Budapest, Hungary

August 7, 1941.

No. 111

SUBJECT: Expulsion of Jews from Subcarpathia.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report:

On July 24th I called on the Prime Minister and left with him some statements on the subject of the ill treatment
to which certain Jews are alleged to have been subjected. I did not ask him for an immediate answer, but requested an examination into the matter. I have just received from him the following letter:

Budapest, the 2nd August 1941.

Dear Mr. Fell,

Last time you kindly left a notice concerning the expulsion of Jews from Subcarpathia near the Galician border.

I didn't fail to have the matter urgently examined and I can inform you as follows:

The expulsion-decree mentioned in your notice is exclusively applied to Jews of Galician origin, on whom an expulsion-order had already been formerly (sic) issued. All measures have been taken for supplying them with food during their transport. Provision has equally been made, as to the goods they are entitled to carry away.

Furthermore all those, whose illness could be certified, as well as those who are over 70 years of age, are excluded from expulsion.

Concerning other claims mentioned in your notice, a strict order has been given to all the competent authorities to strictly respect the expulsion-decree and to carefully avoid anything that would be in contradiction with its principles.

Yours very sincerely

LÁSZLÓ BARDONNY

His Excellency
Mr. Herbert Fell
Envoy extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary
Budapest.
In my opinion this ex parte statement puts the case for the Hungarian Government in an unduly favorable light, but I also believe that the dispatches sent by the American Joint Relief Association are at least equally prejudiced. Although the treatment meted out to many of these unfortunates has been unnecessarily severe and in some cases flagrantly unjust, roughness on the part of those in authority, and hardship do not shock the susceptibilities of people accustomed to the habits and standard of living that prevail in eastern Europe, as they would Americans.

Respectfully yours,

Herbert Fell.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HERBERT C. PELL

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.
September 7, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I have your memorandum of September 2, 1943 making inquiry with regard to the reasons for the continued delay in Mr. Herbert Pell's departure for London.

You will recall that when you appointed Mr. Pell as this Government's representative on the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes it was the general impression that Mr. Pell would be needed in London during the early part of the summer. However, on July 13 the Embassy in London informed us that it had received a communication from the British Foreign Office stating that, while the British were as eager as this Government to promote the establishment of the Commission, they were of the opinion that it would be unwise to assume that the Commission would actually be set up in the immediate future. The British pointed out that the proposals regarding the organization of the Commission had been made to the Chinese and Soviet Governments.

The President,

The White House.
Governments last March but that no replies had yet been received. It was also indicated that following the receipt of such replies the British would wish to take up several related matters with the other Allied Governments. The British note concluded that in view of all these facts the British suggested that Mr. Pell should not leave for London until the situation is clarified.

The Department felt that it could not do otherwise than to accept the British suggestion and accordingly instructed Ambassador Winant on July 17, 1943 to inform the British Foreign Office of the postponement of Mr. Pell's departure. The Ambassador was instructed that the Department was awaiting further information from the Foreign Office regarding the situation.

The Department on August 5 again telegraphed London requesting a report on the progress of the negotiations and an indication of the probable date on which Mr. Pell should proceed. The Embassy replied on August 7 that the Foreign Office had stated that it intended shortly to dispatch a communication to the United States proposing consultation of representatives of the United Nations to arrange for the establishment of the War Crimes Commission. The Foreign Office indicated to the Embassy that such a meeting
meeting would not convene for a month or six weeks after the invitation was extended. The Department has not yet received the invitation from the British Government to the proposed consultation to formulate plans for the establishment of the Commission, and in view of the attendant circumstances, it has been felt that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Pell to proceed.

In the meantime, Mr. Pell is on the pay roll and of course has been kept fully informed. He has been told that the Department believes that he should defer his departure until after the invitation has been received from the British and more detailed information is available regarding the future plans.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1943

AIR MAIL

My dear Mr. Pell:

I have your letter of November 11, 1943 regarding your work on the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. The Commission is, as its name indicates, a fact-finding body, which will be engaged in the collection of all available evidence with respect to war crimes with a view to identifying those responsible for such crimes and assembling the evidence and proof of their guilt. It is not contemplated that the Commission will be entrusted with the trial of war criminals. In the circumstances, and in view of the functions of the Commission there would be no occasion for it or its members to make decisions as to how cases should be disposed of after evidence has been assembled and turned over to those charged with the duty of proceeding with the cases.

The Commission will adopt its rules of procedure. Doubtless, the various interested governments will furnish the Commission with facts concerning war crimes and facilitate it in every way in obtaining all possible pertinent information or evidence.

The Department desires that you keep it advised regarding the activities of the Commission, and that you ask for instructions respecting any questions on which you may need guidance. Your written communications should be sent through the pouch of the Embassy at London and, when occasion arises, you may also transmit through the Embassy any airgrams or telegrams that may be necessary.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull

The Honorable
Herbert C. Pell,
United States Member of the United Nations
Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes,
Care of American Embassy,
September 17, 1943

War Guilt Commission

During the course of June I received a letter from the President offering me the appointment of an American Member of the War Guilt Commission which was to sit in London.

Apparently almost the very day that this letter was mailed from Washington I started off on a trip to Maine and was, for about ten days, out of reach of the post. When I returned to New York the first person I saw was Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles, who was up here on a visit, who seemed very much surprised that I had not received the letter. When I got it I telephoned to him in Washington accepting the appointment and asking him when he wanted me to come down for instructions. He said to come as soon as possible and that he would arrange an interview with the President. I asked him if I could not defer my visit to Washington by two days as I wanted to speak at the Town Hall Broadcast which I regarded as rather important. He said "No" - that the matter of my appointment required the utmost speed. I hurried down to Washington, saw several people in the State Department and had an interview with the President.

The general impression that I got was that I was to be ready to leave as soon as it was possible to do so. I arranged all my private affairs for a possible absence of several years, packed trunks and sent them abroad where they now are.

Nothing happened in the way of orders from Washington. So, after about a month, I went down and asked again when I was to be sent over. It appeared then that I might have to remain in the United States for six months before they were ready to send me. Last week I went down again and had further discussions with the State Department.

As far as I can gather, the British Government sometime early this year, suggested the meeting of a Committee on War Guilt and asked the United States to appoint a commissioner. At that time the British said that they would be more than satisfied to have an American chairman. Since then their zeal seems to have bogged down, there being occasional interchanges of telegrams, the last of which arrived about the first of this month.
The British suggested that the committee should not meet until there had been a conference of Ambassadors in London to be followed by a meeting of a Committee of Experts. After the experts were through, the commission would meet and, in the meantime, the British Government suggested that I should not be sent over.

During my last visit, in the past week, I could not help reaching the conclusion that matter of this committee was being handled in a very lackadaisical way by the State Department. The Department officials are very heavily overcharged with work and this problem does not seem to be the particular interest or duty of any one individual. I saw Mr. Hackworth, the legal adviser of the Department who told me that it was out of his hands and that I should see Mr. Shaw and Mr. Dunn. Dunn told me that he had nothing to do with it - no information or suggestion whatsoever. Shaw said that it was out of his hands and was a question of policy for someone else. I also saw Mr. Berle who seemed interested but could only promise to try to hasten the work of other people.

As an instance of the way the things were handled, the telegram to which I referred from the British Government received on the first of this month, has not yet been answered. Mr. Hackworth presented a comment which was sent up to the European Division where it lay for future attention. The truth is that as the War Guilt Commission is nobody's baby, nobody is paying much attention to it until all other unfinished business is settled.

During the three months that have past since I received my appointment I have received no communications whatsoever from the State Department except answers to letters which I sent.

I have been unable to find any clear definition of the duties and scope of the commission to which I have been appointed. Twice, as a result of conversations with the President, I have understood that it will have to set up a court ad hoc for the trial of war guilt and gather evidence. I know a great deal of evidence of German atrocities has come into the State Department in the reports of our various representatives abroad. None of these have been sent to me. I have not been sent copies of the telegrams received or sent by the Department about the commission or its work.
The Department officials appear to be very much opposed to the idea of an American chairman of this commission because they fear that it will be criticized by a good many people which is unquestionably true and that this criticism will badly affect the United States. The answer to this obviously is that there will also be some credit attached which will redound to our benefit.

Presumably the same thing is going on in London and in other capitals. The result inevitably will be that this commission will not be able to meet in time to do its work properly.

The extremely ill defined duties of this commission will have to be circumscribed and defined before the commission can get seriously to work. There is a great deal to be said for leaving these duties undescribed until the commission does meet and can look over the problem but the process of defining them is one which will take a certain amount of time in the early meetings of the commission. It is almost impossible to imagine that this preliminary stage can be completed in less than two weeks' session by the full committee in London.

The process of setting up the machinery of justice will take a good deal longer. We can certainly see that this part of the work of the committee will require at least two months.

After the committee has agreed on its report it must be sent for confirmation to the various governments concerned. The utmost pressure could not get agreement in less than four months. Difficulties raised by individual nations will have to be ironed out, the commissioners will have to go back and forth from London to their own countries quite frequently. This makes six months. Then will come the selection of men to act as judges.

The problem is entirely new. There are no serious precedents—at the most a few recorded circumstances—conspicuously the proceeding after the last war which warned us of the things to avoid rather than guides working rocks in channels.
4.

After the general rules of procedure and of evidence are arranged it will still require men of intelligence and great moral courage to act as judges. Such men are rare and mostly otherwise occupied. We cannot hope that the selection of the judicial body can be made in less than two months.

We can therefore see that from the date of the first sitting of the commission it will take an irreducible minimum of eight months before the machinery of justice is ready to work. In the meanwhile, of course, the commission should be gathering all the possible evidence from all parts of the world and subjecting it to critical inspection.

There can be no hope of success in this enterprise unless it receives the hearty cooperation of the governments interested.

All questions referring to this commission should be referred to a particular officer in the State Department who will be responsible for rapid consideration of all questions having to do with the War Guilt Commission as they come up.

The President, on various occasions, and also other high placed spokesmen for the Administration have, on several occasions, announced to the world that those responsible for inhuman outrages will be adequately punished. This they cannot be unless the commission is allowed, in the first place, adequate freedom of action and second, and almost as important, adequate time.

The failure of this commission will mean a great deal of vengeful massacre in Europe. The only possible thing which will restrain the armies of the occupied countries from entering on a course of indiscriminate massacre of civilians will be the assurance that there is already set up adequate machinery to insure rapid, firm and comprehensive justice. The soldiers from Norway, for example, who have seen their villages burned, their women raped, their elders shot as hostages, will not restrain their bayonets on entering German villages unless they are convinced that the vast majority of those responsible for their misfortunes will be adequately dealt with by a competent and strong tribunal.
5.

It will not do to pitch a mass of evidence into the lap of a peace conference meeting after the armistice. They must be assured that their wrongs will be taken care of. I therefore urge that the United States should take the lead in forcing the establishment of this commission. I believe that an American chairman would be more satisfactory to European countries than would the representative of any other nation.

The United States is, of all countries, the most trusted by foreigners. The proof of this can be seen by the case in which our troops entered North Africa with the French troops and the entrance of the English in Madagascar. The French authorities, in the one case, said that the Americans would leave, and in the other case, were doubtful if the English would ever get out. The greater confidence inspired by Americans over all the world is a reason for the acceptance of responsibility because given men of equal capacity, the American will have considerably better chance of succeeding.

HERBERT PEL

cc: Judge Mahoney
March 24, 1944

PERSONAL TO THE SECRETARY

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Some days ago I received a personal letter from the President, in which he says:

There can be little reason for disagreement on the general proposition that Germany and her satellites should be required to answer for atrocities against the Jews. I do not undertake, however, to pass on the extent of the jurisdiction of your Commission in these matters. Presumably it would extend to any cases arising during the war period, of which there are many. Those occurring before the war period, or which for other reasons may not fall within the category of war crimes, will have to be dealt with by the United Nations. I should suppose, however, that a large percentage of the perpetrators of atrocities in the pre-war period, have also committed, or have been implicated in the commission of, atrocities during the war period, and hence will be subject to punishment as war criminals.

In accordance with these instructions and with regard to their confidential character I made the following motion at a meeting of the Legal Committee of the War Crimes Commission, held on March 16:

It is clearly understood that the words "crimes against humanity" refer, among others, to crimes committed against stateless persons or against any persons because of their race or religion. Such crimes are judiciable by the United Nations or their agencies as war crimes.
It seems to me a very important question. In the first place, although the Jews have been the most serious sufferers, there have been many Catholics and a certain number of Protestants persecuted for religion, and a great many Poles and Czechs because of race. It was these offences committed in Germany that first aroused the conscience of mankind against the Nazi regime and which first suggested its horrors to the world. There is a universal demand that crimes against these unfortunates should be punished.

It can be said with a good deal of justice that however desirable the punishment of these criminals may be, it would be better to have them attended to by some other body. Without for a moment discussing this question, we must realize that there is no other organization in the world which can take up this question seriously and effectively. If the War Crimes Commission does not consider these offences, they will, almost certainly, go unpunished. I do not believe that it would be a wise policy to let them go, and to leave a large section of the world, intensely interested in this question, feeling that it had been mocked; that its indignation had been aroused and its assistance obtained by mere propaganda.

The machinery of the War Crimes Commission is amply able to handle this question and to prepare a scale of adequate
punishments. The German Government at least does not regard these unfortunate people as citizens of Germany but as enemies. They have even treated Swiss and Turkish Jews, captured in France, as enemies and deported some of them to Germany. It seems to me an unduly narrow point of view to say that we are interested only in our own nationals, and hypocritical if, at the same time, we say we are fighting for humanity and justice.

It must be remembered that the persecution of Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Poles and Czechs, regardless of nationality, has been carried on by the German Government avowedly because these people were the enemies of Germany, and to strengthen the military power of Hitler's Empire.

Almost all of the United Nations have officially promised the punishment of these crimes, and no organization other than the War Crimes Commission has been set up with the remotest authority to handle this question. For these reasons I believe that I have interpreted the President's instructions correctly, although there may be some criticism of my action on technical grounds.

I should be very grateful if you would suggest that Mr. Stettinius should see me during his visit to London. I should not want a long interview, but I feel that it would be most useful if I could see him for a short time. I believe this to be important.

Respectfully,

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Herbert Pell
BY AIR POST

No. 14800
London, April 3, 1944

SIR:

I have the honor to report that at the next meeting of the War Crimes Commission, the following proposal will be made by Sir William Malik, sitting as the substitute of Sir Cecil Hurst, the representative of Great Britain:

"The Commission is of opinion that the question of the punishment of offenses committed in enemy territory against enemy nationals or stateless persons on account of their race, religion, or political opinions, requires immediate consideration. Unless other steps have already been taken, or are in contemplation, with a view to such consideration, the Commission would be ready to undertake this task, if the Constituent Governments so desire. The Commission accordingly requests those Governments to state whether they desire it to undertake a study of this question with a view to making recommendations to that effect."

I believe that consideration should be allowed by the Governments concerned.

We have the materials and the habit of considering very similar questions. As a matter of fact it is only the principle of this thing which is important. Officers of concentration camps and their subordinates are not likely, in practice, to be experienced international lawyers and as such to have protected their personal interests by confining their attentions to certain Catholics and Jews, most of whom have been indiscriminately on this subject and are undoubtedly proper objects of our interest.

I do not believe, however, that it would be a wise policy to allow the Catholic and Jewish communities, and indeed any people interested in human justice, to believe that the United Nations, with our country at the head, were not interested in these outrages and did not intend to extirpate the soul of Judaism. We must either consider this question or allow them to reach the conclusion that everything we have said on the subject is mere propaganda.

On the question of the competence of the War Crimes Commission; to consider this case, I refer to my personal letter of March 24,

Respectfully,

ROBERT FELL
American Representative of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes
London, June 20, 1944

Personal to the Secretary

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing this letter partly to the Secretary of State and partly to the Chairman of the War Refugee Board.

The London papers today print the story of another wholesale slaughter of the Jews by the Germans. It seems to me manifest that something will have to be done to punish such actions, and the clearer we make it that certain punishment will follow, the more effective will be our effort to prevent the repetition of such things.

The Chairman of the War Crimes Commission, Sir Cecil Hurst, has recently sent a letter to Mr. Eden, pointing out that these offences against Jews have shocked the conscience of humanity, and asking if we are to consider them and make plans for their punishment.

As you know, I have been from the beginning extremely anxious to do this. I believe that the general public look on these persecutions as war crimes whether they are committed against people of allied or German nationality, and that the general public will regard the work of the Commission as having been extremely negligently carried out if we pay no attention to them.

In the effort to get something done I have been meeting with a certain amount of opposition, which was very much stiffened by Mr. Preuss's suggestion that he represented the permanent attitude of the State Department, and was opposed to the consideration of persecutions within Germany itself against stateless persons or those of German nationality.
It is true that war crimes are, in the strictest sense, confined to violations of the rules and customs of war committed officially by officers of a belligerent power against the citizens or officers of its enemy or of an occupied state. I am not sure whether they would even include offences against neutrals, and they certainly would exclude from the category of war crimes anything which a belligerent does to its own people.

If we accept this strictly limited definition of our powers there will be nothing that we can do to punish these persecutions on racial or religious grounds against German victims, which will mean either that nothing will be done or that another Commission must be set up for this particular purpose.

Among the victims in many of the concentration camps and in many of the individual massacres, we will probably find a certain number of allied citizens who could be used to cover the case. This would not, however, be true of all. To limit ourselves to the cases of offenders against our own citizens would of course lessen the volume of evidence and make conviction more difficult.

In my opinion the most important thing is the principle involved. There can be no doubt that the persecution of racial and religious minorities was the first thing which effectively appealed to the conscience of the community, and which first showed up the essential evil of the Nazi Government. It is undoubtedly the thing which has most offended the people of the United States. To disregard these persecutions would be a very bad thing. They have been denounced by the responsible leaders of every nation involved in the war against the Axis. To do nothing about them, and merely to consider offences against our own citizens, will expose us to the accusation of having dealt in cynical and meaningless propaganda, and should such things be repeated in the future this parrot cry of propaganda will be more easy to raise against those who denounce new horrors. It will also expose us to the accusation of being totally selfish and inconsiderate of abstract justice.

The announcement that these cases will be taken in hand by machinery already set up may make the desperate Nazis hesitate in at least some future persecutions.
I am not suggesting that the War Crimes Commission is the most perfect place in which this question can be discussed, but, as far as I know, it is the only organization in the world today which is in any way prepared to take it up. It has taken a very long time to get as far as it has and could, by a very little extension of its powers provide all the machinery necessary for the adequate punishment of those who have made victims in Germany of racial and religious minorities, most of which, but by no means all, have been Jewish.

I sincerely trust that I shall receive orders to go ahead as strongly as possible in this matter. I believe that such orders coming from the State Department would not only clear our consciences, which is a personal matter, but would settle the whole affair in conformity with the conscience of the United States and of the world.

Respectfully,

HERBERT PELL

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington.
My dear Mr. Pell:

I have received your letter of June 20, 1944 regarding atrocities against the Jews.

We have had these matters very much on our minds and have discussed them with the War and Navy Departments which, as you know, will play a major role in the handling of war crimes cases.

We hope to be able to send you a helpful instruction within the next few days.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Herbert C. Pell,
Commissioner for the United States
on the United Nations Commission for
the Investigation of War Crimes,
Care of American Embassy,
London.
London, October 20, 1944

Personal to the Secretary

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The War Crimes Commission has just sent in to the various governments a recommendation that courts should be set up for the trial of war criminals.

Two forms of court have been suggested, one a civil court and the other military. Several members of the Commission seem to think that their governments would prefer the civil court--others preferred military tribunals. The military establishment has the manifest advantage that it can be set up much more rapidly and can vary in size according to the number of cases brought before it.

I feel, however, that these recommendations are rather complex and that it would be a good thing if I were ordered back to the United States for consultation on this and other subjects.

For the moment, and I think for at least six or eight weeks, the Commission will not have anything before it that cannot readily be handled by Lieutenant Colonel Hodgson and Lieutenant Colonel Cowles, who are now attached to this office.

I have succeeded, I think somewhat to the surprise of some members of the Commission, in getting through the proposals for courts. When it was first suggested to me from Washington that they were desirable, I should say that not more than half the Commission wanted courts at all, and most of them were seriously opposed to military courts. Eventually, both have been recommended.

I should be very much obliged if you would have orders sent to me to return as soon as possible. I should like about two weeks for official work and ten days for myself. I am asking for orders because it is impossible now to cross the Atlantic except officially. I am also very anxious to see my mother who is nearly ninety and whom I have not seen for a year.

Trusting you will see your way to do me this favor, I am

Respectfully,

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

Herbert Fell
1. Germany
2. Germany's population in January 1916
3. German offensive, from political, economic
4. Attitude of people to political leaders
5. Estimates of casualties in Russia. Are they suppressed in the press?
6. Hungarian attitude to Transylvania
7. Role of Groups in country
8. Role of the press, other topics, national self-confidence
9. Evidence of acceptance of British for medical and a prison
10. Losses to the army: troops, civilians, etc.
11. Supply of key materials, e.g., rubber, cotton
12. Transports for country
13. Manpower problems
14. Conditions in concentration camps, treatment by the G.S. of prisoners, increase generally
15. Military conditions
16. German troops
    a. Policy for prisoners and R.S.
17. Opinion of C.S. women
18. Women and war work
17. Naturality of local police administration
18. Road construction, especially roads and bridges
19. Policing of common carriers
20. Comparison of different elements of public law

Steps:
1. Methods of investigation
2. Address of offices
3. Uniforms

22. Evidence of friction between steps and other

Second page
Most Hungarians dislike the Germans intensely. Although Hungary has been an independent state for the last twenty-two years, the people have not forgotten the long period of Austrian domination which lasted from the expulsion of the Turks to 1918. During the last fifty years of this period, Hungary was a distinctly junior partner of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and before that was governed directly from Vienna. The Hungarians feel that during the last war they were exploited by the Germans, and that at the Peace Conference they were abandoned by everybody.

As a general thing almost all classes of Hungarians have been at one time or another annoyed and incommode by German conceit and arrogance. Although a small people they have retained their national feeling, their language and cohesion through good and bad times, mostly bad, for a thousand years, and resent expressions of superiority from a people whose nationality dates from 1870.

Hungary has been for a great many generations one of the few countries of Europe which exported foodstuffs, and always in the worst of times the Hungarian people have had enough to eat. Recently discovered oil wells have provided Hungary with all the petroleum products that it needed. Today, there is a shortage of everything and all Hungarians, from top to bottom, know who to charge this to. The Hungarian peasant, accustomed to white bread
and plenty of meat, resents being obliged to eat black, hard, heavy, soggy bread, and practically no meat at all. The richer classes and the people of the cities do not like the idea of foreign control. The restrictions on their automobiles and the increased price of most of their comforts make a great deal of discontent. All around Budapest, for example, people, with the exception of the really poor class, have built little houses with gardens all of which have, because of the lack of adequate transportation, become practically uninhabitable to those who work in town. They all recognize that these inconveniences are the inevitable result of a condition brought about by the German Government for its own benefit.

The comparatively few soldiers which the Hungarians sent to the war were badly treated by their German commanders and have returned with a feeling of hostility to their masters.

The only people in Hungary who support the Germans are:

1st. A group of business men who believe they will get immediate profit and hope, for no intelligent reason, that they will be able to escape the fate imposed on their fellows in the other occupied countries and even in Germany itself.

2nd. A small privileged group terrified of communism and which does not realize that private property is as inevitably doomed under Nazism as it is under the most recklessly communistic system.

3rd. Certain out of place politicians, hopeless of office, who believe that a compromise with the Germans could be affected to their personal gain.
4th. And most respectable: A good many Army officers who hope that German domination would give them a chance of promotion, and are certain that Nazi control would raise the importance of the Army.

(b) Hungarian attitude toward the allies.

A good many of the upper class of Hungarians have travelled in England and have made English friends, but it would be absurd to believe that national feeling has been tremendously affected by the pleasant memories of a few sporting nobles or that it has been much changed by the experience of emigrants to the United States, or by the American wives of a small number of Hungarians. The few people inspired by these things are extremely vocal and make a certain effort to approach English and American visitors and are likely to make an undue impression on them.

The people at large know and care only slightly more about America and England than the English and Americans in general know or care about Hungary. Their friendly feeling is based on something far more solid than casual liking or pleasant recollection. They know that Germany is, of all the great Powers in the world, the one which can most easily overawe them and that the English and Americans cannot possibly do them any harm. It is manifestly to their interest that the strongest power should be the one which can do them the least injury, rather than the one which must be continually placated. The fact that their present state of unwilling hardship, and even more unwilling war, has been forced on them by Germany because of the inability of Great Britain or the United States to help them is the best possible argument for the hope with which
they look to an ultimate German defeat. Their preference of England to Germany will remain as long as it is possible for the Germans to send divisions down the Danube and impossible for England to send battleships up the river.

(c) Roumania

The Hungarians dislike Roumania and distruct its people and its government. Immediately after the last war Roumanian soldiers occupied almost all of Hungary and looted liberally. At the same time the Roumanians occupied a large part of Transylvania, which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and which the Hungarians regarded as a legitimate part of Hungary. There can be no doubt that a war between Hungary and Roumania would be fought with the greatest enthusiasm and zeal, which is a lot more than can be said about the present war against Russia.

(d) Italy

Most Hungarians look on the Italian Army with contempt and on Italian diplomats with aversion. This feeling has been strengthened by the attitude of the Italian Minister, who flaunted his mistress before Budapest society, which, although not squeamish, does preserve certain decent appearances. Ciano's conduct has not helped. He has made several visits to Budapest, during which his main occupation appears to have been drink and sleazy amours. They have not forgotten that the Italians took Trieste and Fiume from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and deprived them of their only access to salt water.

Russian War

Up to the time I left Budapest there was absolutely no visible enthusiasm for the war against Russia. A few people who looked on
Bolshevism as a danger thought that it was necessary, but no one looked on it as desirable. There was a great deal of complaint when men were taken from farm work and put into the Army, and an immense rejoicing when they returned. At the time of the British declaration of war, as I informed the British Government, there were no Hungarian soldiers at the front and only a few on guard duty in the rear. The soldiers who returned almost all expressed a dislike of their German associates. The general public took very little interest in the conduct of the war in spite of posters and other forms of anti-Russian propaganda.

III.

German Exploitation

All of the press in Hungary is controlled indirectly by the German Government. No news or editorials may be printed without permission. Although both news and editorials are treated with contempt, they have an influence on the people who have no other source of information. However, the most casual reports of third-hand gossip about news from foreign radios are usually considered far more reliable than anything printed in the newspapers.

The German political influence is extremely strong. Nazi representatives cruelly and openly threaten annihilation to any government which will not follow their wishes. It has for long been impossible for any responsible statesman seriously to advocate anything more than a policy of slowness and perhaps inefficiency in the execution of German orders; eventually these orders must be obeyed. During the early course of the Russian war the Hungarian authorities and the people at large did everything possible to delay the departure and to facilitate the return of the soldiers.
The British declaration of war on Hungary was a Godsend for the Germans. Manifestly it could not be followed up by any hostile act and it made the position of those opposed to Germany far more dangerous and their work less efficient. It promoted the subservience of the Hungarian Government to Germany. This effect was so apparent, even in a short time, that it was an important reason to make the Germans force the Hungarians to break relations with the United States, even though it would have been of manifest interest to the Germans to maintain in Washington legations of other Axis nations after they themselves had declared war.

The system of economic exploitation applied by Germany to Hungary is less ruthless than the method practiced in France but it is equally thorough. The Hungarian factories, which are few, must produce that which the Germans want. Their fields are stripped of grain and cattle to be sent to Germany; their railroad cars are taken by the German authorities; practically nothing is left to the Hungarians except what the Germans at the moment do not desire.

IV.

Attitude of people to political leaders.

About a year ago Hungary signed a friendship pact with Yugoslavia. In the early spring the war between Yugoslavia and Germany broke out. The Germans insisted on sending troops through Hungary to Yugoslavia and offered Hungary certain Yugoslavian provinces which had been part of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. This the Hungarian Government felt unable to refuse. (The Prime Minister, Teleki, committed suicide and for this act has been treated as a national hero.) At the time it would have been impossible for the Government to do otherwise.
Huge German divisions and clouds of aeroplanes rushed through and over Hungary; tanks and armored cars dashed through the city of Budapest in a solid line. They would have had no trouble in wiping out any possible Hungarian resistance in a few days.

The successor of Teleki was Bardossy, a very cultivated man with a great deal of diplomatic experience but extremely weak, who had no possible alternative to a policy of wriggling out of the inevitable as long as possible.

The Regent is universally respected as a good honest man and a patriotic Hungarian who does what he can to preserve the dignity and independence of his country. I think this opinion is justified. All during last summer, and especially during the Regent's illness in the autumn, it became apparent that a successor should be prepared for his office. The Germans were supposed to prefer Archduke Albrecht, who was very unpopular among the Hungarians; those opposed to Germany wanted the Regent's son, Istvan Northy, a pleasant boy whose youthful faults are more than balanced by a fairly solid head and a genuine devotion to his country. I was more or less in on this campaign. I always urged the utmost rapidity because it was apparent that German influence was on the increase. Eventually, just after I left, he was elected. If he succeeds to the office, he will be, like his father, considerate first of the interest of Hungary, and can be counted on to do what is possible to prevent his country being overawed.

V.

Estimates of casualties in Russian War

The Hungarian losses were very small up till the time we left in January. The small number of troops sent to the front and their
rapid return will account for this. They were mostly engaged in parts of the southern advance and did very little fighting.

VI.

Jokes and gossip in country

All during the time I was in Hungary there was a great traffic in what the Germans call Hitlerwitzgen. Most of these, as far as I could see, originated in Germany. Almost everyone coming back, particularly from Vienna or Berlin, arrived with a supply of new ones, of which a surprising small proportion were indecent and a surprisingly large proportion really funny. Of course, a great many were resurrected, slightly altered stories which I heard about the Kaiser, and which my ancestors probably heard about Napoleon or the British Generals in the Revolution. One story told of a Jew in Vienna who was seen at a cafe reading "Der Sturmer", the most violent antisemitic newspaper in Germany. When asked why he preferred it to other journals he said, "When I read the other papers they tell me that Hitler did this, Stalin did so and so and Roosevelt did something else, but in "Der Sturmer" it says that everything is done by the Jews". Another story is of a man who when passing a crucifix raised his hand like a Nazi and said "Heil Hitler". His companion asked him why he had adopted this peculiar form of salutation and was told that it was quite natural--"If it were Hitler on the cross I should have said, 'Gott sei gelobet!'".

VII

Prices, shortage and inflation

The general cost of living for all classes in Hungary has gone up considerably in the last few months, and is in the aggregate today about 200 per cent more than in times of peace. There is
an almost complete lack of imports. Good cloth, silk or cotton goods are practically unobtainable and when found are usually in small quantities and very expensive. Sporting equipment, golf balls, tennis balls, etc. are completely off the market. One rich family which gave frequent house parties was able to get only nine tennis balls for the entire season. On the golf course when a ball is hit into the rough the game is stopped and the entire party turns up until it is found. All forms of imported preserved food are rare and expensive; foreign wines and liquors, all forms of tobacco, chocolate, tea and coffee are hard to get and usually adulterated; leather, especially for the soles of shoes, is rationed and very expensive; bread and other foodstuffs are also rationed and are usually of a low quality; oil of all sorts, particularly gasoline, is allocated in very small amounts. The Hungarians all realize that this shortage is caused not only by the difficulties of import but by the enormous mass of their own products which the Hungarians are obliged to export to Germany.

I do not think there is very much inflation in Hungary. The price of American money has risen on the so-called black market not because of the redundancy of Hungarian currency but because of the confidence of most people in an American victory. They feel that all Axis money will become practically useless as it did after the last war. A certain reserve of the real stuff appears to many people as being a desirable investment and to make such an investment they are willing to pay nearly double the official rate for dollar bills. The real opinion of the people of Hungary, and of most other European countries, can be seen in the enormous rise
in the price of gold and of American money. It is perfectly certain that, in the event of a German victory, the value of gold will fall considerably, and of American money even more. No Axis Government has dared to allow the free sale of either gold or U. S. currency on its market since the beginning of the war, and there is no Axis Government of which the money cannot be bought sub-rosa in large quantities at better than official rates by anyone offering dollars.

VIII.

Evidence of reception of British propaganda

British news is not found to any extent in the newspapers which rely entirely on German sources of information. British broadcasts are frequently listened to and freely quoted in conversation with much greater confidence than those coming from Germany or other Axis countries. As a rule they are relied on for news not because they are perfect but because they are better than any other available course of information. British comment, however, is generally considered childish and the Hungarian broadcasts are practically useless. They very frequently take the form of vicious, personal attacks on the Regent, who is respected and admired throughout Hungary, and is usually considered a honest man, seriously working for the preservation of his country in extremely difficult times. The British propaganda seems to suggest that it is an iniquitous thing for Hungary to do anything except pitch headlong into a war on the British side, notwithstanding the fact that Great Britain could in no way help Hungary, and such a war would last only a few days, ending in the complete annihilation of the country. There seems to be no realization that Hungary.
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thinks first of Hungarian interests, and there is certainly no understanding of the fact that a Government sixty percent German is far less harmful to British interests than would be an entirely subservient rule. There can be no question of Hungary rushing out to suicide, but a great deal could have been done to encourage the group which wishes at any cost, less than the independence of the country, to minimize Hungarian assistance to Germany.

IX.

Supplies of key materials

Rubber, steel products, a great deal of leather and almost all manufactured articles come in, when they come at all, from Germany. There are great shortages in all these things. Tires, and even rubber heels and erasers for pencils are hard to find. Oil, which is produced in Hungary, is immediately seized by the Germans to such an extent that automobile traffic has practically ceased.

X.

Transportation

The shortage of oil and rubber has cut the bus and taxi transportation to less than a half what it was before; railroad cars and engines have been taken by the Germans for military purposes; they are not properly maintained and are all going down hill very rapidly. It was with considerable difficulty that the Hungarian Government assembled a train of food cars for the use of the American Legation staff leaving Budapest for Port Bou. The necessity was such that after two days steady running this train left the Spanish frontier, on its way back to Hungary, only a couple
of hours after the Americans got out. Engines, cars, railroad
stock, Danube shipping, and every other means of transportation
are worked too hard and repaired too infrequently.

XI

Man power problem

Hard work and animal traction are the rule in Hungary. The
production of foodstuffs and of manufactured articles requires
a far greater number of man hours than it would in the United States.
The making of necessities takes a greater proportion of the population
than with us. General mobilization, therefore, works a greater hardship
on them, which was especially noticeable this year during the
harvest when men had to be released from the Army to go back and work
on the farms.

XII

Concentration camps

Concentration camps have been established for refugees, particularly
Polish, and also for Jews. In these the condition is usually bad,
although they do not display the sadistic exaggeration of those in
Germany. In a community where the average standard of living is as
low as it is in Hungary, and where the distinction between the
poor and the rich has always been so great, prison life of any kind
will be pretty bad. It must always be remembered in considering
this question that the people of the eastern part of Europe do not
regard the liberty of others, or even their own liberty, comfort
or convenience, as seriously as we do. This can be seen in numberless
little ways. I have seen prominent business men whose offices were
up two flights of dirty, dark, worn, wooden stairs; the most in-
adequate and inefficient telephone service is accepted without
complaint; they suffer from cold or heat with far greater equanimity than we do; they will cool their heels in dark, dirty, uncomfortable waiting rooms. It is only natural, where the richest accept such conditions without complaint, that temporary places of forceable detention will be rather awful.

Most of the atrocity stories that came to us about Germans, although, of course, there are plenty of Hungarians ready to indulge in practices which are brutal, even according to the rougher standard of Eastern Europe.

Serious enforcement of the German anti-Semitic rules would be practically impossible. The great Nazi politician, Imredy, for example, had a Jewish grandfather; rich Jews have married into many of the big Hungarian families, and a very large proportion of the best doctors, lawyers and scientists are Jews.

XII.

Military matters

When I arrived in Hungary at the end of the war with Yugoslavia, German troops in transit were very frequently seen on the Hungarian roads, and there was a great number of them going through the city of Budapest. Sometime before I arrived, at the time of the invasion, I was told that there was a solid line of big German mechanized units crossing through the town. When we left, and most of the time when we were there, German cars and German officers were frequently visible, and, although they made no effort to make themselves conspicuous, they certainly did not try to conceal their presence. Along the roads the Germans had put up signs in German for the benefit of their military drivers. Outside the hotel where I lived there was, more frequently than not, one or two German Government automobiles.
These cars, and German equipment generally, seemed to be of very
good quality, able to stand rough work and hard usage. I have
been told that their military equipment is as good as can be.

The greatest fear of Hungary, if Germany loses, is of the
retreating Germans who undoubtedly will retire along a line of
own frightful destruction. My opinion is that they will burn
every city in Europe which they control, and every house and
factory; they will destroy the mines, farms, cattle, everything,
making every effort to turn Europe into a desert.

XIV.

Nationality of local police and administrative control

The local police are all Hungarian, but there is, of course,
a considerable number of Gestapo men and of German secret agents
going all over the city. Local and civil ordinances are left pretty
well to the Hungarian police and courts, but international or
political questions usually are under Gestapo supervision. German
agents have travelled over the country to such an extent that it is
probably true that German statistics on the resources of the country
are better than those of the Hungarian Government itself. I heard
a story, which may or may not be true, of some farmers who with the
connivance of the local Hungarian authorities concealed a part of
their produce to save it from going to Germany. They were im-
mediately discovered because German agents had previously appraised
the possible yield of their fields.

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It seems evident from my observation of Hungary, from that
which I saw while motoring across Europe, and from what I have heard
first-hand, that the Germans have lost all hope of establishing a Nazi order in Europe. Their desire was to divide the world into three or four groups, with Germany in the first class, providing all the soldiers and controlling all military, naval and air force, and dominating manufactures, especially of goods of military value. All higher education would be at German universities, almost entirely limited to German students. The policies of all nations would, of course, be subject to the consent of Germany. The rest of Europe they destined to supply raw material for the support of Germany. A somewhat similar, but still subservient, fate was reserved for both North and South America. Japan, although ultimately subject to Germany, and dependent on Germany for raw materials, would probably be left slightly more independent than other countries. This grandiose scheme has lost all hope of execution. The Germans themselves do not believe that they will be able to carry it out. The New Order will remain a blueprint.

There is no use, however, in imagining that German defeat will re-establish old conditions. That was the mistake made by the victorious Allies twenty years ago. In the United States it was, "Back to Normalcy". The business administration of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover was directed by men whose constructive experience had been acquired between 1890 and 1914. They tried to rebuild out of the wreck the social structure with which they had been familiar in their youth.

They were given all the cards in the deck. In the four years, 1914 to 18, the United States, from being the world's greatest debtor, became the only creditor nation. Our manufacturing plants, under the impetus of the war, enormously increased their productivity.
In the eyes of the world we were no longer a distant golden vision
but the greatest reality on earth. In every country, among the
allies, among the neutrals, and even in Germany, we were looked to
by all men, who had anything but a blind fear of the future, as an
almost inspired source of hope.

In less than a decade the magnificent structure was shattered.
We had, to use Harding's phrase, "More business in government and
less government in business". We continued on Coolidge's principle,"The business of this country is business".

During that time I was in continuous opposition to the National
Government and spent a good deal of time travelling abroad. I saw
the opinion of the United States held by foreigners change, from
that properly given to a source of inspiration and hope, to bewilder-
ment, to despair, and finally to downright hostility. It was the
last debauch of the 19th Century, but fortunately for us the crash,
when it came, was purely economic. When we were flat on our back there
was no one to jump on our face. That was the result of trying to
re-organize the economic policies of the 19th Century after the war.

The political dominance of the world, which we returned to
England, was lost in the same way, but it took twenty years to do it.
Practically from the time that the ink was dry at Versailles British
policy seems to have been directed with the single object of building
up the German menace as rapidly as possible. Again, as in the
United States, we see the control of old men inspired by ideas of the
past. They failed to realize that the balance of power was a different
thing when England and France had about forty million inhabitants
apiece and united Germany sixty, than it had been when France had
twenty five million, Great Britain ten or twelve and Germany was divided into a multitude of small states, most of which were for sale or rent. The policy of Pitt, who supported Frederick the Great against Louis XV and assisted him in organizing allies where he could find them, was right in principle but was wrongly applied, when merely to preserve names and to avoid thinking it was used to strengthen Germany with sixty million inhabitants and to weaken the alliances of France which had twenty five.

France too went in for this carnival of reaction. The Army was dominated by men who hated the Republic because of Captain Dreyfus, and commercial life by men who thought, when they thought at all, in terms of the 19th Century.

The German leaders are not particularly efficient men, but they understand that the 19th Century (which did not end in a burst of glory for the Fatherland) is over and done with.

I was elected to Congress in 1918. The election was a few days before the Armistice. I remember many people telling me that I was most fortunate in beginning my career in the Congress which would shape the destinies of the nation and of the postwar world. One old gentleman even went so far as to say that the Congress to which I had been elected would be the most important that ever sat since the first. As a matter of fact, the members of that Congress did absolutely nothing except play politics, preparing for the election of 1920--laying plans for the business administration of Coolidge, Harding and Hoover to protect the revival of greed and selfishness. No such thing as this must be allowed to occur again. The 19th Century
economic theories will not do for the present time.

I do not mean for a moment to suggest that in their time they did not serve a valuable purpose. It was under their operation in the 19th Century that the White race settled all of North America west of the Alleghenies, enormous parts of South America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The conditions of human life improved more in the 19th Century than they had since the time of Caesar. Nevertheless, they have served their purpose—their time is past.

We cannot expect, nor could we intelligently hope for, a revival of the golden age philosophy of the last twenty years, when we were told to look back on past days as models of future attainment. No one but a congenital idiot can seriously believe that the people will again tolerate the mockery of overproduction.

Today the people of England and of the United States are doing without many luxuries and comforts to which they have been accustomed, but they are not facing suffering and danger to re-establish Insullism and bull markets. If they are told that they must cut down on sugar because there is not enough to go around, or on automobiles because the factories are needed for other purposes, they will make these sacrifices cheerfully and without complaint, but they will not again tolerate such atrocious mismanagement of national resources in the interest of private greed as we saw during the twenties.

I remember only a few years ago a thousand hills throughout the country covered with sheep, the wool of which could find no market. In the East, factories with all the machinery necessary for spinning and weaving were empty. The sidewalks were covered with men standing idle who were anxious to work in the factories. All
this time there were millions of people in the United States in need of blankets and woollen clothes. All of this because no one individual could see for himself any profit in the wool business. This is a thing which the people will not peaceably suffer again. I should think less of my countrymen than I do, if I believe that they would once more calmly allow themselves to be mocked. Our factories and our natural resources will work, and our intelligence must be used, for the good of the nation. We must realize that the purpose of a factory is production rather than profit. If the present system cannot maintain production, it cannot hope to continue to live. We must devise a means to make the most of our great resources, not only during the war but at all times. It is debatable whether the world owes every man a living, but there can be no doubt that we must find a real use for the labor of every man or woman who is willing to work.

There are only two possible things that can happen. One is that intelligent, farsighted and patriotic men will lead their courageous and hopeful fellow citizens to the full use of all our resources and establish the greatest civilization known to history. The other is, that selfish and unscrupulous demagogues deluding the hopeless and the cowardly will, by the promise of one last scare, take us back to ineluctable chaos.