

President's Secretary's File
Departmental File
State: Jan-Sept. 1944
Box 71

*State Dept folder
12-44
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested in the attached reproductions of "secret documents bearing on the belligerent policy of the President of the United States," translated from the German propaganda book -- "Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg."

I give you, therefore, the memoranda and the documents with a copy of the book itself I have just received from the State Department.

S.T.E.

Enclosure:

Roosevelt's Weg in den Krieg
Berlin, 1943

File King

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1944

In reply refer to
RP 103.7/7859

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EARLY

Our Legation at Stockholm, which has shown outstanding initiative in procuring enemy publications for use by our war agencies, recently sent to the Department a German propaganda book entitled Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg, which contains facsimile or textual reproductions of "secret documents bearing on the belligerent policy of the President of the United States". I enclose a copy of the book, a translation of the table of contents, and a few pages of translated extracts from the introduction. You may wish to bring this reading matter to the President's attention.


The documents printed in the book are allegedly diplomatic notes and reports of French, Polish, Belgian, and other origins which have fallen into German hands. The volume is described in its foreword as the first of a series which is to be published by the Archives Commission of the German Foreign Office and which is intended to clarify the origin of the war "by making secret documents from European archives available".

Some of the documents in the book are admittedly reprinted from the German White Book issued after the Polish archives were captured by the Nazis. The

statement

- 2 -

statement which the Secretary of State issued on the supposed conversations reported in that White Book is printed in the enclosed copy of the March 30, 1940 issue of the weekly Department of State Bulletin.


E. Wilder Spaulding
Acting Chief, Division of
Research and Publication

Enclosures:

1. Roosevelt's Weg in den Krieg.
2. Table of Contents (translation).
3. Introduction (excerpts, translation).
4. Department of State Bulletin,
March 30, 1940.

In reply refer to
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1. Roosevelt's Log in den Krieg.
2. Table of Contents (translation).
3. Introduction (excerpts, translation).
4. Department of State Bulletin,
March 30, 1940.

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 2470, dated November 19, 1943, from the American Legation, Stockholm, Sweden, entitled: "Review of Book Published in Germany, Entitled: 'Roosevelt's Way to War. Secret Documents Bearing on the Belligerent Policy of the President of the United States (of America)'".

TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN.

Title: Roosevelt's Way to War (Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg), Secret Documents Bearing on the Belligerent Policy of the President of the United States (of America).

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Enclosure no. 3 to despatch no. 2470, dated November 19, 1943, from the American Legation, Stockholm, Sweden, entitled: "Review of Book Published in Germany, Entitled: 'Roosevelt's Way to War. Secret Documents Bearing on the Belligerent Policy of the President of the United States (of America)'".

EXCERPTS.

Title: Roosevelt's Way to War (Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg), Secret Documents Bearing on the Belligerent Policy of the President of the United States (of America).

Subtitle: Summarized Introduction.

Attitude vis-à-vis Germany.

The reticence displayed by President Roosevelt on his assuming office in 1933 in regard to foreign political matters did not prevent him from giving public vent to his anti-German feelings as early as in January 1934

Policy of Bases in Latin America.

President Roosevelt was keenly interested in building up a network of bases extending over the Caribbean islands and the area of the Panama Canal. A cruise taken by the President in 1935 to Cocos Island, allegedly for recreation purposes, proved the personal interest taken by him in the possibilities existing in Latin America for an extension of naval and air bases.

"Quarantine" speech of October 5, 1937.

As a first attempt to cleave or to ignore the strong isolationist tendencies rampant in the United States, President Roosevelt delivered a speech in Chicago in which he called the nation to arms against "the epidemic of world anarchy" and threatened to introduce a "quarantine". This speech proved a milestone in Roosevelt's career. For henceforth he openly ventured on a policy of interference in European and world matters. To quote Count Potocki, Polish Ambassador in Washington at the time, this was a welcome deviation of attention of the American public from internal problems.

France Driven against Japan.

President Roosevelt immediately threatened Japan. In addition to morally supporting China, the United States' Government brought pressure to bear on other powers, particularly France, with a view to safeguarding China's

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supply of arms. When, in 1937, the French Government prohibited the sending of arms and munitions from Indo-China to China, the President interceded personally. In this connection, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Washington felt called upon to warn his Government from attaching exaggerated importance to the assurances of Roosevelt since "the majority in the country do not share his personal views in regard to foreign politics".

In pursuit of his anti-Japanese policy, the President was also quite willing to forego the ideological and other apprehensions existing in regard to Soviet Russia.

"Education" of Public Opinion.

In his active policy of a determined rejection of everything the Totalitarian Powers stood for, the President was far "ahead" of his Government and, to an even greater extent, of public opinion in his country. To educate the latter in the desired direction, numerous speeches were made, with the help of which the President endeavored to instill hatred against Fascism and dictatorships. Beginning with the spring of 1938, the President's interest in European affairs became even more marked.

Influence of the Jews.

In his determined drive to "educate" public opinion, the President was ably assisted by the Jews, who, in the words of the above-quoted Polish Ambassador, constituted "the most able champions of the creation of a war psychosis". The virulence of their feelings in regard to Germany and the fact that almost 100 percent of the radio, film, daily press, et cetera, were in Jewish hands, constituted a powerful factor in favor of the President's anti-German (and anti-totalitarian) policy.

The Adherence of Austria.

The adherence of Austria being regarded as a concession on the part of the Chamberlain Cabinet, President Roosevelt redoubled his efforts to bring about the consolidation of the striking power of the Western Democracies. In pursuit of this aim, France was given irrefutable evidence of the attitude of the President by the latter's significant statement that, "were France to perish, America would also perish".

Neutrality Act.

The attitude of the President and the consequences evolving therefrom could in no way be reconciled with the Neutrality Act. However, the latter was never taken seriously by the President. Moreover, by various ways of circumvention, the efficacy of this law was rendered problematical. In this policy, the President was fully supported by his Government.

Munich.

Nowhere was there more bitter disappointment over

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the treaty made at Munich than at the White House. Not being in a position to turn back the wheel of history, the President did his utmost in order to bring to nought the future results anticipated from that treaty.

"Good Neighbor" Policy.

Beginning with 1937, there was also an activation in the President's policy vis-à-vis Latin America. Under the pretext of having to beware of Nazi conspirations in that continent, everything was done in order to promote the policy of trade treaties which, through Secretary of State Cordell Hull, had become a sort of ideological dogma. This policy of penetration, which was imperialist and pan-American throughout, resulted in --

The Conference in Lima in December 1938.

This conference proved a success in so far as it resulted in a joint proclamation to the effect that all Latin-American States were declared co-guarantors of the Monroe Doctrine, et cetera. For the rest, the Secretary of State used the opportunity for openly agitating against the Axis Powers.

Working Methods of the White House.

The energies devoted by the President to the pursuance of his political aims, were, to quote Count Potocki, merely a craving for self-assertion. By assuming personal control over foreign affairs, through appointing trusted friends to the posts of foreign ambassadors, et cetera, the President soon landed "on the dangerous path toward world politics."

Rearmament.

Parallel with his policy of agitation (Hetzpolitik), the President managed to carry out his policy of rearmament which was rendered acceptable by the people through the weighty implication that this was in the interests of the country's defense.

German-Polish Conflict. War Menacing by Bullitt.

After the setback suffered by the Munich agreement, Roosevelt devoted his particular interest to the study of the German-Polish relations, which seemed sufficiently tense for the desired explosion. The reports of Count Potocki throw a significant light on the eagerness and determination displayed by several leading officials of the State Department in their endeavors to prevail upon Poland (through its representatives) that an unyielding attitude should be adopted by the latter country vis-à-vis Germany.

Concerted Action with the Western Powers.

To clear the field for action, even neutral Belgium is given to understand how matters will be in the case

of a conflict. According to Mr. Cordell Hull, "it would take three days, three weeks or three months perhaps, but we would move".

Pressure upon England.

The policy adopted vis-a-vis England was that of relentless pressure -- of which the favorable trade treaty was but one means -- to drive that country against Germany. In this connection, Ambassador Bullitt was able to assure the Polish Ambassador in Paris that America had "most effective means of coercion", the threat alone of which would be sufficient to insure the pliancy of England.

Wire-Pullers of the Encirclement Policy.

Despite the most far-reaching promises, for example, to France, the President committed himself to no single binding promise. This was felt strongly by Foreign Minister Bonnet, who (in document no. 22) expressed the hope that the promises of support would be followed by more tangible proof of good will.

Outbreak of the European War.

Deep satisfaction must have ruled in the White House when, on September 1, 1939, the European war broke out.

Fight against the Neutrality Act.

Soon after the outbreak of war, Congress was convened for the purpose of bringing about certain amendments of the Neutrality Law, which resulted in the evolution of the Cash-and-Carry Clause. Neutrality had thus become but an empty phrase.

Non-neutral Measures.

In proof of the non-neutral attitude of the United States, the fact that America agreed to regard ships of the merchant marine which were armed in defense as not belonging to the Navy, may be quoted. Moreover, a notice to this effect was received "in confidence" by the French Minister President, while no such notification was sent to Germany.

The Panama Conference of September 1939.

The Extraordinary Pan-American Conference held on that date in Panama was a further step by President Roosevelt toward consolidating the results achieved in Lima and coordinating the work accrued therefrom. The dependence of the Central American States on the U.S.A. became absolute.

Zone of Security.

The security zone proclaimed at the Panama Conference

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was just a further stage in the "education" of public opinion, since its practical realization was foredoomed to failure in view of the impossibility to insure the inviolability of so enormous an expanse of water.

The Mission of Sumner Welles in February 1940.

In February 1940, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles left for Europe allegedly for the purpose of peace mediation. However, while Roosevelt's policy before the war had been under the slogan: "Rather war than a policy of mutual understanding", it was now guided by the principle: "No peace of mutual understanding (Kein Verständigungsfriede)!"

Propaganda Methods.

More energetically even than the President, Ambassador Bullitt in Paris had adopted a course the only outcome of which was war. Numerous notes from those critical times have been found among the French documents which testify to the unremitting zeal of Mr. Bullitt.

The Way into the War.

The disappointing impression made by the collapse of France was not of long duration. Other problems in connection with the systematic pursuit of the fixed goal arose. Toward this end, cooperation with England had to be intensified, et cetera.

In the meantime, further steps toward global war were undertaken. Yugoslavia and Greece were enticed into becoming belligerents and the Soviet Union was hailed as a welcome new partner. The "education" of public opinion progressed in the desired way; the Lease-Lend Bill opened new vistas for material deliveries, et cetera.

On December 8, 1941, at long last, the master of the White House had reached the desired goal -- in a war of the dimensions anticipated by the President. He shall bear the responsibility.

EAA/sf

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

RP

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 2/9/44

ADDRESSED TO

Mr. Early

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF
State
Dept

May 11, 1944

Memo. for the President:

This seems to me good. Could it go
over O.N.I. short wave?

E.R.

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

May 5, 1944

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

rec'd 0 1944

Recent discussions with friends on their reactions to Mr. Hull's recent general policy statement led to an attempt to reformulate these ideas in terms of what they mean to the ordinary people in enemy or occupied countries. Attached is a copy of the statement this resulted in.

While doubtless it is not exactly what such a statement should say, it does illustrate the kind of simple and direct statement which could help to reassure the common people of the enemy and occupied nations, and thereby help shorten the war and save lives as a result of splitting them from their rulers.

Sincerely,

Mordecai Ezekiel

Mordecai Ezekiel

*Relief for the
the
Ezekiel*

*J.P.P. This is a draft of the
statement to be issued to the
peoples of Germany, Japan, their allies,
and to all peoples of nations occupied by them.*

TO THE PEOPLES ENSLAVED BY DICTATORS:

This statement is issued jointly by the leaders of England, the Soviet Union, and the United States, after consultation with one another:

To the peoples of Germany, Japan, their allies, and to all peoples of nations occupied by them, we say:

- I. We are fighting to destroy the dictators who have enslaved you. We are not fighting to destroy the people whom they have enslaved and oppressed all over the world.
- II. We will fight until the dictators have surrendered unconditionally.
- III. After the dictators surrender, we will start at once to help you reconstruct a world in which you and your children can live with dignity, honor, prosperity, and freedom.
- IV. To this end we will see that those political parties which have supported the dictators and which have preached destruction, hate, and enslavement, are rooted out and rendered harmless. All individuals in those parties who have been responsible for crimes of terrorism and destruction will be punished by courts of the invaded nations where their crimes were committed, or by courts established by the United Nations. They will be held in the custody of the armies of occupation until their trials can be held.
- V. No member of the Fascist parties shall be permitted to retain property which has been looted from you. So far as possible, that property will be returned to responsible local governments for distribution among those from whom the Fascists stole it.
- VI. As promptly as Fascist elements have been eradicated, you will be given the opportunity to establish local government organs by democratic processes, for municipalities, towns, villages, and counties.
- VII. In due course you will be permitted to establish whatever form of national government you select so long as it is based on the will of the people, provides for free elections, free speech, and religious freedom of worship, and insures against the creation of new dictatorships.
- VIII. You will be aided to reestablish your production of food and industrial products as promptly as possible after the fighting stops. Relief food will be provided to check actual starvation, but after that your future food supply will depend largely on your own efforts. We will do all that is necessary to assist you in the rehabilitation of your agriculture, industry, and trade as promptly as possible.

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IX. The United Nations will operate the railroads and other transportation in your area under common United Nations' control until more permanent forms of organizations have been developed. When you have established responsible governments, you will be given opportunity to participate as one of the United Nations in the direction of these and other United Nations' activities.

X. We recognize that if the world is to be peaceful in the future, it must also be prosperous, and we undertake to see that the necessary steps are taken after the war so that the citizens of each nation will have the opportunity to earn prosperity.

XI. To this end we will see -

1. That no nation is barred from due access to the raw materials of the world.
2. That no nation is barred from access to the markets of the world.
3. That under-developed nations, or those which have hitherto been exploited for the benefits of others, will be afforded the opportunity to industrialize their own economy and develop their resources for their own benefit as well as those of other countries, and will be assisted in establishing a decent social order.
4. The United Nations are now in the process of developing organs of international collaboration and assistance in the fields of relief, agriculture, labor, monetary stabilization, and long-time finance. In due course, when your nation qualifies as a member of the family of nations, you will be able to join these organizations as one of the participating United Nations.

XII. It is recognized that the peoples of all nations have a common interest which can not be disregarded without adversely affecting the most favored. Our ultimate goal is to establish a world order consisting of a family of nations, each having due regard for the welfare and rights of the others.

To the peoples of Germany, Japan, and their allies, we say:

We recognize that you have been misled or enslaved by the Fascist dictators and the groups around them. The promises just made apply to you as well as to the people of other nations.

XIII. After you have reestablished the functioning of your industry and agriculture, you will be expected to aid in the rebuilding of those portions of the countries which your present rulers have devastated.

- XIV. We hereby enter a solemn undertaking, however, that the burdens of reparation which may be laid upon you and the financial arrangements necessary in the handling of those reparations will not be made so heavy that it will not be possible at the same time for you to create a prosperous life for yourselves, and one which, within a limited course of years, can leave you free to establish higher levels of prosperity, and better standards of living for yourselves than you had known before the war.
- XV. As we have already agreed at Moscow, an International Security Organization will be established. Among other points, this security organization will see that the arms industries are not reestablished in any of your countries. However, your nation will be permitted to participate as one of the United Nations when you have demonstrated your right to that privilege.
- XVI. As this International Security Organization demonstrates its ability to maintain peace and security in the world, it is our intention gradually to reduce our armed forces. That reduction of force this time will come after, instead of before, the world has become protected from future aggressors.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1944

*Ask Admiral
Brown if he has*

Memorandum from Stettinius re a proposed statement by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin addressed to German Army about further resistance. Supposed to have been sent over June 3rd.

Advise Extension 2119, State, if we received.

*Not in our files.
State will submit
a Re-draft*

WR

F-De

(3216)

MEMORANDUM:

Memorandum dated 7/10/44 on White House stationery, reading "Memorandum from Stettinius re a proposed statement by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin addressed to German Army about further resistance. Supposed to have been sent over June 3rd. Advise Extension 2119, State, if re received". sent to Admiral Wilson Brown, as per penciled notation "Ask Admiral Brown if he has".

7/11/44

PSF: State Dept folder 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

What do you think?

F. D. R.

~~Secret~~

July 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The favorable progress on the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts recalls a suggestion made in a memorandum on June 3, 1944 regarding a tripartite statement to the German Army. You and your associate heads of Government may deem it advisable to give this further consideration at this stage. For that reason a revised draft, shortened and brought up to date, is attached.

If Churchill and Stalin are agreeable to the idea, I would suggest that the views of the Russian and Anglo-American military leaders be obtained both as to timing and substance.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Soldiers of Germany, attention! Our assaults from the East, West and South continue relentlessly and with ever increasing force. New blows will fall.

Your defeat is inevitable. In your hearts you know this is true. You know that you have nothing to hope for from prolonging the struggle. Nothing you can do can change the outcome.

Your Nazi leaders led you into war to satisfy their lust for power and conquest. They told you it would be a quick and easy victory. You know now how wrong they were. You marched across Europe - to Narvik, to Bordeaux, to Stalingrad, to Alamein. That was long ago. Since then you have begun to feel the force of our overwhelming power. Your homes are smoking ruins. Your comrades have died. You who have escaped from Russia, from Africa, from Italy, from Normandy, have known the long and bitter road of defeat. Where does that road end? You know the answer. It ends in crushing, total defeat, and in your own homeland.

Every German life lost from now on, soldier or civilian, is a needless loss. You who will die will die without hope,
without

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without faith in your cause. For what?

Your only escape lies in unconditional surrender.

Soldiers of Germany, what fate awaits you and your country when you lay down your arms?

We promise you nothing. Germany has made terrible and disastrous mistakes. Germany must atone for the wanton destruction of lives and property she has caused. That atonement will be hard. The false philosophy of Nazism, whose falsity, evil and futility must be now be very clear to you, must be totally destroyed. I repeat, we promise you nothing, but I tell you again certain fundamental things.

The Allied leaders - Stalin, Churchill and I - have made it abundantly clear that we do not seek the destruction of the German people. I repeat, we do not seek the destruction of the German people.

We seek the goal of human freedom, for all men - a greater true liberty - intellectual, political and religious; and a greater justice, social and economic. We seek a world in which all men may live and work together in freedom and in peace. In that free and peaceful world, Germany, in due time and as she makes and proves herself worthy, will have her place.

Until

-3-

Until you cease your hopeless fight, until your leaders surrender unconditionally, the blows of the Americans, the British, the Russians and our associates will increase in number and in intensity by land, by sea and by air until our inevitable victory is complete.

13887

*Attached to
Circular to EF, 5-5-44
and Circular to EP, 6-2-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think of this?

F.D.R.

Secret letter to the Pres., 5-24-44, from Elmer Davis, returning attached note from Mordecai Ezekiel, Office of Secretary of Agriculture, 5-5-44, addressed to Mrs. Roosevelt, with enclosed suggestion for statement to the peoples enslaved by dictators. Attached is comment to Mr. Davis, 5-22 from Wallace Carroll.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Elmer Davis, Director
From: Wallace Carroll, Deputy Director, OB

There are some good points in this memorandum but it is unsuitable for our use for the following reasons:

1. It lumps together the Germans, Japs, and our Allies in occupied countries. It would therefore cause bitter resentment among the latter.
2. It outlines a very "soft" line to the enemy countries. For instance, it promises the enemy people that they will live in "dignity, honor, prosperity, and freedom." Most of the United Nations would be unwilling to subscribe to that.
3. It draws a very sharp distinction between the enemy people and the Fascists. This is a very controversial subject and, again, it would arouse objection.
4. It promises relief as promptly as possible to enemy peoples. This runs counter to the UNRRA agreement.
5. It says that the Germans and Japs will first be allowed to reestablish their own industry and agriculture and only then will they be expected to aid in the reconstruction of devastated countries. What a howl this would raise!

There are other criticisms which I could make but I think the foregoing shows that it is not a practical matter to proceed with at the present time.



JWC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. ELMER DAVIS:

For your information, with
no recommendation.

F.D.R.

6/15/44

The President says to file.

SIR

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~SECRET~~



RSF State

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

May 24, 1944

The President
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By *JS* Date MRB 2 1972

Dear Mr. President:

I return the enclosed suggestion with the comments of the head of our European propaganda, in which I concur. However, while this program seems unsuitable, I thoroughly agree with Mr. Ezekiel as to the urgent need of some statement to the German people, telling them as precisely as possible what would and what would not be done to them after the unconditional surrender of their armies. No matter how severe it might be, if it were only precise it would be likely to shorten the war in some degree, and thereby save an unpredictable but probably considerable number of American lives.

I recognize that it might be easy to shorten the war by soft terms which would save thousands of lives now, at the cost of hundreds of thousands in the next war which soft terms would make inevitable; and that no such solution would serve the national interest. Nevertheless I am convinced that even hard terms, if clearly stated, would go far to counteract Goebbel's propaganda of strength through fear. The cry in the fall of 1918, you remember, was "Better a terrible end than endless terror." There must be Germans, and they will increase in number, who would feel that way again if they were assured that the end, though terrible enough and final so far as their military power was concerned, would be something else than the complete obliteration which Goebbels predicts.

Very respectfully,

Elmer Davis

Elmer Davis
Director

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTSubject: Possible Statement to the German Army

Since receiving your memorandum of May 18, we have been giving constant study to the question of a statement designed to weaken the German will to resist.

We feel strongly that some such statement should be issued. General Eisenhower feels likewise. Ambassador Phillips, who has given considerable thought to it, has recently submitted a draft prepared jointly by him, Mr. Sherwood and officers of General Eisenhower's staff and placing more emphasis on military factors. We have accordingly prepared a new draft, which takes into account Mr. Phillips' and other suggestions and which is directed specifically at the German Army. A copy is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

If this statement meets with your approval, we would suggest submitting it to the Prime Minister and probably also to Stalin. We feel it would be wise to invite them to join with you in making it or to follow it with statements of their own, as they may think best. We realize, of course, that a Russian call for the German Army to surrender would not have much appeal but Stalin might consider such a message by you alone or by you and Churchill as an attempt to lighten only the task of our Armies in the west.

We believe the best timing for the statement would be as soon after D-Day as substantial progress has been made on the various fronts.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1944

*Will you speak
to me about this
at your
convenience.*


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Statement to Germany

Before Mr. Hull left yesterday he handed me your memorandum of May 31 enclosing Elmer Davis' letter of the 24th and the statement prepared by Mr. Ezekiel, all of which I return herewith. While there are some good points in this statement, we are inclined to agree with the points of criticism made by the OWI officials. In addition, in view of our understanding of the British reaction to the statement recently submitted to the Prime Minister, it would seem to be clear that they would consider this statement "too soft".

We have for some time been giving serious thought to the whole question of a statement to Germany and I will be sending you almost immediately a separate memorandum on this subject.

Enclosures:
As stated above.



HSE

more info. from
2-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reaction in Iraq to Republican
Plank Regarding Palestine.

I believe that you will be interested in the attached paraphrase of a telegram from our Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, summarizing conversations which he has had with members of the Iraqi Government regarding the Palestine plank in the Republican platform. (This plank is similar to that just adopted by the Democratic Convention and in effect provides for free immigration into Palestine and the creation there of a Jewish State.)

You will note that while the Iraqi Government appreciates the fact that a party platform is not the same as a Government policy, the Cabinet decided to ask Mr. Henderson to inform us that the Iraqi Government is deeply concerned lest the Zionists take advantage of the political situation in this country to commit both major parties to a course which would not be in accord with the war aims of the United Nations.

I have no doubt but that the reaction in the Arab world to the Democratic plank on Palestine will be similar, and in view of the strategic importance to us of the Near East, I believe that it would be advisable for leaders of both parties to refrain from making statements on Palestine during the campaign that might tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious balance of forces in Palestine itself.

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of
telegram no. 167,
dated July 18, 1 p.m.,
from Baghdad.

C.H.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 7/25/44

ADDRESSED TO

The President

RECEIVED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72By Date MAR 2 1972

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: ALLEGATION, Baghdad
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: July 18, 1944, 1 p.m.
NUMBER: 167.

On July 15 I was told by the Foreign Minister, and on July 16 by the Prime Minister, that the insertion of a Zionist plank in the platform of the Republican Party had perturbed the members of the Government of Iraq and that it was their hope that the true sentiments of the large number of United States citizens who are members of the Republican Party were not expressed in this plank. I was told by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there had been a discussion of this matter in the Iraqi Cabinet, that a decision had been reached to ban the publication of this item at least for the time being in the local press so as not to stir up any resentment and that the Cabinet had selected him to make the suggestion that I inform my Government of the Iraqi Government's deep concern lest by taking advantage of the internal political situation in the United States the Zionists might be successful in committing both of the leading American political parties to a course of action which would not conform to the principles for which the United Nations are waging war.

Although, as the Foreign Minister pointed out, it was appreciated that the political parties in the United States did not speak for the Government and that a party platform was quite another thing from a policy of the Government, it was felt that commitments made before the election might influence the Government's policies following the election.

It was the conviction of the Iraqi Government that the maintenance of truly friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Arab countries on the other was important to the development of the Arab world. It was the policy of the Government of Iraq to cultivate those relations assiduously. If, however, the American and British Governments under the pressure of Zionist schemers were to turn over Palestine to Zionist control, it would be impossible for any Iraqi Government to stem the wave of indignation which would arise spontaneously in Iraq. Speaking frankly, the Foreign Minister added, he felt that all that had been accomplished in creating friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain and Iraq would instantly be destroyed.

Since

- 2 -

Since there was no ground for a protest, the Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked, he was not making a protest but he felt it to be his duty to express the concern which he and his colleagues felt and to inform the Government of the United States of the serious character of the problems which the Government of Iraq would face if the Republican pro-Zionist plank were to become the policy of the Government of the United States.

In thanking the Minister for his frankness, I pointed out that he had been quite correct in drawing a distinction between Government policies and party platforms and that I hoped his Government would bear in mind that in the United States there is no one except the Government who speaks for the Government of the United States. I also expressed the hope that neither the Iraqi press nor the Iraqi Government should become unduly excited during the coming campaign at utterances which would be made. In making this latter observation, I made it clear that I had no intention of implying that I was giving any intimation of what might eventually be the Palestine policy of the American Government. What that policy would be I did not know, and I doubted whether anyone else in the United States knew precisely. In any event, I added, at the present time Palestine policy was not being either formulated or carried out by the United States.

HENDERSON