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Foreign Policy and its Development.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(See P. Taylor Parker & Emerson
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for such attention as it may seem to merit, a survey of the German National Socialist foreign policy and its development, together with a brief statement of the outstanding external objectives of German statesmanship and diplomacy at the moment.

In the past it would appear that foreign statesmen have been given to viewing with surprise and dismay each new bold move of the Nazi Government affecting foreign relations, as though it were

something

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something which, having no particular precedent, simply could not be true. At least that is the impression one is apt to gain in following reactions to such moves in other countries. Surprising these moves may have been, but only to the extent that the exact time and manner in which they were sprung were not foreseen.

As a matter of fact, each new development has made it seem increasingly likely that the Nazi Government has followed, and intends to follow, with perhaps a certain amendment or shading here and there, the policy laid down by Hitler years ago in his book of books MEIN KAMPF. In making this statement, Hitler's policy vis-à-vis France should probably be excepted. In MEIN KAMPF Hitler constantly refers to France as the natural enemy which must be fought sooner or later, whereas at present on the surface there is no indication of the continuance of this attitude. The persistency with which all other MEIN KAMPF policies are being pursued, however, makes one reluctant to accept this change at face value over any long period.

There is certain justification for the immediate reactions which have taken place abroad and the consequent nervous tension, and even fear, resulting from each new Nazi move (quite aside from the fact that Nazi policy as laid down in MEIN KAMPF

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Let me observe here the fact that Dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler cause surprise as much as anything because they really declare their intentions and carry them out. It is not bluff.

It is true that a Nazi action occasionally does not appear, on the surface, to be following the general policies to be deducted from MEIN KAMPF. As an example in point one may cite Hitler's Reichstag speech of May 21, 1935, in which he ostensibly offered peace, albeit on his own terms, to every country except Lithuania. Despite the bellicose attitude towards France in MEIN KAMPF, that country was included in the offer. Closer examination, however, reveals that this was mainly a tactical move undertaken to bring pressure to bear on Lithuania with the object of benefiting the position of the Memel Germans. As for the peace offer, he doubtless argued that it would not be accepted, but that if it were accepted it would furnish Germany with welcome respite and could later be broken when convenient.

This Government operates on a doctrine of stark realism which has as a corollary a brutal frankness and an opacity of vision toward the outside innate in the German character. It is evident that in regimes of the immediate past this characteristic has produced only a bungling type of statesmanship

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and diplomacy. However, under a highly-g geared system of human regimentation, quite acceptable to the Germans individually, especially after what they may have considered a *laissez-faire* period, a totally different type of diplomatic maneuvering has rapidly been developed and has apparently caught a number of European foreign offices off guard. It is a type which cannot be discounted and must be considered in all seriousness; in any event, it is a type which, by one method or another, is rapidly placing Germany back among the leading world powers - and the basic principles underlying all foreign policy are carefully set forth in the Hitlerian "Bible". Furthermore, this policy has already taken concrete form, in spite of the fact that many otherwise keen observers seem to be able to go only so far as to say that Hitler's Germany "plans to do things." Whether or not policy is being evolved by a more or less formalistic Foreign Office is of little importance in this type of government.

In examining the actual results of Nazi diplomacy and statesmanship, it is interesting to note that in the "program" of the then skeleton National Socialist Party dated as far back as February 24, 1920, at Munich, foreign policy almost identical with what appears to be the current one was set

forth

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forth in four of the 25 points. These four points read as follows in translation:

- (1) We demand the union of all Germans to a greater Germany on the basis of self-determination of the peoples;
- (2) We demand the equality of the rights of the German people vis-à-vis other nations, and the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain;
- (3) We demand land and soil (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and the settlement of our surplus population;
- (22) We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and the formation of a popular army.

The last point mentioned above may not appear to have any direct bearing on foreign policy, but as any national action of Germany is so closely allied with its military set-up, it is fundamental, as will be explained further on. For the Department's information there is transmitted as an enclosure a translation of the complete program from which the four points outlined above are taken.

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It may also be of interest to note that the conditions and trend of thought in other European countries have been of no little assistance to Germany in the pursuit of her aims, surprising as it may seem. For example, immediately after the declaration of conscription on March 17, 1935, loud outcries were heard from practically every quarter against this blatant violation of a treaty which had stood for approximately 17 years, and the entire

continent

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continent was in an uproar. While a number of countries directly affected by this move immediately began various military and diplomatic preparations after the first effects of the stunning blow had worn off, it was not six months after the event that arguments were heard even in the camps of the former Allies that perhaps after all there had been certain justification in Germany's action. The severity of Versailles was apparently a contributory cause to its own downfall. At present, after various other sections of the treaties have been similarly handled, the inviolability of Versailles is scarcely ever brought up in connection with Germany's growth and power. Then there is a decidedly important trend of thought in Europe away from 19th Century democracy and this trend has been extremely helpful, in the furtherance of her ambitions, to a Germany well adapted to the new autocracy of the era.

The aim of all National Socialist foreign policy is power and prestige with the ultimate objective of expansion both economic and territorial. Borne out by MEIN KAMPF, official pronouncements, and past achievements, certain outstanding tenets of Nazi doctrine are seen to be the premises and guides of this policy, as follows:

1. Power, and its correlative prestige, requires a strong army and navy, sufficient
foodstuff

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foodstuff and material bases, and friendship, or at least neutrality, on the part of other outstanding nations.*

2. The Jew and his product Bolshevism is the one natural enemy of Germany.**

3. Pan-Germanism - the belief that Germany should include all Germans.***

4. The peasant is the back-bone of the nation, and a strong peasantry requires sufficient soil, to be gained by national expansion.****

Keeping in mind the factors mentioned above which form the basis for Germany's foreign policy, it might be of interest to outline concisely her progress or retrogression in foreign fields under the Nazi regime. For this purpose one need not go back of the important announcement of conscription on March 17, 1935, as up to that time National Socialism was entirely too occupied with internal reshaping of German institutions to interest itself to any great extent in foreign affairs. The only possible event which might be noted before that date was the withdrawal of Germany's delegates from the League of Nations on October 14, 1933,

and

(All documentary notations in which MEIN KAMPF is mentioned refer to the 1933 unexpurgated edition, Franz Eher Nachfolger G.m.b.H.):

- * 1. MEIN KAMPF: pages 153, 689, 698, 708 and 732
- ** 2. " " : " 351, 703, and 750 et seq.
- *** 3. " " : " 152, 153, 154 and 736
- **** 4. " " : " 153, 154, and 728

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and this event might be considered as a gain for the new regime, speaking strictly from the standpoint of the furtherance of its own aims.

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Beginning therefore with the conscription announcement the National Socialistic external gains and losses to date appear to be about as follows, the former being outlined first. In enumerating these points an attempt will be made to classify them according to the four main tenets, but it will be found that in many instances a development represents gain under more than one heading.

1 (a). The announcement on March 17, 1935, of the creation of a popular army, thus violating treaty stipulations and indicating that Germany was about to embark upon a foreign policy that was totally different from that which she had hitherto been forced to follow, was as important psychologically as in any other direction. Internally, it meant the reestablishment of the school of the nation wherein every sound lad took his two-year course, beginning in most instances as a rather callow, purposeless youth and returning as an erect, steady-eyed and alert man, ready to shoulder his share of the responsibility of German citizenship vis-a-vis sectionalism and the world. It meant the eventual direct employment of some 700,000 men and the indirect employment of mil-

lions

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lions, with the consequent increase in business and in tax revenue. It meant that every German citizen unconsciously and involuntarily perhaps, according to his private views on National Socialism, could hold up his head and shake off the weight of the defeatist's inferiority complex. Externally, it meant that Germany could no longer be dealt with dictatorially and that her statesmanship and diplomacy with a strong military background had to be reckoned with on a basis of equality mingled with fear, whether it was at a conference table or in lone-hand maneuvering.

Regardless of the justification of this action, the objective viewpoint must concede that the basis for National Socialist foreign policy was thus firmly established.*

1 (b). The announcement of a naval building program was shortly followed by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, reached on June 18, 1935, whereby the German navy might be constructed up to 35 per cent of the total British navy, and not only gave Germany domination of the Baltic but amounted to de facto recognition of Germany's breach of Versailles. Incidentally, because of the necessary absence of a portion of the

British

* 1. National Socialist "Program", Point 22, Munich, February 24, 1920.

2. MEIN KAMPF, pages 298, 307, 647, 648.

3. Embassy despatch No. 1876, of March 26, 1935.

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British navy in eastern waters the ratio is more favorable to Germany than would appear at first sight. Furthermore, England's action, independent of France, may be viewed as a diminution of French prestige and a corresponding gain in German prestige.

It will be recalled that rapprochement with England has ever been one of the fundamentals of Hitler's doctrine of foreign policy.*

1 (c). One of the first fruits of the attainment of armed power was the reoccupation of the Rhineland beginning March 7, 1936. Even more important than as another blow at the Treaty of Versailles, was the effect of this action in two other directions. First, French prestige was vitally impaired in that with the decision of the French general staff not to take military action against Germany, it became apparent to all that France was no longer prepared to take up arms on every major provocation, and in that her allies may well have taken note that France would think twice before deciding affirmatively on what really constituted a casus belli. The action on March 7th shut off France from her eastern allies

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* 1. HEIN KAMPF, pages 154 (Germany and England against Russia); 699 (alliance with England desirable); 701 (divergence of British and Jewish interests).

2. Embassy despatch No. 2085, of June 26, 1935.

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and being unopposed materially meant the end of French hegemony in Central Europe, and the consequent loss to French prestige, therefore, is obvious. Second, the practical success of Nazi policy in this case convinced the dubious elements of the army headed by General von Fritsch, which had hitherto evidenced reserve, of the national efficacy of the party and thus brought about the desired unity of these two factors.

Stresa and the famous British questionnaire, as well as all other attempts thereafter to influence Germany, were, in effect, calmly and successfully disregarded by Hitler in the determined pursuit of his objectives.

1 (d). The obvious instruments of power, the army and navy, together with the para-military organizations, are thus seen to have been developed. The next step of obtaining sufficient foodstuff and material bases is being advanced in the country by the so-called foodstuffs battle and the Four-Year Plan.* Their effect on foreign policy has thus far been manifested in a striving for control in the Danubian basin - the agreement with Austria the "gateway" to that area, the parallelism with Italy, the rapprochement with Hungary and Yugoslavia, Germany's key state

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* Embassy despatch No. 3106, of October 21, 1936, and No. 3088, of October 8, 1936.

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in the Balkans, better relations with Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and the anti-French developments in Rumania brought about by the Franco-Soviet Pact, are steps in that direction. The fostering of these friendships is, aside from the broadening of Germany's supply bases, a distinct gain along the line of political policy, especially as it weakens the position of the Little Entente and the general French idea of collective security and European hegemony.

The agreement with Austria,* concluded on July 11, 1936, constituted a gain in prestige and afforded an opportunity for broader National Socialist activity which may bear fruit in the future. The fact that this was brought about with at least the tacit approval of Italy has the appearance of a gain, in that it was one of a chain of developments which led to rapprochement with Italy.

1 (e). Germany's power was originally broken by the Treaty of Versailles, but the struggle to regain her strength was continually hampered by the League of Nations. This body, regardless of the intentions of its founders, proved in effect to be an instrument for the perpetuation of the Treaty, skillfully wielded by France with the aid of her satellites whose very existence was based thereon. Under
these

* Embassy despatch No. 2941 of July 15, 1936.

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these circumstances any loss of prestige on the part of the League must be considered as a corresponding gain for Germany.

Such gains are associated with the failure of the League successfully to settle a long list of international difficulties ending with the fiasco of sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian conflict, and including a variety of outstanding developments such as those connected with the well-known terms Disarmament, Manchukuo, El Gran Chaco and Danzig.

The bungling on the part of the League resulting in antagonizing Italy, was importantly instrumental in bringing about the present "parallelism" of Fascism with National Socialism after a period of vociferous hostility.

2 (a). Under the second main tenet of foreign policy, one is led to believe that National Socialist doctrine of opposition to Jewry and Bolshevism might well be based on the realization that in addition to a series of more or less popular and altruistic slogans such as "Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz" (The Common Good Before The Individual Good), "Blut und Boden" (Blood and Soil), and "Gleichberechtigung" (Equality), etc., a radical political movement must acquire a concrete enemy both internal and external which, even after accession to power, may prove useful as a menace, a scapegoat, an object of ridicule,

or

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er for diverting public attention in turn as occasion requires. Doubtlessly prompted by actual political conditions Jews and Bolshevism were at the very outset selected for this role and have proven increasingly useful to the Nazis, thus justifying their choice.*

A master stroke of Nazi tactics was the identification of one with the other.** While these tactics may be viewed as first-rate demagoguery, the fact must be admitted that Communism was at least a potential danger in Germany and that the Jews had achieved a position of preeminence ill suited to Nazi mentality. In international relations, opposition to Bolshevism has specifically developed into hostility to the Soviets whereby Nazi ideology and the identification of Communism with Jewry is proving increasingly useful, particularly as a means of propaganda appealing to the instinctive, wide-spread fear of Bolshevism and thus finding fertile soil in at least parts of the population of practically every European country today.

Active opposition to "Jewish Bolshevism" in the field of foreign politics really dates from the inception of the Franco-Soviet Pact. From Hitler

down

* REIN KAMPF: page 351 et seq.

** " " : pages 750, 751 and 752.

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down all active Nazi agencies made valiant efforts to dissuade France from concluding a pact with the Soviets, and, after its consummation, to prevent its becoming effective as a political instrument. The entry of the Soviets into European politics via what Germany insisted on terming an outright alliance with France, and the left swing in France itself, made Soviet-Communism appear as an active threat to Germany, and France, after the apparent lull in the German MEIN KAMPF attitude, once more loomed as an opponent to be actively combated - but with different tactics. In defense against this professed menace, Germany launched an intensive anti-Bolshevik campaign which reached a climax at the Nuremberg Party Rally in September of this year and in which Germany insisted on her self-assumed role of champion of Western civilization as opposed to Eastern barbarism.

A campaign of attrition was then initiated against French prestige, as contrasted with the direct aggressive attitude key-noted in MEIN KAMPF - much more effective and insidious tactics in that they were susceptible of furtherance at all times and almost in any direction.

The anti-Bolshevik crusade served a second purpose in that it furnished a common grounds upon which might be laid the foundation for international friendships - "bloc-politique".

Incidentally

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Incidentally, Hitler's reference to the Ukraine, both in *MEIN KAMPF* and later at Nuremberg, gives rise to the unorthodox thought that the ultimate object of anti-Sovietism may possibly be to isolate and thus to weaken Russia as a first step towards at least economic cooperation on a basis agreeable and most useful to Germany. The possibilities inherent in such a constellation are too obvious to require detailing.

The stress placed on anti-Bolshevism on an international basis and the corollary drawing together of Fascist regimes has naturally enough awakened a fear that the Continent is splitting into two blocs corresponding to these alignments. Doubt apparently exists in the British mind as to the relative merits, or demerits of the two movements, particularly in view of the undeniable^{*} similarity of their tactics and doctrine, and it cannot be predicted which bloc, if either, may find the support of English sympathy - English support is the perennial arbiter of continental power.

2 (b). As outlined above, the Franco-Russian Pact called for a persistent attack against the prestige of France, who was now considered as the ally of Bolshevism. For this attack Germany made skillful use of a number of other developments in the European political arena.

First, in the preliminary discussions with England of a possible five-power conference, Germany

made

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made it clear that her participation in such a meeting would be made contingent on (a) an innocuous authoritative interpretation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and (b) the absence from the conference of the influence of Russia and of French satellites such as Czechoslovakia and Poland.*

Second, the protraction of the Locarno preliminaries was probably largely instrumental in calling forth the Belgian king's recent statement of policy which placed particular stress on Belgian neutrality and definitely asserted unwillingness to assume commitments involving the guarantee of boundaries other than her own. A force which contributed further to Belgium's official attitude was the unceasing influence of the Rexist movement in that country. This movement shares many National Socialist tenets, particularly in regard to anti-Bolshevism, and there are material indications that there is more than theoretical interest in it on the part of Nazi Germany. The new position thus created by Belgium was a most important gain for Germany, not only morally but, as has been estimated by competent military authorities, it was equivalent to the additional strength provided by fifteen army corps. France, by the same token, suffered a corresponding loss, thus effectively terminating her claim to hegemony - which presumably

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* Embassy telegrams No. 299 of October 9th, and No. 306 of October 17, 1936.

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did not escape the notice of her satellites.

Third, without wishing to assert which was cause and which effect, another development connecting England with the above-mentioned Belgian move is to be noted. According to reliable information* there is now being considered the formation of a "neutral bloc" to include England, Belgium, Holland, and possibly the Scandinavian countries, which would not undertake a priori to attack Germany on the issue of the maintenance of collective security in the East. The distribution of profit and loss between France and Germany is therefore evident.

Fourth, a result of the France-Soviet Pact was the rapprochement between France's new ally Russia and her old satellite Czechoslovakia, which developed into a sort of military alliance much to the disgust of Berlin, and one of the first thoughts occurring to the German Government was, of course, that the flying time between any one of the probable Soviet airports to be constructed in Czechoslovakia, and Berlin, was entirely too short for comfort.

Germany's recent unilateral termination of the international control of German navigable streams** is a step which clearly brings home to the Czechoslovaks their important dependence on Germany as the

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* The British Embassy, Berlin.

** Embassy telegram No. 535 of November 16, 1936.

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only logical outlet to the sea offering almost natural facilities for transportation, warehousing, etc., and in addition the general economic interrelation between the two countries, grown strong through usage, are ever present in the mind of the average practical Czech business man. The further fact that Czech leadership and public opinion are gradually awakening to the realization that no great material assistance is to be expected from France or for that matter England, is creating a feeling that in the long run alignment with Germany might prove more advantageous.*

The German attitude towards Czechoslovakia is well characterized by repeated confidential statements of members of the German General Staff to the effect that from a military point of view, a complete occupation of the country would be a matter of hours only, and from the political angle it is German policy to support this attitude by isolation in various forms. All progress made towards this end may be counted as a gain for Germany - and there has been progress.

Fifth, one of the most direct blows leveled at the France-Soviet Pact came from Marshal Rids-Smigly, who, it is understood, in replying to French inquiries in Paris recently, stated that Poland could not see

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* Despatch No. 534, September 25, 1936, from the Legation, Prague.

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her way clear to permit the transit of Soviet forces through Poland under any circumstances nor would she permit the establishment of Soviet air bases on Polish territory, in spite of the considerable credit obtained from France for rearmament.

The independent attitude of Poland thus indicated has been subtly encouraged by Germany, realizing full well Poland's national pride and her inherent hatred of the Russians. The gain to Germany has been indirect only, as there are no indications of increasing friendship between the two countries.

2 (c). So much for the specific ramifications of the Franco-Soviet Pact itself. Independent of this development, certain other countries and situations have reacted definitely to Nazi anti-Bolshevik policy.

In respect to ultimate alignment with Germany, it may be said that Austria's position is even stronger than that of Czechoslovakia. The fiasco of Nazi aspirations in Austria, at the time when Dollfuss met his death and Italy established "the watch on the Brenner", has meanwhile been wiped out and Austria is now officially designated as a "German" nation. The agreement of July 11th and the subsequent visit of Secretary of State Schmidt to Berlin* led not only to close economic and cultural relations but it is confidently

* See Embassy's despatch No. 3163 of November 25, 1936.

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fidently expected that on Schmidt's return to Vienna a statement will be issued stressing Austria's adherence to the anti-Bolshevik front.

In Hungary, the recollection of the short-lived Bela Kun regime has sufficed to make the people receptive to German anti-Bolshevik propaganda, here suitably combined with reference to world-war brotherhood in arms. In Japan the rising Communist problems and the traditional enmity to Russia seconded by the absence of conflicting interests with Germany, has established a parallelism between the two countries which, just as this report is being written, has been consummated in an agreement to cooperate in combating Bolshevism.* In England, the natural disinclination of a section of the population towards Bolshevism has permitted the formation of a Fascist party headed by Sir Oswald Mosley which lives on despite repeated accounts of its agony, and it is interesting to note in this connection that queries have been made in Parliament concerning the financing of this party from "abroad" - the German Propaganda Ministry is apparently credited with unlimited means.

In Spain, German anti-Bolshevik propaganda is generally assumed to have taken on the material form of bombing planes and cannon, and the political significance

* See Embassy telegram No. 349 of November 25th

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ficance of German activities in that field is becoming increasingly momentous.

Even from the Berlin angle, where the view of German activities abroad is constantly and effectively clouded by press control and the party propaganda machine, it has been quite apparent for some time that National Socialist interest in Spain's civil strife was manifested by more than moral support of the insurgent group. Firmly convinced that the Madrid Government had the support of Moscow, Germany, in concert with Italy, on the grounds of combating a common enemy even prior to the publicly announced Italo-German "parallelism", and in spite of her "adherence" to the neutrality agreement, found ample reason actively to interest herself in supporting the national insurgents. Accusations, denials, and recriminations on the part of both Fascist and Bolshevik factions marked a period in which it became increasingly apparent that Spain was likely to become a proving ground for the domination in Europe of one or the other faction.

In this development the most important step of Germany, taken in unison with Italy, was the recognition of a Franco government* before such a government was established, thus underwriting insurgent success

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* Embassy's telegram No. 338 of November 18, 1936.

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and definitely indicating Germany's alignment with any action whatever which she believes is necessary in any country or situation in combating Bolshevism - a new angle to German foreign policy.

Short of formal military assistance, Franco may now expect whatever aid he may need, as his defeat would mean too great a blow to German prestige in particular and the Fascist group in general. As long as Franco's success is in doubt, a German gain or loss in Spain cannot be registered, but the complete unanimity of thought on the subject between Germany and Italy would seem to preclude the latter eventuality.

2 (d). Last, but probably most important of all, in that it furnished Germany with a powerful and the only active ally on the anti-Bolshevik front, was the at least temporary parallelism with Italy cultivated carefully for some time previously by an endless interchange of official visits, consummated in a gentleman's agreement between Hitler and Count Ciano at Berchtesgaden on October 25, 1936, and manifested in the striking similarity of the texts of official announcements from both countries relative to international developments. Although this parallelism included many other important aspects in regard to the policies of the two countries in Europe, anti-Bolshevism was the flag under which they were united. Certain fundamental opposing interests and an underlying distrust of each other make the union appear somewhat

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somewhat incongruous and unsteady, but it is nevertheless a practical one which will hold together as long as advantages to each are apparent. Having committed themselves even to this extent, one may venture to predict that close cooperation may continue during such time as Bolshevism appears to be a major issue in Europe - and in so far as the union does not align England definitely against Germany. Indeed MEIN KAMPF states definitely* that a triple alliance with England and Italy is the only desirable closer foreign connection for Germany.

One of the first concrete results of the Italo-German agreement was that, together with the Austrian Pact and the Hungarian aims and leanings, it marked the beginning of an anti-Communist block through Central Europe which may involve many advantages to Germany. It may serve effectually in isolating Russia and Communism from Western Europe, and the possibilities thus created of furthering pan-Germanism, another main tenet of policy, are ominously apparent.

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3. Pan-Germanism, now briefly referred to as "Deutschtum", is the theory that all persons of German stock should be united under German National Socialism

* MEIN KAMPF: pages 705, 755 et seq. and 699.

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ism. This idea is implied by MEIN KAMPF * in criticizing the Reich boundaries of 1914 as not being "complete with regard to the inclusion of the people of German nationality" and is being strongly furthered under the leadership of the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland. With an active staff and extensive means, largely raised by direct popular subscription, it fosters Germanism and cultural relations with the Fatherland among Germans all over the world. Maps distributed by this organization show entire sections of many countries as nationally German, such as the Sudeten section of Czechoslovakia, Memel, Danzig, parts of Poland, the southern portion of Denmark, etc., as well as parts of Russia and Rumania settled by Germans. While for obvious reasons stress is at present placed only on the maintenance of cultural affinities, only the test of time and opportunity will indicate whether Nazi Germany will be able to resist the temptation to establish bonds of a closer nature - with these enclaves near at hand. Already there are definite indications of such ambitions in connection with Danzig and Czechoslovakia. While cultural relations with a political advantage in mind are maintained with German-American elements in the United States and Latin America, closer associations

with

* page 736

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with these sections is probably beyond the most radical of Nazi dreams.

With the exception of the gains mentioned above, progress in Pan-Germanism has to date evolved but little more than potentialities. Nevertheless, National Socialism, which thinks in long periods of time, gives no indication of relaxing its efforts without regard to existing political boundaries. While they disclaim all instrumentality in effecting this policy, it is interesting to note in this connection the existence of the so-called Auslands-Organisation of the party which ostensibly deals only with German citizens abroad, the somewhat recent mysterious inflation of the Kultur Abteilung of the Foreign Office, and the "election" of numerous Reichstag renegade members from Sudeten Czechoslovakia and Austria.

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4. While there appears to be no prospect of early expansion on the basis of "Deutschtum", the drive for colonial expansion under the pressure of economic need of raw materials in the furtherance of their power policy, particularly in view of Germany's foreign exchange distress, has been pressed forward with more immediate urgency by Schacht and the Kolonial-Bund. Although here also no concrete success has been achieved so far, there is to be registered the growth of a section of foreign opinion willing to consider the return

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of Germany's former colonies - a thing unheard of a year ago.

In view of the fact that most of the former German colonies were in Africa, we have here an instance in which circumstances, subsequently developed, have occasioned a deviation from Hitler's original MEIN KAMPF attitude * - which disapproves tropical or semi-tropical colonies as unsuited to satisfy the main object of the colonial expansion he envisaged as providing an outlet for surplus population. Such colonies to be of maximum use must be in temperate zones, as near to Germany as possible, and offer an opening for peasants, the back-bone of the nation.**

Hitler definitely considered expansion to the fertile districts of Eastern Europe a form of colonization which would best permit of organization and administration along the same lines of peasant development he has introduced so extensively in the Reich itself under the slogan "Blut und Boden" (Blood And Soil). Eastward expansion would seem to be the natural corollary to the long-standing and recently stressed anti-Soviet policy.

Certain passages in MEIN KAMPF are so definite on this point as to justify quotation. Thus, as a
broad

* MEIN KAMPF: page 153

** " " : pages 153, 154 and 728

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bread basis, one reads that "the foreign policy of a national state should secure the existence of the race united in that state by creating a sound natural relation between the number and the growth of the people, on the one hand, and the size and quality of the soil, on the other."* More specifically, one reads that "however, such a soil policy cannot find its fulfillment for example in the Cameroon, but today almost exclusively in Europe."** From here, one is led directly to the point that "if one wanted soil in Europe, this, on the whole, could only take place at the expense of Russia; then the new Reich would have to start marching again along the road of the old Teutonic knights in order to give, by the German sword, the German plow its soil and the nation its daily bread."***

The above theory is quite generally presumed to hold good today, and while no concrete gains along these lines may be noted as yet, one hears constantly in well-informed circles of developments tending towards a realization of these ambitions. At one time a plan of attack against Czechoslovakia with Italian aid is mentioned; at another, Danzig, the Polish Corridor, or Memel on the basis of a deal, perhaps forced, with Poland; while the Ukraine, particularly owing to the

attention

* MEIN KAMPF: page 728

** " " : " 152

*** " " : " 154

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attention paid to it both in MEIN KAMPF and recently in anti-Sovietism, is brought up in this connection.

National Socialist foreign policy, treated thus far under the aspect of gains, has also had a number of losses. Frankly and objectively speaking, however, such losses have been comparatively few, are found to be much less tangible than the gains, and seem to be more potential and theoretical than actual at the moment. For these reasons, it does not seem practicable to discuss them under the headings of specific tenets as in the case of gains.

Generally speaking, Germany's rapid rise to armed power has created reactions in Europe which do not make for the "peace" Hitler and his program seem so ardently to desire - in fact, actual advancement towards European appeasement has been exactly nil, due recently in a large measure, to Germany. Diplomacy plus sabre-rattling may be the means of obtaining what Germany thinks she desires of her neighbors, but the psychological effect of fear and uncertainty thereby produced, in itself retards the very progress towards which Germany claims she is striving, and in that respect she may suffer losses.

Thus, in spite of the care with which German diplomats and statesmen have endeavored to handle their relations with Great Britain, the latter has now quite patently come to the conclusion that Germany cannot be dealt with on any acceptable basis,

that

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that she "must be written off as a bad job", to use the recent confidential words of a high-ranking British official,* and that England must therefore proceed with all possible speed to rearm for any emergency.

Likewise, losses must be recorded in the alienation of Poland by Germany's action in Danzig, and in the rearmament of Belgium which might be turned to the advantage of France. Even the armed "neutral bloc" which is believed to be contemplated in the West and which at the moment would give the appearance of an advantage to Germany, might, under the leadership of England, be used against Germany in the event of a war.

Furthermore, the Franco-Soviet Pact which was brought about solely for use against Germany, is still in effect and depending largely on its real military value must be counted as a loss for Germany. Because of the latter's basic enmity towards Russia she also forgoes the possible advantages of arrangements whereby a freer hand might be given her in recovering Memel and the Corridor, or in expanding in the Baltics.

In addition, two other really important losses in prestige abroad must be recorded, both resulting largely from National Socialist internal policy. By the stubborn but perhaps ineffectual doctrine of state domination of religion, Germany has alienated not only
the

* A member of the British Embassy, Berlin.

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the Pope and international Catholicism but Christianity generally; and by her attitude towards the Jews, the Church, the established systems of common justice, and towards real democracy in general, she has injured the sensibilities of, and alienated, a country which might have stood her in good stead during her economic and financial difficulties - the United States.

* * *

In the foregoing survey, an endeavor has been made to indicate the development of National Socialist foreign policy on the basis of certain major theories, and to leave the conclusions to be drawn from an outline of the successes and failures of its ambitious and aggressive program.

If one might venture a prediction in the face of a mad scramble after "peace" through heavy armament for "self-defense" on a continent rendered tense by distrust and abnormal nationalism, it would be to say that for the immediate future there does not appear to be any vital force or combination of forces which will materially impede Germany in the pursuit of her ambitions. However, at least five possibilities must be considered in this connection.

First, the very maintenance of high-powered hair-triggered armament everywhere, although it is ostensibly for "peace" control, is in itself a constant explosive danger. Thus, the situation in

Spain

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Spain, largely created by Germany herself, might well overnight result in embroiling the whole of Europe, and German policy could be either tremendously furthered or disastrously damaged. Indeed, it has just been confidentially learned that Hitler already feels remorse - more on tactical than moral grounds - at having succumbed to the blandishments of Ciano who persuaded him to join Italy in recognizing France.

Second, Germany's progress depends largely on whether or not she is able to maintain at least neutral relations with England.

Third, the economic and financial situation in Germany is a potential danger to the pursuit of her foreign policy depending on whether or not external political progress can be made to such a rapid extent that the intricate economic problems now facing Germany will thereby be largely solved as a natural sequence. In this respect, the constant pressing of foreign policy may at least be understood.

Fourth, there is always the possibility of a dictatorship getting out of hand in that the necessarily rapid developments on which it thrives internally cannot always be absorbed fast enough externally. In a dictatorship with as broad a foreign policy as Germany's this is particularly true. However, one may understand Germany's power and prestige pace better if it is realized that time plays an important role in her rearmament; most of Germany's so-called adver-

series

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saries, notably France, have been fully armed for many years and much of this equipment is consequently now obsolete, whereas Germany's armament is of the latest. If Germany is to carry out her program, it behooves her to be fully rearmed and prepared before old equipment elsewhere can be replaced - and before certain countries, notably England, can arm anew.

Fifth, parallelism with Italy is two-edged and not reliable. There is a constant undercurrent of rivalry going on between Italy and Germany in the Danubian region. The very increase and menace of Germany's power may enable Italy to create a "protective" group there including Rumania and Poland -, but this need not be hostile to Germany. In fact its purpose would be to keep on friendly relations with Hitler. In effect, however, it would mean that Germany's aspirations in Central Europe must be kept within bounds. Italy would thus be taking the place of France in Eastern Europe - but not necessarily on an unfriendly basis towards Germany, as was France's position, but distinctly as a "warning" unit.

One other point might be added. Bolshevism as a major menace in Europe must be either kept as such or totally exterminated by Germany's efforts in order to give her the impetus she requires.

Hitler, an instinctively adroit opportunist and a devout student of the methods of Frederick Wilhelm

I.

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I, during whose reign Germany's power, without resort to a major war, flourished as it never has since, has undoubtedly passed down to the German Foreign Office the gist of his foreign policy from whence it has been repeatedly deled out to inquiring diplomats in various forms as the occasion seemed to require, by Neurath and his spokesmen. It is that Germany will realize her aims without war, if possible, if not, - .

Respectfully yours,

William E. Dodd.

Enclosure:

1. Translation of National Socialist Program.

800

FCL:AC

Copies to Paris, London, Geneva, Rome, Moscow and Riga.

A true copy of
the signed original
M.A.

Enclosure 1.

Translation.

The Program.

The Program of the National Socialist Party is a permanent program. The leaders decline to set up new aims, when those set up in the Program have been realized, merely for the purpose of making it possible for the Party to continue to exist by means of artificially fostered dissatisfaction of the masses.

1. We demand the union of all Germans to a greater Germany on the basis of self-determination of the peoples;

2. We demand the equality of the rights of the German people vis-à-vis other nations, and the cancellation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain;

3. We demand land and soil (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and the settlement of our surplus population;

4. Only he can be a citizen who is a fellow-countryman (Volksgenosse). Only he can be a fellow-countryman who is of German blood, without consideration of confession. Therefore no Jew can be a fellow-countryman.

5. Anyone who is not a citizen shall only be allowed to live in Germany as a guest and must be subject to legislation dealing with foreigners.

- 2 -

6. Only a citizen can be entitled to decide with regard to the management and laws of the state. Therefore we demand that every public office, of whatever nature, whether in the Reich, a State, or a Commune, must only be held by citizens.

We oppose the corruptive parliamentary system of filling posts merely from party viewpoints without consideration of character and qualifications.

7. We demand that above all else the state assume the obligation to provide for ways and means for its citizens to earn a livelihood. If it is not possible to care for the entire population of the state, the members of foreign nations (non-citizens) must be expelled from the Reich.

8. Any further immigration of non-Germans must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have immigrated to Germany since August 2, 1914, be forced to leave the Reich immediately.

9. All citizens must have equal rights and duties.

10. The foremost duty of every citizen must be to work mentally or physically. The activity of the individual must not violate the interests of the generality but it must be carried on as a part of the whole and to the benefit of all.

Therefore we demand:

11. The abolition of income without work and effort.
An end to interest bondage.

12.

- 3 -

12. In view of the tremendous sacrifices of property and blood which every war claims of the nation, personal profit through war must be characterized as a crime to the nation. We therefore demand the confiscation of all war profits.

13. We demand the nationalization of all concerns (so far) already amalgamated (trusts).

14. We demand profit-sharing in all large plants.

15. We demand an extensive development of the old-age pension system.

16. We demand the creation of a sound middle class and its maintenance, immediate socialization of large department stores and the renting (thereof) to small tradesmen at low rentals, the strictest consideration of all small tradesmen when making deliveries to the state, the States and Communes.

17. We demand a land reform adapted to our national needs, the creation of a law for the expropriation without remuneration of land for purposes involving the public good. Abolition of ground rent and the prevention of land speculation of every kind.*

18.

* Note. In the face of the mendacious interpretation of Point 17 of the Program of the National Socialist Party by our opponents, it is necessary to make the following statement:

As the National Socialist Party takes a stand in favor of private property, it is natural that the passage "expropriation without remuneration" refers only to the creation of legal means of expropriating, if necessary, property which was acquired in an illicit manner or which is not administered in accordance with considerations of the public good. Therefore this is directed primarily against Jewish companies speculating in real estate.

Munich, April 13, 1928.

Adolf Hitler

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18. We demand ruthless war against those who by their activity injure general interests. Public enemies, usurers, profiteers, etc., must be condemned to death, without consideration of confession and race.

19. We demand a substitute for Roman law, which serves the materialistic philosophy of life, in the shape of a German common law.

20. In order to make it possible for every capable and industrious German to attain a higher education and thus to enter into leading positions, the state must provide for a thorough development of our entire popular educational system. The curriculum of all educational institutions must be adapted to the requirements of practical life. Understanding of the idea of state must be achieved by the school as soon as (the age of) reasoning begins (science of citizenship). We demand schooling for mentally particularly endowed children of poor parents at the cost of the state, regardless of the station or profession of their parents.

21. The state must provide for improving the public health by protecting mothers and children, by prohibiting child labor, by bringing about physical vigor by means of a legal obligation to engage in gymnastics and sports, by supporting to the utmost all societies for physical training of young people.

22. We demand the abolition of the mercenary troops and the formation of a popular army.

23. We demand lawful opposition to the willful political lie and its dissemination by the press. In

order

- 5 -

order to make it possible to create a German press, we demand that

- a) all editors of newspapers which appear in the German language and their collaborators must be fellow-countrymen,
- b) non-German newspapers require the express permission of the state to be published. They must not be printed in German,
- c) any financial participation in German newspapers or influence thereon by non-Germans be forbidden by law and we demand as a penalty for contraventions the cessation of such newspapers and the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the participating non-Germans.

Newspapers that are contrary to the general good must be prohibited. We demand legal opposition to a direction in art and literature which exercises a disintegrating influence on our national life, and the closing of organizations that violate the foregoing demands.

24. We demand freedom of all religious confessions in the state, in so far as they do not endanger its existence or offend against the feeling of decency and morals of the Germanic race. The party as such takes the stand of positive Christianity, without binding itself to any specific confession. It opposes the Jewish materialistic spirit in and outside ourselves and is convinced that permanent recovery of our people can only occur from within on the basis of: The Common Good Before The Individual Good.

25.

- 6 -

25. For the execution of all of which we demand the creation of a strong central power of the Reich, absolute authority of the political central parliament over the entire Reich and its organizations in general; the formation of chambers of vocations and professions for carrying out in the individual Federal States the skeleton laws issued by the Reich.

The leaders of the party promise - staking their own lives if necessary - ruthlessly to stand up for the execution of the foregoing points.

Munich, February 24, 1920.

AC

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

WE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

PSF:Jodd

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1936

RF

My dear Mr. President:

I have just gone through an interesting despatch from our Embassy at Berlin on the development of national socialist foreign policy. I think you will find this subject of interest also and I enclose a copy of the despatch with a copy of a brief summary thereof.

Faithfully yours,

P. Walter Brown

Enclosures:

Copy of despatch No. 3165,
November 28, 1936, from
Berlin.
Copy of summary of despatch.

The President,
The White House.

PSF: D666

December 24, 1936

SUMMARY OF DESPATCH NO. 3165 FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY
IN BERLIN

Subject: National Socialist Foreign Policy

Hitler's foreign policy should not have been a surprise to students of "Mein Kampf"; the only exception being the present policy toward France which may hew more to the line in the long run.

On the basis of this policy progress or retrogression has appeared in certain fields under the Nazi regime. Under the head of progress may be listed the following:

(1) The basis for a national socialist foreign policy was established in a conscription announcement of March 17, 1935, reestablishing the army and shaking off defeatism. The one event prior to this date which may be noted was the withdrawal of Germany's delegates from the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. Speaking from the standpoint of the furtherance of Germany's own aims, this event might be considered as a gain for the new regime.

(2) The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, gave Germany control of the Baltic and amounted to a de facto recognition of Germany's breach of the Versailles Treaty.

(3) Occupation

-2-

(3) Occupation of the Rhine zone on March 7, 1936, cut off France from her eastern allies and internally brought a unity of view to the Nazi party and the German army.

(4) In seeking to promote more friendly relations in central and southeastern Europe the agreement with Austria of July 11, 1936, opened up a "gateway".

(5) The League has been an obstacle to Germany's gaining power and any weakening of the League was to Germany's advantage. The fiasco of sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian conflict was a combination of a long series of such developments.

(6) The Jews and Bolshevism (Communism) have been selected in advance as perennial scapegoats for ridicule to maintain internal political enthusiasm. This maneuver has proven increasingly useful to the Nazis.

(7) The anti-Bolshevist campaign which reached its height at Nuremberg in September, 1936, was aimed at Soviet entry into European politics via the much-opposed Franco-Soviet pact and prepared the way for international friendships (Bloc Politique).

(8) The German attack on French policy took the form of objection to a five-power conference unless the Franco-Soviet pact was interpreted and unless Russian influence was absent from the conference.

(9) The

-3-

(9) The recent stressing of Belgian neutrality was an important moral and military gain for Germany and a corresponding loss for France. Arising in this connection is a rumor of a "neutral bloc" to include England, Belgium, Holland and Scandinavia, which would not undertake a priori to attack Germany on the issue of maintenance of collective security in the east.

(10) Czechoslovak dependence on Germany is brought home by the recent unilateral German denunciation of the Versailles navigation clause.

(11) Poland has now adopted an independent attitude encouraged by Germany though friendship between the two countries is not increasing.

(12) In addition to the agreement with Austria, the German-Japanese anti-Communist agreement and participation in the Spanish civil strife manifests further German activity abroad.

(13) Ciano and Hitler consummated a gentlemen's agreement under the flag of anti-Bolshevism at Berchtesgaden on October 25, 1936.

(14) The Pan-German Association (Verein fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland) seeks to maintain cultural relations with Germans all over the world. "Mein Kampf" foresees eventual bonds of a closer nature.

(15) Schacht