands of that Jewish minority that favors the formation of a Jewish Army and a Jewish State, the United Nations should offer a definite piece of territory to the Jews in which a Jewish State may be formed. This offer might consist of the renewal of the previous British offer of land in Uganda or perhaps in some part of South America. The important point is that, to offset the decision that Palestine is not to become a Jewish State, a specific area somewhere else should be made available for the establishment of a Jewish State to which politically-minded Jews from any part of the world who wish to do so can emigrate.

There might at the same time be considered the possibility of ceding to such a proposed Jewish State the Jebel Achdar area of northern Cyrenaica. Any area chosen will have difficulties, drawbacks, and disadvantages, but the Jebel Achdar perhaps more nearly fits all requirements, with less drawbacks, than any other area one can suggest. Its location in relation to Europe, its soil and climate so similar in many respects to Palestine and, most important of all, its present virtually uninhabited condition make it worth careful consideration. The Italian colonists previously installed are gone but have left behind them farm lands and cleared areas that can almost immediately begin to support many thousands of Jews. Eventually this region might again support a half million inhabitants that history indicates at one time lived there.

The question of the rights and claims of the Senussi (numbering less than 200,000) to reacquire this northern portion of Cyrenaica would need to be studied and fairly met. However, even under the plan suggested, three-fourths of Cyrenaica would in any case remain to the Senussi. As nomadic people whom the Italians drove from the Jebel Achdar area, the claims of the Senussi to
consideration would undoubtedly have the support of their co-religionists throughout the Moslem world. If, therefore, the Arabs were to agree to a Jewish State in northern Cyrenaica, they could in all probability only be induced to do so if at the same time they were given a definite assurance that, as a result, a Jewish State would never be imposed on them in Palestine.

Conclusion

Even if no final solution can be put into operation until the war has been won, the problem of Palestine is so complicated and has defied solution so long that it is not too soon to be studying intensively what should be done when the war is over. This time it should be our aim to arrive at the peace table with a suggested solution that, because it is in line with American principles, commands the support of both the Government and of the American people. At the same time those responsible for the development of such a plan should also have had the practical suggestions of all important organizations and individuals, both here and abroad, who might have something constructive to contribute to its content.

Harold B. Hopkins
Lt. Colonel AFS