

Louis H Bean Papers  
Box 19 Folder: Palestine  
Subject File, 1923-1953

*Volume*

QUESTIONS TO BE DEALT WITH BY TECHNICAL STUDY NO. 11

THE JEWISH REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THE SUPPLY OF  
IMMIGRANTS FOR PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENT, 1945-1955

- A The Supply of Jewish Refugees
1. What will be the number of displaced Jews in continental Europe at the end of hostilities? What will be their age distribution, physical condition, and immediate value as a labor force? How quickly could they be made valuable members of a labor force?
  2. What evidence exists of the desire of these displaced Jews to emigrate to Palestine? How could such evidence be secured now or after the termination of hostilities?
- B The Supply of Non-Refugee Immigrants For Palestinian Expansion
1. From what countries can substantial numbers of non-Jewish refugees be expected to emigrate to Palestine in the decade 1945-1955? In what numbers?
  2. What are the probable occupational characteristics, economic status, etc. of such non-refugee immigrants?
- C The Probable Costs Of Refugee Rehabilitation In Palestine
1. What experience has Palestine of the per capita cost of rehabilitating refugees of various kinds?
  2. To what extent are these past costs a reasonable indication of the probable outlays that would be involved per capita in post-war refugee settlement?
    - a. To what extent is past cost experience modified by the availability of war-constructed barracks and of other military equipment?
    - b. To what extent is past cost experience modified by shifts in price levels and by a changed situation with respect to shipping and supply?
    - c. To what extent is the experience of the past in handling a relatively few refugees at any one time invalidated by the change in the scale of the problems from a few thousands to hundreds of thousands? What is the elasticity of supply of food, clothing, housing, medical services, etc. in Palestine in terms of the increase in requirements projected?
- D The Probable Costs of Non-Refugee Immigrant Services For Palestine
1. What costs are likely to be incurred in facilitating non-refugee immigration into Palestine?
  2. Are these costs warranted? How do they compare with those of other countries which encourage immigration?

**E Analysis of Advantages And Disadvantages Of Mass Jewish Refugee Rehabilitation In Palestine**

1. Is there reason to believe that it will be cheaper to rehabilitate large numbers of refugees in Palestine after the war than in the United States or several other countries?
2. Will UNRRA funds or other public funds (including reparations) be more readily available if rehabilitation takes place outside of Palestine?
3. Does Palestine have an advantage in handling refugees through the availability of an effective, functioning organization which approaches the refugee in a welcoming spirit as a potential asset?
4. To what extent is the locus of refugee rehabilitation necessarily determined by the consideration that the temporary guest is likely to become a permanent resident?
5. Should refugees be brought into Palestine for rehabilitation only if it is reasonably sure that they will be legally and politically acceptable as immigrants if they desire to stay?
6. Should refugees be brought into Palestine for rehabilitation only if there is a reasonable outlook that economic expansion will permit their unsubsidized employment at presently prevailing wages when their physical and psychological rehabilitation has been completed?

**F Conclusions And Policy Suggestions**

1. The probable supply of refugees and non-refugee immigrants
2. The cost problem in rehabilitation and immigration
3. The long-term political and economic commitments involved in immediate policy determinations
4. Suggested policies on refugee rehabilitation and immigration.

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OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
Washington, D. C.

June 11, 1942

Dear Miss Taylor:

Thank you for your report of June 5. I quite understand the difficulties you encounter in submitting a report, and I deeply appreciate the conscientiousness with which you approach this task.

It would be difficult to comment adequately on your letter without devoting as much time and space to a reply as you did to the original letter. Suffice to say that your observations are most interesting, highly relevant, and have been enormously helpful to us in supplementing our material on labor, farm, and Negro groups and media.

A problem that seems to us of importance, not alone itself, but also as a manifestation of divisionist thought and susceptibility to the Axis line, is anti-Semitism. I should appreciate your including this subject in your next report. Some of the questions are: What form does anti-Semitism take in your community? Is it increasing or decreasing in intensity? Among what groups is it most prevalent?

Another question that seems to be of increasing importance to the war effort is post-war planning and post-war thinking. How much are the people thinking about post-war problems and organization? What do they expect? What do they want?

Looking forward to your observations on these subjects,  
I am

Sincerely yours,

R. KEITH KANE  
Assistant Director  
In Charge, Bureau of  
Intelligence.

Miss Ruth Taylor  
Charles Steisle, Inc.  
512 Fifth Avenue  
New York City

July  
Third  
1942

Mr. Keith Kane  
Office of Facts and Figures  
Office of Emergency Management  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kane:

To take up the first question in your letter of June 19th, that of anti-Semitism - we would, of course, be deluding ourselves if we did not admit that the manifestations of this anti-American "ism" are definitely on the increase. However, anti-Semitism cannot be treated as one specific problem or even as a result of divisionist thought or susceptibility to the Axis line. If we consider anti-Semitism as just that we are no better off in the end than we were in the beginning. It is the equivalent of stopping a headache without getting at its cause.

The three groups with which I deal represent three different phases of this picture. Anti-Semitism among Labor is a religious issue. Among the Negroes it is a class struggle and among the Rural groups it is a conflict of nationalism. Counteractive work must be handled in a different manner with each group.

To clarify my point, let me take up the three groups in order. First, anti-Semitism has made less headway among labor men than it has among any other group. This is not from any keener perception or greater nobility of character on the part of Labor, but simply because force of circumstances made it expedient not to discriminate. This has not only become a habit, but the constant contacts of people of different origins in a common effort have made for greater understanding. It is this same quality that make Organized Labor a bulwark against mob action. As long as there is a strong Organized Labor movement which gives even lip service to the principles of equality and fair play for all, we will have no mobs. I wish some of those who would like to destroy the Labor movement would realize the mob potentialities of unorganized, dissatisfied people.

But to get back to the subject - when anti-Semitism enters into any labor group it does so on a religious issue, not, however, because of a conflict of religions, for there is seldom anti-Semitism against the Jew because of his religion. Labor, and by this I mean primarily the A.F. of L., (for my C.I.O. followers consist primarily of those who knew there was a war before Russia was attacked) is strongly anti-Communist, more strongly so than any other group in the country because it has had to suffer more from their tactics than any other group, and propagandists playing upon this, ignore the fact that comparatively few Jews are Communists. They stress only the utterances of the vocal minority.

One of the most significant features of the Rutgers Conference was the way in which each speaker was forced to declare himself as to his stand

on all "ians" and to condemn Communism as well as Nazism.

Labor is highly religious - and, therefore, the appeal to anti-Semitism among labor has been by generalizing about those Jews who, denying all faith, advocated or lauded Communism with its atheistic background. The issue is religion against atheism. One of the strongest bulwarks against anti-Semitism in the labor movement has been the fact that David Dubinsky and Max Zaritsky are amongst the leaders of the anti-Communists.

There was an attempt last fall, or a rumored attempt, that there was to be a concerted anti-Semitism drive in the labor movement. You probably know the whole story and, as it was all tied up with various personalities, I shall not go into it here. At the time, it was passed on to the proper authorities. The major attack was never made and the minor ones, while distinctly annoying, have remained minor.

The danger spots of anti-Semitism in labor are places like New England, where they overlook the fact that the Battle of the Boyne was fought some three hundred years ago, and in certain middle western and western cities where the percentage of Jews has gone up sharply in the past ten or twenty years. In both instances we have complications in the attitude towards "foreigners" which I will write of with respect to the rural group.

I find the best way to fight any touch of anti-Semitism in the labor press is by constantly reminding them of their own religious responsibilities. They are always keenly responsive to an appeal.

\* \* \* \* \*

With the Negroes, it is a class problem. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, it is the logical result of the attitude of the half-baked publicity seeking radicals who have grouped Negroes, Jews and Mexicans as minority groups of common status. This has resulted not only in classing the Jew as a non-white, but it has also made the Negro feel that the Jew should stay down at his level and be under the same handicaps. I had an illustration of this the other day. A Negro who was in my office discussing how anti-Semitism was growing among the Negroes, told me that when he was in college up north he had gotten on very well with the Jews because they were always lumped together as minorities, but that he very much resented the attitude of the Jews down south "who took the same stand as the Whites."

The cleavage attitude is the basis of the Axis anti-Semitism propaganda to Negroes. The groundwork was prepared by certain Jews who were ultra liberal, but the structure has been built upon by definitely subversive anti-Semitic elements. I call this a class struggle because in the Negro's mind it is definitely a class resentment and is being fanned as such with, of course, the main idea of creating a spring-board for the development of a racist theory.

\* \* \* \* \*

Third, among the rural groups the attack is from a national angle. There is no real hatred of the Jew similar to the quick flare-up of intense dislike between Catholics and Protestants. There is no insurmountable barrier of religious belief. There is no feeling of class difference, but in the last years there has been a steady growth of feeling that the Jew is not an American. This was to a certain extent increased as the pub-

licity about Palestine has increased. The Jew is classed as a foreigner by many rural Americans, and you will never make the average rural group believe that a foreigner can be trusted.

In my opinion only a comparatively small minority of Jews have any real interest in Zionism or in Palestine as an independent state. But those who do have that interest are vocal and active, resulting in the impression that most Jews are political Zionists. This, I believe, is a grave error. A distinction should be made between those "Zionists" who look for Palestine to be the fountain-head of Jewish thought (a minority of the Orthodox group) and that larger group who are thoroughly Americanized and Americans and who think only that some place should be made available for the persecuted Jews of Europe in which they may have an opportunity to exist in freedom and in decency. This group is moved only by humanitarian motives and abhors any idea of dual citizenship.

The rural groups are apt to like Jews as individuals, but the minute they begin to band together, they create suspicion and where the seeds of suspicion have been sown the fruit is dislike. Unfortunately, like several other groups their all too frequently self-appointed spokesmen are apt to be those who can talk the loudest and say the least.

The anti-Semites have worked particularly among these rural groups. If there had been an equally strong propaganda campaign for the Jew as a citizen, the enemy attack would have made no headway. Unfortunately, the only answer was a vehement and vociferous denial of all charges which immediately created suspicion that the charges were true.

Frankly, the whole problem is one of merchandising. One of our valuable American properties - the Jews and what they have contributed to our national life - has been played up in an "It isn't really a bad product" or "You ought to see how bad other stores' goods are" type of advertising - which never sold anything yet. What should have been done was to put across a typical American advertising campaign selling the Jews as a distinct asset to the nation.

Understanding and education could solve the anti-Semitic propaganda among the rural groups. They are slow to learn but once, however, they get an idea into their heads it is almost impossible to get it out. It is therefore highly important to counteract this anti-Semitic propaganda before it takes deep root.

\* \* \* \* \*

Now to treat of the group that I find the most anti-Semitic. It is not one with whom I deal. It is not one with whom I could suggest a way to deal. Anti-Semitism is most strongly rooted among those families with incomes from about \$7,500 to \$15,000. The first conflict there is, of course, economic. Whereas labor strives for regulations so that all groups should work at rates of pay that would mean fair living standards, white-collar men cannot do that and they have been up against Jews who will work harder, for longer hours and for less money in order to get a start, so they charge success up to unfair practices and resent it.

They resent the Jews having a larger percentage in the medical and legal professions than their ratio to the population, and then complaining about not getting a proper percentage in industrial jobs. Also, frankly, it is

increasing because of the number of Jews in Washington in certain types of "front office" jobs. The fact that the critics would not, on a bet, work for the salaries paid by the government doesn't enter into it. It is an American habit to utterly ignore the actual salaries paid to government employees and to assume that anyone who takes a government job is fixed for life. There is an increasing resentment among the men in the armies over stories of commissions and quartermaster jobs, etc. The fact that there have never been any figures available to disprove these charges has prevented a proper refutation.

Unfortunately, one cannot dismiss this group of people by merely analyzing them as contemptuously as they deserve. They are articulate. They are leaders of small groups and while, if you talk to them, you would say they were intensely patriotic, they are the material from which revolutions are made. (There was a quite peaceful revolution of the middle classes planned to start last winter in one western state but I believe it fizzled because the war effort enlisted the leaders. Its plans, however, were quite unconsciously along Axis line.)

I don't know how this group can be reached because it is spread all over the country. It is impervious to argument and capable of believing only what it wants to believe. The only way I can think of to reach them is through articles in the magazines they read. There, however, the approach would have to be more subtle than has been the case in those publications which have recently had a change of heart.

\* \* \* \* \*

I don't know whether there is anything in this which can be of use to you. I am fighting anti-Semitism constantly both in my articles and in my speeches. The way I find most effective is to hammer against generalizations of any kind and harp on personal responsibilities. This is platitudinous, of course, but unless you can make anti-Semitism appear as the kind of cheap, common thing that decent people don't indulge in, you won't be able to stop it.

I had an instance of this one time last winter. I was speaking at the Athenaeum in Kansas City which is about as snug a women's club as there is in the country. They asked me, instead of talking about democracy, if I would tell them something of my experiences as a fashion editor. As this was sprung on me just about ten minutes before I was going to speak on "Fighting Ideas" I was rather at a loss, so I decided to combine the two.

After I had talked to them for a while on the technique of fashion reporting, I said to them somewhat as follows: "If I had told you today of a new way to dress your hair or of a new style in millinery or dresses, you could have made it the fashion in Kansas City - because you women set the style for the community." (They all nodded in complete accord.) I went on, "That is why I say to you if there is any racial or religious discrimination, if the children of Kansas City are learning to hate their neighbors because of race or creed or color, it is your fault because you set the fashion and you can make it the fashion to be kind."

The amazing part was while at first they looked surprised, they then accepted the responsibility, and I had more women come up and thank me for saying that than I had mention any other sentence in the whole three quarters

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of an hour speech.

You will never settle the question of anti-Semitism until you make it as unfashionable as eating peas with a knife.

I'll send you the answer on the post-war question within the next few days.

Sincerely yours,

RT:ls

Ruth Taylor

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Miss James:

Please put this in the super  
confidential files and leave there until  
called for.

Miss Hornick

April 20, 1943

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Y

## THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST

### PART I - THE FACTS

#### I. PURPOSE OF MEMORANDUM

The object of this memorandum is to summarize the facts and information collected during three and one-half months (November 1942 to March 1943), when, in compliance with instructions from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staffs, I visited the Near East.

#### II. MY MISSION

##### 1. ITINERARY

Although physically familiar with most of the areas visited on this trip, I had not been in the Near East since the spring of 1939. Fortunately, it was possible on this visit not simply to hit the high spots in whirlwind fashion but actually to spend approximately two weeks in each country — Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. I also visited Turkey and Iran in order to get first-hand information on the attitude of these neighboring states toward the Arab world. In addition I motored over 800 miles through Egypt and Cirenaica along the coast from El Alemein to Bengasi. My return flight to the United States took me along the rest of North Africa via Tripoli, Algiers, and Casablanca to Marrakech and Dakar.

##### 2. PEOPLE SEEN

The facts and information given in this memorandum reflects conversations with:

- (a) British and Fighting French military and diplomatic representatives in the various countries.
- (b) American consular, diplomatic, and military representatives.
- (c) American missionary and educational leaders.
- (d) Arab leaders both in and out of political office.

In my contacts with Arab leaders I was assisted by a list especially prepared for me by President Bayard Dodge of outstanding graduates of the American University of Beirut living in the areas visited. I also renewed contact with many friends of my father and mother who had served as missionaries in Syria for 50 years.

##### 3. PROCEDURE

In all my contacts I explained that I was there to collect information not to give it, to listen and not to talk. I hoped that they cared to give me their views as the information which I was collecting was not for publication in any way but for the benefit of the United States Government. In gathering first-hand information I was naturally aided to a great extent by my ability to converse in Arabic or, where necessary, in French or German.

### III. BACKGROUND - AMERICAN INTERESTS AND STANDING IN THE NEAR EAST

Although American interests in the Near East have centered primarily on the importation of tobacco and dates, and our exports have centered on films and automobiles, our main interests in the Near East, due to 100 years of missionary and educational efforts, have remained in the cultural field. The fact that these missionary and educational efforts were supported entirely by private philanthropic contributions rather than by Government funds has added to the prestige that the United States gained from these efforts. The standing and influence, for example, of the American University of Beirut, and of Robert College in Istanbul and of their graduates is hard to realize except after a first-hand visit to the area.

As a result, American prestige has for many years been extremely high throughout the whole Near East. This situation was strikingly confirmed in 1919 when, from the Crane-King Commission's investigation, over 60 percent of the petitions submitted by the people of this area gave the United States as their first choice for a mandatory power. This was over four times the request for Great Britain, which was the second power suggested.

At the same time, the fact must also be clearly recognized that American prestige has declined considerably in recent years and is still declining. Some of the reasons for this decline are suggested in the later sections of this memorandum.

### IV. OUTSTANDING FACTS

The outstanding facts developed in the course of my trip may be summarized as follows:

1. The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded as their only effective means of protest into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that unless they do something, when the war is over, they will be faced with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly harped.

2. There is clearly a hardening of feeling on both sides which is reflected in an increasingly unyielding attitude by the extremist leaders of both Arabs and Jews in regard to any compromise solution. Both sides are armed and indicate a willingness to fight.

It is common knowledge that the Zionist undercover military organization, the Hagana, has made plans and has stocks of tommy guns and machine guns as well as small arms. Much of this equipment was bought from French Vichy troops in Syria and has, during the past two years, been smuggled into Palestine.

The Jews particularly feel that with their increased numbers and with their increased stock of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American Military forces.

3. It is also increasingly clear that the growing interest of Jews and moslems in all parts of the world in the Palestine settlement is now so large that it makes quite impossible any purely domestic or local solution that might otherwise have been arrived at by the Arabs and Jews living in Palestine itself.

4. The outbreak of internal conflict in Palestine is obviously one of the major objectives of Nazi propaganda in this area. It is aimed at precipitating Arab-Jewish fighting at a moment when combat troops of the United Nations can least readily be spared for putting down domestic insurrection. Furthermore, Axis propaganda in this area has of late become increasingly effective because the Nazis have played down reference to Axis interests and have laid their main emphasis on the one fact that, if the United Nations win the war, the Arabs can be certain that they will lose Palestine to the Jews. Nothing could be simpler or more readily understandable to the average Arab than the Axis three-point program which in their daily broadcasting promises:

- (a) the elimination of all alien control, whether British or French;
- (b) the liquidation of the Jews in Palestine; and
- (c) "complete independence"

5. Traveling through Palestine one clearly realizes that it is not an unpopulated area into which an indefinite additional number can immediately be poured. For quick comparison, Palestine in area is a little smaller than the State of New Hampshire and already has a population four times as large. The figures, which, like all Near Eastern statistics, are only approximations, indicate the large growth that has taken place:

|       | 1920          | 1942           |
|-------|---------------|----------------|
| Arabs | 600,000       | 1,000,000      |
| Jews  | <u>70,000</u> | <u>500,000</u> |
|       | 670,000       | 1,500,000      |

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6. There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated. The Zionist press in Palestine claims the support of public opinion in Britain and the United States for its aspirations and the Arab press makes no effective denial.

Although the State Department has taken no official position in the dispute as to the correct interpretation of the Balfour Declaration calling for a "national home for the Jews", the recurring petitions of members of both houses of Congress have been interpreted both by Zionists and by Arabs as indicating clearly where American sympathies lie. Furthermore, it should be clearly realized that every American statement in favor of Zionism is within a few hours widely broadcast by the Axis radio to the whole Arab world in support of its main propaganda theme that a United Nations victory means for the Arabs the certain loss of Palestine to the Jews. For example, the December 1942 petition supporting the Zionist position signed by 67 Senators and 180 Congressmen was very widely broadcast by the Axis radio throughout all the Near East. It was, of course, referred to not as a petition but an expression of government policy. It resulted in unprecedented demonstrations against the United States that culminated in Damascus in the closing of the bazaars for several days as a protest against the United States.

7 - There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrian remembers that, after the last war and despite an overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France. As a result many pro-American supporters in Syria have for years felt the displeasure of the French and claim that since that time they have been discriminated against or passed over in Government appointments.

In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.

8 - Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower. On my return to the United States via North Africa I found in both the Eighth Army and the First Army American officers responsible for the security of American troops who were increasingly disturbed by the unenthusiastic, and in some places hostile, attitude on the part of the North African Arab populations toward the United States.

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They expressed fear of still further difficulties if the issues of a Jewish political state and of a Jewish Army continue to be pressed at this time. The uncooperative attitude of the North African Arabs reflected, in their opinion, the irritation of the Arabs at the behavior of some of the local Jewish populations in North Africa as well as the effectiveness of hostile propaganda which continued to claim that United States' successes in North Africa would only give greater support to the Jewish claims in Palestine.

9. From my trip through North Africa I also got the impression that American political efforts had, quite naturally and perhaps of necessity, concentrated on the problems of our relations with the various French groups or factions. The effect of our military occupation on the Arabs who form approximately 95% of the population and their attitude toward the United States had as a result not been given the attention it deserved. Furthermore, such information on the attitude of the Arabs as was available to American officers had almost invariably been received at second hand from the local French authorities.

Obviously the situation of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a very critical stage. But it is definitely unhealthy and now is the time when steps should be taken to prevent a further deterioration. The unfortunate British experience during their retreat in Burma is only too recent an example of the serious effects that a hostile rather than friendly native population can have on military operations.

10. Since Zionist propaganda and political pressure in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine. The Arabs in Palestine have on many occasions fought both the Zionists and the British military forces sent against them, and there is absolutely no basis for assuming that they will not fight again when they feel it necessary. It should therefore be very clear that a Zionist State in Palestine can only be imposed upon the Arabs by military force.

Bean

Washington, D. C.  
March 9th, 1944.

The following statement by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen S. Wise, co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council, was reported by the United Press this afternoon:

"The President authorized us to say that the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939. The President is happy that the doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home, for which our Government and the American people have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever, in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."