SW said they decided to include Italy and he will call on Papal Delegate and explain whole program to him in order to get Pope interested.

6 April 38 M.D. Vol. 118 p. 175: asked SW what was happening on German refugee matter and Pres appeal on radio and said 'I agree most heartily with you and have not given up idea...’

DATE COMPLETED
P.D.
1/13

COST
$ N.C.
Dear Henry:

I am enclosing herewith copies of the two memoranda which we took up with the President yesterday. The main memorandum is slightly modified to meet the President's wishes as expressed to us.

I also enclose confidential copies of the circular telegrams which have gone out to certain of our missions in Europe and to our missions in the other American republics in pursuance of the President's instructions.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosures.

The Honorable
Henry Morgenthaler, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury.
when President raised question of what could be done for political refugees in Austria. Miss Perkins said German and Austrian quotas could not be combined legally for admission of Austrian refugees, Int'l Labor Bureau at Geneva might be able to handle. Pres. suggested getting together with SW and 2 finished documents ready within 24 hours. President comb. the quotas of Germany and Austria and let the Austrian refugees come in under the combined quota.

Miss Perkins said that this could not be done legally. The President asked the Cabinet if they thought they could increase the quota by getting an act through Congress. The consensus of opinion was that they could not get such an act through Congress. Miss Perkins said that possibly the International Labor Bureau at Geneva could handle this situation. The President said that he thought this was a good idea. He said he thought if different countries were appealed to that, depending upon their size, they would take from 100 to 1,000 families each and, in this way, we could find homes for 10,000 or 15,000 families.

Sunday night I discussed this idea confidentially with Irving Lehman and he thought very well of it, and I think my wife suggested Hamilton Fish Armstrong as the American representative.

At lunch Monday, March 21st, I brought this whole question to the President's attention again and asked him if something could not be done at once. He said that I should get together with Sumner Welles and have something ready for him within 24 hours or anytime be fore he left for Warm Springs. I got Welles over here at 3 o'clock and we went over the whole proposition and he thought extremely well of it and his whole attitude was simply fine. I asked him whether he could have something ready by 11:30 Tuesday, March 22d. He said he would work all evening, if necessary, to get it ready.

He came here on Tuesday and I was most pleasantly surprised to find that he had two finished documents on this subject. I asked him if he had shown these to Mr. Hull and he said he had and they met with his approval. The documents covered the subject admirably and I had no suggestions to make.

I called Miss LeHand and asked for an appointment to see the President. She called back in two minutes and we had an appointment for 12:45. The President read the document through and was enthusiastic about it. He said, "I have only one suggestion to make. The words 'religious' and 'racial' should be changed to 'political'. I think it would be better. We all agreed."
The Portuguese Minister called this morning on a number of miscellaneous matters. He said that he saw no possible compromise in the Spanish fight nor did he anticipate a breakdown of morale on either side. He expected that the war would have to be fought to a point of exhaustion when one side or the other was completely victorious.

Meeting in Sumner Welles' office this afternoon to deal with the refugee situation. The President does not like the idea of proceeding through the International Labor Office, instead he desires to set up a committee ad hoc, despite the fact that there are already three international organizations dealing with the same problem. He goes on the assumption that we must not forget our great tradition of being the home of the exile and the outcast, but he recognizes that public opinion and Congressional sentiment are against any relaxation of existing restrictions. What he has in mind therefore is: (1) to liberalize the procedure under existing legislation; (2) to issue an appeal which he believes would persuade many of the Latin-American Republics to accept some thousands of Austrian refugees during the present emergency; and (3) as a long term proposition to look into the question of travel documents, legal disabilities, et cetera. The difficulty was that he wanted to be presented with a detailed plan before he left for the South tomorrow afternoon. After a discussion between Mr. Messrs. Mr. Warren, Mrs. Shipley, Hackworth and myself, we reached the following conclusions:

(a)
7-page teleg for MYRON TAYLOR and RUBLEE:
8 February 39
London Embassy signed HULL/S.W. re
Rublee's memo: 1. program outlined relate
exclusively to Jews; 2. gives Germany
final say as to what must be done; 3. fee
strongly program outlined be carried out
unilaterally by German govt; *consider
program outlined warrants Committee takin
cognizance of it; more specific consider-
ations are 1 through 11.
WASHINGTON, February 7, 1939

AMBASSADOR

LONDON (ENGLAND)

FOR MYRON TAYLOR AND RUBLEE

1/384

Your 167, February 6, 4 p.m.

Before commenting specifically upon Rublee's memorandum to Wohltat, we wish to emphasize certain general considerations.

One. The program outlined relates exclusively to Jews.

You should emphasize to the Committee that its task also covers the emigration and resettlement of Catholics, Protestants and others. As a practical matter, however, there appears to be no objection to admitting frankly that Jewish emigration and resettlement constitutes by far the greatest and most difficult part of the Committee's task.

Two. The condition that the program will be put into effect only when Germany is satisfied that the countries of immigration are disposed to receive currently Jews from Germany in conformity with this program is a serious one. It gives Germany the final say as to what must be done or what assurances must be given by other governments before the program will be put into effect and would permit Germany to drop or

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M, 19
or change the program at any time on the excuse that other governments were not acting in accordance with it.

Three. We feel strongly that the program outlined must be carried out unilaterally by the German Government. We agree that the program represents the maximum obtainable from the German Government at this time; that it represents a new and more favorable attitude toward the problem of Jewish emigration, and that it will, if carried out, provide a notable improvement over present conditions in Germany. On the other hand, even this maximum contains objectionable features which this Government would not wish to condone by participating in an agreement between the Committee and the German Government or by an active acceptance. In this connection the German position that they are acting independently on their own initiative is helpful. As a unilateral program it presumably represents the best that could be expected. As a basis for an agreement it would be definitely unacceptable.

Four. We consider definitely that the program outlined would, if carried out, represent a sufficient improvement over present conditions (aside from the repercussions in Germany which could be expected if the Committee did not take cognizance of...
of the program) to warrant the Committee taking cognizance of it. We do not, however, favor a reply by the Committee to the Germans which could be construed either as an acceptance or as initiating a negotiation between the Committee and the German Government which would saddle the former with responsibility. The distinction between raising no objection to, and actively accepting, a project may seem a fine one, but it is none the less real. The Committee, having taken cognizance of what Germany is prepared to do, should make clear that it is disposed, also unilaterally, to deal to the fullest extent of its ability and within the limits of the immigration laws and practices of its member Governments, with the problem of developing opportunities for settlement.

The following are more specific considerations:

(1) As far as our immigration laws are concerned, it is unthinkable that we could admit the right of another government to say whom we should or should not admit and there is, of course, no way in which preference can be granted to persons in the wage-earning category as such. The only way in which the percentage of persons of that category coming to this country could be increased would be by the purely voluntary action.
action of persons in other categories giving up their places when their turn is reached under the quota. Obviously no assurances of any kind could be given in this connection and no pressure could be exerted.

(2) The emigration of 150,000 persons of the wage-earning category from Germany over a period of five years should not, however, be impossible or even excessively difficult without departure from existing immigration laws and practices. If our estimate that refugees are currently being admitted into other countries at a rate of 80,000 a year is correct, and we are confident that it is conservative, and if the German estimate that three-eighths of the persons to be emigrated are wage-earners, it seems probable that wage-earners are already emigrating at a rate approximating 30,000 a year. On the one hand, current emigration includes a certain percentage, perhaps ten to fifteen per cent, of non-Jews and a further percentage of Jews over 45; on the other, the current estimated rate of emigration takes no account of mass settlement possibilities. It would not seem improbable that a five year period would be sufficient not only for the emigration of 150,000 wage-earners but for the emigration of most of their dependents as well.
Department of State

Washington,

(3) There will presumably be a considerable residue of wage-earners who for one reason or another will not be admissible into any country in the normal course of events and these must be provided for in mass-settlement projects. This will not be easy as mass settlement under pioneering conditions will require a particularly capable type of emigrant, but it is believed that large-scale mass settlement should be amply provided for this residue as well.

(4) The provisions for organizing emigration within Germany, with foreign participation, should have distinct value. It must be borne in mind, however, that our immigration laws would not permit the intervention of any agency between applicant and consul.

(5) The release of all, or nearly all, Jews from concentration camps would be a considerable achievement.

(6) The arrangements for the care of persons who are not to be emigrated are not definite and far short of what might be desired but are definitely better than present conditions.

(7) The setting up of a trust fund from existing Jewish property in Germany is something which, as indicated in our 602, December 21, 6 p. m., would be most difficult for us to recognize in view of the implied sanction of the principle of confiscation.

Sent by operator M. 19.
fiscation. This difficulty might be overcome, however, if the individual were to retain title to the amount he had contributed to the fund, such title to cover his pro-rata share in such amounts as may eventually be transferred if any are. The limitations on the use of the trust fund do not appear objectionable.

(8) We assume that the words "traditional sphere" of the Hatzolah system refer solely to Palestine.

(9) The permission for emigrants to leave without payment of their flight or personal effects/taxes would be a further worthwhile achievement.

(10) The relationship of the Committee to the proposed outside/purchasing agency will have to be worked out in London, but care should be taken in this connection to avoid active acceptance of the German program.

(11) The appointment of the trustees would also involve active acceptance. We should not desire to see an American serve in this capacity even if individual contributors to the trust fund are permitted to retain title.

Rublee appears to have accomplished more in Berlin than we had reason to expect, and we wish to congratulate him and to express appreciation for the energy and determination with which
which he carried out his mission in Berlin.
My dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram which was sent yesterday to Mr. Myron Taylor and Mr. George Rublee with regard to the program of emigration which the German Government has indicated its willingness to carry out.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram sent to Mr. Taylor and Mr. Rublee, February 8, 1939.

The President,

The White House.

Em: TCA: EMC 2-8-39