AMERICAN POLICY

towards the

JEWISH NATIONAL HOME IN PALESTINE

1917-1912

PROFESSOR CARL J. FRIEDRICH.

For Private Distribution Only
Dear Judge Rosenman:

I am enclosing a memorandum in accordance with your suggestion, when you were good enough to give me an interview last week. The memorandum contains the gist of what I told you about out work, the possibilities and the future of Palestine. I made it as brief as possible and did not, therefore, attempt to discuss all the questions which may be raised, but to give what seems to me the most essential facts. If you would like to have any point amplified, I will be glad to do it.

I look forward with great interest to meeting you again either in New York or in Washington.

Thank you most warmly for your kindness and patience at our first meeting.

Yours sincerely,

David Ben-Gurion

P. S. I can always be reached either at the Winthrop Hotel, New York, or the Ambassador Hotel, Washington.

Judge Samuel Rosenman
135 Central Park West
New York, New York.
It is generally admitted that after this war we will be faced with a formidable problem of Jewish migration, even if in all countries of Europe complete equality is restored to the Jews. Very large numbers of uprooted Jews in impoverished and devastated Europe will have to find a new home. Nobody who knows the Jews can have the slightest doubt that with, possibly, a few exceptions, Jews who cannot remain where they are will ardently desire to make their new home in Palestine. History as well as international law have ordained Palestine as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Since the last war Palestine has taken in more Jewish refugees than any other country and, in certain periods, when artificial limitations were relaxed, more than all other countries together. But in view of the magnitude of the Jewish refugee problem after this war the question legitimately arises: how many more Jews can settle in Palestine on a sound economic basis?

No one can seriously pretend to give a clear-cut arithmetic answer. Science has not yet discovered a safe method for predicting how many people can be settled in a given area in any country—what is called the absorptive capacity of a country being not a static, but a dynamic, quantity which depends as much, if not more, on the human factor as on the nature of the country. Only a scrutiny of the special conditions of Palestine as well as of the Jews settling there can guide us: the experience of past achievements, the availability of land for new settlers, and the suitability of the country for industrial development. It is the earnest conviction of all those associated for decades with Jewish colonization in Palestine that the most potent factors in the capacity of Jews to find room in Palestine for new settlers are:

1. The desperate need of many Jews to find a new, hospitable and safe home.
2. The creative ability and pioneering, enterprising spirit of Jewish settlers.

3. The deep-rooted love of the Jewish people for their ancient homeland.

To these must be added the regime of the country— the political, legal and administrative conditions affecting Jewish immigration and colonization.

**JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE:**

At the end of the last war there were 58,000 Jews in Palestine. In 1941 there were over 500,000. They settled in villages and towns built by themselves. The area they occupy is about 1,500,000 dunum—less than 1/17 of the area of western Palestine. The whole area of Palestine is some 27,000,000 dunum, of which the Arabs cultivate some 7,000,000. More than 12,000,000 dunum are still waste land.

In many essential aspects Jewish settlement in Palestine differs from that in other countries. Contrary to accepted economic dogmas, Jews in Palestine went from town to country; town people for centuries, they became tillers of the land. Over 30% of the Jews in Palestine live in rural settlements.

Even more marked is their return to manual work. Of 500,000 people, 126,000 adults are members of the Labor Federation. As in no other country Jews in Palestine are engaged in every kind of work: in fields, factories, quarries, mines, buildings, roads, railways, harbors, fishing, aviation, etc..

Coming from all corners of the earth with diverse languages and cultural traditions, they are being welded into a new unit, Hebrew becoming their common language, the rebuilding of Zion their common purpose.

Living in their own villages and towns, providing for their own defense, education and social services, they developed a comprehensive system of local and national self-government, rooted in an independent economy and culture, and thus laid the foundations, for all practical purposes, of a Jewish Commonwealth.
Agricultural Development:

Before the new Jewish colonization Palestine was almost entirely an agricultural country, poor and sparsely populated; less than a fourth of the land was cultivated and that very primitively. The greatest part of the area where Jews settled had been considered uncultivable, comprising sand-dunes, swamps or barren mountainous tracts. Jews had not merely to acquire land out to reclaim, drain, reforest, fertilize, and wherever water could be discovered, irrigate it. In this way, and by the introduction of modern and intensive methods of cultivation, modern machinery, new breeds of cattle and poultry, new plants and seeds, rotation of crops, and by utilizing surface and sub-soil water to the best advantage, they made new land available for settlement and increased the yield to such a degree that they were able steadily to raise the standard of living, while gradually reducing the subsistence area from the 280 dunum per family necessary in the earlier stages of colonization, to 100 dunum in unirrigated plain land, 50 dunum in the mountains where fruit trees were planted, and 20 dunum in irrigated land.

Whereas in purely Arab districts, the Arab population remained almost stationary, in areas of Jewish settlement it increased considerably. The economic standard of the Arabs was raised and they made use of the improved methods of cultivation of their Jewish neighbors.

For the purpose of agricultural settlement western Palestine can conveniently be divided into four areas: plains, comprising 4,502,500 dunum; the hill country, 8,038,000 dunum; the Negev (southern Palestine) 12,577,000 dunum; the wilderness of Judaea, 1,080,900 dunum.

In the plains some 3,500,000 dunum are irrigated; at present only 360,000 are irrigated. One irrigated dunum yields at least as much as ten unirrigated dunum. If an additional area of one million dunum were irrigated and made available for new settlement, another forty or fifty thousand families
could be settled there. This would leave more than two million dunum for later development. F. Julius Fohs, an American expert who has conducted hydrographic surveys of Palestine over a period of many years, has said that if the available water resources in Palestine, exclusive of the Negev, are conserved, it is possible to irrigate 3,500,000 dunum, after providing for the civil and industrial uses of a population of 2,500,000.

In the hill country some 4,500,000 million dunum are at present uncultivated, and officially considered uncultivable. So far Jews acquired some 350,000 dunum of such "uncultivable" land and established flourishing villages in the hills of Jerusalem, Samaria and Galilee. At least another 3,500,000 dunum of waste hill country can be brought under cultivation by Jews, making room for another 50,000 families.

With regard to the Negev, Sir John Simpson sent by the British Government in 1930 to make a survey of the agricultural possibilities of Palestine, reported: "Given the possibility of irrigation there is practically an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba area....Up to the present time there has been no organized attempt to ascertain whether there is or is not an artesian supply of water." The Peel Royal Commission in 1937 pointed out that "since the date of this Report, it appears that very little has been done by Government to discover water in Palestine." But water was discovered by Jews in many parts of Palestine where it had not been believed to exist, and it is the view of Jewish colonization experts that water for the Negev can be made available either by (1) boring artesian wells; (2) building dams to preserve the rain water flowing from the southern slopes of the Judaean hills or (3) bringing water from the rivers of the north (Yarkon, Jordan, Yarmouk, Litani). Given the necessary authority and means to provide the Negev with water, it will be possible for hundreds of thousands of new immigrants to settle on the land in that section alone. At present the Negev, half of western Palestine, is wholly unoccupied
except for a few roving Bedouins.

The experience of Jewish settlement in Palestine has been that for each family in agriculture at least another three families can be settled in industry, trade and liberal professions.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT:

Though Palestine is deficient in raw material it has the advantage of easy access to the sea and is favorably placed for obtaining its requirements at a low cost. A hydro-electric plant supplies it with power; the Dead Sea possesses inexhaustible mineral wealth and the presence of the Iraq oil pipe-line is of considerable advantage to the country.

Linking the three continents of the old world, lying on the shore of the Mediterranean in the west, with direct access to the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea on the south, serving as the main artery for air communications between east and west, Palestine is geographically destined to become the industrial center of the Near East given an intelligent, industrious and enterprising people who can supply the necessary capital, skilled labor and scientific knowledge.

In 1937 the Peel Royal Commission stated: "Twelve years ago the national home was an experiment, today it is a going concern. The number of its inhabitants has increased fourfold.... The process of agricultural colonization has steadily continued.... yet more impressive has been the urban development. Tel Aviv still a wholly Jewish town has leaped to the first place among the towns of Palestine. Its population now probably exceeds 150,000.... rising so quickly from a barren strip of sand it is quite startling.... There is the same effect at Jerusalem. The population of Jerusalem has grown to 125,000 and of that some 75,000 are Jews. The growth of Haifa, too, which now has a population of over 100,000 is only less remarkable than that of Tel Aviv.... about one-half of its inhabitants are now Jews and much of the business of its port is Jewish.
business....Broadly speaking the remarkable urban development in Palestine has been
Jewish. The relation between rural and urban areas, between industrialists and agriculturists has remained fairly constant from the start...From 1918 to the
tpresent day over LP 14 million has been invested in Palestine through 'national
funds' and roughly LP 65 million by private industrialists. The total invest-
ment therefore amounts to LP 77 million and of this at least one-fifth has been
contributed by the Jews in the United States. Lastly the amount of Jewish de-
posits in Palestine banks amounted to LP 152 million. These are all startling
figures. They bear witness to quite an extraordinary measure of economic ex-
pansion."

Since then there has been further expansion. A wholly Jewish port
was built in Tel Aviv, whose population is nearing 200,000. New industries have
been started—textile, chemical, wood, metal, electrical, food, building, clothing, which supply the home market and the Near East as far as India. Two enter-
prises deserve special mention—the Palestine Electric Corporation, which har-
nessed the water of the Jordan and supplies the whole country with light and
electrical power. The second, the Palestine Potash Company which extracts the
rich minerals of the Dead Sea and serves as the basis for a large chemical
industry. In 1941 over 200 new Jewish industrial undertakings were established.

In recent years the Jews have started a shipping and fishing in-
dustry, and thousands of Jewish immigrants are now employed in the harbors of
Palestine, Tel Aviv and Haifa, in fishing in the inland lakes and the Mediterranean
and in navigation. Thus far only a small percentage of the needs of the
country is supplied. But the same urge and determination which brought Jews
back to the soil and manual labor is also impelling them toward the sea.

Jews have also begun to engage in civil aviation. They establish-
ed schools to train pilots, acquired planes and organized flying services between
Palestine and the neighboring countries. Among the refugees from Central Europe are many pilots with long experience in commercial and military aviation. 

**FUTURE REGIME**

This brief summary of what has been and can be done by Jews in Palestine indicates, it is believed, that the Jewish settlement in Palestine can be increased many times if the country be fully developed. A mass colonization on a large scale will be necessary to meet the needs of Jewish migration after this war. This will obviously require a large outlay of capital to be obtained from inter-governmental sources. The main readjustment, however, indispensable for a task of such magnitude, is a new regime—political, legal and administrative—especially designed for the maximum development of the resources of the country and the absorption of the maximum number of immigrants in the shortest possible time. The fundamental laws of the country, land and water legislation, labor legislation, fiscal regulations, trade relations, must be entirely changed to suit the requirements of intensive colonization, the speedy building up of industries, the growth of cities and villages. And not only the laws, but their daily administration must be guided and inspired by the steadfast and unwavering purpose of building the country and absorbing new immigrants on a large scale. It is difficult to see how this purpose can be achieved unless there be a Jewish administration—an administration completely identified with the needs and aims of the Jewish settlers and whole-heartedly devoted to the upbuilding of the country.

Under any regime complete equality must be guaranteed to all inhabitants of Palestine, Jews and Arabs.

Jewish immigration on a large scale is bound to result in the not distant future in a growing Jewish majority in Palestine and in the
establishment of a self-governing Jewish Commonwealth.

In the meantime the population of Palestine, Jews and Arabs, should have a larger measure of self-government in all municipal affairs, and all educational and religious matters should be left entirely to the respective communities.

Great Britain should remain in charge of foreign affairs and the external defense of the country.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine (established under Article IV of the mandate) as the trustee for the prospective immigrants and settlers, should have full control over Jewish immigration and be invested with all authority necessary for the development and upbuilding of the country and the maintenance of internal defense.

To secure the homeland for homeless Jews, Jews themselves must be entrusted with its reconstitution.

February 10, 1944
Washington, D. C.
WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division, G-2
Washington

File No. ____________________________ Date ____________

SUBJECT (Short Title Only): Arab-Jewish Controversy.

Received of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, the following described communications:

Memo. ____________________________

Xerox dated 17 August 1943 ____________________________

Indorsement(s) dated ____________________________

1 Inclosure(s) Chronology ____________________________

Officer. ____________________________ Rank. ____________________________

The White House ____________________________

Office. ____________________________

NOTE: Return to the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Branch, ____________________________ Section, Room 2E800
MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE ROSENMAN:

Reference our conversation yesterday afternoon, I am sending over, for your personal information, a Chronology of extracts from documents bearing upon the Jewish-Arab question in Palestine. I have included in this Chronology the sources from which the various reports have come. In consequence, it is requested that you use this matter for your own information as we might be seriously embarrassed if the sources of these reports become known. Please treat the document as secret.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Incl:
Chronology.
1. 10 and 12 June 1941 - Military Attache, Colonel Fellers, Cairo, Egypt, cabled that the underlying cause of the Ali Gallani revolt in Iraq was the Jewish colonization of Palestine. Furthermore that such colonization creates the only barriers to a British-Arab agreement. Immediate settlement of this controversy is of utmost importance to the United States.

2. 14 December 1942 - Diplomatic Agent, Mr. Wadsworth, Beirut, Lebanon, cabled that the Zionist resolution introduced by Senator Wagner and passed by the United States Congress was the greatest obstacle to Arab support for the Allied cause.

3. 16 December 1942 - British HQ, Palestine, Weekly Intelligence Review, reported the indignation of the Palestine Arab communities over the Balfour Day speech of Mr. Willkie. Later the shops of Gaza, Palestine, were closed in protest against the pro-Zionist Wagner resolution.

4. 22 December 1942 - O.S.S. Representative, Beirut, Lebanon, cabled that "serious Anti-American feeling is being created throughout Syria by Congressmen's endorsement of Zionist demands."

5. 29 December 1942 - British Ninth Army Weekly Military Newsletter reported the bazaars of Homs and Damascus, Syria, closed in protest to Mr. Willkie's statement favoring further Jewish immigration into Palestine.

6. 30 December 1942 - Diplomatic Agent, Mr. Wadsworth, Beirut, Lebanon, cabled that disorders, strikes and demonstrations took place in Damascus, Homs, and Hama, Syria, following publication of the pro-Zionist resolution.

7. 3 January 1943 - O.S.S. Representative, Beirut, Lebanon, cabled that "feeling against Americans is on the increase, causing demonstrations in Damascus."

8. 16 January 1943 - USAFIME Periodic Report No. 8 states: "... the speech of Wendell Willkie had tremendous effect on the attitude of the Arab toward America. ... Common Arabian sentiment is to the effect that America and the Jews are teaming up to run the Arabs out of Palestine, in spite of the British influence. ... Because of the above-mentioned speech and because of wide-scale employment of Jews by American interests and unwise treatment of Arabs who are employed, the Arabs are becoming more and more suspicious of the Americans. ..."

*The complete versions of the documents are available in the files of the Military Intelligence Service.
9. 23 January 1943 - Lt. Colonel Hoskins, Cairo, Egypt, cabled that the Arab-Jewish situation was becoming critical and that an armed outbreak in Palestine could be expected before the end of the year unless positive action were taken at once. Repercussions would follow in all surrounding Moslem countries and perhaps throughout the Moslem world.

10. 5 February 1943 - Minister Kirk, Cairo, Egypt, cabled his fears that raising of the Zionist issue would undermine the goodwill felt toward the United States and injure the Allied cause.

11. 26 March 1943 - G-2 USAFIME, Colonel McClenahan, Cairo, Egypt, reported: At a recent meeting in Jerusalem of influential Jews, "a plan was discussed and read into the minutes which called for the entry of four million Jews into Palestine - by legal or illegal means. The purpose of the entry of these Jews is to form a body strong enough to take control of the country by force if necessary in case the control is not voluntarily given to the Jews. . . ." 

12. 26 March 1943 - G-2 USAFIME, Colonel McClenahan, Cairo, Egypt, reported: "Evidence of expected serious trouble in Palestine upon the conclusion of the present war continues to accumulate. There are stated to be 30,000 Jewish soldiers in the British forces, and irregulars to the number of about 30,000 under the control of "Haganah" and other organizations. Thefts of arms and ammunition are constant, and large stores are known to be concealed. . . ."

13. 3 April 1943 - USAFIME Periodic Report No. 18 reports that "... David Ben Gurion, Zionist leader, has stated in discussing plans for bringing 4,000,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine that the Palestine Jewish Youth is armed sufficiently to seize the country and present the United Nations with an accomplished fact during the period of uncertainty immediately after the war. Since the Arabs appear to be equally well armed, and equally belligerent, it is possible that a spark may explode this powder keg at any hour. . . ."

14. 3 April 1943 - O.W.I. Representative, Mr. Britt, Beirut, Lebanon, reported "... there is alarming currency to the belief that the policy of America is determined by a circle of Jewish advisers in the White House. . . ."

15. 9 April 1943 - G-2 USAFIME, Colonel McClenahan, Cairo, Egypt, reported "... It is not a question of whether there will be civil war in Palestine, but of when it will commence."

16. 12 April 1943 - Lt. Colonel Hoskins, Washington, D. C., reported on his mission to the Middle East and concluded that the danger of violence in Palestine and in the surrounding countries is very great. Both the Arabs and Jews are well armed and are ready to fight. Nazi agents and propaganda are doing everything possible to precipitate the civil war. Unprecedented Arab demonstrations against the United States have resulted
from evidence of American sympathy for the Zionist cause. Compromise is now virtually impossible; a Zionist State in Palestine can only be imposed upon the Arabs by military force.

17. 13 April 1943 - G-2 USAFIME, Colonel McClenahan, Cairo, Egypt, reported that "... the explosive Arab-Jewish situation in Palestine may be touched off at the slightest provocation."

18. 17 April 1943 - Consul General, Mr. Pinkerton, Jerusalem, Palestine, cabled that the theft by Jews of arms and ammunition is reaching alarming proportions. The British are doing nothing to prevent this for fear a showdown with the Jewish Agency would be forced with consequent effect on the war effort. Neither the Jews nor the Arabs wish to risk being blamed for embarrassing the war effort by starting violence now. It is felt, therefore, that trouble will not start until the end of the war, but since both races are excitable, feeling may quickly reach the boiling point. The Jews, who are well armed, are more likely to disturb the peace than are the Arabs.

19. 30 April 1943 - S-2, Levant Service Command, reports: "...This assumed American policy" (marked favoritism to the Jews) "is harmful to American prestige in Palestine, and to some extent throughout the Middle East; and it furnishes opportunity for unfriendly elements to spread dangerous propaganda; and it may lead eventually to sabotage against Americans. If the Jewish-Arab problem is not solved soon, the situation will be disastrous; the blame will be placed by the Arabs upon America. . . ."

20. 9 May 1943 - Chief, CIC, USAFIME, reports that an arms-stealing organization, controlled by Zionist authorities and connected with Hagana, the Jewish quasi-military organization, is becoming increasingly active. In recent days 600 rifles, 22 machine guns, 9000 lbs. high explosives, and 8000 detonators have been stolen.

21. 10 May 1943 - Chief, CIC, USAFIME, reports "... that Ben Gurion recently urged Hagana to organize illegal Jewish immigration in violation of the White Paper restrictions. . . . He also stated that since Palestine Jews are now sufficiently armed to overcome any obstacle, violent means are now in order to obtain Jewish aims. . . ."

22. 19 May 1943 - Chief, CIC, USAFIME, reports as follows on the Hagana as of May, 1943:

a. Membership - 30,000 to 60,000

b. Jews in British Army - 11,500 (to be added to Hagana after the war)

c. Arms available to Hagana:

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G. 116/2, Sec. 5(2) and 5(2) or (3)

OSD letter, May 4, 1943

SECRET

JUL 16 1974
(1) First class condition (British)
- Small arms: 12,000
- Rifles: 10,000
- Machine guns: 162
- Automatic rifles: 2,245
- Total: 24,407

(2) Second class condition (French, Belgian, Italian)
- Small arms: 4,000
- Rifles: 8,000
- Automatic rifles: 2,300
- Total: 14,300

TOTAL: 38,707

23. **22 May 1943** - CIC, USAFIME, Weekly Report states that ".. British security officials anticipate Jewish disturbances will arise in Palestine shortly, due to the expiration of the 'White Paper' policy, under which present immigration quotas are fixed."

24. **4 June 1943** - Bulletin No. 2 from British Political Intelligence Center, Cairo, Egypt, states that ".. Ben Gurion remains fanatically nationalistic. Further confirmation has been received of the intention of Haganah to play a large part in Palestine politics in future. A skeleton administration is reported to have been formed, containing representatives of all essential public services, which is prepared to take over the administration of any part of the country should this become necessary as a result of 'operations'."

25. **8 June 1943** - British G.S.I., HQ, Palestine, Major Hunlue, states: "There is a so-called 'secret' army organized among the Jews called the Haganah. British official quarters estimate that this organization totals 80,000 men and is fairly well equipped with rifles."

26. **16 July 1943** - O.W.I. Representative, Mr. Barnes, Cairo, Egypt, reports that "The situation in Palestine is delicate, according to our intelligence reports, with violence possible at any time. The Jews may strike first and are well armed. The Palestine Arabs are being supported by all Arab Nationalists. The British are keeping quiet about any policy they may have with which to meet this situation."

27. **12 August 1943** - JICame fears armed outbreak in Palestine if Britain and U.S. declare in favor of Jewish Political State. Danger of attacks on Jewish property developing into Anti-Christian and anti-foreign riots. Military transients will require convoy under guard. Serious political and economic effects inevitable.
28. 14 August 1943 - Teheran states in event of armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, Moslems would stage Anti-Jewish riots and disturbances. Iraq Government would assist Arabs by sending personnel, arms and ammunition plus sabotage material. For first time Arabic language newspaper published strong Anti-Zionist editorial in reply to article appearing in the Palestine Jewish Standard.
17 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE ROSENMAN:

Reference our conversation yesterday afternoon, I am sending over, for your personal information, a Chronology of extracts from documents bearing upon the Jewish-Arab question in Palestine. I have included in this Chronology the sources from which the various reports have come. In consequence, it is requested that you use this matter for your own information as we might be seriously embarrassed if the sources of these reports become known. Please treat the document as secret.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Incl:
Chronology.
4th January, 1944.

I have been anxious to write to you for some weeks now, but have felt it better to wait for a good opportunity.

First of all, I wanted to let you know something of the "Hoskins story", of which you may have heard some echoes in Washington, and I think I cannot do better than send you the account of recent developments at this end which I wrote down for Mr. Sumner Welles in a letter dated December 13th. I attach a copy of this letter, with the enclosure by Mr. St. John Philby. (Mr. Philby, who is a great Arabic scholar and traveller, has been connected with Ibn Sa'ud for many years; he is, I believe, a great friend of the King)

Though I addressed the letter to Mr. Sumner Welles, it is, as you will realise intended for the President, to whom I was anxious to explain that it was not by us that his name had been so gratuitously introduced into the matter of the guarantee. Ibn Sa'ud's change of attitude as reported by Colonel Hoskins' visit (the first discussion with Mr. Philby was...
three years ago); or to the fact that Colonel Hoskins came without the "firm offer" which the King expected; or - in my view very probably - to the inter-
vention of certain representatives of the oil companies which hold important
concessions in Saudi Arabia, and which must provide Ibn Sa'ud with a considera-
ble income; the activities of such companies in the Middle East are, in my
experience, usually anti-Jewish. In my own view, the sending of Hoskins to
Ibn Sa'ud was a serious mistake: he came empty-handed, and quite unprepared —
and he is in any event none too sympathetic. I did warn Mr. Sumner Welles abou
this in a letter which I wrote him before leaving America - of which you can
get a copy from Mr. Meyer Weisgal.

I think the letter to Mr. Welles covers the rest of the Hoskins
story - so far as it is known to us here. I should perhaps add that the "plan"
which Mr. Philby mentioned to the King three years since was also mentioned to
me, quite independently, and without any knowledge of Mr. Philby's views, by
the Prime Minister, and this is why I have always attached considerable impor-
tance to it.

Since my return to London I have seen quite a number of people: the
Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, Field-Marshal Smuts, and of course the Colonial
Secretary (several times) - apart from some other members of the Cabinet. No
very precise information was made available to me, but my impression is that
there are the following "probabilities" in the air:

1) It seems to be assumed that the White Paper cannot be maintained
(though I'm sure that the Palestine Administration would do - and is doing -
everything in its power to maintain the White Paper policy), and that something
/else,
else, at present unspecified, will replace it. It may be that the idea of partition is to be revived. Such a solution at this time would, I believe, be neither just nor final, nor could it be agreed to by the Jewish people. I do not know whether any definite decision has been reached or not, though I gathered from hints dropped by Field-Marshal Smuts that our affairs were discussed at the recent meetings, and no doubt the President was in the picture - which makes me very happy.

2) Hints are also being dropped in various quarters that the decision - whatever it may be - will be "imposed" on both sides, and not previously discussed with us or the Arabs.

The element in the present situation which worries us most is the growing bitterness between the British Administration in Palestine and the Jewish Community. It stems, of course, mainly from the White Paper (to which, as already mentioned, the local officials would like to adhere indefinitely), and from all that has happened to us in the last few years: the Struma, the Patria, the evacuation of refugees from Athlit to Mauritius, the recent trials and searches for arms, with the savage sentences imposed on our people (in striking contrast to the trivial punishment meted out to hundreds of Arabs guilty of similar and more serious offences) - all this, with innumerable small and larger chicaneries over a period of years, has contributed to exasperate the Jewish population. I have done my utmost - not, I believe, without some measure of success - to hold things steady, and have just recently invited delegations from Palestine and from the States to meet in London in order to discuss the whole situation, and the possible decisions, of which we may be informed. I cannot emphasise too strongly that our most immediate /anxiety
anxiety is to prevent the occurrence in Palestine of incidents which may prejudice any future arrangements. Many Americans returning from Palestine are, I fear (like many of the British) unduly and adversely influenced by the local Administration, and anything which can be done from the American side to counteract this would be of great value. For the last year or so we have been hearing from British and American sources that everything in Palestine is working up for a clash between Jews and Arabs - On the other hand, we understand from many sources that relations between Jews and Arabs - at any rate in ordinary day-to-day intercourse - are improving, and these panicky reports have no real justification. For myself, I am quite sure that talking about clashes is the best way of bringing them about. Uncertainty is also a fertile breeding-ground for unrest: the sooner a definite decision is taken, and a constructive policy announced, the better for everyone. The Prime Minister rightly attaches the greatest importance to correct timing (as you may see from the enclosed note of my talk with him); and we would agree, were it not that we fear that delay may play into the hands of the dark forces operating in that part of the world - forces anxious to provoke a clash, and prevent any constructive solution.

Just as I left America I heard, to my great distress, that you were not well, so that I could not see you to say goodbye. I am very happy to learn that you are back at work again - the best possible sign of full recovery.

I send you my very best wishes for a happy New Year, and look forward to hearing from you soon.

With kind personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

P.S.
P.S. We have been thinking of going to Palestine - but of course it is difficult, things being as they are, to make any definite arrangements any distance ahead.
EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES OF THE 25TH OCTOBER, 1943.

TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER:

Dr. Weizmann said that there had been present at the lunch, besides Mr. and Mrs. Churchill, and Major Churchill, Mr. and Mrs. Attlee, Lord Portal, the Dowager Lady Reading, and another Labour man whom Dr. Weizmann did not recognise. Dr. Weizmann sat between Mrs. Churchill and Lord Portal. During lunch, Mrs. Churchill talked about Quebec and Orde and Lorna Wingate, and at one stage Mr. Churchill joined in by saying that he knew Dr. Weizmann had wanted Orde Wingate for Commander-in-Chief of the Jewish Force, but they could not have him because he was wanted for other work.

After lunch the ladies retired and Mr. Churchill had introduced him to the other guests in very complimentary terms. The Prime Minister said it was a long time since he had seen him, and Dr. Weizmann said it had been too long for him. Mr. Churchill then said that after they had crushed Hitler they would have to establish the Jews in the position where they belonged. He had had an inheritance left to him by Lord Balfour, and he was not going to change. Dr. Weizmann said he did not think the Prime Minister would change, but there were dark forces working against them which might force the Cabinet's hand. Major Churchill said they were all only human, and none of them getting any younger; it was therefore necessary to act quickly. Mr. Churchill said they would have to take some chances. Turning to Dr. Weizmann, he said: "You have some very good friends: for instance, Mr. Attlee and the Labour Party are committed on this matter." Mr. Attlee said he certainly was, adding that he thought something should be done about Transjordan. Mr. Churchill said he had been thinking about partition, but Transjordan was a good idea. He knew the terrible situation of the Jews. They would get compensation, and they would also be able to judge the criminals. As regards the position in the Near East he did not take for granted all the information that came from that part of the world. Mr. Attlee said to Dr. Weizmann that some of his people were overplaying their hand: they were sometimes threatening. Mr. Churchill said they should not do that. He personally would prefer one good row. He would advise them not to have a series of rows. What they had to do was to watch the timing. He could not say publicly what he was telling Dr. Weizmann now; there would be questions, and he would have to lose time explaining. They could quote his public utterances, and say that he would not budge from them.

Mr. Churchill repeated that they had a number of good friends: Mr. Attlee was committed, the Labour Party was committed, the Manchester Guardian was friendly, etc. He understood, however, that there were certain Jews in America who were opposed. He thought Dr. Weizmann should try and win over Mr. Baruch. Mr. Churchill had talked to Mr. Baruch, and had told him that he was wrong, but had not succeeded in persuading him. Mr. Churchill went on to say that he was not going to change his view; he would bite deeply into the problem, and it was going to be "the biggest plum of the war."
When Mr. Churchill mentioned partition, Major Randolph and Dr. Weizmann demurred, and Mr. Churchill replied that he had been against it originally, but now they had to produce something new instead of the White Paper. He had not meant partition in the literal sense - he then mentioned something about the Negev and Transjordan.

Speaking of the Arabs, the Prime Minister said that they had done very little, and in some instances had made things difficult for us. He would remember this when the day of reckoning came. Mr. Churchill added that when the Palestine issue came up, he would speak out, and proceeded to give the headings of his speech. He finished off by saying that Dr. Weizmann need not worry - they had a wonderful case.

At one stage, Dr. Weizmann mentioned that anti-semitism was growing, and the Prime Minister said he thought it was not so, and Lord Portal agreed with him.

Mr. Churchill said they could not yet discuss details. On the subject of the Arms Trial, the Prime Minister clearly did not knew the details, but said again that they should not threaten. He suggested that Dr. Weizmann should go to Palestine, adding jokingly that he had freedom of movement throughout the Empire.

At one stage Dr. Weizmann said that March 1944 was approaching, and he feared then to see a notice over the gates of Palestine: "No Jew need apply." From Mr. Churchill's reply it had appeared that they were thinking of carrying forward the balance of certificates after March 1944, and Mr. Churchill added that in a couple of months or so after that, something else might turn up.

Mr. Churchill quoted, during the talk, the saying that "God deals with the nations as they deal with the Jews." Mr. Churchill also said that of every fifty officers who came back from the Middle East, only one spoke favourably of the Jews - but that has merely gone to convince him that he was right.

When the party broke up, and Dr. Weizmann said goodbye, the Prime Minister said: "Not goodbye - au revoir", and that he would see Dr. Weizmann again. Dr. Weizmann said he was glad to hear that because he had understood that the Prime Minister was not very keen on seeing him, and sometimes urgent things arose which he could discuss only with him.

The lunch and the talk which followed lasted until 3.30 p.m.
My dear Meyer,

You will no doubt have seen Goldmann's telegram to me asking me to send a full report to Judge Rosenman about the situation here. I have done so, and the reports are being forwarded to-day, and I hope they will reach him quickly. I have sent copies of everything sent to Judge Rosenman to Henrietta Klotz for Secretary Morgenthau. I enclose another set for yourself and the office.

I have little to add to what is contained in these documents, except to say that we have no precise information, and probably there will be none until the P.M. returns after his convalescence - which may be fairly soon. It is therefore essential, in my opinion, that the American Delegation should be here as early as possible, as it may be that some very important questions will require to be dealt with here by a responsible body of Zionists.

As you will have inferred from my various telegrams, I am quite mystified by the vague and evasive answers which I am getting from and about Bergmann. I am beginning to believe that there must be something seriously wrong - perhaps that he is not well - and both Mrs. Weizmann and myself are greatly worried. He used to be a very regular correspondent, but now for months past we have not heard a word from him. The telegrams all speak of "negotiations", but I have not the slightest idea what it is all about. Surely I am entitled to a little information?

I have also been enquiring about Andre Meyer - whether he has carried out what he promised to do? Again I can get no definite reply, and you would greatly oblige me if you could manage to cable either "Yes" or "No".

[Signature]

4th January, 1944.
We shall probably be going to Palestine at the end of the winter, but of course it is very difficult to say definitely what will happen a month or two hence.

I send you, Shirley and the children all our affectionate greetings, in which Mrs. Weizmann joins me, and remain, as ever,

Yours affectionately,

[Signature]

Enclosures.
January 12, 1944

Memorandum.

Some time ago Dr. Goldmann told me that Dr. Weizmann wanted to write me about some talks he had had with Churchill re Palestine. I told him to tell Weizmann to give it to the OWI office in London and I would arrange for them to transmit it to me here. I arranged with Mr. Sherwood to do it and today a package of letters came in a sealed envelope via the pouch. My instructions were that they should be given to OWI to be brought over by some OWI man who was returning to Washington, but it seems they sent it this way. One sealed letter was addressed to me. One sealed letter was addressed to Secretary Morgenthau, which I am sending over to him unopened, and one to Mr. Weisgal, 41 East 42nd Street, New York City.

I phoned Dr. Goldmann and said Weizmann had no right to send this private letter over and I was going to return it or read it and satisfy myself that there was nothing which censorship might object to.

He said it was perfectly all right for me to open it and if there was nothing objectionable, he would call for it and deliver it to Mr. Weisgal.

I told Dr. Goldmann, who is leaving for London in a few days, that he should tell Dr. Weizmann to send me no more letters except via regular mail.

I then decided to let Goldmann only read the letter and not take it with him.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
GRACE

I want to be sure to talk to Sam Rosenman about this at Hyde Park on Saturday.

F. D. R.
1) Any obj to strong actions
2) Will make do with
3) Will British call in Jews
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to our conversation of this morning regarding the joint statement on Palestine, I am enclosing for your approval a copy of the proposed statement which has incorporated the views expressed to me on the subject of Palestine by the Acting Secretary of War in a letter dated July 27, 1943.

It is my understanding that you are to telephone to Judge Rosenman asking him to call a meeting in New York of such Jewish leaders as he might select in order to explain the necessity for the proposed statement. Before calling such a meeting it would be desirable for Judge Rosenman to come to Washington to see me so that I can give him background information.

I should point out that the present revised statement will have to be cleared with the British Government before it is issued.

Enclosure:

Statement.
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING PALESTINE

The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom, having in mind the terms of the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, are agreed that while public discussions on international questions are in general desirable, in order to promote an informed public opinion and clarification of the issues involved, it is undesirable that viewpoints of a controversial character should be so pressed while the war is in progress as to create undue anxiety among United Nations and other friendly governments and peoples.

In this connection, the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom have taken note of public discussions and activities of a controversial nature relating to Palestine. According to the respective military authorities of the two Governments, it is clearly in the military interest that, for the duration, the situation in Palestine should not be disturbed. The military requirements in this area are paramount and must be accorded precedence over the adjustment of any political questions until the military effort to win the war will not be prejudiced. Accordingly, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom unite in declaring that it would
would be helpful to the war effort if discussions and activities of the character above mentioned were to stop.

As in the case of territorial problems in other countries, it is not, in their view, essential that a settlement of the Palestine question be achieved prior to the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, if the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts at any time, such a development would be highly desirable. In any case, the British Government has already stated that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine would be reached without full consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews. But the British Government wishes to make it clear that it has no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or the administration of the country. The United States Government is in full accord with this policy.
The Honorable
The Secretary of State.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The State Department and the War Department have consulted from time to time on the military situation existing in the Middle East, in which the War Department has a primary interest from the standpoint of security of military operations in that area.

The Middle East is one of our theaters of strategic maneuver. It may be expected that military activity in the Middle East, which has already exerted so profound an effect upon the war, will continue to be of the utmost importance in the attainment of our strategic objectives. Prior to the successful termination of the African campaign, the maintenance of the security of our Middle East Theater engaged an enormous proportion of the United Nations' effort. Since the successful termination of the African campaign, the Middle East has changed from a defensive to an offensive base. The effective use of this base in the attainment of our strategic goals is essential to our war effort. The war effort cannot be accomplished to its full extent if military forces now intended for offensive use are diverted to the maintenance of order in the Middle East.

Palestine is an integral part of this base area. Because of the size and complexity of the armed forces in the Middle East and because of the wide zone in which they must operate, disorder in Palestine would affect adversely the situation in the whole area and possibly even the course of the entire war. There are indications at the present time of increasing unrest there. It is clearly in the military interest that for the duration of hostilities the situation in Palestine remain quiet. The military requirements in this area are paramount for the time being and must be accorded precedence over the adjustment of any political questions until such time as the military effort to win the war will not be prejudiced.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Robert P. Patterson,
Acting Secretary of War.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of State sent this letter of Secretary Patterson over so that the President could read it in connection with a memorandum sent over by the Secretary of State to the President yesterday afternoon at five o'clock, relating to a statement suggested by the State Department in connection with the Jewish agitation in this country.
SUMMARY OF REPORT ON THE NEAR EAST

Part I gives the outstanding facts developed in the course of a three and one-half months' trip through the Near East and North Africa and may be summarized as follows:

(1) The most important and most serious fact is the danger that, unless definite steps are taken to prevent it, there may be a renewed outbreak of fighting between Arabs and Jews in Palestine before the end of the war and perhaps even during the next few months. Such fighting in Palestine is almost certain to lead to the massacre of Jews living in the neighboring states of Iraq and Syria as well as in other places in the Near East.

The tension is growing steadily and as a result the Arabs are likely to be goaded, as their only effective means of protest, into breaking the informal truce which has existed in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in 1939. The Arabs feel that the Zionists, by continuing a world-wide propaganda for a Jewish State in Palestine, have not kept their part of the bargain. There is therefore in the minds of the Arabs a growing fear that, unless they do something, they will be faced, when the war is over, with a decision already taken by the Great Powers to turn Palestine over to the Jews. This fear is, of course, one on which Axis propaganda to this area has constantly and effectively harped.

(2) The
(2) The Jews feel that with their increased numbers and with their increased stocks of arms they can more than hold their own in actual fighting with Palestinian Arabs. However, from previous experience the Jews realize that, whenever serious fighting with the Arabs starts in Palestine, assistance from neighboring Arab states will again pour in. It is this increased opposition that the Zionists admit they probably do not have the power to overcome without outside assistance from British or British and American military forces.

(3) There is an ever-present Arab fear of American support for political Zionism with its proposed Jewish State and Jewish Army in Palestine. This is now extending to the further fear of American support for the penetration of Jewish people into Syria and other neighboring Arab areas, once Palestine has been fully populated.

(4) There is also a growing Syrian fear of American support for, or at least acquiescence in, a continuation of French control in Syria after this war is over. The Syrians remember that, after the last war and despite an overwhelming preference for the United States and specific objection to France, the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were nevertheless given to France.

In fact
In fact, the fear that already haunts all of the Near East is that at the end of the present World War the United States may again return to isolationism. Even today this is the cause of such worry that reference is made to it in almost every conversation held with private or official individuals.

(5) Tension and difficulties with the Arabs in North Africa have already been reported to the War Department by General Eisenhower. The unenthusiastic, and in some places uncooperative, attitude of the North African Arab populations reflects hostile propaganda that has claimed that American successes in North Africa would aid the Jewish cause in Palestine.

Obviously the security of American or United Nations troops in the Arab or Moslem world has not yet reached a critical stage. But the situation is definitely unhealthy. The experiences of British troops during their retreat in Burma are a grave and recent warning of the serious effects that a hostile, rather than friendly, native population can have on our military operations.

(6) Since Zionist propaganda in the United States is much greater than corresponding Arab pressure, it is important for the American people to realize that, in
the Moslem world, Arab feelings remain uncompromisingly against the acceptance of a political Zionist State in Palestine.

It should be very clear to the American people, therefore, that only by military force can a Zionist State in Palestine be imposed upon the Arabs.

Part II notes some of the effects of the Arab-Jew conflict in Palestine on the United States.

Our domestic disunity is aggravated by dissension among American citizens of various foreign born groups and increasing conflicts among various Jewish groups, as well as increasing anti-Semitism.

An unfortunate effect for the Jews themselves has resulted from mixing together two problems that should be kept quite separate. Support for all-out aid to persecuted Jews in Europe, on which there can be no difference of opinion, should not be diminished by tying it up with the extremely controversial proposal to establish a Jewish political state in Palestine.

Part III suggests a specific step toward winning wartime support for our United Nations' cause of the 60 million Arabs in North Africa and the Near East.

(1) By the issuance now of a brief statement by the United Nations (or at least by the four major powers) giving assurances
assurances regarding the procedure that will be followed in arriving at a post-war settlement of Palestine. Such a statement need only re-state as official policy of the United Nations, in regard to Palestine what the United States, Great Britain, and their Allies have already announced as their general policy in regard to territorial problems everywhere. This assurance can be very brief and need only consist of two points: (1) that no final decisions regarding Palestine will be taken until after the war; (2) that any post-war decisions will be taken only after full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

A statement along these lines issued as soon as possible would go far to relieve existing tension in the Near East and would, in the opinion of officials in that area, be the military equivalent of at least several extra divisions of troops.
MEMORANDUM ON THE 1939 WHITE PAPER ON PALESTINE

Submitted to:
His Excellency, the Rt. Hon. the Viscount Halifax
Ambassador of Great Britain

January 17, 1944
MEMORANDUM ON THE 1939 WHITE PAPER ON PALESTINE

Submitted to

His Excellency, the Rt. Hon. the Viscount Halifax
Ambassador of Great Britain

by

The American Jewish Committee

January 17, 1944
MEMORANDUM ON THE 1939 WHITE PAPER ON PALESTINE

With full cognizance of the historic friendship of the people of Great Britain and their successive Governments for Jews, which has made them pioneers in the establishment of equal rights for Jews within the confines of their own country, as well as staunch spokesmen for justice when oppression and persecution pursued the Jews elsewhere, the American Jewish Committee is impelled to press for attention the situation created by the White Paper of 1939.

In line with that historic policy, the British Government on November 2, 1917 issued the Balfour Declaration, offering hope to persecuted segments of the Jews throughout the world that they might find a home in the country with which they had an ancient bond.

Following the First World War, after the military victory for the Allied Powers and the subsequent liberation of the Near East, the promise of the Balfour Declaration was included in the Mandate for Palestine, which was entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922. The primary purpose of the Mandate was the establishment of a national home for the Jews with the understanding that nothing be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country. This promise of a homeland within Palestine was specific and admitted. It
was not controversial as is the question of the creation of a commonwealth.

Acknowledging the historical connection of the Jews with Palestine, the Mandate holds the Mandatory responsible for securing development of self-governing institutions. It provides for the encouragement, so far as circumstances permit, of local autonomy, and the recognition of an appropriate Jewish agency to advise and cooperate with the Administration of Palestine. The Mandate makes it obligatory upon Great Britain "to facilitate Jewish immigration" and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land. The holy days of the various religions of the country are made legal rest days; each community in Palestine is to be allowed to maintain its own schools; English, Hebrew and Arabic are made the official languages of the country. No discrimination of any kind, on the ground of race, religion or language, is to be made between the inhabitants of Palestine. "No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief."

Within the terms of the Mandate, principles on which immigration is to be "facilitated" are not defined. Shortly before the signing of the Mandate, however, a Statement of Policy was issued on June 3, 1922, by Mr. Winston Churchill, then Secretary for Colonies, in which the principle of economic absorptive capacity was established as the sole criterion for Jewish immigration into Palestine. This Statement became the interpretation on which the Mandate was subsequently put into effect.
When this Statement was issued by Mr. Churchill, there were already some 80,000 Jews in Palestine, living in an organized community with a certain amount of self-government in local affairs. These Jews and all those who would enter subsequently would be in Palestine, in Mr. Churchill's words, "as of right and not on sufferance."

Except for an episode which occurred in 1930, the British Government adhered to the principle of economic absorptive capacity as the sole criterion for immigration. The one exception was provoked by the disturbances in Palestine in 1929. In a 1930 Statement of Policy, known as the Passfield White Paper, the British Government proposed to discard the principle of economic absorptive capacity and to reduce immigration drastically on political grounds. But British public opinion at the time was highly adverse to this project. The present Lord Chancellor, then Sir John Simon, and Lord Hailsham suggested in a letter to the Times that the British Government should induce the Council of the League of Nations to obtain from the World Court an advisory opinion on whether the restriction of immigration on political grounds is consistent with the Mandate and asked that the British Government should not enforce the measure without a decision of the Court. Mr. David Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister of Great Britain at the time of the Balfour Declaration, speaking in the House of Commons in 1930, described the dominant idea of the Mandate as the "recognition of the special position of the Jewish people in
the country whose name they have made immortal, and the
conferring on them of special rights and interests in
that country."

As a result of this opposition, the British Govern-
ment virtually withdrew the Passfield White Paper. Mr.
Ramsey MacDonald, the Prime Minister, reiterated that "the
considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity
are purely economic considerations."

Moved by the disturbances in Palestine in 1936, the
British Government established a quota of 8,000 Jewish im-
migrants to Palestine for the eight months following August 1,
1937. Confronted with the situation, the Mandates Commission
of the League of Nations again reaffirmed that the limitation
of Jewish immigration to Palestine on other than the principle
of economic absorptive capacity was not in accordance with the
meaning of the Palestine Mandate. The Mandates Commission drew
attention to the fact that this departure from the principle
of economic absorptive capacity was acceptable only as a tem-
porary measure. "The Commission does not question that the
Mandatory Power, responsible as it is for the maintenance of
order in the territory may, on occasion, find it advisable
to take such a step, and is competent to do so, as an ex-
ceptional and provisional measure.... It feels, however, bound
to draw attention to this departure from the principle, san-
tioned by the League Council, that immigration is to be pro-
portionate to the country's economic absorptive capacity."
By 1937, the Jewish population of Palestine had risen to about 400,000. The immigrants, utilizing their own enthu-
siasms and energies, and drawing on the encouragement and
support of Jews throughout the world, had brought Palestine
to great heights of development. Arabs as well as Jews had
benefited from highways, modern housing, exemplary hygienic
provisions, and -- above all -- from the introduction of
economic efficiency and new methods of agriculture that had
turned arid stretches into fertile fields, vineyards and
orchards. Speaking before the House of Commons on the pro-
gress made in Palestine, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary
for Colonies, said, in 1939:

"... the manner of their return has indeed been something
of a miracle. There are places where they have turned the
desert into spacious orange groves. Where was a bare seashore,
they have made a city. They have advanced the frontier of
settlement into waste and plague-ridden spaces. Wherever they
bought up the land they made it produce its fruits more abun-
dantly, and they have started in Palestine a score of thriving
industries.

"There was no denying that Jewish immigration and Jewish
development in Palestine were bringing great material benefits
to the country. Industry and employment increased, and the
revenue from this expansion went to create social services
such as the country had not known before. The Arabs shared
the greater well-being which flowed from these services.
Under the new dispensation, unlike the old Palestine, the
population of the Arabs increased in something like twenty
years from 600,000 souls to over 1,000,000 souls."

The contribution in human energy and material
resources which the Jewish immigrants to Palestine, and their
friends throughout the world, gave to the renaissance of the
country was inspired by the confidence that the future of
Jewish existence there would be allowed to maintain the pace
of accomplishment and fulfillment which had been envisioned
in the documents of 1917 and 1922, the reaffirmation of the
British people and successive British Governments.

To them the 1939 White Paper was a setback and
a shock. The British Government sought justification for the
issuance of the White Paper on May 17, 1939 in the increasingly
disturbed situation of the world, which affected the Near East
with equal intensity. Arab resentment, admittedly fed by Axis
propaganda (the ex-Mufti is now a Berlin favorite) had not been
abated by the immigration curtailment of 1937. War was in-
dubitably imminent, and it may be assumed that this temporary
circumstance activated the British Government.

The White Paper fixes the proportion of Jews
in Palestine as approximately one-third of the total population
by providing that until March 1944, during the first five years
of the transition period, not more than 75,000 Jews be admitted
to the country. Thereafter, unless Arab acquiescence for its continuance is obtained, further Jewish immigration is to be prohibited. Before the publication of the White Paper, it had never been doubted that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were primarily intended to provide the Jews with continued immigration possibilities into Palestine.

The White Paper further provides that the High Commissioner be given powers to regulate and prohibit the transfer of land to Jews. On the basis of this authority, the Palestine Land Transfer Regulations of February 28, 1940 were issued.

In these Regulations, Palestine was divided into three zones. In Zone A, comprising 4,104,000 acres, or about 63.1 per cent of the total area, transfer of land by an Arab to a Jew is altogether prohibited. In Zone B, consisting of 2,067,840 acres, or 31.8 per cent of the total area, land transfers from Arabs to Jews may be allowed under special circumstances at the discretion of the High Commissioner. Only in the so-called "free zone," comprising 332,160 acres, or 5.1 per cent of the total area, do land transfers remain unrestricted.

According to the Land Transfer Regulations, Jews -- even those who are citizens of Palestine -- will not be allowed to buy land in nearly 95 per cent of the total area.
of the country. Others, whether they are citizens of Palestine or foreigners, retain unrestricted purchase rights.

The Mandate, in Article 15, states that "no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the ground of his religious belief." In providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, and in barring the Jews from land purchases in large areas of Palestine, the White Paper is not only inconsistent with the Mandate's terms, but would make Palestine a country in which Jews are discriminated against on the basis of race or religion. The American Jewish Committee does not press the question of a commonwealth; it does urge that the discrimination against Jews as such with respect to land ownership and immigration is wrong in principle and a violation of the legal duty of the Mandatory.

Under the international political uncertainty which motivated the issuance of the White Paper, the House of Commons, by a small majority, approved its policy. Mr. Winston Churchill, opposing the White Paper during the debate that preceded the vote, said: "... the provision that Jewish immigration can be stopped in five years' time by the decision of an Arab majority... is a plain breach of a
solemn obligation... This pledge of a home of refuge, of an asylum, was not made to the Jews in Palestine but to the Jews outside Palestine, to that vast unhappy mass of scattered, persecuted, wandering Jews whose intense, unchanging, unconquerable desire has been for a National Home...

Now, there is the breach, there is the violation of the pledge, there is the abandonment of the Balfour Declaration; there is the end of the vision, of the hope, of the dream...

Yesterday the Minister responsible descanted eloquently in glowing passages upon the magnificent work which the Jewish colonists have done. They have made the desert bloom. They have started a score of thriving industries.... They have founded a great city on a barren shore. They have harnessed the Jordan and spread its electricity throughout the land.

So far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country and multiplied till their population has increased more than even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population. Now we are asked to decree that all this is to stop and all this is to come to an end. We are now asked to submit -- and this is what rankles most with me -- to an agitation which is fed with foreign money and ceaselessly inflamed by Nazi and by Fascist propaganda.”

Furthermore, the White Paper provides that the neighboring Arab States, not mentioned in the Mandate, are under certain circumstances to be consulted during the transformation
of Palestine from a mandated territory to an independent state. On the other hand, it completely ignores the Jewish Agency, which had been the Jewish body advising and cooperating with the Palestine Administration, in accordance with the Mandate.

The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, including a British member, unanimously decided that the policy was not in accordance with the interpretation which had been placed upon the Palestinian Mandate by the Commission. A majority of the Commission also stated that the interpretation given by the White Paper to the obligations contained in the Mandate was "ruled out by the very terms of the Mandate and by the fundamental intentions of its authors." War broke out before the Council of the League of Nations, which had hitherto always followed the advice and recommendations of the Commission, could examine the Commission's report.

Today, the situation which attended the issuance of the White Paper has been considerably changed. We believe the temporary conditions which motivated its issuance have passed. The Near East, recently chosen as the meeting place for the leaders of four great United Nations powers, is no longer in danger of Axis conquest. Amid the encouraging scene, however, millions of Jews who once lived in central and much of eastern Europe stand as symbols of the persecutions and the tyrannies that have made this war a holocaust
of horror. The destruction of Jews and the extent of their uprooting are greater than those to which other population groups have been subjected. Thousands, equipped only with the courage and the hope that sent their predecessors to Palestine from lesser hardships, but as assured as were their predecessors of the good-will and aid of Jews in other parts of the world, plead for the opportunity to utilize their creative energies in the country with which their people’s history is so closely bound. Their admittance into that country, to live freely and securely, would be in the spirit of the Four Freedoms.

For Great Britain, in 1943, the tensions that made her deem the 1939 White Paper necessary are no longer so compelling. For the Jews to whom the Balfour Declaration was addressed and for whom the Mandate was evolved, has come unprecedented need that the possibilities envisioned in the Mandate be released from their present constraints.

The American Jewish Committee, which was organized primarily to "prevent the infraction of the civil and religious rights of Jews, in any part of the world... to secure for Jews equality of economic, social and educational opportunity...", does not at this time urge determination of the final constitutional status of Palestine; it does urge that the British Government re-examine the 1939 White Paper, considering such re-examination to be of the utmost urgency in the light of the present needs of European Jewry. The
American Jewish Committee has from the beginning supported the Balfour Declaration as the legal sanction for the creation of a homeland for Jews within Palestine, and welcomed the opportunity to cooperate with those who sought to establish in a rehabilitated Palestine a center for the development of Jewish life and for the continuation of cultural creativity. It seeks today the safeguarding of the Jewish settlement in, and Jewish immigration into, Palestine under an international trusteeship responsible to the United Nations; and a guarantee of adequate scope for the future expansion of the Jewish community in Palestine to the extent of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. It specially pleads for the abrogation of the White Paper which discriminates against Jews as such.

The American Jewish Committee is in full agreement with the position taken by Mr. Winston Churchill in 1939. The events of the past four years have served to emphasize the vision and wisdom of his attitude.

In view of all existing conditions -- political and humane -- the American Jewish Committee earnestly urges that His Majesty's Government should abrogate the 1939 White Paper.
I am deeply grateful to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee for the privilege afforded me to appear here and speak in approval of the Resolutions 418 and 419 which have been introduced in the House. These Resolutions reflect the spirit of a similar resolution adopted unanimously by both Houses of Congress in 1923. They evidence again the profound interest of the American people, speaking through their chosen representatives in Congress, in the great historic cause of the rebuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

May I say, at the outset, that nothing is further from my mind and from the mind of those for whom I speak — the millions of Jewish citizens of the United States — who through the representatives of their national organizations and the elected delegates of their respective communities gathered at the great American Jewish Conference last September and voiced overwhelmingly their endorsement of the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine and called for the abrogation of the White Paper — than to embarrass our great and gallant ally — Great Britain — whose heroic defense of civilization against Nazi barbarism in the dark days when she stood alone will remain an epic of high courage and spiritual grandeur to inspire all future generations. We have no quarrel with Great Britain. We can never forget that it was Great Britain which, first among the nations, gave recognition to the national aspirations of the Jewish people in the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. But, a false and unjustifiable political policy affecting the Jewish National Home which this very Declaration welcomed and committed His Majesty's government to its achievement, is about to be consummated. It would to all
intent and purposes liquidate the Jewish National Home. It is this policy, which has been sharply criticized by the foremost Statesman of Great Britain herself that we ask to be rescinded. We retain our strong confidence in the integrity and the abiding goodwill of Great Britain that this will be done.

May I also be permitted to give a brief historical background to the movement to reconstitute the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. It is not a recent movement. It did not begin with modern Zionism, nor with the first Zionist colonies which were established in Palestine 65 years ago. The ideal of national restoration is nearly 2000 years old. It dates from the year of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple in the year 70 A.D., and from the beginning of the widespread dispersion of the Jewish people.

Throughout the following centuries the hope of returning to their national home was never absent from among our people. Modern Zionism is only the latest expression of that unbroken and undying will to national restoration which has persisted through the ages.

For fifteen centuries and more prior to the time of the great Dispersion, the Jewish people lived in Palestine as a nation, undergoing all the changing political vicissitudes which all nations, large or small, are bound to experience over a long period of time alternating periods of expansion and contraction, independence and subjugation. But never was the strong sense of life and the will to survive wanting among our ancestors. They stubbornly resisted all attempts to submerge or annihilate them.

During some of those centuries they made their greatest
contribution to civilization in the religious field. They gave the
Bible to the world and formulated the great spiritual and ethical
ideals of mankind. In Palestine and from the Jewish nation came
both Judaism and Christianity.

Whenever disaster threatened their national existence, they
found strength to surmount it. The destruction of the first Temple
in the 6th century B.C., and the exile of the best part of Israel to
Babylonia did not result in the death of the nation. By the rivers of
Babylon they sat down and wept as they remembered Zion and in their
exile they vowed: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand
forget her cunning."

In the second pre-Christian century, the Jews revolted against
their Syrian overlords and regained their political independence.
A century later they lost it again to the Romans. When the oppression
of the Romans became too great, they revolted again. This great re-
volt lasted for six years, until 70 A.D., when Jerusalem and the
Temple were destroyed. But the Jewish nation did not perish then.
In 115 the Jewish people revolted again. And in 135 they revolted a
third time. Determinedly they resisted the greatest empire of the
earth in defense of their national life and liberties.

In the following centuries and as a result of persecution,
Jewish life in Palestine sharply declined from its high levels but
it continued on a relatively large scale up to the 7th century when
we again hear of Jews fighting for their freedom. Jews clung to
Palestine all through Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Christian and Turkish
domination, to this very day. "Throughout the ages, even in the
darkest periods of the Crusades, the

protracted wars of the Middle
Ages, and in modern times, the Jews never entirely left the soil of
Palestine." They never ceased to think of it as their national home. They never surrendered the hope that some day they would rebuild their national life there. The bitter experiences of two thousand years of exile, outlawry, ghettos and massacres only served to re-enforce that hope.

The effort to return to Palestine were unremitting through the ages, although of necessity, sharply restricted and inhibited. The living bond with Palestine was never broken. The hope of return became part of the Jews' creed. It echoed through the pages of his Prayer Book. His festivals were redolent of memories and hopes of Palestine. The messianic hope which sustained the spirits of our people throughout the bleak centuries was essentially the hope of Israel's return to Palestine. All through the Middle Ages, when travelling was most difficult and dangerous, Jews found ways, singly or in groups, to return to Palestine.

In the 19th century, this age-old national aspiration finally entered the phase of political organization and practical action.

Orthodox Rabbis and lay leaders, moved by convictions both religious and national, were among the first to advocate planned and concerted colonization projects in Palestine.

A strong urge towards political action for national emancipation came also from the circles of the so-called assimilated Jews of Western Europe who had become disillusioned with the results of 19th century enlightenment and emancipation. Sudden and violent outbursts of anti-Semitism in unexpected places forced upon these Jews who had so sanguinely awaited the early liquidation of the Jewish problem, the necessity of taking stock of their position anew.

They realized that the problem of the national homelessness of
the Jewish people was the principal source of the Jewish millennial tragedy and that it remained as stark and as menacing as ever. It simply could not be circumvented by wishful thinking or pleasant daydreaming.

These Jews began to look for the basic solution of the problem and they soon discovered it. Fundamentally the root of all the trouble was that the Jewish people was a nationally homeless people in the world and the only solution for national homelessness is a national home.

Great thinkers from among the intellectual circles of Westernized European Jewry formulated this new insight and conviction. The theme common to all was emancipation through national restoration. Not that all Jews should return to Palestine any more than that all Englishmen living in all parts of the world should return to England, or all Frenchmen to France, or all Germans to Germany. Every nation today has many of its former nationals, citizens of other countries. But just as there is an England, a France, and a Germany so must there be a Land of Israel in order that the status of the Jewish people might be normalized throughout the world. Politically the Jewish people as a people must become, like every other people, possessed of an independent life in a national home.

In 1897, Theodor Herzl convoked the first Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland. There the official Zionist platform was adopted: "The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a Home in Palestine secured by public law."

Within twenty years of the organization of modern political Zionism the movement received formal approval at the hands of the greatest empire on earth — Great Britain.

On November 2, 1917, Arthur James Balfour, then Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, issued the following declaration in the name of the British Government:

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The Balfour Declaration, which represents a turning point in the history of the Jewish people, was not, as has sometimes been represented, a purely British formulation of policy. It was for many months the subject of long and earnest negotiation between the principal Allied Powers. In February and March of 1918, the French and Italian governments respectively issued parallel statements in support of the Balfour Declaration. President Wilson had followed the negotiations, and had encouraged the issuance of that Declaration. At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers, held at San Remo in April, 1920, the Balfour Declaration was unanimously adopted and embodied in the Mandate for Palestine which was offered to Great Britain. On July 24, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations unanimously ratified the British Mandate, with the incorporated Declaration as an integral part. That same year the Congress of the United States adopted the following resolution:

"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places
and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected." (June 30, 1922)

The Preamble to the Mandate contains this significant clause:

"Whereas recognition has hereby been given to the historical connections of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country .........."

The creation, or reconstitution of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine was thus accepted as a world policy. It was also regarded as an act of restitution. It was a recognition both of the present need of the Jewish people and of the continuity of its claim to its Homeland, a continuity unbroken by the vicissitudes of two thousand years of history.

What did the framers of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate have in mind when they spoke of the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine? Their utterances leave no doubt as to their clear intent. They meant a Jewish State, a Jewish Commonwealth.

Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain at the time of the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, writes in his memoirs:

"It was not their (the British Cabinet's) idea that a Jewish State should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for establishing representative institutions in Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a National Homeland, had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth. The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order to ensure that the Jews should be a permanent minority never entered into the head of anyone engaged in
and in view of what has transpired since those few moments.

Is it therefore, most proper, as well as historically accurate, to call on the Department of State, Washington, 1939, for an immediate response? - President of the Department of State, Washington, 1939.

See p. 60, 'Remarks for Palestine' - presented in the Office of the President and the Department of State.

With regard to the negotiations reached in substantial accordance with the interests of our Government and Great Britain, and subject of the negotiations between our Government and Great Britain, and our then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to india.

Committee of a Jewish Commonwealth.

I am persuaded that the Attlee's action with the failure of the common

President Wilson in 1918, do not go.

would be especially in harmony with the supreme interests of the British Crown.

the history of the world which would now come to pass, if we are permitted to

right cooperate these million of your million and an equal will have occasion to

o'clock by the Board of Trustees, under the protection of the British Crown, which

If I am wrong, I am happy, those should be exercised in our interests. By the

Wilson Administration, when we were Secretary of State in 1920, do not go.

the Jewish State and other neighboring States.

the hope and confidence that there could and could be peace and cooperation between

1917 of the necessity of co-operating a Jewish State in Palestine and to expressed

Nations that there was none more, and "that he is committed today to lose them in

obtain of Jewish Emancipation into Palestine and in cooperation to come a Great Temple

General Balfour, still one of Great Britain's foremost statesman, in 1919.

people to whom we are appealing.
sound, for the Resolutions which have been introduced in the House, to speak of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. It is not a new concept. It is exactly what was originally contemplated. Attempts have been made to whittle down the meaning of the term, "a national home" employed in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. It has even been asserted that a Jewish national home already exists in Palestine and that a permanent Jewish minority within a Palestine state, such as the White Paper envisages, is quite consistent with the avowed purposes of the Mandate. This of course, is not the case. It is well, therefore, to stress the true objective of the Mandate which was the reconstitution of the Jewish Commonwealth, which presupposes a Jewish majority in the country, as Mr. Lloyd George correctly points out. The experiences of the last twenty-five years indicate that no such majority will ever be attained unless the control of immigration is vested with the Jewish Agency which alone is interested in the creation of absorptive capacity and in the intensive agricultural and industrial development of the land in order to absorb rapidly large numbers of immigrants and provide them with the means of earning a livelihood.

It was not contemplated to set up two states in Palestine, or to set up a Palestine State in which Jews would be a permanent minority. The mandate made Great Britain "responsible for putting into effect the declaration officially made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of his Britannic Majesty", i.e., the Balfour Declaration. The Mandate was charged with the responsibility "for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." (Article 2) The Mandate nowhere speaks of the establishment of an Arab National home in Palestine.

The Mandate calls for the recognition of "an appropriate Jewish
Agency as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National home ... and to assist and take part in the development of the country." The Mandate nowhere speaks of the recognition of an Arab Agency for it was not required, inasmuch as it was not contemplated to set up in Palestine an Arab National State.

Under the terms of the Mandate the Zionist Organisation of the World was invited "to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National home." (Article 4)

The Mandatory was charged with the duty of "facilitating Jewish immigration" into Palestine and of encouraging "in cooperation with the Jewish Agency" close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes." (Article 6)

It was called upon to enact a nationality law "so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine." (Article 7)

There are no provisions in the Mandate for facilitating Arab immigration into Palestine or their close settlement on the land.

The Administration of Palestine was asked to "arrange with the Jewish Agency to construct or operate any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the national resources of the country." (Article 11)

What do all these clear provisions amount to? That Palestine was to be built up as a Jewish national state - and that for the transition period, until a Jewish majority is achieved and the country is ready for self-governing institutions, Great Britain was entrusted by
the Principal Allied Powers with a Mandate to administer the country upon
terms and powers clearly defined in the Mandate by the Council of the
League of Nations.

Was the proposed re-establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth
in Palestine unfair to the Arabs? May I be permitted to quote the words
of the Rt. Hon. Alfred Duff Cooper, former First Lord of the British
Admiralty, spoken here in Washington in the spring of 1940:

"In 1914 there was hardly any territory which the Arabs could
call their own. They were almost throughout the Near East subject to
Turkish suzerainty. Since 1914, they have acquired vast tracts of terri-
tory where they are independents: the whole of Arabia; Trans-Jordania,
which was taken away from the original conception of Palestine; Syria,
where again they exercise semi-independent rights. No nation in the
world has so little ground for complaining of what the Germans call lack
of Lebensraum as the Arab race. They have vast spaces in which to expand.
They have been amongst the greatest beneficiaries of the World War, and
now they are subject to no particular evils.

"And what, meanwhile, has happened to the Jew? Did anybody
imagine when Balfour made his Declaration, what was going to happen in
the Continent of Europe in the years to come? Could anybody, believing
in progress, in human nature and in Christian civilization, have dreamt
of the ghastly, hideous and shocking persecution that has befallen the
Jewish race?"

Realising that the Arabs would have their national aspirations
satisfied after the war by the establishment of a number of national
states and that these states would have land areas so large that it
would take them centuries to develop them, and realising also that the
Jews stood in desperate need of a place of refuge, for their people,
the Allies reserved "the tiny notch" of Palestine, as Balfour called
it, --just 10,000 square miles. The Arab lands cover more than a million square miles and they are underpopulated and largely undeveloped.

Provision, of course, was made in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate for the political equality of all citizens and for the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities. These rights have been fully protected. The Palestine Arab has not been exploited. In fact there are no Arabs on the face of the earth today more prosperous than the Arabs of Palestine.

The Survey of Palestine made by the Peel Commission in 1937 contains the following statement: "It is difficult to detect any deterioration in the economic position of the Arab upper class... We are also of the opinion that until now the Arab cultivator has benefited on the whole from the work of the British Administration and from the presence of the Jews in the country... Wages have gone up; the standard of living has improved... The large import of Jewish capital into Palestine has had a general refining effect on the economic life of the whole country... The reclamation and anti-malaria works undertaken in the Jewish colonies have benefited all the Arabs in the neighborhood... Broadly speaking, the Arabs have shared to a considerable degree in the material benefits which Jewish immigration has brought to Palestine... The Arab charge that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained. Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamps and unsold when it was purchased."

The establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine will be a great boon to the entire Near East and to all the Arab peoples. Jews are bringing scientific skill, technical knowledge, material resources and high enthusiasm to the upbuilding of Palestine. Palestine is destined to become the hub of a great and rapid economic development of the entire Near East. The prosperity of Palestine will stimulate and, in the course of time will come to depend upon the prosperity of all the adjacent Arab countries.

It is the Jews of Palestine who are the true pro-Arabs. The Jews of Palestine wish to work in complete friendship and cooperation with the Arabs—but not at the sacrifice of their national rights.
It has been alleged that promises were also made to the Arabs during the last war to the effect that Palestine was to be included in the area in which Arab independence would be established. Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, who negotiated with the Sherif of Mecca, later King Hussein, is alleged to have made such a promise. The British government has consistently maintained that Palestine was definitely excluded from McMahon's pledge.

McMahon, himself, in a letter to The Times, London, July 23, 1937, stated:

"I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised.

"I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein."

During the years 1917-1921 no claims to Palestine were raised by the Arab representatives. Indeed, they did in various ways explicitly agree to Palestine being treated differently from Arab territories.

Haif Faisal, son of Hussein, afterward King of Iraq, the leader of the Arabs, in the crucial war years, stated in December 1918: "The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs, and Jews understand one another, and I hope that as a result of interchange of ideas at the Peace Conference, which will be guided by ideals of self-determination and nationality, each nation will make definite progress towards the realization of its aspirations. Arabs are not jealous of
Zionist Jews, and intend to give them fair play, and the Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist Arabs of their intention to see that they too have fair play in their respective areas."

And in January, 1919, Emir Feisal, for the Arab Kingdom of Hedjas, and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, on behalf of the Zionist Organization, signed a Treaty of Friendship which clearly showed that Feisal regarded Palestine as a land reserved for Jewish national settlement. He also submitted to the Peace Conference a Memorandum on the Arab claims in which he asked for the independence of a number of Arab areas with the explicit exception of Palestine.

The record, then, of what was intended for Palestine and what was undertaken is quite clear. The civilized world recognized the right of the Jewish people to rebuild their national home in Palestine. Great Britain accepted a mandate to facilitate its consummation. The Jews of the world set themselves to the task of upbuilding.

Thus a new era in Jewish history was ushered in. The Jewish people threw itself into the work of upbuilding with incomparable zeal and enthusiasm. The task was enormous — untrained hands, inadequate means, overwhelming difficulties. The land was stripped and poor — neglected through the centuries. European Jewry was shattered and impoverished by the war and could not be quickly rallied to the work of reconstruction. Plans had to be improvised and carried through piece-meal. Nevertheless the record of pioneering achievement of the Jewish people in Palestine in the twenty years between two world wars, the story of their heroic labors and sacrifices and their courageous experimentation have received the acclaim of the entire world. A

vegetable miracle of colonization was performed. The Jewish population increased from 56,000 to 600,000. Close to 500 colonies have been
established. Social vision and high human idealism went into the planning and structure of many of them. Some 2,000 factories and 4,000 small workshops were opened. The waters of the Jordan were harnessed for electric power. The Dead Sea was made to yield up its vast chemical resources. Barren hills and valleys were reforested. Marshes were drained. A splendid educational system was developed, crowned by the Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus. A modern health service was established throughout the country, available to Jews, Mohammedans and Christians alike.

It was fortunate indeed that Palestine was available, readied and prepared by the labor of these Jewish pioneers, when the horrible Hitler persecutions swept over European Jewry. For that little country was able to absorb more than 300,000 refugees from Germany and Central Europe. Today Jewish Palestine is again vindicating its claim to full life and national freedom by the extraordinary contributions which it is making to the war effort of the United Nations. Some 23,000 young Palestinian Jews out of that small population have volunteered for service in the armies of the United Nations, have fought bravely, many of them with rare distinction. The civilian population is engaged in an all-out effort to back up the fighting armies in the Near East by providing them with many vital supplies and services. 80,000 Palestinian Jews are engaged in defense work.

These remarkable achievements did not come about easily. Resistance was encountered almost from the very start and it has increased in intensity with the years.

The administration of Palestine has unfortunately not always been conducted on a plane corresponding to the high intentions of the framers of the Balfour Declaration, nor did it reflect the good will and
unflagging sympathy of the English people whose historic friendship the Jewish people will never forget. Local British officials, though of high integrity, have shown little understanding of the processes involved in the building of a Jewish Homeland. They have not grasped the implications of the organic relationship between the Jewish people outside of Palestine, to whom the Balfour Declaration was issued, and the land which they administered. The facilitation of the rebuilding of the Jewish Homeland implies a dynamic outlook. The outlook of British officials has been in the main static, based on the tacit assumption that Palestine alone, and not the integration of large numbers of immigrants with an evolving Jewish Homeland, was their concern.

They have therefore tended to look upon the local difficulties associated with the upbuilding of the Jewish Homeland as unnecessary disturbances of the status quo, instead of a natural part of the task assigned to them. No corrective to this attitude was applied by the home government in London. There, too, a tendency manifested itself to meet difficulties by relinquishing the objectives which a high statesmanship had set. No consistent attempt was made to bring home to the Arabs of Palestine the fact that the Balfour Declaration was an Inter-Allied policy, and later, that the Mandate was international law, and the first evidence of recalcitrance on their part — namely the riots of May, 1921 — was rewarded by a temporary suspension of Jewish immigration.

Concession led to concession. The White Paper issued in 1922 declared that "the terms of the Balfour Declaration do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be established in Palestine." This
was the beginning of "re-interpretation." It introduced an element of ambiguity into what had been quite clear till then.

The Palestine contemplated in the mandate had consisted of Transjordan and cis-Jordan. In the year 1922, Transjordan -- three times the area of cis-Jordan -- was closed by administrative decree to Jewish immigration.

In subsequent years, Palestine's British officials took the view that they were not primarily concerned with the facilitation of the creation of a Jewish Homeland, but with the administration of the country in its existing condition.

This view has dominated the policies and actions of the Palestine administration ever since. The national rights of the Jewish people in relations to Palestine which had been internationally acknowledged, and which alone gave legal basis for the Mandate presence there were progressively and consistently sacrificed.

Following the disturbances of 1936, a Palestine Royal Commission was sent to Palestine to investigate. Its report proposed to partition Palestine, and to create an Arab and a Jewish State, and an area reserved for British administration.

A technical commission (the Woodland Commission), was set up to work out the details of a partition plan. It declared that the partition plan was unworkable.

Following discussions in London in 1939, to which representatives of Arabs and Jews were invited and which brought no positive results, the British Government of the late Mr. Chamberlain prepared the White Paper of May 17, 1939. The Commons reluctantly consented to it during a tense period of international complications, only after the Government insisted
on acceptance as a vote of confidence. It was formally disapproved by the Permanent Mandates Commission. It was never submitted for approval by the Council of the League of Nations, although Article 27 of the mandate clearly states that "the consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modifications of the terms of the mandate." It was thus denied legal validity. However, despite all this, it was put into effect.

Under the terms of this White Paper, Jewish immigration was limited to 10,000 a year for the next 5 years. A bonus immigration of an additional 25,000 was allowed in consideration of the plight of Arab Jewish refugees. However, after March, 1946, Jewish immigration is to be discontinued entirely "unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."

The White Paper likewise grants the High Commissioner of Palestine general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. Regulations in performance of this provision have been issued according to which Jews are allowed the right of free purchase in only 2.6% of the total area of Palestine — 250 square miles! A total prohibition on transfer of land to Jews was imposed in about two-thirds of the country; in the remaining area transfer is permissible only under severe restriction and subject to the consent of the High Commissioner.

Thus the Jews were left to build their national home without men and without land, just as their ancestors in Egypt were expected to make brick without straw.

The White Paper is by no stretch of the imagination the fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Jewish people recognized in the mandate. It is their total liquidation.
This White Paper when it was issued in 1939, in the disastrous Munich appeasement era and as part of that tragic political and spiritual debacle of those days, aroused the bitterest opposition. It was denounced, both at home and abroad. The foremost British Statesman, Lord Snell, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Leopold Amery, Herbert Morrison, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Earl of Lytton and Winston Churchill, himself the greatest stout heart of England, repudiated it.

Mr. Churchill, in voting against the proposals of His Majesty’s Government, declared in the House of Commons:

"My Right Hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs may use his great legal ability. He is full of knowledge and power and ingenuity, but unless this can be answered, and repulsed, and repudiated, a very great slur rests upon British Administration. It said specifically on Page 10 of the White Paper that Jewish immigration during the next 5 years will be at a rate which, if the economic absorptive capacity allows, will bring the population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. After that the Arab majority, twice as numerous as the Jews, will have control, and all further Jewish immigration will be subject to their acquiescence, which is only another way of saying that it will be sufferance. What is that but the destruction of the Balfour Declaration? What is that but a breach of faith? What is it but a one-sided denunciation — what is called in the jargon of the present time a unilateral denunciation — of an engagement?"

"We are now asked to submit," he further declared — "and this rankless most with me — "to an agitation which is fed with foreign money and ceaselessly inflamed by Nazi and by Fascist propaganda."

If the White Paper was found odious and morally unjustifiable
in 1929, before the Second World War and before the appalling disasters
swept over the Jewish communities of Europe driving hundreds of thousands of
Jews helpless and impoverished from their homes to wander over the face of
the earth, how utterly insupportable and insufferable is it today!

The last five years have been the blackest in Jewish history. They
climaxed five other years which the Nazi regime ushered in, during which one
Jewish community after another in Central and Eastern Europe was broken and
myriads of Jews were driven into exile from countries and homes where they
had known dignity, honor, and where they and their ancestors had lives for
centuries. Myriads of them crowded the highways of the world in quest of
refuge and sanctuary and finding most doors barred against them. But a
worse fate awaited those who could not escape in time. For them Hitler
has decreed total extermination — systematic, ruthless annihilation — in
gas chambers, by machine guns, in human slaughter-pens. Two million
managed to escape, and after months of wandering finally reached the shores
of Palestine — the shores of the Jewish national home — were turned away.
They were refused admission. They had no certificates. The last door of
hope was shut to them. Many tried to enter illegally. Hundreds of them
were apprehended, sent to concentration camps and later forcibly evacuated to
the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean where they are rotting to this
day. Many perished in Haifa Bay. 760 souls perished in the Black Sea on
the ill-fated Struma, because permission to enter Palestine was refused to
them, But for this infamous White Paper they might have been saved.
Had the doors of Palestine been wide open these last years of Nazi terror
and had the Mandatory Government fully cooperated in the task, tens of
thousands of additional refugees might have been saved from Hitler's mass
execution.
In March of this year, the pitifully restricted immigration schedule permitted under the White Paper will come to an end. Only the 30,000 unused visas—unused, principally because of the administrative difficulties put in the way by Palestinian officials—remain. Thereafter no more Jews will be permitted to Palestine except on Arab suffrage and consent. This confronts the Jewish people and the whole civilized world with an appalling prospect. It is self-evident that Jewish homelessness will be wide-spread after the war. There will be hundreds of thousands of Jews perhaps millions who will seek new homes in a world which will be inhospitable to immigration. The struggle for existence in a ravaged post-war Europe will be harsh and bitter. Famine, poverty, and misery will stalk over the face of that war-riven continent. There will be ruined economies, worthless currencies, mass social collapse and revolutions in every defeated country—just as after the last war. The youth of half the world which has been indoctrinated with the racial and nationalistic mythologies of Nazi-fascist dictatorship will be spiritually lost and unsuited to a democratic way of life which they have been taught to hate and despise—and they will be virulent Jew-haters. Jews will again be eyed solemnly as unwelcome economic competitors by millions of job-hungry and career-hungry men. Economic hostility will once again be rationalized into the well-known and quite serviceable anti-Semitic theses.

No doubt the Jews of Europe, following an Allied victory, will be restored to their political rights and to equality of citizenship. But they possessed these rights after the last war—even minority rights in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and anti-Semitism was never so rampant, so vicious as after the last war.
been wide open these last years of Nazi terror and had the Mandatory Government fully cooperated in the task, tens of thousands of additional refugees might have been saved from Hitler's mass execution.

In March of this year, the pitifully restricted immigration scheduled permitted under the White Paper will come to an end. Only the 30,000 unused visas—used, principally because of the administrative difficulties put in the way by the Palestine officials, remain. Thereafter no more Jews will be permitted to Palestine except on Arab suzerainty and consent. This confronts the Jewish people and the whole civilized world with an appalling prospect. It is self-evident that Jewish homelessness will be widespread after the war. There will be hundreds of thousands of Jews who will have to seek new homes in a world which will be inscrutable to immigration. The struggle for existence in a ravaged post-war Europe will be harsh and bitter. Famine, poverty, and misery will stalk over the face of that war-riven continent. There will be ruined economies, worthless currencies, social collapse and revolutions in every defeated country — just as after the last war. The youth of half the world which has been indoctrinated with the racial and nationalistic mythologies of Nazi-Fascist dictatorship will be spiritually lost and unsuited to a democratic way of life which they had been taught to hate and despise — and they will be virulent Jew-haters. Jews will again be eyed solely as uninvited economic competitors by millions of job-hungry and career-hungry men. Economic hostility will once again be rationalized into the well-known and quite serviceable anti-Semitic theses.

No doubt the Jews of Europe, following an allied victory, will be restored to their political rights and to equality of citizenship. But they possessed these rights after the last war — even minority rights in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and anti-Semitism was never so rampant, so vicious as after the last war.
Some of the most prominent and influential Jewish leaders have played significant roles in the political and economic life of the United States. They have been influential in shaping public opinion and policy, both through their personal influence and through their involvement in various organizations and institutions. Their contributions have been recognized and appreciated by the Jewish community and by the wider society.

In a speech to the Jewish community, one leader emphasized the importance of unity and the need for cooperation. He stressed the need for all Jews to work together in the service of the nation. The Jewish community has a unique role to play in the shaping of public policy and in the promotion of democratic values. It is the duty of all Jews to contribute to the well-being of the nation and to work towards a just and equitable society.

In another speech, another leader called for the continuation of the work of goodwill and cooperation. He highlighted the importance of education and the need for Jews to work towards the establishment of a just and equal society. The Jewish community has a responsibility to work towards the betterment of society and to promote the values of justice, equality, and human dignity.

The Jewish community has a long and proud history of contributions to the nation. From the founding of the nation to the present day, Jews have played a vital role in shaping the political and social landscape. They have been leaders in the arts, sciences, and in the fields of education and social reform. The Jewish community has a unique perspective on the world and a unique role to play in the shaping of public policy.

In conclusion, the Jewish community has a vital role to play in the shaping of the world. It is the duty of all Jews to contribute to the well-being of the nation and to work towards a just and equitable society. The Jewish community has a unique perspective on the world and a unique role to play in the shaping of public policy.
parties, ask our government to use its good offices, as it did once before, to assist a sorely tried and harassed people in accomplishing the task of rebuilding its national life in its ancestral home—a task approved of by our government and our people and by 52 other nations at the close of the last war—a task, however, which cannot be accomplished without the free entry of Jews into the country and without the fullest opportunities for colonization and economic development. The reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth would be fulfillment of prophecy and an act of historic justice to an ancient and long-martyred people.
H. RES. 419

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 27, 1944

Mr. Compton submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

1 Resolved, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the
doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.
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H. RES. 418

RESOLUTION

Relative to the Jewish national home in Palestine.

By Mr. Wright

January 27, 1944

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
February 3, 1944

Dear Dr. Wise:

The President has arranged to receive the following group of persons and yourself on February fourteenth, 1944, at about o'clock:

Dr. Israel Goldstein
Mr. Henry Monsky
Dr. A. R. Silver —
Mr. Joseph V. Proskauer
Mr. Jacob Blaustein
Mr. Adolph Hild

I understand that this conference has been requested of the President in order to discuss the continuance of immigration into Palestine and the settlement of refugees therein.

Will you please notify me of your ability to attend at that time?

Very sincerely,

EDWIN M. WATSON
Major General, U. S. A.
Secretary to the President
February 11, 1944.

Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Judge Rosenman:

At the request of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum on the
absorptive capacity of Palestine of which I understand,
he has spoken to you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Arthur Lourie

End.
Comparative Estimates

1. Palestine, west of the Jordan, comprises an area of 10,000 square miles. It is characterized, despite its small size, by great diversity of climate, soils, altitude, and rainfall, and offers possibilities for many types of agriculture and varied economic development. Its population today is about 1,500,000.

2. Belgium, Holland, and Sicily are each of approximately the same size as Palestine. The population of Sicily, mountainous and without important industries, is 4,000,000; that of Belgium and Holland each, over 8,000,000. It is clear that area alone does not determine the absorptive capacity of a country; its material resources and the energy, skill, and character of its inhabitants must also be taken into account.

3. Archaeological and historical evidence indicates that Palestine in Graeco-Roman times supported a population of 3,000,000 - 4,000,000, or more than twice the present total. It is reasonable to suppose that with the aid of modern technology that figure will not only be reached once more, but considerably exceeded.
Agricultural Possibilities

4. Increase in the agricultural population depends on an extension of irrigation. The present irrigated area of Palestine can be increased at least ten times. This is the conclusion reached a decade ago by two American experts (Professor Strahorn and Dr. F. Julius Fohs) who confirmed an earlier study by the late Dr. Elwood Mead, former United States Commissioner of Reclamation. At present less than 100,000 acres (1½% of the total area of Palestine), are irrigated.

5. Since the date of the above study, further new and abundant sources of water have been found in the sub-soil of Palestine. An estimate of 1,000,000 acres of irrigable land must today be regarded as conservative. Development of such an area would make possible the doubling or even trebling of the present agricultural population.

The Negeb

6. For lack of water, the entire southern half of Palestine, known as the Negeb, is almost unpopulated. Archaeological remains throughout the Negeb bear witness to partial irrigation and marked prosperity in that region in ancient times. Sir John Hope Simpson, who in 1930 investigated agricultural possibilities in Palestine on behalf of the British Government, reported that "Given the possibility of irrigation, there is practically an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba district (Negeb)." It is now clear that irrigation waters can be brought to the Negeb from northern Palestine, much as they are brought from the Colorado River to southern California. Plans for the irrigation of the Negeb along these lines are part of a comprehensive irrigation scheme of the type
Industry

7. Palestine industries before the first World War comprised only a few handicrafts. By 1933 production had risen to $20,000,000, and by 1942 to $80,000,000. Today Palestine produces an astonishing range of articles, including metal, textile, and chemical products, precision instruments, electrical equipment, machine tools and parts, cement, glass, and many specialized products. In addition, the Palestine Potash Company has begun to extract the vast and hitherto untapped mineral wealth of the Dead Sea, whose products may well serve as the basis of a great chemical industry.

8. Jewish skilled workers and technicians have already proved the possibilities of developing flourishing industries in Palestine, based on local resources as well as imported raw materials. It is a commonplace of economics that many great industries have developed far from their sources of supply, and Palestine's central geographical position gives it easy access to raw materials.

9. Though Palestine lacks coal, great quantities of fuel from the oil-fields of Iraq reach Haifa, the Mediterranean terminal of the Mosul pipeline. Moreover, plans are now under way for a great hydro-electric development made possible by the remarkable rift formation of the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea, dropping from 3,000 feet above to 1,300 feet below sea level. On a small scale this rift formation has already been utilized for the production of light and power by the Palestine Electric Corporation.
Palestine, a Trade Center

10. Palestine's geographical position is also bound to be a factor of prime importance in determining its economic future. Located as it is at the crossroads of three continents, Palestine is rapidly becoming a commercial center for the whole of the Near East. In the words of Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, it has "a position in the twentieth century world ...... not incomparable to the position of Great Britain as an entrepot between Europe and the Americas." Already Haifa is the third largest harbor in the eastern Mediterranean. A second modern port has been built in Tel Aviv, a city of 200,000, where thirty years ago there were merely sand dunes.

Palestine's Balance of Trade

11. Coincident with the growth of Jewish immigration and settlement, Palestine's trade figures have consistently shown a considerable excess of imports over exports. In the normal course of events dependence upon large capital imports would be dangerous as involving an increase in the external debt. But the case of Palestine is unique in that the great bulk of capital imported is provided by the immigrants themselves or by Zionist funds from abroad.

As the Palestine Royal Commission pointed out:

"The most singular feature in the economy of Palestine is the vast amount of capital which has been invested in the country, for which no remittance for interest and sinking fund are required. This feature sharply differentiates the Jewish National Home from other communities which have been created by a process of colonization and are burdened by charges on the capital obtained from overseas for their development."
12. On the basis of this capital influx, assets of a permanent and constructive character in the shape of new farms and factories have been and are being created, and will provide the basis for a self-supporting society. It is significant in this connection that an increasing number of the Jewish settlements founded with the help of Zionist funds, have begun to make repayments out of income on the monies originally borrowed by them. During the years 1922 to 1923 the sum total of these repayments averaged only about $2,000 a year. In 1939 alone they reached the sum of nearly $400,000.

Conclusion 13. As long ago as 1930 when Palestine was far less developed than it is today, Lord Samuel, after five years experience as High Commissioner, said:

"I am confident that with proper agricultural and industrial development Palestine could . . . support a population of three millions."

On the basis of the experience of the last thirteen years and of the economic possibilities above indicated, Lord Samuel's estimate now appears conservative. It has become clear that Palestine may well be able to maintain a population of at least 5,000,000.

14. Dr. Walter C. Lowdermilk, Assistant Chief of the United States Soil Conservation Bureau, who in 1939 spent eight months in a thorough study of land use in the countries of the Near and Middle East on behalf of the United States Government, has the following to say on the absorptive capacity of Palestine:

"I shall not attempt to estimate the final absorptive capacity of Palestine. That would be impossible, for the absorptive capacity of any country is a dynamic and expanding conception. It changes with the ability
Page 6

of the population to make the maximum use of its land, and to put its economy on a scientific and productive basis. It is clear, however, that there is ample proof of the assertion that full utilization of the Jordan Valley depression for reclamation and power will in time make possible the absorption of at least four million Jewish refugees from Europe, in addition to the 1,800,000 Arabs and Jews already in Palestine and Trans-Jordan."

15. The experience of the last twenty-five years has proved that Jewish immigration and economic activity have led to a marked increase in the numbers and well-being of the Arab population. As Mr. Malcom MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Chamberlain Government, stated in the House of Commons on November 24, 1938:

"The Arabs cannot say that the Jews are driving them out of their country. If not a single Jew had come to Palestine after 1918, I believe that the Arab population of Palestine today would still have been round about the 600,000 figure (instead of over 1,000,000 as at present) at which it had been stable under the Turkish rule. It is because the Jews who have come to Palestine bring modern health services and other advantages, that Arab men and women who would have been dead are alive today, that Arab children who would never have drawn breath have been born and grow strong."

16. Repeatedly our conception of the absorptive capacity of Palestine has had to be revised upwards because of the achievements brought about by the combined pressure of Jewish need and of Jewish determination to rebuild the ancient homeland of the Jewish people. We believe that the prospects held out in this memorandum are, if anything, an under-statement of the possibilities.

"Palestine, Land of Promise", to be published by Harpers in March, 1944.
The Chief of C.I.D. told me the other day that the aim of the Jews, when the proper time comes, will be to seize the whole country by armed force, in the belief that no one will be willing to take it from them once they are in control. He is a bit of a pessimist, but there is no doubt of the strength of the Jews.

There was recently put up to the Jewish Agency by the British military authorities the proposition that a considerable part of the Palestine Regiment be taken to act as a defense party in a bridgehead to be established in Europe. They would not be used in connection with the landing but after the landing troops had advanced inland the Palestine soldiers would be used to restore and maintain order and guard the territory won. The Palestine Government showed me the Agency's reply. The Agency reminded the Army of the promise made by General Nessim that Palestinians would be used in defense of Palestine which might involve service in nearby countries but did not include service which could not be construed in defense of Palestine, although General Nessim had said that the fortunes of war are so uncertain that no definite assurance could be given on the subject. They added that the case might be different if the regiment were required for actual fighting. If the regiment is taken it would be necessary, they said, to bring in other troops to do guard duty and they thought it would be preferable to leave the Jewish troops who are already performing those duties. I understand some of the troops have been sent to Benghazi but I do not know for what service.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
S. I. R.

I talked with the Prime Minister about Palestine and he is very much against taking any action now. He is absolutely opposed to the Balfour Paper.

He believes with me that a great deal of additional people can be found room for in Palestine but that these additional people -- Jews and Arabs -- cannot be taken care of there in unlimited numbers right away. Much engineering must be done and there will probably develop limits to the total.

I think that in one of my speeches I could say something about preparations being necessary because I do not want to see an immediate mass influx before the country is ready for it.

Surveys looking toward settlement by additional people would definitely be a step initiated by me and could be done, I think, without a final settlement with the Arabs.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

As you know the Republicans have made much ado about Palestine — promising "the world". While this has not had too much effect, it has had some.

My information is that when Dewey gets back to New York, he is going to make quite a play on this subject.

I wonder whether you could discuss with the Prime Minister, while he is with you, whether any action is possible on the White Paper. I know that there is no chance of an outright segregation; but is there a possibility of some new policy of unrestricted immigration of refugees — Christian and Jewish alike?

I do not suggest that anything be done while the Prime Minister is here, but if you approve of this and could clear the ground with him so that action might be taken later in such a way that it will appear that you initiated it, you would be substituting action for the mere words of Dewey and the Republican platform.
American Zionist Emergency Council

April 16, 1947

The attached memorandum, which analyzes the British action in referring the Palestine question to the United Nations, is sent to you in the hope that the facts contained therein may prove useful to you in evaluating the new situation created by the British move.

The American Zionist Emergency Council stands ready to supply you with any additional information or material on the Palestine question that you may require. Please do not hesitate to call on us.

KPM: SR
Enc.
MEMORANDUM

April, 1947

1. With the publication of the British note to the United Nations of April 2nd, the Palestine issue entered a new phase. The text of the note follows:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary General of the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular annual session. They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League of Nations mandate and will ask the Assembly to make recommendations under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine.

"In making this request, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the Secretary General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular annual session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly, of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph."

2. Unfortunately, this new phase is not as decisive as appears on the surface. Careful reading of the note shows that Britain does not put its mandate for Palestine (a mandate which she holds from the League of Nations) at the disposal of the United Nations; nor does she offer to withdraw from Palestine; nor does she submit to the judgment of the United Nations regarding the legality of the regime now in force in that country; nor does she even commit herself to abide by whatever decisions the United Nations may reach regarding the future of Palestine. She merely asks for "recommendations", without giving the slightest indication that she would consider herself bound by them.

3. This impression, which one gathers from the text of the British note, is further corroborated by well-authenticated newspaper reports. It will suffice to quote from two such reports:

"LONDON, April 2 -- The British have definitely decided not to relinquish their mandate in Palestine to the United Nations when the General Assembly meets to consider the Palestinian problem, it was learned in an authoritative quarter today.

"In fact, the British seem determined to reserve their position all along the line and, while they do not say that they would reject any United Nations' recommendations that they surrender their mandate, they point out that the General Assembly can make only recommendations, not decisions.

"Hence, any decision must, in the final analysis, be made by the British Government and not by the United Nations. This
means that the British, in effect, have given up nothing so far as Palestine is concerned. Moreover, it was made clear that they consider the present situation as 'frozen' until the United Nations makes its recommendations, if any . . . "

(N.Y. Times, April 3, 1947)

"LAKE SUCCESS, L. I., April 3 -- Great Britain has reserved her right to reject any United Nations decision on the future of Palestine, it was made clear today.

"The British request for General Assembly consideration of the Holy Land does not automatically commit London to acceptance of whatever the Assembly decides. At the same time, officials of the British delegation explained this afternoon, Great Britain is ready to give thorough consideration to any Assembly recommendation . . . "

(N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 4, 1947)

4. In the light of the above, the British action in referring the Palestine question to the United Nations, instead of being a genuine appeal to the international organization for a solution, assumes the character of a further play for time. By putting in motion international machinery of investigation and deliberation, the British government again hopes to evade demands that she modify her Palestine policy; she seeks to continue her present lawless regime pending the deliberations; and -- once "recommendations" are formulated -- she retains the freedom to disregard them.

This is not the first time that the British government has dealt in this manner with the Palestine problem. On the contrary, this has become the established pattern both for unilateral British inquiries and for international inquiries into the Palestine issue initiated by Britain:

A British Royal Commission (Peel Commission) in 1937 inquired into the British administration of Palestine, severely criticized that administration as unjust to the Jews, and recommended the partition of the country into Jewish and Arab States. This conclusion did not find favor with the British government. It thereupon appointed another Commission (Woodhead Commission) which reported in 1938 that the partition of the country was impracticable, and Britain could look forward to a further indefinite period of rule over Palestine.

To give herself an alibi further to curtail Jewish development in Palestine, Britain convoked a so-called "Round-Table Conference" on Palestine in the spring of 1939. None of the members of the League of Nations were invited. But Britain did invite the Arab States, which did not form part of the League and which have as little right to determine Palestine's destiny as Palestine has to determine their future.

When the Conference ended in failure -- as was universally expected -- the British Government made this an excuse to publish the "White Paper of 1939", a
document under which only 75,000 more Jews were to be admitted to Palestine and all further Jewish immigration into the Jewish National Home was to be subject to Arab consent; the Jewish population was to remain forever a minority; and severe discriminatory measures were to be enacted forbidding Jews to acquire property and to settle in 95% of the territory of Palestine.

In the same year, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations — not a trumped-up especially-composed-and-selected gathering, but the competent international authority entrusted by the League with the task of supervising the administration of all mandatory regimes — decided that the White Paper was contrary to the Mandate for Palestine. But since this finding of the international authority was unwelcome to the British Government, it was blithely ignored, and Palestine is governed to this very day under the terms of the White Paper, in flagrant violation of the Mandate.

When, with the end of the war, the plight of the uprooted Jews of Europe made the opening of Palestine a matter of extreme urgency, and the President of the United States requested that at least 100,000 of these uprooted Jews be admitted to Palestine immediately, the British Government, seeking to avoid action, proposed the appointment of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. This Committee, in April 1946, formulated a series of long-term proposals and a few recommendations for immediate action, viz., the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews and the abrogation of the discriminatory measures enacted under the White Paper.

These recommendations did not please the British Government. Therefore, they were ignored. Instead, the British proposed a further "study" of the Palestine problem by the United States and Great Britain. This "study" culminated in the so-called Morrison Plan, under which Palestine was to remain under British authority for an indefinite period, though an ostensibly self-government scheme was to be offered to Arabs and Jews, respectively, in some parts of the country; in fact, however, these rights of self-government were nullified by provisions for British supervision and veto. Provided that Arabs and Jews both agreed to such perpetuation of British rule, 100,000 Jews were to be allowed to enter Palestine at the rate of 4,000 a month, but further Jewish immigration into most of Palestine was to be made impossible and their immigration into the so-called "Jewish province" was to be subject to British veto.

When this all-too-transparent proposal was rejected by the President of the United States, and the British Government once more faced pressure for immediate action, it resorted again to the device of a "round-table conference" with Jews, Palestine Arabs, and representatives of the Arab States. Again the British posed as selfless mediators attempting to bring together two "unreasonable" parties.

But the device was used once too often and no longer deceived anyone. Faced with mounting criticism, at home and abroad, of its handling of the Palestine problem, the British Government had to try something new. It referred the Palestine issue to the United Nations. For a few weeks, while the precise terms under which the United Nations would deal with this problem were not yet known, sections of public opinion had thought that this time the British Government was indeed inviting the judgment and decision of an impartial international body. But now that the note to the United Nations has been published and commented upon by British officials, it is plain that again we have nothing more than a procrastinating device on the part of the British Government which is as determined as ever to pursue a policy universally recognized as iniquitous and lawless.
6. It is now almost generally understood that British policy in Palestine is to submit the case of a small coterie of British Colonial officials unwilling to abdicate their positions of influence, to the Security Council of the United Nations by the British delegation in the Security Council. The security of British interests is thus turned over to the United Nations to be safeguarded by the British delegation. The British position is determined by the fact that the United Nations have already been asked to take a stand on the question of the British position in Palestine. If the British delegation persists in its refusal to submit the case to the Security Council, it will be on the record of the United Nations that the British delegation refused to submit the case. The British delegation is not prepared to put its position on record, but will continue to avoid the question of the British position in Palestine.

7. Though few illusions remain regarding British intentions in submitting the case of a small coterie of British Colonial officials unwilling to abdicate their positions of influence, to the Security Council of the United Nations, it is desirable to avoid the possibility of the Security Council taking a stand on the question of the British position in Palestine. The British delegation is not prepared to put its position on record, but will continue to avoid the question of the British position in Palestine.

8. Specifically, the British delegation in the United Nations has been envisaged as being arm in arm with the British delegation in the United Nations, with the British delegation being represented by the British delegation. The British delegation is not prepared to put its position on record, but will continue to avoid the question of the British position in Palestine.
Charter. This procedure would be more time-consuming but equally proper. Whichever of these two procedures is adopted, it is to be devoutly hoped that, in one way or another, a truly impartial judgment on the legality of British rule in Palestine will be rendered.

10. Before agreeing to take any action on the British request, it would be highly proper for the United Nations Assembly to request and obtain assurances from British authorities that its findings will be observed by them. The Government of the United States has just given a statesmanlike proof of its attitude toward the United Nations by agreeing to modify a most important part of current American foreign policy (our assistance to Greece and Turkey) at the request of a simple majority of the United Nations Security Council. It is, therefore, quite in order to suggest that Britain should agree to submit to the findings of a majority of the United Nations Assembly (to which body, rather than to the United Nations Security Council, the British had chosen to bring the Palestine problem) without reserving to itself the right to refuse compliance with these findings. Anything less would make the United Nations appear ridiculous.

11. It has been pointed out by British spokesmen that Britain cannot commit herself to accept findings of the United Nations which would require her, as the Power in control of Palestine, to carry on a policy which she is not prepared to undertake. This may, at most, be a reason for relieving Britain of her present position of responsibility for and authority over Palestine. But in all fairness, this cannot be considered a valid argument against making recommendations which are called for by the facts of the situation.

12. In formulating substantive recommendations regarding Palestine's future, the member-governments of the United Nations should keep in mind the need to distinguish between the immediate future and a long-range solution. If no such distinction is made, it would be easy for the British to keep staving off a long-range solution, thus making it possible for themselves to continue the present brutal regime in Palestine for an indefinite period. It would be highly appropriate, therefore, to pass a preliminary set of interim recommendations designed to bring present British administration in Palestine into line with existing international law, and to pass to the consideration of long-range recommendations only if and when the British government will have agreed to abide by the interim recommendations. The minimum interim policy upon which every fair-minded person may insist should be the abolition of the discriminatory racial measures now in force in Palestine and the re-opening of Palestine to large-scale Jewish immigration in accordance with the Mandate.
13. It is hoped that when the United Nations approach the task of formulating a long-range solution for Palestine they will keep in mind that the social, economic, and political reasons which prompted the League of Nations a generation ago to sanction the idea of a Jewish National Home that would develop in time into a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth, have not become less compelling. On the contrary, if the need for a Jewish National Home was clear to the statesmen of a generation ago, it should be even more obvious to their successors of today. Nor have any other attendant circumstances changed so as to militate against the continuation of the Jewish National Home policy. Economically, the history of Jewish colonization in the intervening decades has dispelled any doubts as to whether a Jewish Commonwealth is feasible. Politically, the setting aside of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people was part of a general settlement under which about one million square miles were established as territories of the future Arab States; these States have now all come into being and have assumed their places as members of the family of nations, leaving unfulfilled only that part of the settlement which concerns the development of Palestine as the Jewish National Home. Finally, the Jewish rights to Palestine confirmed in a series of valid documents (the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Resolution of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo in 1920, the League of Nations Mandate of 1922, the United States-British Palestine Convention of 1924) of which the Jewish people is the beneficiary, have created a position in which Jewish rights to Palestine have been recognized and may no longer be denied without Jewish consent. Legally as well as morally, the future status of Palestine must, therefore, be based on the right of the Jewish people to re-establish Palestine as the territory destined to become the Jewish State.

14. The above considerations apply to each and every member of the United Nations. They apply particularly to the Government of the United States. Our Government has assumed a position of moral leadership in world affairs. It has acted on this assumption in the Near East and within the United Nations. When it comes to the problem of Palestine, it stands particularly committed by a long series of official acts and pronouncements beginning with President Wilson's endorsement of the Balfour Declaration; a Joint Resolution of Congress in favor of the Jewish National Home policy, adopted under President Harding; a treaty ratified by President Coolidge; and ending with a current Resolution of the U.S. Congress in December 1946 and official pronouncements by the President of the United States in October 1946.

15. All these documents are too lengthy to quote in this memorandum, but it may be useful to recall the most recent resolution of Congress on this subject:

"RESOLVED BY THE SENATE (THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCURRING), That the interest shown by the President in the solution of this problem is hereby commended and that the United States shall use its good offices with the mandatory power to the end that Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum of its agricultural and economic potentialities, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization and development, so that they may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine as the Jewish national home and, in association with all elements of the population, establish Palestine as a democratic commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall have equal rights."
16. It is hoped, therefore, that now that the Government of the United States is called upon to deal with the Palestine question not only in its individual capacity but also as a leading member of the United Nations, it will take a clear and unequivocal stand in support of the policy to which it is so clearly committed, and the righteousness and wisdom of which the leaders of the American people have so often and clearly affirmed. It should be realised that many of the smaller governments of the United Nations will follow the lead of the Government of the United States in this matter, as in many other matters. Any sign of weakness, hesitation or compromise with principle on the part of the mighty United States will induce many other governments within the United Nations to deal with the problem in a similar manner. In that case, the resolutions of the United Nations will be vague, opportunistic, and ineffective. Justice will be the loser, nor will the name of the United States be enhanced. If, on the other hand, the President of the United States instructs the American delegation to the United Nations to uphold forthrightly the cause of justice in this matter, we may feel certain that most countries of the world will rally around our Government. Whatever the subsequent attitude of Great Britain, the United Nations, under the leadership of our own country, will then have done its duty.