Intergovernmental Comm. on Political Refugees
Corres. 1942-1943
Abba Hillel Silver,
United Palestine Appeal,
41 East 42d St., New York.

Dear Dr. Silver,

I greatly regret my inability to be present at the National Conference for Palestine to be held in Cleveland on January 17th and 18th.

I knew Palestine when, following the last great war, its doors were opened for the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people. I saw the beginning of its development. It is an heroic undertaking, conceived of human sympathy, fostered by racial and religious fidelity and sustained by unparalleled generosity.

The refugee problem has grown by leaps and bounds since those days. These intervening years have been filled with fear, hunger, suffering, despair and death. The brute forces of the world are unleashed in final combat. Before the forces of seeming relentless destiny, we as individuals are as nothing, and it is easy to despair. But to despair is futile in a day when courage and action are needed. Never before have the nations that love peace and justice assumed such a responsibility for the future of the world.

In the far past, exiles had to fight their way to new homelands, or, wandering as men and women without countries, they have become the slaves of whoever picked them up. In the near past, refugees have been no one's concern, and no international responsibility was assumed for those who were compelled to flee their homes, and who are today scattered throughout the world.

But in the recent past, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, many nations associated themselves in the Intergovernmental Committee
on Political Refugees, to assist in arriving at a species of order in the transit of exiles and to introduce a policy of resettlement on an international basis. These activities, with which you are all familiar, had progressed most commendably. A growing measure of success in the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee was in sight, when the war intervened and changed the scene and enlarged the problem. Its organization is intact, its office in London continues to function. Its future is important, for it is beyond question that when this war comes to its weary end, there will be a refugee problem which will be almost in the nature of a migration problem, and which, if not settled properly, may hold within it a whole new series of wars.

And so if the peace which comes to Europe, or if the peace which comes to Asia, is to be anything more than an armed truce, the peace treaties must be peace treaties and not war treaties, and the question of racial and religious minorities must be settled in those treaties.

In the interim, the utmost that this fine Palestine organisation and its associated groups can contribute is to give and to serve as never before, to save what is left of honor and justice and decency from perishing.

Sincerely yours,

(Sd) MYRON C. TAYLOR.
My dear Mr. Taylor:

Again off the record, you may be interested to know that following your letter the item for the Intergovernmental Committee was reinstated on the instructions of "high authority".

Devotedly yours,

Robert T. Pell

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Myron Taylor,

You have been kind enough to send me, through Mr. Fitch, two documents which I have been very interested to see. The first was a copy of a report by HICEM regarding refugees in Morocco. I have had a good deal of information from various sources regarding the condition of the camps in North Africa. They have been appalling, and are still bad, but I believe that some improvement has taken place due mainly to the efforts of the J.D.C. and the Friends. Apart from the efforts of voluntary bodies, almost the only chance of improvement in these camps, as also in the camps in Occupied France, has seemed to be through representation through the Vichy Government of the Ambassador of the United States of America at Vichy. I have made proposals to this effect on several occasions. The question has, of course, been complicated by the delicate relations between the U.S.A. and Vichy, and I imagine that the entry of your country into the war has not made matters easier. However, I am sure that if you have not already done so, you will be good enough to mention the matter to the State Department with a view to representation at a suitable time.

As regards immigration, I notice that the HICEM report was written in October last. Before last December there was some immigration to the U.S.A., but so far as German and Austrian refugees are concerned, the procedure has since been tightened up, and, as you know, visas are now granted only in very exceptional cases. I had a cable a few days ago from the J.D.C. at Lisbon saying that they had arranged sailings for two ships in March to carry about one thousand emigrants in all. These are to go to Havana, Jamaica and Mexico, and some of the emigrants will be from Casablanca. So immigration has not completely closed down.

The Hon. Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.,
2. The second document was a copy of your letter to Abba
Mahan Silver, head of the United Palestine Appeal. May I say
that it struck exactly the right note, and I am entirely in
sympathy with the sentiments expressed? I hope that Palestine
will be able to make a useful contribution after the war but the
size of it will, I am afraid, be determined by economic and
political conditions, and I see little hope of the more extra-
 vagant aims of the Zionists being attained. Indeed, it seems to me
that the Jewish problem will become completely insoluble if the
Jews themselves attempt to act on the principle that most European
countries are not going to be places in which they can live in
the future. This would mean an uncontrollable exodus after the
war, and the defeat of any attempt to obtain an orderly solution.
I have been engaged during the past few weeks in putting down my
ideas on this and other aspects of the post war refugee problem,
and hope shortly to finish this preliminary and necessarily
 tentative survey. Before it assumes its final form, I shall dis- 
 cuss it with Mr. Winant, to whom I have already spoken, and with
the Foreign Office. I am not making it either as Director of the
 Inter governmental Committee, or as High Commissioner under the
League of Nations, since I do not wish even to appear to be
expressing the views of either body which, in the present circum-
 stances, cannot of course be ascertained, but I hope it may be of
 some use as a tentative analysis of the question.

You and we are passing through a bad patch at present,
and I am afraid things will get worse before they get better.
None the less, I am personally much more sanguine about ultimate
victory than I was six months ago. There has been no slackening
in this country of the will to win, and the domestic controversies,
which must have been puzzling and distressing to our American
friends, reflect the determination of the people to see the thing
through. We know that this is the spirit in the U.S.A.

I hope that you have completely recovered, and that
Mrs. Myron Taylor is very well.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]
EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
41 East 42d Street
New York

March 26 1942

Hon. Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Taylor:

May I address you informally for a moment in the following matter? At a recent meeting with Acting Secretary Welles of the State Department, a delegation, including representatives of the American Jewish Committee, the B'ni B'rith, the American Jewish Congress and the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, presented to Secretary Welles certain questions arising out of the lamentable, and what we believe to have been avertible, disaster of the Struma, as a result of which all but two passengers of the more than seven hundred on the boat, lost their lives. Secretary Welles indicated that he planned to refer the problem, in some of its phases in any event, to you and Lord Winterton as heads of the Intergovernmental Committee.

My associates and I feel that it would be well for us to have an early preliminary talk with you with respect to the Struma disaster and some of the very grave problems which it raises, -- problems, I need hardly add, of deepest concern to us and more or less immediately related to the work of your Intergovernmental Committee. We ask, therefore, for an opportunity to discuss the problem with you, at your convenience, either in New York or in Washington, though New York would be somewhat more convenient to most of us who live in New York. But we are ready to meet with you whenever and wherever you suggest.

I am, my dear Mr. Taylor, with most cordial greeting,

Faithfully yours,

(Se) STEPHEN S. WISE.

SSW:S
My dear Mr. Taylor,

You are of course familiar with the reports which have figured so prominently in the press lately concerning the tragic fate of 768 Jewish refugees who lost their lives as a result of the recent sinking of the SS Struma in the Black Sea near Istanbul. The feeling in the United States over the tragic loss of these human lives is increasingly widespread and I believe that this Government must take cognizance of the circumstances in which disasters like this can occur. I therefore think that it would be appropriate for you to communicate with Lord Winterton with regard to the situation of which the Struma incident is a shocking example, in order that it may be brought to the official attention of the member Governments of the Steering Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee. With this end in view I am enclosing a suggested draft of a letter which you may wish to address to Lord Winterton.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES
New York
March 31 1942

My dear Lord Winterton:

I am sure you have been giving much thought, as I have, to the tragic incident of the S. S. Struma, which has again thrown into relief the problem of the inhuman treatment of the Jews under the brutal administration in Germany and in countries under German domination. The accounts of this disaster as reported in the press would appear to be substantially supported by information which has come to us. They have caused, of course, a wave of indignation, and public opinion of the civilized world demands some effective action designed to put an end to the inhumanity of this traffic. The Struma incident was in fact only one of a series of similar occurrences. There may be others, unless some basic and concerted action is undertaken.

The vast political changes which have taken place on the continent of Europe since the policies of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees were determined justify, I think, a consideration of incidents like the Struma tragedy as within the purview of the Committee. Rumania is, we know, completely dominated by Germany, and the outrages against the Jews have been, we must believe, instigated by the Hitler
regime, and the execution of these measures has been only nominally a matter of Rumanian administration.

The desperate situation of the unfortunate human beings delivered over to a persecution which thus became more irresponsible than in Germany itself, explains their seeking what was admittedly an almost hopeless means of escape. I fear that the tragic fate of the Struma passengers will not dissuade others from seeking refuge by similar means, nor will it deter the authorities in Nazi-ridden countries from abetting or compelling the departure of other groups.

I know that you share with me the desire to do whatever may be possible to make sure that such disasters shall not happen again, and I am confident that the member Governments of the Intergovernmental Committee would like to consider any concerted plan to this end. Will you let me have your views in the matter? I should be grateful also if you would request the member Governments of the Steering Committee to consider whether this aspect of the refugee problem should not be made a matter of early discussion.

Sincerely yours,

(Sd) MYRON C. TAYLOR.

The Right Honorable
The Earl Winterton,
Chairman,
The Intergovernmental Committee
on Political Refugees,
London.
Office of Dr. Wise  
40 West 68 Street,  
April 1, 1942.

Hon. Myron C. Taylor  
16 East 70th Street  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Taylor:

May I supplement our visit of this morning, as per your suggestion, by sending you a memorandum of the word which has come to us first from the Geneva office to the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, and second, from our London office. Our Geneva office has cabled to the following effect:

"New decree followed by anti-Jewish riots various places, issued March 7th, orders total Jewish population Slovakia, numbering 90,000 to Ghetto near Polish border within period ending March 23 stop. Each Jew allowed one suit, one shirt, one pair boots, while other belongings and property confiscated by Hlinka Guards. Will you not approach leading Catholics with a view to their appealing to the Vatican to influence Father Tiso to abstain from Jewish expulsions ex Slovakia."

Within the last few days, a further message has come from London:

"Threat of immediate deportation Jews of Slovakia to Ghettos Polish border. We have asked the Chief Rabbi, Dr. Herz, to approach his Eminence, Cardinal Hinsley, with a view to intervention of Vatican with Tiso owing influence Catholic Church Slovakia, and suggest similar action in America."

Dr. Goldmann and I are grateful indeed for your offer to discuss the problem with the Papal Legate in Washington, whom I shall have great pleasure in meeting upon an early visit to Washington.

I am, with deepfelt thanks, my dear Mr. Taylor,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Presiden
April 1, 1942.

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Since I saw you, I have learned that the Institute of Jewish Affairs, established by the American Jewish Congress, has prepared a full memorandum on the status of Jews in Slovakia, which you might feel it would be worthwhile presenting to the Papal Legate.

Faithfully yours,

Stephen S. Wise

SSW:3
Enc.
THE JEWISH BULLETIN

The purpose of this Bulletin is to provide readers abroad with information and views of Jewish interest on present-day issues, especially from the spiritual point of view.

It is intended for personal use, and for press reproduction overseas.

MONTHLY

No. 7.

MARCH, 1942

THE PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS

BY CARDINAL HINSLEY

The cruel treatment of the Jews at any time and in any land calls for the strongest condemnation.

Whoever believes in God, our loving Father, revolts against the tyranny of governments which oppress His children of any race. To the Christian and Catholic, Jews and Gentiles are alike sons of the Eternal Father. In every human heart, the decent sentiments of justice and equity proclaim that a Jew is a fellow man and entitled to be treated as such: he is an innocent brother unless and until he commits a crime that is brought home to him by clear evidence.

All these motives of religion and natural humanity have been discarded by the Jew-baiters in past times and in many lands. But never and nowhere has the savagery of prejudice been so fiercely let loose as in Nazi Germany and in the Nazi-dominated countries during these last years of unexampled brutality. The whole world knows the frantic hatred with which the Hitler Gang has pursued the Jews; a hatred begotten of jealousy and greed. Grave and glaring faults are charged against Jewry. Yes: there are faults in every section of the human family; there are evil-doers in most places. But with St. Paul we may well warn the anti-semites that they be not chargeable with the offences of which they accuse others: In any case why rob and murder the innocent? Why pursue the innocent with the guilty and drive them out to starve?

As we hope for goodwill and fair play for ourselves, so must we insist on justice and compassion for all our fellow men. We Catholics with other Christians have had our share of persecution and of calumny: we are enjoying martyrdom now as we did centuries ago before this violent age of systematic lying—and so we can well understand the Jewish reaction to similar treatment by whomsoever it is inflicted.

The Church abhors and condemns anti-semitism.

A. Cardinal Hinsley

ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER.
THE JEWS IN NAZI SLOVAKIA
By DR. JURAJ SLÁVIK
(Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior.)

The attitude and methods of the present rulers of Slovakia, a country directed by the Nazis and administered by traitors, are opposed to the entire Slovak tradition, and differ diametrically from everything that the Slovak patriots were proclaiming and realising both at the time of the Hungarian slavery, and during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. This could easily be proved in all walks of national life as well as in all branches of the life of the State, but this appears unnecessary as the evidence in this case is plainly very striking. Instead of traditional Slav solidarity we perceive servility to the Germans, instead of democracy and tolerance nothing but Nazi totalitarianism and terror, instead of the freedom of conscience and of religious liberty, Gestapo methods and prisons. The same applies, of course, in a full measure also to the Jewish question, and in Bratislava to-day they boast of their perversity.

After the last visit of Béla Tuka to Berlin the newspaper of the so-called President Tiso, "Slovak," stated that whilst Béla Tuka was in the Nazi capital he was told that the problem of co-existence of different national groups in Slovakia had been settled in a model way, and that the Jewish question also appeared to be regulated there better than anywhere else outside Germany.

It is a fact, however, that the co-existence of different national groups settled in such a highly satisfactory way signifies simply the hegemony of a small group of Germans over the whole nation, and that the boast concerning the "regulation" of the Jewish question is a sad and infamous allegation that nowhere in the world, except in Germany, are the Jews more oppressed, tortured, robbed and persecuted than in Tuka's Slovakia.

I am not in possession of all data by which I could prove the shameful boast of the rulers of Bratislava, but let me just mention some facts of the last two or three months as announced by the Bratislava Broadcasting Station. On September 10th, 1941, the Bratislava Station announced that the council of ministers approved, after a prolonged deliberation, the Jewish Code as well as a regulation concerning a special levy on Jewish property. What provisions the Jewish Code contains appears only from some later remarks and from regulations which followed. The Code defines the term "Jew" exactly in the same way as is laid down in the Nuremberg laws, that is on the basis of the race. In the same way it defines the idea of the admixture of Jewish blood. Jews older than six years must have a visible mark on their clothes, this being in the form of a yellow star over the left breast. The Jews are not permitted to live in the centre of the towns, they are not permitted to employ women-servants below the age of forty, they are not permitted to own industrial enterprises, land and other real property, and they are not permitted to visit places of entertainment, theatres, exhibitions, etc.

The application of the Jewish Code is extremely severe. Jewish property which so far had not been confiscated was subjected to a 20 per cent. tax, the proceeds of which amounted to 600 millions of Czech Kronen. For the payment of this levy it was decreed that all Jews are jointly and severally liable. Jewish enterprises are being liquidated, which means that they are being taken without compensation. Up to November 1st, 9,620 Jewish firms were thus "liquidated" and, as reported from Bratislava, more than 400 millions of annual clear profit has been taken away from over 13,000 firms owned by Jews. Jewish house property to the value of 1,200 millions has been expropriated together with about 25,000 acres of land. Bratislava announced further that even the personal property of the Jews will be "arianised," and that the Jews will be permitted to take with them to the Ghetto only objects of absolute necessity.

In Bratislava a Ghetto is being founded, but only for employed Jews. These Jews are now concentrated in certain streets and even there they can be given three months' notice to vacate the premises at any time. They are permitted to live only in old houses. This Ghetto is only a transitory arrangement as all Jews will be removed from Bratislava.

As soon as the authorisation to work is taken away from a Jew, he has to move together with his family to another Jewish centre. By the end of 1941, 70 per cent. of all Jews, that is 10,000 persons, had to move from Bratislava.

Special concentration camps for Jews are being created, and special labour obligations apply to Jews. Even Jewish intellectuals have to perform the most arduous tasks. Before concentration camps are created the Jews are permitted to settle only in the following towns: Trnava, Nitra, Žilina, Prešov and Spišská Nová Ves. The Jews are not allowed to buy milk and other food in the morning hours and must not do so in the open market, that is, outside licenced shops.

I have stated here an example of how the Jews are treated in the "free" Slovakia. These are sad facts and circumstances and no great fantasy is needed to realise them. Well known also is the brutality and the inconsiderateness of the so-called "Minister of Interior" Saño Mach, who carries out the anti-Jewish laws and regulations. Well known also, however, are his corrupt practices and we can easily judge the disinterestedness of his officials. The application of these laws and regulations could, to better advantage, be entitled: Larceny, robbery, terror and beastliness.

All, however, that is happening to our Jewish fellow-citizens in Slovakia is only temporary. Slovakia is a part of Czechoslovakia and it will remain in the hands of traitors and Nazi lackeys only until the victorious end of this war. The words of President Beneš, stated in his message published in "The Jewish Bulletin" will then equally apply to Slovakia as a part of Czechoslovakia:

"The renewed Czechoslovak Republic will have no other programme than the programme of religious tolerance of the first Republic of Masaryk."
A VISIT TO THE REFUGEE INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH WALES
By JAMES GRIFFITHS, M.P.
(Member of the Refugee Industries Committee)

The Refugee Industries Committee was set up in July, 1939. Our object was to provide assistance to the many refugees who desired to transform their industrial skills into industries in their own country. Many of them had, by monopoly of special patents or designs, established industries in their own country. In addition they had built up an extensive export trade. Before these refugees could transfer their industries to this country, it was necessary for them to secure Government permits. Each case was examined by the Home Office, by the Board of Trade, Ministry of Labour and Commissioner for Special Areas. We can confidently state that every industry established has either introduced a new labour process, or secured for Britain a new export market. We can also give the most categorical assurance that each refugee admitted is a loyal friend of this country. We do not ask for refugees who do not themselves desire any conditions more favourable than those granted to our own industries.

On the Treforest Estate alone, thirty-five key-workers were given "B" (secondary) classification by the Tribunals and, in the spring of last year they were all interned. Through the efforts of the Committee, with the invaluable support of Mr. George Latham, M.P., all but three of them have been released and have returned to their work.

The Protected Areas Order of June 8th, 1940, prohibited all aliens from remaining in Protected Areas. Those working at Treforest Trading Estate were given three days' notice to leave; as a result of the personal appeal by the Committee's Secretary to the Home Office, these notices were repealed in their entirety.

In the Tyneside area even more drastic action was taken. All the refugees of that area, forty-two in all, were interned at two hours notice. We arranged a deputation to Mr. Osbert Peake, M.P., Under-Secretary of the Home Office; with two exceptions, all who were interned from Team Valley have now been returned to their factories. Under the Emergency Powers Act, eleven of the factories at Treforest were requisitioned at three days' notice by a Government Department. The Committee appealed to the Government for compensation, have had the principle of the claim accepted and secured substantial deposits of the amounts claimed. Some of the refugees had, at the request of the Government, re-established export trade with their Scandinavian and Balkan customers. When these countries became involved in the War, payments were suspended and very serious losses sustained. The greatest difficulty the refugees have to deal with at present is that the various quotas are all based on output during the period when all these special difficulties were being encountered. We feel, too, that some allowance should be made for the fact that instead of being allowed to start in districts where there was labour available with experience in these industries, permission to start was granted on condition that they go to distressed areas; where, instead of workers, experienced in their industries, they had to deal with a young generation which had never known employment of any kind. All these difficulties the refugees have borne without any complaint. Indeed, at all times, we hear from them nothing but expressions of gratitude for the sanctuary they have found in this country, coupled with an intense eagerness to assist Britain and her Allies in the War effort.

Recently I had an opportunity of visiting some of these factories in South Wales, and I would, briefly, give a few details of some of these factories which appear to me to be of special interest.

I was very much impressed with a firm which makes moulded plastics, Gablonz jewellery, etc. It is generally known that hitherto the Continent has held the monopoly of Gablonz wear; it is an industry specially adapted for export trade because of its high value in relation to bulk. Seventy-five per cent. of the output of this factory is being exported to South America and Africa, five per cent. of their output is Government work. As a Welshman, I was specially impressed that their raw material was cellulose acetate; this is a by-product of coal and it is obvious that when the War is over any industry making use of a by-product of coal will be of special advantage to South Wales. This factory employs seventy workers.

The next factory we visited was one making lamp cases from tin; which is a local product. They are also engaged on aircraft components and tank parts. I learned that they were supplying lamps, etc., to the value of £1,000 monthly, to the Government, County Councils, Fire Brigades, A.R.P., etc. In addition to making lamps they have a cadmium-plating shop; 100 per cent. of this output is used for Ministry of Aircraft Production, and they have sufficient orders to employ them for ten months. They are employing 105 workers.

We next visited a factory making cigarette papers and cardboard boxes. I found they were manufacturing £6,000 worth of cigarette papers monthly, for export to Canada, Africa, India, Newfoundland. They employ 105 workers. As an illustration of how an industry can be adapted for War production, a Czech factory which we assisted in establishing on the Estate, originally planned to make steel furniture and tools; they are now engaged ninety per cent. on Government work, making parachute hatch dampers for the Air Ministry and ejector shell components for the Ministry of Supply.

We next saw a factory which is the only one in Wales making cardboard. The whole of their raw material is collected locally and they are using thirty-four tons of waste paper daily. The cardboard is used mainly for making suit cases for the Forces and evacuees. This industry is regarded as so important by the Government that it has now been declared a protected industry.

Another topical industry is the factory making dry electric batteries for head lamps, wireless,
etc. These lamps are being used for Military, Police, Home Guard purposes, and for use in the mines. Their employees total 110.

The last factory we visited on the Estate was one which was established for making ladies’ gloves in Continental style. I found that 100 per cent. of their output was for export trade; they had also submitted and had had approved, samples for a Government contract for 85,000 pairs of heavy transport driver gloves. At the present moment, we are informed that there are no trained glove makers available in Yeovil, Worcester or Hyde, so that the workers who are trained at Treforest are proving themselves invaluable for this Government work. In addition to producing gloves, one section of the factory is being used entirely for components for Morrison shelters, and outside the factory they have no less than 750 tons of material stacked.

We went to Dowlais which, at one time, had the enviable distinction of having the highest unemployment rate in the whole country. We visited there a factory producing buttons. I was pleased to find that some of the raw material was Bakelite, which is a by-product of coal. They are producing some lines of buttons, hitherto not manufactured anywhere outside Germany. The importance of this industry is illustrated by the fact that for the three years preceding the War, Great Britain imported no less than 44,000,000 gross of buttons. In addition to making buttons, the proprietors had been appealed to by the Military Authorities for suggestions for portable games for the troops and, with great ingenuity, they have now produced pocket games, draughts, dominoes, etc., which are in great demand by the troops in isolated districts. They started with five workers and are at present employing 300. As an illustration of the problem of training workers, the cost to this firm for this purpose was £10,000.

As a Welshman, I am grateful for the new industries these refugees have brought to my country and the work which they have provided. My visit convinced me that the future solution to our unemployment problem lies not in a small number of industries each employing a great number of workers, but in the great number of small industries each employing a small number of workers. There is no doubt in my mind that in helping these refugees, we are, at the same time, helping Wales.

**NEWS IN BRIEF**

Lord Derby personally moved the resolution in favour of the Nathan Laski Manchester Memorial at a town’s meeting held at Manchester recently. The Lord Mayor paid tribute to Lord Derby who had come to show esteem for the leader of Manchester Jewry, who had recently passed away. Lord Derby said he had come to do honour to one who had proved himself a good citizen of Manchester. He did not confine his good deeds to his own co-religionists, and we owe him much for his unfailing loyalty and service to all. The Lord Mayor was supported by the Mayors of Salford and Prestwich. The Fund, which is to be for the sum of £50,000, will be used for local requirements of the City and of the Jewish community.

The Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies has addressed a communication to the Inter-Allied Conference which met in London, which dealt with the question of Nazi atrocities. The communication draws the attention of the Conference to the sufferings of the Jews as victims of the Nazi atrocities in the occupied countries.

More than 1,000 Jewish children are receiving kosher meals in eight evacuee centres: the number of meals served approximated 250,000, it is reported by the Chief Rabbi’s Kosher Canteen Committee. A considerable proportion of the income is received from Government sources, which also assists the Committee in establishing and maintaining many of the canteens.

It is expected to open fifty special canteens for the Passover period.

Presiding at the 85th annual meeting of Jews College recently, the Chief Rabbi, who is President of the College, stressed the urgency of maintaining the character and humanity of the nation in wartime. Jews College, like the universities and other educational institutions, had maintained its work without interruption since the outbreak of war. Upon the success of the College depended the future character of Anglo-Jewry. They were grateful to Providence, and to the academic staff, who had kept the flag of learning flying. The report of the Council showed many academic successes, and stressed the pride of the College at the fact that many Ministers, graduates of the College, were serving the cause of freedom and Britain as chaplains in all the theatres of war.

My dear Archbishop Cicognani:

I have received the enclosed memorandum relating to the status of Jews in Slovakia, which was sent me by Stephen S. Wise, President of the American Jewish Congress.

Rabbi Wise has suggested that you might be interested in receiving a copy.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure:
Copy of memorandum from Stephen S. Wise.

His Excellency
The Most Reverend
Amleto Giovanni Cicognani,
Archbishop of Laodicea di Frigia,
The Apostolic Delegate,
Washington.

Eu:SR:NNB
4/4/42
According to the last Czechoslovak census (1930), the number of Jews in Slovakia was 136,737, and they were 4.1% of the total population. The Slovakian Jews lived on a modest social and economic scale, engaging chiefly in commerce, agriculture, handicrafts, and manual labor. While they were not among the upper classes in wealth and status, the Jews were well represented among the Slovak intellectual classes.

As a result of the cession of part of Slovakia to Hungary on November 3, 1938, the number of Jews in the country decreased. Their number was further lessened when, at the close of the Polish campaign in September 1939, several thousand Slovak Jews were deported to the Lublin Reservation in Poland. At the beginning of 1941 a Slovakian census of population was published. This source states that there were 88,951 members of the Jewish faith in Slovakia, and estimates that, together with "non-Aryens" according to the Nazi definition, the number of Jews was 105,000.

The legal status of the Jews in Slovakia is copied closely from Nazi legislation, and is calculated to reduce the Jewish population to the level of pariahs. Over a hundred anti-Jewish decrees, based on "racial" conceptions, have been issued. In September 1941, a Jewish code containing 270 clauses was published, which completely debars Jews from participation in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country.

As in other countries under Nazi influence, the Jews of Slovakia were systematically dispossessed of all their property. They were forced to surrender their valuables, jewelry, stocks, bonds, real estate, and business enterprises. Jewish funds and valuables, estimated at 250 million crowns, have been frozen by the Slovak Government. 12,300 Jewish firms have been liquidated, and 6,000 Jewish buildings, valued at 1,200 million crowns, requisitioned. According to the Slovak State Land Office (Lidove Noviny, Prague, March 5, 1941), there were 4,693 Jewish landowners in Slovakia possessing 41,172 hectares of farm land, 45,862 hectares of forest, and 11,168 hectares of uncultivated land. With very few exceptions, all this land was "Aryanized". Altogether, 15,000 Jewish estates in 150 communities were given up. According to August Moravék,
head of the Slovak Central Economic Office, in January 1942, "the Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically solved". This official reported that Jewish property in Slovakia had amounted to 3,950 million Slovak crowns ($140,000,000).

It may be noted in this connection that the "Aryanisation" of Jewish property in Slovakia was accompanied by charges of corruption and public scandal against employees of the Central Economic Office. Many were dismissed and arrested for thievery.

Forced labor is also imposed upon Jews, and special Jewish labor camps have been established. After the decision of Slovakia to participate in the war between Germany and Russia, it was ordered that, upon completion of their compulsory term of "service" in labor camps, the Jews should not be released but they should be assigned as laborers to the families of mobilized soldiers. In this way a new slave status was established for the Jews.

From the very beginning of Nazi influence on Slovakia, the Jews have been forcibly shifted from one part of the country to another. In this process, of course, a good deal of Jewish property was lost, and much physical suffering brought upon the Jews.

Such migrations began at the time when German army divisions were massing in Slovakia for the invasion of Poland. About 20,000 Jews were then removed from the border zones to the interior.

Later, under the pretext of "unsanitary conditions which constitute a danger for the whole population", the Jews were evicted from their homes without any notice. In Bratislava the Jews were at first removed from their homes in the historic Jewish quarter and told to move into houses built after 1920. Afterwards, the "evacuation" of Jews from cities whose population was over 5,000 to "Jewish centers" in the Slovak provincial towns was begun. The first such "evacuation" took place in October, 1941, when 1,500 Jews from Bratislava were removed from the city in special trains. All 14,000 Jews of Bratislava received orders to leave the city before the end of 1941. The expelled were allowed to take with them personal belongings weighing not more than sixty pounds.

On March 7, 1942, the whole Jewish population of Slovakia was ordered to leave for concentration centers near the Polish border by March 23rd. Only ten kilograms (twenty-two pounds) of baggage
were allowed.

The "Jewish centers" in Slovakia are administered in the same manner as the Jewish ghettos in Poland.

From the very beginning of the Slovakian autonomy, terrorisms, pogroms, and petty persecutions, anti-Jewish decrees and restrictions on personal liberty have been the order of the day for the Jews. Hlinka Guards and their followers pillaged Jewish homes and possessions, beat up Jews in the streets, and staged mass arrests. More than 4,000 Jews were arrested in the period since the outbreak of the war between Russia and Germany. Hlinka Guards are empowered to enforce the anti-Jewish measures, and they may enter Jewish dwellings and carry out personal searches of any Jew.

By administration and law the degradation of the Jews to a separate and subordinate position was enforced. After September 19, 1941, all Jews had to wear yellow armbands bearing the six-pointed Star of David. According to an order of March 1942, the width of the Star had to be increased from 2 to 3 inches.

The isolation of the Jews from all contact with Slovaks was attempted. They were forbidden to attend the public bars, public places of entertainment, theaters, movies, restaurants and the exhibitions of the Danube Fair. No Jew was to use the telephone service, ride bicycles or automobiles. They were forbidden to walk in the streets in groups, or visit synagogues, except during religious services. All social intercourse between Jews and non-Jews was forbidden.

The movement of the Jews was strictly limited in time by stringent curfews and regulations. All Jews had to remain at home between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. Beginning with November 1941 the curfew was extended to fifteen hours - from 3 p.m. to 6 a.m. The Jews were allowed to buy milk in the public markets only after 8 a.m. and other food only after 10 a.m.

Among other restrictions are the following: Ritual slaughter was forbidden. Jews were allowed only four ounces of bread daily. They had to give up to the authorities all radio sets, fishing and photographic equipment, field glasses, and phonograph records.

All Jewish communal institutions were abolished and replaced by a single Jewish Office, membership in which was obligatory for all Slovak Jews. The Jewish office carried on a cultural, educational and philanthropic program. The activities of this office are
indicative of the depth of impoverishment to which the anti-Jewish policy had brought the Jews. For instance, in the first four months of 1941 the food kitchen of the Jewish Office in Bratislava served 32,000 meals. In July, the number of meals had risen to 50,000 for the one month. From January to April 1941, the average number of persons served daily ranged from 300 to 350; in July the average was 1650 and on some days reached as high as 1800.
HIAI-ICA EMIGRATION ASSOCIATION, INC.
HICEM
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

April 24, 1942

Hon. Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

Under a recent decree issued by the Cuban Government, no person born in any of the Axis countries or countries occupied by the Axis, can be admitted to Cuba.

We learned that the decree is retroactive and that persons of these categories who are already in possession of legally acquired visas, are having these visas cancelled by the Cuban Consulates in Europe.

To our knowledge, the great majority of holders of Cuban visas are located in unoccupied France, a minority in Spain and Portugal, and that many of them have obtained their liberation from the various internment camps on the strength of these visas. The cancellation of the visas will automatically result in their reinternment and blasting for them all hope of escape from their persecutors.

We, therefore, appeal to you as Chairman of the Inter-Governmental Committee, to use your good offices with the Cuban authorities to the effect that all visas already granted by the Cuban Immigration Department, should remain valid and that the holders of same be permitted to land on arrival in Cuba.

We are assured that you will do your utmost to save these innocent refugees the bitter disappointments that are certain to follow the cancellation of their visas at the moment when they are waiting for a steamer to take them across and away from their misery.

Very respectfully yours,

Dr. James Bernstein
Director

H. Diour
Exec. Secretary
HIAS-ICA EMIGRATION ASSOCIATION, INC

HICEM
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Cable Address
HICEM

Murray Hill 3-2845

April 27, 1942

Hon. Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

Referring to our letter of the 24th, we wish to advise that we have just received detailed information from Havana concerning the Portugese boat "San Thome" which arrived last Sunday in Havana with 236 refugees on board.

Of this number, only six (Swiss, Cuban and Bolivian citizens) were not affected by the new law but the remaining 230, among whom are 42 Polish, 24 French, 13 Czecho-slovakian, 12 Russian, 8 Belgian, 6 Spanish, 13 Luxemburg, 19 Dutch, 2 Yugoslavians, and 28 Germans, are in danger of being deported to Portugal.

You are aware of what this would mean for these people under the present conditions and we therefore take the liberty of asking you again to take whatever steps are possible in order to help these unfortunate people as well as their brethren who already possess Cuban visas and are prepared to sail on the next boat scheduled to leave early in May.

Thank you in advance for whatever assistance you can possibly render in this matter.

Very respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Dr. James Bernstein
Director

[Signature]

Ilija Djordjevic
Exec. Secretary
HIAS-ICA EMIGRATION ASSOCIATION

HICEM
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Cable Address
HICEM

LEXINGTON 2-8760

May 6, 1942

Hon. Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

Referring to our letter of April 27th, we are very pleased to inform you that according to information which reached us today from Havana, all of the passengers on board the "San Thomé" were permitted to land and were taken to the immigration camp of Tiscornia.

At this time the only question pending is if it would be possible to obtain from the Cuban authorities, an assurance that the new law would not be made retroactive and emigrants in possession of Cuban visas would be allowed to take the next two boats which are scheduled to leave Lisbon and Casablanca about the 15th and 22nd of May.

As we mentioned to your secretary on the telephone, we cabled in this matter to the High Commissioner for Refugees in London, Sir Herbert Emerson, as follows:

"According recent decree immigration Cuba forbidden all persons born axis occupied countries STOP visas already issued invalidated STOP several hundred refugees already in possession Cuban visas in danger reinternement in camps if prevented to emigrate STOP appealing to you name HICEM use your good offices with Cuban authorities not to make decree retroactive and that holders of visas be permitted to land"

Today we received the following reply from Mr. Gustave Kullmann, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in London:

"Your cable concerning Cuba am taking up matter with Cuban Government"

We will be most grateful if you will advise us of any new developments in this matter.

Very respectfully yours,

Dr. James Bernstein
Director

Iija Dijier
Exec. Secretary
May 11, 1942

Mr. R. A. Fitch
Secy. to Mr. Myron Taylor
71 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Fitch:

Thank you very much for your letter of the 9th and for your efforts to bring this very important matter to a conclusion.

As two boats are actually in preparation for leaving Lisbon and Casablanca on about the 15th and 22nd of May, it would be of the utmost importance to us to obtain, if possible, definite information concerning the attitude of the Cuban Government, before at least the second of these boats leave Europe.

We would, therefore, greatly appreciate it if you will let us know, at the earliest possible moment, the result of Mr. Taylor's and your own efforts.

Very truly yours,

Dr. James Bernstein
Director

Ilja Dijour
Exec. Secretary
HIAS-ICA EMIGRATION ASSOCIATION, 

386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Murray Hill 3-2845

Cable Address
HICEM

May 21, 1942

Hon. Myron C. Taylor
Mayflower Hotel
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Referring to our previous correspondence and to the recent conversation which you had with Dr. James Bernstein, we wish to give you the following additional information concerning our proteges abroad who received Cuban visas or authorization for the issuance of such visas, prior to the new Cuban immigration law.

Due to the existing difficulties in corresponding, we do not have a list of these emigrants but the approximate number of such issued visas is about 100 and of authorizations about 50; these figures involving a total of 300 persons, at a maximum.

From our experience with immigration to Cuba during the past year and a half, we can state that among the refugees going to Cuba, the overwhelming majority consisted of citizens of the allied countries such as Poles, Russians, Czechs, Dutch, Belgians, Luxembourgers, as well as French nationals and stateless; very few being native refugees from enemy countries.

We, therefore, feel that if you would present these facts directly to the proper Cuban authorities, they will certainly agree that it would be an unnecessary hardship toward this relatively small group of refugees who escaped from the camps and lost everything in view of their immigration to Cuba on the basis of a visa or authorization already issued. They are placed in a worse position than persons without any visa.

We would be most grateful if you would make a final effort in order to bring to a solution this very serious matter and advise us as soon as you receive the decision because it depends on a favorable one that we will be able to make the proper arrangements in order for the next two boats to stop in Havana on their way to the United States.

Very respectfully yours,

Dr. James Bernstein
Director

Ilja Dijour
Exec. Secretary
My dear Mr. Taylor,

Lord Winterton, to whom I believe you wrote recently about the tragic sinking of the "Struma", has asked me to tell you, in your capacity as American delegate to the Inter-Governmental Committee on Political Refugees, that he has been giving careful consideration to your letter and will soon send you a reply.

Believe me,

My dear Mr. Taylor,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) HALIFAX.

The Honourable Myron Taylor,
71 Broadway, New York.
The resignation of Alfred Wrigg, president of the intergovernmental committee on refugees, marks an end of the U.S. government's concern over the refugee problem, which has been passed to a new agency.

The State Department's Office of Refugees has been discontinued. The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees has been dissolved. The Department of Labor is now responsible for handling refugee work.

What does this signify? It really means doing away with a problem that had a little tough. This action of effete does not take into consideration the value of the work. Humanity has just taken it for granted, once more, that all is well. The whole situation recalls the inhuman story of the famous general who said, in answer to the plea of the, the enemy who sought to surrender: "You can't surrender. I'd rather fight you than feed you."

Why should we concern ourselves with other refugees' problems? The answer lies in what we have to civilization and humanity. Harder-bitten men will prefer to consider the refugee situation a serious military and public health problem.

Organized refugee resettlement is one of the finest things that we, as a neutral nation, could undertake. It demonstrates that there still exists somewhere in the world other objectives beside destruction.

In proportion to the tremendous need, the good that any program can do must remain small; actually, it is large, however, in significance, in hope, in keeping alive some vestige of faith in humanity needed alike by refugees and those who by some miracle have escaped the circumstances that combine to make refugees.

To see United States' interest in the grave problem thrown overseas, even while the need was growing, and in spite of the fact that certain very significant projects were already under way, does not reflect credit on our government.

By observing President Roosevelt's insistence upon careful selection of refugees abroad, the projects underway in the western hemisphere need to provide a rich biennial addition to the countries of destination. With the selection of material the primary guide, the substantial elements of European nations' population could not secure passage. The greatest danger to a refugee project is that unselected, mass migration take place, with no provision existing in the country of destination to care for them. Those projects that have already failed in the hemisphere, are ample testimony to this.

And what may we expect as a result of this dumping overseas of all the refugees governing migration? It's obvious. Watch for Germany or Italy to lose refugee ships loaded to the gunwales with suffering humanity, with no destination in view. Watch for a repetition of the disgraceful atrocities of a few years past, when a ship, the Cuba, slammed the oceans for many weeks without a harbor for its human cargo.

It would be most interesting to know why the Department of State, Department with regard to the resettlement of refugees, It would be valuable to discover if the Army and Navy thought they were simplifying matters by precipitating the very thing that the State Department had formerly sought to avoid, in order with refugees.

Both now, and during the imminent future of Europe's war, and after that war, the refugees problem pointing to be one of the most serious faced by all, opposition governments. What should be done? We should listen to the words of our President about the vital problem? Why repress human advance to repress our enemies in order to gain the means of defense? We already know the disparagement and the peril that attend it.

It would be interesting to know if it was believed in Washington that we were taking military precautions by running our resettlement projects in Latin America. The answer to that will be learned better when some of those nations begin to admit refugees at random, or secretly, and to until with U.S. cooperation, or U.S. participation.

We will learn that we have aggravated the military problem, then, not simplified it.

These responsible for our Government's throwing open the door to the matter of refugees, should be held accountable for the least certain choice that they make. They have to cut a knife into the back of one of the few remaining humanitarian projects possible in these days of universal disaster. Shall we abdicate humanity entirely? Shall we kill them off, because it's too hard to feed them?—to house them? It's not that kind of military tactics that have won all of our wars for us so far. Once, we had leaders like Lincoln, who tempered a victorious frenzy with pity for the vanquished. Leaders who remembered war's innocent victims, and went to triumph.
Dear Mr. Myron Taylor:

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of the 31st March regarding the tragic incident of the S. S. "Struma." This disaster caused, as you may well imagine, the greatest distress to my Government, and on receiving your letter I at once consulted the authorities concerned, from whom I learned that they had already answered an enquiry on the subject received from the State Department. This was in addition to the public explanations given in Parliament by the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies on the 10th and 11th March. I enclose copies of all three documents for your information.

So much for the past. Your letter deals mainly with the future, and I should like to say first how cordially I, as Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee, welcome your interest and assistance in finding a solution to a problem of which the "Struma" affair was so ghastly an illustration. You speak of member Governments of the Intergovernmental Committee considering a concerted plan to avoid similar disasters. After consultation with Sir Herbert Emerson and the appropriate British Government Departments, I would venture to suggest that in present circumstances the only two member Governments who would be capable of taking effective action, or at least drawing up practicable suggestions, would be the United States Government and my own Government. The problem (which is incidentally one of disorderly emigration as contrasted with the orderly migration which the Intergovernmental Committee was formed to promote) has its humanitarian and political aspects, complex enough in peace time, but complicated even more in time of war by questions of military security. As you say, the exodus of the Jews from German-controlled Europe is instigated by the Nazi regime which has at least two motives: first to cause political embarrassment in the Middle East, and second to introduce enemy agents, or persons capable of being used as such, into territory under Allied control. The number of the latter may be extremely small in comparison with the number of people who have every compelling human reason for wishing to escape, but the fact must obviously
be taken into the most serious consideration by the authorities responsible for security in Palestine and the Middle East generally. The political embarrassment, too, is of the greatest importance. We know from experience that no country to which these unhappy shipments proceed is willing to admit them. Indiscriminate reception of them in Palestine would, the British Authorities are convinced, result in ever-increasing German instigation to other parties of Jews to leave, and apart from questions of security involved in the reception of unlimited numbers of persons coming from enemy territory, and with relations still under enemy control, there is the disturbing effect on the Arab world, at a critical moment of the war, if it could be plausibly represented that the White Paper policy in respect of Palestine was being substantially modified. Under the stress of war both your country and mine have found it necessary to tighten up immigration restrictions against people who, whatever may be their personal views and claims, are, in fact, enemy aliens, and a contradiction is to a certain extent unavoidable between what feelings of humanity would prescribe and vital conditions of security and military prudence allow.

This is the negative aspect of the case, and I think you will appreciate the reasons why my Government has been unable, in war-time, in spite of the very strong humanitarian aspect, to give any cover of legality to illegal immigration directed towards Palestine. It is entirely contrary to my Government's declared policy to assist enemy-owned ships to reach British ports or to assist enemy subjects by the grant of residence visas which would facilitate their entry into British-controlled territory. This does not, however, mean that these wretched victims of Nazi persecution would be turned back. Even in the case of the "Struma" messages were sent to the Turkish Government not to return the ship until arrangements could be made for receiving the children. Unfortunately these messages failed in their effect, but steps have now been taken which should result in preventing any recurrence of such a tragedy as the "Struma"; that is to say, the Turkish Government, when they require future parties of illegal immigrants to leave their territorial waters, will not prevent them from continuing their voyage onwards. This, of course, will be into a zone of war with its peculiar risks, against which the British Government can obviously give no guarantee. But the ships will at least have the opportunity of making for some shore with a reasonable hope of being received, and I can inform you in strict confidence that should that shore be Palestine, there would be no question of expelling the ship or passengers. In other words, the British Authorities cannot in any way modify their attitude towards illegal immigration and so cannot facilitate the entry of visa-less
persons into Palestine; but those who succeed in reaching that country will, if they have no alternative destination and no choice between admission to Palestine and return to Nazi domination, be allowed to land. They will then be placed in detention camps and those who pass the security and economic check will gradually be released against the current quotas. I should emphasize that this statement of my Government's policy is extremely confidential; were it made public the Germans would be only too ready to break it down by shipping off from the Balkans every kind of unwanted person. You will appreciate that, in this event, the Allied war-effort in the Middle East would be most seriously threatened, and my Government would be compelled to reconsider its position. In fact, in its anxiety to relieve distress in this particular matter, it appears to me that the British authorities are taking a certain risk.

Further than this, in any case, my Government does not feel able to go. Their difficulties would of course be greatly eased if destinations other than Palestine could be made available. Some of the passengers have been found to be ex-employees of the United States Legations or Consulates in enemy-controlled countries. Would it not be possible for these to be granted United States visas? If so, temporary refuge in Palestine could, I am sure, be arranged. Again, it may be assumed that many of the immigrants will not fit into the economy of Palestine, but might well be absorbed in more spacious countries further from the zone of actual operations, for example, Latin American countries. Could not the intake of immigrants into San Domingo, for example, be substantially increased? It would be an extremely delicate matter for the British Government to suggest the reception of such persons, especially in countries which have laid such emphasis on their unwillingness to receive Jewish immigrants. But I should be grateful to know your view on the possibility of a joint move by our respective authorities. The "Struma" case, as you say, has caused comprehensible indignation, and a demand for preventive action. But, as you also point out, this is only part of the whole great problem of the deliberate German extrusion of unwanted Jews from territories under their control. In time of peace this called for international action; in time of war it is a burden which can only be taken up in the first instance, so it seems to us here, by your country and ours. I have explained our difficulties, and I have told you of action which the British authorities earnestly hope will afford at least some relief,
but a radical solution which would give satisfaction to the conscience of all civilized countries demands the most careful preparation and if, after reading this, I fear, lengthy letter and its enclosures, you have any other proposal to make; I should be most grateful to receive it, and can promise to take it up immediately and actively with the authorities concerned.

Sincerely yours,

(Sd) WINTERTON.
All material facts relating to the sinking of the M/S “Struma” on February 24th with such deplorable loss of life have now, after investigation, been stated in Parliament by the Secretary for the Colonies on March 10th and by the Under-Secretary in reply to a question on March 11th. It may, however, be added that, although all the immigrants on board this ship were, so far as is known, of enemy nationality, while the ship’s captain and crew themselves were also enemy (Bulgarian), it was not only on this account that it was found impossible to grant permission to enter Palestine to any of the immigrants except the children. The regularized admission of Jewish immigrants is fundamental to His Majesty's Government’s Policy and to reverse it at a critical moment of the war would involve a risk of dangerous repercussions on the non-Jewish populations of the Middle East which might affect the whole conduct of the War.

2. His Majesty’s Government have been by no means insensible to the terrible persecution in Germany and German-controlled countries, and have given many practical demonstrations of their anxiety to assist the victims of racial and religious persecution. Illegal immigrants who have reached Palestine have been and will continue to be treated with every regard for humanity, but indiscriminate and substantial additions to their number cannot but be regarded with the greatest misgiving by the authorities responsible for the military and political security of the Middle East. The United States Government, are, of course, aware that His Majesty's Government are not alone in finding it vitally necessary, under the stress of war, to place restrictions on emigration from enemy countries.

3. His Majesty’s Government have no confirmation of the report mentioned in the last paragraph of the State Department’s memorandum. According to their information the Turkish Government, who had already expressed their inability to allow the children from the "Struma" to be landed and taken across Turkey to Palestine, were apprehensive of an attempt to force them to accept all the immigrants in their territory, and so decided to return the ship to the port from which it sailed.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.
14th March, 1942.
My dear Mr. Taylor:

I am instructed to give you good news this time. The Department's decision to resubmit the budget for the Intergovernmental Committee to the Senate Committee has had favorable results. The Senate Committee, without further inquiry, has approved a continuation of the budget and has held a conference with the House Committee which has reversed its decision. The budget will be maintained.

Devotedly,

[Signature]

Robert T. Pell

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York.
11th August, 1942.

Dear Mr. Lynchie,

You will no doubt have seen in the Press reports that Laval has accepted the principle of the Nazi Decree by which Jews in unoccupied France are to be deported to Poland and the parts of Russia occupied by the Nazis. This is an extension of the policy which is being systematically pursued in occupied countries. So far as the latter are concerned, it is impracticable to do anything. As regards unoccupied France, there is not, I think, much prospect of either your Government or the British Government being able to give even temporary asylum to the persons concerned, at any rate on a considerable scale and the number involved is at least 10,000 and may be as many as 20,000.

The only other measure appears to be diplomatic pressure on Vichy by your Government since it may deter Laval from this monstrous step if he knows that it will outrage public opinion in America.

I would be very grateful if you could represent the matter to the State Department.

With every good wish to Mrs. Myron Taylor
and to yourself,

The Hon. Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Myron Taylor,

As I think I mentioned in a previous letter, I have been giving considerable thought to refugee problems after the War and some weeks ago I finished a Memorandum on the subject giving my own personal and provisional ideas. I enclose a copy of the Memorandum. I would emphasize that the views expressed are my own and owe nothing to any official suggestion.

You will see that I have not written either as Director of the Intergovernmental Committee or as High Commissioner under the League of Nations. This was deliberate. First, I did not wish to embarrass either body and, second, it seemed to me that there would have to be a lot of preliminary work before a concrete scheme would be ready for consideration, if necessary, by either of the two international bodies now interested in refugees.

The first step, as it appeared to me was to get your Government and the British Government thinking about the question with the view of agreement being reached on general lines of policy, for there can be no doubt that a solution depends primarily on such agreement.

When I had finished the Memorandum, I therefore got into touch with the British Foreign Office, on one hand, and Mr. Winant, on the other. The Foreign Office, as you know, is the Department of the British Government immediately concerned, but other departments are closely interested and have to be consulted before proposals could be presented by the Foreign Office to the British Government even for their provisional consideration.

The Hon. Myron C. Taylor
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y. U.S.A.

...
So far all that has happened is that the Foreign Office has now taken up the general question on refugee problems after the War (not necessarily on the lines of my Memorandum), and will, I hope, be soon in a position to consult other departments.

I have had the advantage of two talks with Mr. Winant to whom I sent a copy of the Memorandum. Mr. Winant is very keenly interested in the subject and although, of course, he is not in any way committed to any of the views expressed by me, he was good enough to say that in writing to you I could mention that he is in agreement with the general lines of my Memorandum. In fact he himself suggested that I should write to you, enlisting your help and seeking your advice.

I should indeed have sent you a copy when I had finished the Memorandum, but before I sent copies to you, to Lord Winterton and to the Secretary General of the League for his information, I wished to make sure that there was nothing in it to which fundamental objection would be made by Mr. Winant or the Foreign Office, and, that whatever might be the final decisions, the Memorandum furnished a basis for examination. I have not had a personal discussion with Lord Winterton, but I have heard that he is in general agreement with the Memorandum as a line of approach to the problem.

The position is thus that I have started the ball rolling and am naturally anxious that it should go on rolling in the right direction.

2. I have myself no doubt about the main proposition set forth in the Memorandum, namely that there must be an International Refugee Authority to deal with "long term problems" concerning refugees, and that if it is to achieve success this body must have wide functions and be adequately financed. I am also clear about maintaining the distinction between the "short term problems of relief" and the "long term problems of refugees". I do not regard the actual setting up of the Refugee Authority as a matter of immediate urgency. So long as the War continues the opportunities of tackling the refugee problem as a whole are limited, and the High Commissioner of the League, on one hand, and the Intergovernmental Committee, on the other, can deal with current problems within the limits which the War prescribes.

It is however essential that the U.S.A. Government
and the British Government should agree in the first place, and later obtain the agreement of other Governments concerned, regarding the machinery to deal with the post-war problems of refugees and the general lines of policy to be pursued, so that when the proper time arrives there will be no delay in bringing the machinery into being.

3. When the two Governments mainly concerned have each been able to give thought to the question, there will, I imagine, have to be discussions between their Representatives either in Washington or in London. If I can assist these discussions in any way, I shall, of course, be delighted to do so.

Meanwhile, may I beg your help first in forming your own opinion as to whether the Memorandum, as a whole, is a suitable basis for examination, and second, if you think it is, in bringing it, unofficially, to the notice of the State Department, not with the view, of course, to the acceptance of the principles stated in it, but so that your Government may, if it has not already done so, engage in the preliminary examination of problems that are likely to arise and of the means of solving them. I know of course that the question of "short term relief" has already been taken up, but such information as I have, suggests that the same thought has not been given to the "long term question."

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
COPY

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

11d Regent Street,
London, S.W.1.

11th August, 1942.

Dear Mr. Myron Taylor,

As I think I mentioned in a previous letter I have been giving considerable thought to refugee problems after the War and some weeks ago I finished a Memorandum on the subject giving my own personal and provisional ideas. I enclose a copy of the Memorandum. I would emphasize that the views expressed are my own and owe nothing to any official suggestion.

You will see that I have not written either as Director of the Intergovernmental Committee or as High Commissioner under the League of Nations. This was deliberate. First, I did not wish to embarrass either body and, second, it seemed to me that there would have to be a lot of preliminary work before a concrete scheme would be ready for consideration, if necessary, by either of the two international bodies now interested in refugees.

The first step, as it appeared to me was to get your Government and the British Government thinking about the question with the view of agreement being reached on general lines of policy, for there can be no doubt that a solution depends primarily on such agreement.

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The Hon. Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y., U.S.A.
information, I wished to make sure that there was nothing in it to which fundamental objection would be made by Mr. Winant or the Foreign Office, and, that whatever might be the final decisions, the Memorandum furnished a basis for examination. I have not had a personal discussion with Lord Winterton, but I have heard that he is in general agreement with the Memorandum as a line of approach to the problem.

The position is thus that I have started the ball rolling and am naturally anxious that it should go on rolling in the right direction.

2. I have myself no doubt about the main proposition set forth in the Memorandum, namely that there must be an International Refugee Authority to deal with "long term problems" concerning refugees, and that if it is to achieve success this body must have wide functions and be adequately financed. I am also clear about maintaining the distinction between the "short term problems of relief" and the "long term problems of refugees". I do not regard the actual setting up of the Refugee Authority as a matter of immediate urgency. So long as the War continues the opportunities of tackling the refugee problem as a whole are limited, and the High Commissioner of the League, on the one hand, and the Inter-governmental Committee, on the other, can deal with current problems within the limits which the War prescribes.

It is however, essential that the U.S.A. Government and the British Government should agree in the first place, and later obtain the agreement of other Governments concerned, regarding the machinery to deal with the post-war problems of refugees and the general lines of policy to be pursued, so that when the proper time arrives there will be no delay in bringing the machinery into being.

3. When the two Governments mainly concerned have each been able to give thought to the question, there will, I imagine, have to be discussions between their Representatives either in Washington or in London. If I can assist these discussions in any way, I shall, of course, be delighted to do so.

Meanwhile, may I beg your help first in forming your own opinion as to whether the Memorandum, as a whole, is a suitable basis for examination, and second, if you think it is, in bringing it, unofficially, to the notice of the State Department, not with the view, of course, to the acceptance of the principles stated in it, but so that your Government may, if it has not already done so, engage in the preliminary examination of problems that are likely to arise and of the means of solving them. I know of course that the question of "short term relief" has already been taken up, but such information as I have, suggests that the same thought has not been given to the "long term question".

With kind regards

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) HERBERT EMERSON
THE REFUGEES PROBLEMS AFTER THE WAR

1. Introductory.

Attempts at the present time to make an estimate of the refugee problem after the war, and to suggest measures for dealing with it, must obviously be of a provisional character. Exact information regarding the existing position is not obtainable; the situation changes almost from day to day, and will continue to change for some time after hostilities cease. Any appreciation must therefore be not only tentative, but to a large extent hypothetical in character. In some respects it will certainly be falsified by events. One the less, there are some aspects which can now be envisaged, while the consideration of certain principles at this stage may avoid confusion and mistakes later on. It therefore seems desirable, in spite of the very large element of uncertainty, to attempt some analysis of the very complicated questions that are likely to arise, and to suggest some principles to be observed in their solution. These must assume that the victory of the Allies will be complete, so that they are able to impose the terms of settlement. It is on this basis that I have proceeded. For convenience of treatment it is further assumed that the boundaries of States after the war will be the pre-war boundaries. Unless it is otherwise clear from the context, references to countries are to them as they were before the war.

2. Pre-war Groups of Refugees.

In September 1939 the three main groups of refugees were the following:

(a) The Russian refugees, who comprise
   (i) Russians,
   (ii) Armenians,
   (iii) Refugees from the Baltic;
(b) Refugees from Spain;
(c) Refugees who had to flee from Greater Germany owing to political, racial or religious persecution.

Of the Russian group, the Russians and Armenians are static, in the sense that they had been settled for many years in the countries of asylum. So far, the war has not appreciably affected this outstanding feature.

The refugees from Spain were those who fled from that country after the Civil War and obtained asylum elsewhere, the great majority in France. They included some Germans, Austrians and Czechs who had fought in the International Brigade, and who came properly under the third group. Practically all the remainder were of Spanish nationality. In September 1939, too short a period had elapsed since the end of the Civil War to regard these as permanent or even long-term refugees. It was hoped that many of them would be able to return to Spain, and this in fact has happened. So far as numbers are concerned, the problems of this group are far less formidable than when war broke out. It is still too early to regard as long-term refugees all those who are still in countries of temporary refuge.

The third group, that of refugees from Greater Germany, constituted the main pre-war problem. They included three classes
classes, which, however, sometimes overlap, namely,

(1) those who had to flee for political reasons;
(2) those who were the victims of religious persecution, e.g., Protestants and Catholics;
(3) the Jews as defined by the Nuremberg Laws.

The last class was by far the most numerous, and probably accounted for ninety percent of the total.

If we regard as refugees only those who had left Greater Germany before the war, the position has worsened. For, while there has been some emigration during the war to countries of permanent settlement, this has been more than offset by the fate of those who were caught when the Germans occupied the countries of temporary asylum. If we take a broader view of the position, and look at the forces responsible for this problem, then there has been very grave and widespread deterioration. Not only has the policy of elimination of the Jews from Germany been ruthlessly pursued, but their persecution has been extended to occupied territory, and has been actively encouraged and followed in countries in alliance with Germany. As far as can be foreseen, the Jewish refugee problem will be the most difficult, both as regards numbers and remedies.

3. MOVEMENT OF POPULATIONS.

The cessation of hostilities will bring millions of people away from their own countries. Apart from the forces fighting in the field or on the seas, there will be numerous groups to whom the general term "displaced persons" may be given. Included in these groups are the following:

(a) those who have left their own country on account of political, racial or religious persecution, either before or during the war, and have obtained temporary asylum in other countries;

(b) those transferred from one area to a different area, in another country, on a basis intended to be permanent, e.g., Germans from the Baltic States transferred to former Western Poland;

(c) persons forcibly deported to places outside their own countries, e.g., Jews from Germany to Eastern Poland;

(d) those who have fled from war zones to places outside their own territory;

(e) persons employed on labour outside their own country;

(f) prisoners of war.

In addition there will be many who, although in their own country, are away from their own homes. In many cases, families will have been broken up, and the members unable to trace their relations. There will be great physical distress in most of the countries of Europe, and this will extend to nationals as well as to strangers. At this stage, except for one or two clearly defined groups, it will not be possible to distinguish between those able to return to
to their homes and those who have to find new homes, in other countries. That is to say, it will not be practicable at first to isolate the long-term problem, nor is it desirable that the attempt should be made prematurely. The object should be to get back to their own countries, and within them to their own homes, as many persons as possible who are willing and able to return, within the least possible time. From the outset, the goal should be to confine the long-term problem within the least compass that is practicable. Otherwise, the problem will be intractable and insoluble. Accordingly, the policy should be to discourage exaggeration of the long-term problem, to be reluctant to accept individuals as permanently displaced from their own countries until it is clear that this in fact is the position, and to distinguish clearly between the ephemeral problems and those which will be of a more enduring character. In this connection, it is unfortunate that the term "refugee" is often used not only to denote the person who, for permanent reasons, is unable to return to his own country, but also the person who, owing to temporary causes, is unable to make his way back. It is the members of the former class who properly come within the meaning of the term "refugee", and for whose problems a special agency is particularly necessary. Generally, the obstacles to their return to their own country are not physical, but arise either from the system or policy of government which practises various forms of political, religious or racial persecution; or from changes in the boundaries of States, as a result of military conquest. Since it is difficult to find suitable words which will describe exactly members of these two groups, and which will at the same time differentiate between them, I shall regard them as all coming within the two classified persons and distinguish between them as "short-term refugees" and "long-term refugees" respectively. The principles to which I attach great importance are the following:

(1) that a clear distinction should be kept between the short-term problems and the long-term problems;

(2) that the aim from the outset should be to get persons back to their own countries;

(3) that groups of persons should not be recognized as long-term refugees until it is clear from the facts that they will have to be treated as such.

4. Immediate Measures following the Cessation of Hostilities.

...
consideration for an Inter-allied Relief Organization, which, either independently or in cooperation with the Government concerned as circumstances may permit, will undertake relief measures. In the early days a great deal of the work will probably have to be done by the military. I would urge that, during this initial period, no distinction should be made for relief purposes between nationals and strangers, whether the latter are temporarily displaced or prima facie long-term refugees. The standards of relief should be the same, and the responsibility should be vested in a single agency. To attempt to set up one authority for the purpose of relief for nationals and another for non-nationals would lead to confusion, conflict, and variation in standards, and would cause a great deal of unnecessary suffering. Still more confusion would result if attempts are made at this stage to distinguish for purposes of relief between short-term and long-term refugees.

Simultaneously with the relief of distress, there will be the movement of displaced persons back to their own countries or homes. This will require a great deal of organization in the countries of departure and of arrival, and will involve the efficient and economical employment of means of transport, which in the early stages will in some countries be under the control of the military. This should again be the responsibility of a sole authority, namely, the agency primarily responsible for the relief of distress. Competition between independent authorities will result in inefficiency and muddle.

5. Gradual Clarification of the Problems.

The process of getting the displaced population back to their own countries and their own homes will obviously take a considerable time. It may occupy two or three years. Meanwhile, many of them, indeed most of them, will be without normal employment, and unless provision is made, they will tend to wander aimlessly from place to place. It will almost certainly be necessary to establish refugee camps, and if these can be associated with employment on public works, e.g., reconditioning of areas damaged during the war, so much the better. Arrangements will also have to be made for the education and the welfare of children, for medical relief, recreation, etc., -- not on a permanent scale, but on a scale sufficient to tide over the transitional period. This period will not come to a close so long as there remains a considerable number of displaced persons wishing to get back to their own countries but unable to do so for physical reasons. The primary responsibility for coping with and disposing of this humanitarian problem should be that of the Inter-allied Relief Organization, working in close concert with the Governments concerned.

Meanwhile, the facts of the long-term problem will continuously be revealed. Some groups, e.g., Palestinian refugees, will from the outset come within the long-term category. Others will emerge as such at conditions in their own countries of origin become more clear, and as the attitude of the refugees themselves becomes manifest. An important factor which will influence this attitude will be the alternatives open to them if they do not return to their own countries. For instance, if there are fairly wide facilities for permanent emigration, many will prefer to mark time rather than to return. If, on the other hand, there are few open doors,
the reluctance to go back will be less marked. These factors will not be evident for some time, and this is a further reason against premature assumptions regarding the long-term character of particular problems. The problems of the long-term groups will differ in many respects from those of the short-term. Many of these problems will be outside the scope of the Allied relief organization, and it will be essential to have an international refugee authority competent to deal with them. I discuss this question below.


There are at present two international refugee organizations, namely, the Intergovernmental Committee and the High Commission for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations. The Intergovernmental Committee was brought into being at the Conference held at Evian in July 1938, which was itself due to the initiative of Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America. Its specific object was to find a solution of the involuntary emigration of nationals from Greater Germany by a long-term programme to be arranged, in collaboration with the German Government, within the framework of the existing immigration laws and practices of the Governments concerned.

It was hoped that the cooperation of the German Government would result in an orderly system of emigration, and that its finance would be largely provided from the assets of the emigrants themselves. Early in 1939 a provisional arrangement was reached with the German Government, but the details were not finally completed before the outbreak of war. In the meantime the Committee had been able to obtain facilities for emigration from several of the Governments participating in the Committee. In the late summer of 1939 a Coordinating Foundation was formed, under its auspices, which included among its objects cooperation with the Intergovernmental Committee, with the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and with the voluntary organizations, to assist in the orderly emigration of involuntary migrants and the protection and transfer of their property, and to investigate the possibilities of large-scale settlement and to assist in the work of settlement. The Foundation had been in existence only a short time when war broke out, and it was in fact unable to make practical progress with the objects for which it was formed. Its success in any case depended on factors which will either not exist after the war, or will not be operative to the same extent as when the Foundation was formed in 1939. For instance, it was presumed that there would be close cooperation between it and an internal body in Germany which would administer for the benefit of refugees the property from which they were expropriated. It was also assumed that large funds would be available from private sources, and that it would be possible to carry out large-scale settlements. Post-war conditions will be entirely different, and the new problem will have to be tackled in accordance with the changed facts.

The large part which the League of Nations has taken since the last war in the solution of relief of refugee problems is described at length in Sir John Hope Simpson's survey of the Refugee Problem. Briefly, it may be said that, since Dr. Panse accepted the appointment of High Commissioner in 1921, there has been no time when the League has not had definite responsibilities for particular groups of refugees. The responsibilities and the groups have varied, but it has a continuous record of refugee service and experience. It has
consistently given special attention to the political and legal protection by it of those groups which from time to time have been brought within its mandate. While acting as a coordinating agency, it has been reluctant to allocate League funds for relief and settlement; but exceptions have been made to its general policy in this respect. In particular cases it has undertaken or financed ad hoc schemes of settlement, and it has made specific allocations towards emergency relief. It was under the auspices of the League that the necessary loans were raised for the settlement of Bulgarian and Greek refugees.

In its present form, the High Commission for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations was established by a resolution of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (September 1933). The main functions, as defined by that resolution, are the following:

To provide for the political and legal protection of refugees;

To superintend the entry into force and the application of the legal status of refugees, as defined more particularly in the Conventions of October 28th 1933 and February 10th 1938;

To facilitate the coordination of humanitarian assistance;

To assist the Governments and private organizations in their efforts to promote emigration and permanent settlement.

The groups that come within the mandate of the Commission are the following:

(a) the Haskan refugees;
(b) refugees from Greater Germany, including the Sudetenland.

The annual reports describe the activities of the Commission during the war.

There are certain characteristics common to the two existing international bodies:

(1) Jurisdiction is limited to specific groups of refugees;

(2) Neither body is undertaking any financial responsibility for the relief of distress among refugees;

(3) Neither body is undertaking any financial responsibility for emigration of refugees, or for their settlement.

The budgetary position of both bodies has been limited to meeting administrative expenses, namely, the salaries of staff, office expenses and travel and allowance, and, in the case of the Intergovernmental Committee, the cost of meetings of the Committee. Following the necessary suspension of most of its activities during the war, the administrative charges of the Intergovernmental Committee have been reduced to the minimum. The Director (myself) works in an honorary capacity, with headquarters in London and with a staff of one personal secretary only. The Secretary of the Committee is in Washington, but his pay is not a charge on the Committee.
The High Commissioner for Refugees is directly responsible to the Assembly of the League. His headquarters are in London, where he is assisted by a Deputy High Commissioner and a staff of a Registrar, a personal secretary and two assistants, with an office-keeper. Previous to the war, the High Commissioner had representatives in Belgium, France, Greece, Lithuania, Romania and Yugoslavia, who were, however, concerned only with the group of Nansen refugees. They worked either in an honorary capacity, or at a comparatively low salary, their office expenses being met out of the budget of the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner has also a small humanitarian fund. No contribution is made towards it from League funds, and it can be used only for the benefit of Nansen Refugees.

7. Functions of an International Refugee Authority.

Before considering the constitution of an international organization competent to deal with post-war refugee problems, some of the functions of such a body may be briefly stated. It would consider and formulate broad principles of policy. It would be fully and continuously informed of the facts of the changing situation relating to refugees, so that it could determine the long-term groups coming within its jurisdiction. Its primary object would be to find a permanent and complete solution for such groups. This would involve their political and legal protection, the organization and coordination of humanitarian assistance, whether from international, state or private funds, the promotion of measures to secure the rehabilitation and economic independence of the refugees concerned, by return to their own countries, absorption within the country of refuge, normal emigration to other countries, or large-scale settlement. In brief, the international organization would be concerned directly or indirectly with all matters affecting the refugees within its mandate, except in so far as particular matters were the responsibility of some other international body. It might also be the most suitable body to deal with schemes relating to short-term refugees requiring international assistance and where the carrying out of such schemes was likely to be spread over a considerable period. Not least, it should be able to exercise a powerful influence in discouraging the kind of action which has in the past been responsible for the creation of large groups of stateless persons.

It is clear that these objects can only be achieved if the international organization has the active support and good will of the participating States, is so organized as efficiently to carry out its duties, and has therefore adequate funds under its control. There must be close contact between its officers and the Governments of the countries most closely concerned. There must be a headquarters staff competent to deal with general questions, and there must be an executive staff able to deal with the problems of each group as a whole, and also with the problems of that group within a particular country. The whole must be under the control of an administrative head, who will keep his finger on the pulse and will be responsible to the international refugee authority for the proper execution of its policy.

Vertically there will be different groups, some large and some small, of long-term refugees. Horizontally there will be dispersal of members of the same group over a number of countries.
The vertical division will require that under the general control of the Director-General there should be Directors responsible for the various groups, namely, a Director in charge of a single group, where this is sufficiently important fully to occupy his time, or a Director in charge of several small groups, where they can be combined for this purpose with economy and efficiency. The Director for a group would deal with problems relating to that group, in whatever countries the members of the group may be.

The horizontal division due to the dispersal of refugees over many countries necessitates the appointment of a local representative in each country where the number of refugees so requires. Perhaps the most important of his functions would be the political and legal protection of the refugees, work which involves close and friendly relations with the Government concerned. For this reason, it is necessary that the local representative should be carefully selected, that he should be a person of sufficient standing to command respect, and that he should therefore be adequately paid for his services. There is, however, no reason why the vertical division should automatically be applied to representatives. It might happen that in the same country there were two groups, each of which would involve the full-time services of a representative. In that case there should be two representatives, one for each group, but ordinarily a single representative should be able to watch the interests of all groups in his country, and this should be the normal arrangement. He should be appointed by and be the representative of the Director-General, but should be responsible to the group Director for work connected with that group.

Each Director will have to do a considerable amount of touring, so as to maintain personal relations with the Governments concerned, and also to obtain personal knowledge of the conditions of the group for which he is responsible in different countries. The Director-General will not be able to tour on the same scale, but he should be able to make visits where personal contacts or knowledge are clearly needed. Special missions may be necessary to countries of emigration and settlement. These could be appointed as required, under the general control of the Director-General. Since economic conditions will have a profound bearing on the solution of the problem, the organization must have access to the best advice obtainable. Many questions, some of them of a difficult character, will arise regarding employment, but this side of the question could best be dealt with by very close cooperation between the refugee organization and the International Labour Office.


It is clear that neither of the two existing international organizations is competent in its present form to deal efficiently with post-war problems. Neither could, however, be adapted and developed for the purpose. It would be premature in the present state of uncertainty to make any suggestion as to which would be the more suitable. It is sufficient to say that, if a solution of the refugee problem is to be found, there must be an international body able to carry out the duties briefly outlined in the preceding paragraph, and that it must have the status and resources necessary
for its task. For convenience, I will refer to this organization as the International Refugee Authority. The following conditions should be satisfied:

(1) The Authority must be thoroughly representative. The participating Governments should include

(a) those of the countries in which a refugee problem has originated;
(b) the countries of temporary asylum;
(c) the countries of permanent settlement or emigration;
(d) those countries which are willing to assist financially towards a general solution.

Since practically every country comes under one or other of these three categories, there is in fact no limit to State membership. It will not, however, be necessary, and may not be feasible, to secure at once complete representation.

(2) It is essential to success that the Authority should have the active support of the leading Powers.

(3) The Authority should include an adequate number of representatives of the International Labour Office, who, for this purpose, would be representatives of the Office, and not of any particular country.

(4) While the full body should lay down general lines of policy, it should delegate freely its powers to a small Council, on which the I.L.O. should be represented.

(5) The primary concern of the Authority should be with the long-term refugee, although during the transitional period before the groups become clearly defined, it may properly, and indeed may have to, concern itself with groups which cannot be definitely and finally placed in this category.

(6) So far, at any rate, as Europe is concerned, it should include in its mandate all long-term groups. Although the character of the problem, and the nature of the solution, will no doubt vary from group to group, there will be many features which are common to all, and efficiency and economy will be best served if there is a single authority embracing all groups.

(7) The Authority may also undertake the execution of long-term schemes relating to short-term refugees who have returned to their own country.

(8) The form of the organization is as follows:

INTERNATIONAL
### Administrative Representatives in various countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Director</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group A</td>
<td>Group B</td>
<td>Group (C &amp; D)</td>
</tr>
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### Finance Statistical Emigration and Settlement Special Missions and Undertakings

The above lay-out is on the assumption that the Refugee Authority will be independent and self-contained. Tonight, however, be part of an international body concerned with functions of a much wider character, as is at present the case with the High Commission acting under the League of Nations. Indeed, if there is such a body after the war which is thoroughly representative, it would be clearly desirable that the Refugee Authority should come within the general framework. The above scheme could, of course, be adapted accordingly. Further, the plan represents a conception of the probable requirements. In some respects it may overstate the requirements immediately after the war; in others, it may underestimate them. I would certainly deplore the creation of machinery on an extravagant scale in excess of actual needs, and would prefer to see development of the essential machinery as the needs become manifest. Subject to this, I believe that the proposals are along the right lines.


The discussion so far has assumed two main classes of displaced persons, the first consisting of those temporarily severed from their own countries, who are able and willing to return, and the second consisting of those unable to return for other than physical reasons. In forecasting the post-war situation there is a third class to be considered, that of potential refugees, namely, persons who, on the conclusion of hostilities, are in their own countries, but who are unwilling to stay there. There may be an outward as well as an inward movement. This is particularly so in the case of the Jewish nationals of the central and eastern countries of Europe. Horrified by the conditions in which the Jews concerned now exist, there are many who take the view that, with few exceptions, the countries of Europe will not be places in which Jews can continue to live. There is a school of thought which contemplates an exodus on a scale which may run into millions.
In many European countries there is no security of life and property for Jews, and it is undoubtedly the fact that there are many hundreds of thousands of Jews who, if they were free agents, would flee tomorrow from the appalling persecution, torture and humiliation to which they are subject in countries allied with or occupied by Germany. The forces which create refugees in the mass are intensively active over the greater part of Europe, and their inevitable tendency is to encourage an outrush of Jews if and when this becomes possible. If a solution is to be found of the refugee problem, it is absolutely essential that not only should a stampede of this character not take place, but that the centrifugal movement should be actively discouraged and kept within the smallest practical volume. This is as important to the ultimate interests of the Jews as to an orderly solution of the whole refugee question. From the Jewish point of view, it would be suicidal for them to acquiesce in the doctrine that a Government, by a calculated policy of persecution and oppression, should be allowed to divest itself of a particular class of its nationals. It would be a triumph for the Nazi policy, and if other countries acquiesced, it would equally be a triumph for the policy of blackmail by which Germany was able to give widespread effect to its policy before the war. It is extremely improbable that other countries will acquiesce. Many have been willing in the past to give asylum to the victims of Nazi oppression, and it is hoped that, within limits, they will be willing to do so after the war. But good will and humanity will be complicated by economic factors, and any attempt to flood other countries with a large number of Jews would tend to produce in those countries the same policy of the closed door. There would be no widespread extension of anti-Semitic feeling. The solution does not lie in this direction.

If, on the other hand, Jews are to continue to live in the European countries of their nationality, and if other States are to be protected against the economic and political disturbance which large incursions would involve, then there must be adequate guarantees for the safety and protection of life and property, for the restitution of their rights as citizens, and for the peaceful enjoyment of those rights. Discriminatory legislation must be annulled, and an end put to administrative measures of discrimination. These guarantees must be part of the peace treaty or equivalent settlement, and they must be backed by the necessary sanctions. Without this, not only will the immediate post-war situation be incapable of control, but the conditions created by Germany from 1933 until the present time will be perpetuated there and in other countries, and the Jewish refugee problem will become insoluble and permanent.

The terms of the peace settlement, far-reaching as they must be, will not by themselves restore at once the confidence of the Jews, or automatically change the feelings of whole populations which have been taught to loathe the Jew and everything connected with him. But they will help to tide over the immediate crisis, and will give time in which to formulate and carry out the revivification of Jews and the reconstruction of Jews and Jewish states. In some countries, France for instance, the persecution of minorities is completely alien to national traditions, and the return of old ideas should not be long delayed. In other countries, the process will be more difficult and the period more prolonged. The Jews as a community will be able to assist in the recovery. It is right that they should do so. For if they are guaranteed the enjoyment of full citizens’ rights,
rights, and these guarantees are backed by international sanctions, they must themselves accept the consequential obligations of citizens, and strive to develop along lines which will attenuate the more common causes of friction. Such thought is being given by Jews themselves to measures designed to this end. Among them is a broadening of the economic foundations of the community, less concentration in particular professions, trades and callings, and a healthier distribution of the population between urban and rural areas. This is as large a part of the long-term solution as is the international protection of minority rights.

10. Some Centrifugal Movement Unavoidable.

In laying emphasis on the necessity of discouraging centrifugal movements of nationals from their own countries, I refer to the emergency period following the war, before the forces which govern migration assume a more or less normal character. Restrictions on migration have so complicated the refugee problem in the past that I should be the last to suggest that greater rigour should be a permanent feature of post-war conditions. But time must be given for the creation of more or less stable conditions in countries both of departure and reception, before ordinary migration can be resumed on a considerable scale.

Even during the emergency period there must be some centrifugal movement. Yet the least cruelty of Nazi persecution is the break-up of families that it has caused. Children are separated from their parents, husbands from their wives, mothers from their children. Before the war the deliberate policy of the Nazis was to force out the men from Germany so that they could prepare a home in some other country for their wives and children. The first desire of wives and children in German or German-occupied territory will be to join their husbands or parents, and where the husband or the father has made a permanent home for himself elsewhere and is able to support his family, it is right, alike from the economic and humanitarian points of view, that reunion should be brought about as soon as practicable. There will be other cases where, on the particular merits, exceptions should be made even during the emergency period to the principle of discouraging centrifugal movements, but they should be regarded as exceptions to the normal policy.

I have dwelt on the case of the Jews because it is at present the outstanding example. But the same principles should apply to other communities and groups. Control must be exercised for some time after the cessation of hostilities over the exodus of nationals from their own countries, until the normal ebb and flow of migration comes into operation.


Whatever measures, however, may be taken to mitigate the problem and to reduce it to manageable proportions, there will be a large number of stateless persons or of nationals unwilling or unable to return to their own countries, but who have failed to find a permanent home and livelihood elsewhere. The groups to which they belong will be the long-term refugee groups. The ultimate goal of the International
Refugee Authority will be to find permanent homes, permanent livelihood and nationality for these persons. Other activities of the Authority, many as they will be, are ancillary to this end. There are the following methods by which this goal can be attained:

(a) Return of individuals to the country of origin.
(b) Absorption in the countries of temporary asylum.
(c) Emigration to other countries by infiltration.
(d) Emigration to other countries for the purpose of large-scale settlements.

I will deal briefly with those in turn.

(a) Return to the country of origin. Something has already been said about this subject. Further, what has been said about the measures necessary to keep potential refugees within their own countries applies with still greater force to those who have fled elsewhere. Unless conditions are such as will ensure them the rights of full citizenship they will not be persuaded to return. Compulsory repatriation is unlikely to be a practical measure. Repatriation should be on a voluntary basis, and its extent will depend on the confidence felt by refugees themselves in the stability of conditions in their own country.

(b) Absorption in the countries of temporary asylum. The question of absorption will obviously be a difficult one after the war. Much will depend on the conditions of the labour market. If unemployment is plentiful there will be less opposition to the naturalization and absorption of refugees, but if there is unemployment governments will find it difficult to approve a policy which might involve demobilized nationals remaining out of work while foreigners were allowed to compete in the labour market. Generally, therefore, there is likely to be a reluctance to approve naturalization in considerable numbers until the economic position becomes clarified. A strong case can, however, be made for those refugees who have joined the military forces of the country of asylum. They should certainly be given priority of naturalization in comparison with other refugees, and it is to be hoped that it will be possible to give the opportunity of naturalization to all of them. On the general case, it has to be remembered that there may be great delay in finding permanent homes for temporary migrants, that in the meantime they will have to be maintained if employment is not available and that the greater part of the cost of maintenance, if not the whole, will fall on the state. It is demoralizing to persons to be kept indefinitely in a state of uncertainty, and if in the long run no outlet is found for them by emigration, the state is the worse off by having kept them in suspensio. While, therefore, some delay may be necessary (except, it is hoped, as regards members of the military forces) before decisions are reached regarding absorption and naturalization, it is most desirable that decisions should not be delayed too long, and that the policy pursued should be as liberal as economic conditions permit. Twenty-three years after the end of the last war, there are still thousands of stateless
Hansen refugees who have lived for many years in the same country of adoption, have found permanent employment there, are not likely to emigrate, but who are still unable to secure naturalization. It is to no one's interest that the same should happen to refugees after the present war, for the State suffers as much as the refugee when it puts off taking action in accordance with the manifest facts.

(c) Emigration to other countries by infiltration.

Emigration by infiltration is the normal and by far the most important method of disposal. In ordinary circumstances it provides for the overflow of populations by spreading it over countries where it can be economically provided for with benefit to all concerned. In the past, emigration on a large scale to Northern Europe has prevented what would otherwise have been troublesome refugee problems. Restrictions, on immigration, by quota or otherwise, have very greatly reduced the effectiveness of this safety-valve, and unless there are wide changes in this policy, infiltration after the war will still be conditioned by the pre-war restrictions and safeguards imposed by the laws of immigration of the receiving countries. None the less, even before the war, a great deal was achieved in this respect. In August 1939 it was estimated that 400,000 refugees from Nazi oppression had left Germany, of whom 224,000 had been permanently settled, at least eighty-five per cent of the latter had been placed by infiltration. Moreover, as the number of persons permanently settled increased, the difficulties of placing the rest tend progressively to decrease, other things being equal. The earlier stages include comparatively few who can go to close relations already permanently established, but as the earlier settlers establish themselves, they are able to receive and provide for their relatives.

The war has inevitably caused special restrictions and limitations to be imposed in many countries on immigration, and has also often resulted in the introduction of special and sometimes lengthy procedure. The sooner these war restrictions can be removed after the war, the better, so that a steady and orderly flow of emigrants can be resumed. At the same time, it will be an important duty of the Refugee Authority, assisted in this respect by some of the voluntary organizations, to persuade the Governments of suitable countries of reception to adopt a liberal policy, to try to provide the type of refugee suited to local conditions, and to fit others by training for their new life.

In this connection, there may be opportunities in Europe which did not exist before the war. Postillence, famine and the ravages of war may so reduce the population in some areas as to make an influx of new-comers almost an economic necessity. One task of the Refugee Authority will be to ascertain and develop these opportunities.

(d) The last method is by emigration to other countries for the purpose of large-scale settlement. Before the war surveys of various areas of potential settlement were carried out. These included British Guiana, Northern Rhodesia, San-Domingo
and Mindanao in the Philippine Islands. Less complete enquiries were made regarding a number of other areas. A scheme for a refugee settlement in British Guiana, to be backed by certain financial assistance from the British Government, had reached an advanced stage, when war intervened, and for the time being at any rate the scheme had to be abandoned. The same was true of Mindanao. As regards Northern Rhodesia, the estimated cost of settlement was so high, and its potential scope so small, that it was hardly worth pursuing. In the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, a very liberal agreement under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Committee was concluded between the Dominican Republic and the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, a body set up for the purpose and financed from various sources in the U.S.A. The initial object of the Association is to establish a pioneer settlement of five hundred families, in order to determine one way or another whether persons of Central European origin can become self-supporting under sub-tropical conditions in an agricultural settlement combining certain industries closely related to agriculture. The scheme is still proceeding, and by September 1941, 418 settlers were at Bousu. The Dominican Republic Settlement Association has devoted much thought and care to the settlement, and has done a good deal of preliminary work in the breaking up of land, the erection of farm and other buildings, the introduction of new crops, and the physical health of the settlers. So far as any forecast can be made, the present indications are that the prospects of success are not unfavourable, provided that sufficient provision is available to meet the very considerable overhead charges during the period of experimentation in commercial crops before the settlement becomes self-supporting. But as yet no positive answer can be given either on the economic aspect of the experiment, or on the question as to whether Europeans can successfully carry out agricultural work in sub-tropical conditions.

Before the war it was fairly clear that the scope of large-scale settlement was limited. The first difficulty is that of finance. The cost per family is high, and there is usually an initial period of several years before the settler becomes self-supporting. Even after this he can only repay the capital spent on his behalf over a long period of years, and there is always the very real danger of overloading him with a burden of long-term debt. On the other hand, if he does not make a considerable contribution towards this capital expenditure, the cost becomes prohibitive. Again, the only practical form of settlement dealing with large numbers is agricultural, associated in some cases with allied industries. As a producer of primary products, the settler is dependent on world markets, and since the last war, the experience of agricultural producers has fluctuated between a short boom and a long and very deep depression. It is quite impossible to forecast what may happen to primary producers after the present war. Some years may intervene before a safe estimate can be made. At all events, there will be great uncertainty for some time. It will be unsafe to embark on big schemes of land settlement without obtaining the best advice obtainable, and it may be doubted whether the economist will be able to give a positive opinion. Two conditions will most probably have to be satisfied: first, a low capital cost per family; and second, the careful selection as settlers of persons who are hereditary agriculturists or who have had a very thorough training. The transfer of peasants from one European area to another may, however, be a practical proposition, when it would not be feasible to transfer refugees with no agricultural traditions to countries where the climate
and other conditions are different from those to which they have been accustomed. While, therefore, big-scale settlement can make a contribution to the general solution, I am very doubtful whether, during the years immediately following the war, it can play a substantial part, except in the case of peasant refugees. So far as Jews are concerned, it must certainly be preceded by a thorough training, and accompanied by a determination to stick to the land.

An important exception must be made in the case of settlement in Palestine. There the scope is not confined to agricultural settlement, and even in the agricultural field religious and racial fervour, supported by first-class organisation, has achieved a very large measure of success. Finance hitherto has not been a difficulty, since the community as a whole has been willing to provide the necessary funds on a very generous scale, and will no doubt be willing to do so in the future. The difficulty in Palestine arises from the fact that absorption is determined by political and economic factors. It is to be hoped that, so far as these will allow, Palestine will make its full contribution.

12. The Voluntary Organisations.

So far little has been said about the voluntary organisations and their part in the post-war solution. In the term "voluntary" are included three types. First, there are voluntary workers who receive no remuneration for their services, or remuneration much below their market value; second, there are voluntary organisations which depend entirely on voluntary sources of revenue, but which maintain in addition to voluntary workers a highly efficient paid staff; and third, there are voluntary organisations which derive part of their funds from State grants, and part from private sources. All three classes were doing refugee work before the war, and they are still doing it in many countries, according to the opportunities open to them. The war has seen some development of the third class, and I believe that after the war there will be much scope for further developments along these lines. During the emergency period, and later, voluntary workers can play a very large part both in the relief of distress and in the solution of refugee problems. They bring to their work a human element often absent from Government Departments. They are not fettered to the same extent by rules and regulations, and they establish individual contacts which a busy official has not the time to make. Apart from the purely voluntary service they give, they are usually economical in their methods, and the reputations they have established enable them to tap private sources of revenue with which to supplement State or international finance. They are often quicker in the field than State agencies. It is therefore essential that their help should be enlisted and encouraged to the utmost extent. At the same time, it will be necessary, especially during the early period, to co-ordinate and to exercise some measure of control over their efforts, so as to avoid overlapping, confusion and waste. In the early stages, and for relief purposes, this will be the business of the Relief Organisation. In some areas and for some purposes, that Organisation may find itself able to use a particular organisation as its recognised agency, and to finance through it certain activities for which it is responsible. Financial assistance would be accompanied by a measure of control, which could be readily arranged between the Relief Organisation and the voluntary body.

The solution of the short-term problem and of the long-term problem will each involve large sums of money. The combined cost is likely to run into hundreds of millions of pounds. Where is the money coming from? There seem to be the following potential sources:

Private sources
(a) Charitable contributions from the public or particular communities.
(b) Contributions from the relatives of refugees.
(c) Contributions from the refugees themselves.

Public sources
(d) State revenues.
(e) International funds.

I will take the private sources first.

(a) After the last war very large sums of money were contributed by the public, especially by the people of the U.S.A., towards the relief of distress. Before the present war large sums were contributed, though not on the same scale; in particular, very generous gifts were made by the Jews for the assistance of their co-religionists. Indeed, up to the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, very large sums continued to be raised in that country through the United Jewish Appeal. The flow of contributions to refugee organisations in other countries was very greatly reduced by the war, but it has not entirely ceased, even for refugee purposes. More or less. The total stream has almost certainly increased, but it is diverted into more channels, and spread over many more fields. Its volume has necessarily been affected by the drastic changes in individual incomes and in conditions which the war has caused, and since the effect is cumulative, the longer the war lasts the more will this source be reduced. When hostilities cease, the change-over from war to peace industry is likely to have a still greater effect. While, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that the fountains of charity will dry up, or that the outflow will not be considerable and continuous, it is certain that they can only make a partial contribution towards the total that will be required. It is desirable that there should be co-ordination in the appeal for and collection of funds, as in the case of the Fund for Refugees, which has been set up for this purpose. An extremely valuable form of private assistance is the system of guarantee, by which a guarantor accepts whole or partial financial responsibility for a particular refugee, sometimes giving him hospitality, sometimes direct financial aid, and sometimes both. This is a system particularly suitable for children who have lost their parents or have been separated from them.

(b) Apart from the contributions which relatives of refugees have made towards funds for general purposes, they have given assistance earmarked for the benefit of particular individuals. The gift may be for maintenance or for training, or, more often, for emigration. Sometimes it is spontaneous, sometimes it is encouraged by persuasion or legitimate pressure by the refugee organisation concerned. Some voluntary bodies have shown much efficiency in this respect. The Joint Distribution Committee of
of America, for instance, would not have been able to have
carried out its large programme of emigration, had it not
succeeded in turning the resources of relatives. This
source should continue to be turned after the war, and in
particular, as regards the expenses of emigration. As
already mentioned, reunion of families will be an important
post-war activity. Where the breadwinner, himself a for-
mer refugee, has established himself in his country of
adoption, it is right that he should make full con-
tribution towards the cost of reunion. Similarly, rela-
tives who are not refugees, but have lived long in the
country of emigration, and who are prepared to act as
sponsors, should be encouraged to bear a reasonable share
of the cost. There is a private as well as an international
side to the problem.

(c) Contributions from refugees themselves. Until
they are permanently settled, the great majority of refugees
are not self-supporting, unless they are allowed to take
remunerative employment. Even when they were able to get
or bring out some of their resources, these have been
exhausted in many cases. This, however, is not always the
case. Some have still considerable capital. Moreover,
many have been able to earn their own living during the
war, e.g., temporary migrants in Great Britain. Even if
they are not able to continue that employment after the
war, some of them at any rate will not be entirely without
resources. The general rule must be that assistance to
the individual should be determined by the necessity for it.

Apart, however, from this elementary principle, the
equation arises as to what contribution, if any, refugees
can reasonably be expected to make towards the finance of
the problem. The tendency in the past has been too much
in the direction of making them dependent on charity. It
is obviously necessary to make physical distress independent
of any question of remittance. But the benefits afforded
to refugees often go beyond this, e.g., training or retrain-
ing, the provision of the implements of his profession or
vocation, the cost of professional education, expenditure
on emigration, land settlement, etc. Many of the refugees
from Nazi oppression are able, enterprising men, qualified
to make a career for themselves, given the opportunity. It
is due to their own self-respect, to a charitable public
and to the taxpayer, that the assistance given to them
should be repaid, at least in part, if and when they are
able to repay it. The sums so repaid then become available
for others less fortunate. I would like to see a wider
application of the principle of loans and remittances than
has been the practice in the past.

Again, having regard to the size of the financial prob-
lem involved, it will be necessary for the Governments con-
cerned to consider how far refugees should make a special
contribution to the State for the purpose of refugee relief.
There are several precedents for this:

(1) In some countries a special duty is levied on the
issue and renewal of Nansen passports, the pro-
cceeds of which are credited to a humanitarian
fund.

(11) Switzerland has given temporary asylum to many
refugees from Nazi persecution. The Federal
Government has made a graduated capital levy,
for the benefit of the refugees as a body, on well-to-do refugees, with a specified minimum of capital. It has also levied a graduated income tax on refugees in remunerative employment with a minimum income.

These examples are sufficient to show that the question will at least merit examination by the International Authority. The financial contribution will be small, but in so far as the principle encourages self-respect and a common bond of union among refugees, it is salutary. It is also of value as tending to mitigate the prejudices of nationals.

For Jewish refugees from Nazi oppression there is another possible source of finance derived from the refugees themselves. This is capital in Germany arising from the confiscation and realization of property belonging to refugees. The Nazis purport to credit the proceeds, after various deductions, to a fund earmarked for the benefit of Jews. If there is anything left in the fund after the war it could be made available for the benefit of this class of refugees. There is, of course, the wider question whether Germany should not be required to make good the value of the property confiscated from refugees. But this seems to be a particular instance of the whole question of reparations, to be decided according to general principles.

Financial Assistance from Public Funds.

I have already mentioned the principle accepted at the Evian Conference that the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement of refugees from Greater Germany should not assume any obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration. With few exceptions this principle was observed previous to the war, the whole financial burden being left to private resources. Even before September 1939 the strain, however, was proving very severe, and after the outbreak of hostilities the system of voluntary relief broke down in several countries. It would not have survived so long had it not been for very liberal assistance by private organizations in America, and especially the Joint Distribution Committee. The Belgian, Dutch and Swiss Governments had to give indirect assistance from State funds, and the French Government was considering similar aid just before the German invasion. Subsequently, the Viyov Government has maintained many unable to support themselves in refugee camps. From the beginning of the war the British Government undertook to share authorized expenses equally with the voluntary organizations, and later it increased its contribution to 100% of maintenance as assessed by the Assistance Board, and to 75% of other authorized expenses. The above relates to a single pre-war group of refugees, which, since it is composed largely of Jewish victims of persecution, has been assisted on a very liberal scale by the Jewish community. It is clear, therefore, both from experience before and during the war, and from the accounts given above of potential private resources, that these will be quite inadequate to finance the long-term programme, while they will not cover the fringe of the problem as a whole. Moreover, it will take some time to mobilize such private resources as are available, and meanwhile, the need for relief will be immediate. It is therefore inevitable that the great bulk of the finance required should be provided out of public funds. There are two main sources: first, State revenues; and second, international funds.

(d) Assistance
(d) **Assistance from State Revenues.** Two assumptions may perhaps be made: first, that in the general reconstruction after the war, of which the solution of the problem of displaced populations is only a part, the policy will be to give international financial assistance to various Governments according to their needs; and second, that the aim will be to get State Governments to undertake, as they are able, a fair share of the expenditure incurred within their territories, and for their benefit. This, however, is a policy of perfection which will present many difficulties in its execution. In some countries considerable time may elapse before stable Governments are established; the adverse effects of the war and financial and economic resources will vary greatly from country to country; and as a further complication, the expenditure both on the short-term and the long-term refugee problems will vary with the number of refugees involved, which in turn will depend to some extent on the liberality or otherwise of the policy pursued in the past in giving asylum to the victims of persecution. It is therefore impossible at present to forecast the extent to which contributions from State revenues will be available. But it is reasonable to assume that in many countries, and for some years, they will be inadequate for the purpose. It is possible at this stage only to suggest certain principles which merit consideration.

1. Where there is a stable Government, the active co-operation of that Government should be sought and given in the operations financed or carried out by international bodies, and in particular by the Relief Organisation and the Refugee Authority.

2. As early as possible, agreement should be obtained between the State concerned and the international financing body regarding the financial contribution of the former. Relief measures should not, however, await such agreement.

3. Where an international body gives financial assistance, it should exercise adequate control to ensure the due fulfilment of the objects for which assistance is given.

4. While at the outset it will be necessary in some countries, and for some objects, for an International Relief Organisation to carry out relief measures through its own agencies, the aim should be to use the normal machinery of the State, subject to the necessary safeguards. This general principle, however, might well be subject to exceptions, for instance, a scheme of settlement financed entirely or mainly from international funds.

5. With regard to actual relief, the Government should apply to a displaced person the same standards as are applicable to its own nationals, or at any rate give the most favorable treatment to them accorded to nationals of a foreign country. In this connection, Chapters VIII and IX of the International Convention of February 1938 concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany states the humanitarian objects at which to aim:
CHAPTER VIII. - Welfare and Relief.

Article 11.

Refugees residing in a territory to which the present Convention applies who are unemployed persons, persons suffering from physical or mental disease, aged persons or infirm persons incapable of earning a livelihood, children for whose upkeep no adequate provision is made either by their families or by third parties, pregnant women, women in childbed or nursing mothers, shall receive therein the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in respect of such relief and assistance as they may require, including medical attendance and hospital treatment.

Article 12.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to apply to refugees, as regards social insurance laws at present in force or which may subsequently be established, the most favourable treatment accorded to the nationals of a foreign country.

Article 13.

Refugees shall, as regards the setting-up of associations for mutual relief and assistance and admission to the said associations, enjoy in the territories of the High Contracting Parties to which the present Convention applies the most favourable treatment accorded to the nationals of a foreign country.

CHAPTER IX. - Education.

Article 14.

Refugees shall enjoy in the schools, courses, faculties and universities of each of the High Contracting Parties treatment as favourable as other foreigners in general. They shall benefit in particular to the same extent as the latter by the total or partial remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.
accordance with the principles applicable to British subjects in need of relief. This system has several advantages. It maintains the direct link between the refugees and the voluntary organisation; it encourages voluntary contributions in money, kind and especially in service; and it has enabled the voluntary movement to carry on when otherwise it might have had to close down owing to lack of funds. From the Government point of view it has relieved the State of the troublesome task of accepting direct responsibility for the welfare and care of some ninety thousand refugees. At the same time, it has secured close co-operation between Government Departments and voluntary associations.

Similar schemes might well be adopted in other countries where the State makes grants towards refugees. It is capable of modification and adaptation to local conditions. For instance, some Governments might think it desirable to have an official Chairman or official representatives on the Committee which administers the grant. Or they might find it convenient to deal direct with the well-established voluntary organisation. But the principle by which the public authority assesses the rate of maintenance in each individual case while the actual payment is made through a welfare agency, I believe, many merits.

(e) International Funds. We come to the last source of financial assistance, namely international funds. It is clear that international assistance will be necessary on a very large scale. Without it, reconstruction cannot begin, or continue, or be completed. And without reconstruction there cannot be a revival of international trade, commerce and prosperity. Since the problem of displaced persons is one part only of the general question, it is outside my province, even if it were within my ability, to make any suggestions regarding the system of finance or the fixation of contributions. But I would most strongly urge that, within the general framework, adequate provision be made for the short- and long-term programmes, and that the acceptance of the refugee problem as an international question, as it undoubtedly is, be accompanied by the practical consequence that the financial gulf between expenditure and the revenue available from other sources should be bridged by international funds. This will, of course, mean the complete abrogation of the principle observed by the League of Nations and also laid down at the Evian Conference that, except for administrative expenditure, the refugee problem should not be a charge on international funds.

Then we come to consider the nature and scope of the expenditure which the International Refugee Authority will have to incur, it is necessary to form as clear a picture as possible circumstances will allow of:

(a) the functions which the Relief Organisation will perform;

(b) the gradual transference of some of those functions to particular groups or particular problems to the International Refugee Authority;

(c) the initial functions of the International Refugee Authority; and

(d) the development of its functions as the long-term problems become clarified.
With regard to the functions of the Relief Organisation, I assume that it will be the body primarily responsible for measures of relief during the emergency period, which may extend to two or three years. I assume, further, that the relief measures will include the provision of food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., and the control of transport. Both long- and short-term refugees will come within the scope of their activities, not because they are refugees, but because they are in need of relief and it will lead to extravagance and confusion if, in the early stages, different agencies are dealing with the same problems of relief. A position might, however, soon be reached, at any rate in some countries, in which it would be practicable to separate a long-term group or groups, and to arrange for relief measures to be carried out through some agency other than the Relief Organisation. The International Refugee Authority might, for instance, itself undertake direct relief measures for such a group or groups, but I would deplore this if it would mean appointing a dual and parallel executive staff for the purpose. The more suitable arrangement would be one by which the work of relief for a group of this kind was carried out by a voluntary refugee organisation subsidised from international funds. In that case, the grant should be made through the International Refugee Authority, which would be put in funds for the purpose. This method would be of great practical value in establishing the status and influence of the Authority, and in bringing it into intimate relations with the voluntary organisations.

Again, I have already suggested that there may be long-term problems relating to groups other than those of long-term refugees. For instance, the return of ex-refugees to their own countries will not solve in itself solve their problems. Their rehabilitation may involve long-term schemes of settlement, and in so far as these might require international assistance, the Refugee Authority might be the most suitable body to undertake the work. Further, the time would come when it would be desirable to wind up the activities of the Relief Organisation; even though, apart from long-term refugees and long-term problems which would already have been transferred, there would still be some loose threads to be gathered up. The Refugee Authority might again be a suitable body for the purpose.

In paragraph 7 above, I have stated some of the initial functions of the Refugee Authority. Assuming that several groups of long-term refugees will be immediately included within the mandate of the Authority, it would be at once reasonable for all matters of an international character concerned with those groups, except those included within the relief measures of the Relief Organisation. Its work would rapidly develop, first, as it undertook, either directly or preferably through voluntary relief organisations, duties primarily assumed by the Relief Organisation; and second, as new long-term groups came within its mandate. The skeleton organisation outlined in paragraph 8 should be brought into immediate being at the end of the war, and it should be extended and developed as it assumed fresh responsibilities.

In addition to the financial responsibilities suggested above, the International Refugee Authority would probably have to subsidise the following objects:

(1) settlement
(1) settlement overseas;
(ii) scheme of training and re-training;
(iii) refugee camps.

It would also have to assist emigration, but in this respect one would expect very considerable contributions from relatives.

The above is not an exhaustive list of the liabilities which an international body, having as its object the solution of the refugee problem, will have to assume; but it is sufficiently comprehensive to indicate that very large sums of money will be necessary. In so far as assistance is given in direct subventions to Governments, it is to be hoped that, when the necessity is established, the grants will be in the form of gifts and not of loans. Much of the delay that occurred after the last war in the settlement of displaced populations was due to the protracted negotiations for loans, and even so, the service of the loans was not always maintained.

14. Long-Term Groups now Apparent.

It is not possible at the present time to make any forecast regarding the number and character of the long-term groups of refugees which will emerge from the war. There are, however, two groups about which it can be said with reasonable certainty that they should be regarded as coming within this category, and should therefore be included within the mandate of the International Refugee Authority as soon as that body is set up. The two groups are, first, the Nansen refugees, and second, refugees from Greater Germany. The problems concerning the Nansen refugees are comparatively simple, but they require that an International Authority should continue to deal with them. The aim should be to liquidate as soon as practicable the problems which remain.

With regard to refugees from Greater Germany, I have made it clear that in my view it would be a mistake to regard each and every member of this group as a long-term problem, in the sense that none will be able to return to his own country of origin. On the contrary, I hope that such conditions will be established in their own countries as will allow the return of many of this group. None the less, there will be some who cannot return, and apart from this there are problems of a long-term character which are now being dealt with and can continue to be dealt with only by an International Refugee Authority.

15. Summary.

I may now summarise the more important conclusions contained in the preceding paragraphs.

(1) The number of persons displaced from their own countries at the end of the war will run into many millions.

(ii) The great majority of these will, however, be willing and able to return to their own countries. They represent broadly the short-term problem. The object should be to get as many back as possible within the least possible time.

(iii) There
(iii) There will be others unwilling or unable to return because of political, religious or racial conditions. These will constitute the long-term refugees.

(iv) A clear distinction should be kept between the short-term and the long-term refugees, and groups of persons should not be recognised as long-term refugees until it is clear from the facts that they will have to be treated as such.

(v) During the emergency period immediately following the war, which may extend for two or three years, widespread measures of relief will be necessary. Such measures will include the provision of food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., and will cover nationals and all classes of displaced persons, including short-term and long-term refugees.

(vi) The primary responsibility during the emergency period for such relief measures, and also for transporting persons back to their countries, should, in so far as international action is required, be that of the International Relief Organisation.

(vii) The same standards of relief should be applied to all persons coming within the ambit of relief.

(viii) There should be an International Refugee Authority, as representative as possible of the various Governments, and including representatives of the International Labour Office.

(ix) Its initial constitution should be along the lines described in paragraph 8 above.

(x) This Authority should include within its mandate all groups of long-term refugees. It should be the Authority which decides whether a particular group comes within this category.

(xi) Except in so far as relief measures are undertaken by the International Relief Organisation, it should be primarily responsible for all matters of an international character relating to long-term refugees, including their legal and political protection.

(xii) The Refugee Authority should not undertake direct relief measures immediately after the war, this being the function of the Relief Organisation. Even later, this should be avoided if it involves the setting-up of a dual and parallel executive relief agency. It should, however, be practicable, for some groups and in some countries, gradually to organise relief measures through voluntary or unofficial refugee organisations, subsidised where necessary for the purposes. This might well be accomplished by transfer of responsibility for relief in such cases from the Relief Organisation to the Refugee Authority.

(xiii) Apart from questions affecting groups of long-term refugees accepted as such by the Refugee Authority, there may be long-term problems relating to other groups which might properly and suitably be brought within the mandate of the Refugee Authority.

(xiv) The activities of the Refugee Authority should not, therefore, be rigidly defined at the outset. The mandate should contain a large element of flexibility in order to permit the Authority to cope with problems and developments as they arise. Similarly, the administrative and executive organisations should be capable of expansion and adjustment.

(xv) The
(xv) The Refugee Authority must be adequately financed efficiently to fulfil its purpose.

(xvi) The following long-term groups will come at once within the mandate of the Refugee Authority when established:

(a) Mennon Refugees,
(b) Refugees from Greater Germany.

(xvii) There will probably be centrifugal forces at work, tending to increase the number of long-term refugees by voluntary emigration on a large scale from certain countries immediately after the war. Unless these forces are controlled and centrifugal movements regulated, until the normal ebb and flow of migration becomes operative, the long-term refugee problem will be intractable and insoluble.

(xviii) It will not be practicable either to control centrifugal movements, or to secure the return of certain groups to their countries of origin, unless conditions are established in those countries which will enable the persons concerned to live the normal lives of citizens, with complete protection of life and property. It is therefore essential that every effort should be made to establish such conditions, and, as an indispensable precedent thereto, that all discriminatory legislation be annulled and all discriminatory administrative measures stopped. This must be part of the peace settlement, and must be enforced by the necessary sanctions.

(xix) It will be a particular function of the Refugee Authority to obtain permanent homes for long-term refugees by

(a) return to their own countries,
(b) absorption in the countries of asylum,
(c) emigration, and
(d) large-scale settlement.

(xx) It will be an important duty of the Refugee Authority to secure the closest co-operation and assistance both of Member and non-Member Governments, and to bring so far as possible the administration of internal affairs relating to refugees within the ordinary machinery of the Governments concerned.

(XXI) The fullest use should be made of voluntary assistance, in money, in kind, and in service. Subject to the necessary safeguards, voluntary organisations, when necessary, should be subsidised from international or State funds.

(xxii) Since the solution of the many problems will depend very largely on adequate finance, all available public and private sources must be encouraged to contribute.
August 26, 1942

The Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees met at Evian, France in July 1938, on the call of the President of the United States. The conference under the Chairmanship of the United States of America representative Myron J. Taylor resolved itself into permanent form at the conclusion of the conference. More than thirty governments are represented on the Committee. Lord Winterton, the Chairman of the British Delegation, is Chairman of the Committee. There are five vice chairmen who, with the Chairman, act as a steering Committee. The vice chairmen are the chiefs of delegation of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Argentina and Brazil. Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees is the Director. The post of Secretary of the Committee which by agreement is to be occupied by a representative of the United States is now vacant.

The Intergovernmental Committee was given a two-fold mandate by the Evian Conference: (1) to undertake negotiations (with the country of origin, Germany) to improve the conditions of exodus and to replace them by conditions of orderly emigration; and (2) to approach the governments of the countries of refuge and settlement with a view to developing opportunities for permanent settlement.

Negotiations were carried out by Mr. George Rublee, Sir Herbert Emerson, and Mr. Pell with the German Government throughout
throughout the winter and spring of 1939. Agreement was reached in principle on a plan whereby order would have been introduced into the exodus of persons from Germany and the exodus would have been financed in part by the pooling of refugees' goods in Germany and in part by financing on the outside. The war, of course, put an end to this project.

Meanwhile, negotiations for the settlement of groups of refugees were carried on with various governments, notably the Government of the Dominican Republic, the Government of the Philippine Commonwealth and the Government of British Guiana. Opportunities for settlement were explored under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Committee in various parts of the world, notably, with the collaboration of the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees and a similar body in London, in the Dominican Republic, British Guiana, Mindanao, Northern Rhodesia and Surinam.

When war broke out plans which had been formulated for trial settlements in several areas had to be suspended but, under the terms of an agreement signed at Ciudad Trujillo on January 30, 1940, a settlement was undertaken at Sosua in the Dominican Republic under the direction of the Dominican Republic Settlement Association headed by Mr. James N. Rosenberg.
In the course of the work of the Committee it became apparent that there was a need for a body which would be closely related to the financial groups in various countries that were prepared to contribute to the financing of projects and which would undertake to investigate the facilities for emigration and further in a general way plans of emigration. Talks were held in London, Paris, and New York with a view to an organization of this nature which came to be called the Coordinating Foundation and which was, among other things, to maintain contact with the trust which at that time it was proposed to set up inside Germany. American trustees of the Foundation include Mr. Paul Baerwald, Chairman of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; Mr. John W. Davis; Dr. Rufus Jones, President of Swarthmore College; former Governor Nathan Miller; the Honorable Dave Hennen Morris; Judge Joseph Proskauer; and Mr. Lessing Rosenwald. M. Paul van Zeeland, former Prime Minister of Belgium, was persuaded to become Chairman of the Coordinating Foundation and established headquarters in New York.

Meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee were held from time to time in London, Paris, Washington and Ciudad Trujillo. In October, 1939, after the outbreak of war in Europe, the officers of the Committee were addressed
addressed by President Roosevelt at the White House. The President stressed that the work of the Intergovernmental Committee must not be abandoned because of the outbreak of war; it must be redirected. Without overlooking the short-range problem of placing those few persons who might be rescued in permanent domiciles the Committee should focus its attention on the long-range problem, that is an expansive effort to survey and study definitely and scientifically the geographical and economic problem of resettling several million people in new areas of the earth's surface. The President emphasized in conclusion that he wished the Intergovernmental Committee to remain in being in order that the more than thirty-three governments members of the Committee might be prepared at the close of the war to continue their collaboration for the resettlement of the vast populations.
His Excellency,  
Mr. Myron C. Taylor,  
Mayflower Hotel,  
Washington, D.C.  

Your Excellency,  

I have just received an acknowledgment from the Holy See of the documents sent here under date of June 9th with reference to the condition of the Jewish people in Slovakia. Your Excellency had forwarded them at the request of Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Please be sure that the Holy See is profoundly interested in this question.

With sentiments of esteem, and with all good wishes, I remain

Sincerely yours in Christ,

[Signature]

Archbishop of Laodicea,  
Apostolic Delegate.
September 10 1942

Dear Sir Herbert:

Replying to your letter of August 11th, in a recent interview with Laval our Charge d'Affaires at Vichy protested in the strongest possible manner against the wholesale deportation of Jews from the occupied and unoccupied zones of France and against the inhuman and revolting manner in which their exodus was carried out. Opportunity was taken to point out the unfortunate effect on public opinion in this country and throughout the civilized world and Laval was informed that in our opinion his Government would have to accept full responsibility for the regulations now in force in the unoccupied zone of France, which were causing these unfortunate people to be turned back to their persecutors.

As you know, the Papal Nuncio at Vichy has likewise expressed to Laval the deep concern which the Pope feels for the fate of the non-French Jews in France. Various representatives of well-known American relief organizations operating in unoccupied France have seen Marshal Petain in an effort to persuade him to modify the harsh measures which have been adopted.

Our Charge d'Affaires reports that it is evident from Laval's attitude that he has little interest in or sympathy for the fate of any Jews; that he is in fact pleased at the opportunity presented to get rid of a considerable number; and that in spite of the various protests which have been made he has no intention of departing from his original plans.

Under the circumstances there appears to be little more that my Government can effectively do.

We all regret very much indeed that the circumstances are most unsatisfactory to all.

With best regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

(Sd) MYRON TAYLOR.

Sir Herbert Emerson,
11d Regent Street,
My dear Mr. Easterman:

I have received your letter of October 7, 1942 with which you enclosed a memorandum in regard to the grave situation of the Jews in German-occupied Europe.

The Government of the United States of America is fully aware of the desperate plight of these unhappy people and will continue its efforts to alleviate their condition wherever and whenever possible. As you know the United Nations have already issued formal statements expressing their abhorrence of the atrocities committed in occupied Europe and providing for the full punishment of the war criminals responsible for them. The necessary organization has been established in London for listing those criminals to be brought to trial. I believe that this step adequately meets your request for some explicit declaration on the part of the Allied Powers.

I assure you that the American Government will consider carefully every possible measure that may be taken to promote the welfare of these unfortunate persons. One of the main purposes for which this war is being fought is to ensure that all of the peoples of the world, regardless of race or creed, will not in the future be subject to mass persecutions of the type imposed by the Axis Nations.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Mr. A. L. Easterman,
Political Secretary, World Jewish Congress,
British Section, 1 Harley Street,
Cavendish Square, W.1.,
My dear Mr. Taylor:

I am afraid that my offer to resume a connection with the Interdepartmental Committee is merely leading to embarrassment. I am sure that you will understand if I withdraw the offer - with the very deepest regret.

Theola is back from Nassau and we hope that we may have the pleasure of having you with us when next you are in Washington.

Ever devotedly,

Robert T. Pell
Assistant Chief, Division of Current Information

Honorable Myron C. Taylor,
United States Steel Corporation,
71 Broadway,
New York, New York
My dear Myron,

I am glad to have your letter dated November 25, 1942, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Max Gottschalk, President of the HIAS-ICA Emigration Association, Inc., 386 Fourth Avenue, New York, New York, with which he enclosed a copy of a cablegram from St. Herbert Emerson, of the Inter-governmental Committee on Political Refugees in London.

The Department has and is giving every consideration to the fate of these unfortunate refugees but the recent events in France have made it practically impossible for them to obtain exit permits from that country. It is possible, of course, that a certain number of refugees will succeed in entering Spain and Switzerland. For those who have found refuge in Switzerland, there is little that we can do to assist them as it would be necessary for them to pass through enemy occupied territory in order to reach the Western Hemisphere. Concerning those refugees who have arrived in Spain, we have asked our Consuls to give special consideration to any bona fide refugee whose admission into the United States would not be detrimental to public safety. We have also authorized our Consuls to take care of all children whose parents have been deported to enemy occupied countries and have asked the Consuls that they report the names of those refugees who have minor children, in order that special consideration may be given to those cases.

Concerning the children who are unable to obtain exit permits in order to leave France, we are endeavoring to ascertain whether the German and French Governments will permit these children to enter the United States and we hope to have information on the subject at an early date. The Department is keeping the Committee for the Care of European Children fully informed and is doing what it consistently can to assist these unfortunate refugees.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES.

The Honourable Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway, New York.
WESTERN UNION CABLEGRAM

Received at 40 Broad Street, New York, N.Y.

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NLT HONOURABLE MYRON TAYLOR

71 BROADWAY NEW YORK

HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED TO HEAR OF ORDER GIVEN BY
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FOR LIBERATION OF ALL PERSONS
CONFINED ON INSPIRATION OF NAZI GOVERNMENT STOP
PRESUME THESE INCLUDE REFUGEES INTERNED UNDER ORDERS
OF VICHY GOVERNMENT IF NOT WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF
YOU WOULD SUPPORT THEIR INCLUSION AND IMPROVEMENT IN
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CAMPS IN WHICH THEY MAY
HAVE TO REMAIN ALTHOUGH NOW FREE

EMERSON.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 20 1943

My dear Mr. Taylor,

I have your letter of January 13, 1943, and its enclosures regarding the problem of the refugees from France who are now in Spain.

The British Ambassador has also approached me on this subject.

The American Embassy at Madrid is giving attention to this problem and has arranged to afford some relief to those who are interned. Governor Lehman has taken up the tasks involved.

With reference to the migration of the refugees in Spain, I have been informed that General Eisenhower has a representative at Madrid, who may accept those who may be found to qualify for war work in Africa. Advisory approval has been given under the war-time visa procedure for the issuance of visas to several hundred, who may be able to come to the United States. We have sent a message to London regarding the proposal of the President’s Advisory Committee that 1,000 be taken to Palestine and from 500 to 1,000 to a relief camp in Jamaica. I shall also speak to the British Ambassador about this.

I perceive no objection to the proposal of the President’s Advisory Committee to approach the Netherlands authorities regarding a possible place of refuge in Surinam for these refugees for the duration of the war.

The lack of available shipping facilities complicates the problem.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES.

The Honourable Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway, New York.
PERSONAL

May 25 1943

Sir Herbert Emerson,
Intergovernmental Committee,
11 D Regent St., London, S.W.1.

Dear Sir Herbert:

There has been much discussion over the matters upon which you and I are mutually engaged, resulting in the conference at Bermuda, and I would like to have you know that I was not prepared to go as the American representative; and for your personal information I am attaching a memorandum which I explained both to Mr. Eden when he was here and to our own Department of State. In the early stages when Ottawa was the discussed place of meeting, I felt that certain steps should be agreed upon before the conference was held, to avoid its being considered a failure.

Recently I received both of your letters, describing very completely the problems of the present and the future, and circulated both with the American authorities.

We are now discussing the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee as recommended by the Bermuda conference, and I have again raised doubts as to actually holding that meeting until the British and ourselves have come to some definite conclusion—questions as to providing the cost of transit; (2) as to maintaining residents in places of temporary refuge; (3) as to the places of temporary refuge. These questions may be settled by the President and Mr. Churchill while the latter is here. In any event that is the substance of a memorandum which I have presented to our Government.

I have not written you about the details of your two most excellent statements, and will now refrain from doing so until the atmosphere has cleared and we may know definitely what the procedure is to be.

Give my kind regards to Lord Winterton; and with assurances of continuing interest with respect to yourself, believe me,

Faithfully yours,

(Signed) MYRON TAYLOR.
April 1943

Dear Sumner:

While it is my earnest desire to be in every way helpful, I must not take on the Ottawa Conference. In fairness to myself and the work of the Economic Committee, under the new plan, my time and attention can be better devoted to its work.

I am still associated with Intergovernmental Committee which might have dealt with this problem if the basic policy of Britain and U.S.A. as outlined in my memo of yesterday were settled. This can not be settled by open debate but by private negotiation. This procedure will be more creditable to the President and the Department in my opinion.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) MYRON TAYLOR.
Probably private conversations with Mr. Eden and/or other British representatives can attain the same result as a public well advertised conference which must not fail. Either or both Britain and ourselves must:

I. Permit the refugees to enter some part of the Nation's territory.

II. Pay the cost of (a) transportation to the place of temporary refuge - (b) the cost of maintenance while there.

III. Guarantee to find place of permanent settlement, pay the cost of transportation to it; and the cost of maintenance until occupation has been found for the refugees.

IV. This whole problem ties up, at least as precedent, with post war migration and settlement.

V. Assistant Secretary Berle has taken over that field and I think he should initiate action with the consent of the Secretary and under the advice of the Under Secretary at once.

VI. The immediate question is what have we to offer

   (a) Place of temporary settlement

   (b) Cost

   (c) Commitment regarding places of permanent settlement

VII. What similarly have the British to offer.

These several questions could be answered before or without a conference which may result in unexpected developments and commitments. Certain it is that it will bring out a great Jewish gathering at Ottawa.
June 11 1943

Mr. Welles:

If the Prime Minister accepts the principle proposed in the last memorandum to the President re 50/50 participation in expenses of refugee movements and maintenance in places of temporary refuge, our Government will need to select a Vice Director to operate with Sir Herbert Emerson, Director, in the office at London. This will be a full-time paid official and should be one of outstanding ability, capable of negotiating with foreign diplomats and Foreign Office officials of the member countries upon the Intergovernmental Committee, as well as neutral countries not members.

The Department should be exploring the field to discover such a man.

(Signed) MYRON TAYLOR.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REORGANIZATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

I. Appoint Winterton British Representative.

II. Elect an American full-time and salaried Chairman. Salary?

III. Elect Emerson Director.

IV. Provide for Vice Director who might be a Dutchman. (Van Zeeland?) George Warren, Robert Pell.

V. Secretariat.

VI. Office - London.

VII. Funds for support in place of present refuge - transportation to places of temporary refuge.

VIII. Funds for transportation to places of temporary refuge - by Intergovernmental Committee.

IX. Maintenance or relief by International Red Cross - or by Lehman organization.

X. Places of ultimate permanent settlement - transportation to

1. Their original home.
2. Places under regular immigration laws.
3. New places of permanent settlement.

XI. Contributions by private organizations and individuals.
REFUGEES TODAY AND AFTER THE WAR

by Dr. Paul van Zeeland

This war seems to have extended the boundaries of human sorrow. The sum of sufferings accumulated throughout the world since the war started is equalled only by the heroism of those who intend, even at the cost of their lives, to put an end to it forever.

The refugees have had more than their share of trial and sacrifice. Their history has not yet been written; it will not be until the nightmare of war has ended. But even then the book will not be concluded. We will have to give it a denouement.

Without doubt it will then be made evident that the problem of refugees is connected with another, vaster, problem, with which it finally merges, namely the problem of migrations in general.

The case of the refugees owes its acute character to the war. This character, in several aspects, is the direct result of the crimes, excesses and abuses born of the war. It was the enemy invasion which swept before it those who would not or could not face it at home. Think, for example, of the tens of millions of Chinese whom the Japanese aggressor has pushed back from province to province to the high country of the Center or the West. But in Europe the problem had been born long before the war.

It was the coming of Nazism which let loose the persecutions; it was from that moment that Jews, Catholics and liberals were banished or had to flee their homes; they knew the hell of the stateless in search of a refuge, temporary or permanent.

Throughout history, how often had revolutions banished, forever or
merely for a long time, those who had been conquered or who refused to bow
down to new masters. Let us remember the fate of so many Spaniards, Russians,
Latin Americans, Greeks....

In a general way, in all times and in every corner of the world there
have been men pushed by powerful forces from the places in which they were
born. These forces are multiple; they include, besides war, demographic
pressure, creating unbalance between unequally populated regions; economic
crises or difficulties; political oppression; religious intolerance; the ad-
venture drive; the call of the unknown; and as many other factors which re-
fect the complex of the human soul and of the life of men in society.

During the last century vast population movements have been able to be
realized with a relative degree of order. Immense territories were open to
emigrants; the latter, even though their life was harsh, found in their
present and in future admirable compensations for its harshness -- they were
free, they worked, they hoped, they created.

But at the beginning of this century we found ourselves faced by a new
fact: the old "frontiers" -- in the sense in which the pioneers used that word --
had finally reached the ends of the earth. Everywhere, even on the new con-
tinents, the soil had been legally occupied. Strict restrictions had been
imposed on immigration even where enormous and still virgin territories seemed
to call for man's effort.

From that time on it became evident that population movements could no
longer proceed according to the empirical method of the last century, but that
they had to proceed from an organized action of a necessarily international
character. This fact did not go unnoticed by such international organizations
as the League of Nations and the International Labor Office. In their studies
and in their activities they tried to help refugees over their immediate
trials, but at the same time they were intent on preparing the way for larger solutions with a view to channelizing and to regularizing great human migrations.

In the recent past various attempts were made within the framework of international action on behalf of refugees; we content ourselves with mentioning — only as an example and because tangible results were obtained — the effort made under the auspices of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations in favor of the Greek refugees.

But during those years which preceded the war the exodus of refugees fleeing Germany, banished by the Nazis, took place under particularly sorrowful conditions, and provoked acute difficulties, for which a remedy was sought. The Conference at Evian met at the initiative of President Roosevelt. It was prolonged under the form of a permanent organization of an international nature, the Intergovernmental Committee. The action of this latter was reinforced in the realm of private initiative by the creation of an international body, the Coordinating Foundation, charged, as its name indicates, with trying to coordinate the efforts made in research and study of solutions to the problem.

Unfortunately, events proceeded rapidly. War broke out. The whole picture changed. The dominant preoccupation was to make the war effort as efficient as it could be. On the other hand, the crushing victories of the German army; the torture chamber which they made of Europe; the tension which they imposed on the rest of the world — all this so hindered the efforts made on behalf of the refugees, efforts still timid and not well defined, that soon their case seemed almost hopeless.

Private organizations, of whatever denomination or political belief they were, did their best. It would be ungrateful to under-estimate the results of their efforts.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees have been transferred to or welcomed in countries of permanent refuge. In the United States alone more than 400,000 visas have been granted during the past ten years.

The lot of the refugees in the countries of permanent refuge has in the majority of cases been given careful consideration. Relief, care, aid and success have not been lacking. Nevertheless, the problem of the refugees remains acute. First of all, we still have millions who in Germany or in countries under Axis domination are placed in a situation of grave danger or intolerable want. Their fate is even worse than that of the exiles.

On the other hand, there remain a large number of refugees who have not succeeded in reaching a country of permanent refuge; they are dispersed throughout the world, some in France, others in Spain, in Iran, in Shanghai, in Portugal, in Africa; the majority of them in material and moral circumstances which are extremely painful and often critical. For all those people the primary task is to find as soon as possible a solution which will last at least until the end of the war.

England and the United States have just consulted together in Bermuda on this matter. Their delegates have studied the immediate problems affecting the fate of the refugees. The conclusions arrived at have not yet been published. None the less, from the communiques which were given to the press and from the fragmentary declarations which have been made, we may draw a twofold conclusion.

The first is that the definitive solution to the problem of the refugees in its entirety can come only after the war.

The second is that the measures which can and should be taken right now can be effective only within the framework of a truly international action or, more exactly, of a truly inter-Allied action. That is doubtless why the
delegates to Bermuda have suggested that the urgent measures to be taken should be entrusted to the Intergovernmental Committee, which in turn should beforehand be reconstituted in its aims, composition, powers and methods of action. We may therefore assume that in the near future a reorganized Intergovernmental Committee, endowed with the necessary powers, will take up the task again. We have proof that its action will encounter a profound and active good will in a whole series of countries, especially North and Latin America. It will also find the ground much better cleared than it was before. Many studies have been undertaken, especially by the International Labor Office, the Coordinating Foundation, and several other foundations; they allow us to draw conclusions from a series of experiments, of which several, incidentally, have been cruelly disappointing.

Certain essential principles now appear to be very widely accepted. Infiltration -- that is to say, the penetration by individuals or families of refugees or immigrants into already established communities -- is a useful, fruitful method, almost always advantageous to both parties, the immigrant and the country of immigration. It must therefore be retained and encouraged. But the application of this method has relatively narrow limitations. The percentage of immigrants which a community can welcome in this manner is greatly variable, depending on a whole series of economic, political and psychological circumstances. These limitations, even if we should extend them through a far-reaching concerted and active policy are, nevertheless, so narrow that they will be incapable of allowing us to face the population movements which will be inevitable and, without any doubt, urgent after the war.

We must therefore have recourse to other, newer measures, bolder and even more daring, especially colonization en masse.

This method has been tried many times in the past. It has often failed,
but the causes of failure can be discovered through analysis. It is not impossible to avoid them or to remedy them.

In order to establish emigrants in large-scale colonies in new countries, a series of conditions is necessary, without which the enterprise seems doomed in advance. The establishment of the colonies must have been maturely studied and prepared for a long time. The new community must be numerous and must probably amount to several thousand people. Public works must have been executed, assuring it from the very beginning of the advantages of a high degree of civilization; roads, water supply, electricity, health services are all conditions sine qua non—and this is not an exhaustive list! Such as it is, it implies the preliminary investment of relatively large amounts of capital.

When these conditions have been attained, there still remains the need to organize the economy of the new community on a special basis. During the period of growth, it must rest on an agriculture conceived in such a fashion that the family shall draw from the earth most of its direct subsistence. Certain basic industries and the essential services must enable the community during the first difficult years to live and to wait in self-reliance. Cash crops cannot represent more than a relatively unimportant part of the revenue of the community. They must be chosen in such a manner as to be largely independent of the violent fluctuations of outside markets.

Projects in which the interests of the immigrant and of the country of immigration are combined have been prepared. Limited experiments have been made; they have yielded interesting results, both in the partial failures and the fragmentary successes which we have been able to note. All told, one conclusion may be drawn; that is, that colonization projects in fairly large groups have a good chance of success, if they are based on cautious and methodical planning, and if they are maintained by the capital necessary to assure a fairly high
standard of living from the very beginning. But if they succeed, there is no doubt that they are advantageous for all those who participate in them. They increase the economic strength of the country of immigration; they enrich it; they develop its markets while providing new hope for those who are looking for a new chance in life.

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In brief, if we admit that the general considerations presented above are correct, we may resume as follows the plan of action which they imply.

The problem of the refugees is twofold; on the one hand it presents immediate or temporary aspects; on the other, permanent or long-term aspects.

1) Immediately, we must assure a refuge, at least temporary, to those who have been uprooted. These can be divided into three categories:

   a- A certain number have reached countries where order and liberty reign.

   Some of these wish to integrate themselves in the communities which have given them shelter. These have ceased being refugees.

   Others will be less successful. A day will come when they will wish to return to their countries of origin. Meanwhile they must live and they must take part in the effort of the community in which they find themselves; and their difficulties in temporary adaptation must be resolved.

   All these refugees have been welcomed and helped by private organizations, whose devotion and efficiency cannot be sufficiently praised.

   The role of these organizations will not end and will not be essentially changed after the war. Until that time they must have at their command the resources which are indispensable for their functioning. Until now private philanthropy has furnished these resources.
b- A large number of unfortunate people are still today in Axis or Axis-dominated countries. Those whom we include in this category are not, properly speaking, refugees, since they have not succeeded in escaping. But they have already been excluded by the authorities from the national community. Their situation is abominable; the risks they run are constant. With all their heart they wish to find refuge elsewhere.

Alas, as long as the war lasts we can see only limited possibilities for intervening on their behalf. Of these possibilities, whatever they may be, it would seem that the Intergovernmental Committee, properly reorganized, can best take advantage.

c- There remains the whole category of refugees who are still traveling; buffeted about from here to there, imprisoned here, banished there, subjected to the worst indignities and the cruelest privations. For all these people, temporary refugees should be organized at once; but where? how? through what means? Our path bristles with difficulties.

We must find a place where the doors will open before them -- and this at a time when every country is surrounded by perils. We must assure their transport -- and this at a time when difficulties of transport are everywhere considerable. We must assure their feeding -- and this at a time when in many places food supplies are diminishing. We must finally pay for their transport and for their shelter -- at a time when private charity is greatly burdened and when the national treasuries are depleted by the war effort!

Nevertheless, none of these difficulties appears insoluble. Here and there countries remain where a refuge could be organized; countries which have remained outside the armed conflict would be disposed to do what is necessary if guarantees were given that their gesture would end with the war and that they would be supported in their effort. In other words, we must settle the
question of post-war repatriation, and of wartime feeding and financing. Until now the principal expenditures on behalf of the refugees have been made through private philanthropy. But this is obviously insufficient for the task; the solution of the problem on a temporary or, a fortiori, on a permanent scale — if we wish the solution to be commensurate with the magnitude of the needs — will have to rely on methods of financing largely dependent on public funds. Once again, in order to conduct successfully the negotiations relative to such an enterprise, we need an international organization of a public character; which is to say that the Intergovernmental Committee appears to be made to order in the present circumstances.

But action is urgent. It is imperative. It is a necessity of the human conscience. If we must, during the war, submit to the inevitable and give complete precedence to the exigencies of war and desire for victory — that is all the more reason to do all that we can when it is possible to act without prejudicing our chief aim.

The few measures which have just been suggested would be doubtless enough to relieve the problem of the refugees during the war of its acuteness. Of course, these are only palliatives. It has been said and repeated, after an English statesman: the only real solution to the problem of the refugees is an Allied victory. It is the re-establishment of law, order, decency and justice in the relations of men among themselves.

On that day, the totalitarian regimes will have crumbled; their abuses will have ended. Immediately all measures of discrimination must be abolished, whatever they may be — racial, religious, philosophical, social, political or any other — and their very vestiges must be wiped out, material and moral. The refugees will once again find the inalienable right of resuming, if they so desire, their natural place in their community of origin.
2. None the less, let us not forget that victory by itself will not provide the solution. It will provide the possibilities of carrying out solutions. These must be well conceived and well applied. As soon as the discriminatory laws have been abolished, the problem of the refugees will become once more what it fundamentally is, a part of the problem of human migrations in general.

In all probability the end of the war will call forth new population movements. These latter, in close relations with a whole series of political, economic and social problems, will be part of the problem of post-war reorganization. Need we add -- so obvious is it -- that this reorganization can be the outcome only of international action? Treated in relations not only with the needs of the individual but also with concern for the economic and social interests of countries both of emigration and immigration, the population movement in the vast post-war complex can be a useful help, if the problem is resolved as it merits, or a dangerous embarrassment, if it is not.

In the plan for this long-term policy, the advantage will no doubt be recognized of using the various methods to which we have referred above: regularized infiltration, colonization by properly organized groups, public works, and large-scale investments. It will be well to emphasize and to bear in mind the direct relations which exist or which can profitably be established between, on the one hand, the exploitation of previously unexploited regions, the opening of new markets, and the carrying out of international public works; and, on the other hand, the shift of populations.

Whatever the outcome, let us hope that those called on to make a decision in this matter will not lose sight of two essential ideas, one of principle,
the other the result of long experience; the first, that no practical solution is possible or can long last if we do not recognize the preeminence of the eternal and immutable truths on which is based the human personality with its totality of reciprocal rights and duties; the second, that when men animated by the will to create for themselves once again a chance for a decent life are given the opportunity to work and are provided with the instruments necessary to subdue matter, their presence and their activity become an enrichment, a source of prosperity for the community which gives them welcome.

New York, June 8, 1943
My dear Myron:

You started the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees at Evian in 1938 and have been my principal reliance in all of its activities since. It is about to enter a more active phase in connection with the refugee problem created by the enemy powers. I know you are heavily engaged in the postwar studies and other duties here and to an extent which might justify your desire to withdraw from the work of the Intergovernmental Committee, but your long experience with it and understanding of its problems constitute the predicate of my real desire that you continue that work.

You need not necessarily devote your personal time and energy to attending meetings. You could designate an alternate and could in fact name the Vice Director of Operations under the revised plan. This person could report to you through the State Department so that you could be generally advised of the movements and developments of the work carried out by the Executive Committee, and I am sure that your continuing identity with the work would be particularly welcome to the groups directly interested in it and would likewise assist greatly in the successful completion of its labors.

So I am asking you to dismiss any thoughts in conflict with this and to continue to give it the benefit of your active service and guidance.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway,
New York, N.Y.
My dear Mr. President,

Responding to your favor of July 7th in respect to the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees, I would like to make my position a bit more clear to you than it perhaps now is.

My first concern at this time is to assist definitely as your personal representative to His Holiness Pope Pius XII in the accomplishment of a wise and constructive result of our long labors in achieving peace with Italy.

My second desire is to contribute in a concrete way to the development of the principal U.S.A. post-war policies to aid you in guiding the ultimate negotiations for peace in this war-disturbed world.

Now in regard to the Intergovernmental Committee. I have not been in harmony with much that has taken place, particularly in the recent past, but, even so, I have endeavored through the Secretary, and more particularly through Mr. Breckinridge Long and to some extent with Mr. Welles, to bring to your attention the essentials that must be agreed upon between Mr. Churchill and yourself, lacking which neither conferences nor any sort of successful action could or can be undertaken.

I believe there is before you at this moment a telegram which, if it contains the essential principles of the recent program (copy attached) which I submitted to the Secretary and Mr. Long and later to Lord Halifax, will enable the Director's Office of the Intergovernmental Committee in London to be reinforced and authorized, as well as financed, to do something definite to help those unfortunate refugees who are scattered along the Mediterranean, so that they may be taken to some place of temporary refuge and later be able to return to their homes or transported to agreed places of permanent residence. I would like to see the completed telegram, however, before it is sent.

Your wish as expressed in your letter in regard to my further activities will of course be heeded to the fullest extent of my ability.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) MYRON TAYLOR.

The President.
July 14 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Referring to the letter regarding the Intergovernmental Committee, I think that it would greatly forward the work if I did in fact designate Mr. Robert Pell, who has been associated with me in this work from the beginning, as my alternate.

We are casting about for a suitable Vice Director of Operations in London under the revised plan with which you are familiar. I hope shortly to have a name that will appeal to your judgment. This plan will enable both the Department and myself through Mr. Pell, who is a departmental official, to keep in touch with the details of the situation without too great difficulty.

I believe it would be of first importance if you would write me a letter approving the appointment of Mr. Pell as my alternate and send a copy of that letter to the State Department in order to make perfectly clear Mr. Pell's relationship and authority.

With these steps taken I see no reason why the work cannot go forward if the revised plan in its other aspects is authorized by yourself.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) MYRON TAYLOR.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Myron,

I have your letters of July 13 and 14. I am happy to have your acceptance of the request conveyed by my letter of July 7 that you continue to give the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees the benefit of your active service and guidance.

I am glad to give my approval of your designation of Mr. Robert Pell of the Department of State to act as your alternate here in your work on the Intergovernmental Committee.

I am sending this letter to you through the Department of State so that that Department may be informed, as you request, that Mr. Pell is to act as your alternate as indicated above.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Honorable Myron C. Taylor.
July 6 1943

My dear Mr. Taylor,

This is just a line in behalf of the Committee for the Proclamation on the moral rights of Stateless and Palestinian Jews, for your prompt response and understanding of its invitation.

The committee is deeply appreciative of the good work you have done in the past and are continuing to do.

With the best of wishes, I am

Yours faithfully,

(Signed)  
LOUIS BROMFIELD.
June 24, 1943

Dear Louis Bromfield:

In reply to your telegram regarding the Conference which you and your associates are proposing I find that my activities through a number of years in the field you discuss, and which are, because of our past meetings, well known to you, and my present association with the Intergovernmental Committee and the plans which it is undertaking to forward, render it undesirable for me to accept your invitation at this time. I am sure you realize that I have been very active in supporting the cause of refugee relief. My interest continues unimpaired.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Mr. Louis Bromfield,
Organizing Committee of the Emergency Conference to Save the Jews of Europe,
1 East 44th Street,
Suite 701,
New York, New York.
June 24, 1943

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Mr. Louis Bromfield,
Organizing Committee of the Emergency Conference to Save the Jews of Europe,
1 East 44th Street,
Suite 701,
New York, New York.
June 23, 1943

Mr. Welles:

What do you advise in this situation?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

June 23, 1943

Mr. Taylor:

I have refused this invitation. Not only the more conservative Jewish organizations and leaders but also such leaders as Rabbi Wise, who was with me this morning, are strongly opposed to the holding of this conference, have done everything they could to prevent it, and are trying to get Bishop Tucker and one or two others who have accepted this invitation to withdraw their acceptances. In a personal letter to Louis Bromfield I have suggested that he drop in to see me when he is in Washington so that I can talk over this matter with him.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From

19wu mj 414/409 NL 13 extra

New York NY June 21, 1943.

Myron C. Taylor,
Department of State Washington.

The Nazis are rapidly carrying out the threat to annihilate the Jewish people of Europe as reprisal against approaching doom. There is real danger that unless immediate and vigorous action is undertaken to halt this unparalleled butchery, the slaughter of innocent civilians will be extended to other people of Europe and the victorious invading armies of the United Nations will find Europe not a continent but a cemetery. It is surprising how little the world forces of democracy have been mobilized for this urgent task.

In face of the enormous responsibility which such a situation imposes, an emergency conference to save the Jews of Europe will be held in New York City on July 6-11th, attended by representatives of cross-section American public opinion. Representatives of Churches of all creeds, of labor unions and professional organizations will participate.

One of the main objectives will be discussion of the plan to create a United Nations agency, composed of experts with full authority to define and effectuate a realistic and stern policy of action to save the remaining millions of the Jewish
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

2/19wu Newyork.

people.

The conference will work in committees of experts and open sessions. Some reports will be nationally broadcast.

We appeal to you, as an outstanding American leader upon whose shoulders lies not only the responsibility for the outcome of the war, but also the preservation of democracy and civilization, to sponsor this conference by becoming one of its honorary chairmen along with others of the Nation's distinguished public figures. We consider it of historic importance to have you participate in the conference, or at least to convey to this nation and the world your message through a national hook-up in connection with this conference.

We are happy to inform you that among those in different fields who will participate actively in the conference will be Louise Adamic, Herbert Hoover, Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Senator Elbert D Thomas, Max Lerner, Claire Booth Luce, Professor Francis E Macmahon, Representative Will Rogers jr, Bishop Tucker, William B Ziff and others.

We would gladly submit details and plans of this conference. We are sure of your agreement that the problem of the Jewish people of Europe has entered such a disastrous phase that it requires urgent attention by all the great leaders among the United Nations. Your adherence to this conference in any way
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

3/19wu Newyork

affects the fate of millions. Every hour counts.

Louis Bromfield, For Organizing Committee of the Emergency Conference to Save the Jews of Europe

one East 44th Street, Suite 701, Newyorkcity NY.

925am June 22, 1943.
July 28, 1943

PERSONAL

Dear Lord Halifax:

You have been helpfully associated with the formation and activities of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees from its inception. The work of the Committee has suffered many vicissitudes, the last great feature being the declaration of war which stopped for a time practically all of its activities. You and I have recently discussed a plan which will revive and expand its activities.

At the President's personal request I have, upon the approval of that plan by your Government and ours, agreed to continue association with the Intergovernmental Committee as the Chairman of the American Delegation, and Mr. Robert Peil, who was formerly Vice Director, has consented, at the President's instance, to become alternate for me in my capacity. We have also proposed the name of Mr. Patrick Murphy Malin as Vice Director, to be an active officer with the Director in London. He will devote his whole time to this work. It has been proposed, and we have consented, that the Secretary of the Committee at London might be appointed from one of the other countries represented on the Committee other than an American or British.

It has now been suggested to us through formal diplomatic channels that it would be desirable from the British point of view if we should accept the Chairmanship of the Committee. As you know, the Executive Committee is made up of the British Chairman of the full Committee and five Vice Chairmen, namely, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Argentina, and Brazil. Our Government, and I particularly, feel that the original plan evolved at Evian with

His Excellency

The Right Honorable

The Viscount Halifax, K. G.,

British Ambassador.
with respect to the officers should be continued and that the Chairman should be a British appointment.

I am addressing this letter to you in a personal sense because of our long association in the Intergovernmental Committee, and, as I have said before, because of your uniform cooperation in its activities.

With kindest regards believe me

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor
I have delayed sending a reply to your personal letter of May 25th until I could report progress with the reorganisation of the Intergovernmental Committee. May I say how much I appreciate the fact that you did write, and how well I understand your motives and views? As usual, they are in complete accord with my own. However, they relate to past history. After many vicissitudes we appear to be on the right road. As you will no doubt have heard before this reaches you, the meeting of the Executive Committee held the day before yesterday, went off very well. There was agreement on all points, and I am only waiting for the draft record of the proceedings to be approved to send out the explanatory letter to all Member Governments and the invitation to new prospective members.

I am very glad Malin is to be the Vice Director. I met him in London, liked him very much, and know his work and record. It will take a little time to get the organisation going but meantime I have been very cheered to hear this morning that arrangements are in hand for the first group of fifteen hundred refugees to go from Spain to Morocco. Although this will not be the direct concern of the Committee, it is a real advance. One of our troubles is going to be the extravagant hopes that have been raised by irresponsible zealots, mainly in this country. Personally, my own expectations are that the Committee, as re-organised, should be able first, to use such opportunities as now exist, but these are, for the moment, very limited; second, to develop new opportunities as they arise, and the war is not static, and third, the most important, to play a big part in the solution of post war problems. I am not encouraging ideas of immediate spectacular results.

The Honourable
Myron C. Taylor,
71 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
May I say how much I appreciate the suggestion, which I know came from you, that I should be paid for my work as Director? Lord Winterton has let Mr. Winant know my feelings on the matter. Briefly, I have asked that for the present the matter be kept in abeyance. Apart from the fact that I should have to discuss it with the League of Nations, I am influenced by feelings similar to those expressed in your personal letter. I want to see some concrete results, and feel that I am making a real contribution before I accept any remuneration. Also, I prefer to have some experience of the extra work involved. I think it is going to be pretty heavy. While, therefore, I have agreed with Lord Winterton that I may raise the question later, I am sure that I am right in letting the present arrangement go on for the time being. This does not affect my appreciation of your very kind thought. I hope and assume that it was only time and distance which deprived us of your advice at the Executive meeting. We all missed you very much.

With best wishes to Mrs. Myron and yourself,

[Signature]

L. H. Winterton
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: HON. MYRON C. TAYLOR

I have been informed of a telegram from the American Ambassador in Madrid which states that the number of refugees in Spain is 1600, of which 500 already hold visas for Palestine. This is quite a different situation from the one on which we were basing our action, namely, there were said to be 7000 who needed to be moved to North Africa.

This revised figure leads me to question whether the plan should be actually put into effect if some other temporary or permanent disposition of the smaller number could be arranged for.

I am delighted to know that the problem of refugees in Spain seems to have assumed much smaller proportions.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

With further reference to the movement of an alleged seven thousand refugees from Spain to a camp in North Africa, concerning which I recently handed a memorandum to the President, copy attached, I called upon Mr. Herbert Lehman last week and, as the organization of which he is Director is to be the relief medium, so far as maintenance is concerned, on the arrival of such refugees in North Africa, he was discussing the general subject and mentioned the number of seven thousand. He asked me if I had seen a telegram from Ambassador Hayes on the subject to which I replied in the negative. He then showed me the message which, in substance, indicated that instead of seven thousand refugees in Spain there are sixteen hundred, of which six hundred already have visas to Palestine. This was quite a surprise as the larger figure had been discussed for several months, and the reduction in the number of those to be cared for changes, in my mind, the nature of the problem and is an added reason why we should undertake to keep this smaller number in Spain and a combination of private organization contribution and British and American contribution care for them there until more permanent places of residence can be found.

My suggestion to visit Spain via London was through an habitual precaution in order to determine the exact situation for action creating a camp which might be called by some a concentration camp as actually set up.

The foregoing is the position of the matter at this time.

Myron C. Taylor
Saranac, N. Y.
August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM MYRON TAYLOR

Intergovernmental Committee: Following our correspondence I sought an American Vice Director for the London office, selecting Patrick Murphy Malin, who has had experience in migration and settlement work. He is about forty years of age, in a position to give full time, and able to travel where needed. He was elected by the Executive Committee last week and left for London where he will function under Sir Herbert Emerson, Director.

I am considering a trip to London early in September to meet with the Executive Committee. I also have it in mind to visit Spain to explore the possibility of arranging for the continued temporary residence of about seven thousand refugees now there, rather than to move them to a tent camp in Algiers or elsewhere. My preoccupation is that if the camp proved to be in any way unsatisfactory the charge would be made that it was a concentration camp operated by the Allies and in some respect no better than the Germans. Besides, it would be much cheaper to provide for maintenance in Spain, Portugal or wherever they may be, if in neutral countries. The instability of the Franco regime might prove to be a reason against this plan. It needs careful consideration.

I would like your approval of these suggestions.

MYRON TAYLOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 8 1943

My dear Mr. Taylor,

I have received your letter of August 24, 1943, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Tittmann in further regard to the serious plight of a large number of Yugoslav nationals who are held in Italy and who are in need of supplemental foodstuffs.

As outlined in Mr. Welles' letter of August 9, there are extremely difficult obstacles to an Anglo-American relaxation of the blockade in favor of this group, appealing though their situation is. The British authorities and we have continued our consideration of this matter in the hope of finding a formula under which some assistance might be extended to these unfortunate individuals. This matter is being given further study and if some feasible means for ameliorating the conditions of these individuals can be developed, we shall do everything possible to be of assistance.

It has been noted that Mr. Tittmann inquires as to the source of the International Red Cross Committee's information that only 350 Yugoslav civilians detained in Italian camps were considered to be interned enemy aliens eligible for relief under Red Cross supervision. While the Department has no direct information in the premises, it is understood that the International Red Cross obtained this information directly from the Italian authorities in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) BRECKINRIDGE LONG.

Assistant Secretary.

The Honorable Myron Taylor,
71 Broadway, New York.
Mr. Bergson came in at my appointment, accompanied by Mr. Ira Hirschman, who is Vice-President of Bloomingdale Department Store in New York. He said that he had received notice that it would not be practical to send to Palestine, to Turkey and to Spain via air priority their delegation. His organization had wanted Mr. Ira Hirschman to go to Turkey and they were disappointed that it was impractical. He said that he had made some inquiry at the War Department about priorities and had gained the impression that they were guided by the Department of State in granting priorities. I restated for his benefit the facts in regard to the granting of priorities and told him that whereas the military and political situations might not justify the dispatch by private agencies of their own representatives to areas such as North Africa, Palestine, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean area in general, if priorities could be arranged we would be glad to facilitate the departure of the representatives to go to England. He then asked about the priority for himself to accompany the person to England. He stated he was not an American citizen but a citizen of Palestine. I told him that we could not be very helpful to persons who are not American citizens who were going abroad on business connected with the American Government's interests but that if he would make an application in the normal way and then write a letter stating the reason for his journey, the Department would give him very careful consideration, and if a favorable decision was reached we would be glad to do whatever we could to expedite it. However, any proper American citizen they desired to send abroad would be helped.
helped by the Department. He then returned to the proposal to go to Palestine and asked whether or not political considerations outweighed the facts of the air priority situation. I replied that naturally consideration would be given by the military authorities and that questions of that character would probably be presented to General Eisenhower. The visitation behind the American lines by the representatives of private organizations on different missions were not considered to be helpful to the military situation and this applied to North Africa, the Near East, Southern Europe and the whole Mediterranean area. When questioned as to whether those facts had been considered I replied it had not been necessary to consider them because priorities could not be provided and without priority it was immaterial to proceed further with the inquiry.

He then asked particularly for Mr. Hirschman to go to Turkey and asked that it be presented on a political basis. I told him that we had a qualified Ambassador in Turkey who could make inquiry with far more efficiency than a private emissary. They were not satisfied, however, with allowing the American Ambassador at Ankara to make inquiry about things in which they were interested and wanted their personal representatives. I suggested to them that if they had any points on which they wanted clarification I would be glad to transmit those points to the Ambassador and ask him to comment upon them. Instead they proposed, and I eventually agreed, to telegraph Ankara and ask whether Mr. Ira Hirschman could be helpful in any circumstances and to state to them what organization he represented and what he proposed to do when he was there and to request from the Ambassador his reaction in the circumstances.

I did not discuss with him the question of other representatives of different Jewish organizations proceeding, but did impress upon him the fact that the American Government represented the interests of American citizens of Jewish and other faiths and that this Government had a historic interest and a long record of activity in relieving suffering and interfering in behalf of the oppressed and that we were carrying it out to the best of the Department's ability in the present situation in Europe.

Mr. Bergson contended that according to the memorandum he had submitted to the Secretary some ten days ago when he was received by the Secretary, he had suggested that there be established a Governmental Agency in Washington to attend particularly to the case of the Jews in the control of Germany. I told him that the Department of State was functioning in that capacity and was the agency of the Government already interested and operating but that his suggestions were being given consideration by the Department and that there would be some conclusion. This did not indicate

that
that there was any delay in connection with the efforts the Department is making to get the most help to the oppressed people both within the jurisdiction of the German military authorities and those without that jurisdiction who had escaped from it but who were still under the shadow of danger.

B. L.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

A-L

DATE: September 1, 1943

SUBJECT: Refugees in general, and Palestine.

PARTICIPANTS: Congressman Celler,
               Mr. Long.

COPIES TO:

Congressman Celler came in this morning at his request after he had talked at length yesterday with the Secretary. He started out to be highly critical of the Department in general and its handling of the refugee problem and gradually centered his attacks upon the visa procedure and the Interdepartmental Committees. Amongst other criticisms he stated that persons other than the applicant were not permitted in the room at the time of their appearance before the Committee and that neither they nor their sponsors were acquainted with the reasons why they were not favorably acted upon by the Committee. He also attacked the public relations of the Department and said that the whole question had been mishandled from the point of view of the public.

He gradually worked into the Palestine question and it developed that it was directly his purpose to insist upon some action by this Government via Great Britain in regard to Palestine. He mentioned the Balfour Declaration and the MacDonald paper, which he argued was a modification of that Declaration, and mentioned the Agreement of 1924 between the United States and Great Britain and referred to more recent utterings on the subject by Churchill and Mr. Eden. He insisted that the United States take a position via England and take issue with England as to the binding effect of the MacDonald Declaration and urge that the United States Government state that it was not bound by a unilateral fact on the part of Great Britain in this connection - in view of the antecedents and all the circumstances.

He wanted
He wanted to present the case of Palestine to the Intergovernmental Committee, either himself undertaking the mission or assisting some persons identified with Dr. Wise and Mr. Proskauer.

I allowed him to carry through his entire argument with only an occasional interruption. At the end of it I presented the history of the Department's activity in connection with the refugee problem, running back as far as 1933 but with particular emphasis upon the events from 1940 to date. I related in general and in detail a large part of the story and explained why it was impractical to make too many public announcements. I then took up the origin of the Bermuda Conference and the reasons for it, the development of the Intergovernmental Committee idea, the necessity for holding secret some of the deliberations of the Conference and related the more recent activities of the Government in connection with the Intergovernmental meeting in London and a prospectus of the work of that meeting.

At the end he expressed himself as being surprised that so much had been done by the Department and attributed his own misunderstanding and that of his associates to the reticence of the Department. He said that he was highly satisfied with our conversation and left in an entirely different mood from that in which he had arrived. He said that he would arrange to go as a representative of his group and present the matters in his mind and in the hearts of his associates to the Intergovernmental Committee. I told him that we would give him every help we could in making his arrangements to go. I called to his attention, however, the fact that his was not the only organization which desired to proceed abroad. I reminded him that I was receiving a Mr. Bergson at the close of our conversation and that Mr. Bergson, on behalf of the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, wanted to send delegates to Palestine, Turkey, Spain and to London. I stated that there were also other organizations which desired to send delegates abroad and told him that we could not have a great load of private representatives in different parts of the world where there were delicate military situations and it was impossible for the Department to select between them. Having consented to his own departure, how could I now prevent the departure of others?

He launched upon a diatribe against Mr. Bergson and the organization he represented and he discounted the activities of several other organizations. I called his attention to the fact of his disagreement and to the thought that they would probably disagree with the Department if the Department showed favoritism to him and his organization. That left us in somewhat of a quandary.
quandary and in a difficult situation vis-à-vis all the organizations and the public. I then stated that the Department had been doing its best to represent the interests of the United States as such, which contemplated that the United States envisioned the humanitarian aspects in the world at large and was doing its utmost to relieve distress and to help the persecuted, but we had to do this ourselves as being the representative of all the elements in the United States, some of which were discordant and many of which were highly critical of the Department because their own particular desires were not fully complied with.

The meeting ended on a friendly understanding basis and I have no doubt but that as a result of it there will be a different attitude from the point of view of his associates as regards the Department and the Department's past, present and future activities to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees.

B. L.
My dear Myron:

I have not replied to your letter of October 23rd before, but I am now writing to say that I have had the pleasure of meeting Colonel Hoskins, and find him a most interesting man.

His views and mine on Middle Eastern problems are almost wholly similar.

If you have time to dictate one, I should be very glad to receive a letter regarding the proceedings at Atlantic City and the informal discussions, in which you have, I think, taken part, concerning the connection with the I.G. Committee with U.N.R.R.A.

With kind regards from Monica and me to you and Anabel.

Sincerely,

(Sd) WINTERTON

Myron C. Taylor, Esq.,
Department of State,
Washington,
U.S.A.

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Dear Roberts - What would you suggest as a letter re Atlantic City?
Perhaps we should also send any printed material available re Atlantic City, &c.

MCT
12/17/43
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SINCE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING OF AUGUST 4, 1943.

1. REPLIES FROM GOVERNMENTS

Of the twenty-nine nations which were members of the Intergovernmental Committee prior to its reorganisation, eight have formally accepted the recommendations adopted by the Executive Committee on August 4, including the six members of the Executive Committee (the Argentine Republic, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Netherlands, and the French Committee of National Liberation) and two others (Belgium and Canada). In addition, the Norwegian Minister in London has indicated that favourable action may be expected from his Government; and the Danish Minister in London has reported that, although he has not been able to communicate the recommendations to the Danish Government, he feels sure that it would be of considerable interest to his country to have continued representation on the Intergovernmental Committee - an arrangement which has been accepted by the Executive Committee. No reply has been received from nineteen Governments - Australia, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Of the twenty nations which have been invited to join or rejoin the Intergovernmental Committee as reorganised, two have accepted membership (Czechoslovakia and Poland); five have raised certain questions and are now considering the matter further (Ethiopia, India, South Africa, Spain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); and one (Luxembourg) has reported that the question is now before its Foreign Minister, who has until recently been absent from London. No reply has been received from twelve Governments - Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, Greece, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Panama, Portugal, Salvador, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
Ten of the eighteen governments which have replied to the recommendations or invitations raised questions which have been discussed at some length with their officials. These were Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Spain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Committee of National Liberation.

2. **ADMINISTRATIVE MATTTERS**

(a) Executive Committee Meetings have been held on September 30 and November 18, and have required from the office the usual preparation of agenda etc. A more extensive press communiqué than the one issued on August 4 was authorised by the Executive Committee Meeting on September 30, and released on October 14. Procedural relations between the Director's office, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, and the representatives of the other governments which are members of that Committee, have been worked out. Recommendations were made by the Director, and approved with some slight modifications by the Executive Committee, concerning the relations between the Intergovernmental Committee on the one hand and voluntary organisations and private individuals on the other. Budgets for administrative expenditure of the Director's office during the remainder of 1943 and the whole of the calendar year 1944 have been framed, and adopted by the Executive Committee; a sub-committee of the Executive Committee is now investigating what should be included within administrative expenses for the purpose of sharing by all members of the Intergovernmental Committee and in what proportions those expenses should be shared; and the Director's office has commenced the consideration of the proper procedure for budget estimates of future years, with particular reference to the operational expenses which are to be under-written in the first instance by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

(b) A new staff has been assembled. Besides the Director, who serves without remuneration while continuing as the League of Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Vice-Director, there are now
two other senior officers: Dr. Gustav Hullmann, a Swiss citizen who
has for some years been Deputy High Commissioner for the League of
Nations, and who has been invited by the Executive Committee to be
Honorary Assistant Director of the Intergovernmental Committee; and
Dr. John Gottlieb Sillea, a Netherlands diplomat who has become our
Secretary. It is anticipated that two intermediate-grade officers,
for financial and statistical matters respectively, will be needed in
the near future; and preliminary enquiries are being made toward
securing suitable persons. The experienced registrar of the High
Commissioner's office is now shared by the Intergovernmental Committee;
and Mrs. Latham, the Director's personal assistant, who has been on the
staff since 1938, is remaining in that capacity as well as that of
office superintendent. Another personal assistant shared by the Vice-
Director and the Secretary, a stenographer-typist, and a telephone
operator whose services are divided with the High Commissioner's office,
constitute the rest of the Intergovernmental Committee staff. Help is
available when needed from the three clerical employees of the High
Commissioner's office. In order to provide quarters for the twelve
persons who are now working in the two offices, and for those who may
be needed in the near future, additional space (fortunately available
immediately across the corridor from the space already occupied) has
been rented and equipped. Such arrangements as are necessary for
functional specialisation among the officers, and for efficient office
management, have been made.

3. IMMEDIATE MEASURES OF RESCUE OR RELIEF

(a) The proposed transfer of refugees from Spain to North Africa has not
been formally referred to the Intergovernmental Committee by the
governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America,
but our office has - on the invitation of the British Foreign Office
and the American Embassy in London - participated in a number of
conferences/
conferences dealing with the question of whether such transfer was still desirable, the process of selection in Spain, and the conditions of reception in North Africa. The Department of State has recently provided us with information regarding the situation of French citizens in Spain, and their transfer directly from Spanish ports to North Africa; and we have also acquired considerable information on the general refugee situation in Spain, Portugal and North Africa from representatives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the American Unitarian Service Committee in Lisbon - both by correspondence and by consultation during their visits in London. Lisbon and London representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine have informed us concerning their efforts to secure transport to Palestine for the several hundred certificate holders now among the refugees resident in Spain and Portugal. We are, of course, keeping in close touch with all developments in this area, and are ready to render any assistance which may seem indicated - with special reference to the responsibility envisioned for the Intergovernmental Committee in moving the transferred refugees on from North Africa as soon as possible. In this connection, it is pleasant to record that the Canadian representative in London has informed us of his government's decision to admit further refugees from Spain and Portugal for the duration of the war, and to reopen its immigration office in Lisbon to facilitate this movement.

(b) By reference from the Department of State, as well as voluntary organizations, we have been concerned with several questions relating to refugees (chiefly Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Polish, German and Austrian Jews) located in Italy, in the portions of Southern France until recently occupied by Italian troops, and in the Balkan areas adjacent to Italy - including the Dalmatian island of Rab. Since it seemed that the refugees in Northern Italy and Southern France were in fact limited to unorganized crossing into Switzerland, we raised with the British Foreign Office and the American State Department the question of approaching the Swiss Government with the aim of encouraging it in continuing to extend its generous hospitality to all who succeeded in making their way to its borders; we understand that the British and American Ministers in Berne
were instructed to take appropriate steps, but that no word has yet been received from the Swiss Government. Having been approached repeatedly by private agencies and once by the British Foreign Office for information or action on behalf of the refugees found by the Allied armies in Southern Italy, or smuggling themselves through the battle lines into that zone, we are seeking from the proper military authorities the designation of a channel by which we may be regularly and fully informed on the situation there, and have asked the Foreign Office and the State Department to support our proposal for an immediate exploratory visit by the Vice-Director. With regard to Rab, we have raised the question of whether the Allied military authorities, if unable to give direct assistance, can find a way of supplying to the refugees on the island the money with which they themselves may be able to negotiate for transportation to Southern Italy.

Following certain preliminary consideration by British, American and Swedish Government officials of the Adler-Elbel scheme for transferring a fairly large number of children from Germany and German-occupied territory to Sweden, the Intergovernmental Committee was asked by the Department of State whether it would informally discover from the Swedish Government if the latter would be willing to receive such children and to approach the German Government regarding their release. With the agreement of the British Foreign Office, and as an initial step necessary before possibly being in a position to bring the matter before the Executive Committee, the Director's office has laid the question, informally but definitely, before the Swedish Minister in London - and, at his kind suggestion and by means of his own present visit to Stockholm - before the Swedish Government. There seems to be little or no likelihood that the scheme will come to fruition, but it seems important - from the standpoint of the British and American Governments, and that of the Intergovernmental Committee - to have the situation clarified.

A proposal of the World Jewish Congress that the United Nations should provide funds to the International Red Cross Committee for the purchase of food and medicine in Europe for the relief of remnant groups of surviving Jews in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other parts of Central Europe/
Europe, has been referred to the Intergovernmental Committee by the State Department. After consultation with the American Embassy in London and the British Foreign Office, we wrote to the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva by way of its delegation in London asking for as specific an outline as possible of practicable projects whose nature was such that only the lack of funds prevented them from being undertaken or extended. Pending a reply, we have received some information about the arrangements by which certain Allied governments and certain voluntary organisations in Britain and the United States have been enabled to purchase food and medicine in Europe and to forward them subject to certain guarantees to various occupied regions. Therefore, in preparation for the possible presentation to the Executive Committee of a proposal whereby such arrangements might be somewhat expanded to aid the groups covered by the State Department's reference, we have asked the Department and the Foreign Office to supply us with further information about the existing arrangements.

(e) The Intergovernmental Committee is very closely interested in the question of a declaration by the United Nations to neutral nations regarding the future of refugees to whom they may give asylum. In fact, the matter was raised by the Director nearly a year ago. Although it is being dealt with through diplomatic channels and not by the Intergovernmental Committee, the office has several times been asked by private organisations about the prospects of some such assurance—having been mentioned by the government spokesman in the House of Commons debate on refugees in May. Such assurance is also generally relevant to the Swiss and Swedish questions referred to above. So, we have discussed the matter with the Foreign Office and the State Department, and are being kept informed by them.

(f) In connection with these immediate measures of rescue and relief, it should be mentioned that frequent discussions have been held, on their initiative, with officials of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, and of the (British) National Committee for Rescue from Nazi Terror—the latter represented particularly by Lord Perth (formerly Sir Eric Drummond, secretary-general of the League of Nations) and Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P.
Discussions have also been held with Sir Norman Angell, who is now returning to the United States for another extended visit, and with the Honourable Will Rogers, Jr., Member of Congress - both of whom are interested in the possibility of a similar rescue committee in America, either growing out of the present American Emergency Committee to Save the Jews of Europe or being formed afresh. Our informal advice to them has been that such an American Committee would serve little or no useful purpose at present.

Finally, in this context, reference should be made to two resolutions offered in Congress, which have received some publicity in the Daily News Bulletin (London) of the Jewish Telegraph Agency. These have to do, respectively, with the creation of a diplomatic, economic and military commission for the rescue of persecuted people from occupied Europe, and the temporary admission of up to 100,000 refugees into the United States. In order to have an authoritative basis for answering enquiries, we have sought and obtained information from the State Department on both of these matters.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE POST-HOSTILITIES PERIOD

Much of our attention during the last three months has been devoted to the question of the relations between the Intergovernmental Committee and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This has resulted in a comprehensive memorandum, and the Executive Committee has authorised the Director to enter into discussions with the U.N.R.R.A. on its basis. Copies of this memorandum have been supplied to the U.N.R.R.A. Council Meeting in Atlantic City and to Mr. Byron Taylor in Washington. The extensive exploratory conversations held between our office and the British and American relief authorities in London have indicated an almost complete identity in ideas as to the proper distribution of functions between the two international bodies.

We have regularly attended the meetings of the Technical Advisory Committee on Displaced Populations set up under the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (the so-called Leith-Ross Committee); our views have
have been particularly desired on the question of registration, identity papers, and the re-establishment of contact between separated portions of families. We have also been included in the membership of the "working-party" on the subject of relations with voluntary societies, set up under the chairmanship of the Relief Department of the Foreign Office and including representatives of the various British Government agencies - both civilian and military - interested in relief, as well as the British Red Cross and the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad. In addition, we have had a number of conferences on our own specific concern with the Council just named, the various British (case-working) refugee agencies whose headquarters are at Bloomsbury House, and Mr. Joseph Schwartz of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

With the knowledge of the State Department, we are maintaining contact with Allied military authorities by way of the Civil Affairs Section of the British War Office. (The material confidentially supplied by the State Department's Special Committee on Migration has afforded us a useful background in this realm, as its further material doubtless will in other realms.) In respect of the special situation in the Middle East, we have been in touch with a former British member of the Middle East Refugee and Relief Administration, and had a conference with Mr. James Lamia when he was in London on his way to his post as American Minister in Cairo.

In all of our preparations for work following the cessation of hostilities, it has been increasingly borne in upon us that the Intergovernmental Committee will require its own resident representatives in all countries where there are sizable refugee problems in one form or another, and - with specific reference to liberated areas - as soon after the shooting stops as the military authorities can permit. Such resident representatives should whenever possible be nationals of the country where they work, but in some instances it may be necessary, semi-permanently, to have British or American or neutral citizens at the head of the delegations. With this in mind, we have asked the State Department confidentially to suggest some names of American civilians who might be available/
available if needed for such services in Italy; and we are planning gradually to develop a list of candidates of different nationalities for similar posts elsewhere.

5. **LONG-RUN MATTERS**

There would be little profit in spending much time at this stage in detailed investigation of the various possibilities for handling the problem of those within the present enormous total of internationally displaced Europeans who will prove to be not readily returnable during the post-hostilities period. But some of our time is even now being invested in general consideration of such matters.

The Vice-Director is gradually making himself acquainted with materials issuing from Dr. Isaiah Bowman of the Department of State, Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain of the International Migration Service, and other sources. Conferences have been held with Colonel Harold Henskins of the State Department, Dr. Chaim Weizmann of the World Zionist Organisation, and Mr. David Schweitzer of Hicoma. The latter was formerly associated with the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, and supplemented our information about the Sosua project—concerning which we had previously written to Mr. Myron Taylor.

When we saw General Sauts a few weeks ago, he raised the question of Angola, about which we had earlier received some general material from the British Foreign Office.

We maintain contact with the London representative of the International Labour Office, and have asked the State Department to obtain information for us concerning the recent conference held in Mexico City under the aegis of the Inter-Allied Congress for the Study of Post-War Immigration into the American Continent.
580,000 Refugees Admitted To United States in Decade

Disclosure of State Department Data to Bloom's Committee Is Linked to Its Opposing Bills for Wider Action

BY FREDERICK R. BARKLEY
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10.—The United States has admitted about 580,000 victims of persecution by the Hitler regime since it began ten years ago, Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 26, in secret testimony released today by Chairman Solomon Bloom.

The release of the testimony by permission of the State Department was construed as an intimation that Mr. Long's report had swung the committee into opposing two bills providing for executive creation of a commission "to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe."

Although the transcript contained no direct opposition to the measures, it indicated Mr. Long's feeling that such legislation would hinder future American rescue efforts and also constitute a criticism of what the State Department had done quietly to this end.

Mr. Long testified that the majority of the refugees admitted were Jews, because "we have recognized from the start that the Jews were the most persecuted and the object of more antipathy than any other section or class of the people, although they were not the only ones."

He mentioned Poles particularly as having "hunted down and killed like rats" by the German Army, which seized Polish properties.

While other neutral or anti-Axis countries aided in rescuing victims of German oppression, he said, the chief job of meeting the problem fell on this country and Britain, which formulated the policies making possible the salvation of so many oppressed peoples.

He added, however, that Spain, Portugal and the French National Committee cooperated with the English-speaking nations to remove 30,000 French refugees from Spain, leaving only about 1,200 for transfer to temporary shelter in North Africa. He thought had now been completed.

Bermuda Undertaking Disclosed

One of the proposals adopted at the Bermuda conference, believed not to have been made public before, was given by Mr. Long as follows:

"The executive committee of the Inter-governmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member States to undertake negotiations with neutral and Allied States and organizations to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion or political beliefs."

The operation of the committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come as a result of the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The executive committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above funds both public and private.

Among other efforts to rescue victims of the Nazis, Mr. Long mentioned the offer of Sweden to take in as many as it could, the acceptance by Switzerland of probably about 60,000 Jews, Italian Army men and American citizens who were living in northern Italy, as well as Jewish people from parts of France formerly under Italian occupation.

Question of Wider Open Door

At the end of his testimony Mr. Long indicated his feeling that, while it would be unwisely the committee positively to reject the pending bills, it should hold them in suspension for further study.

"The point is that the historic attitude of the United States as a haven for the oppressed has not changed," he said. "The Department of State has kept the door open."

"It has been carefully screened, but the door is open and the demand for a wider opening cannot be justified for the time being because there just is not any transportation."

"There are vacancies on the list of quotas, and any wholesome, proper person who appears and applies for permission to enter the United States can, under the law, and under the direction of the department, enter the United States."