

Samuel Rosenman Papers
Box 4
Weizman, Dr. Chaim

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I saw Henry Morgenthau last night and we discussed what you had said about Ibn Sa'ud still insisting that he had been offered a bribe.

We both agreed that it would be well to hand you the attached copy of a letter which Dr. Weizmann sent to Sumner Welles last December, explaining this whole situation and giving the facts as he knows them.

The letter was sent to Mr. Welles with the idea that he show it to you but I do not know whether he did.

There is also attached excerpts from a statement sent to Dr. Weizmann by Mr. St. John Philby, who seems to have been the principal actor in the transaction.

S. I. R.
Dr. Ch. Weizmann, 77, Great Russell St.
London, W.C.1. 12/13/43
H. St. J. Philby. re acquisition of
part of Palestine for the Jews.

PERSONAL.

March 8, 1944

Dear Henry:

I have given to the President the enclosures in Dr. Weizmann's letter of January fourth, to wit, the copy of Dr. Weizmann's letter to Sumner Welles, dated December thirteenth, and the attached excerpts from a statement from Mr. Philby to Dr. Weizmann, dated November seventeenth.

I did not want to take time to make copies of them, so I wonder if you could send me a copy of these papers made from the copy in your possession because I do not suppose I will get them back from the President and I would like to have my file complete.

Many thanks.

Very sincerely,

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN

The Honorable,
The Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.

SIR/TMB

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1944

Dear Sam:

In reply to your letter of March 8th, I have had a photostatic copy made of the material which you have asked for, and I am sending it to you herewith.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Henry".

Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

42.
Philby Scheme.

13th December, 1943.

Hon. Sumner Welles,

Dear Mr. Sumner Welles,

It was with deep regret that I learned of your leaving the Department of State. I hope you will forgive me for troubling you, even now, with a matter discussed between us while you were in office; for I should like it to be brought to the attention of the President, and if you are willing to do me this great service, I feel that no one is as well acquainted with the subject as you are yourself.

2. You will doubtless remember that during my conversations with you I mentioned a scheme for a Jewish-Arab agreement, originally put to me by Mr. St. John Philby, the well-known Arabian traveller and scholar, who is a personal friend of King Ibn Sa'ud. This I briefly repeated to the President when I had the honour of seeing him. May I remind you of its main outline? The Arabs should relinquish Palestine west of the Jordan to the Jews if, at that price, complete independence is secured to them in all other Arab lands in Asia. Mr. Philby envisaged considerable transfers of Arab population, and a compensation of £20,000,000 was to be paid to Ibn Sa'ud. When Mr. Philby first discussed this scheme with me in the autumn of 1939 in the presence of my colleague Mr. Munnier, we replied that Jewry, however impoverished, will be able to meet the financial burden, of which part would have to take the form of Palestinian goods, or work on land to be developed for re-settlement of Arabs. But the political part of the programme could only be implemented by Great Britain and the United States.

3. In the talk with the President you suggested sending Colonel Hoskins to King Ibn Sa'ud. I felt reluctant to express my doubts, but, after careful consideration, I wrote to you deprecating the proposed choice because I know Colonel Hoskins to be in general out of sympathy with our cause. The position with regard to Ibn Sa'ud was extremely delicate. As you will see from the enclosed letter from Mr. Philby, he had put his scheme before Ibn Sa'ud on January

ary 8th, 1940. Ibn Sa'ud replied that he would consider it, if it came to him as a firm offer, but that he would disavow Mr. Philby if this attitude was prematurely divulged. Clearly he feared opening himself to attack by rivals in the Arab world on account of a scheme which might never reach the stage of practical consideration.

4. After leaving America last June I heard no more until the end of October, when Colonel Hoskins came to see me here three times in November. He told me that he had been to Arabia and had there heard for the first time about the Philby scheme. He reported King Ibn Sa'ud as having spoken with great bitterness about me, declaring that I had sent Mr. Philby to him with the offer of a bribe, which was contrary to his honour, patriotism and religion; and that he had turned Mr. Philby out, and would not receive him in Arabia again. Colonel Hoskins also reported Ibn Sa'ud as saying that the £20,000,000 was to be guaranteed by the United States. Colonel Hoskins further informed me that Ibn Sa'ud had sent a written statement to the President in which Mr. Philby is alluded to, but not named.

5. The assertion about the United States guarantee for the money compensation was obviously based on a misconception somewhere (see above, paragraph 2). I should be profoundly distressed if the President thought I had used his name in this connection, which was never the case. Further, I was astonished by what Colonel Hoskins reported Ibn Sa'ud to have said about Mr. Philby, as I knew that Mr. Philby had remained a guest of the King for quite half a year after having put his scheme before him. I was therefore relieved the next time I met Colonel Hoskins to discover that the report of Mr. Philby's disgrace had been merely Colonel Hoskins' own deduction: he said he could not imagine that the King would welcome back a man who had suggested so distasteful a scheme. Mr. Namier and I discussed the matter frankly with Mr. Philby, who has also seen Colonel Hoskins alone. Mr. Philby's view (as you will see from the enclosure) is that Colonel Hoskins' mission left matters much as they stood, and that if the original scheme was offered to Ibn Sa'ud on behalf of the President and Mr. Churchill, it would be accepted.

6. When I was in America you were good enough to discuss with me at length the Palestine question. I hope that you have not lost the interest in Palestinian affairs which gave me so much encouragement and pleasure. May I put my views before you once more in special connection with Mr. Philby's scheme? It is conceived on big lines, large enough to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of Arabs and Jews, and the strategic and economic interests of the United States and Britain. In my belief, none of the problems of the Middle East can be effectively settled piecemeal, but only by treating them as a connected whole. The world is deeply interested in solving the Jewish problem, the overwhelming majority of the Jews themselves desire a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, and expect its establishment to normalise the position of Jews in the Dispersion; the Arabs demand complete independence and freedom to achieve unity.

7. If the world supports the Jews in their demand for Palestine west of the Jordan, let the Arabs concede it as a quid pro quo for fulfilment of their
/claims

claims everywhere else. Our heritage in Palestine was cut down to the bone when Transjordan was separated in 1922. What is left is clearly a unit, and further partition of it would deprive the settlement of finality. If the whole of Western Palestine is left to us, we plan to carry out a Jordan Development Scheme suggested to us by American experts. This would also benefit the Arab land on the western bank, and facilitate transfers of population. A scheme on such large lines would be greatly helped by the backing of an outstanding personality in the Arab world such as Ibn Sa'ud. I therefore feel, in spite of Colonel Hoskins' adverse report, that, properly managed, Mr. Philby's scheme offers an approach which should not be abandoned without further exploration.

*Yours very sincerely,
Ch. Weizmann*

Enclosure.

EXTRACTS FROM A STATEMENT SENT TO ME BY MR. ST. JOHN PHILBY, 17.11.45.

.....It was, I said, on January 8th, 1940 - a few days after my return to Arabia - that I communicated "the plan" to the King. There was nothing whatsoever to prevent him telling me then and there that it was an impossible and unacceptable proposition - in which case I should have informed Dr. Weizmann accordingly and dropped the whole thing. But the King did not tell me that. He told me, on the contrary, that some such arrangements might be possible in appropriate future circumstances, that he would keep the matter in mind, that he would give me a definite answer at the appropriate time, that meanwhile I should not breathe a word about the matter to anyone - least of all to any Arab - and finally, that if the proposals became the subject of public discussion with any suggestion of his approving them, he would have no hesitation whatsoever in denouncing me as having no authority to commit him in the matter. I was perfectly prepared to accept that position, and the King knew that I would communicate his answer to Dr. Weizmann. He did not forbid me to do so!

So far from being a persona non grata to the King owing to my connection with this business, I remained in Arabia until July 21st of that year (1940) - six and a half months after the fatal communication, and practically all the time as the King's guest at Riyadh or in his desert camp. Indeed, on June 1st His Majesty made me a gift of a newly-built house on the assumption and in the hope that I should live permanently in Arabia. Time dragged on with never a sign from the King, and on a certain occasion when Yusuf Yasin and I were alone together in the desert I ventured to broach the subject to him. As I expected he was hostile, but, so far as I know, he kept my confidence and I heard no more of the incident. Still later, under similar conditions of confidence, I told Bashir Sa'dawi the general outline of the plan, and found him unexpectedly favourable; but within the hour he had told the King of our conversation, and, when I walked into the audience-chamber that afternoon, the King summoned me to his side. Didn't I tell you, he said, not to talk to anyone about that matter? I made some very lame excuse, saying that I thought he must have forgotten all about it, and that there was no harm in talking about it as an academic proposition. Well, remember, he said; don't do it again! Meanwhile, the European situation was having a gloomy effect on Arabia, and I imagined that appropriate conditions for the discussion of Palestine affairs would be long in establishing themselves. In May I decided to press the King for an answer, but, as I anticipated, he put me off again, - though without one single word of reproach.

It was entirely on my own initiative that I decided about the middle of June to leave Arabia for America. Communications with my family in England had been cut off by the closing of the Mediterranean; but, when I gave this as my reason for going to America, the King telegraphed to the

Arabian Minister in London to telegraph a weekly bulletin regarding my family. Nevertheless, I insisted on going despite the efforts of the King and the Amir Sa'ud to dissuade me on the ground that I might get into trouble owing to my habit of free speech. I answered that England was a democratic country cherishing the right of free speech at all times. In the end, unable to dissuade me, the King insisted on my recording in my diary that he himself had warned me not to leave Arabia lest I might get into trouble. On the very day of my departure the Crown Prince, who had come to the door to see me off, begged me to change my mind even at the last moment, and begged me to record in my diary that he too had tried to prevent me leaving Arabia.

I explained all this in detail to Colonel Hoskins in order to disabuse him of the impression that I was at any time, after making "the plan" known to Ibn Sa'ud, a persona non grata at his Court. As regards the future, I put it to Colonel Hoskins that the suggestion of my return to Arabia being unwelcome to the King was obviously susceptible of a very simple test. The very same suggestion had been officially made on before (in February 1941) and I had applied the test with the result that I had been categorically assured by the Arabian Minister in London not only that I would be welcome back in Arabia, but that he was ready at any time to give me the necessary visa for the purpose of returning thither. In view, however, of the withdrawal of Colonel Hoskin's original statement that the King would not permit my return, I did not think it necessary to take any specific action in the matter. I was, indeed, as I explained to Colonel Hoskins, completely satisfied with his explanation of the whole matter, and he readily accepted my suggestion that, as his remarks about the King's attitude to me had naturally shocked Dr. Weizmann, he should seek an opportunity of explaining the real position to them as he had done to me. With that, I brought the conversation back to "the plan". On his own showing, I said, he had known nothing of "the plan" until it had been mentioned to him by the King. It followed that he had not gone to the King with anything in the nature of a firm offer on the lines of "the plan" on behalf of the United States Government. A further statement, made by Colonel Hoskins to Dr. Weizmann (but not repeated to me) was that Colonel Hoskins started by asking the King whether he would see Dr. Weizmann that the King replied that he would consider the matter, but some days elapsed without his returning to the subject. Concluding from this that the answer was negative, Colonel Hoskins asked him whether he would meet one of Dr. Weizmann's colleagues? It was then that the King is reported to have broken out against Dr. Weizmann and the Scheme. Colonel Hoskins was now aware. I went on, from what I had said, that the King had sworn me to complete secrecy and had warned me that he would, if necessary, denounce me. That was exactly what had happened, and the deduction I drew from the whole story was as follows:

The King, on hearing that he was to be visited officially by a confidential emissary of the American Government naturally assumed that the emissary was coming to communicate to him a firm offer on the lines of "the plan". The emissary came with no such offer, but merely with the suggestion that Ibn Sa'ud should meet Dr. Weizmann or some other Jewish leader, presumably for the purpose of further bargaining

over Palestine. The King, fully accustomed to the tortuous ways of diplomacy, had deliberately refrained both from giving a definite answer and from expressing his opinion of Dr. Weizmann. He may well have thought that a few days of silent incubation would produce the firm offer which he had a right to expect if "the plan" reflected the desire of the British and American Governments. But Colonel Hoskins had no firm offer to make him; and when some days later he merely asked for the King's reply to his original suggestion about seeing Dr. Weizmann, His Majesty, realising that "the plan" had obviously not won acceptance on the part of the two Governments concerned, allowed himself, as he occasionally does in moments of disappointment, the luxury of a fit of ill-temper at the expense of Dr. Weizmann, the Jews in general, and myself. It was exactly what I would have expected in the circumstances. King Ibn Sa'ud is getting very weary of the ways of Western diplomacy, and he perhaps rightly suspects that the strategic, economic and political interests of certain Great Powers debar them from making any really acceptable offer to the Arabs.

Nevertheless, as I made clear to Colonel Hoskins after our very full talk over the whole business, his account of his conversations with King Ibn Sa'ud had not in the least shaken my conviction - a conviction on which I was prepared to stake my whole reputation, which was all I had to stake since I had already sacrificed my career by my fight for Arab independence - that, had he gone out to Arabia with President Roosevelt's firm offer, made on behalf of the American and British Governments, on the lines of "the plan", that offer would have been accepted. I could only draw the rather disappointing conclusion that the British and American Governments are not prepared to make the relatively light sacrifices involved in "the plan" even to save the Jews from persecution, torture and death. If, however, I am wrong on this point the opportunity presents itself for putting the matter to the test. If the two Governments are really desirous of an arrangement on the lines of "the plan" and are prepared to make to Ibn Sa'ud a firm offer in that sense, I am convinced that the King will accept it - but it must be a firm offer on the lines of "the plan", to be accepted or rejected as it stands without modification or bargaining. I have only my own conviction to pit against the views of Colonel Hoskin but no harm can come of putting the matter to the test. Either "the plan" is accepted, or the status quo remains intact without prejudice to any body. For my part, I guarantee (for what my guarantee is worth) that the suggested firm offer will be accepted if made by any reasonably intelligent person of indisputable goodwill on behalf of the two Governments concerned.

H. St. J. PHILBY.
17.11.43.

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SHORT NOTE OF CONVERSATION WITH FIELD-MARSHAL SMUTS, HYDE PARK HOTEL, LONDON, S.W. 1
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14th, 1943, at 10 a.m.

I met General Smuts at the Hyde Park Hotel at ten o'clock this morning, and though we had not seen each other for eleven years, we met as old friends. I had, however, a considerable amount of leeway to make up in order to put before him a picture of the situation as I see it at present, and this took about half an hour.

I described our difficulties and frustrations: the White Paper, and what it means for us, the Jewish Army, etc., and incidentally told him that because of the White Paper probably about 150,000 to 200,000 more Jews had died in torment because we could not get them out. I added that in a few months now, there would be a notice over the gates of Palestine: "No Jew need apply!" I described the gun-running trials, and told him that Englishmen and Americans were apt to return from Palestine with poisoned minds, to spread anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic propaganda, suggesting that the Jews were subversive, and attacking the United Nations in the midst of the war. They were trying to drive us into revolt, and at the same time they accused us of being subversive. It seemed that they were following the pattern so successfully evolved by Hitler: first defame - then you can do what you please with them.

The General listened with close attention, and at the end said that I had painted a dark picture. He thought I had changed a great deal in the years since we had met. I said it was small wonder if I had. But my attitude had taken a course precisely opposite to his own: he had started by fighting the British, and now everything was being done to drive the Jews into opposition to them. I think this made an impression on him.

I said that, so far as the Jews were concerned, Hitler had won the war, because he had succeeded in poisoning men's minds everywhere. He replied emphatically that Hitler was not going to win.

He asked me whether I thought the Jews still followed me? I said I believed that English, American and South African Jews still did. So far as Palestine was concerned, it was some years since I had been there and they might regard me as coming empty-handed. But I thought they would still follow me.

I told him the story about Ibn Sa'ud and Philby and the Prime Minister's talk with me about his plan. But more than two years had passed since then, and nothing had happened. I was afraid that such an atmosphere was being created as eventually to make it impossible for the Prime Minister - with the best will in the world - to do anything; his hands would be tied - the Administration in Cairo and Jerusalem would see to that. I said it was therefore essential to do something now, and the first thing I would suggest was that General Smuts and myself should meet the Prime Minister and discuss the matter. He thought this an excellent suggestion, and said he would try to arrange it.

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That more or less terminated the interview. I am sending him a written note of the facts mentioned in my statement. He will, as he said, "chew it over", and we shall meet again. He will then try to arrange the interview with the P.M.

In conclusion, I said: the picture is gloomy, but there are still three men in the world who could solve our problem: the Prime Minister, Mr. Roosevelt and yourself. I then gave him a short account of my talk with Roosevelt.

The talk, which was throughout most friendly, lasted about three-quarters of an hour.

SECRET:

EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES OF THE 21ST DECEMBER, 1943.

TALK WITH MR. AMERY:

Dr. Weizmann said he had shown Mr. Amery the telegram he had received from General Smuts; Mr. Amery had answered that he could not tell him anything about it. Dr. Weizmann replied that he quite understood that, but it seemed to him that things were going towards partition. Mr. Amery replied that there would only be a definite decision when the Prime Minister was back in London. After some time, Mr. Amery said there was one thing he could mention, and that was the Palestine Currency Board had accumulated some £50,000,000, so that there would be some money to give both to Arabs and Jews. At one stage, Mr. Amery said; Let them impose it on you; otherwise the Arabs will refuse.

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EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES OF THE 25th OCTOBER, 1943

TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER:

Dr. Weizmann said that there had been present at the lunch, besides Mr. and Mrs. Churchill, and Major Churchill, Mr. and Mrs. Attlee, Lord Portal, the Dowager Lady Reading, and another Labour man whom Dr. Weizmann did not recognise. Dr. Weizmann sat between Mrs. Churchill and Lord Portal. During lunch, Mrs. Churchill talked about Quebec and Orde and Lorna Wingate, and at one stage Mr. Churchill joined in by saying that he knew Dr. Weizmann had wanted Orde Wingate for Commander-in-Chief of the Jewish Force, but they could not have him because he was wanted for other work.

After lunch the ladies retired and Mr. Churchill had introduced him to the other guests in very complimentary terms. The Prime Minister said it was a long time since he had seen him, and Dr. Weizmann said it had been too long for him. Mr. Churchill then said that after they had crushed Hitler they would have to establish the Jews in the position where they belonged. He had had an inheritance left to him by Lord Balfour, and he was not going to change. Dr. Weizmann said he did not think the Prime Minister would change, but there were dark forces working against them which might force the Cabinet's hand. Major Churchill said they were all only human and none of them getting any younger; it was therefore necessary to act quickly. Mr. Churchill said they would have to take some chances. Turning to Dr. Weizmann he said "You have some very good friends: for instance Mr. Attlee and the Labour Party are committed on this matter." Mr. Attlee said he certainly was, adding that he thought something should be done about Transjordan. Mr. Churchill said he had been thinking about partition, but Transjordan was a good idea. He knew the terrible situation of the Jews. They would get compensation, and they would also be able to judge the criminals. As regards the position in the Near East he did not take for granted all the information that came from that part of the world. Mr. Attlee said to Dr. Weizmann that some of his people were over-playing their hand: they were sometimes threatening. Mr. Churchill said they should not do that. He personally would prefer one good row. He would advise them not to have a series of rows. What they had to do was watch the timing. He could not say publicly what he was telling Dr. Weizmann now: there would be questions, and he would have to lose time explaining. They could quote his public utterances, and say that he would not budge from them.

Mr. Churchill repeated that they had a number of good friends: Mr. Attlee was committed, the Labour Party was committed, the Manchester Guardian was friendly, etc. He understood, however, that there were certain Jews in America who were opposed. He thought Dr. Weizmann should try and win over Mr. Baruch. Mr. Churchill had talked to Mr. Baruch, and had told him he was wrong, but had not succeeded in persuading him. Mr. Churchill went on to say that he was not going to change his views; he would bite deeply into the problem, and it was going to be "the biggest plum of the war."

When Mr. Churchill mentioned partition, Major Randolph and Dr. Weizmann demurred, and Mr. Churchill replied that he had been against it originally, but now they had to produce something new instead of the White Paper. He had not meant partition in the literal sense - he then mentioned something about the Negev and Transjordan.

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Speaking of the Arabs Mr. Churchill said that they had done very little, and in some instances had made things difficult for us. He would remember this when the day of reckoning came. Mr. Churchill added that when the Palestine issue came up, he would speak out, and proceeded to give the headings of his speech. He finished off by saying that Dr. Weizmann need not worry - they had a wonderful case.

At one stage, Dr. Weizmann mentioned that anti-semitism was growing, and the Prime Minister said he thought it was not so, and Lord Portal agreed with him.

Mr. Churchill said they could not yet discuss details. On the subject of the Arms Trial, the Prime Minister clearly did not know the details, but said again that they should not threaten. He suggested that Dr. Weizmann should go to Palestine, adding jokingly that he had freedom of movement throughout the Empire.

At one stage Dr. Weizmann said that March 1944 was approachin , and he feared then to see a notice over the gates of Palestine: "No Jew need apply!" From Mr. Churchill's reply it appeared that they were thinking of carrying forward the balance of certificates after March 1944, and Mr. Churchill added that in a couple of months or so after that something else might turn up.

Mr. Churchill quoted, during the talk, the saying that "God deals with the nations as they deal with the Jews." Mr. Churchill also said that of every fifty officers who came back from the Middle East, only one spoke favourably of the Jews - but that had merely gone to convince him that he was right.

When the party broke up, and Dr. Weizmann said goodbye, the Prime Minister said: Not goodbye - au revoir, and that he would see Dr. Weizmann again. Dr. Weizmann said he was glad to hear that because he had understood that the Prime Minister was not very keen on seeing him, and sometimes urgent things arose which he could discuss only with him.

The lunch and the talk which followed lasted until 3.30.p.m.

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SHORT NOTE OF CONVERSATION WITH FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS, HYDE PARK HOTEL, LONDON, S.W.1.
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I described our difficulties and frustrations: the White Paper, and what it means for us, the Jewish Army, etc., and incidentally told him that because of the White Paper probably about 150,000 to 200,000 more Jews had died in torment because we could not get them out. I added that in a few months now there would be a notice over the gates of Palestine: "No Jew need apply". I described the gun-running trials, and told him that Englishmen and Americans were apt to return from Palestine with poisoned minds, to spread anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist, anti-semitic propaganda, suggesting that the Jews were subversive, and attacking the United Nations in the midst of the war. They were trying to drive us into revolt, and at the same time they accused us of being subversive. It seemed that they were following the pattern so successfully evolved by Hitler: first defame - then you can do what you like with them.

The General listened with close attention, and at the end said that I had painted a dark picture. He thought I had changed a great deal in the years since we had met. I said it was small wonder if I had. But my attitude had taken a course precisely opposite to his own: he had started by fighting the British, and now everything was being done to drive the Jews into opposition to them. I think this made an impression on him.

I said that, so far as the Jews were concerned, Hitler had won the war, because he had succeeded in poisoning men's minds everywhere. He replied emphatically that Hitler was not going to win.

He asked me whether I thought the Jews still followed me? I said I believed that English, American and South African Jews still did. So far as Palestine was concerned, it was some years since I had been there, and they might regard me as coming empty-handed. But I thought they would still follow me.

I told him the story about Ibn Sa'ud and Philby, and the Prime Minister's plan with me about his plan. But more than two years had passed since then, and nothing had happened. I was afraid that such an atmosphere was being created as eventually to make it impossible for the Prime Minister - with the best will in the world - to do anything. His hands would be tied - the Administration in Cairo and Jerusalem would see to that. I said it was therefore essential to do something now, and the first thing I would suggest was that General Smuts and myself should meet the Prime Minister and discuss the matter. He thought this an excellent suggestion, and said he would try to arrange it.

That more or less terminated the interview. I am sending him a written note of the facts mentioned in my statement. He will, as he said, "chew it over", and we shall meet again. He will then try to arrange the interview with the P.M.

In conclusion, I said: The picture is gloomy, but there are still three men in the world who could solve our problem: the Prime Minister, Mr. Roosevelt and yourself. I then gave him a short account of my talk with Roosevelt.

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SECRET

EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES, 23rd November, 1943

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SMUTS:

Dr. Weizmann said he had seen General Smuts at 11 o'clock that morning, and had had a very cordial talk with him. General Smuts had given him as much time as he wanted. The General thought that things were going well for them. A decision might be taken by Mr. Stalin, the Prime Minister and the President at their present Conference, and General Smuts might join them at the end of the week - or the beginning of next week. He suggested that Dr. Weizmann and Sir Wyndham Deedes should lunch with him before he left. The General said that the Prime Minister's mind was revolving around partition, which would give a good run to the Jews. He told Dr. Weizmann that he should not ask too many questions, so that he should not be committed. They wanted to retain Dr. Weizmann's leadership. General Smuts said that the talk which Dr. Weizmann had had with the Prime Minister meant more than they believed. Dr. Weizmann should not pay too much attention to what other people were saying: it would be the Prime Minister, the President, and perhaps he himself, who would settle the matter. The General said they had friends in Mr. Amery and Sir Archibald Sinclair. In the meantime, Palestine must be kept quiet. He would see Mr. Casey on the way back. He mentioned that Mr. Casey had spoken to him about the Haganah. General Smuts did not believe there had been organised "provocation" but there probably was a good deal of "panic" (he used the words "terror judaica"), which led to provocative acts. Dr. Weizmann said that such acts had to be stopped, and General Smuts said he would talk about it that day. General Smuts said the Government had great confidence in Dr. Weizmann, and Dr. Weizmann replied that they had a funny way of showing it, because he was not even allowed to communicate with his people in Palestine and America. General Smuts said he was surprised to hear this, and would take it up. The General suggested that Dr. Weizmann might have to go to Palestine. Dr. Weizmann told him about Mr. Ben-Gurion, and the cables sent to Palestine and America. General Smuts said if necessary they would arrange for Mrs. Weizmann to travel with him.

Dr. Weizmann said that at one time they had heard that Sir Douglas Harris was here and was advising on some kind of partition scheme. General Smuts brushed this aside, and said: "We will decide."

Summing up, Dr. Weizmann said they had discussed three points:

- (a) the stoppage of the arms searches;
- (b) communications with Palestine and America;
- (c) provision of transport facilities for Mrs. Weizmann if Dr. Weizmann had to go to Palestine.

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EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF THE 21st DECEMBER, 1943

TALK WITH MR. AMERY

Dr. Weizmann said he had shown Mr. Amery the telegram he had received from General Smuts; Mr. Amery had answered that he could not tell him anything about it. Dr. Weizmann replied that he quite understood that, but it seemed to him that things were going towards partition. Mr. Amery replied that there would only be a definite decision when the Prime Minister was back in London. After some time, Mr. Amery said that there was one thing he could mention, and that was that the Palestine Currency Board had accumulated some £50,000,000, so that there would be some money to give both to Arabs and Jews. At one stage, Mr. Amery said: Let them impose it on you; otherwise the Arabs will refuse.

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January 12, 1944

Memorandum.

Some time ago Dr. Goldmann told me that Dr. Weizmann wanted to write me about some talks he had had with Churchill re Palestine. I told him to tell Weizmann to give it to the OWI office in London and I would arrange for them to transmit it to me here. I arranged with Mr. Sherwood to do it and today a package of letters came in a sealed envelope via the pouch. My instructions were that they should be given to OWI to be brought over by some OWI man who was returning to Washington, but it seems they sent it this way. One sealed letter was addressed to me. One sealed letter was addressed to Secretary Morgenthau, which I am sending over to him unopened, and one to Mr. Weisgal, 41 East 42nd Street, New York City.

I phoned Dr. Goldmann and said Weizmann had no right to send this private letter over and I was going to return it or read it and satisfy myself that there was nothing which censorship might object to.

He said it was perfectly all right for me to open it and if there was nothing objectionable, he would call for it and deliver it to Mr. Weisgal.

I told Dr. Goldmann, who is leaving for London in a few days, that he should tell Dr. Weizmann to send me no more letters except via regular mail.

SECRET.EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES.23rd November, 1943.INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SMUTS:

Dr. Weizmann said he had seen General Smuts at 11 o'clock that morning, and had had a very cordial talk with him. General Smuts had given him as much time as he wanted. The General thought that things were going well for them. A decision might be taken by Mr. Stalin, the Prime Minister and the President at their present conference, and General Smuts might join them at the end of the week - or the beginning of next week. He suggested that Dr. Weizmann and Sir Wyndham Deedes should lunch with him before he left. The General said that the Prime Minister's mind was revolving round partition, which would give a good run to the Jews. He told Dr. Weizmann that he should not ask too many questions, so that he should not be committed. They wanted to retain Dr. Weizmann's leadership. General Smuts said that the talk which Dr. Weizmann had had with the Prime Minister meant more than they believed. Dr. Weizmann should not pay too much attention to what other people were saying: it would be the Prime Minister, the President, and perhaps he himself who would settle the matter. The General said they had friends in Mr. Amery and Sir Archibald Sinclair. In the meantime, Palestine must be kept quiet. He would see Mr. Casey on the way back. He mentioned that Mr. Casey had spoken to him about the Haganah. General Smuts did not believe there had been organised "provocation", but there probably was a good deal of "panic" (he used the words "terror judaica"), which led to provocative acts. Dr. Weizmann said that such acts had to be stopped, and General Smuts said he would talk about it that day. General Smuts said the Government had great confidence in Dr. Weizmann, and Dr. Weizmann replied that they had a funny way of showing it, because he was not even allowed to communicate with his people in Palestine and in America. General Smuts said he was surprised to hear this and would take it up. The General suggested that Dr. Weizmann might have to go to Palestine. Dr. Weizmann told him about Mr. Ben Gurion, and the cables sent to Palestine and America. General Smuts said that if necessary they would arrange for Mrs. Weizmann to travel with him.

Dr. Weizmann said that at one time they had heard that Sir Douglas Harris was here and was advising on some kind of partition scheme. General Smuts brushed this aside and said: "We will decide".

Summing up, Dr. Weizmann said they had discussed three points:

- (a) the stoppage of the arms searches;
- (b) communications with Palestine and America;
- (c) provision of transport facilities for Mrs. Weizmann if Dr. Weizmann had to go to Palestine.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET
LONDON, W.C.1.

13th December, 1943.

Hon. Sumner Welles,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sumner Welles,

It was with deep regret that I learned of your leaving the Department of State. I hope you will forgive me for troubling you, even now, with a matter discussed between us while you were in office; for I should like it to be brought to the attention of the President, and if you are willing to do me this great service, I feel that no one is as well acquainted with the subject as you are yourself.

2. You will doubtless remember that during my conversations with you I mentioned a scheme for a Jewish-Arab agreement, originally put to me by Mr. St. John Philby, the well-known Arabian traveller and scholar, who is a personal friend of King Ibn Sa'ud. This I briefly repeated to the President when I had the honour of seeing him. May I remind you of its main outline? The Arabs should relinquish Palestine west of the Jordan to the Jews if, at that price, complete independence is secured to them in all other Arab lands in Asia. Mr. Philby envisaged considerable transfers of Arab population, and a compensation of £20,000,000 was to be paid to Ibn Sa'ud. When Mr. Philby first discussed this scheme with me in the autumn of 1939, in the presence of my colleague Mr. Namier, we replied that Jerry, though impoverished, will be able to meet the financial burden, of which part would have to take the form of Palestinian goods, or work on land to be developed for re-settlement of Arabs. But the political part of the programme could only be implemented by Great Britain and the United States.

3. In the talk with the President you suggested sending Colonel Hoskins to King Ibn Sa'ud. I felt reluctant to express my doubts, but, after careful consideration, I wrote to you deprecating the proposed choice because I knew Colonel Hoskins to be in general out of sympathy with our cause. The position with regard to Ibn Sa'ud was extremely delicate. As you will see from the enclosed letter from Mr. Philby, he had put his scheme before Ibn Sa'ud on January 8th, 1940. Ibn Sa'ud replied that he would consider it, if it came to him as a firm offer, but that he would disavow Mr. Philby if this attitude was prematurely divulged. Clearly he feared opening himself to attack by rivals in the Arab world on account of a scheme which might never reach the stage of practical consideration.

4. After leaving America last June, I heard no more until the end of October when Colonel Hoskins came to see me here three times in November. He told me that he had been to Arabia and had there heard for the first time about the Philby
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scheme. He reported King Ibn Sa'ud as having spoken with great bitterness at me, declaring that I had sent Mr. Philby to him with the offer of a bribe, which was contrary to his honour, patriotism, and religion; and that he had turned Mr. Philby out, and would not receive him in Arabia again. Colonel Hoskins also reported Ibn Sa'ud as saying that the £20,000,000 was to be guaranteed by the United States. Colonel Hoskins further informed me that Ibn Sa'ud had seen a written statement to the President in which Mr. Philby is alluded to, but not named.

5. The assertion about the United States guarantee for the money competition was obviously based on a misconception somewhere (see above, paragraph 2). I should be profoundly distressed if the President thought I had used his name in this connection, which was never the case. Further, I was astonished by what Colonel Hoskins reported Ibn Sa'ud to have said about Mr. Philby, as I knew that Mr. Philby had remained a guest of the King for quite half a year after having put his scheme before him. I was therefore relieved the next time I met Colonel Hoskins to discover that the report of Mr. Philby's disgrace had been merely Colonel Hoskins' own deduction; he said he could not imagine that the King would welcome back a man who had suggested so distasteful a scheme. Mr. Namie and I discussed the matter frankly with Mr. Philby, who has also seen Colonel Hoskins alone. Mr. Philby's view (as you will see from the enclosure) is that Colonel Hoskins' mission left matters much as they stood, and that if the original scheme was offered to Ibn Sa'ud on behalf of the President and Mr. Churchill it would be accepted.

6. When I was in America you were good enough to discuss with me at length the Palestine question. I hope that you have not lost the interest in Palestinian affairs which gave me so much encouragement and pleasure. May I put my views before you once more in special connection with Mr. Philby's scheme? It is conceived on big lines, large enough to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of Arabs and Jews, and the strategic and economic interests of the United States and Britain. In my belief, none of the problems of the Middle East can be effectively settled piecemeal, but only by treating them as a connected whole. The world is deeply interested in solving the Jewish problem, the overwhelming majority of the Jews themselves desire a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, and expect its establishment to normalise the position of Jews in the Dispersion; the Arabs demand complete independence and freedom to achieve unity.

7. If the world supports the Jews in their demand for Palestine west of the Jordan, let the Arabs concede it as a quid pro quo for fulfilment of their claims everywhere else. Our heritage in Palestine was cut down to the bone when Transjordan was separated in 1922. What is left, is clearly a unit, and further partition of it would deprive the settlement of finality. If the whole of western Palestine is left to us, we plan to carry out a Jordan Development Scheme suggested to us by American experts. This would also benefit the Arab land on the western bank, and facilitate transfers of population. A scheme on such large lines would be greatly helped by the backing of an outstanding personality in the Arab world, such as Ibn Sa'ud. I therefore feel, in spite of Colonel Hoskins' adverse report, that, properly managed, Mr. Philby's scheme offers an approach which should not be abandoned without further exploration.

Yours very sincerely,
Signed.....CH. WEIZMANN.

CONFIDENTIAL

MINUTE OF CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL HAROLD HOSKINS
State Department Building-- Washington, D. C.
December 28, 1943

Present: Col. Hoskins, Dr. Goldmann

Dr. Goldmann went to see Col. Hoskins at the latter's invitation.

Col. Hoskins said he had returned from London about ten days ago. He had seen Dr. Weizmann several times and he had asked Col. Hoskins to get in touch with Dr. Goldmann. He had reported to Dr. Weizmann on the result of his visit to Ibn Saud and wanted to give Dr. Goldmann the same report. He had discussed the Zionist problem with Ibn Saud and had proposed to him on behalf of the American government that Ibn Saud, or one of his representatives, meet with Dr. Weizmann, or other representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Ibn Saud had refused on two scores-- first, because of his generally antagonistic attitude toward Zionism, and, second, because Sir John Philby had come to see him in 1941 and, on behalf of Dr. Weizmann had offered him 20 million pounds (or dollars, the figure escapes me--NG), which he regarded as a personal insult to him. When Col. Hoskins saw Ibn Saud he did not know what the actual facts were and learned them only later in his conversations with Dr. Weizmann.

The real story is that Sir John Philby suggested to Dr. Weizmann that he be authorized to discuss with Ibn Saud the question of a loan for the development of Saudi Arabia; that Dr. Weizmann had discussed this proposal with British officials and had told Philby that if Ibn Saud would help the Jews, it should not be impossible that such a loan be arranged. It appeared that Philby, who had spent several months in Saudi Arabia without achieving anything, did not tell Ibn Saud that the idea of the loan originated with himself.

Col. Hoskins said that Dr. Weizmann felt that the President should be informed of the real facts and had wanted to give Col. Hoskins a memorandum to be submitted to the President, but since Col. Hoskins left England a few days before his scheduled departure the memorandum was not ready. He expects to get it through the American Embassy in London. In any case, Hoskins concluded, it is clear from his talks with Ibn Saud that the idea of using him as an intermediary was a mistake and that door must be regarded as definitely closed.

Dr. Goldmann said this was no surprise to the Jewish Agency. As Col. Hoskins might recall, in conversations with him and with Mr. Murray, Dr. Goldmann had said that the Agency was more than skeptical about Ibn Saud's taking a moderate stand; that Mr. Shertok had warned against the whole idea. However, since the State Department thought there was a chance, the Agency did not think it should prevent their trying it.

Col. Hoskins said that the idea about Ibn Saud had originated with Mr. Churchill who had discussed it with Dr. Weizmann in 1940. For this reason the President, after receiving his report, thought that Mr. Churchill and the British government, as well as Dr. Weizmann should be informed directly by Col. Hoskins about the failure of his mission; it was for this reason he had been sent to London.

Col. Hoskins said that now the situation was clarified and other avenues of approach will have to be found to bring about an understanding between Jews and Arabs.

The talk then turned to the general situation about

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Palestine. Col. Hoskins said he had talked with Nuri Pasha and other Arab leaders in Cairo and had seen Bengurion in Jerusalem; he also had had a long talk with Shertok in Cairo. On his way back from Saudi Arabia, he wanted to go back to Jerusalem to see Bengurion and Shertok, but in Bassra he got a cable asking him to return immediately. He got the impression from his talks with the Arab leaders that it should not be impossible to bring about a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem through an understanding mutually acceptable to both parties. He thought the American government could be very useful in this respect as the Arabs have great confidence in America.

Dr. Goldmann said that since the beginning of the war, the Jewish Agency had taken the position that America and England should cooperate in securing a solution to the Palestine problem. The Agency never believed in playing America off against Great Britain, but did believe, and was encouraged by many of its best friends in Great Britain, that it would be difficult for Britain to find a way out of contradictory commitments, and it would be easier if there were joint Anglo-American responsibility.

Col. Hoskins said he fully agreed with this attitude and that such was the main purpose he and others had who suggested the joint statement about Palestine to be issued by America and Great Britain. He said: "I know you were against it and finally prevented it. But I would like you to know my motives; I would not want you and your friends to think I was anti-Zionist." He said he felt that such a statement would ease the tense situation in Palestine and would bring America definitely into the picture as ready to take a hand in the solution of the Palestine question.

Dr. Goldmann said that the intent to bring America into the scene was certainly laudable, but for this purpose it was not necessary to issue such a statement as was contemplated. It was unacceptable for three reasons: (1) the Zionists did not agree with the evaluation of the Palestine situation as being on the eve of civil war, with the Jews ready to provoke disturbances. Dr. Goldmann said he knew that Col. Hoskins felt that way because he had seen his report, but thought that the picture was exaggerated and rather hysterical. The fact that nearly a year had passed without any disturbances should convince him that he was too fearful.

Col. Hoskins said that Dr. Goldmann might be right, but he believed the situation was still tense and mentioned reports of the killing of Jews and Arabs in recent weeks. However, he said, his motive was a genuine desire to prevent anything which would interfere with the war effort, in which Dr. Goldmann was certainly as interested as he.

(2) Any joint statement between America and Great Britain, Dr. Goldmann pointed out, which does not indicate that the White Paper policy is changed, must be regarded as an endorsement of that policy by the American government.

(3) The warning to Jews and Arabs contained in the statement to discontinue public discussion would never have been accepted by Jews in this country or other countries; on the contrary, it would have antagonized Jews and created a breach between the Administration and Jewish public opinion, which should certainly be avoided.

If, Dr. Goldmann said, the British and American governments should issue a statement that both were ready to act jointly to solve the problem and that a new policy would be initiated in due course, no

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one would object to it. But for the reasons already given, the statement as it had been drafted was certainly most objectionable.

Hoskins said that the matter was no longer/real issue; a decision had already been made against his position. However, he had raised it only to explain that whatever the differences, his motives were not anti-Zionist. He said his only aim was to be used as a mediator between Jews and Arabs and to help them reach a positive agreement.

Dr. Goldmann said this was again very laudable, but that in order for him to play such a role, he could not give the impression that he was biased against the Zionists and all Zionists had that impression. Dr. Goldmann drew his attention to various conversations with Senators and said that/Zionists would have to regard him as hostile, he could not play the role which he wanted to play.

Dr. Goldmann then asked whether he thought the time had come for discussions in London between the Zionists and the British about the final solution.

He said he thought the time was rapidly approaching when such discussions could start and that the British attitude that they were not yet ready for such discussions was beginning to change.

He knew that Dr. Goldmann was planning to go to London and said that there he would get a real picture of the situation and would also realize that the moment for discussing an ultimate solution was approaching. He said he had also read rumors of some partition scheme to be discussed by various British officials and asked what the Zionist position was.

Dr. Goldmann explained why Zionists were now insisting on the maximum area in the whole of Palestine-- the problem is no longer one of gradual and slow immigration; after this war the problem will be one of mass transfer of homeless and uprooted Jews and a small part of Palestine would not serve the purpose.

Col. Hoskins said he thought the Arab leaders understood that the White Paper policy would not stand; on the other hand, the Jews cannot expect that 100% of their demands would be satisfied. Some concessions may have to be made to Arab demands.

Dr. Goldmann said that once the Arabs recognized the right of the Jews to return to Palestine, a basis would be found for agreement with them. However, discussion is of no use, so long as they do not know that the policy of the Jewish National Home will be supported by America and Great Britain. Once they know this, they will be ready to reach an agreement; but so long as they think that America and Great Britain will adhere to the White Paper policy, there is no basis for agreement.

Col. Hoskins said he agreed with this and that the main problem was for America and Great Britain to work out a formula.

Dr. Goldmann said that the Zionists should be kept informed about such a formula and not be faced with a fait accompli.

Col. Hoskins said he would remain in Washington and would be

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glad if Dr. Goldmann would keep in touch with him.

Before leaving Dr. Goldmann made an appointment for Dr. Silver.

The interview lasted an hour and a half.

NG

Washington, D. C.

COPY

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE,
77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET,
LONDON, W.C.1.

4th January, 1944.

Judge Samuel Rosenman,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

I have been anxious to write to you for some weeks now, but have felt it better to wait for a good opportunity.

First of all, I wanted to let you know something of the "Hoskins story" of which you may have heard some echoes in Washington, and I think I cannot do better than send you the account of recent developments at this end which I wrote down for Mr. Sumner Welles in a letter dated December 13th. I attach a copy of this letter, with the enclosure by Mr. St. John Philby. (Mr. Philby, who is a great Arabic scholar and traveller, has been connected with Ibn Sa'ud for many years; he is, I believe, a great friend of the King). Though I addressed the letter to Mr. Sumner Welles, it is, as you will realise, intended for the President to whom I was anxious to explain that it was not by us that his name had been so gratuitously introduced into the matter of the guarantee. Ibn Sa'ud's change of attitude as reported by Colonel Hoskins, may I think be due to the long delay between the original mention of the idea and Colonel Hoskins' visit (the first discussion with Mr. Philby was three years ago); or to the fact that Colonel Hoskins came without the "firm offer" which the King expected; or - in my view very probably - to the intervention of certain representatives of the oil companies which hold important concessions in Saudi Arabia, and which must provide Ibn Sa'ud with a considerable income; the activities of such companies in the Middle

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East are, in my experience, usually anti-Jewish. In my own view, the sending of Hoskins to Ibn Sa'ud was a serious mistake: he came empty-handed, and quite unprepared - and he is in any event none too sympathetic. I did warn Mr. Sumner Welles about this in a letter which I wrote him before leaving America - of which you can get a copy from Mr. Meyer Weisgal.

I think the letter to Mr. Welles covers the rest of the Hoskins story - so far as it is known to us here. I should perhaps add that the "plan" which Mr. Philby mentioned to the King three years since was also mentioned to me, quite independently, and without any knowledge of Mr. Philby's views, by the Prime Minister, and this is why I have always attached considerable importance to it.

Since my return to London I have seen quite a number of people: the Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, Field-Marshal Smuts, and of course the Colonial Secretary (several times) - apart from some other members of the Cabinet. No very precise information was made available to me, but my impression is that there are the following "probabilities" in the air:

1) It seems to be assumed that the White Paper cannot be maintained (though I'm sure that the Palestine Administration would do - and is doing - everything in its power to maintain the White Paper policy), and that something else, at present unspecified, will replace it. It may be that the idea of partition is to be revived. Such a solution at this time would, I believe, be neither just nor final, nor could it be agreed to by the Jewish people. I do not know whether any definite decision has been reached or not, though I gathered from hints dropped by Field-Marshal Smuts that our affairs were discussed at the recent meetings, and no doubt the President was in the picture - which makes me very happy.

2) Hints are also being dropped in various quarters that the decision - whatever it may be, will be "imposed" on both sides, and not previously dis-
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cussed with us or the Arabs.

The element in the present situation which worries us most is the growing bitterness between the British Administration in Palestine and the Jewish Community. It stems, of course, mainly from the White Paper (to which, as already mentioned, the local officials would like to adhere indefinitely), and from all that has happened to us in the last few years: the Struma, the Patria, the evacuation of refugees from Athlit to Mauritius, the recent trials and searches for arms, with the savage sentences imposed on our people (in striking contrast to the trivial punishment meted out to hundreds of Arabs guilty of similar and more serious offences) - all this, with innumerable small and larger chicaneries over a period of years, has contributed to exasperate the Jewish population. I have done my utmost - not, I believe, without some measure of success - to hold things steady, and have just recently invited delegations from Palestine and from the States to meet in London in order to discuss the whole situation and the possible decisions of which we may be informed. I cannot emphasise too strongly that our most immediate anxiety is to prevent the occurrence in Palestine of incidents which may prejudice any future arrangements. Many Americans returning from Palestine are, I fear (like many of the British) unduly and adversely influenced by the local Administration, and anything which can be done from the American side to counteract this would be of great value. For the last year or so we have been hearing from British and American sources that everything in Palestine is working up for a clash between Jews and Arabs. On the other hand, we understand from many sources that relations between Jews and Arabs - at any rate in ordinary day-to-day intercourse - are improving, and these panicky reports have no real justification. For myself, I am quite sure that talking about clashes is the best way of bringing them about. Uncertainty is also a fertile breeding-ground

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for unrest: the sooner a definite decision is taken, and a constructive policy announced, the better for everyone. The Prime Minister rightly attaches the greatest importance to correct timing (as you may see from the enclosed note of my talk with him); and we would agree, were it not that we fear that delay may play into the hands of the dark forces operating in that part of the world - forces anxious to provoke a clash, and prevent any constructive solution.

Just as I left America I heard, to my great distress, that you were not well, so that I could not see you to say goodbye. I am very happy to learn that you are back at work again - the best possible sign of full recovery.

I send you my very best wishes for a happy New Year, and look forward to hearing from you soon.

With kind personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Signed....CH. WEIZMANN

P.S. We have been thinking of going to Palestine - but of course it is difficult, things being as they are, to make any definite arrangements any distance ahead.

Jewish Agency for Palestine
(see Weizmann)

PERSONAL

March 8, 1944

Dear Henry:

I have given to the President the enclosures in Dr. Weizmann's letter of January fourth, to wit, the copy of Dr. Weizmann's letter to Sumner Welles, dated December thirteenth, and the attached excerpts from a statement from Mr. Philby to Dr. Weizmann, dated November seventeenth.

I did not want to take time to make copies of them, so I wonder if you could send me a copy of these papers made from the copy in your possession because I do not suppose I will get them back from the President and I would like to have my file complete.

Many thanks.

Very sincerely,

BENJAMIN I. ROSENTHAL

The Honorable,
The Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.

SIR/T