

Box a

President's Secretary's File
Confidential File
State Dept June-Dec 1943

3186

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1943.

*File
2 sets for Pres. sig.
to M.C. Taylor
drafted 8-20-43
Cu: Juf: IED.*

August 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM HON. MYRON TAYLOR:

Before your departure I wish to call your attention to two matters.

1. VATICAN. The Apostolic Delegate firmly believes that on any day we may expect the safe conduct message for my visit to the Vatican. No reply to his message proposing safe conduct for my return of June 4th, has yet been received. Events in Italy and the growing breach and final rupture between the King and Mussolini probably prevented earlier action. The Germans have steadily opposed my return.

*140.45
7-27-43
12-9-66*

2. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE. Following our correspondence, I sought an American Vice Director for the London office, finally selecting Patrick Murphy Mallin, who has had previous experience in migration and settlement work. He is about forty years of age, in a position to give full time and able to travel where needed. He was elected by the Executive Committee last week and left for London, where he will function under Sir Herbert Emerson, Director. I am considering a trip to London in early September, to meet with the Executive Committee. I also have it in mind to visit Spain to explore the possibility of arranging for the continued temporary residence of about 7,000 refugees now there, rather than to hold them to a tent camp in Algiers or elsewhere. My preoccupation is that if the camp proved to be in any way unsatisfactory, the charge would be made that it was a concentration camp operated by the Allies, and in some respects no better than the German. It would probably be a much cheaper operation to provide for maintenance in Spain, Portugal, or wherever they may be, if in neutral countries. The instability of the Franco Regime might prove to be a reason against this plan, but it needs careful consideration. In due course I would like your approval of these suggestions.

M. C. T.

SEP 21 1943
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040.45 REFUGEE/4400
PERMONT

OK.
Will you
pick up with
Patterson &
F.D.R.

(Original signed
July 30th 1943
by the Secretary of
State - July 31, 1943,

700

July 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In connection with the proposed joint statement by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the Palestine situation, I desire to raise the question whether it would not be well to present the letter of the Acting Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, a copy of which was sent to you today, to a suitable assemblage of Jews representing especially discordant and vociferous elements. At such time they could be told that unless they are willing to desist from further agitation, this Government will be obliged to make public the letter of the Acting Secretary of War and also to publish the proposed statement of the two Governments requesting that further agitation cease. In any case, it seems to me that we are committed to the British Government to publish the latter part of the proposed statement having to do with British policy in Palestine and our concurrence therein.

Such

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Such a Jewish gathering might decide to call off the unfortunate agitation being carried on, especially in this country. If they should refuse, however, this Government would be in the strongest possible position from the standpoint of attack and criticism of the proposed joint action of the two Governments.

In his letter the Acting Secretary of War omits specific reference to undesirable agitation in this country. However, as will be observed from the attached draft of a letter prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, specific reference is made to such agitation, and that draft represents the views of the military authorities, including, so I am informed, General Marshall's. This draft Judge Patterson used as a basis for his letter. If further steps must be taken, doubtless Judge Patterson would be willing to revise his letter so as to incorporate in it the views of the military authorities, referring specifically to the dangers of further agitation in this country. I say this because the basis for any action rests primarily on military considerations.

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C.H. x20

(copy)

D R A F T

July 26, 1943.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

From time to time in the past year there has been an interchange of information between the War Department and the State Department in regard to the situation existing in the Middle East, in which the War Department has had a growing concern from the standpoint of security of actual or contemplated operations in that area.

The Hoskins Report presented a clear picture of the situation which appears to be growing worse rather than better, due to continued agitation in this country on the part of certain groups who desire an immediate territorial and political solution of the Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine. Recent information from the Middle East again brings this question to the front and indicates

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the desirability of immediate action to forestall any further agitation in this country aimed at forcing at this time a political solution to a question fraught with far reaching military implications.

As you know, the Middle East is one of our theaters of strategic maneuver. It may be expected that military activity in the Middle East, which has already exerted so profound an effect upon the war, will continue to be of the utmost importance in the attainment of our strategic objectives. Prior to the successful termination of the Tunisian campaign, the maintenance of the security of our Middle East Theater engaged an enormous proportion of the United Nations' effort. Since the successful termination of the Tunisian campaign, the Middle East has changed from a defensive to an offensive base. The successful use of the Middle East base in the attainment of our strategic goals is essential to our war effort. This war effort cannot be accomplished

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to its fullest extent if military forces now intended for offensive use are diverted to the maintenance of order in the Middle East.

Palestine is an integral part of this base area. It is common knowledge that this small country is a focus of world-wide controversy despite the fact that its inhabitants, regardless of race or creed, are committed to the United Nations' cause. Because of the size and complexity of the armed forces in the Middle East, and because of the wide zone in which they must operate, widespread disorder in Palestine would affect adversely the situation in the whole area and possibly even the course of the entire war. It is clearly in the military interest that for the duration of hostilities, the situation in Palestine must remain in its present condition, and hence that agitation in regard to controversial questions of a political nature which might lead to unrest and violence in this area must be avoided. Continued

agitation

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agitation in this country for the immediate establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine constitutes a grave danger to the United Nations' war effort. The military requirements in this area are paramount and must be accorded precedence over the adjustment of any political questions until such time as the military effort to win the war will not be prejudiced thereby.

The War Department would appreciate any action which may properly be taken by the State Department to discourage agitation from any source tending to prejudice the security of military operations in this area.

Sincerely yours,

Acting Secretary of War.

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C. F.
State

C.H.
OK
JBR

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JUL 19 1943

Original returned to
State, 7/21/43.

My dear Mr. President:

With your approval, we recently suggested to the British Government the issuance of a statement on Palestine, in order to reduce Arab-Jewish tension. Our suggestion was in the form of a statement by the United Nations, but we stated to the British that we saw both advantages and disadvantages in a United Nations' statement on the subject, and that if the British preferred a joint Anglo-American statement, such would be agreeable to us.

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Mr. Eden has now informed our Ambassador at London that the British Government warmly welcomes our proposal and thinks it will be most valuable in preventing any further aggravation of the position in Palestine. The British believe that the disadvantages of a statement by all the United Nations outweigh the advantages, and prefer a joint statement by the United States and British Governments.

Our

The President,
The White House.

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Our proposed statement meets with the full approval of the British. However, they suggest an expansion of the concluding sentence to take account of a statement made by Lord Cranborne in the House of Lords on May 6, 1942. They also desire to add that the British Government will not permit or acquiesce in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country, and that we are in full accord with that policy.

We consider that the British redraft is fully acceptable, apart from inconsequential wording due to differences in usage, and we shall have the statement issued here in accordance with American practice. These minor changes have already been cleared with the British Embassy.

Provided you perceive no objection, we shall immediately arrange with the British for simultaneous issuance of the statement in Washington and London at the earliest possible moment. The statement which we intend to issue here is attached.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Statement.

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STATEMENT FOR ISSUANCE BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING PALESTINE

The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom, having in mind the terms of the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such an extent as to create undue anxiety among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. As in the case of other territorial problems, it is not, in their view, essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a

development

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development would be highly desirable. In any case, the British Government has already stated that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine would be reached without full consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews. But the British Government wishes to make it clear that it has no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country. The United States Government is in full accord with this policy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

June 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your approval a draft of a telegram to London regarding a proposed declaration by the United Nations with respect to Palestine. This draft incorporates substantially the phraseology contained in your message to Ibn Saud, which you have already approved.

*Filed to State
5/26/43.*

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①
C. F.
State

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No Distribution

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AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR. +4281

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You are requested to inform the Foreign Secretary without delay that this Government is deeply concerned over Arab-Jewish tension in Palestine. Reliable information made available to our representatives, principally by British official sources, in Palestine and neighboring areas is to the effect that both Arabs and Jews are well armed and confident and that each side is merely awaiting what it deems to be suitable provocation before resorting to force in furtherance or defense of its supposed interests.

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The serious effects which such an eventuality would have upon the populations of vast areas which are vital to the military effort require, of course, no elaboration. Moreover, Zionist political agitation in the United States and elsewhere has already caused in the Arab countries alarm and political reactions which in turn produce a still higher pitch of Zionist activity. A spiral of increasing tension has thus been created

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which feeds on itself and, unless the tension is abated, disastrous results might well occur in the immediate future. In any event, it would appear that the large amount of attention and energy which is being devoted to the Palestine question is causing serious distraction from the war effort.

It appears to us, and we hope the British Government will agree, that the time has come to deal effectively with the situation. To that end we suggest the issuance of the following statement which is designed to postpone a decision on the Palestine question for the duration of the war. The suggested statement is believed to be in harmony with declared British policy, and the text given below has the approval of the President:

GRAY CODE QUOTE: The United Nations, having in mind the terms of their Declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on controversial international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that special viewpoints should be pressed while the war is in progress to such a degree as to create undue anxieties

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among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the United Nations have taken note of public discussions and activities of a political nature relating to Palestine and consider that it would be helpful to the war effort if these were to cease. As in the case of other territorial problems, it is not in their view essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts before the end of the war, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. UNQUOTE END GRAY CODE

RESUME SECRET It will be observed that the statement has been drafted for issuance by the United Nations. We feel that there are definite disadvantages as well as advantages in having a statement on the subject by all of the United Nations. For this and other obvious and essential reasons we are seeking the views of the British Government before taking the matter up in any other quarter.

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Among the disadvantages are the length of time which would be required to consult the other United Nations; the possibility that one or more of them might not feel able to subscribe to the statement; and the fact that some of them presumably have little interest in the Palestine question. On the other hand, a statement by the United Nations would have great weight.

We are prepared to consider whether, taking things all around, issuance of the statement (with changes of wording to take account of the fact that it would not be issued by the United Nations) might not be preferable on the part of a smaller group of countries such as China, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States.

For your information, we should not object to issuance of a joint statement or of essentially similar and concurrent separate statements by the British and American Governments should the British suggest and show a marked preference for either procedure, in which case you are authorized ^{so to} to ~~so~~ state.

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JRP
6-8-43