Intergovernmental Committee
on Political Refugees
Corres. - May - June 1939

MAY 1939

Telephone :—ABBEY 6077-78-79.
Cables: PELRU, LONDON.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

Director:
SIR HERBERT EMERSON,
G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., C.B.E.

Vice-Director:
MR. ROBERT PELL.

1, CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

May 15th 1939.

Myron C. Taylor Esq.,
71, Broadway,
New York.

Dear Mr. Taylor,

I enclose a copy of my letter No. 11. This was written before your telegram of May 13th was received and as I write you now we are preparing to go to the Treasury to discuss your message. I shall telegraph a report of the conversation so that in a few hours' time we will know better where we stand.

My candid impression is that our business is becoming a tug of war between the Governments and our Jewish financial friends. The Governments are striving hard to shift the major part of the responsibility to Jewish finance and Jewish finance is working equally hard to leave it with the Governments. Some of our friends at New Court are, as usual, extremely frank and say that the whole object of the Evian movement was to bring about governmental in place of private financing of the evacuation of the Jews and their resettlement and that they intend to maintain this objective.

I can picture, in the circumstances, the titanic struggle which you must have had with our friends in New York in order to bring about anything concrete. You certainly deserve full credit.

We at our end have not relaxed the pressure for a single instant, but I am afraid the results are not much to boast about. At least it is now agreed that Lucas will go to New York with <u>some</u> idea of what the people here will be willing to do. Previously it was suggested that he would go to New York merely as a pilot fish to feel out the way the currents were running.

With respects to Mrs. Taylor,

Devotedly yours,

Robert T. Pell.

May 12, 1939

LETTER NO. 11

Dear Pierrepont:

Two main interests have monopolized our attention during the last week: (1) the British Guiana Report and (2) the private international corporation or foundation.

With regard to the British Guiana Report, I sent you a series of telegrams presenting the high-lights. Here, then, I shall try to give you in some detail the background.

(1) Happily, we, that is, Sir Herbert and I, had our copy of the Report from Warren before any other copies reached London. This gave Sir Herbert an opportunity to do a little good work at the Colonial Office and with Winterton before the official copy was received.

(2) As soon as the official copy arrived, Mr. Malcolm Macdonald called the first meeting which was attended by officials of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, Winterton, the Governor of British Guiana, and the British members of the Commission. Winterton's statement to us the following day that the matter had been, or would be, discussed through diplomatic channels between Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Kennedy was an echo of that meeting. What it meant was that the meeting decided to go along on the basis of the so-called "Kennedy Plan" of last Autumn, that is that if the British put up the land, Americans would put up the money. Further recommendations of that meeting were (a) that there should be a limited trial settlement before a large-scale settlement was founded, and (b) that the British Government should not contribute services in the period of experimentation.

(3) The following day a second meeting was called by Mr. Macdonald which included, in addition to those who attended the first meeting, Mr. Anthony de Rothschild, Lord Bearstead, Lord Hailey and Sir Herbert Emerson. Three view points emerged during this meeting. The Rothschild-Bearstead group took a very negative attitude and, picking out the objectionable features of the Guiana Report and the appendices, described Guiana as a hell-hole and said that they would not put up a sou for it. The Government

people took the middle position, and in fact at first (according to Sir Herbert, who is my authority) were inclined to be quite enthusiastic, but towards the end adopted a more cautious attitude and said they would stand on a trial settlement of 250 persons and no services in the experimental period. Hailey and Emerson represented the third point of view, which was that Guiana offered excellent possibilities for development, that it was important to make a good showing both from the standpoint of the German conversations and in view of the necessity of relieving pressure in countries of refuge, and that not hundreds, but thousands should be sent to the colony, if the money could be raised, in the experimental period. Specifically, Hailey and Emerson asked the Government to authorize (a) not one, but several experimental settlements of 250 persons each; (b) industrial as well as agricultural experimentation; (c) reasonable terms for the purchase of land; and (d) the assurance of services in the experimental period and not only upon condition that a large-scale settlement could be founded.

(4) The next day the Cabinet Committee on Refugees examined the minutes of Mr. Macdonald's two meetings and came to the conclusions which I telegraphed to you, namely, that (a) there should be two trial agricultural settlements of 250 persons each; (b) there should be an industrial survey; (c) land should be made available at reasonable rates, and (d) if a large-scale settlement was found to be justified, the Government should contribute services and grant a degree of local autonomy to the settlement. These decisions of the Cabinet were later ratified in the full Cabinet and by the Prime Minister. Parenthetically, Sir Herbert understands that Winterton did a very good job indeed during this period.

(5) The next incident was the drafting of a letter, giving the views of the private group here, by the Rothschild Emigration Committee, to the Advisory Committee in New York. Sir Herbert showed me the draft prepared by the Emigration Committee. It was terrible - negative and defeatist in the extreme, grousing about Guiana and saying that they had no money to put up. Sir Herbert told them bluntly that they could not send this letter, and that if they did, he would throw in his hand. In fact, as I write this, Sir Herbert is drafting his version of what the letter should be.

(6) There has been confusion worse confounded regarding the projected <u>private corporation or foundation</u>. As Mr. Taylor left matters, Bearstead and Rothschild were more or less committed

(1) to filing articles of association and (2) to approaching Sir Bertram Hornsby who was formerly associated with the Bank of England, to ascertain whether he would be willing to serve as Chairman of the corporation. The New Court group neither approached Hornsby nor filed articles of association. Their claim has been, and is, that they were not expected to do anything until they had word from Mr. Taylor indicating what progress he had made in his conversations in New York. Since no definite word was received from him they made no move here (in spite of Sir Herbert 's earnest entreaties and mine).

As a matter of actual fact, indeed, the group here not only did nothing, but began a whispering campaign against what they call the "Rublee Plan" and in particular against the financing aspects of it, notably the inside trust and the outside corporation. Against their firm opposition, Sir Herbert and I persuaded them to give us some grounds to go on in the conversations with Wohlthat, and we almost had to beat the letter about Bruins out of them. I have the impression that they are unqualifiedly opposed to conversations with the Germans, and have no intention of being placed in a position where they, instead of the governments as represented in the Intergovernmental Committee, will have to deal directly with Berlin.

The financing of settlement projects is another thing again. Here the New Court group is willing to go into a corporation or consider a corporation, on condition that the bulk of the financing is done in New York. Their idea is that this corporation should take the general form of a chartered company with shares sold over the counter. The British Government is also interested in the early formation of a corporation for this purpose, because they want to get along with the Guiana scheme.

Into this atmosphere came Mr. Taylor's messages of progress, and finally word that he was working out details of a foundation which would be in contact with the German trust but which, evidently, would not be the agency for financing settlement projects. I have the feeling that the group here was not as pleased as it might have been to hear that Mr. Taylor was making headway and was not at all pleased to learn of the direction matters were taking in New York. In any event, it has now been decided to send over Lucas, more as a scout than anything else, and Emerson and I are working hard to have him given as concrete

instructions as possible in the circumstances. Our difficulty is that our friends have come to the conclusion that the governments are preparing to side-step the whole business and plant the baby on their door-step. They are determined somehow to put the baby back in the governments' lap. All their moves will be colored by this consideration.

Angola has been back on the map here this week. It appears that, unbeknownst to us, the Rothschilds here, who were dissuaded by the Government from approaching the Portuguese, arranged with their cousin in Paris, Robert de Rothschild, to send a negotiator to Lisbon in the person of Jacques Politis, son of Nicholas, the Greek Minister. Politis has been in Lisbon for five months, working out with the Portuguese Minister of Colonies the terms of a purchase or lease of an extensive area where thousands of Jewish families might be settled. He has obtained an option and worked out a tentative agreement which the Portuguese Government has made subject to approval by the British Government. Politis is now in London and is conferring with Macdonald, Winterton and Emerson, at the request of New Court, and has been asked to prepare a brief for submission to the Cabinet Committee on Refugees. Sir Herbert so far has not been willing to give me the details of the plan, but I hope to have some further news next week.

In order to keep the records straight, I enclose the full text of the Prime Minister's statement on British Guiana.

Pierrepont Moffat, Esq.,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Telephone:—ABBEY 6077-78-79.
Cables: PELRU, LONDON.

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1, CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

May 1st 1939.

Hon. Myron C. Taylor,
71, Broadway,
New York.

Dear Mr. Taylor,

I enclose a copy of letter No. 9. to Pierrepont Moffat. As you will see, it expresses bewilderment on several scores. We have not a very clear idea where we stand on either the private corporation or the British Guiana project. Undoubtedly before this week is out we shall have further information but for the time being we are in the dark.

Undoubtedly the State Department has given you the substance of my Friday telegram reporting on my visit to Berlin. It leaves very little doubt with regard to the situation which, to my mind, is deadlocked until some step has been taken regarding the corporation. In short, once again everything turns about you and the progress of your negotiations with our friends in New York. May the outcome be favourable!

Respects to Mrs. Taylor,

Devotedly yours,

Robert

Robert T. Pell.

May 1, 1939

LETTER NO.9

Dear Pierrepont:

This week was broken by my unexpected dash to Berlin. There is nothing to add to the account which I gave you in my telegram, except that the meeting with Wohlthat this time was on a distinctly informal plane. We dined at the Esplanade, and he insisted upon going down to the station with me, etc. In other words, he evidently felt at liberty to be seen in public with the emissary of Satan, and actually confessed that his ambition was to become the expert of his Government on the Anglo-Saxons. He was very genial - except when speaking of his disappointment that I had nothing tangible to report with regard to the private corporation.

Frankly, Sir Herbert and I do not know where the matter of the corporation stands. We have the impression that the "big business" involved is banking on the general international situation to escape doing anything. Against this we have Mr. Taylor's assurances of progress - but in which direction we do not know. Our friends in the City insist that the corporation, if it is set up, will be established in such a way that there will be no dealing with the German authorities. This is the only hint that we have, and we hope to receive some clarification in the next few days. We are confident that Mr. Taylor has brought about some concrete result.

The British Guinna report has been received and is most encouraging. The publication of it should have a wholesome effect and must bring the matter of financing to a head. Incidentally, when Sir Herbert and I discussed it with Lord Winterton, he - Lord Winterton - said "in strictest confidence" that the details were being worked out between Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Kennedy and that the American Government was going to put up money for the project. Lord Winterton added that the matter had now gone out of the hands

Pierrepont Moffat, Esq.,
Department of State

of the Intergovernmental Committee, and its Director, and was the subject of exchanges through diplomatic channels. We would be told in the course of time of the result.

My impression is that Sir Herbert is not very pleased with this turn of events, nor with the rather hoity-toity way in which Winterton conveyed to him the impression that he was not to be consulted when important matters were at stake. Emerson asked me to try and find out what I could about the negotiation. I have tried but can learn nothing, so that we are completely in the dark on this score too. If you are able to, will you give us some indication as to what is going on.

Yours ever,

(signed) R. T. P.

P. S. Since dictating the above Sir Herbert and I have lunched with Mr. Max Warburg and Mr. Wilfred Israel, who has succeeded Mr. Warburg as head of the Hilfsverein at Berlin. Sir Herbert lead off the meeting with a gallant charge in which he said that he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that Jewish finance had no intention of setting up a private corporation and was just playing for time and finding excuses. Mr. Warburg, after some hesitation, admitted that that was the case. He said that he had conferred at great length with Lord Bearsted, Mr. Anthony de Rothschild, etc., etc., and this was the situation: (1) they did not wish to set up any corporation; (2) if they were forced by circumstances to set up a corporation it would have to have (a) shadow capitalization and (b) Aryan direction, preferably by Mr. Taylor. Mr. Warburg said that he and the others concerned were opposed to the idea of a trust in Germany and wished to do nothing which would encourage the creation of it. He said that if a project, such as the British Guiana project, were opened, financing should be only partly by private subscription and predominantly by governmental subscription. He said that there was no reason why the Jewish community should bear the burden of a situation which it had not created.

Mr. Israel, who is on the spot in Germany, took a very

different point of view. He said that he was convinced of Wohlthat's sincerity and good faith. He said that he was having a difficult time battling against radical elements. He. Israel, had conferred with him last Wednesday, when Wohlthat had pleaded for some action in the way of a private corporation or else, he said, his position with the Führer would be rendered impossible, and Israel was of the opinion that at least a holding company should be set up urgently on the outside or else the battle inside Germany for the improvement of the condition of the Jews would be lost. He said that he found that the Jewish leaders here did not have, or did not wish to have, any realization of the situation inside Germany. He said that he sincerely felt that a great opportunity was being thrown away.

Sir Herbert, summing up, remarked that the difference between his point of view and the point of view of Jewish finance was that he thought the corporation should be set up because there was nothing to lose, while J.F. was opposed to setting up the corporation because they could not see that there was anything to gain. He hoped that the two view points were not irreconcilable.

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1, CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

May 2nd 1939.

Myron C. Taylor Esq.,
71, Broadway,
New York.

Dear Mr. Taylor,

I enclose a copy of a memorandum summarising information sent to Sir Herbert Emerson by an official of the Jewish Agency who is in close and constant contact with the Jewish question in Germany and Austria. I am sure that you will find it most interesting.

Yours ever,

Robert

Robert T. Pell.

Note on conditions of Jews in Germany and Austria made by a recent visitor from Palestine.

(Based on information forwarded by an official of the Jewish Agency who recently spent a fortnight in Berlin and Vienna).

(The accuracy of the figures is not vouched for, but as a general estimate of the position the note is considered quite valuable.

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1. In 1933 there were about 735,000 Jews in Germany and Austria (excluding the Sudetenland and, of course, the rest of Czecho-Slovakia.

2. Of these, about 305,000 have left the Reich; there has been an excess of deaths over births of about 20,000; and about 6,000 Aryan women have left their husbands.

3. The 400,000 Jews still left in Germany and Austria are distributed as follows:-

Berlin	180,000
Other German cities	120,000
Vienna	100,000

4. Of the 19,000 Jews who used to live in 33 other cities of Austria, only 2,000 are left in 3 cities.

5. Of these 400,000 Jews, the total number who still have the right to earn their own living is under 3,500, who are working as follows:-

Employment	Germany	Austria
Jewish communal bodies	400)	800
Hilfsverein	270)	
Travel agencies for Jews	50	-
Zionist bodies	220	80
Legal advisers to Jews	120	40
Doctors and nurses for Jews	400	100
Servants in Jewish boarding houses	400	200
Miscellaneous	200	-
	2,060	1,220.

Not all these are actually earning their living.

There are no Jewish shops open anywhere in the Reich. Jews can buy in almost all Aryan shops. Of the 43,000 Jewish shops and workshops in Vienna, 2,000 have been Aryanised and 41,000 closed. The Jewish quarters of Vienna look as if the plague had passed over them; everything closed and the streets deserted.

7. In Berlin, there is no hotel where German Jews are allowed to stay. There is one good Aryan hotel where foreign Jews and others are allowed to stay. There is an Aryan hotel in Vienna for German and foreign Jews only.

8. In Berlin there is one Jewish cafe and two Aryan restaurants for Jews, one of which is for Aryans also. In Vienna there are two Aryan restaurants for Jews only.

9. Of the 100,000 Jews left in Vienna, one-third are living on their reserves. The remaining two-thirds, or 65,000 are kept alive by charity. Of these, 30,000 are fed in five public Jewish soup-kitchens; one meal a day, consisting of soup, vegetables and half a kilo of bread costing about 2½.

10. The remaining 35,000 Jews living on charity get subsistence allowances.

11. Of the 300,000 Jews left in Germany (excluding Austria) 200,000 are living on their reserves and 100,000 on charity in the form of subsistence allowances.

12. The sums required for keeping alive the 100,000 Jews in Germany (excluding Austria) are being found from the sale of Jewish communal property at about one-tenth its real value. This will provide enough to feed 100,000 Jews for about 10 more months.

13. The sums required for keeping alive 65,000 Jews in Austria are being provided largely by the British Council for German Jewry and the American Joint Distribution Committee.

14. No Jews in Germany and Austria have any more cash. A few still have securities which are now being taken for the fine; nevertheless only one-fifth of the fine can be collected. All Jewish houses and land are being disposed of by forced sales, sometimes for no price at all. The reserves still left to Jews consist largely of jewelry, and this must now be sold before May.

15. A large part of the money sent to German and Austrian Jews from abroad is taken by the German Government, and only a fraction reaches the recipients.

16. There are still 12,000 Jews in concentration camps.

17. Landlord are refusing to renew leases for flats occupied by Jews as their tenants have no money to pay rent, and the frequent searches of Jewish flats by day and night disturbs the Aryan tenants. Jews are being evicted from their own houses which are taken over, with much of their furniture, for Party and State purposes. There is considerable over-crowding in the houses still occupied by Jews.

18. There are 34,000 Jewish children of school age still in Germany and Austria of whom 40 per cent. are not in school. Those that are in school receive no real education in view of the constant change in the composition of the classes and the arrest or flight of the teachers.

19. Many cases occur where children who are brought to the Palestine offices for registration in the Youth Movement to Palestine are rejected on grounds of physique or age. When the offices are closed in the evening, the children are found abandoned on the stairs. When they are taken to their parents' houses, the parents have left for an unknown destination, so that the Movement may be forced to take over the children and get them out of Germany.

20. There is no more Jewish cultural life whatever. One Jewish theatre is still allowed in Berlin, but is practically empty. Only persons with German passports marked with a J (Jude) may enter this theatre. On the night of the widespread attacks on Jewish synagogues and shops and the mass arrests of Jews in November, following the murder of von Rath in Paris, the Jewish theatre had instruction from the Ministry of Propaganda to play to an empty house.

21. All Jews must use the name Israel and all Jewesses the name Sarah in addition to their first names. Letters between Jews in Germany are now opened and their senders fined if they sign "yours, Fritz" instead of "yours, Fritz Israel".

22. Of the 305,000 Jews who have left Germany and Austria, 225,000 left Germany during the last 6 years and 80,000 left Austria in 10 months.

23. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that the Gestapo official in Vienna in charge of the Jewish Department is Eichman, a German settler from Sarona, near Tel Aviv, and a fluent Hebraist.

24. The 300,000 Jews who have left Germany and Austria have gone to the following destinations:

For	From Germany	From Austria
U.S.A.	60,000	12,000
Palestine	40,000	4,000
Western Europe	30,000	25,000
Shanghai	4,000	7,000
Eastern Europe	30,000	
South America	20,000	32,000
Other countries	25,000	

25. The following countries are now closed to Jews by law:

Colombia
Venezuela
Panama
Peru
Paraguay
Uruguay
Mexico

26. Only parents of Jewish residents are now admitted to Argentine and Brazil.

27. No Jew is admitted to Chile without 800 dollars, and to Ecuador without 600 dollars.

28. In San Domingo, Jews are taxed 500 dollars each on entry as compared with 5 dollars (£P.1) in Palestine.

29. 30,000 Germans and Austrians are admitted a year to the United States. In practice, the United States quota is wholly reserved for Jews and no Aryans are given immigrant visas. There are 90,000 Jewish applicants from Germany and Austria, and the quota is thus filled for 3 years ahead. There are tentative proposals for amending the United States law to admit all the men and women and also to admit 20,000 children, but it is not known if they will be approved.

30. Australia is taking 15,000 Jews over 3 years, but only those with some capital.

31. 20,000 German and Austrian Jews are believed to have been admitted to England in 1938, some permanently.

32. 80 per cent of all Palestine immigration certificates are now going to German and Austrian Jews.

33. The 400,000 Jews (actually 401,500) still left in Germany and Austria belong to the following age groups:

Age groups	Germany	Austria	Total
0-14	25,000	12,000	37,000
14-16	6,500	3,000	9,500
16-20	14,000	5,500	19,500
20-25	10,500	6,500	17,000
25-45	74,000	30,000	104,000
45-60	76,000	26,000	102,000
Over 60	94,000	18,500	112,500

34. As nearly all these will be living in Germany on foreign charity in another year, it is for consideration whether it would not be preferable to evacuate a large number to refugee camps outside Germany.

35. A large part of the relief money sent from abroad to

to individual Jews in Germany is at present lost on the exchange or taken by the Government. If it were paid to keep Jews alive in refugee camps outside Germany, it would be less of a financial burden to the relatives outside Germany or Jews in Germany and to the relief organisations concerned. Part of the relief moneys taken by the German Government only goes to strengthen its armaments.

36. Jews in refugee camps outside Germany would not go in daily fear of being flung into the far more horrible concentration camps in Germany.

37. They would wait in the refugee camps until they could be absorbed into the United States, Palestine and other countries. Meanwhile, they would live like prisoners of war, doing a little manual labour and learning new trades and foreign languages.

38. It is suggested that some of the old German prisoner of war camps in England and France might be used for this purpose, or that refugee camps might be set up in some of the Scandinavian countries. The Isle of Man camps in particular have been mentioned.

39. It is not suggested that all the 400,000 Jews still left in Germany and Austria should be evacuated in this manner. Cruel as it may seem, it is proposed that all the 112,500 Jews over 60 years in Germany and Austria should be left there and allowed to die out, as well as many of those between 45-60.

40. The number of those under 45 years of age is about 185,000 and it is suggested that 100,000 should be evacuated into refugee camps outside Germany within the next year. This is a far smaller problem than that of the Spanish refugees in France.

41. It must be remembered that of the 270,000 Jews in Czecho-Slovakia, 70,000 are now in territory occupied by Hungary and 200,000 more have been added to the German Reich. That problem must also be faced.

Charge to the account of Myron Taylor, 71 Broadway

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Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

May 2 1939

Robert Pell,
5 Culross Park Lane,
London (England).

For your confidential information, After many meetings and much discussion am taking a ~~small~~ group to call upon the President Thursday afternoon, after which the question ~~of~~ whether a small group ~~to~~ will visit London to confer ~~in London~~ with their British associates ~~and determine~~ to decide upon procedure further will be determined by them. Stop Very important that no words be used in any documents or messages to indicate ~~that Common~~ proposals can be interpreted as an agreement or a plan, ~~by any member of Intergovernmental Committee~~ Stop In all future communications and activities please bear this in mind as the groups here and the Government are extremely sensitive that nothing appear to indicate an agreement Stop Saw your father last night and had nice visit with him. He is very well. Affectionate regards to both.

~~TAYLOR~~ Pneroud.

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

Myron Taylor, 71 Broadway, New York,

1206-A

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R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT — NEWCOMB CARLTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD — J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

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The sender should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

May 8 1939

Robert Pell,
5 Culross St.,
Park Lane,
London (England).

Washington meeting Thursday successful STOP American group now in communication with British group looking to prompt action STOP Forward dozen copies printed minutes last London Intergovernmental meeting. Best regards to both.

PENROD.

T

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE.

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PENROD

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

ALL MESSAGES TAKEN BY THIS COMPANY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

To guard against mistakes or delays the sender of a cable message should order it repeated, that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For this, one-half the unrepeated cable message rate is charged in addition. Unless otherwise indicated on its face this is an unrepeated cable message and paid for as such, in consideration whereof it is agreed between the sender of the message and this Company as follows:

1. The Company shall not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the unrepeated-message rate beyond the sum of five hundred dollars; nor for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-delivery, of any message received for transmission at the repeated-message rate beyond the sum of five thousand dollars, *unless specially valued;* nor in any case for delays arising from unavoidable interruption in the working of its lines; nor for errors in cipher or obscure messages.

2. In any event the Company shall not be liable for damages for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for the non-delivery, of any message, whether caused by the negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the sum of five thousand dollars, at which amount each message is deemed to be valued, unless a greater value is stated in writing by the sender thereof at the time the message is tendered for transmission, and unless the repeated-message rate is paid or agreed to be paid, and an additional charge equal to one-tenth of one per cent of the amount by which such valuation shall exceed five thousand dollars.

3. The Company is hereby made the agent of the sender, without liability, to forward this message over the lines of any other company when necessary to reach its destination.

4. No responsibility attaches to this Company concerning messages until the same are accepted at one of its transmitting offices; and if a message is sent to such office by one of the Company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent of the sender.

5. The Company will not be liable for damages or statutory penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is filed with the Company for transmission.

6. It is agreed that in any action by the Company to recover the tolls for any message or messages the prompt and correct transmission and delivery thereof shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal by competent evidence.

7. Special terms governing the transmission of messages under the classes of messages enumerated below shall apply to messages in each of such respective classes in addition to all the foregoing terms.

8. No employee of the Company is authorized to vary the foregoing.

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY
INCORPORATED
R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT

CLASSES OF CABLE SERVICE

FULL RATE

An expedited service throughout. Code language permitted.

DEFERRED HALF-RATE

Half-rate messages are subject to being deferred in favor of full rate messages for not exceeding 24 hours. Must be written in plain language.

CABLE NIGHT LETTERS

An overnight service for plain language communications, at one-third the full rate, or less. Minimum of 25 words charged for. Subject to delivery at the convenience of the Company within 24 hours.

SHIP RADIOGRAMS

A service to and from ships at sea, in all parts of the world. Plain language or code language may be used.

Mr Taylor

We gave you 2 copies of the 2 Bell messages to take to Washington.

You wanted another for your file – herewith.

L 5/16/29

C
O
P
Y

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

May 2 1939

Robert Pell
5 Culross Park Lane,
London(England)

For your confidential information. After many meetings and much discussion am taking a group to call upon the President Thursday afternoon, after which the question whether a small group will visit London to confer with their British associates to decide upon further procedure will be determined by them STOP Very important that no words be used in any documents or messages to indicate that proposals can be interpreted as an agreement or a plan STOP In all future communications and activities please bear this in mind as the groups here and the Government are extremely sensitive that nothing appear to indicate an agreement STOP Saw your father last night and had nice visit with him. He is very well. Affectionate regards both.

PENROD.

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

May 8 1939

Robert Pell
5 Culross Park Lane
London(England)

Washington meeting Thursday successful STOP American group now in communication with British group looking to prompt action STOP Forward dozen copies printed minutes last London Intergovernmental meeting. Best regards to both.

PENROD.

The President, attended by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, today received Mr. Myron Taylor, Vice Chairman and American representative of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, Mr. James G. McDonald, Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Judge Joseph H. Proskauer, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Mr. Paul Baerwald, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, who discussed generally the refugee question.

Mr. Taylor reviewed the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee, which, through the fine cooperation of the thirty-two governments represented upon the Committee, has made substantial progress along the several lines of its declared purpose.

Mr. Taylor and Mr. McDonald also reported progress in respect to the development of places for mass settlement, including the reports of the Commission for Survey of British Guiana, which was offered as a place of settlement by the Prime Minister of Great Britain late last year, as well as a similar report by the commission which has surveyed Dominica, and the progress of similar surveys of the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, as well as other prospects which are under consideration.

It was made clear that the activities under discussion did not include reference to a change of existing immigration laws.

The President indicated his satisfaction at the progress made in a large and difficult field, and encouraged continuance.

(5-4-39)

MEMORANDUM

May 3, 1939

Today the President received Mr. Myron Taylor, Vice Chairman and American representative of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees; Mr. James G. MacDonald, Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees; Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Judge Joseph F. Proskauer, Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Mr. ~~Paul Baerwald~~ Saddison, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.

After a general discussion of the refugee question Mr. Taylor gave a review of the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees to date, in which he gave due credit to the thirty-two governments represented on the Committee whose aid has been so greatly appreciated by those who have labored to accomplish in so far as is humanly possible the objectives as outlined at the Evian Conference.

Mr. Taylor and Mr. MacDonald then said that they were happy to report that the results will soon be known of the splendid work done by the several commissions which have been sent out to explore the possibilities for large scale settlement of political refugees in British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, the Island of Mindanao in the Philippines, as well as in other areas. Mr. Taylor said that it was his

belief

belief that should these reports prove favorable tremendous strides toward a permanent solution of the refugee problem will have been made, though at the same time he warned against undue impatience, saying that in order to insure ultimate success short periods of experimentation may be necessary before any great mass settlements can be made. As the Intergovernmental Committee has continually emphasized, no country would be asked or expected to make any change in its existing immigration legislation. Thus Mr. Taylor pointed out that as the hopes for mass settlement become brighter, the possibilities of refugee settlement by infiltration in other countries are lessening.

Mr. Taylor then proceeded to outline the plans for the setting up of the "Refugee Foundation", ~~which~~ to be organized by private individuals ~~along the lines of any business corporation will~~ to carry out, ~~it is hoped,~~ the financing and execution of settlement projects.

The President expressed great satisfaction with the work that has been done in the face of great difficulties and said that he hoped that progress would continue to be made.

Eu:Morris:EMC

Telephone:—ABBEY 6077-78-79.
Cables: PELRU, LONDON.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

Director:
SIR HERBERT EMERSON,
G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., C.B.E.
Vice-Director:
MR. ROBERT PELL.

1, CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

May 9th 1939.

Myron C. Taylor Esq.,
71, Broadway,
New York.

Dear Mr. Taylor,

I enclose a copy of letter No. 10 to Pierrepont Moffat. I believe that it covers the week's developments adequately and I have nothing to add except congratulations on the progress which you have made with regard to the private corporation. I should be most interested to learn the details because, frankly, I do not feel very much like returning to Germany unless I have something tangible to say to Wohlthat about this project. I feel that it places both of us in a very awkward position.

Harsch arrives tomorrow, and I am looking forward to having him with me and also to hearing from him the latest news from your side. I have no very clear idea of the state of mind in Washington or of what is happening at that end. Your telegram warning against the use of "plan" or "agreement" in connection with the German conversations gave me a hint. I shall be very careful in future not to use those terms.

I have cabled this morning that the reports of the last Intergovernmental Committee meeting are not as yet printed and that in consequence I cannot forward the twelve copies which you wish. We have been keeping after them about the printed copies, and I do not know exactly what has caused the delay. Apparently the lady who has the matter in charge has been absent on her vacation. She is back now, however, so that we may have the reports very soon. We shall send them to you as soon as they are ready.

With respects to Mrs. Taylor,

Devotedly yours,

Robert T. Pell.

May 8th 1939.

Letter No. 10.

Jay Pierrepont Moffat Esq.,
Department of State,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Pierrepont,

Our major preoccupation this week has been the British Guiana report. Sir Herbert Emerson's copy of the report was received here from Warren on Saturday, April 29th, and he immediately had copies of the report (not of the appendices) made for distribution to Lord Winterton and the Foreign and Colonial Offices. The Colonial Office received its copy of the following Monday and the British Commissioners arrived on Tuesday. Sir Herbert Emerson and I conferred with Lord Winterton on Monday (as I mentioned to you in my letter No. 9.) and we were left up in the air by his statement that the matter was now being handled through diplomatic channels. Sir Herbert Emerson was annoyed because he had prepared the ground at the Colonial Office and had planned to make an immediate request that the British Government, as its contribution, announce that it would instal the necessary services, such as roads, bridges, etc. which would facilitate the settlement in British Guiana. He refrained from doing so, however, because he did not wish to cross wires with whatever might be going on between Mr. MacDonald and Ambassador Kennedy. I felt that the only honest thing to do was to see the Ambassador and find out from him what was going on. He was busy so that I spoke to Herschel in his place and he took the matter up with the Ambassador, who said that he had had no conversations with Mr. MacDonald on this subject, that he had no intention of having such conversations and that he was tempted to make an informal enquiry at the Foreign Office to discover the meaning of Lord Winterton's statement. I do not know whether this enquiry has been made but at least the atmosphere is cleared for us. Sir Herbert Emerson has been called into conference several times by Mr. MacDonald, and while he has not given me any details of his conversations, he has given me to understand that he has got things moving both

at the Colonial Office and at New Court (the Maison Rothschild).

April 18th 1939.

Sir Herbert has been especially anxious to have immediate action on the Guiana project because word has come to us through several channels that the Zionists are organising to defeat the project by hook and crook. Towards the end of last week they founded a private finance corporation in the City of London through which they hope to draw private money away from any project which we may have. Their antagonism to the Guiana project was heightened because word has leaked out from Government circles that the Guiana report (as I telegraphed to you) was to be used to cushion the Palestine report which everyone agrees will be a blow to Jewry. Sir Herbert has been seeking to prevail upon the Government to dissociate the two reports so that the Guiana project may stand on its merits. My impression is that he has been having a difficulty in bringing this about, although he now has word that the report will be issued as a White Paper with an accompanying statement by Mr. MacDonald on Wednesday next.

Sir Herbert and I have been most interested to receive the indications, vague though they may be, that progress has been made on your side with regard to the private corporation. There is very little change here, although it is understood that Lucas (who is attorney to the Rothschilds) and one other may go to New York in the immediate future. In this connection, Monick arranged for me to lunch today with Maurice Stern of Lazard. He professed to be most interested in the idea of an international corporation and is willing to contribute, as a private individual not as a member of the firm, a very substantial amount of money. He feels that it is essential that the corporation be headed by a non-Jew (he suggested Mr. Taylor) and that the general buying public be permitted to purchase its shares. He said that Monsieur Berenger was scared to death because he was unable to understand what was going on and, moreover, he had gained an impression (a false one of course) that money was being handed out somewhere and that he wasn't getting any, which made him very angry. He said that /Stern he had impressed upon Coulon that no money was crossing the counter but Coulon said that the "old man" was highly suspicious and was going to block the whole thing until he was given his share. Stern said that a way would have to be found to satisfy him but that should not prove too difficult. He added that he - Berenger - was particularly insensed since he

had received information that Lord Winterton was going to cash in on the Northern Rhodesia project and of course he assumed that Mr. Taylor was going to make millions out of the corporation. Only he, of the original trio, seemed to be out in the cold. Accordingly he had adopted the policy of "either I play or no-one plays". Mr. Stern said, however, that he was being worked upon.

Stern's advice seemed to be that when a tract of land is made available for settlement, capital should be raised in the form of common stock. With this capital a certain number of refugees should be settled. If the land lends itself to further development, then the capital at first subscribed should prove an adequate guarantee for the issue of mortgage bonds to the total of twice the amount of common stock. This might be expanded further if the settlement seemed to justify it. Stern seemed to believe that the first issue of common stock will have to be subscribed by Jewish sympathisers. In his opinion the subscribers to a share in a company of this kind - the return to be limited to 6% - would be much more generous than the contributors to a simple charity fund where the money is destined to satisfy only the most immediate and current needs. After the interest of 6% had been paid any profits would be reinvested in the company and would constitute an additional security for the issue of bonds. Stern reiterated very strongly that the company should not be headed by Jews and the issue of bonds should not be promoted by Jewish bankers.

While on the subject of finances, I have been somewhat - not too much, concerned about the finances of the Committee. I attach a copy of a brief memorandum which I sent to Sir Herbert today and which he in turn proposes to hand to Lord Winterton. Sir Herbert feels a little hesitant about coming into the picture himself in this matter since many of the Governments on the list are also members of the League of Nations and he does not wish to offend them. I believe that we will get through the fiscal year without difficulty but we could do with the additional subscriptions.

We have been having a rather curious time with regard to Brazil. As you will recall, at the last meeting of the Committee Senhor Lobo was authorised to make a statement that his Government was prepared to receive a proposal from the Committee for the admission of 3,000 refugee families. Sir Herbert thought that he would test the value of this offer through the Parana Plantation Company, which is working under the aegis of the Rothschild Emigration Committee. Their

agent was authorised to place before the Brazilian Government a plan of settlement and, after much haggling and passing from one official to another, the agent was told that the matter was in Senhor Lobo's hands at Geneva. Accordingly Sir Herbert wrote Senhor Lobo and proposed to him that a representative of the Emigration Committee should confer with him at Geneva with regard to the proposed settlement. After some delay Senhor Lobo replied that "when the proposition - the proposition to the Intergovernmental Committee - was to take effect, a special representative would be appointed to select the emigrants and grand the necessary visas". He suggested that it would be useless for the representative of the Emigration Committee to come to Geneva and suggested that an approach should be made through Rio. Sir Herbert then decided to address a letter to Senhor Lobo (on Intergovernmental paper) indicating that he wished to get along with the settlement in Brazil, saying that he - Sir Herbert - felt strongly that no effort should be spared to make a complete success of this generous offer. He then put various questions to Senhor Lobo and said that he hoped that he would hear from him in the very near future. The letter was exceedingly cordial, but in spite of this Sir Herbert has received no reply. I, however, had a very friendly letter from Senhor Lobo this week, acknowledging the receipt of the memoranda on my conversations with Wohlthat and saying that he hoped there would be no meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee in July, August and September, since he was going on leave. I wonder if you in Washington have had anything more with regard to the Brazilian scheme.

Yours ever,

Robert T. Pell.

MAY 11 AM 5 32

THIS COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

1281

CLASS OF SERVICE
This is a full-rate Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT
NEWCOMB CARLTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SIGNS	
	Full-Rate Cablegram
LC	Deferred Cablegram
NLT	Cable Night Letter
	Ship Radiogram

1939 MAY 11 AM 5 11

Received at 40 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

FROM LONDON

TO NEW YORK

L68 146 1/47 11 1059A

LC PENROD 'PENROD'
MYRON C TAYLOR
22ND FL 71 BWAY

PELL HAS REPORTED SUBSTANCE YOUR TELEGRAM INDICATING PROGRESS MADE NEW YORK TOWARDS FORMATION PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION PURPOSE FINANCING SETT-LEMENT INVOLUNTARY EMIGRANTS FROM GREATER GERMANY STOP THIS IS VERY WELCOME NEWS SINCE WE FEEL HERE THAT PROMPT ACTION RESPECT OF CORPORATION ESSENTIAL VIEW OF FACTS

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

1281

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

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SIGNS	
	Full-Rate Cablegram
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NLT	Cable Night Letter
	Ship Radiogram

R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT — NEWCOMB CARLTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD — J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1939 MAY 11 AM 5 12

Received at 40 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

2/L68 LC PENROD 49

FIRST THAT MONEY WILL SOON HAVE TO BE FOUND FOR FINANCING SETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND SECOND THAT WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION SAY TO BERLIN FRIEND WHEN HE COMES TO LONDON EARLY JUNE THAT CORPORATION HAS BEEN FORMED STOP IF YOU ARE AT LIBERTY TO DO SO I SHOULD

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE 1281

OF SERVICE
This is a full-rate Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT
NEWCOMB CARLTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SIGNS	
	Full-Rate Cablegram
LC	Deferred Cablegram
NLT	Cable Night Letter
	Ship Radiogram

Received at 40 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

1939 MAY 11 AM 5 13

3/L68 LC PENROD 50

BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TELEGRAPH ME BRIEFLY
MAIN OUTLINES OF DECISIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN
NEW YORK PARTICULARLY AS TO PERSONNEL AND SCOPE
OF CORPORATION STOP SHALL APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED
MOREOVER IF IT IS INTENTION OF GROUP NEW YORK SEND
REPRESENTATIVES LONDON FOR CONSULTATION WITH
PRIVATE GROUP HERE

WINTERTON

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

FAST

DIRECT

RADIOGRAM

R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

A RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA SERVICE

TO ALL THE WORLD — BETWEEN IMPORTANT U. S. CITIES — TO SHIPS AT SEA

RECEIVED AT 64 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK, AT 39 MAY 11 AM 10 56 **STANDARD TIME**

D 484

GLCRL GBK2050

LONDON PO 37 11 1613

LC PENROD NEWYORK

CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION NAME IS BERTRAM HORNSBY OUR FRIENDS NEW COURT FAIL TO REMEMBER OCCASION WHEN NAME WAS SUGGESTED BUT THIRD PARTY RECALLED BOTH INCIDENTS AND NAME BUT URGED CAUTION IN ITS USE

ROBERT

Telephone: HAnover 2-1811 To secure prompt action on inquiries, this original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the office of R.C.A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the place of origin.

Form 113 TA-48

as Sadler

our views here

Peel,

Confirming our telephone conversation ~~I wrote~~ Desire to make it clear to you that Intergovt Com. ~~Can not be~~ not the sponsor for the private foundation. ~~That must continue to be a completely independent entity.~~

which must be organized by private International interests with a nominal capital. It must be a completely independent entity, and ~~[illegible]~~ carry on all further ~~negotiations~~ liaison relations with the Internal Trust Stop. If particular settlements are to be set up as for instance Guiana it ~~should be~~ must through the medium of a separate and distinct corporation for the purpose

We have devoted much ~~[illegible]~~ attention to ~~[illegible]~~ bringing about ~~this~~ an organization but from time to time we have had many discouragements none more ~~destructive~~ so than the British group failing so far to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American group.

The President's proposal was to use the Com

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

for German Society. an Established Corporation for the purpose. adding a new group of Aryan Directors to ~~those already~~ Existing groups. Stop. The American group have not, this far, favored this but it would if used admit of ~~more~~ prompt action ~~in meeting~~ and aid in Wolthat London Meetings. It already has an outstanding Christian Executive Director ~~who owed~~ which ~~[illegible]~~ meets another condition of the proposals.

(Charge Myron C Taylor--71 Broadway)

WESTERN UNION

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED			
DOMESTIC		CABLE	
TELEGRAM		FULL RATE	
DAY LETTER		DEFERRED	
NIGHT MESSAGE		NIGHT LETTER	
NIGHT LETTER		SHIP RADIOGRAM	

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1206-A

CHECK

ACCT'G INFMN.

TIME FILED

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

Copy

May 12 1939

Robert Pell,
5 Culross Street,
Park Lane, London (Eng.)

Wire date Wohlthat visit STOP Wiring you and Winterton through Department tonight.

PENROD.

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE.

ALL MESSAGES TAKEN BY THIS COMPANY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

To guard against mistakes or delays, the sender of a message should order it repeated, that is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison. For this, one-half the unrepeated message rate is charged in addition. Unless otherwise indicated on its face, this is an unrepeated message and paid for as such, in consideration whereof it is agreed between the sender of the message and this company as follows:

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2. In any event the company shall not be liable for damages for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for the non-delivery, of any message, whether caused by the negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the sum of five thousand dollars, at which amoun. each message is deemed to be valued, unless a greater value is stated in writing by the sender thereof at the time the message is tendered for transmission, and unless the repeated-message rate is paid or agreed to be paid, and an additional charge equal to one-tenth of one percent of the amount by which such valuation shall exceed five thousand dollars.

3. The company is hereby made the agent of the sender, without liability, to forward this message over the lines of any other company when necessary to reach its destination.

4. Domestic messages and incoming cable messages will be delivered free within one-half mile of the company's office in towns of 5,000 population or less, and within one mile of such office in other cities or towns. Beyond these limits the company does not undertake to make delivery, but will, without liability, at the sender's request, as his agent and at his expense, endeavor to contract for him for such delivery at a reasonable price.

5. No responsibility attaches to this company concerning messages until the same are accepted at one of its transmitting offices; and if a message is sent to such office by one of the company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent of the sender.

6. The company will not be liable for damages or statutory penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is filed with the company for transmission.

7. It is agreed that in any action by the company to recover the tolls for any message or messages the prompt and correct transmission and delivery thereof shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal by competent evidence.

8. Special terms governing the transmission of messages according to their classes, as enumerated below, shall apply to messages in each of such respective classes in addition to all the foregoing terms.

9. No employee of the company is authorized to vary the foregoing.

THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY
INCORPORATED
R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT

CLASSES OF SERVICE

TELEGRAMS

A full-rate expedited service.

NIGHT MESSAGES

Accepted up to 2:00 A.M. at reduced rates to be sent during the night and delivered not earlier than the morning of the ensuing business day.

Night Messages may at the option of the Telegraph Company be mailed at destination to the addresees, and the Company shall be deemed to have discharged its obligation in such cases with respect to delivery by mailing such night messages at destination, postage prepaid.

DAY LETTERS

A deferred day service at rates lower than the standard telegram rates as follows: One and one-half times the standard night letter rate for the transmission of 50 words or less and one-fifth of the initial rates for each additional 10 words or less.

SPECIAL TERMS APPLYING TO DAY LETTERS:

In further consideration of the reduced rate for this special Day Letter service, the following special terms in addition to those enumerated above are hereby agreed to:

A. Day Letters may be forwarded by the Telegraph Company as a deferred service and the transmission and delivery of such Day Letters is, in all respects, subordinate to the priority of transmission and delivery of regular telegrams.

B. This Day Letter is received subject to the express understanding and agreement that the Company does not undertake that a Day Letter shall be delivered on the day of its date absolutely, and at all events; but that the Company's obligation in this respect is subject to the condition that there shall remain sufficient time for the transmission and delivery of such Day Letter on the day of its date during regular office hours, subject to the priority of the transmission of regular telegrams under the conditions named above.

NIGHT LETTERS

Accepted up to 2:00 A.M. for delivery on the morning of the ensuing business day, at rates still lower than standard night message rates, as follows: The standard telegram rate for 10 words shall be charged for the transmission of 50 words or less, and one-fifth of such standard telegram rate for 10 words shall be charged for each additional 10 words or less.

SPECIAL TERMS APPLYING TO NIGHT LETTERS:

In further consideration of the reduced rates for this special Night Letter service, the following special terms in addition to those enumerated above are hereby agreed to:

Night Letters may at the option of the Telegraph Company be mailed at destination to the addressees, and the Company shall be deemed to have discharged its obligation in such cases with respect to delivery by mailing such Night Letters at destination, postage prepaid.

FULL RATE CABLES

An expedited service throughout. Code language permitted.

DEFERRED HALF-RATE CABLES

Half-rate messages are subject to being deferred in favor of full rate messages for not exceeding 24 hours. Must be written in plain language.

CABLE NIGHT LETTERS

An overnight service for plain language communications, at one-third the full rate, or less. Minimum of 25 words charged for. Subject to delivery at the convenience of the Company within 24 hours.

SHIP RADIOGRAMS

A service to and from ships at sea, in all parts of the world. Plain language or code language may be used.

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE 1281

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

1939 MAY 13 AM 5 25

40 BROAD ST N.Y.
HANOVER 2-7000

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SIGNS	
	Full-Rate Cablegram
LC	Deferred Cablegram
NLT	Cable Night Letter
	Ship Radiogram

Received at 40 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

1939 MAY 13 AM 5 18

LONDON
TO NEW YORK

L97 7 13/1108A

LC PENROD 'PENROD'
MYRON C TAYLOR
22ND FL 71 BWAY

ABOUT JUNE FIRST

ROBERT

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

Mr. Taylor:

1:45 pm Mr. Morris of the State Department telephoned:

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO 695 May 17th NOON FOR LORD WINTERTON.

"I am greatly encouraged by the belief that the British and American points of view regarding the establishment of the refugee foundation will rapidly nearly accord. Virtually the only point where there is still disagreement is the suggestion of the British group that a second holding company should be set up to control the settlement corporation. I do not believe that such a holding company is necessary. On the contrary I believe that the individual corporations could function more successfully as completely indipendent entities. I envisaged the Foundation as a negotiating medium to be set up to meet the terms in Rublee memorandum. The independent corporations would naturally work in conjunction with it to the extent which may be necessary.

"The suggestion that the American group should come to London as soon as possible is accepted in principle. The American group feels that it should not sail until there is a closer of mind with the London group, but believe that this can be accomplished by telegraph within the next few days."

DRAFT TELEGRAM AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON for Pell from Myron Taylor.

"I feel that we can now assume that the foundation will be established early in June and that its establishment should be followed very shortly by a meeting first by the officers and second by the whole committee. In particular it appears desirable to hold these meetings while Wohlthat is still in London and while the directors of the foundation are also there.

"I expect to sail on the Normandie on June 14th spending 2 days in Paris and reaching London June 21st. I suggest that a meeting of the officers be held on the 26th and a meeting of the full committee on the 27th. If the other officers of the committee are agreeable to these dates, I propose to give on the evening of June 27th a large dinner to which I would be glad to have you invite on my behalf the officers and members of the committee, the chiefs of mission of the countries represented, Lord Halifax and perhaps the Prime Minister, Mr. Wohlthat and the German Ambassador, and such of the directors of the foundation as may be in London. I hope to leave London on June 29th, and after a brief visit to Florence, to sail on the Normandie July 5th."

Dear Mr. Wohlthat:

I have had the honour of holding conversations with Dr. Schacht and yourself. In order that I may not fail to make a correct report of the conversations I should be greatly obliged if you would have the goodness to confirm whether the following strictly confidential memorandum is correct:

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM GERMANY.

It has been ascertained that Germany is disposed to adopt a policy which will in every way facilitate and encourage the organised emigration of Jews. A program along the lines hereinafter outlined will be put into effect when Germany is satisfied that countries of immigration are disposed to receive currently Jews from Germany in conformity with this program. If the program is put into effect - and its implementation will be greatly facilitated by an improvement in the international atmosphere - the emigration will take place in a uniform and orderly manner.

I.

Organisation of Emigration

ONE. This program relates exclusively to Jews of German nationality or stateless Jews in Germany. The term "Jew" where used in this memorandum as provided by the Nuremberg laws means the following:

(1) A Jew is a person who has three or four Jewish grandparents. A grandparent is deemed to be a Jew if he or she embraced the Jewish faith;

(2) A person is also deemed to be a Jew who has two Jewish grandparents and who on September 16, 1935, was of the Jewish faith or thereafter embraced the Jewish faith, or who has two Jewish grandparents and on September 16, 1935, was married to a Jew or thereafter married a Jew.

TWO. There are approximately 800,000 Jews remaining in Germany, including Austria and the Sudetenland, at the present time. Of this number, 150,000 are classed as wage earners; approximately 250,000 are regarded as the dependants of the wage earners; the remainder are primarily the old and infirm who for that reason are not included in this program of emigration.

THREE. The wage earner category shall consist of all men and single women between the ages of 15 and 45, who are individually

capable of earning a living and are otherwise fit for emigration.

FOUR. The dependant category shall consist of the immediate families of the wage earners, excluding the old (persons over 45 years of age) and the unfit.

FIVE. The wage earner category shall emigrate first, in annual contingents over a period of three years not to exceed a maximum of five years.

SIX. All persons from the wage earner category as defined above shall be admitted by the receiving governments in accordance with their established immigration laws and practices.

SEVEN. The practical work of organizing emigration shall be carried out with the participation of Bureaus representing the Jewish organizations of Germany under the control of a Commissioner designated by the German Government.

EIGHT. The Bureaus organizing the work of emigration may be assisted by foreign experts representing outside private organizations concerned with immigration and enjoying the confidence of receiving governments, on condition that these experts are agreeable to the German Government.

NINE. Passports shall be furnished to persons emigrating from Germany under this arrangement. Stateless persons in Germany shall be furnished suitable papers for emigration.

TEN. Conditions which have led to the retention of Jews, other than persons detained for reasons of public safety, in camps should automatically disappear if a program of organized emigration is put into effect.

ELEVEN. Facilities shall be granted for the retraining of wage earners for emigration, notably in agricultural retraining centers but also in artisan schools. Retraining shall be encouraged.

TWELVE. Emigration of persons in the dependant category shall take place when the wage earners are established and able to receive them.

II

Position of Persons Remaining Permanently in Germany and of Those Awaiting Emigration.

THIRTEEN. A definite method has not as yet been found for caring for old persons and persons unfit for emigration, who are not included in this program and who will be allowed to finish their

days in Germany. It is the intention on Germany's part to assure that these persons and persons awaiting emigration may live tranquilly, unless some extraordinary circumstance should occur. There is no intention to segregate the Jews. They may circulate freely. Persons fit for work shall be given the opportunity of employment so as to earn their living; Jews employed in the same establishments as Aryans will, however, be separated from Aryan workers. Generally, in order to provide for adequate administration of the program, centralization of control over Jewish affairs is contemplated.

FOURTEEN. The support and maintenance of the persons referred to in paragraph thirteen above, who are not able to earn their own living, will be financed in the first instance from Jewish property in Germany apart from that portion thereof to be set aside in the trust fund (hereinafter described), and from the income from this trust fund. If the above resources do not suffice, there will be provided for these persons decent conditions of existence from the material standpoint in accordance with prevailing practices relating to the public relief of destitute persons generally. There will be no recourse to sources outside Germany for the support and maintenance of these persons.

III.

Financing of Emigration.

FIFTEEN. In order to finance the emigration contemplated by the program, a trust fund shall be established in a specific amount to be ascertained but at all events in an amount not less than 25% of the existing Jewish wealth in Germany, which, if transfer possibilities are found, will represent a material increase over the present rates of transfer. At the present time the remaining Jewish wealth in Germany is in the hands of its individual owners; it has not yet been decided how the requisite amount thereof will be set aside in the trust fund.

SIXTEEN. The trust properties shall be held by a corporation administered by three trustees. Two of the trustees shall be of German nationality. The third trustee shall be of foreign nationality and recognised standing.

SEVENTEEN. The principal of the trust fund may be used to purchase equipment for emigrants of the wage earner category and (subject to cartel agreements) capital goods for the development of settlement projects and for travelling and freight expenses of the emigrants in Germany and on German boats, all in connection with this program of emigration. It is contemplated that an outside purchasing agency will be established to effect all purchases out of the fund, to maintain contact with the German authorities and generally to handle all problems arising outside of Germany in connection with the transfer of the fund. The types of goods which

may be purchased by the purchasing agency may be restricted to those which, in accordance with prevailing practice in Germany, are computed to contain no imported raw material or a relatively small percentage thereof; or, alternatively, no restrictions will be imposed if arrangements can be made to pay to Germany in foreign exchange a portion of the aggregate price of goods purchased which represents the computed value (on an over-all percentage basis to be agreed upon) of the imported raw material content of such goods. Arrangements shall be made to secure the exemption of goods purchased out of the fund from the scope of clearing, compensation and payments agreements in force between Germany and the respective countries into which such goods are imported. Assurances shall be required of the purchasing agency that the goods purchased will not be disposed of otherwise than for the purpose of equipping emigrants or for the development of settlement projects. It is the intention to facilitate the purchase out of the fund of such goods of the requisite types and in adequate volume to meet the current emigration needs. The prices to be paid shall not be in excess of inland prices for goods or services of a similar character and quality.

EIGHTEEN. The Haavarah method of transfer shall be permitted to operate within its traditional sphere. The Haavarah purchases are to be paid for out of the trust fund.

NINETEEN. The principal of the trust fund, except to the extent that it is used for the purposes above referred to, shall be eligible for transfer whenever a change in conditions may render transfer possible or whenever arrangements to that end can be made, whether by way of agreed schemes for additional exports or otherwise.

TWENTY. Goods purchased out of the trust fund may be exported free of all taxes or other payments, and emigrants may take with them, free of all taxes, levies, contributions or similar exactions, their personal effects (with the exception of Jewelry, precious metals, objets d'art and with the exception of goods of special value recently acquired with a view to emigration), household goods, tools and equipment for use in their trades or professions, owned or which may be acquired by them in a reasonable amount for personal use.

TWENTY-ONE. No flight tax or exaction of a similar nature shall be levied against Jews emigrating in accordance with this program.

Yours very sincerely,

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(Feb 1933)

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1939

My dear Mr. Taylor:

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram from Pell transmitting a confidential message to you from Lord Winterton.

I note that the thought of the British group tends to go considerably beyond your suggestion that settlement projects be financed by ad hoc organizations, in that they suggest a new organization to act as parent company for the ad hoc corporations. Might not this tend to render the first foundation nugatory in German eyes, to say nothing of possible dangers of friction, duplication, and dispersion of energy?

Sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Pierrepont Moffat

Enclosure:
As stated.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

RFP

GRAY

London

Dated May 17, 1939

Rec'd 11:38 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

695, May 17, noon.

FROM PELL.

Winterton has asked me to transmit the following personal and confidential message through you to Mr. Taylor:

"One. I am very grateful for your message of May 13 with regard to the private corporation or foundation. It was very helpful to me to have this information since we, at this end, were very much in the dark as to what was taking place in New York, although we heard from time to time with satisfaction that you were working very hard to bring about some concrete result and were truly grateful.

Two. Emerson attended today a conference at Newcourt at which were present Hailey, Bearstead, Reading, Anthony de Rothschild, Lionel Cohen, Lionel Montague, and Lucas. The trend of discussions was as follows:

(a) The principle was accepted of a foundation with small capital registered in London but representing different interests, which would deal with the Internal

Trust

Trust in Germany when established.

(b) The question was considered whether this should be also a holding company for settlement corporations, but on the whole it was thought it would probably be better to keep the settlement corporations distinct.

(c) In the latter case it would be necessary to establish a separate holding settlement corporation which would have subsidiary companies for specific schemes, the first subsidiary company being for British Guiana.

(d) The Conference considered that rapid progress could now best be made if there were early conference in London at which American, British, Dutch and French interests were represented. They preferred this to sending a representative to America, since he could only represent British group and would not himself be a principal. The object of discussion at the conference would be, first the foundation, and second, the holding settlement corporation with special reference to subsidiary company for British Guiana.

Three. I hope you will agree that this attitude is satisfactory and that the procedure proposed is suitable. I understand that a cable is being sent to Strauss inviting American representatives to come to London. I hope you will find yourself able to help in this respect and persuade the American ~~and German~~ to send men who are truly representative and can conclude definite arrangements."

PEG:CSB KENNEDY

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1939

My dear Mr. Taylor:

There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum concerning the foundation, prepared by Sir Herbert Emerson for the Rothschild group. I am also transmitting a copy of a memorandum prepared by Dr. Bowman concerning the report of the British Guiana commission. Dr. Bowman suggests its transmission to the Intergovernmental Committee, the Advisory Committee and the Refugee Economic Corporation. While I think his views should be given due weight by everyone interested in the project, I see disadvantages in giving it wide distribution in view of the efforts which the Zionists are apparently making to prevent development of the Guiana project.

In accordance with your request I am also enclosing a table of the members of the Intergovernmental Committee, showing whether or not they are members of the League and whether or not they have paid their contributions to the Committee or to the League for 1938.

Sincerely yours,

Theodore C. Achilles

Theodore C. Achilles

Enclosures:
As stated.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

May 1st 1939.

NOTE BY SIR HERBERT EMERSON.

Mr. Pell saw Mr. Wohlthat on April 6th 1939 and again on April 26th 1939. On both occasions the conversations indicated a clear disposition on the part of Mr. Wohlthat to give effect to the German plan as disclosed to Mr. Rublee. This was particularly so in the case of the conversation of April 26th. It then appeared that a set of decrees had been drafted and approved by the Inter-Ministerial Conference. They awaited the final sanction of the Chancellor, which it was hoped would be obtained within a few days of the discussion. The decrees mentioned to Mr. Pell were the following:

(1) A decree establishing a central Jewish organisation in Germany. Mr. Pell understood that its main object was to give the Jew a definite legal status in the Reich. Inter alia it provided for the education of Jewish children and recognised the right of the Jews to practise the Mosaic faith under the protection of the State. It envisaged the ultimate emigration of the Jewish community from Germany, and with this in view made provision for the retraining for purposes of settlement overseas of one thousand young Jewish men and women at a time with State aid.

(2) The second decree dealt with the internal trust which it is proposed to set up inside Germany. No details of this were given, but Mr. Wohlthat made it clear that it would be held in abeyance until such time as an external corporation had been brought into existence.

At both discussions Mr. Wohlthat has insisted very strongly on the necessity of a private corporation before anything could be done in the way of a trust. He has emphasised that

the absence of positive action to establish such a corporation has rendered his task more difficult. He has also laid stress on the fact that the delay in forming the internal trust, which is to come into being simultaneously with the private corporation, involves the dissipation of Jewish wealth, part of which can be appropriated for emigration as soon as the trust is formed. Mr. Pell says Mr. Wohlthat has been definitely helpful in various matters concerned with the refugee problem, and there is no reason at all to suppose that he is not keenly interested in it and is not acting in good faith. Special importance attaches to the last discussion, since it appeared that various proposals to bring into effect the Rublee plan had been approved not only by Mr. Wohlthat, but by other Ministers concerned. It seems to me that until and unless something occurs to indicate the contrary, the right policy on this side is to do all that is possible to get the Rublee plan into full operation.

2. It is clear that full advantage of the plan cannot be obtained until a private corporation is set up. Indeed, very limited advantage can be obtained unless this is done. For various reasons the scheme to set up a corporation has hung fire. The main causes have, I think, been the following:

(1) The international situation.

(2) Doubts about the good intentions of the other party.

(3) The necessity of consultation with parties interested in America.

(4) The absence of any specific scheme of emigration which required to be financed.

If the scheme is to wait until the international situation clears up, the delay may be indefinite. The second point I have already dealt with. The absence of specific schemes is now, I hope, in process of solution following the report of the Commission on British Guiana. In any case, it has always

seemed to me that, quite independent on the Rublee plan, a corporation, or several corporations, will be essential at some stage or another. Without a private corporation, no scheme of settlement on a considerable scale can be carried through, whether in British Guiana, Ecuador, Northern Rhodesia, or elsewhere. If there had been no Rublee conversations, or even if the Rublee plan broke down completely, the necessity would still remain. While it is incidental to the Rublee plan, it is an indispensable element in any serious scheme of settlement. Its importance in the Rublee plan arises from the facts that (a) the internal trust will not be formed until an external body is established and (b) the Germans will not believe that the private organisations are seriously interested in settlement until a private body to deal with its finance is set up. I can see certain objections to creating a corporation with considerable called-up capital in anticipation of the necessity of financing particular schemes, but these objections do not seem to apply if capital was called up as the necessity occurred. In any case, the objections to such action appear to be far outweighed by the fact that delay in formation of the internal trust is resulting in the progressive dissipation of internal assets which would otherwise become available for purposes of emigration.

3. There is a further consideration which is likely to arise in the near future in consequence of the report on British Guiana. One hopes that the British Government will take an active part in assisting that scheme as one of colonial development, but before concrete proposals can be made in this respect, it is reasonable to suppose that the Government will require assurances that the finance for transport, settlement etc. will be forthcoming from a private corporation. Indeed, I imagine that the terms on which a settlement can proceed will have to be embodied in an agreement between the Government

and a private corporation.

4. It seems to me, therefore, that on every account vigorous action is now necessary in order to bring the corporation into being.

[Copy Eu:EMC]
[Comp. rfa]

Memorandum on the Report of the British Guiana Commission

Remarks Submitted by Isaiah Bowman

I have just completed a thorough reading of the report on British Guiana, and have the following comments to make as a result of this reading and of personal experience in tropical sections of South America.

In deciding whether or not to put a plan of settlement into effect, there is required, first of all, global consideration of essential elements. The fundamental question is, can a given settlement become self-supporting? No one can answer such a question before experimentation with actual settlement in a given region. That is to say, no one can answer the question conclusively. We have, however, a large number of past experiments upon which to draw, and we have our knowledge of the existing world situation with respect to the use of best and second best lands. In addition we have a general knowledge of the character of the migrants who are expected to settle in selected lands. Finally, we have a knowledge of tropical production today. Such production, following the rule of monoculture, has resulted in the flooding of the world's markets with an excess of staples that has brought distress or severe limitation to every organized enterprise involving the production of rubber, coffee, tea, sugar, etc.

These economic conditions impel one to think of settlement in the same general terms that have been set by past experience; namely, it is the best of the tropical lands from the standpoint of production or transportation or marketing that we should try to locate. Millions of dollars spent upon a railway line or a motor road to support a handful of people will guarantee failure, in my judgment. The experiment will not be an experiment at all, but an artificially sustained enterprise which will leave practically all questions unanswered at the end of five, ten, or fifteen years that were asked of the experiment in the first place.

Of course it will be said that we must take second best or third best in the way of available lands in British Guiana if necessary because British Guiana is politically open for settlement. If British Guiana were the size of Argentina or Bolivia this might be a powerful argument, since the potentialities would be so vast that an expensive experiment would be justified. In all complicated problems involving human nature, a less than optimum environment, and the vast complexities of production, transport, and marketing today in our present economic scheme, it is common to have

individuals

individuals focus upon a particular advantage and forget that success is not going to be determined by this particular advantage but by the whole complex of conditions with which a new settlement has to deal.

Political availability is not going to change the climate, the soil, the transport conditions. Nor can it have very much of an effect upon the market conditions.

It might be thought that the remarks in this memorandum are at variance with those of the Commission itself. A careful reading of the report of the Commission will correct this impression. In the main I have no fault to find with the report. It seems to me to be a conscientious and honest report based on real effort and insight. If one will read it closely, all the qualifying observations are to be found therein. It is cautious, and conservative, and fair. One might question individual phrases, such as a reference to the possibilities of the region, on the first page of the report, which is followed by the statement that such possibilities "woulf fully justify the carrying out of a trial settlement project on a substantial enough scale. . . ." It seems to me that the body of the report does not sustain the form of this assertion. It seems to me that a trial settlement is not fully justified. I would prefer to see the statement that a trial settlement is a gamble and that it will mean nothing at all unless it is very carefully planned, so that a direct meaning can be extracted from the experiment after a period of years.

The differences of opinion which have been expressed respecting the meaning of settlement enterprises in the tropics arise chiefly from the fact that the settlements were not set up in a way nor maintained in a form that enables the student to draw out of a given settlement experience a reliable conclusion. Almost every statement that one can make today about the possibilities of white settlement in the tropics has to be qualified. Regions differ in different parts of the tropics in the extent of such qualifications.

We are accustomed to misread the meaning of progress in the control of tropical diseases. Public health in the tropics is to medical science what engineering is to physics and chemistry. That is to say, it is a matter of the application of scientific discovery to masses. What has been done in Panama, where there is a terrific concentration of economic, political, and military interests to support such

doing

doing, is no indication as to what can be done economically in the case of an outlying settlement that is subsisting under marginal conditions. One of the most important items in the location of any settlement in the tropics is the question of water drainage. Critical in this connection is the question of mosquito control during the wet season. How widely flooded are the lands that it is proposed to occupy? Will the production that is possible and the market conditions in a given field create the profits out of which drainage, mosquito-proof dwellings, etc., can be provided? In raising these questions I am not going beyond the comments of the members of the Commission. Few questions can be raised that have not been anticipated by the Commission. But it remains to put a value upon the answers to the questions in terms of long-range economic maintenance. Practical questions have to be faced. Specific plans have to be drawn up. Explicit arrangements have to be made, financial and otherwise. Facing this group of conditions and taking into account the facts reported by the Commission, I am of the opinion that the investment of millions in a trial settlement in British Guiana could be made a first-class scientific experiment of absorbing interest and one that I would expect to follow with the deepest attention and even hope; but it is also one which I believe would be an economic failure. I am bound to say that I think the money that it is proposed to invest in such a trial settlement could be better expended in other places.

May 11, 1939

May 16, 1939

GOVERNMENTS MEMBERS OF THE

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL REFUGEES

Australia
Argentine Republic
Belgium
Bolivia (2)
United Kingdom
* Brazil
Canada (1)
** Chile (June 1, 1940) (1)
Colombia (1)
Cuba (1) (2)
Denmark
Dominican Republic (1)
Ecuador (1) (2)
* United States
France (3)
* Guatemala (1)
Haiti (1) (2)
* Honduras (2)
Ireland
Mexico (1) (2)
* Nicaragua (1)
Norway
New Zealand
Panama (1) (2)
* Paraguay (1)
Netherlands
** Peru (April 8, 1941)
Sweden
Switzerland
Uruguay (1) (2)
** Venezuela (July 11, 1940)

* Not members of the League of Nations today.

** Countries which have given two years' notice and dates when withdrawal will become effective.

(1) Have made no payment to the Intergovernmental Committee.

(2) Have not paid 1938 contributions to League of Nations.

(3) Has made partial payment to Intergovernmental Committee.

1:45 pm May 19 1939

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON #706
May 18 5pm from Pell:

Strictly confidential. I attended meeting in Winterton's office this morning with Emerson and others to meet leaders of the Jewish community in Germany, who told us that they had come to London at the instance of the Gestapo. The substance of their statement was that the Intergovernmental Committee must take immediate steps to find places of refuge or settlement, and that "world Jewry" must establish a private corporation or the authorities in Germany would resume the violent tactics which had in the past been so effective in forcing Jews from Germany. The German Jewish group was in possession of a memorandum specifying how many Jews each government represented on the committee should admit each year for 5 years. They begged Winterton to use this or a similar plan as the country's and to present it to the German authority at once if a further wave of persecution of Jews in Germany were to be avoided.

In reply Winterton stated that neither the British Government nor the committee could accept dictation from the German police. The committee had demonstrated considerable patience and liberality with its dealings with the authorities in Berlin. It was exerting its utmost efforts to find opportunities for refuge or settlement for involuntary emigrants from Germany, and provide financial circles who were working toward the creation of the private foundation were doing their utmost to prepare for the financing of this emigration. The committee could not accomplish the impossible and should not be asked to.

There were limits to admission of aliens, regardless of race or religion which the other governments could not exceed and the German authorities should be able to understand this. The violent tactics previously used in Germany have greatly added to the difficulty of carrying out the committee's task. Further resort to such tactics would make its task impossible. Opportunities for emigration would everywhere be closed to this enforced exodus and no funds could be raised in the way of threats.

He reminded the German group that the authorities in Berlin had shown an intention of doing many things, for example retraining persons for emigration, establishing a central organization to deal with emigration etc., but that none of these things had been done. A number of the governments represented on the committee were restless. He was nevertheless not yet prepared to question the good faith of the German officials with whom contact had been established, and was ready to take further action pari-passu with them.

The spokesman for the German group, Mr. Israel, stated that the sincerity of Wohlthat and Goering could not be questioned but that they were in danger of losing a hard battle. He said that when Wohlthat recently reported to Hitler the Chancelor had made it plain that he was not impressed and had refused permission for the

issuance of Wohlthat's decrees until the committee had made more substantial progress.

The German group was distressed by Winterton's reception of their plea but was somewhat consoled by his actions in asking Emerson and me to study their memorandum with them. We shall do so tomorrow morning but we have made clear that the U.S. naturally cannot commit the member governments to any specific course of action.

Copy sent Lewis Strauss
(top 3 lines omitted)

Usher

JR

GRAY

London

Dated May 22, 1939

Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

723, May 22, 6 p.m.

FROM PELL.

Winterton and the Foreign Office have come to the conclusion that it would be advisable to hold a meeting of the officers of the committee early in July. However he does not wish to take any step towards calling the meeting without having your views and Mr. Taylor's. He would appreciate a reply as soon as practicable.

KENNEDY

CSB

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

May 22 1939

My dear Myron,

I am delighted to hear that progress is being made in the matter of setting up the Refugee Foundation. As the final steps will presumably be taken in London, and as they should be followed by a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, I should greatly appreciate it if you could see your way to returning to London some time in June to attend the meeting and to help in completing arrangements.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor.

May 22nd 1939.

Letter No. 12.

Jay Pierrepont Moffat Esq.,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Pierrepont,

I am going to put the Godman matter first this week because I have telegraphed you about British Guiana, the Private Foundation and our meetings with the Jewish delegation from Berlin, so that whatever I have to say on those subjects will merely supplement my messages.

Godman's claims are now filed with the Court. I enclose the printed brief. As you will see, the contentions do not correspond with the facts. It is clear, however, that they provide a useful peg on which Godman can hang a case for publicity purposes. If you examine the statement carefully, you must conclude, as we do here, that Godman's object is not merely to establish his claim for money but to smoke out the Committee generally.

Counsel for my side are convinced, after a little quiet investigating, that Godman is not acting on his own, that he is being put forward in this case either by some Nazi group in Germany or by the Fascist party in this country with which he is closely identified, or another group. They say that his Attorneys have acted in the past for Fascist groups in England and there is, in consequence, strong reason to believe that they are acting once again in the same interest. They say, moreover, that by invoking various statutes the British Government could stop this case in five minutes if it wished. They have suggested this to the solicitors who are protecting Lord Winterton (including the Attorney General and Solicitor General) but have received no conclusive reply. In other words, they have been obliged to conclude that the British Government has decided to allow this case to come into Court.

We held a meeting on Friday at this office in order to map out a plan of campaign. In addition to the Counsel who are acting for me there were Lord Winterton's secretary and the representatives of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, also Sir Herbert Emerson, who, although in no way involved in this case, insisted upon being present.

My Counsel first of all raised the question of immunity. They suggested that it would be very easy for the British Government, if it wished, to cover me with diplomatic immunity and thus end the case. The reply was made that immunity could only be granted in two ways, by inclusion in the diplomatic list of the missions accredited to the Court of St. James which was clearly out of the question, and by statute. The officials of the League of Nations serving in London, including the officials of the League Commission for Refugees, were covered by the Covenant of the League of Nations which was incorporated into British statute law. The officials of the Intergovernmental Committee were covered by no agreement and in consequence have the status merely of private persons. Some claim could be made that officials of a foreign government in London in a temporary capacity might by courtesy enjoy immunity. This could not be so in the case of officials serving more or less permanently or for long periods of time in London. In other words there could be no question of immunity for officials of the executive office of the Intergovernmental Committee. This was a final decision which had been reached after due consideration.

My Counsel then said that it would appear that Lord Winterton and I would therefore be answerable to the suit of Godman on the same basis and that the case would have to be attacked from the point of view that there were no grounds for action. The Attorney and Solicitor Generals' representatives said that it would be their contention that Lord Winterton was in no way involved, that he was not responsible personally or officially for the actions of the Committee's executive, that he knew nothing of the Godman matter, that he had not met Godman personally or corresponded with him and that he had not heard of Godman until long after the contact had been established by the Director, (Mr. Rublee) and his associates.

At this point I was obliged to say that the contact with Godman was established by Mr. Waley, a high official of the British Government, that it had been continued at the request of Lord Winterton's office and that Mr. Rublee had taken great pains to report to Lord Winterton at every meeting with him on the Godman matter and that I, on the understanding that the contact with Godman was established at the request of the British

Government, had taken great pains to inform the Foreign Office after each session with Godman. It was therefore not correct to say that Lord Winterton was wholly ignorant of the Godman matter and that the British authorities had no direct responsibility.

Winterton's secretary then said that Mr. Rublee had been in contact with Godman from August whereas Lord Winterton had merely heard of the association in October. We then checked on the date from Godman's own statement, and it appears that the first interview with Godman, other than the introductory interview at the Treasury, which took place a day or so before, occurred on September 26th, and I distinctly remember that Mr. Rublee gave Lord Winterton all the details a day or two later.

The Attorney and Solicitor Generals' representatives then said that it should be understood that they were to represent Lord Winterton alone in this matter and they presumed that my Counsel would make arrangements to represent me. They were willing to consult with regard to the case but they had to insist that Lord Winterton had no part of the responsibility.

After the meeting Sir Herbert Emerson, who had maintained a discreet but observant silence throughout, said that Winterton could not be allowed to dodge his responsibility, that he, Emerson, had taken on the directorship of the Committee with the understanding that the directorship was to share the responsibility for the executive action of the Committee with the Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen, that if he were no obliged to assume the sole responsibility he might have to reconsider his position.

In other words, Pierrepont, much more is involved in the Godman case, I am afraid, than the mere action of a disgruntled busybody. This case has already settled, adversely to us, the question of immunities, and it bids fair to unsettle the whole organisation. I do not wish to exaggerate, but I have a feel of the situation here which is perhaps not perceptible at long range, and my view is that if the case comes to trial in the next week or two it may lead to publicity of such a nature that what little we have done will be undone.

I think that you in Washington should realise that fundamentally we are regarded here as a terrible nuisance. The prevailing thought is that in the matter of the Jews the League Commission does the necessary. It enables the Government to say that it is doing wonderful things for the Jews, and it really doesn't get in the way at all. Moreover it has the advantage of enabling the Government to say that it is collaborating with

a League body and therefore the propaganda that the Government is opposed to the League is all rot. We - that is the Intergovernmental Committee - mean, however, that injection of American earnestness into the otherwise happy picture. Apparently we really want to do something for the Jews, and this is looked upon as very annoying. I have just come from a weekend at Lothian's and among those present were Geoffrey Dawson of The Times, Lord Hankey, Lord Perth etc. etc. and the conversation dealt almost exclusively with the Jewish question, including Palestine. The consensus was that it was too bad about the Jews, that obviously something should be done for them but it should not be done within the framework of the British Empire. They did not feel that it was a good thing for the Jewish problem to be shifted from Germany to the Empire and in fact they were determined that it should not be so shifted. The suggestion was made that if America was so excited about these people it should turn over an American state to them. That would be an excellent solution. Another suggestion was that Madagascar should be acquired from the French somehow. Curiously enough, however, Angola was sharply ruled out as a possibility. I cite this conversation as a typical example of what one hears in ruling circles. The Jewish cause is far from popular, and the Intergovernmental Committee is clearly associated with the Jewish cause. It is quite frankly put down in popular conversation, in Foreign Office circles, in Government circles and so forth, to Jewish pressure on the President which had to be appeased. The British Government is willing to help the President out, but to a very limited extent only. The sooner the Intergovernmental Committee is merged with the League Commission by American adherence to this noble humanitarian endeavour on the part of the League the better it will be for all concerned. With this there is a tendency to laugh at "poor Eddy Winterton" who has been saddled with the Cabinet's unwanted child.

There is, in short, no use in deceiving ourselves. If this office is to continue and its prestige is to be maintained on a level even somewhat approaching that of the League Commission you in Washington will have to show in some tangible manner that it is still regarded as a matter of some importance by the President and our Government and that it is not just another unwanted baby we have cast out into an angry world. You know how readily it is said in high places here that we at home are apt to embark on crusades, enlisting a goodly company of fellow knights, and then abandon them as soon as our first enthusiasm wanes. It has been said in my presence that this is the case with regard to this effort, and I think that it is up to our side to make it crystal clear that this is not the fact by making, in the near future, a new move on the implementing the position and prestige of the Committee.

I do not mean to suggest by this that you have not borne the brunt of this affair. You decidedly have, and Mr. Taylor has worked like a trojan to whip the financial people into line on the corporation. I am concerned merely to have the impression maintained that our effort continues to occupy a place of importance even though it is dwarfed by major political developments.

By way of postscript, I have just come from a meeting with Winterton where I had an opportunity of discussing the Godman matter alone with him, which is rather unusual because generally he is surrounded by Treasury and Foreign Office officials. I got the impression that he, too, is mystified by the whole affair and thinks that certain forces, which he would not attempt to define, are at work not against the Committee but against him. He indicated that he had been told positively by the Foreign Office and Treasury people that the matter would never reach the formal stage, and it was a great shock to him that it had gone this far. He said that he was very much distressed and very unhappy about the turn of events, that he had naturally followed the counsel of his advisers in the matter and that he thought it was up to Waley to get us out of the scrape.

I am glad to be able to say that the atmosphere is cleared in respect of the Private Foundation. The exchange of messages between Mr. Taylor and Lord Winterton has removed the uncertainty which existed here with regard to what was going on at your end and permitted Emerson to make a real drive at New Court with the results which I telegraphed to you. I enclose, as of possible interest to you, the draft of a message which it was proposed to send in reply to Mr. Taylor's telegram of May 13, but which was withheld when Emerson was successful in his meeting at New Court. This message, which was drafted in the first instance by Sir Herbert, was modified by the Foreign Office and the Treasury, accepted by Winterton and only withdrawn at the very last minute. It may be interesting to you as indicating the trend here at this stage. Of course water has gone over the dam since then and, as I understand the situation, it is only a question now of smoothing out minor details to enable the representatives of the New York group to come to London. This is decidedly to the good and Mr. Taylor deserves the highest praise.

I telegraphed you at length regarding the visit here of the Jewish leaders from Berlin, and I have not very much to add. We felt like the worst sort of dogs at having to turn down these poor people who left the meeting in tears, but we decided that

there was no alternative. To give in even an inch to the secret police under pressure exercised through threats against the Jewish community in Germany would be fatal. Without a doubt these poor people would be back in a week's time with greater demands, and there would be no end to this process. It was wiser to make it clear without any question that we did not propose to deal with the secret police even indirectly through the Jewish leaders. We explained to them that we were dealing with Wohlthat, who had been designated by the German authorities for this purpose.

Speaking of Wohlthat, the press here, including The Times and The Telegraph, has been filled with accounts of a secret visit of the gentleman to London last week and conferences between him and Waley at the Treasury. Winterton denied most formally to me yesterday that he had any knowledge of a visit of Wohlthat. He said that he had asked Waley what was behind these reports and Waley suggested that they were circulated by Godman. He admitted, however, that he had been conferring with a financial delegation from Berlin, including Wohlthat's immediate assistant. Against this, I was informed yesterday by the Germans that Wohlthat had been here, that he had seen Waley, that he was now in Spain and would return to London about June 1st. Take your choice. My impression is that poor Winterton is told very little so that he may have been reassuring me in good faith. This information published in the press has had an unfortunate effect on our friends at New Court. I heard twice from them yesterday, and the implication was that we were withholding information from them which might have a vital bearing on their decision with regard to the Private Foundation. I attempted to tell them that I had been assured by the Treasury that Wohlthat had not been to London and they merely laughed. They said they knew for a fact that he had conferred with Mr. Norman at the Bank of England. I said I could not argue with them because I had to stand on the information which had come from the Treasury.

With respect to British Guiana, the Times on Saturday last launched an editorial attack accompanied by a hostile letter to the project from a Mr. Schwelm. I spoke to Dawson during the weekend about this editorial, and he said that The Times was opposed to the project and would continue to be opposed to the project, and the more the Jews in Palestine misbehaved the more The Times would be opposed to their being established anywhere inside the Empire. I remarked that it seemed very odd that they should oppose the testimony of a gentleman who admitted in his letter that he had never been to British Guiana against the evidence of an Anglo-American commission which had

spent months on the spot. He suggested that the commission was a prejudiced commission and that Mr. Schwelm was much more important than the whole commission put together. The cat came out of the bag yesterday during my talk with Winterton. It appears that Schwelm is the expert for a big project of settlement in Argentina in which Sir Horace Wilson is personally interested. Wilson has said to Winterton that it would be useful if the Committee would focus its attention on persuading the Argentine Government to admit people to his settlement, thus establishing them outside instead of inside the Empire. I have just come from Sir Herbert Emerson, who said that he was called to conference with Winterton, Wilson and Schwelm yesterday, and was more or less told that if he expected to have any support from the British Government for any of his schemes he had better see that the Argentine project was put first in the books. Sir Herbert said that he protested that the Argentine Government had shown no inclination to admit persons in large numbers to particular projects. The reply was that it would be a test of his negotiating abilities to succeed in this particular instance. He promised to do what he could.

As I indicated in my last letter, I have been working to unearth what I could with regard to Politis' negotiations in Lisbon regarding Angola, and the attitude of the Government here. I said frankly to Sir Herbert Emerson that I would be grateful if he could give me any information. He said that he was in rather a delicate position because he had been instructed to reveal no details of the Politis matter. Later in the week, however, he called me over to his office and showed me a letter which the Foreign Office had addressed to Lord Winterton on the subject of the Politis negotiations. Sir Herbert remarked that he was not authorised to show me this letter but felt that I should see it. The letter stated that after the conference with Politis at the Foreign Office Sir George Mounsey had called in the Portuguese Ambassador and said to him that the British Government was solicitous for the welfare of the Jews who were obliged to leave Germany and was hopeful that the Portuguese Government might give consideration to the possibility of receiving some of them in the colony of Angola. The Portuguese Ambassador replied, according to this letter, that, although Portugal would wish to be helpful to the British Government in this respect, it was convinced, after careful investigation, that the unfortunate Jews could not possibly survive the climatic and health and other conditions in Angola and would surely perish if they were sent there. It might be possible for the Portuguese Government to come to an arrangement with Mr. Politis principals for the admission of Jewish settlers in a limited

number but even this was doubtful. The Portuguese Government was supremely anxious to avoid the growth of anti-semitism of which the country was singularly free at the present time, and, accordingly, it could not look with enthusiasm upon the admission of Jews in any considerable numbers to the colonies. The Ambassador very much regretted the necessity for this attitude and did not wish to appear to be closing the doors to further talks with Mr. Politis and his principals, since it was now understood that he had if not the support at least the sympathy of the British Government. Sir Herbert said that Politis had now returned to Paris to confer with the French Rothschilds and would later return to London before going back to Lisbon.

Yours ever,

Robert T. Pell.

May 23, 1939

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

For Pell from Myron Taylor.

I feel that we can now assume that the Foundation will be established early in June and that its establishment should be followed very shortly by a meeting first of the officers and second of the whole Committee. In particular it appears desirable to hold these meetings while Wolthat is still in London and while the Directors of the Foundation are also there in order to establish direct contact between the two.

Our information is that the occasion for Wolthat's visit to London will be fixed for June 13 or shortly thereafter. The President has asked me to return to London to assist in the completion of these plans. Accordingly, I expect to sail on the NORMANDIE on June 14 spending two days in Paris and reaching London June 21. I would suggest that the meeting of the officers be held on the 26th and the meeting of the full Committee on the 27th. If the other officers of the Committee are agreeable to these dates I propose to give on the evening of June 27th

a dinner to which I would be glad to have you invite on my behalf the officers and members of the Committee, Mr. Kennedy and the other Chiefs of the Diplomatic Missions in London of the countries represented, Lord Halifax, Mr. Baldwin, and perhaps the Prime Minister, Mr. Wolthat and the German Ambassador, such of the directors of the Foundation as may be in London and others who were invited to the last dinner. I hope to leave London on June 29th and after a brief visit to Florence to sail back on the NORMANDIE July 5th.

I have consulted State Department which approves the foregoing.

This telegram was prepared before the receipt of your 723, May 22, 6 p.m. Its substance will enable you to answer Winterton's queries.

Eu:PM:ASD

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1939.

Dear Mr. Taylor:

I enclose for your confidential information copy of the letter from Pell of which I read you a section over the telephone.

I also enclose a first draft of the instructions to you, on which we would naturally welcome your suggestions whenever you feel up to considering the matter. We have purposely tried to convey our ideas without tying you down specifically with regard to procedure or as to details.

I hope very much that you are soon feeling entirely well again. Meanwhile, with every good wish,

As ever yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Letter from Mr. Pell.
2. First draft of Instructions.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

[Copy Eu:EMC]
[Comp. 11]

Telephone:-Abbey 6077-78-79
Cables: PELRU, London.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

Director: Sir Herbert Emerson,
G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., C.B.E.

Vice-Director: Mr. Robert Pell.

1, Central Buildings,
Westminster,
London, S.W.1.

May 12, 1939

LETTER NO. 11

Dear Pierrepont:

Two main interests have monopolized our attention during the last week: (1) the British Guiana Report and (2) the private international corporation or foundation.

With regard to the British Guiana Report, I sent you a series of telegrams presenting the high-lights. Here, then, I shall try to give you in some detail the background.

(1) Happily, we, that is, Sir Herbert and I, had our copy of the Report from Warren before any other copies reached London. This gave Sir Herbert an opportunity to do a little good work at the Colonial Office and with Winterton before the official copy was received.

(2) As soon as the official copy arrived, Mr. Malcolm Macdonald called the first meeting which was attended by officials of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, Winterton, the Governor of British Guiana, and the British members of the Commission. Winterton's statement to us the following day that the matter had been, or would be, discussed through diplomatic channels between Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Kennedy was an echo of that meeting. What it meant was that the meeting decided to go along on the basis of the so-called "Kennedy Plan" of last Autumn, that is that if the British put up the land, Americans would put up the money. Further recommendations of that meeting were (a) that there should be a limited trial settlement before a large-scale settlement was founded, and (b) that the British Government should not contribute services in the period of experimentation.

(3) The following day a second meeting was called by Mr. Macdonald which included, in addition to those who attended the first meeting, Mr. Anthony de Rothschild, Lord Bearstead, Lord Hailey and Sir Herbert Emerson. Three view points emerged during this meeting. The Rothschild-Bearstead group took a very negative attitude and, picking out the objectionable features of the Guiana Report and the appendices, described Guiana as a hell-hole and said that they would not put up a sou for it. The Government people took the middle position, and in fact at first (according to Sir Herbert, who is my authority) were inclined to be quite

enthusiastic,

enthusiastic, but towards the end adopted a more cautious attitude and said they would stand on a trial settlement of 250 persons and no services in the experimental period. Hailey and Emerson represented the third point of view, which was that Guiana offered excellent possibilities for development, that it was important to make a good showing both from the standpoint of the German conversations and in view of the necessity of relieving pressure in countries of refuge, and that not hundreds, but thousands should be sent to the colony, if the money could be raised, in the experimental period. Specifically, Hailey and Emerson asked the Government to authorize (a) not one, but several experimental settlements of 250 persons each; (b) industrial as well as agricultural experimentation; (c) reasonable terms for the purchase of land; and (d) the assurance of services in the experimental period and not only upon condition that a large-scale settlement could be founded.

(4) The next day the Cabinet Committee on Refugees examined the minutes of Mr. Macdonald's two meetings and came to the conclusions which I telegraphed to you, namely, that (a) there should be two trial agricultural settlements of 250 persons each; (b) there should be an industrial survey; (c) land should be made available at reasonable rates, and (d) if a large-scale settlement was found to be justified, the Government should contribute services and grant a degree of local autonomy to the settlement. These decisions of the Cabinet were later ratified in the full Cabinet and by the Prime Minister. Parenthetically, Sir Herbert understands that Winterton did a very good job indeed during this period.

(5) The next incident was the drafting of a letter, giving the views of the private group here, by the Rothschild Emigration Committee, to the Advisory Committee in New York. Sir Herbert showed me the draft prepared by the Emigration Committee. It was terrible - negative and defeatist in the extreme, grousing about Guiana and saying that they had no money to put up. Sir Herbert told them bluntly that they could not send this letter, and that if they did, he would throw in his hand. In fact, as I write this, Sir Herbert is drafting his version of what the letter should be.

There has been confusion worse confounded regarding the projected <u>private corporation or foundation</u>. As Mr. Taylor left matters, Bearstead and Rothschild were more or less committed (1) to filing articles of association and (2) to approaching Sir Bertram Hornsby who was formerly associated with the Bank of England, to ascertain whether he would be willing to serve as Chairman of the corporation. The New Court group neither approached Hornsby nor filed articles of association. Their

claim

claim has been, and is, that they were not expected to do anything until they had word from Mr. Taylor indicating what progress he had made in his conversations in New York. Since no definite word was received from him they made no move here (in spite of Sir Herbert's earnest entreaties and mine).

As a matter of actual fact, indeed, the group here not only did nothing, but began a whispering campaign against what they call the "Rublee Plan" and in particular against the financing aspects of it, notably the inside trust and the outside corporation. Against their firm opposition, Sir Herbert and I persuaded them to give us some grounds to go on in the conversations with Wohlthat, and we almost had to beat the letter about Bruins out of them. I have the impression that they are unqualifiedly opposed to conversations with the Germans, and have no intention of being placed in a position where they, instead of the governments as represented in the Intergovernmental Committee, will have to deal directly with Berlin.

The financing of settlement projects is another thing again. Here the New Court group is willing to go into a corporation or consider a corporation, on condition that the bulk of the financing is done in New York. Their idea is that this corporation should take the general form of a chartered company with shares sold over the counter. The British Government is also interested in the early formation of a corporation for this purpose, because they want to get along with the Guiana scheme.

Into this atmosphere came Mr. Taylor's messages of progress, and finally word that he was working out details of a foundation which would be in contact with the German trust but which, evidently, would not be the agency for financing settlement projects. I have the feeling that the group here was not as pleased as it might have been to hear that Mr. Taylor was making headway and was not at all pleased to learn of the direction matters were taking in New York. In any event, it has now been decided to send over Lucas, more as a scout than anything else, and Emerson and I are working hard to have him given as concrete instructions as possible in the circumstances. Our difficulty is that our friends have come to the conclusion that the governments are preparing to side-step the whole business and plant the baby on their door-step. They are determined somehow to put the baby back in the governments' lap. All their moves will be colored by this consideration.

<u>Angola</u> has been back on the map here this week. It appears that, unbeknownst to us, the Rothschilds here, who were dissuaded by the Government from approaching the Portuguese, arranged with their cousin in Paris, Robert de Rothschild, to

send

send a negotiator to Lisbon in the person of Jacques Politis, son of Nicholas, the Greek Minister. Politis has been in Lisbon for five months, working out with the Portuguese Minister of Colonies the terms of a purchase or lease of an extensive area where thousands of Jewish families might be settled. He has obtained an option and worked out a tentative agreement which the Portuguese Government has made subject to approval by the British Government. Politis is now in London and is conferring with Macdonald, Winterton and Emerson, at the request of New Court, and has been asked to prepare a brief for submission to the Cabinet Committee on Refugees. Sir Herbert so far has not been willing to give me the details of the plan, but I hope to have some further news next week.

In order to keep the records straight, I enclose the full text of the Prime Minister's statement on British Guiana.

Yours ever,

R.T.P.

Pierrepont Moffat, Esq.,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DRAFT

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I wish to set forth certain considerations and suggestions for your guidance in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee;

(1) The refugee problem continues and will undoubtedly continue for a long time to come. It may at any time be greatly aggravated by a new wave of persecution in Germany. In the normal course of events it may be expected gradually to diminish quantitatively in Germany, but to increase quantitatively in Eastern Europe.

(2) This Government's interest in efforts to bring about a solution of the problem is strong. This Government was primarily responsible for the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee. As and when direct action by this Government is required in connection with the refugee problem, this Government has naturally preferred to take such action through the Intergovernmental Committee rather than through any other agency.

(3) At the same time, the imminent establishment of the Refugee Foundation and the opening up by the Committee of opportunities in various parts of the world

for

for mass settlement have created a new situation, requiring a new integration of private and governmental effort.

(4) The Foundation, which was envisaged in the Rublee plan and is being set up in accordance with that plan, is designed to be in a position to negotiate more effectively with the German authorities concerning financial, and perhaps other, questions than could the Committee. I assume that the Foundation will be ably directed and wholeheartedly supported by the private interests most deeply concerned. Without such support governmental effort can be of little avail.

(5) The financing and administration of settlement projects must be undertaken by private corporations specifically organized for the purpose in cooperation with the Foundation.

(6) The terms of reference of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees permit him to negotiate with governments of countries of immigration for the further development of opportunities for settlement.

(7) It must reluctantly be admitted that this Government's efforts to stimulate concrete action by other governments

ments to meet the problem have been met at best by a lukewarm attitude. In view of the attitude of other governments, and the reluctance which many of them have shown to contribute toward the Committee's expenses during its first year, it is apparent that few governments are willing to contribute on the present basis to the Committee's support for another year.

(8) In the absence of drastic changes in governments and attitudes, if not of human nature, in Europe, the problem in its larger aspects appears almost insoluble except through a basic solution such as the development of a suitable area to which refugees could be admitted in almost unlimited numbers. Whether the Committee could best contribute toward the attaining of such a solution or whether it should be sought through other means is open to question. I am convinced, nevertheless, that every effort must continue to be made to attain a practicable solution along those lines.

In view of the foregoing considerations I envisage that the nature of the Committee in the future should be along the following lines:

Subject

Subject to general approval, the Intergovernmental Committee should take steps to turn over its function of negotiating with the governments of countries of settlement to the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. If this is done, this Government is disposed to contribute to the expenses of the High Commission for this purpose. It should turn over its function of negotiating with the authorities of the country of origin to the Foundation. In making this change every effort must be exerted to minimize the risk of unfavorable reaction in Germany.

The Intergovernmental Committee should continue in existence though in an inactive form. It might well be composed of the diplomatic representatives in London of the member governments. If this idea is adopted, the Committee will need at most only a nominal staff and no permanent offices. It should be in a position to meet at short notice if circumstances make its revival necessary. Contributions toward its support should be purely voluntary and in such amounts as the member governments might consider appropriate.

I

I wish again to emphasize that this Government's interest in practical efforts to solve the problem continues strong and unabated. It will be prepared to exert its influence, through the Committee and through diplomatic channels, to assist the High Commissioner, the Foundation and the settlement corporations in the carrying out of their tasks.

Sincerely yours,

May 31st 1939.

Letter No. 13.

Jay Pierrepont Moffat Esq.,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Pierrepont,

This has been a very abbreviated week because of Whitsun which means, as you know, that pretty much everything closes down here. There was time before the holiday, however, for a meeting to consider the substance of Mr. Taylor's proposals for a session of the Committee's executive and of the full Committee, and the results of this meeting I telegraphed to you.

It is clear to me that the British side is determined to hold off on the full meeting until there has been some definite action on the part of our private financial people with regard to the British Guiana project. The establishment of the foundation is clearly regarded as of secondary importance to progress on the Guiana scheme (to which the Prime Minister is publicly committed) and so now is the exchange with the Germans.

Winterton keeps coming back to the "discussions" or the "arrangement" with the American Government "last autumn". I have said to him (and persuaded Emerson to say to him) that I have no knowledge of these "discussions" or this "arrangement". In fact I have the most emphatic reason to believe that there were no discussions of this order and no such arrangement. Winterton merely rubs his hands and rolls his eyes and looks at me as though I were a very humble worm and speaks of "matters of such importance that they were taken up through diplomatic channels".

The Foreign Office people, for their part, have begun to take the line that there is really not much purpose in going ahead indefinitely with the present cumbersome machinery of the Committee. Ultimately the solution must be an Anglo-American

solution with the United Kingdom putting up the land and the United States the money. Why not admit this frankly, etc. etc., and gradually telescope the Evian multilateral effort into a bilateral Anglo-American accord? I have replied that having begun on a multilaterial basis we should continue on this basis, particularly as we cannot be too exclusive with regard to the sources of money which will be required to finance settlement projects and we must count somewhat upon the Latin American republics for infiltration purposes. It is true that no-one at present is taking an active part in the Committee's work with the exception of the United Kingdom and the United States, but the others may not be doing any good but at least they are doing no harm. I cannot see that any purpose would be served by breaking up a Committee which has been constituted and which has functioned so far without any open breach.

There has been an interesting denouement with regard to Mr. Schwelm, who was produced by The Times as an expert on British Guiana. It appears that the Foreign Office was very much annoyed by the Schwelm attack on the Guiana project, and dug out his secret dossier which was placed in Winterton's hands. Schwelm, according to this account (Emerson and Winterton told me about it separately) has been mixed up in much shady business in Latin America over a long period of years, and, to quote Winterton, is, "Ahem, usually accompanied, ahem, by a young man described as his secretary who was formerly, ahem, a bell boy at Claridge's". Fortified by this information Winterton held a stormy session with Schwelm. Emerson held a second. Winterton then saw Barrington-Ward, No. 2. man at The Times, and arranged with him to insert correspondence attacking Schwelm's thesis. Winterton, supported by the Foreign Office, then had some of his friends produce the correspondence. I enclose the clippings.

The second mystery - that of Wohlthat's passage through London - has also been cleared up - partially. I happened to run into Kordt, the German Counsellor, and asked him casually how long Wohlthat had been in town. He replied without any hesitation "Oh, he was here only over May 11th and 12th". I said that I was very sorry to have missed him. He said, "Why, I thought you saw him with Waley at the Treasury". I plead innocence of knowledge of this meeting, and Kordt remarked "That is curious".

It would appear from this, then, that Wohlthat actually was in London and that he saw Waley - and that Winterton was not informed because he still insists, and I am sure with real conviction, that Wohlthat was not here.

To sum up the position, on the eve of Ted Achilles' arrival:

1. Machinery. The contact between the League Commissioner's office and this office is working smoothly. Sir Herbert holds the reins of both organisations very firmly, and there is constant interchange of ideas and information. The personal relationships are most friendly and the collaboration is very close.

There is also a close contact with the Chairman, Lord Winterton,. He meets with the Director and Vice-Director twice a week (when he is in London) and more often when occasion requires. Technically he should keep in contact with the other Vice-Chairmen but in actual fact he doesn't and this is perhaps unfortunate. He holds very strongly to the belief, however, that the essential thing is complete agreement between the American and British delegations. In his opinion the French will follow the British lead and the others will dovetail in according to their political affiliations with either Britain or the United States.

As a general thing, the Chairman and the Director's office are chary of frequent meetings of the Committee although it is believed that fairly regular meetings of the Executive are useful.

2. Contact with Germany. For the very good reason that Wohlthat has been absent from Berlin, it has not been possible to have further contacts with him in recent weeks. The conversations are to all intents and purposes suspended, and there are grounds for the belief that Hitler, at the recent meeting with Goering and Wohlthat, declined to go ahead with the legislation which had been promised, giving as a pretext lack of action by the outside Governments and private groups.

However, it is hoped to resume the conversations with Wohlthat when he comes to London for the Whaling Conference on July 17th.

3. International Foundation. Exchanges are taking place between the New York and London groups, and it is understood that representatives of the New York group are about to sail for discussions with New Court. The principal point of difference at the present time is that the English group wish to tie the financing of settlement, notably in British Guiana, more firmly to the proposed Foundation than the New York Group. The British Government supports the British financial people in this.

4. Infiltration and settlement. Infiltration (regular and irregular) is now practicable to a substantial extent only in the United States and Palestine, to a limited extent in the United Kingdom and Australia, and to a negligible extent in other parts of the world.

Various settlement schemes are being explored and British Guiana has been explored. The view here is that, despite its drawbacks, a real effort should be made to finance and organise the trial settlement in British Guiana in order to relieve the pressure in refugee countries and to provide something concrete for use in the conversations with the Germans.

Sincerely yours,

Robert T. Pell.

Telephone :—ABBEY 6077-78-79.
Cables: PELRU, LONDON.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

Director:
SIR HERBERT EMERSON,
G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., C.B.E.

Vice-Director:
MR. ROBERT PELL.

1, CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

June 2nd 1939.

Myron C. Taylor Esq.,
71, Broadway,
New York.

Dear Mr. Taylor,

The telegram saying that you were improving was good news although we are still very much concerned about you and hope that we will be kept informed of your progress to complete recovery.

I have heard rumours that Mr. Bearwald and Harold Linder are on the ocean coming to London for conferences at New Court although neither Lord Winterton nor I have any official confirmation of this. I hope that it is true because the time is reached when the distinguished gentlemen who are going to finance all the settlement projects must come to some conclusion.

I enclose a copy of the latest letter to Moffat reporting on the last very short week. Coupled with the telegram I sent reporting the meeting to consider your proposals for a meeting of the officers and the meeting of the full committee, it presents the picture on the eve of the new phase.

Ever devotedly,

Robert T. Pell.

P.S. I find that the cutting of the Schwelm article in The Times and the accompanying editorial were not included in my last letter, so I make amends here.

Telephone :—ABBEY 6077-78-79.
Cables : PELRU, LONDON.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE.

Director :
SIR HERBERT EMERSON,
G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., C.B.E.
Vice-Director :
MR. ROBERT PELL.

1, CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
WESTMINSTER,
LONDON, S.W.1.

May 30, 1939

Dear Mr. Taylor:

I have just cabled the wishes of the staff for your speedy recovery. Everyone in this office was sorry to hear that the surgeons had got you. We all hope that you will be in fine fettle before long and on our side of the water.

I understand that Macdonald,(I suppose James, not Carlisle), is acting temporarily in your behalf. I am afraid, though, that your fine touch will be missed, and that our friends who are long on promises but short on deliveries will be tempted to take advantage of your absence and slow down the preparation of the international Foundation.

I shall not trouble you with many details of our efforts here to line up and keep in line the corresponding group. Candidly, it is like dealing with jumping fleas, and one is forced to the conclusion that there is no real will to do anything.

I enclose the latest letter to Moffat, and shall send you further word probably tomorrow when I have dictated this week's effusion.

With many wishes for your speedy and satisfactory recovery and regards to Mrs. Taylor, who must have been much worried.

Devotedly yours,

Hon. Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York.

Enc.(Copy Moffat No.12)

Settlement in British Guiana

An important letter appraising the prospects of refugee settlement in British Guiana is printed on another page this morning, and fully confirms the less optimistic passages in the recent report of the Commission of inquiry. MR. SCHWELM'S authority to speak on the matter is unquestionable. He has had a very special and prolonged experience of exactly the kind of work which is in question; and he declares bluntly that settlement in British Guiana by North Europeans is impracticable. The country, he says, "lends "itself to development only by the immigration "of tropical labour, backed by a large amount "of capital"; and he adds that he is appalled by the idea that refugees should "try to find a per-"manent home in a climate unsuitable to a "white population, devoid of any of the most "primitive amenities, and faced with problems "with which none of them have before been "confronted," including "tropical diseases and "insect plagues." MR. SCHWELM adds that even the experimental farms suggested in the Commission's report would take at least five years to establish.

These expert views are not an encouraging introduction to the action foreshadowed in the Government's comments on the Report. They made it clear that they expected private sources to find the money (estimated by the Commission at over £600,000) for experimental settlements; that they could not allow settlement in the already occupied coastal belt; that they hoped someone would conduct a survey of the possibilities of industrial development (without which large-scale settlement is admittedly impossible); and that on certain conditions they would themselves provide "arterial communications." Unhappily neither the Report nor MR. SCHWELM'S letter really justifies the hopeful tone which seems to permeate this announcement. There is, however, in the letter an indication of another possibility. MR. SCHWELM quotes an expert view that "tropical countries can only "be developed by tropical races"; and adds that tropical labour for development does not exist in British Guiana. But it does exist not very far away in the West Indies, whose problems, including over-population, are now being investigated by a Royal Commission. LORD MOYNE and his colleagues—who visited British Guiana—might well consider whether they cannot make some use of a country which clearly holds out little hope to refugees from Northern Europe.

LONDON TIMES
May 20 1939

Letters to the Editor

BRITISH GUIANA

FACTORS AGAINST SETTLEMENT

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The report presented by the Commission appointed by the President of the United States is a very interesting document, and testifies to the courage of the men who flew for weeks on end over uninhabited tropical forests where any accident would have meant that none of them would have returned to their respective homes. Having had certain experience of colonization, however, I should like to put forward what seem to me some of the problems which a settlement of refugees in British Guiana would entail.

A leading article in *The Times* on May 11 concluded an excerpt from the report with the following:—

> Any reader whom this sentence does not make a refugee from the report can discover for himself what is meant by "potential possibilities."

It is because few people are in a position to judge the enormous difficulties with which such a scheme would be confronted, that I should like to emphasize a few of the facts.

Assuming a group of from 3,000 to 5,000 settlers were landed at Georgetown, there arises the problem of how the journey of hundreds of miles into the uninhabited interior is to be accomplished. To quote the report:—

> Since the experimental settlers and their equipment must be brought in with existing means of transport, it will be necessary to establish a number of well-planned rest camps with suitable housing and sanitary arrangements along the Cattle Trail.

As the refugees would naturally arrive in batches, where are the necessary horses to transport them and their belongings into the interior to be found? Experience has shown me that to move thousands of people a first-class cart road is required, and preferably one suitable for lorries.

The actual construction of a road is a question of money, but the preliminary survey for the location of the road is a difficult and lengthy task, and has to be followed by the necessary survey of the individual plots to be allocated to each settler, which would be a matter of years. Droughts and torrential rains would inevitably delay the work. Without adequate roads and surveys colonization is impossible.

The medical adviser to the Commission writes as follows:—

> "Every consideration of health, sanitation, working efficiency, and social well-being indicates that the unit of settlement should not be the family but the village. Isolated families are more difficult to protect from tropical illnesses owing to the impracticability of eradicating malaria over wide areas," &c., &c.

This is true from a medical standpoint, but impracticable in its agricultural application. It is impossible for people to live in villages if they are to farm the land, and more particularly in a tropical climate. There are tropical diseases of plants as well as of men, and while British Guiana is the naturalist's delight, abounding in an infinite variety of butterflies, lianas, orchids, and every kind of epiphyte, &c., there are also many insect pests, *e.g.*, beetles, caterpillars, and termites, these latter attacking not only plants, but trees and even human habitations, and at the introduction of man they are especially voracious. The agriculturist to the Commission has every reason to state in Clause 25:—

> "Further, it will be realized that in a new area, special problems will arise."

To give one instance, should the settler live in a village, probably several miles away from his land, he may find that his crop has been destroyed overnight. In summer ants prefer to work at night, and unless the settler lives on his land he has no means of combating them.

To go on to another point, it is not mentioned specifically in the report, but I gather that the intention is for the settlers themselves to clear the forest. Having settled thousands of Northern Europeans I have learned from experience that almost without exception white men are unable to perform such arduous manual labour in tropical or even sub-tropical climates. The trees growing in fertile soil in British Guiana reach a height of 150ft. and more—in other words, to fell them by hand would be a superhuman task for Europeans. In this part of the world small trees are a sure sign of poor or stony soil. Native gangs would have to be commandeered for this and other rough preliminary work, which brings me to another very serious obstacle.

To quote another extract from the medical adviser's contributions to the report:—

> It is especially recommended that any receiving station be placed at a reasonable distance from existing centres of population, since these are also reservoirs of malarial and other infections.

This again is a wise precaution, but not practical when it comes to clearing forests, and carrying out the general developmental work of a colony, for this, like road-making, must necessarily be performed by native labour. While the report states that

> *at present* there is no frequency of tropical diseases,

once the whites come into contact with the natives—be they East Indians, negroes or Indians, as such a contact would be of a permanent nature, epidemics would be bound to break out. In this connexion the Foreign Office Handbook for 1920, page 47, states:—

> In British Guiana, as in most tropical countries where the white man is incapable of prolonged manual labour, the maintenance of an adequate labour supply is a matter of perennial difficulty.

This short phrase not only confirms my view as to the unsuitability of Europeans to perform the manual labour which is apparently expected of them, but it points to another very serious factor—the shortage of labour. The lack of population in British Guiana outside the sugar and rice plantations (which are excluded from this scheme), presents a problem which ought not to be underestimated.

It might be argued that reasonable pay would attract natives, but I have had a good deal of experience and know how difficult it is to induce them, however poor, to leave their homes and proceed for hundreds of miles into what may be called an unknown forest. James Rodway, in one of the three excellent books he has written on British Guiana, says:—

> It may be safely stated that tropical countries can only be developed by tropical races. If there is not a supply in the country the planters must give up or import from other tropical countries.

The greater part of the small British colony live in Georgetown, which on the whole is considered a prosperous community. Moreover, they are at liberty to come home every four or five years, a good many of them are bachelors, and others leave their women and children in England, and so there can be no comparison between their lives and the lives of those who are supposed to open up the virgin forest of the hinterland.

The formation of experimental farms, as suggested in the report, is undoubtedly essential; but having started an experimental farm (not in British Guiana), I know that it takes at least five years to learn something of what crops are likely to be a success, and to open up a market for them.

I do not want to under-value the great riches of the interior of British Guiana, but in my opinion it lends itself to development only by the immigration of tropical labour, backed by a large amount of capital. The precipitated settlement of thousands of childless families with very small capital is doomed to failure.

According to all reports the refugees have been through dreadful times, and the idea that they should now try to find a permanent home in a climate unsuitable to a white population, devoid of any of the most primitive amenities, and faced with problems with which none of them have before been confronted, and which include tropical diseases and insect plagues, cannot but appal one.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

A. J. SCHWELM.

1, Kensington Gore, S.W.7.

OVER

JUN 1939

June 5th, 1939

Nine hundred and seven Jewish refugees aboard the steamship St. Louis have been given permission to land in Cuba provided they will agree to live in a concentration camp and will provide a guarantee that their stay will be temporary and that they will not become public charges. Jewish aid organizations were given until tomorrow to accept the conditions. The tale of 907 human beings without a country wandering for days in unfriendly seas, this tale of human misery so close to our own shores, focuses attention upon the whole distressing picture of five million homeless wanderers, victims of intolerance and the fortunes of war scattered throughout the civilized world waiting for they know not what. This chronicle of exile, destitution and despair began with the Bolshevik revolution when two million Russians were driven from farm, village, and city. Thousands died in their flight. Those Russians who reached China were and are the most wretched of all who were forced to flee from their homeland. Many of them of gentle birth and scholarly attainments, they sank to the lowest level of poverty and degradation. More than 135,000 Russians who fled by the south, across the Black Sea from the Crimea, crowded into Constantinople, sleeping in Barracks, in cellars, in the streets. They died of hunger on the pavements. They were dumped in ports and on islands all over the Near East. Strange fates awaited them. Three thousands arrived at French Tunisia and enlisted in the foreign legion. Some settled in Corsica, some in South America. Some, as might have been expected from the crazy, crowded tubs in which they sailed, were shipwrecked.

The Russians who wandered to France are a story in themselves. Four hundred thousand of them live there. There are Russians farming in Gascony. There is a Russian peasant and a German general who never handled a plough in his life before who are partners in a farm. There are small land-tillers who are primitive Kalmucks from wild Mongolia, worshipping Buddha. The landlords supply these strange refugees with everything they need, but the refugees speak little French and life is very hard for them.

(MORE)

In three districts of Paris, there are whole streets where none but Russians live. They are very poor with average earnings of less than $30.00 a month. In Asia Minor, the Turkish soldiery rounded up droves of Armenians in their villages and drove them like cattle into the desert. From half to two-thirds of the long, stumbling columns died on the way. Greeks who poured out of Asia Minor, when the Turks took Smyrna, were shot and bayoneted as they waited in wailing masses on the quays. Twelve thousand people were burned to death when the city was set on fire. All the world hoped that when the first rush of post-war refugees had subsided the cruel custom of turning people out of their homes would never be practiced again. But each decade has brought its new instalment of miseries. After a little pause, Spaniards began to troop out of Spain before the wrath of Primo de Rivera. Then came the even more dreadful days of the Spanish Civil War. In 1933, Hitler began to persecute the jews, and for six years that has been going on. All these tragic evictions and forced migrations constitute the problem the Evian Refuge Conference is dealing with to-day -- the terrible and seemingly insoluble problem of finding homes for these cruelly treated human beings, before starvation, disease and homesickness take their inevitable toll.

I thank you ----------

6/6/39 Rec'd from Taylor

June 5 1939

Mr. Taylor:

This morning I phoned Mr. Moffat:

"Mr. Taylor wanted me to call your attention to Mr. Pell's cable in which he said the British approved or thought there should be a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee early in July. We subsequently suggested the dates July 27th or 28th. Mr. Taylor thinks it would be a good idea if you would send a message to Mr. Pell that because of his illness he cannot leave for London on June 14th as planned, and therefore suggests that the British idea of a meeting early in July be accepted--in which case there is no doubt that Mr. Taylor could leave here by June 28th."

Mr. Moffat answered:

"That fits in very well, because it was the tenor of the British reply, which I am sending to Mr. Taylor today. It will suit everyone.

"I cannot say the outlook is too cheerful, because the setting up of the foundation is so slow. But as for the plans for the meeting, it is good. Tell Mr. Taylor there is nothing whatever to worry about.

"Mr. Pell is having a secret meeting in London tomorrow with the German representative of Wohlthat. We will send you the report of the conversation, which probably we shall get Wednesday, as soon as we do get it."

Mr. Moffat made particular inquiries about your progress, and expressed himself as very happy to hear that it is so favorable.

WCF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1939

My dear Mr. Taylor:

On the chance that you are now feeling better I am writing to tell you that we have just received a message from Pell that Wohlthat was coming to London very secretly to spend today and tomorrow. He wished to meet Winterton and Emerson privately and so Pell is having the three of them to lunch at his house tomorrow.

Some time last week we had received another telegram which I did not relay to you but which I attach herewith.

I do hope that you are by now feeling better and regret very much that you had as disagreeable a time with the surgeons as seems to have been the case.

With every good wish,

As ever sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Pierrepont Moffat

Enclosure:
Telegram no.744

P.S. Since dictating the foregoing I have just received Mr. Fitch's message that you would be well enough to sail on June 28 and suggesting a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee early in July. This fits in pretty well with the suggestions contained in Pell's 744 of May 25. We are, accordingly, sending

Pell

Pell this morning the following message:

"Your 744, May 25, 8.p.m.

"Owing to illness Mr. Taylor has had to postpone sailing on June 14 as previously planned. He will, however, be able to sail on the NORMANDIE June 28 and hopes that you can make arrangements for meeting first of officers of the Committee and then of the full Committee at appropriate dates first half of July."

PM

COPY

GRAY
LONDON
Dated May 25, 1939

Rec'd 3:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

744, May 25, 8 p.m.

FROM PELL

I discussed the substance of your 383, May 23, 4 p.m. with Winterton, Emerson and the representatives of the Foreign Office today.

(1) They were of the opinion that a meeting of the officers of the Committee should take place in June, at a date convenient to Mr. Taylor.

(2) A meeting of the full Committee should take place only if it were possible to report concrete results in (a) the Pell Wolhthat conversations (b) the plans to establish an international foundation and (c) the plans to finance settlement projects, notably the British Guiana project.

(3) The full meeting, in other words, should take place, if at all, only after the visit of Wohlthat to London. In this connection, an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries visited Berlin last week and conferred with Wohlthat who requested that the Whaling Conference be postponed until July 17 in view of the fact

that

that he was leaving almost immediately on a special mission to Spain and would not be free to go to London before the middle of July. It is the present intention of the British Government to accede to this request.

(4) It was proposed that, in order to advance matters, the British and American Governments might suggest informally through their missions at Berlin that if Wohlthat was not available to carry on the refugee conversations at this time some one else might be designated as an alternate. It was felt that the Committee could not overlook the tendency of the Germans to say at one moment that the refugee conversations were urgent and at the next to ignore them for months at a time. The British would welcome your views regarding this suggestion.

(5) It was believed, moreover, that a firm decision with regard to the Foundation should precede the preparation of plans for a meeting of the full Committee. The view was expressed that this decision would not be reached until an American representative of standing had come to London. The suggestion was made, and I was asked to convey it to you and to Mr. Taylor informally, that Mr. Taylor, accompanied by a representative of the American group, should come to London for discussions with Lord Winterton and a representative of the British group at which the director would be present.

KENNEDY

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1939.

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I enclose the text of a telegram from Pell in reply to the one we sent him yesterday suggesting that the officers should meet on July 7th and 8th, and the full Intergovernmental Committee on July 10th. If this is agreeable to you would it be too much to ask Mr. Fitch to telephone to me.

With every good wish,

Sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Pierrepont Moffat

Enclosure:

Telegram No. 782.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

COPY OF TELEGRAM

London

Dated June 6, 1939

Received noon

Secretary of State

Washington

782, June 6, 4 p.m.

FROM PELL.

I have been endeavoring to obtain a definite decision from Winterton and the Foreign Office with regard to a meeting of the officers and the full committee. This morning the matter was discussed at length and the following proposals were made which he was asked to transmit to you and to Mr. Taylor immediately:

(1) The officers should meet on Monday and Saturday, July 7 and 8. The meeting cannot be held sooner because Emerson is obliged to leave almost immediately for investigations of refugee conditions in the Balkan countries and will not return to London until July one.

(2) The full meeting should take place on Monday July 10. This will allow weekend in the event that leeway is requested for settlement of points at issue.

Winterton would appreciate an indication at your earliest convenience whether these dates are agreeable

in

in order that he may sound out the other vice chairmen and issue invitations for the meetings.

KENNEDY

x

June 7, 1939.

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

FOR PELL.

Your 782, June 6, 4 p.m.

Mr. Taylor desires to give you and Lord Winterton full latitude in setting the dates. It would be satisfactory to him for the meetings to occur on July 7th and 10th, or in the middle, or it would be satisfactory if they were set a week or ten days later. If the whaling conference is to meet on July 17th, with Wohlthat present, the latter dates might possess certain advantages.

Eu:PM:CMS

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1939.

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I enclose paraphrases of three telegrams received from Pell today. The second one was pretty discouraging, but fortunately the difficulties seem to have been cleared up by Pell and Emerson.

I also send you the text of a brief telegram we are sending Pell this afternoon following my talk with Mr. Fitch.

I hope to have the pleasure of meeting Mrs. Taylor tomorrow at the British Embassy, and am only sorry that you are not well enough to be present.

With every good wish,

Sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Pierrepont Moffat

Enclosures:

1. Paraphrases of 3 telegrams from London.
2. Telegram to London.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington
From: Amembassy, London, Pell
Dated: June 6, 1939, 6 p.m.
Number 784

Wohlthat met today at my house at luncheon a group consisting of Treasury and Foreign Office officials, Emerson, Winterton and the Committee. Abshagen accompanied Wohlthat. It was stated by Wohlthat that the decrees intended to establish in Germany both the internal trust and the Central Jewish organization were in Hitler's office and might be signed by him at any time.

After certain requirements on the outside have been fulfilled, the decree establishing the trust will give Winterton the authority to commence setting aside for the trust some part of existing Jewish wealth, this to be in the form of both real and personal property as well as shares. The authorities in Germany intend to seek contributions for the trust from the Jewish population in installments, these installments to be not over five in number and to extend over the three to five-year period. Wohlthat pointed out that due to the fact that panic liquidation of Jewish wealth had lessened since last fall and that forced liquidation had ceased, the installments would be considerable.

It had been decided to draw on this wealth in installments

ments so that the difficulties encountered by the Central Jewish organization in keeping up the least prosperous part of the Jewish population in Germany will not be increased and also to prevent the German markets from becoming depressed.

After having been satisfied that those persons outside Germany occupied in emigrating Jews, that is to say both the Intergovernmental Committee and the private financial organizations, were actually engaged in the preparation of settlement projects, Wohlthat anticipated asking for the first installment. He said that after he himself had been assured that a certain plan had definitely been projected, for example, one to settle a substantial number of persons in either the Dominican Republic or British Guiana, and that such a project was financially guaranteed by the private organizations, and that there was an actual movement of wage-earners to these settlement regions, he would ask that a certain percentage of Jewish property be contributed, and that this wealth be used to transport persons to the agreed places for settlement and to purchase supplies for the settlement by means of the outside purchasing agency. It was stated by Wohlthat that it was of no importance to the authorities in Germany what form was taken by the foundation or outside corporation just as long as it was really effective in advancing settlement plans.

He

He insisted upon no specific amount for the capitalization of the outside group. However, he frequently emphasized that it would need much more than a nominal capitalization since its value would be in financing both emigration and settlement. Wohlthat put special emphasis on the fact that the working of the trust could not be started until he could tell the various officials concerned that it was really aiding emigration and that the contributions from it were to be directly used for settlment projects.

It was further stated by Wohlthat that it would be helpful for him to be informed each month as to what progress was being made in settlement projects and their financing. He also said that when he presented his case to the ministers he would not be required to state the exact amount of capital that had been put up, but that it would be necessary only for him to state that the private financial organizations had guaranteed the financing of the project.

It was called to Wohlthat's attention by Emerson that emigration to settlement places must include not only persons from the country of origin but also those from countires of refuge, this in order that pressure, now reaching a serious point, might be lessened in countries of refuge. Wohlthat agreed and stated that this was a further reason for quickly organizing regions for settlement.

Wohlthat said that he would meet at my house tonight certain Jewish leaders, including Bearstead and Rothschild.

Eu:SM:EMC

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington
From: Amembassy, London, Pell
Dated: June 7, 1939, 11 a.m.
Number 788

The meeting of the Jewish leaders referred to in my telegram no. 784, 6p.m., June 6 was held last evening. Not only were Rothschild and Bearsted present, but also Felix and Baerwald.

The situation within Germany was summarized by Wohlthat. He informed the meeting that the present Jewish wealth was estimated by the authorities in Germany to be about four billion reichsmarks, and he stated that he would be happy to answer any questions.

Though an attempt was made by Baerwald to maintain an objective discussion, Rothschild and Bearsted put Wohlthat to task concerning propaganda in Germany, the activities of the Gestapo, the fine, etc. Things became tense and then Wohlthat stated that in view of the fact the other side had spoken so frankly he in turn would be equally honest and would put forward a direct question: "Would the persons outside Germany be willing to finance either in whole or in part the program as submitted to Mr. Rublee?" To this question Bearsted replied emphatically in the negative. Wohlthat then proceeded to inquire whether the outside group

had

had ever been willing to finance either in part or in whole this program. Again a negative answer was given by Baerwald. After saying that no more remained to be discussed, Wohlthat started to withdraw. As he left he told me that in his opinion there remained no basis upon which the conversations could be continued and that personally his own plan was to depart right away for Berlin and to request that he be relieved of trying to work out the problem along the lines of the "confidential memorandum".

Baerwald assured me that the position was not accurately described by Bearsted's unconditional negative. I paid a visit to Wohlthat and requested that he stay in London this morning. A meeting with Emerson has been arranged by me.

Eu:SM:EMC

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington
From: Amembassy, London, Pell
Dated: June 7, 1939, 2 p.m.
Number 791

With reference to my previous telegrams Emerson and I for three long hours this morning threshed out the whole situation with Wohlthat. We spoke with the utmost frankness and he left, as he said, reassured, enlightened and resolved to do everything he could to cooperate by establishing orderly emigration from Germany so that there might be orderly settlement elsewhere.

The discussion was opened by Emerson, who said that recrimination was entirely beside the point. As Commissioner and Director he merely had to accept the fact that a certain line of policy had been decided on by the German Government; that the effect of this policy required certain private and intergovernmental action on the outside and that his task was to try and correlate whatever machinery might exist in Germany with whatever machinery might exist on the outside. He then took the memorandum on refugee settlement which I gave Wohlthat last April and went over it one paragraph at a time, explaining in detail what each country was doing and what some countries were ready to do. Next he

demonstrated

demonstrated how the emigration from Germany had been financed from (garble), showing how the various private organizations had been made up and giving Wohlthat copies of their financial reports and other data. He also told Wohlthat confidentially the efforts which had been made since the Rublee conversation by Mr. Myron Taylor and others to create a machinery on the outside. He described the present status of these efforts.

For his part Wohlthat described the difficulties which he had overcome in Berlin in order to bring the organization of emigration to its present point. He was convinced that Hitler would approve the proposed legislation without delay and exhibited copies of the two decrees which set up the internal trust and the central Jewish organization. He remarked that just as he believed that we were facing this problem constructively so we would have to believe that he and Goering were doing the same thing, and proceed pari passu. He expressed pleasure at having made contact with Sir Herbert Emerson and suggested that the two should henceforth deal directly by private letters, thus avoiding trips back and forth with the attendant risks of publicity. Emerson agreed and the talk ended in friendly exchanges all around.

Eu:PM:CMS

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1939.

6/10 answ

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I enclose herewith a letter of instructions from the President drafted along the lines of our recent conversations. This gives the final seal of his approval to the ideas you had formulated.

I tried to meet Mrs. Taylor at the Garden Party yesterday afternoon but the crowd was unfortunately too great. I am awfully sorry as I had been looking forward to meeting her, as well as to getting last minute news of your recovery.

With every good wish,

As ever sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Enclosure:

Letter from The President.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

June 8 1939

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I wish to set forth certain considerations and suggestions for your guidance in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee:

(1) The refugee problem continues and will undoubtedly continue for a long time to come. It may at any time be greatly aggravated by a new wave of persecution in Germany. In the normal course of events it may be expected gradually to diminish quantitatively in Germany, but to increase quantitatively in Eastern Europe.

(2) This Government's interest in efforts to bring about a solution of the problem is strong. This Government was primarily responsible for the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee. As and when direct action by this Government is required in connection with the refugee problem, this Government has naturally preferred to take such action through the Intergovernmental Committee rather than through any other agency.

(3) At the same time, the imminent establishment of the Refugee Foundation and the opening up by the Committee of opportunities in various parts of the world for mass settlement have created a new situation, requiring a new integration of private and governmental effort.

(4) The Foundation, which was envisaged in the Rublee plan and is being set up in accordance with that plan, is designed to be in a position to negotiate more effectively with the German authorities concerning financial, and perhaps other, questions than could the Committee. I assume that the Foundation will be ably directed and wholeheartedly supported by the private interests most deeply concerned. Without such support governmental effort can be of little avail.

(5) The financing and administration of settlement projects must be undertaken by private corporations specifically organized for the purpose in cooperation with the Foundation.

(6) The terms of reference of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees permit him to negotiate with governments of countries of immigration for the further development of opportunities for settlement.

(7) It must reluctantly be admitted that this Government's efforts to stimulate concrete action by other governments to meet the problem have been met at best by a lukewarm attitude. In view of the attitude of other governments, and the reluctance which many of them have shown to contribute toward the Committee's expenses during its first year, it is apparent that few governments are willing to contribute on the present basis to the Committee's support for another year.

(8) In the absence of drastic changes in governments and attitudes, if not of human nature, in Europe, the problem in its larger aspects appears almost insoluable except through a basic solution such as the development of a suitable area to which refugees could be admitted in almost unlimited numbers. Whether the Committee could best contribute toward the attaining of such a solution or whether it should be sought through other means is open to question. I am convinced, nevertheless, that every effort must continue to be made to attain a practicable solution along those lines.

In view of the foregoing considerations I envisage that the nature of the Committee in the future should be along the following lines:

Subject to general approval, the Intergovernmental Committee should take steps to turn over its function of negotiating with the governments of countries of settlement to the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. If this is done, this Government is disposed to contribute to the expenses of the High Commission for this purpose. It should turn over its function of negotiating with the authorities of the country of origin to the Foundation. In making this change every effort must be exerted to minimize the risk of unfavorable reaction in Germany.

The Intergovernmental Committee should continue in existence though in an inactive form. It might well be composed of the diplomatic representatives in London of the member governments. If this idea is adopted, the Committee will need at most only a nominal staff and no permanent offices. It should be in a position to meet at short notice if circumstances make its revival necessary. Contributions toward its support should be purely voluntary and in such amounts as the member governments might consider appropriate.

I wish again to emphasize that this Government's interest in practical efforts to solve the problem continues strong and unabated. It will be prepared to exert its influence, through the Committee and through diplomatic channels, to assist the High Commissioner, the Foundation and the settlement corporations in the carrying out of their tasks.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway
New York

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Urgent

June 10, 1939

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I quote the following telegram just received from Pell, no.810, June 9, 6 p.m.:

"Your 418, June 7, 8 p.m.

"Winterton now proposes that the meeting of the officers be held on Tuesday, July 18, and the full meeting on Thursday July 20, and the ensuing days if necessary. This will allow time for adequate preparation with Mr. Taylor and an opportunity for Emerson, who will endeavor to curtail his trip in the Balkans, to prepare recommendations which he plans to make to the meeting."

Very sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Pierrepont Moffat

The Honorable

Myron C. Taylor,

71 Broadway,

New York, New York.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hand

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 10, 1939

Dear Mr. Taylor:

I enclose for your confidential information copy of a rather worrying message from Pell outlining a confidential proposal put forward by Sir Herbert Emerson for governmental participation in financing the emigration of European refugees. I shall recommend that a reply be sent out to Pell directing him to discourage such a plan in every possible way, pointing out that this Government had made it clear from the beginning that while it desired to assist in the orderly solution of the refugee problem the responsibility for financing rested with the private groups. In any event, I feel it essential that at this stage no cross current such as the Emerson proposal be introduced. We have one problem before us on which all effort should be concentrated

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date JAN 16 1973

concentrated that is to set up a Refugee Foundation before the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee next month.

With every good wish.

As ever, sincerely yours,

Pierrepont Moffat

Pierrepont Moffat

Enclosure:
Message from Pell

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington
From: Amembassy, London, Pell
Dated: June 9, 1939, 8 p.m.
Number 813
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Linder, Achilles, Emerson, Baerwald and I met at luncheon today, at which time Emerson described in great confidence the following proposal which he said was only a personal one but that he was ready to give it to his Government and that, if the Government reacted favorably to it, it would be proposed to the United States Government and to the Intergovernmental Committee.

There should be an effort made to obtain the sum of $100,000,000 within a five-year period in order to help the departure from Europe of people who may be classified as being under the scope of the Intergovernmental Committee's authorization. Within this specification governments would put up an amount equal to the sums received from private contributions. These sums would result from the sale to both the governments and the public of securities which would for the first three years pay no interest but after that period would pay three percent interest. After 25 years these securities would be capable of redemption. There would be an international organization whose directors and whose executive director, having been chosen according to an agreement entered into by those governments concerned, would

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date JAN 16 1973

would administer this fund. This fund would finance mass settlement and would also make advances to persons with the aim of helping them to immigrate into other countries by infiltration. This fund is envisaged as a partly commercial and a partly charitable one, for it plans to have the interest paid and a sizeable proportion of the principal repaid by means of the profits of the individual settlement organizations and the repayment of money advanced.

It was pointed out to Emerson that, should our Government wish to participate, action would be necessary by Congress and that the United States Government might be willing to consider with sympathy a plan along these lines, especially if it were accepted by the British Government. However it would be most unwise to take it forgranted that Congress would act ultimately in favor with regard to a proposal of this kind, and under any circumstances in order to put such a plan on a working basis several months would be a minimum time necessary. Emerson, though he realized these difficulties, said that it was his belief that there existed an absolute necessity to institute a great drive for funds in which the governments should participate, in order to face the problem in a practical way. He went on to say that unless the British Government supported the plan he would not urge it on. Naturally the Intergovernmental

Committee's

Committee's members could only accept it after their governments had approved the plan. He also said that though it would obviously take time even initial action of this kind would have greater effect in Germany than the establishment of the foundation or the setting up of individual settlement corporations. The opinion was expressed by Linder and Baerwald that the participation of governments was most necessary and that it would be of especial assistance in the efforts of getting private contributions should the participating governments make contributions equal in amount to those contributed by private persons. Since Emerson had had a meeting this morning with Waley and Winterton it is assumed by us that such a plan would not have been proposed by him unless the Treasury and perhaps other governmental officials in London had known about it before and approved it.

What the motive is is not apparent. The New Court people and the private American individuals negotiating have both insisted that governmental participation was vital to financing settlement, and it is thought that the proposal originally came from the New Court people. Though believing in the sincerity of Emerson we are not so certain of the purposes of those for whom he appears to be acting. It might be interpreted that it is an attempt to hinder and confuse the present efforts for setting up the foundation,

though

though Emerson has made no definite objection to the idea of setting up immediately the foundation without taking account of any plan of such a kind as he proposed. There is another possible interpretation which is that governmental and private groups in Great Britain, thinking that participation by the United States would never be allowed by Congress, want to get away from any responsibility and to make it seem to the Jews in America and to public opinion abroad that all responsibility for the plan's failure rests on our Government.

Until now the talks between British and American private financial groups have been delayed due to the refusal by the British to allow a foundation to be established which would have no direct participation in settlement financing, with special reference to British Guiana. Owing to the instructions coming from New York, the Americans have been unable to make any concession on this point. Nevertheless the idea of an independent foundation appeared this morning to be conceded by the British, but they said that to fulfill basic requirements they would not be willing to take upon themselves fifty percent of the financing, whether they acted independently or whether they acted together with other European groups.

Eu:SM:EMC

LEWIS L. STRAUSS
52 WILLIAM STREET
NEW YORK

June 29, 1939.

6/30 a check

Dear Mr. Taylor:

I have just had a piece of news, through Mr. Max Warburg, which I feel that I should relay to you because it indicates to me that despite the apparent moderation of Herr Wohlthat, the situation in Germany continues to deteriorate. A law has just been made effective which provides that trust funds or charitable bequests, the beneficiaries of which were Jews and Christians, or Jews alone, must now be paid, irrespective of the will of the Testator, to Aryans only. This can be characterized only by a very ugly word. Its effect, however, is to throw out into the street the orphan and the aged who have managed to subsist upon the charity good men have left behind them in years past.

Sincerely yours,

Lewis Strauss

Myron C. Taylor, Esq.,
71 Broadway,
New York, N. Y.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 22 1939

My dear Mr. Taylor:

I am delighted to see from the newspapers this morning that you have recovered sufficiently to leave the hospital and go to your own home, and I want to express the hope that you may soon be completely recovered and altogether well again.

I had yesterday a conversation with the President with regard to the present situation in connection with the refugee problem, and I told the President that I would communicate to you some of the wishes which he expressed to me in order that I might obtain your reactions.

The President feels - as you and I do - that the long delay in the accomplishment of anything concrete by those individuals and organizations that are supposedly most interested in furthering an orderly emigration of Jews from Germany to new homes has obviously placed the German authorities in a position where they can sit back and smile and say that the people who are most vocal in their protests against the German treatment of the Jews have been entirely unwilling to do anything of a practical nature to assist the Jewish refugees. I told the President in this connection that I believed and hoped that within the next few days the International Foundation would be incorporated, and that as soon as this step had been taken, the German Government, in accordance with the tacit understanding reached, would be obligated to set up a Jewish internal trust in Germany. I told him further that I myself was heartily in accord with the general idea that separate settlement foundations should be set up for each settlement project inasmuch as I believed that was the most business-like and simple way of handling that side of the problem.

The President believes in that regard that much of the outlay in the settlement projects can be banked and that it should be possible for each individual settlement foundation corporation to sell bonds at a low rate of interest to sympathizers with the objectives being pursued. On that point the President and you are far better judges than I.

Finally, the President is very strongly of the opinion that there is an increasing defeatist psychology with regard

to the whole refugee problem. He believes that the orderly and efficient handling of the settlement of refugees from Europe in new homes throughout the world would be a tremendous factor in bringing about peaceful conditions in the world during the years to come. He is of the opinion that this element has not been sufficiently dramatized, and he also believes that too little stress has been laid upon the need of getting over to public opinion both here and in Europe the fact that if migrations of the character envisaged can be successfully carried out, a majority of the individuals resettled will be Christian and only the minority Jewish. Very definitely he believes that some step in the nature of a dramatization of the efforts being made should be undertaken without much delay.

In order to attain the objectives mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the President desires that the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee be invited to meet with him in Washington over a period of some two days during the first half of next September in order that this Government may discuss through him with the other governments who have representatives on the Executive Committee a concrete and detailed agenda of the most effective manner in which the general purposes which he has in mind may be advanced. I told him that if he undertook this step, it should probably be undertaken by means of an invitation extended by yourself in the name of the President at the July meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee. I said that it seemed to me that any new initiative of this character which the President desired to undertake should be carried out within the existing framework which had been set up as the result of the Evian Conference. To this the President heartily agreed.

I should greatly appreciate it if you will let me have at your convenience your thoughts with regard to the questions I have mentioned above in order that I may discuss the matter further and more fully with the President in the light of your own reaction.

With my kindest regards to you, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd) SUMNER WELLES.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
16 East 70th Street,
New York, New York.

THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHRISTIAN GERMAN REFUGEES

287 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

STUYVESANT 9-4580

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DR. E. GRAHAM WILSON
MR. MATTHEW WOLL

June 15, 1939

6/20/39
ack

Mr. Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Taylor:

In transmitting to you the enclosed memorandum for the consideration of the American members of the Evian Conference on Refugees and its possible presentation in some manner to the whole Conference, may I say that it represents the combined thought of a number of individuals who are in one way or another officially related to the problem of the refugees both from the Christian and Jewish point of view.

As secretary of the American Committee for Christian German Refugees, I ventured to invite a number of persons representing these agencies in the United States to meet with Dr. Gourevitch, of Paris, who is the secretary of the French Organization known as the Union for the Protection of the Human Person, an organization of which I have the honor to be a president.

The result of our deliberations was the preparation of the enclosed memorandum. We respectfully convey it to you for such consideration as it may merit.

Yours respectfully,

Henry Smith Leiper
Secretary

HSL:LS

June 12, 1939

MEMORANDUM ON THE NECESSITY OF EXTENDING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1938-1936, REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND STATELESS COMING FROM GERMANY, TO THE REFUGEES AND STATELESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

In view of grave political and economic developments since 1918, the world-wide problem of refugees has become increasingly crucial. Millions of people are involved, including Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, Armenians, Assyrians, and others, Russian emigres, and the more recent refugees from enlarged Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal. To these must now be added new categories of refugees resulting from territorial changes and discriminatory legislation in other countries.

A most important aspect of the problem is to provide refugees with legal protection and security. Without special legal steps, refugees have neither. They are merely tolerated in the country of asylum and suffer every kind of disability. They are denied the right of continued residence, and live under the constant threat of discrimination and expulsion.

Refugees are indebted to those countries affording political and legal protection. Some degree of protection has been provided by the League of Nations and strengthened by international conventions, ratified by interested Governments. Accordingly, most States have granted legal status to the refugees and the League of Nations has placed its facilities at their disposal. The main agencies have been, the Nansen Office for Refugees; the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany; and ad hoc organizations formed to deal with specific urgent problems.

While the League has accepted responsibility for political and legal protection, generally it has not given official sanction to suggestions for extension of protection to all classes of refugees. Yet, at various Sessions, the League called attention to the tragic plight of the refugees. At the Thirteenth Session in 1932, and the Fourteenth in 1933, a Resolution was adopted, recognizing the dangers to which refugees are exposed, and the difficulties which Governments must face. The League renewed its intense plea that the Governments not expel a refugee before he obtains permission to enter another country. This was repeated at the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions, quite apart from the many recommendations made at meetings called especially to consider refugee conventions. These appeals of the League of Nations to the Governments point out the precarious position of the refugees and the difficulties confronting the Governments until the status of the refugees is clarified.

Since 1937, tens of thousands of new refugees have been created by territorial changes and the political developments in Czechoslovakia, Italy, Roumania, Poland and Hungary. The new categories of refugees do not come under existing arrangements and no provision has been made for them. New and graver difficulties have arisen for the refugees as well as for the Governments - problems which the League of Nations has stressed often.

On September 1, 1938, Italy decreed the expulsion of all Jews of foreign origin, though naturalized, who had settled in Italian territory after January 1, 1919. Included here are stateless Jews of German origin, uncertain of the assistance of the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany, since Italy had not ratified the conventions.

The revision of citizenship demanded by the Goga Government in Roumania on January 22, 1938, is being executed rigorously. At least 150,000 Jews have been or are being deprived of citizenship. Not only is the potential number of refugees increased, but many residing in foreign countries are affected. Paris has a colony of 30,000 Roumanians, mostly Jews. A large number of passports are not renewed, and these people automatically become stateless and without protection under any convention. Those who leave Roumania may get a passport "bon pour aller pas pour retourner." *

In April 1938, Poland passed a law, denationalizing citizens who had resided abroad more than five years and had not maintained contact with their country of origin. As a result, on October 28, 1938, Germany expelled more than 16,000 Jews, 3,500 of whom are at Zbonszyn, in no-man's land on the Polish border. Mass expulsions have been renewed, and 30-40,000 Jews of Polish origin are threatened. In addition, great numbers of Jews, Polish citizens in Europe and overseas, are becoming stateless overnight as a result. Danzig has decreed similarly, depriving hundreds of Jews, who have left Danzig, of status and nationality.

The Hungarian Government has been empowered by the law of May 3rd, 1939, to revise the citizenship of certain categories of Jews. Similar measures are expected in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as Slovakia. It is feared that other countries will follow these examples.

These new refugees are especially hard-hit by the increasing rigor of legislation. France, the traditional country of asylum, issued a decree on May 2, 1938, increasing the power of the police and granting it the right of penal sanction against aliens. Countless numbers of refugees were imprisoned for no fault other than being stateless, without identification papers and without being able to proceed elsewhere. Further, thousands were reduced to misery.

Here is an urgent problem of humanity and State, which must be solved in the interests of the refugees and of the Governments. Legal status and protection must be provided for the new groups of refugees, as they exist for others under various conventions, of which the latest for refugees coming from Germany was made on February 10, 1938. The fact that the High Commissioner for German Refugees is at the same time High Commissioner for all refugees, is sufficient indication that no distinction can be made among categories of refugees. Provision for the protection of these newly created refugees should be embodied in the convention governing the status of various existing groups of refugees, so that the issuance of travel documents and the right of sojourn, could be extended to cover also refugees and stateless persons of whom this memorandum speaks.

BK•MM/EP

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* good for exit, but not for re-entry.