Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany

1. Demilitarization of Germany.

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. Partitioning of Germany.

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which does not go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the attached map, (Appendix A).

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

(d) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a customs union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. The Ruhr Area. (The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the attached map, including the Rhineland, the Keil Canal, and all German territory north of the Keil Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power, the caldron of wars. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled and removed from the area or completely destroyed. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked.

It is anticipated that the stripping of this area would be accomplished in three stages:

(i) The military forces immediately upon entry into the area shall destroy all plants and equipment which cannot be removed.

DECLASSIFIED
(ii) Removal of plants and equipment by members of the United Nations as restitution and repair (Paragraph 4).

(iii) All plants and equipment not removed within a stated period of time, say 6 months, will be completely destroyed or reduced to scrap and allocated to the United Nations.

(b) All people within the area should be made to understand that this area will not again be allowed to become an industrial area. Accordingly, all people and their families within the area having special skills or technical training should be encouraged to migrate permanently from the area and should be as widely dispersed as possible.

(c) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objectives.

4. Restitution and Reparation.

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

5. Education and Propaganda.

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.
6. Political Decentralization.

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Lander) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states’ rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

7. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

8. Controls over Development of German Economy.

During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.


There is attached (Appendix B) a program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups.

10. Wearing of Insignia and Uniforms.

(a) No person in Germany (except members of the United Nations and neutral countries) shall be permitted to wear any military insignia of rank or branch of service, service ribbons or military medals.
(b) No such person shall be permitted to wear, after 6 months from the cessation of hostilities any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

11. Prohibition on Parades.

No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

12. Aircraft

All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate such aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.


(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsibility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1) the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany's continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in this memorandum.
14. **Appointment of an American High Commissioner**

An American High Commissioner for Germany should be appointed as soon as possible, so that he can sit in on the development of the American views on this problem.
APPENDIX B

Punishment of Certain War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.

A. Punishment of Certain War Criminals.

(1) Arch-criminals.

A list of the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transmitted to the appropriate military authorities. The military authorities shall be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:

(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of the General rank.

(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers of the United Nations.

(2) Certain Other War Criminals.

(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military Government for the trial of certain crimes which have been committed against civilization during this war. As soon as practicable, representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on such commissions. These crimes shall include those crimes covered by the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions may be ordered to try from time to time.

(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the issuance of orders or otherwise), or having participated in, causing the death of any human being in the following situations shall be arrested and tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory:

(i) The death was caused by action in violation of the rules of war.

(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons.

(iii) The victim met death because of his nationality, race, color, creed, or political conviction.

(c) Any person who is convicted by the military commissions of the crimes specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military commissions, in exceptional cases, determine that there are extenuating circumstances, in which
case other punishment may be meted out, including deportation to a penal colony outside of Germany. Upon conviction, the sentence shall be carried out immediately.

B. Detention of Certain Groups.

All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(a) The S.S.
(b) The Gestapo.
(c) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.
(d) All high Government and Nazi Party officials.
(e) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

C. Registration of Males.

An appropriate program will be formulated for the re-registration as soon as possible of all males of the age of 14 or over. The registration shall be on a form and in a manner to be prescribed by the military authorities and shall show, among other things, whether or not the person registering is a member of the Nazi Party or affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S., S.A. or Kraft Korps.

D. Labor Battalions.

Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

E. Dissolution of Nazi Organizations.

The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

F. Prohibition on Exercise of Certain Privileges.

All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:
(1) The Nazi Party.

(2) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.

(3) The Junkers.

(4) Military and Naval officers.

G. Junker Estates.

All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

H. Prohibition on Emigration.

(1) A Proclamation shall be issued prohibiting any person resident in Germany from leaving or attempting to leave Germany, except with permission from the Allied Military Government.

(2) Violation of this Proclamation shall be an offense triable by military commissions of the Allied Military Government and heavy penalties shall be prescribed, including death.

(3) All possible steps shall be taken by the military authorities to prevent any such person from leaving (without permission).

[Signature]
Send in the President before he sees the story of war — Hold.

I talked to FDR — Shiever, 9/5, 9/15, 9/22.
My dear Mr. President:

When I returned to Woodley last Sunday afternoon, I found a beautiful bunch of roses with a very kind card from you indicating that you had remembered my birthday. Birthdays at my age are not desirable memorabilia, but the kindness which lay behind the gift was very touching to me. I thank you greatly.

I also found your memorandum of September 22nd asking me to speak to you the next time I saw you about my memorandum of September 15th in respect to Germany. I should have gone to see you at once but found that you were in Hyde Park. The publicity which has been excited over this matter is of course most deplorable, but fortunately from the mutually contradictory forms of the rumors even an outsider can recognize that probably none of them are accurate. In the meanwhile we all, from the State Department, the Treasury, and my own Department, have been going ahead in an attempt to make progress on the immediate steps before us without any further disagreement. I am happy to say that we have all three Departments agreed upon a form of post-surrender interim directive to General Eisenhower which, after it is cleared by the British, can be sent at once to him without further disagreement. Harry Hopkins has seen it and approved it. I think it will be a step in the right direction. It does not attempt to conclude any of the long distance future steps about which we may have different opinions.
I was sorry to learn from Bob Patterson that you had been worried by rumors as to what the Army Pearl Harbor Board might find in its report. The Congressional Joint Resolution directing the creation of such a board was passed while I was in Europe, and the Board was appointed before I returned. I looked into the matter and found that the members had been selected by the General Staff from a careful study of the persons available and with an eye to the selection of responsible men representing the three elements of the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the National Guard. Each member had a good record. After its selection it had been approved by Marshall.

I found awaiting me a request to appear before it. I postponed my appearance until now in order that I should have time to make a careful study of the documents and thus make an appearance which would answer any possible false rumors that have arisen. This work has occupied a good deal of my time during the past week or ten days, but this morning I was before the Board for two hours and a half, and I think satisfied them on the subject matter of some of these speculations. One can never tell but I felt at the end of the hearing that they were satisfied with my account of the sequence of the events. I had the advantage which, so far as I know, none of the other witnesses have had of having kept a daily account of my meetings and work during that critical period so that my testimony was all based upon records and thus lifted above the danger of faulty memory. For myself, I can hardly imagine a picture of more close cooperation and anxious desire to warn our outposts of impending attack than was shown by this documented
record. According to my memory, you were yourself so painstakingly on the job throughout that period that I should be greatly distressed if you were victimized now by ignorant or malicious rumors. It has been my feeling that the best way to avoid such erroneous findings as you evidently feared was to meet with the Board and give them the true facts. I hope that it worked.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Will you speak to me about
your memorandum of September fifteenth the
next time we see each other?

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since the meeting with you on September 9th attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory,—that is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.

The point of difference is not one of objective,—continued world peace—it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather
whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.

The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of
seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims--it would be a crime against civilization itself.

This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive
many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.

The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people's lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand
any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.

I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England's need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.

The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open
confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.

I plead for no "soft" treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.

I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 9, 1944

Our discussions relate to a matter of method entirely; our objective is the same. It is not a question of a soft treatment of Germany or a harsh treatment of Germany. We are all trying to devise protection against recurrence by Germany of her attempts to dominate the world. We differ as to method. The fundamental remedy of Mr. Morgenthau is to provide that the industry of Germany shall be substantially obliterated. Although expressed only in terms of the Ruhr, the fact of the matter is that the Ruhr and the adjacent territories which Mr. Morgenthau would include in his program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are proposed, the core of German industry. His proposition is

"the total destruction of the whole German armament industry and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength."

In speaking of the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he says:

"This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area—all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed.
by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked."

I am unalterably opposed to such a program for the reasons given in my memorandum dated September 5 which is already before the President. I do not think that the reasons there stated need again be elaborated. In substance, my point is that these resources constitute a natural and necessary asset for the productivity of Europe. In a period when the world is suffering from destruction and from want of production, the concept of the total obliteration of these values is to my mind wholly wrong. My insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available for the benefit of the whole of Europe, including particularly Great Britain. The internationalization of the Ruhr or the trusteeship of its products—-I am not prepared at the moment to discuss details of method—-constitutes a treatment of the problem in accord with the needs and interests of the world. To argue that we are incapable of sustained effort to control such wealth within proper channels is to destroy any hope for the future of the
world. I believe that the education furnished us by
the Germans in two world wars, plus the continuity of
interest which such a trusteeship would stimulate is
sufficient insurance that we can be trusted to deal
with the problem. The unnatural destruction of this
industry would, on the other hand, be so certain, in
my judgment, to provoke sympathy for the Germans that
we would create friends both in this country and abroad
for the Germans, whereas now most of the peoples of the
world are thoroughly antipathetic to them.

The other fundamental point upon which I feel we
differ is the matter of the trial and punishment of
those Germans who are responsible for crimes and depreda-
tions. Under the plan proposed by Mr. Morgenthau, the
so-called arch-criminals shall be put to death by the mili-
tary without provision for any trial and upon mere identi-
fication after apprehension. The method of dealing with
these and other criminals requires careful thought and
a well-defined procedure. Such procedure must embody,
in my judgment, at least the rudimentary aspects of
the Bill of Rights, namely, notification to the accused
of the charge, the right to be heard and, within reason-
able limits, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not
mean to favor the institution of state trials or to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization, will have all the greater effect upon posterity. Furthermore, it will afford the most effective way of making a record of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.

I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal constituted to try them. They should be charged with offences against the laws of the rules of war in that they have committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been upheld by our own Supreme Court and will be the basis of judicial action against the Nazis.

Even though these offences have not been committed against our troops, I feel that our moral position is better if we take our share in their conviction. Other war criminals who have committed crimes in subjugated
territory should be returned in accordance with the Moscow Declaration to those territories for trial by national military commissions having jurisdiction of the offence under the same Rules of War. I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions may try and convict those responsible for excesses committed within Germany both before and during the war which have no relation to the conduct of the war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain field in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would be without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court would be without jurisdiction to try those who were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in our own country.

The above are the two main points with which I differ from the proposed program submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Partition

I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the matter substantial consideration I have,
as yet, come to no conclusion as to wisdom or method of partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively with that subject until we have had an interchange of views with the English and the Russians. I, myself, seek further light on this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous effort toward separation of the country into two or more groups.

Amputation

I understand that there is some general recognition of the probability of Russia or the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but that we take no part in the administration of the area. On the Western border the primary question is the matter of dealing with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland and the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor of the automatic return of Alsace and Lorraine to France but though my mind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the burden of proof lies on those who suggest giving France more territory. She will come out of this war with her Empire practically intact, with a reduced population and already possessing
a very valuable bit of ore in the Longwy Briey area. To give her a substantial territory of German-speaking and German-bred people would create another problem in the balance of Europe. To counteract this, I would give France a share in the benefits of the internationalization of the Saar and the Ruhr and the advantage which this gives of what would in effect be an international barrier between France and Germany.

There are certain other methods of punishment affecting the personal lives of individual Germans proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting irritations of no fundamental value and, indeed, of considerable danger, but these are primarily matters of administration which I think need not be discussed at this time. In some part, at least, they had best be determined by those who have the primary responsibility for the administration of the occupation.

As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which is all that we can deal with at the moment, the President be recommended to approve a program generally in accord with the memorandum submitted by
the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Tuesday, September 5, except for a modification of subparagraph 2(h) of that memorandum and slight modification certain other conditions on which I hope we can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.

Henry L. Stimson
September 5, 1944

The White House

Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

With minor reservations about language which do not affect the intent of the document, "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President", I approve of it.

If there be agreement on policies, then it becomes of the utmost importance for the proper government officials to indicate how the policies in this document are to be implemented.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY L. H O D G E N S
September 5, 1944.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose here my comment on the
"Suggested Recommendations on the Treatment of
Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President"
which we discussed this morning at our meeting.

I should be very much obliged if you
would convey it with the paper in question to the
President as was proposed this morning.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Hon. Cordell Hull,
The Secretary of State.
I have considered the paper entitled "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President", dated September 4th, submitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State and have discussed it with my colleagues on the Committee.

With the exception of the last paragraph I find myself in agreement with the principles stated therein and they are in conformity with the lines upon which we have been proceeding in the War Department in our directives to the Armed Forces.

The last paragraph, however, is as follows:

"h. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconver to war production".

While certain of these statements by themselves may possibly be susceptible of a construction with which I would not be at variance, the construction put upon them at the discussion this morning certainly reached positions to which I am utterly opposed. The position frankly taken by
some of my colleagues was that the great industrial regions of Germany known as the Saar and the Ruhr with their very important deposits of coal and ore should be totally transformed into a non-industrialized area of agricultural land.

I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it. During the past eighty years of European history this portion of Germany was one of the most important sources of the raw materials upon which the industrial and economic livelihood of Europe was based. Upon the production which came from the raw materials of this region during those years, the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated. Upon that production Germany became the largest sources of supply to no less than ten European countries, viz: Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France. By the same commerce, which in large part arose from this production, Germany also became the best buyer or customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; and the second best
customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. The production of these materials from this region could not be sealed up and obliterated as was proposed this morning, without manifestly causing a great dislocation to the trade upon which Europe has lived. In Germany itself this commerce has built up since 1870 a population of approximately thirty million more people than were ever supported upon the agricultural soil of Germany alone. Undoubtedly a similar growth of population took place in the nations which indirectly participated in the commerce based upon this production.

I cannot treat as realistic the suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can be turned into a non-productive "ghost territory" when it has become the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples of energy, vigor and progressiveness.

I can conceive of endeavoring to meet the misuse which Germany has recently made of this production by wise systems of control or trusteeship or even transfers of ownership to other nations. But I cannot conceive of turning such a gift of nature into a dust heap.
War is destruction. This war more than any previous war has caused gigantic destruction. The need for the recuperative benefits of productivity is more evident now than ever before throughout the world. Not to speak of Germany at all or even her satellites, our Allies in Europe will feel the need of the benefit of such productivity if it should be destroyed. Moreover, speed of reconstruction is of great importance, if we hope to avoid dangerous convulsions in Europe.

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty. This would mean
condemning the German people to a condition of servitude in which, no matter how hard or how effectively a man worked, he could not materially increase his economic condition in the world. Such a program would, I believe, create tensions and resentments far outweighing any immediate advantage of security and would tend to obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the viciousness of their doctrines and their acts.

By such economic mistakes I cannot but feel that you would also be poisoning the springs out of which we hope that the future peace of the world can be maintained.

It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation, and trial of all the Nazi leaders and instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism, such as the Gestapo, with punishment delivered as promptly, swiftly, and severely as possible, that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our determination to extirpate it and all its fruits forever.

My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous weapon of complete economic
oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war; they tend to breed war.

Hugh Stevenson
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN CABINET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

AS STATED IN PAPER SEPTEMBER 4, 1944

To paragraph 2(a) should be added the following:

"At least for an indefinite period Germany shall be denied the means or power to manufacture or design aeroplanes or gliders of any sort whether military, commercial or private, and Germany shall have no license to operate any airlines. During this period no schools or courses for the study of air flight in any form shall be permitted.

All machines, plants and other instruments which are peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of arms and lethal weapons of any sort shall be dismantled or destroyed."

Paragraph 2(b) should be rewritten to read as follows:

"All members of the Gestapo, viz., the so-called security or political police, prominent Nazis in whatever activity they may have operated, substantially if not all members of the S.S. organizations, and others who are suspected of having taken part in or had responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes, should be apprehended and held for further disposition. Prompt and summary trials shall be held of those charged with such crimes and punishment should be swift and severe.

Studies should be instituted at once to determine
Insert at beginning of rewrite paragraph 2 (b)

"Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all its affiliated and associated organizations should be effected immediately and ......."
the procedures to be followed in such trials, and they should be cleared with the British, Russians, and French as quickly as possible, so that they can be communicated to the appropriate occupying authorities without delay.

All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed, political activity or opinion, should be annulled.

To Paragraph (e) should be added the following:

"The territories of Germany which are to be ceded to other countries are understood to be all or most of East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. The question of the Rhineland and the Saar is closely connected with the treatment of the Ruhr. We recommend as the present view of the United States that a strong control over the products of this area must be maintained by means of some form of international trusteeship of its products and resources. It should not be obliterated as an industrial productive center, but it must be actively managed by others than Germans and otherwise completely taken from German domination.

On the other hand no efforts shall be made to rebuild any of the destroyed plants in Germany until permission is given by appropriate Allied or United Nations authority."