

REFUGEES

A Review of the Situation
since September 1938

By SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON, K.B.E., C.I.E.

Price 3s. 6d. net

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

REFUGEES

A Review of the Situation Since September 1938

by

SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON, K.B.E., C.I.E.

London

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

New York · Toronto · Bombay · Melbourne · Cape Town
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial and non-political body, founded in 1920 to encourage and facilitate the scientific study of international questions.

The Institute, as such, is precluded by the terms of its Royal Charter from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in this publication are not, therefore, the views of the Institute.

The copyright and all rights of reproduction and translation are reserved by the Institute. Application for permission to reproduce or translate any material contained in this report should be made to the Secretary.

First published, August 1939

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN, HERTFORDSHIRE

PREFACE

The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey was published in January 1939. It brought the history of modern refugee movements down to the end of September 1938, and such small additions were made as were possible while the book was in the press. It has been decided to bring *The Refugee Problem* up to date by the issue of the present supplementary report supplying data on changes in the situation. This information is at present scattered in a large number of reports and of other publications, and it is thought that the assemblage of the more important facts within a single cover would be of value, especially to those responsible for devising solutions of the problems involved. An attempt has been made to make the present volume as nearly as possible complete in itself with regard to current questions, but the older groups of refugees, except in so far as they present current problems, are not dealt with in this volume. For their position, for a historical survey of refugee movements since the war, and for an account of the general legal position of refugees in the countries of asylum the reader is referred to *The Refugee Problem*.

The publication of information supplementary to that contained in the Report of the Survey is more necessary because of the exacerbation of the German and Spanish problems in the last nine months. The annexation of the Sudeten areas of Czecho-Slovakia in October, a new drive against the Jews in Germany in October and November 1938, accompanied by exceptional violence, forced emigration from Germany on a large scale, the adoption of anti-Semitic measures in Italy and the establishment of a German Protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 produced new waves of refugees for whom emergency provision had to be made.

In the original Report, information is confined to post-war refugees from European and Mediterranean countries. The present supplementary report, however, includes some information on the movement of refugees from regions in China occupied by Japanese forces, a movement which far exceeds in magnitude the whole of the European movements. Facts stated and figures quoted are believed to be substantially accurate at the time of writing. But it must be borne in mind that the situation is constantly changing and that movements continue from day

to day. It is hoped to issue a further supplement later in the year and to bring both facts and figures again up to date.

My thanks are due once more to the co-operation of governments, of the staff of my office, and of many organizations and persons concerned with the welfare of refugees without whose help this supplement could not have been prepared.

J. HOPE SIMPSON

CHATHAM HOUSE,
ST JAMES'S SQUARE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

June 23, 1939.

CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. THE GENERAL SITUATION AND THE METHODS EMPLOYED TO DEAL WITH IT	
1. Introductory	1
2. The entry of refugees	4
3. Extent of the problem	5
4. Settlement	6
(a) General	6
(b) Economic approach to settlement	8
(c) Mass settlement	11
II. CHANGES IN OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES	
1. The High Commissioner of the League of Nations	16
2. The Intergovernmental Committee	18
3. Limitation of international protection at present afforded	22
III. MIGRATION FROM GERMANY	
1. Introductory	24
2. The Jews in Germany	25
3. Destination of Jewish emigrants from Germany	29
4. Children from Germany	30
5. Persecution of the Churches	31
6. Emigration of Christians	33
7. Conclusion	34
IV. REFUGEES FROM THE FORMER CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FROM ITALY (including those refugees from separated and ceded areas, who remain in Bohemia and Moravia)	35
1. Movements within the territory formerly included in Czecho-Slovakia	35
2. Emigration from Bohemia and Moravia	38
3. Distribution of refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia	41
4. Foreign Jews in Italy	41

V. REFUGEES IN CHINA	
1. Chinese refugees	43
2. Refugees from Germany and Austria	47
3. Russian refugees	48
VI. COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND SWITZERLAND	
1. France	49
(a) Introductory	49
(b) Legal position	49
(c) Refugees from Greater Germany and the former Czecho-Slovakia	52
(d) The Spanish exodus to France	54
(e) Arrangements made for Spanish refugees	58
2. Belgium	63
3. Switzerland	66
VII. COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: GREAT BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS, AND SCANDINAVIA	
1. Great Britain	68
(a) Introductory	68
(b) Assistance to Jewish refugees	71
(c) Assistance to non-Jewish refugees from Central Europe	72
(d) Child immigrants	73
(e) Refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia	75
(f) Professional persons and scholars	76
(g) Spanish refugees	76
(h) Funds available	77
2. The Netherlands	78
3. Scandinavia	81
VIII. COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: PALESTINE ..	83
IX. OVERSEAS COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
1. Quota conditions	90
2. Distribution of refugees and their place in American life	92
3. Organization of assistance	94

X. OVERSEAS COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: LATIN AMERICA	
1. General policy	96
2. Proposals for large-scale settlement in British Guiana	99
3. Possibilities of large-scale settlement in San Domingo	102
XI. OVERSEAS COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: BRITISH DOMINIONS AND THE BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE	
1. British Government policy	104
2. British Dominions	105
(a) Australia and New Zealand	105
(b) Canada	107
(c) South Africa	108
3. British Colonial Empire	108

APPENDICES

I. Anti-Jewish Legislation in Germany since November 1, 1938	111
II. Distribution of Spanish refugees in France	114

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL SITUATION AND THE METHODS EMPLOYED TO DEAL WITH IT

(1) INTRODUCTORY

DEVELOPMENTS in European politics since September 1938 have altered the scale and the intensity of refugee problems. Not only has the number of people cast homeless and penniless on the outside world increased, but the urgency of each individual case has been intensified as persecution and spoliation have become steadily more ruthless and more efficient. In the conditions prevailing in the first months of 1938 the most pressing refugee problem was the distribution abroad of some 25,000 refugees a year from Germany. The majority of refugees from Nationalist Spain were still on Spanish soil; German rule, with its persecution of Jews, was confined to the Old Reich, and many of the victims could find refuge in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. The extension of the German Reich, however, first to Austria and then to so-called Sudeten districts of Czecho-Slovakia and the infection of Italy and of some countries of Central Europe with anti-Semitism in an active form enlarged the scale of involuntary migration. The occupation of the Sudeten areas by the Germans and of other areas of Czecho-Slovakia by the Poles and the Hungarians set many thousands in flight towards Bohemia and Moravia. The final defeat of Republican Spain was followed by the flight of over 400,000 terror-stricken people across the French frontier. In China the advance of the Japanese army provoked the evacuation of millions of Chinese southwards and westwards.

The prevalence of violence in Europe set up movements of population comparable to those which took place during and after the World War and the Russian Revolution. These movements would have been even greater but for the stringent measures taken to block the frontiers of neighbouring countries, although the prevention of illegal emigration was often thwarted by the ingenuity of the terror-stricken refugees on the one side of the frontier and by human compassion on the other. Desperate groups of starving, homeless people in the snows of the mountain passes or hiding in the woods could not be held back indefinitely.

As far as German emigration was concerned, the intricate and on the whole effective machinery which the great Jewish and other private organizations had built up to arrange the orderly movement of about 25,000 to 30,000 persons a year from Germany was swamped by the

enormous strain put upon it. The principle of individual case-work applied first of all in the country of origin, and then in the proposed country of refuge to procure the necessary papers and to ensure the maintenance of the individual and the further movement of the temporary migrant to a permanent home, was maintained, but progress on these lines, though sure, is necessarily slow, and meanwhile the victim may be in a concentration camp or in his grave. Moreover, the mere provision of temporary asylum without the right to work, which was all that most western European countries could or would give, was no longer sufficient, in view of the increasing difficulty of finding outlets for emigration to countries of permanent settlement. The American quota is filled for at least two years, and many newer countries overseas have either closed or nearly closed their doors. Under these conditions countries of temporary refuge rapidly became saturated.

Delay in final settlement is steadily depleting the available funds, because the bulk of the refugees are maintained, roughly speaking, in four ways:

- (1) by resources that they already possessed outside Germany before the stringent regulations on the export of capital were enforced;
- (2) by friends or relatives or by funds provided by individual guarantors who are more or less strangers;
- (3) by maintenance grants provided by the societies assisting refugees; or
- (4) by private hospitality.

A large part of the funds now being spent on maintenance might under happier circumstances have been devoted to finance permanent settlement, and the process is uneconomic except in so far as maintenance grants are used for training of children and adults. The aggregation of compulsorily idle persons is moreover a social and political danger.

By the autumn of 1938 it was apparent that radical modifications of method were required to meet the new conditions of emigration from Central Europe. The process of legal exodus by case work machinery had to be speeded up unless means could be found to mitigate oppression under the dictatorships and to prevent other countries with groups of undesired citizens from following their example. On the other hand it became clear that the gradual process of infiltration into countries of final settlement, though undoubtedly the most satisfactory, facilitating as it does the absorption of the newcomers and avoiding the danger of creating new minorities in the countries of refuge, was no longer adequate. Finally, it became obvious that private charity was totally insufficient to provide for new multitudes of destitute fugitives.

The Intergovernmental Committee called by President Roosevelt at Evian in July to consider this situation and to provide remedies met before the efflux from Czecho-Slovakia and the flight from Catalonia

had extended the general problem. The Committee handled the German question only. The terms of reference recognized the important principle that action on behalf of the involuntary migrant must be taken in the country of origin before he left it, not deferred until after he became a refugee; this was implicit in the stress laid on negotiations with the German Government. The Committee have made a considerable step forward in establishing contact with the German Government and securing the promise of alleviation of present conditions if and when plans for emigration materialize; but efforts to induce overseas countries to open their doors to the refugees have not yet met with the hoped-for success. Nevertheless, a beginning has been made. Equally important was the acceptance of the principle of international co-operation in a practical form between governments for the assistance of refugees, apart from such legal protection as might be offered by the League of Nations through its High Commissioner.

Though there has been no substantial and active international co-operation between governments on any sufficient scale, certain facts indicate that governments recognize the refugee question as a political one which they cannot neglect. In some cases individual States have assumed a certain responsibility. The French Government have spent and are spending millions of francs a day for the maintenance of camps for Spanish refugees, and some other governments have contributed to refugee relief in various ways. Those States which border on the expelling countries are placed in the most difficult position. Refugees were thrust upon them during a period of acute international crisis. Their presence created internal difficulties and complicated their relations with the expelling Power; the flight of Sudeten Germans into Czecho-Slovakia in October and of Spaniards into France in March are outstanding examples. The receiving countries are at the disadvantage which always exists in dealing with a ruthless opponent. Hesitation to take bold action by way of relief is no doubt due in part to unwillingness to make the eviction process easier for the expelling governments.

The need for co-operation and consolidation was also felt by private organizations; in individual countries they have combined to co-ordinate their effort nationally but, except for the great Jewish organizations and, to a very much smaller extent, for the International Red Cross, there is among them little systematic international collaboration, though, in so far as German refugees are concerned, the machinery for such collaboration exists in the Liaison Committee, composed of private organizations, attached to the High Commissioner's office. For the assistance of Catholic refugees from Germany an international co-ordinating committee is being established at Utrecht.

(2) THE ENTRY OF REFUGEES

Legal conditions for the admission of refugees have not been substantially altered in Europe during the period under review, but administration has been tightened up. Even France, which cherishes the right of political asylum as an essential principle of the Revolution, has strengthened frontier control; internal police action towards refugee residents without valid papers is now more severe, though for Spanish refugees the regulations were necessarily waived, and a simple system for the provision of safe-conduct cards applied.

In Western and Northern Europe private organizations have given labour and money without stint to ensure legal entry, maintenance, and eventual final settlement for many thousands of refugees. For each separate case this means assistance in procuring the necessary papers, ensuring that the complicated laws governing the entry and residence of aliens are not wittingly or unwittingly broken; consideration of how the individual or the family can be finally provided for; and emergency action when the inevitable hitches occur. Feasible in dealing with hundreds of cases, all this becomes impracticable in dealing with thousands in a month. Private organizations cannot adapt their methods to migration on its present scale unless there is an active will on the part of governments to co-operate by simplifying and accelerating procedure. In some cases, where this will has been manifest, the organizations have been able to bring out considerable groups of refugees at once by a system of block visas, but in general the old system of separate guarantee for each case persists. There should be an immediate examination of the possibility of a rationalized extension of the block visa system under government auspices with safeguards against abuse.

Writing in the early autumn of 1938 I urged the provision in the countries of temporary refuge of camps on a large scale where the refugee could be accommodated and if necessary retrained and readapted for the new life which is his destiny. The French Government were driven to the emergency expedient of camps for the Spaniards, but, as the immigration was expected to be purely temporary, no training or occupational provision was made. The Jewish organizations have set up a training camp with accommodation for 3,500 at Richborough in England and the Dutch Government are providing a central camp in Holland with training facilities; but these need to be multiplied many times to meet the necessities of the case. The possibility should be examined of creating on an international basis a pool—or pools—into which refugees, provided with simple identification papers, can be poured, merely to save their lives or their reason, until they can be dealt with on the case system. The cost of these camps would have to be borne in part by

government funds, which might be subscribed in some agreed proportion to population and wealth of co-operating countries. The camp solution I still hold to be necessary, but it is a temporary one, and leaves the core of the problem, final settlement, untouched except in so far as the training provided may fit the inmates for a new life.

3. EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

The extent of the Central European problem alone is serious. In a recent broadcast Sir Herbert Emerson stated that between 1933 and the end of 1938, 350,000 persons had left Germany and Austria. "Even so, in February of this year there were still 600,000 persons who came within the Nuremberg laws, and of these 400,000 will have to be evacuated. They are not all Jews by religion. On the contrary, about one-third of them are Christians. If there is serious persecution of the Jews in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, the total number to be dealt with will be more than three-quarters of a million.¹ This is not the whole story, for in the background there lurks the spectre of Poland, Italy, Rumania, and Hungary."

The urgent problems to be faced immediately are provisional refuge for some 100,000 new refugees from Central Europe; the settlement of about 50,000 Central European refugees now in the Western European countries where they have found asylum, and the emigration of 50,000 temporary residents; the emigration overseas of at least 40,000 Spanish political refugees now in France, and some arrangement, by repatriation or otherwise, for about 300,000 others; and substantial assistance to the Chinese Government in financing settlement in the western provinces of China.²

In Great Britain attention is concentrated mainly on the refugees from Central Europe, and the gravity of their situation must not be minimized. But machinery for their evacuation and settlement has been fairly well organized, and there exists on behalf of their settlement a powerful international organization, the Intergovernmental Committee. It is, therefore, worth while to emphasize that the number of refugees who left Spain in January–February 1939 was greater than the exodus from Germany over the whole period 1933–8, and that practically the whole of the burden has fallen on France. The refugee movement within China is a migration of peoples of a magnitude and rapidity for which we must

(1) cf. the more detailed statements in Chapter III.

(2) Those refugees who have been legally admitted to overseas countries with a prospect of naturalization should no longer be reckoned as refugees. A dangerous new phenomenon is the aimless wandering of ill-equipped ships of emigrants sailing from port to port and repeatedly rejected. Another is the congregation of destitute German Jewish refugees in Shanghai and other places, simply because there have been no adequate measures to prevent it.

go back to the Middle Ages to find a parallel; the burden falls almost exclusively on the harassed Government of China.

In reading the pages on the settlement of refugees which follow it should, therefore, be remembered that the settlement of Spaniards will become at least as urgent as the settlement of Germans unless conditions in Spain undergo a change which will enable a much more rapid solution by repatriation than is at present possible. For the Chinese refugees the question is one of international assistance in money, equipment and possibly in the loan of skilled engineers and others to the hard-pressed Chinese Government in their effort to provide for the refugees while a large part of the country is in Japanese occupation.

4. SETTLEMENT

(a) GENERAL

The final settlement of scores of thousands of refugees cannot be accomplished without the expenditure of sums of money much larger than those which can be obtained by private subscription, however generous. The provision of loans by governments will certainly be required for any colonization schemes on a large scale. But before loans are raised there must be some hard thinking on the general principles to be followed and the aims to be pursued. Money is not the only requisite for successful settlement, which demands enterprise, initiative, and organization of a high order and a certain amount of discipline.

Constructive schemes actually in hand include:

- (1) Provision for settlement of refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia out of the £4,000,000 gift of the British Government, including arrangements for the settlement of a number of Sudeten families in the Peace River district of Canada.
- (2) Arrangements for immigration into Mexico, Chile, and other South American countries of those Spanish refugees in France who cannot safely return to Spain.
- (3) The extension of Jewish retraining schemes in Europe and especially the training arranged for refugee German children in western European and Scandinavian countries.
- (4) Arrangements for the redistribution throughout the United States of refugees congregated on the Eastern seaboard.
- (5) Organization by the Chinese Government of industry and agriculture in the Western Provinces.
- (6) Settlement in Australia in the next three years of 15,000 refugees from Central Europe.

More important than the actual schemes in process of development is perhaps the fact that systematic investigation of possibilities of large-scale settlement is being pursued by the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees (United States) and by some British colonial governments in connection with the work of the Intergovernmental Committee. These include detailed inquiries on the spot in British Guiana, San Domingo, Mindanao (Philippines), Northern Rhodesia, and Nyassaland.

In some countries also—Great Britain and Australia may be instanced—a careful examination of the possibilities of infiltration is being made by private committees.

Some of the studies already made are described in later chapters of this book. They are concerned mainly with the formation of new large communities in sparsely occupied territory. In addition to these studies for large-scale colonization more information on the economic advantages and disadvantages of all overseas countries likely to offer possibilities of immigration of smaller groups is needed. In many cases it is meagre, and before large numbers of migrants are sent from Europe, the position should be clarified. The following points may be indicated as having an important bearing on the desirability of immigration:

- (a) past experience of immigration in the particular country concerned;
- (b) adequacy of administration and an adequate degree of political security;
- (c) statistics of existing essential services, such as posts, railways, roads, schools, hospitals, etc., calculated in proportion to the population. (Obviously if the provision per head is high, immigration should reduce taxes and rates per head; if these services are insufficient or have to be created, the case is different);
- (d) investment of capital over a period of years, again calculated on the basis of capital investment per head, and the return on investment in state bonds and in different branches of economic life. This question is related to (c) above;
- (e) a survey of natural resources and consideration of which, if any, it is desirable to develop in view of the course of world prices; the development of natural resources requires to be considered not only in connection with local and world market conditions for particular commodities but with the position of such resources and with questions of transport¹;
- (f) the prospect in certain raw material countries of concurrent development of consumption industries and the increase of consuming population;
- (g) taking the above and other factors into account, could a *prima facie* case for a scientifically controlled immigration into any given area be made? If the population is stationary what would be the effects of immigration?²
- (h) in what direction is expansion desired in the immediate future? (a) agriculture; (b) industry; (c) professional and other occupations. What kind of skilled labour and of unskilled labour is required for projects immediately in view, including industries new to the country? Can these projects be carried out without a new inflow of capital?
- (i) if development is intended, what should be the rate of development to prevent too sudden an increase of indebtedness?

Before any serious improvement in the settlement situation can take place certain steps appear to be necessary:

- (1) Adequate provision for temporary refuge, which would abolish the conditions which drive refugees to seek illegal entry by sea and land.
- (2) An extension of the careful studies now being made of the possibilities of overseas countries of immigration.
- (3) A radical change in the point of view with regard to involuntary migrants, i.e. an approach on normal economic lines to the problem of settlement.
- (4) The establishment of a clearing office for the redistribution of skill and labour.

(1) Generally speaking, it is difficult to develop agricultural resources for export along long lines of communication unless the existence of peculiarly valuable products, usually non-ferrous minerals, justified the creation of lines of transport.

(2) It is always possible that development with the accompanying improvement of public services may convert a stationary population into an increasing one, e.g. Arabs in Palestine.

- (5) The creation of an International Corporation or institution to provide *bona fide* settlers with sufficient advances for settlement on a reasonable basis of deferred payments on the Revolving Fund system.
- (6) The creation of a Settlement Corporation to make and execute the arrangements for large-scale settlement imperative under present conditions.

A minor reform, which lies to some extent within the competence of the refugee organizations themselves, is the imposition of a larger measure of control and discipline over the refugees for the prevention of certain practices which have prejudiced refugee settlement in recent years, such as the abuse of tourist visas, entry under false pretences (for instance, entry as farm workers and early movement into urban occupations).

(b) ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SETTLEMENT

In Western European countries certain definite factors, partly economic and partly psychological, limit the possibilities of settlement for adult refugees. The fear of incurring minority problems for the future is fairly general. France already fears lest certain districts may become wholly foreign. England has a chronic post-war problem of native unemployment and all classes tend to fear competition in their labour market. Belgium is already very densely populated. Whether the limiting factors are based on economically justifiable arguments is another matter; but they exist as obstructions to settlement.¹

It is clear that Western Europe cannot retain and absorb in its structure even half of the 100,000 refugees already present (omitting the Spaniards for the moment) unless there is some fundamental change in the attitude towards foreign labour, and a greater readiness and ability on the part of the foreigner to assimilate the manners and habits of his adopted country.

The case of the child immigrant requires special consideration. In Great Britain, for instance, where concern is already felt at the low percentage of young people in the population, child refugees were accepted on the understanding that the great proportion of the boys would be emigrated before reaching the age of eighteen.² But the country requires young people. English money is being paid out for their maintenance and education, and it would seem desirable to keep them once they are trained, unless there are good reasons for their emigration, such as the possibility of joining their parents or a much better opportunity in another country. The younger ones, at all events, will grow up English in their habit and outlook, and their absorption in English life should

(1) See Norman Angell and Dorothy Buxton, *You and the Refugee*, London, Penguin Special, 1939, and J. Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey*, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press, 1939), Appendix X.

(2) It is understood that less insistence is now being placed on this proviso.

present no difficulty. In France this potential advantage is recognized and it has even been suggested that the young people trained should be bound to remain in the country for a given period.

An economic approach both to the migration and infiltration of refugees involves a complete change in the method of selection, the beneficiary of an emigration grant not being chosen because of his desperate circumstances, but because of his chances of making good in the receiving country. The inherent disadvantage in refugee migration is that it takes place under pressure and often in defiance of ordinary economic motives. Where there is no strong political pressure on men and women to leave their country they emigrate to countries with an expanding economy or they go to fill certain definite gaps for which their special acquirements fit them; they do not go to places where trade is bad and the standard of living is falling. Nor do they under modern conditions select countries where conditions are extremely hard and where the essentials of life have to be secured by hard pioneering. For pioneering adventure special justification must be provided.

Generally speaking, the question involved might be approached from the point of view of the distribution of skilled labour and of the connection of the movement of labour with the movement of capital. It would be very useful if it were possible to get away from the words "immigrants" and "refugees." The adjective commonly attached to immigrant is "undesirable." Many good skilled men are said to be deterred from emigration because they object to the implications of the word. This consideration applies with even more force to the word "refugee," especially as by implication the refugee moving to another country is not actuated so much by the attractions of the place to which he is going as by grim necessity of getting away from where he is.

Now in so far as migration by infiltration is concerned, which is the method so far employed in the settlement of refugees, there is need of general clearing offices for labour and skill of all kinds so that special kinds of ability and of training can be utilized where they are most needed. Such an organization would be desirable even if there were no refugee question. It is doubly necessary at the present moment when there is an artificially created pool of highly trained professional persons, doctors, architects, artists, and others; of business men with knowledge of foreign markets; of manufacturers, technicians, and workmen in a great variety of industries, notably in those branches where Central Europe has had a practical monopoly or has been in the first rank; finally there are a considerable number of young persons receiving agricultural training in Germany and in the countries of temporary asylum. The proper approach to the question is from the angle of redistributing throughout

the whole world part of the learning and skill concentrated in Central Europe. The occasion is in fact offered of a definite enrichment of the newer countries by the diffusion of the skill, culture, and enterprise of these people.

The capacity to provide landing money is not necessarily a criterion of the future value of the citizen. The ability even of a qualified manual worker in many trades, if capitalized, might run into hundreds or even thousands of pounds. Distribution of this kind must be mainly by the process of infiltration, but not entirely, for wherever mass settlement is arranged, a sprinkling of highly trained professional persons and industrial experts must be included. The country importing skill is a net gainer in another way. The education provided for citizens, wholly or largely at the public expense, is repaid to the homeland in the services rendered by increasing the general wealth or in direct service if the man remains at home. If he emigrates, his training is a free gift to the country of immigration. This gift may be wasted through the common insistence by overseas countries of immigration that newcomers should work on the land. Skilled workmen in a score of specialized branches of manufacturing and engineering and light industries are a greater asset to their new country if they can develop new industries than if they are set to do pioneer clearing work, for which they may or may not be fitted, and high grade scientific or academic workers are wasted as labourers.

It should not be beyond the wit of man to discover some means whereby the trained man and the suitable opening can be linked even when international boundaries intervene. One difficulty of course is that the job as such may not be in existence, and can only be created when the man is on the spot and able to discover the opportunity. A clearing-house of information at some centre is an urgent necessity. At present the overwhelmed case-working organizations cannot possibly undertake the scientific examination of opportunities which is needed. Experience, even on a minute scale, goes to show that the careful records of technical specialists compiled by existing organizations can provide candidates immediately the details of openings are known.

On the prospects of the redistribution of knowledge and ability some preliminary information might be obtained from governments, consular authorities, Chambers of Commerce, employers' federations, and banks. For those industries which have international associations of producers or of sellers, information is more readily obtained than for unorganized industries. On the labour side the first sources of information are the labour organizations; here again the inquiry is easier for those trades which have international associations of their own experienced in the

transfer of labour.¹ The most suitable body to organize some centre of the kind is probably the International Labour Organization which is in constant touch with employers, workers, and governments.

In co-operation with any clearing-house established there should be a body, probably independent of the organization handling mass settlement, able to finance the emigration and settlement of individuals, and to recoup from them in due course the expenditure incurred. An organization of this kind could probably work on a small initial capital to form the basis of a Revolving Fund, recoupments from refugees being returned to the fund and available for new cases.

(c) *MASS SETTLEMENT*

Mass settlement and infiltration should not be considered as competing alternatives, but as complementary. The question of mass emigration, which must be faced under existing conditions in Europe, is, however, much more difficult than individual settlement. There are few empty territories presenting desirable conditions for settlement by Europeans which have not been developed. It is true that pioneer development has not taken place on a large scale since the War, possibly conditions have been unfavourable for the extension of the market for primary commodities which are usually produced by the pioneer. Further, the rise in European standards of living and in the level of social services has produced a reluctance to face pioneer conditions. The refugee, however, may be willing to undergo hardships which he would not have faced before the present persecution began. Climatic and other physical drawbacks to European settlement are susceptible to-day of mitigation if full use is made of the technique now available to make living practicable and even pleasant in very hot and very cold climates. Nor are the general economic difficulties insuperable if sufficient foresight and adequate capital are available. Considerable groups of people can be placed in sparsely settled territories if the countries concerned are convinced that immigration is desirable, if the settlement is carefully planned, and if adequate long term credits are available. Obviously the provision of finance on the necessary scale is a primary consideration.

There is one outstanding example of mass settlement by private effort and private funds, the settlement of Jews in Palestine. But the gigantic effort and the large capital necessary would hardly have been forthcoming for any other project than that of the National Home.

(1) It must be borne in mind that some less developed countries, where labour organization is rudimentary, are important for this study, and that for these other methods of preliminary inquiry might be necessary.

Palestine was and is a symbol of the moral and spiritual greatness of Jewry and therefore a case apart.

Earlier refugees, like the Pilgrim Fathers, discovered a country where, by their own pioneer efforts, they could found new colonies which would provide a national home for themselves and their descendants. They were prepared to make and did make any sacrifice for this purpose. There are now no undeveloped countries where the refugees can create their own State. The best that can be done is to find undeveloped areas within the jurisdiction of existing sovereign States where capital on settlement can be safely invested without the fear of acute political complications. Many countries fear the incursion of large groups of politically and socially advanced European settlers using a foreign language and likely to remain a separate group and form a powerful minority.

Sufficient immediate opportunities for settlement on the required scale can only be for the most part in groups which are prepared to fit into the framework of an already integrated community. This demands good sense and good will on both sides, but is not impossible, as is shown by many examples, by the Scandinavian and other groups in the United States, and the Ukrainians in Canada. The British Government offer for settlement in Guiana is important because, whatever the physical and other difficulties advanced, there is the possibility, under the traditions prevailing in the British Colonial Empire, of creating a real community life and obtaining in time self-governing institutions, in a country which is almost empty and where there are no political complications to hinder success.

Finally, the Government of the receiving country must be convinced that development by a hard-working, intelligent population will more than repay, in the long run, the necessary State expenditure on communications, drainage, schools, health, and other necessary services.

There seems to be a widespread conviction that permanent refugee settlement on a large scale must necessarily take an agricultural form. Yet it may be fairly argued that the world agricultural population is already uneconomically large; it is certain that there are heavy stocks of many basic agricultural products,¹ and it is also certain that any fore-

(1) "If search were being made for the most unremunerative, the most fluctuating, and the most overstocked world markets in which to start fresh enterprise, there can be little question that the choice would fall on agriculture. Among the leading crops, world acreage is seriously disproportionate to any probable demand, while sugar, rubber, and tea, after periods of ruinous prices have been forced to resort to restriction schemes." Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.), *An Approach to the Refugee Problem*, 1939. It may be worth while to point out that the Near East Fund charged with Armenian settlement in Syria and the Lebanon has been able to recoup from the settlers practically all the advances made in urban dwellings, but only a relatively small proportion of the advances on agricultural settlements.

seeable increase in consumption could be met by improved methods of production, probably with a smaller number of workers than those now employed.¹

Agricultural settlement even on a modest scale is so costly that it is improbable that the money could be found to finance it for scores of thousands of refugees. The cost runs from a couple of hundred pounds in Latin American countries for subsistence farming to £1,200 to £2,000 for adequate settlement in the temperate zone. The Jewish Colonization Association with excellent organization and large funds has been working for half a century in Argentina, but the settlement is numerically small. In Palestine, where the greatest stress has been laid on the necessity of agricultural development, the large Jewish population has been built up primarily on an urban basis, the proportion of agricultural to urban occupations being about the same as it is in Great Britain.

In a memorandum on *An Approach to the Refugee Problem* issued by Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.) in 1939 it is suggested that the only way by which large numbers of refugees can be provided for is by urban development for the production of manufactured goods for which there is undoubtedly a market in the more backward countries. Why then do all the refugee organizations concentrate on retraining for agriculture? The reasons are two: first, that countries of immigration will receive land workers when they will take no one else; second, that for any mass settlement a proportion of pioneers and land workers are required and that the refugee population is poor in those particular elements.

The ideal settlement appears to be a combination of the urban and rural elements, the development of town life taking place as soon as the background of agricultural production is sufficient for local needs. Urban development, as Tel Aviv and Haifa and the new trading estates in Great Britain show, is by far the quickest method of absorbing labour. But in any of the less developed countries in which large-scale opportunities of settlement are likely to be offered, the areas must be opened up by pioneer labour in communications and agriculture. The first object of the farmers will be to provide subsistence crops for themselves and their families and to feed the new industrial units, and second to produce crops for export. The kind of export crops which may be produced are discussed in the reports issued on British Guiana and San Domingo. For successful agricultural development long term resources are necessary. While it is fairly cheap to organize crops which

(1) But in many countries, as in Australia, there is room for new agricultural immigrants, mainly because earlier immigrants are moving from the land into the towns.

will yield quick returns, e.g. cereals, a longer period is ordinarily required for the specialized and diversified crops which are desirable for export. Hence it is false economy not to provide agricultural settlements with support for a long enough waiting period to enable them to focus their production on products in world demand rather than on what can be produced quickly.

The settlement must be devised to maintain a balance between urban and rural economy, and between agricultural production for subsistence and for export. Such a settlement would undoubtedly contribute greatly to the wealth and prosperity of the country concerned, but there are many and serious prejudices to be overcome before the *parti pris* for purely agricultural development is overcome.

The need for centralization in finance and organization has been recognized. The formation of an independent Settlement Corporation is an essential part of the agreement reached by the Intergovernmental Committee with the German Government. The preliminary conversations for the establishment of such an organization are now taking place, but it is understood that reliance is being placed on private subscription of the necessary funds. It is suggested that the requirements of the situation demand the formation of a corporation on a wider basis with the co-operation of governments in financing the undertaking.¹

An economist correspondent of the Survey suggests the establishment of an appropriate organization or organizations to deal with all classes of refugees, not only of Jewish emigrants from Germany. It would be staffed by persons with adequate administrative, financial, and technical knowledge who could undertake the examination of plans for the permanent settlement of large and small groups of refugees, working in association with the governments of the receiving areas. All public moneys made available for permanent settlement would be handled by the association, just as the expenditure of public funds was delegated to the Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Such an organization would develop settlements on the basis of (1) an annual grant to meet expenditure, including interest on loaned money, and (2) a guarantee for the ultimate funding and repayment of capital obligations incurred as and when the settlers were able to begin to make payments. Part of the payments would be returned to the Fund to allow of further enterprise. It would be for the organization to determine in the light of the situation of each particular settlement scheme what financial

(1) Past experience in the settlement of Armenians in Syria and the Lebanon, of Greeks from Asia Minor in Greece and of Bulgar immigrants into Bulgaria appear to show the necessity of government participation with carefully regularized financial support over a reasonable period of time. An account of these settlements and the methods employed is provided in Hope Simpson, *The Refugee Problem*.

arrangement would be equitable between itself and (a) the government of the receiving country, and (b) the settled refugees individually or as a group. As it would be impossible to predict in advance the degree of ultimate success likely to attend individual settlement schemes, our correspondent insists that any attempt to determine in advance a uniform basis for financial support must prove to be inequitable as between different settlement groups. It is of primary importance that the framework of separate settlement schemes should be sufficiently elastic to prevent their breaking down under inflexible regulations which take no account of changing conditions.

There is no reason why persons who are not refugees should be excluded from these settlement schemes. In fact there is every advantage in leaving the door open to any one who is likely to make an effective contribution to the success of the settlement.

The task before the settlement organization, whatever form it may take, is an extremely difficult one because it has to be carried out under pressure. In the case of the establishment of large communities in undeveloped countries the normal rate of development has to be speeded up. It is as if the founders of the New Zealand community had to carry out in ten years the work accomplished in a century. The organization will have many difficult political, social, and economic problems to face. The aim for each settlement must be clearly defined, but in every case the plans made must be sufficiently varied in character and elastic in their organization to permit of adaptation of the growing community to changing conditions.

CHANGES IN OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES

I. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE work of the League of Nations for refugees was reorganized in the autumn of 1938 in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Assembly in September. The Nansen International Office for Refugees and the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany were replaced by a High Commissioner of the League of Nations, with offices in London, to deal with the protection of all classes of refugees hitherto coming under the organizations closed down.¹ Sir Herbert Emerson was appointed High Commissioner, and formally took charge on 1 January, 1939, with Dr G. G. Kullmann as Deputy Commissioner and Lord Duncannon as Secretary of the office. The organization of the High Commissioner's office is much simpler than that of the former Nansen International Office for Refugees. There is no Governing Body, nor any elaborate system of committees. The High Commissioner is, however, in touch with the societies working on behalf of refugees from Germany through a Liaison Committee on which the principal societies are represented,² and it is expected that some similar arrangement may be established for contact with the private organizations assisting Russian, Armenian, and other "Nansen" refugees. The relation between the High Commissioner and the Liaison Committee at present is purely for the exchange of information.

(1) The resolutions outlining the duties of the High Commissioner are cited in full in *The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey*, by Sir John Hope Simpson.

(2) The Liaison Committee originally formed to assist the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, has been reconstituted and has its own Statutes. It was set up in virtue of par. 4b of the First Resolution of the Assembly: "He [the High Commissioner] shall establish contact, in such manner as he may think best, with private organizations dealing with refugee questions." The new Statutes were determined at a meeting of a sub-committee held in Paris on 28 Jan. 1939. It was proposed that the general committee should meet twice a year and the Executive Committee of eight members at least four times annually. Seven of the eight organizations represented on the Executive were designated at this meeting; they were Hicem, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Council for German Jewry, Zentralvereinigung der Deutschen Emigration, Bureau International pour le Respect du Droit d'Asile, the Society of Friends and the International Christian Committee (joint representation), the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the World Jewish Congress (joint representation).

(a) THE FORMER "NANSEN" REFUGEES

It will be remembered that the Nansen Office maintained a representative in each of the principal countries of refuge in Europe to act as the agent of the Office with governments, to supervise the arrangements made in regard to the Nansen Stamp and to co-ordinate the work of relief when necessary. Their functions varied according to the degree of responsibility undertaken by the governments themselves. Some of these representatives were themselves refugees, but it was expressly laid down in the Resolutions for the appointment of the new High Commissioner that neither members of his staff nor his representatives (or their assistants) abroad should be refugees, and some changes were therefore necessary.

Some humanitarian work for the "Nansen" refugees is still discharged by the office of the High Commissioner, but individual cases are not considered. The revenue from the Nansen stamp is spent in the country yielding the revenue, 50 per cent¹ being allocated on the spot by an allocation committee or by the representatives, and the other 50 per cent being distributed by the High Commissioner to suitable organizations in the country concerned. No part of the revenues from the Nansen stamp is available outside the country of collection. Part of the Humanitarian Fund handed over from the Nansen Office (about 500,000 Swiss francs) can be used for distribution to organizations or for special purposes. Part of it is earmarked for expenditure in the countries where the money was collected; that part which may be called the "Free" Fund consists of the remaining balance of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Nansen Office, and of the income from the Nansen surcharge on postage in Norway.

The outstanding liabilities of the Nansen Office, the recoupment of advances made to individuals or groups under Revolving Fund schemes, are the concern of a Liquidation Committee presided over by Judge Hansson. The two undertakings of the Nansen Office involving the most serious liabilities were the Armenian settlement schemes in Syria and Lebanon undertaken by the Mandatory Government and the Nansen Organization, and the housing scheme undertaken by the Nansen Office for Armenians in Greece. In both cases the outstanding work was taken over by the Armenian Benevolent Fund with assistance from the Nansen Office. The Armenian organization also accepted the responsibility for collecting the instalments on the properties provided for

(1) In France the Russians, Armenians, and Saarlanders each have their allocation committees. There is an allocation committee in Rumania; in the other Balkan countries the Representative has the task in hand, except in Bulgaria, where the allocation is through the ministerial committee whose constitution is described in *The Refugee Problem*, p. 400.

payment into the special funds created for the purpose.¹ In Syria and the Lebanon the Armenians are minorities; only a small number figure as refugees, and the settlement scheme is regarded as completed; it is expected that in due course the public and private bodies and persons who advanced money will be recouped. The Armenian housing scheme undertaken by the Nansen Office in 1937 in Athens-Piraeus is nearly completed, about half the money having been provided out of the "Free" Fund mentioned above.

The High Commissioner has two serious problems for solution in connection with Russian refugees, one in the territories formerly comprized in Czecho-Slovakia, the other in China and Manchukuo, where the future of the Russian residents under Japanese domination is most precarious.

(b) REFUGEES FROM GERMANY

The most urgent claim on the High Commissioner's attention is that of the refugees from Germany, Austria, and the territory of the former Czecho-Slovakia. His commission did not originally include refugees from former Czecho-Slovakian territory, but at the 104th Session of the Council on 17 January, 1939, his mandate was extended to include "persons who, having formerly possessed Czecho-Slovakian nationality and not now possessing any nationality other than German nationality, had found themselves compelled to leave the territory formerly part of the Czecho-Slovak State where they were established for other territory." The formula was not very satisfactory, and it is desirable that it should be amended. In handling the German question Sir Herbert Emerson is in a strong position, as, on the resignation of Mr George Rublee, he was appointed Director of the Intergovernmental Committee in London set up as a result of the Evian Conference. He is, therefore, in charge not only of the legal protection of the refugees provided by the League but of practical questions of emigration and settlement.

2. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE

The Intergovernmental Committee, constituted at Evian in July 1938 by the Committee convened by the President of the United States to consider the refugee question, also has its seat in London. Its activities at present are solely directed to migration from Germany and the possibilities of permanent settlement for the migrants.

The Vice-Chairman, Mr Myron C. Taylor, at a meeting of the Coun-

(1) For a statement of expenditure and receipts of the Near East Fund and outstanding liabilities see *The Refugee Problem*, p. 212.

cil on Foreign Relations, at New York, on 3 October, 1938,¹ pointed out that the refugee himself had neither time nor opportunity to discover what countries offered the best opening for the exercise of his trade or profession, and the receiving country had no machinery for selection among the refugees of those likely to fill gaps in their economic structure. Consequently many countries had introduced new and severe restrictions to prevent the entry of penniless and unselected refugees. If emigrants were able to take with them a reasonable amount of capital and if countries were able to exercise some choice among the refugees, more could be absorbed. In the last resort reception was a question of the placing of individuals, but settlement of several hundred thousand people could not be initiated on that basis. The necessary preliminaries were to ascertain (1) from the countries of immigration what opportunities existed, what types of immigrants were desired, and (2) in the country of origin or of temporary refuge the age and occupational distribution of the emigrants. If this information was provided and correlated private organizations could then proceed with the placing of individuals, and the work of retraining young emigrants could proceed on sound principles.

The functions of the Intergovernmental Committee, as laid down at Evian, are purely diplomatic in character. They are to undertake negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus from Germany and to replace them by orderly conditions of emigration, and to consult with countries offering opportunities of permanent settlement. For various reasons a considerable period elapsed before it was possible for the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee to approach the German Government, and in the interval the situation was seriously aggravated by the intensified persecution of the Jews in Germany in November. But on 11 January, the Director, Mr George Rublee, visited Berlin and remained there, with a short interval to report to a meeting of his Committee in Paris, until 2 February.

The original plan for emigration as outlined by Dr Schacht was an ingenious scheme by which Germany would at one and the same time rid herself of an unwanted section of her population and increase her own resources in foreign exchange. As seen by the *New York Times* (12 January, 1939) the plan envisaged the financing of the emigration "by an international loan which would in turn be secured through the seizure of the refugees' own property in Germany. Interest on this loan would be provided out of the sale of German goods abroad 'over and above normal German trade under existing treaties'. But it was estimated that less than 15 per cent of the funds as raised would go to the

(1) Reported in *Industrial and Labour Information*, vol. lxxviii, No. 6, 7; Nov. 1938.

servicing of the loan, and that the balance would accrue to Germany in the form of the foreign exchange which is so desperately needed . . . The 'additional export plan' would in effect make refugees from Germany the advance agents of the sale of unwanted German goods to countries which give them refuge." The scheme was unacceptable, and a new plan had to be evolved. For this purpose conversations were held in Berlin by Mr Rublee, in the first instance with Dr Schacht, and, after he left the Reichsbank, with Herr Wohltat, designated by Field Marshal Goering for the duty. The German Government never officially recognized the Intergovernmental Committee, but agreement was reached on a unilateral declaration making certain proposals to facilitate emigration of Jews from Germany. The plan eventually embodied in correspondence between Mr Rublee and Herr Wohltat on 1-2 February was much less drastic than the original Schacht plan.¹

Of the 600,000 Jews estimated as remaining in Germany, Austria, and Sudetenland, 150,000 men and single women between the ages of 15 and 45, individually capable of earning a living and otherwise fit for emigration, were to be emigrated within a minimum period of three and a maximum of five years. It was expected that as these "wage-earners" were established in countries of refuge they would be able to receive their dependents, estimated at 250,000. The whole of the rest of the programme hinged on provision made outside the Reich for the emigration which should be financed through a corporation set up for the purpose. Provision would be made for Jewish bodies in Germany to arrange for the emigration with the assistance of foreign experts; and suggestions, which however are extremely carefully guarded, were made for the improvement of the existing position of the Jewish population in Germany, including facilities for the training of intending emigrants and provision for the destitute when the resources of Jewish property were exhausted. Even these limited assurances were not unqualified, and might lapse if an event similar to the vom Rath incident should occur. A Trust Fund with three trustees, one of whom should be a foreigner, would be formed to administer 25 per cent of Jewish property in Germany. From this fund means would be provided for the actual costs of emigration, the equipment of emigrant wage-earners, fares on German ships, etc. A purchasing agency outside the Reich might purchase in Germany goods in the preparation of which no considerable proportion of imported raw material had been used. These

(1) The Memorandum embodying the proposals was kept secret at the request of the German Government. A detailed statement of the proposals, which appears to represent them pretty fairly, nevertheless appeared in the *New York Times* on 14 Feb., 1939.

purchases would be independent of existing clearing arrangements. The Haavara method of transfer would be permitted to operate for Palestine. Emigrants would take with them their personal effects, tools, household goods, but not jewelry, precious metals or works of art. The emigrants under the scheme would be excepted from all emigration taxes, including the flight tax (*Fluchtsteuer*).

Mr Rublee¹ reported the results of his mission at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee held in London on 13 February, 1939. In the communiqué issued after the meeting the Committee stated that they had taken cognisance of the project for the formation of a private international corporation which would serve as an agency for financing emigration from Germany and "for maintaining such contact with the German authorities as might be necessary for the purpose."

The terms of the arrangement are far from ideal. They are conditioned primarily by Germany's lack of foreign exchange. It was held to be impossible for the German Government to permit the export of capital or to allow the emigrants to take with them money or property except some personal belongings (excluding jewelry, furs, etc.) and equipment necessary to begin life anew elsewhere. The internal German Jewish Fund would provide the bare costs of emigration, but outside organizations must meet the cost of settlement. In view of the urgent necessities of the case, conversations were continued on the basis of the German plan.

It was understood in May 1939 that Mr Myron C. Taylor, Vice-Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee, was attempting to secure the formation of a corporation for the settlement of refugees and that the German Government were prepared to take further steps to facilitate emigration. Presumably such a corporation would act on the basis of a Revolving Fund which would permit new activities as the earlier settlers were able to repay advances from the Fund. The whole of the work for the Jewish community in Germany and Austria would be centralized in Berlin in a Reichsvereinigung for Jews and non-Aryan "Mischlinge of the first degree." This organization would have a German director appointed by the Government, but a Jewish personnel, and would fulfil the functions hitherto carried out by the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland in Berlin and the Kultusgemeinde in Vienna. Arrangements were under consideration for allowing Jews to work in industry in separate groups, segregated from "Aryan" workmen, and support would be given to training centres. Education, both primary

(1) As Mr Rublee had accepted the position of Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on a purely temporary basis, until some arrangement could be made with the German Government, he resigned on 14 February 1939. The Committee appointed as his successor Sir Herbert Emerson.

and secondary, would be provided for Jewish children. These concessions were, however, conditional on headway being made with plans for emigration and the establishment of the private corporation outside Germany.

The plan of the German Government was limited to Jews (in the sense of the Nuremberg Laws), but the Intergovernmental Committee are concerned with all involuntary emigrants from Germany. The acute nature of the Jewish problem in Germany, however, has hitherto forced the Committee to devote their efforts almost exclusively to it.

An important part of the work of the Intergovernmental Committee is investigations into the possibilities of large-scale settlement in undeveloped or partially developed areas. In the United States the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, acting in close cooperation with the Intergovernmental Committee, took the initiative in appointing a commission to carry out investigations on the spot in British Guiana, San Domingo, and Mindanao in the Philippines. A summary of the findings on British Guiana and on San Domingo is given on pp. 99-103, reports on Mindanao and of investigations made under the auspices of the British Government on the possibilities of settlement in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika are not yet available. The United States quota of over 27,300 is practically reserved for refugees from Germany, but it is full for some years ahead. Other offers on a smaller scale have been received.¹

3. LIMITATION OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AT PRESENT AFFORDED

The work done by the High Commissioner of the League of Nations and by the Intergovernmental Committee is thus essentially diplomatic in character. The High Commissioner seeks to secure that the legal and social protection for certain classes of refugees for which provision is made in the Conventions of 1933 and 1938 is in fact available. In addition, under the pressure of recent events he has intervened with governments to secure some protection for involuntary migrants who do not come under the terms of those Conventions. In fact the situation in Europe to-day resembles that when Dr Nansen began his work in 1921, when new situations constantly arose which demanded action for which exact legal prescriptions did not exist. The High Commissioner has no funds at his disposal to meet these emergencies, but his diplomatic standing enables him to intervene in some of the worst situations.

(1) The possible openings are discussed below under the accounts given of the countries concerned. For an account of the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee at which these proposals were discussed, see the *Bulletin of International News*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, vol. xvi, No. 4, 25 Feb. 1936.

The Intergovernmental Committee negotiate with the German Government on the one hand and with countries of settlement on the other.

So far there has been little inclination on the part of governments to undertake large financial responsibilities for refugees, with the outstanding exception of the French Government, which during the last six months has spent certainly not less than 200 million francs per month in provision for Spanish refugees in France. The International Commission for Child Refugees in Spain, presided over by Judge Hansson, formed under the auspices of the League of Nations, which provided food for child refugees within Spain itself and now operates for Spanish refugees in France, was financed mainly from government sources to a total equivalent up to 1 May 1939 of £364,101, subscribed by twenty-five countries. Some responsibility for refugees from Czecho-Slovakia has been taken by the British Government. A free gift of £4,000,000 was paid into a special account in the Bank of England to the credit of the Czecho-Slovak Refugee Institute, set up in Prague by the Czecho-Slovak Government to deal with the large refugee problem with which they were faced, and the money is being made available for purposes of settlement.

These isolated instances are insufficient to meet the situation, and, great as private generosity has been, a satisfactory solution of the vast refugee problem cannot be reached without assistance from governments on a much larger scale.

There are several classes of refugees for whom no international protection is available. Those foreign Jews compelled to leave Italy who are of German origin can claim the protection of the High Commissioner. Some protection is in fact available for those refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia who do not come strictly within the definition cited on p. 18 above. But no League protection is provided for Italian, Portuguese and other political refugees, or for the great mass of Spanish refugees in France, who at present form the largest single concentration in the world. Nor is international official assistance available for the many millions of Chinese who have fled before the Japanese advance. Some suggestions have been made to fill some of these gaps by the extension of League protection to certain Spanish republican refugees, to refugees from Bohemia and Moravia, certain Italian Jews of foreign origin naturalized since 1919, and refugees from Memel-land, about half of these latter being Jews.

CHAPTER III
MIGRATION FROM GERMANY

1. INTRODUCTORY

By the end of December 1938 the German Government's pressure on Jews to emigrate had increased to such an extent that starvation or concentration camps had become a frequent alternative. On 17 January 1939 it was officially announced in Berlin that a total of 175,000 Jews had emigrated from Germany since 1933,¹ and that emigration was to continue on a still larger scale. In Austria the relative proportion of Jewish emigration had been even higher. In its Vienna edition of 16 December 1938, the *Völkischer Beobachter* announced that almost a quarter of the Jewish population of Austria had been forced to emigrate since the Anschluss. Numbers of these emigrants went to places where there is no possibility of settlement. Again many Viennese Jews were unable to emigrate even when they had received police permits, simply because no country would accept them. The majority of these were sent to concentration camps as a penalty for remaining after they had promised to go. The threat under which these people were placed is sufficient to account for the organized illegal entries which have taken place in Palestine and many other countries. Many unfortunates booked passages to countries which refused to receive them on arrival, and the plight of these people, marooned on ships which cannot discharge the passengers, is one of the saddest episodes in the whole story.²

Sir Herbert Emerson, the League High Commissioner for Refugees, has stated³ that not less than 120,000 refugees left Germany in 1938-9. Thus in a single year nearly as many left as in the five preceding years, if the total estimate up to December 1937 of 150,000 is correct. A large part of this movement was concentrated in the winter of 1938-9.

Consequently, all the organizations concerned with refugees from Germany have been overwhelmed in the last nine months. The experience of the Council for German Jewry, described in the following extract, may be accepted as typical of that of other organizations:

Every part of the organization of the Council and the bodies with which it worked had to expand, as it were, overnight. Whereas the German Jewish Aid Committee, which is concerned with the refugees in England, had in the five years ending in 1937 dealt with about 10,500 refugees arriving and registered in England, during the one year 1938 it had to deal with almost an equal number of new arrivals. And whereas its expenditure in 1937 reached a total of about £40,000, or £800 a week, its expen-

(1) cf. the figures for total emigrants given on p. 5.

(2) See p. 99 below.

(3) *The Listener*, vol. xxi, No. 544, 15 June, 1939, p. 1248.

diture during the last months has been at the rate of £5,000 a week. Whereas the Inter-Aid Committee for the Care of Children from Germany, which assisted the placing of boys and girls in English schools, and their maintenance during their school period, had prior to November brought over 300 children, the larger body into which it was merged—the British Movement for the Care of Children from Germany—brought to this country during the last two months of 1938 over 1,500 children, and took responsibility for their distribution. Arrangements were made for about an equal number to follow in succeeding weeks. Whereas the Training Sub-Committee of the German Jewish Aid Committee in England had hitherto apprenticed about 300 boys and girls a year, arrangements had now to be made for transferring to England and educating there some thousands of young persons who were receiving in Germany and Austria vocational training, in agriculture or artisan trade or domestic work, and for establishing centres at which their training could be completed. The pace of the work was completely transformed, because there was no longer the possibility of an ordered emigration from Germany over a period of years. The Council had to contemplate a mass movement of evacuation of the young men and women, and the children for whom there might be a chance of life in a new home. That big task had to be envisaged within a period of months.¹

2. THE JEWS IN GERMANY

Before the intensification of the Jewish persecution in Germany in 1938 the Jewish organizations and communities throughout the world were hoping to bring about the ordered emigration of about 100,000 Jews from Germany over a period of four years, especially of the younger people, who were the best fitted to start a new life with success in other countries. The operation was considerable, but the difficulties were not insuperable. All these plans were upset by the annexation of Austria in March 1938 and of Sudetenland in October, adding more than 250,000 to the number of Jews directly subject to the National Socialist régime; by the violent attacks on the Jewish communities in Germany which followed the assassination in Paris of a German Secretary of Legation, Herr vom Rath, by a Polish Jew on 7 November 1938, and by the virtual elimination of all German Jews from professions, industries, and all other means of livelihood; and by the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. Instead of an emigration of 25,000 a year the exodus of some 400,000 in three to five years became an imperative need, and some provision had to be sought for the old, the infirm, and the sick for whom emigration was impracticable. The German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 meant that some five thousand German Jews and some 1,200 non-Jewish Germans who had found asylum there, in acute danger because of their political opposition to National Socialism, became refugees for a second time. In the old German Reich and in Austria the murder of vom Rath served as an excuse in November for mass incarceration of Jews in concentration camps, for the destruction of synagogues and Jewish communal property, for attacks on Jewish shops and Jewish houses, and for large-scale

(1) Council for German Jewry Report for 1938, p. 7

confiscation of Jewish wealth. Following the wave of violence, new laws (see Appendix I for a summary of new legislation) forbade the possession of arms by Jews, imposed a collective fine on the Jewish community of one milliard Reichsmarks, excluded Jews from practically all businesses and occupations still remaining open to them, forbade the access of Jewish students to colleges and universities, blocked the sale of securities or of valuables by Jews, and deprived them, with few exceptions, of access to public relief. By 1 January the decrees had become fully effective, and Jews were excluded practically from all professions and business occupations. Moreover, the heads of Jewish communities having been arrested, their organization was dislocated, though valiant and unexpectedly successful efforts were made by the women to carry on; it was only gradually, as Jewish officials were released, that the work of relief, which had already been an urgent problem before the new attacks began, was fully resumed. In addition several minor but serious problems had arisen. German Jews had to fly from Danzig and Memel, 16,000 Jewish Polish citizens resident in Germany—some of them all their lives—were summarily expelled from Germany during a single night,¹ and Italy decided to expel all foreign Jews who had settled in the country since 1919, including about 5,000 who were already refugees from Germany. Many of the German Jews in Italy had left Germany in 1933, before currency restrictions became severe, and had been able to bring considerable wealth with them, a great part of which they must now leave behind them in Italy.

By the spring of 1939 the liquidation of German Jewish business was practically complete. Of the 402,000 Jews remaining in Greater Germany (excluding Sudetenland) only 5,500, less than two per cent, had the right to employment. The occupations open to them, and the numbers employed are:

<i>Employment</i>	<i>Numbers employed</i>
Jewish communal and social organizations ..	1,470
Travel Agencies for Jews	50
Zionist organizations	300
Legal Advisers to Jews	160
Doctors and Nurses for Jews	500
Servants in Jewish boarding-houses ..	600
Miscellaneous	200
	<hr/>
	3,280

It will be seen that most of this occupation was provided within the Jewish community itself. But since these figures were compiled it is reported that work on the roads has been offered to between 4,000 and

(1) There was a fresh expulsion of Polish Jews on 7 June 1939, when several hundred were driven across the frontier by armed men of the Gestapo. Most of them have already lost Polish citizenship and were compelled to remain in No Man's Land.

5,000 Jews, and that German policy is to hinder the emigration of elder boys and adults with a view to employing them on fortifications etc. Skilled surgeons, eye and ear and throat specialists are being kept in Germany. They are not allowed to treat non-Jewish patients, but are held in reserve in case their skill is required in war. It was stated in June that in recent weeks the tension generally was rather less acute.

There are reported to be still 12,000 Jews in concentration camps, the amnesty provided for a certain number of inmates of concentration camps in May 1939 not being extended to Jews. There are no Jewish shops. In Vienna, where there were 43,000 Jewish shops and workshops, 41,000 have been closed and 2,000 "Aryanized." In Berlin there are one Jewish café and two "Aryan" restaurants open to Jews, one of which also admits Aryans. In Vienna there are two restaurants for Jews.

Of the 34,000 children of school age only sixty per cent attend school, and education is reported to be unsatisfactory because of constant changes of teachers and the flight of many of them. The workers in Germany arranging for the emigration of children under the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany find many child applicants, whom for various reasons they have been unable to accept, left on their hands because of the impossibility of tracing their parents.

Austrian Jewry had a much larger proportion of indigent Jews than German Jewry. In Germany to-day perhaps one half of the Jewish community still have sufficient reserves of their own or through relatives to provide for their own subsistence, and the remaining half exist on the charity of the community. In Vienna, where practically all the Jews still in Austria are now living, only one-third are able to provide for themselves; Jewish charity provides subsistence allowances for about 35,000 and public meals (consisting of soup, vegetables, and half a kilo of bread) in soup kitchens for 30,000. By an ingenious method the necessary funds for relief in Austria are found largely from emigrants leaving the country¹; in Germany the money is obtained partly from the sale of Jewish communal property at about one-tenth of its real value; it is estimated that available funds will suffice to feed 100,000 for a further ten months. If and when the arrangement made by the German Government with the Intergovernmental Committee comes into force, a certain proportion of the tax levied on Jewish property is to be put at the disposal of the community for emigration purposes.

(1) The Council for German Jewry and the Joint Distribution Committee have made an arrangement with the authorities in Vienna whereby the organizations provide foreign exchange for emigration only. This money is put at the disposal of emigrants to enable them to comply with requirements for landing money, visas, etc., and they pay into the Kultusgemeinde whatever equivalent sums they can in marks. These contributions are used for soup kitchens and other forms of assistance.

Confiscation of Jewish property has proceeded further in recent months. The Second Decree for the "Aryanization" of German industry (24 November 1938) stated that the Reich had no obligation to compensate Jews excluded from industry under the terms of the law, though the Minister of Labour might make exceptions in individual cases. Decrees providing for the handing over of valuables, gold, silver, etc., were issued in January and February 1939, and 4 March, the time limit for surrender, was extended to 31 March.

A circular of the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland of 25 February 1939 sent to all the Jewish communities in Germany (the Old Reich) announced that all Jews living in Germany must pay on emigration an emigrant's contribution if their means exceeded 1,000 marks, the proceeds to be devoted to the tasks imposed on the Reichsvereinigung, namely assistance of emigration relief, education, etc. The rate of payment is graduated, ranging from 0.5 per cent on resources up to 5,000 marks to 10 per cent on a million marks. This contribution is additional to the flight tax and the tax on Jewish property, which are not deducted from the sum on which the contribution is calculated. It is payable to the local Jewish community into a special account, and the Reichsvereinigung decides how much may be kept for local purposes and how much sent to headquarters. Before obtaining a pass for emigration or for an "information journey" the emigrant must show that he has paid his ordinary dues to the community for 1938 and 1939 as well as the new tax. This obligation applies to all Jews whether they are practising Jews or not, as a law of 30 January 1939 provided that Jews no longer attending the synagogue but held to be Jews by religion should be considered members of their local Jewish organization.

Hitherto assistance in the Old Reich for maintenance and for emigration purposes has been met by the Jews in Germany who have made extreme sacrifices for the purpose. Emigration from Austria has so far been rather easier because of the arrangement for foreign exchange mentioned above. One of the reasons for not sending outside help to Berlin is the loss on exchange, as no such arrangement has proved possible. Assistance in emigration from outside bodies therefore begins as a rule when the refugee has passed the German frontier, mainly through the Hicem organization.¹

(1) Hicem (HIAS-JCA Emigration) Association maintains some 41 offices in various countries and is financed by the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Colonization Association, and the Council for German Jewry. In the year 1938 Hicem arranged for the emigration overseas of 3,462 persons and of 894 persons within Europe. Some 30 to 40 per cent of the expenses were probably met by the migrants themselves. The Hicem contribution worked out at about £16 for fares etc., with expenses averaging about £8 per head incurred in the countries of immigration. In the

The following figures show the estimated changes in recent years in the Jewish population of Germany and Austria.

Germany		Austria	
1933 ..	500,000	1934 ..	191,480
Dec. 1937 ..	350,000		
April 1939 ..	300,000	April 1939 ..	102,000 ¹

These estimates will be replaced by more exact information in due course by the census in Germany in May 1939. Part of the decrease is explained by the excess of deaths over births, calculated for Germany alone at 23,700 for the period 1933-7 and at a higher proportional rate for 1938; a small part, about 6,000, by the loss to the community of Aryan wives leaving their husbands; but the decrease is due in the main to emigration.

Provision therefore remains to be made for the evacuation of more than 390,000 Jews in Germany and Austria. To these must be added an unknown portion of the 270,000 Jews in the former Czecho-Slovakian territory.

Of the Jews in Germany and Austria 120,000 are over sixty years of age, and it is expected that in due course, as their children are definitely settled, these will be able to send for their parents. Effort is being concentrated on the younger age groups, which include 51,000 under twenty years of age. The figures cited above are for full Jews. "Mischlinge of the first degree," that is, those who have more than one Jewish grandparent, may also have to be evacuated, and their numbers are unknown. A tentative estimate is 210,000. "Mischlinge of the second degree" will in time be absorbed in the general population.

3. DESTINATION OF JEWISH EMIGRANTS FROM GERMANY

The following figures of the destination of refugees as at the end of April 1939 are given from Jewish sources, but they do not account for the total emigration figure indicated above. The distribution of Jewish emigrants from Germany and Austria in May 1939 is estimated as follows.

first three months of 1939 Hicem emigrated overseas 1,995 persons, but the costs per head were much higher owing to the reduction in the average resources of migrants. The migrants have sometimes paid for their fares and visas before leaving Germany, but cannot provide landing money and expenses in the country of immigration because of the lack of foreign exchange.

(1) In June Mr Norman Bentwich put this figure at 90,000 of whom all but 1,000 were in Vienna. He puts Jewish emigration from Austria at about 90,000, and estimates that some 10,000 have died, been killed, or committed suicide. The emigration has been fairly evenly distributed over the period, August 1938 being the peak month. The chief receiving countries have been England (7,500), United States (5,500), Shanghai (5,250), Palestine (3,000).

DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES FROM GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

Country	Number	Country	Number
U.S.A.	50,000	Repatriation in Eastern Europe	40,000
Palestine	50,000	Central America and the Caribbean	3,000
Other parts of Asia	9,000	South America	26,000
Western and Northern Europe including British Isles	80,000	British Empire	8,000

In the year 1938 it is estimated that 34,000 left Germany and 90,000 left Austria. The destinations of those who emigrated in 1938 cannot be given as a whole. Sample figures give some indication of distribution. Of 1,995 assisted to emigrate overseas by Hicem, 731 went to the United States, 268 to Palestine, 182 to Central America, 229 to Bolivia, 66 to Brazil, and 169 to other South American countries; other destinations 271. Emigration overseas from Great Britain assisted by German Jewish Aid were 466 to Australia, 319 to United States, 207 to South American countries, 98 to other destinations. Repatriation accounted for 287.

If the figures in the foregoing table are compared with those for December 1937¹ it will be seen that the number of German Jewish refugees in Europe and in the United States has more than doubled. The Palestinian figure shows a relatively small increase but it is probable that if the extent of the illegal immigration were accurately known the figure would be considerably higher. The situation in the various countries is noted in detail later. It may here be pointed out that the countries of refuge adjoining Germany are already saturated, and that admission of new refugees can only take place as those already there move on to overseas countries where permanent settlement is possible. The estimate for Western and Northern Europe is probably an underestimate. In any case the number is constantly fluctuating as new refugees enter and others leave for overseas countries. Some observers put the number as high as 100,000 in May, and it has certainly increased since then.

4. CHILDREN FROM GERMANY

The Movement for the Care of Children from Germany have calculated that in Old Germany and Austria there are still about 40,000 Jewish children under the age of sixteen who should be rescued. The figures for Germany are not known exactly,² but in Austria there are 10,550, of whom 700 are under two years of age. For the former Czechoslovakia the estimate is harder to calculate but is tentatively put at 31,800.

(1) See *The Refugee Problem*, p. 563.

(2) See a Jewish estimate on p. 27 above.

For "non-Aryan" Christian children no certain figure is available, nor is it known whether it is necessary for any of them to leave; the case obviously depends on the degree of discrimination against their parents and themselves. In the present shortage of labour in Germany the Government are unwilling to allow the emigration of any non-Aryan children, unless their parents are known to be hostile to the régime. The Movement place the estimated total of Jewish and non-Aryan Christian children in Greater Germany and Bohemia and Moravia at 85,675, but it would be an error to think that their parents would wish all of these to leave or that it would be desirable that they should do so. Many will no doubt emigrate with their families. Within the next two years, at the present rate of emigration, the number of children remaining will probably be reduced to about 50,000.

In the meantime 7,990 children have been emigrated apart from their parents between November 1938 and May 1939.

DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN REFUGEE CHILDREN

Country	Number	Country	Number
Great Britain ¹	4,800	France	600
Holland	1,500	Sweden	250
Belgium	600	United States	240

The worst feature of this emigration is the separation of children from their parents, but happily it is often possible to secure the reunion of families later. The hopeful side of the question is that the children, especially the younger ones, will grow up with an education and training suited for the new life they have to lead. Many of them will no doubt remain in France and Sweden, and some in Great Britain. Those who re-emigrate from Great Britain will probably go to English-speaking countries where they will settle more easily because they know the language. In any case, whatever their future permanent home, absorption and assimilation are much easier for them than for older people.

5. PERSECUTION OF THE CHURCHES

The conflict between the National Socialist organization and the Churches became more acute in the period under review. The development of hostility towards the Churches was probably inevitable, because the State, according to National Socialist principles, is the source of all law and right and cannot brook any division of allegiance. There had been many breaches of the Concordat of 1933 with the Roman Catholic Church, but the process of eliminating Catholic influence,

(1) On 15 June Lord Samuel announced that 6,600 had already arrived. They were coming in at the rate of 250 a week.

especially on young people, proceeded more rapidly in 1938. The attack on the Catholic Church had developed gradually in Germany, but in Austria the campaign was carried through in the briefest possible time. It is not too much to say, with Principal Micklem,¹ that "within three months of the annexation of Austria the whole organization of the Church, apart from purely pastoral or liturgical functions, was in ruins." Early in August the theological faculty at Innsbruck was suppressed. Lay supervisors were placed in church schools, and no private schools were to take new pupils after September. On 1 September the suppression of all convent schools was announced. In October there were violent demonstrations against Cardinal Innitzer in Vienna and a decree was issued in Vienna by the Minister of the Interior that "in view of the necessity of an education informed with the spirit of National Socialism" all confessional schools and educational institutions of all grades must be closed. The absorption of the young people throughout Germany and Austria in the Hitler Youth is the main positive instrument in weaning the children and young people from allegiance to the churches.² So far there has been no closing of churches, but there has been an intensification of taxation in various ways, and under a law promulgated on 3 August 1938 bequests for religious purposes can easily be invalidated. In June 1938 a decree was issued that the State only grants subsidies to the Churches and enables them to collect church taxes upon condition that the Churches respect the interests of the State in accordance with statutory provisions and likewise with the maintenance of order, and in October police authorities were notified that State subsidies should be refused to bodies which did not conform with State regulations.³

After the attacks on the Jews in November it was generally believed that the toleration so far accorded to the Churches would be limited. Articles in the *Osservatore Romano* of 12 and 13 December 1938 forecast drastic measures against them.⁴ Further measures against the Churches were, in fact, not long delayed. On 15 February 1939 Herr Himmler issued an order dissolving the German Catholic Young Men's Association, and two days later the Catholic Theological Faculty at the University of Munich was dissolved. Three orders issued by Dr Werner, administrative head of the Evangelical Church, on 26 April provided for the introduction of the National Socialist principle of "leadership" into

(1) Nathaniel Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church*, R.I.I.A. Oxford University Press, 1939, p. 214-5.

(2) A list of theses (a private document) drawn up by a leader of Hitler Youth for the instruction of young Austrians cited in *Osservatore Romano*, 19 June, 1938, illustrates this. (Micklem, *op. cit.* p. 227.)

(3) Micklem, *op. cit.* pp. 233-4.

(4) *op. cit.* pp. 236-7.

church organization; for the right of a "religious minority" to choose their own pastor if they were dissatisfied with the parish pastor, and for the removal of pastors from office for "official reasons." In Austria more drastic measures were taken. The Commission for the liquidation of Austria decreed (2 May) the cessation of State subsidies to the Roman Catholic Church, and on 10 May a decree was issued depriving the Supreme Council of the Protestant Church of Austria of its official status and allowing it to continue merely as a private concern of the two branches of that Church.

Practising Catholics and Protestants find it difficult to maintain official positions. In the census papers issued in May 1939 the heading Confession had three alternatives other than Judaism: Catholic, Protestant, Gottgläubig. The last presumably includes, as well as miscellaneous sects, religious belief on National Socialist principles. In June a certain lessening of tension in ecclesiastical matters was reported by observers in Germany.

6. EMIGRATION OF CHRISTIANS

Nevertheless, there is as yet no general emigration of Catholics or of Protestants as such, though a certain number have emigrated because they are unwilling to submit to the regimentation of the Churches. Those who have found the position so intolerable that they have had to leave Greater Germany are for the most part, however, "non-Aryans," i.e. persons with some Jewish blood or persons married to Jews. These non-Aryan Catholic and other emigrants are often confused with the Jewish emigration, and it is not always easy to say what part of the emigration from Germany is Catholic. A letter from the Vatican Secretariat circulated to the Catholic episcopate dated 9 January 1939 expresses the opinion that about 200,000 "non-Aryan" Catholics will have to leave Germany and suggests the measures to be taken for their assistance.¹

(1) A step forward in the organization of assistance and relief for non-Aryan and other Catholics was accomplished by the recent development of the former committee for Catholic refugees at Utrecht into the International Catholic Office for Refugee Affairs, which will, it is hoped, serve as a co-ordinating body for the work which is done by committees in the various countries of refuge. The Office also hopes to co-operate with the international organization for non-Aryan Christians which the Bishop of Chichester hopes to build up. Arrangements for the emigration and final settlement of non-Jewish refugees should be facilitated if arrangements can be made from a single centre. The new Catholic Office works in close co-operation with the three organizations set up in Germany, Austria, and Bohemia to advise non-Aryan Catholics on emigration, and few refugees are accepted by the Catholic committees in the various countries unless they are recommended by St Raphaelsverein at Hamburg, Vienna, and Prague. Similarly the Protestants now maintain an office for emigration in Berlin which is in close touch with societies in foreign countries.

7. CONCLUSION

The chief problems in connection with Jewish refugees from Germany are:

- (1) Emigration to countries overseas of about 50,000 persons, half the refugees at present in countries of Western Europe, which are unlikely to absorb more than the other half.
- (2) Removal from Germany in the next five years of 185,000 Jews under the age of forty-five to overseas countries, and of over 200,000 dependents as soon as the pioneers are established.
- (3) Removal of other groups who may be liable to persecution, who are in number certainly not less than 200,000.
- (4) Provision for groups at present in places where they cannot remain, e.g. Shanghai, illegal refugees on ships, etc.

REFUGEES FROM THE FORMER
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AND FROM ITALY

(including those refugees from separated and ceded areas, who remain in Bohemia and Moravia)

WHEN the German army began the occupation of the Sudeten areas of Czecho-Slovakia on 1 October 1938, there were already some 5,000 refugees from Germany and Austria in the country. Their position was already difficult because, under the political situation created by the annexation of Austria to the Reich and the agitation in the Sudeten areas, relations with Germany were increasingly disturbed and the presence of the refugees from Germany was felt to be an additional danger; at the same time it was difficult to arrange for their emigration even if other places of refuge were available for individuals, because the main routes outward passed through unfriendly territory.

1. MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE TERRITORY FORMERLY
INCLUDED IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

The occupation of the districts ceded to Germany created a large movement of refugees in the direction of Prague. The refugees were mainly:

- (1) Sudeten Germans who had opposed the Henlein party and had been loyal citizens of the Republic;
- (2) Czechs whose homes and farms were in the annexed areas;
- (3) Jews who would come under the Nuremberg Laws in Reich territory, whenever these were extended to the Sudeten areas.

Not all of these fugitives¹ were admitted. The Czech Government feared the creation of a large German minority within the new frontiers; there was not land and work in the now restricted areas even for Czech refugees; and the presence of thousands of homeless fugitives added to the general uncertainties of the situation.² Under these circumstances some 20,000 Germans were packed into railway trains and sent back and some 10,000 returned of their own accord to their homes.

(1) Very high figures were quoted in the press at the time. The movement was opposed on the German side, though a report which appeared in the American press on 8 October that Germany had officially demanded the return of all German refugees by the Czech Government on the plea that the Reich was unprepared to part with a single German appears to have been unfounded.

(2) The question of business and professional competition also had some weight. *The Daily Telegraph* correspondent (12 Oct.) reported that the Sirovy Government had passed a number of decrees chiefly directed towards the protection of Czech professional and business men from new competition.

On 6 October it was reported that about 10,000 Czech refugees fled when the Poles occupied Teschen. As further infringements of Czecho-Slovakian territory took place there were new movements of refugees.

It was not until 24 October that the forcible return¹ of German-speaking fugitives from the Sudeten areas was suspended, but even then they were not allowed to remain in the city of Prague unless they could prove that they had means of support. In fairness to the Prague Government it must be stated that after the early days of confusion none were sent back.

The right of option for residents in the Sudeten territories annexed by Germany, promised at Munich, was defined in the Agreement² between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia of 23 November. Under article 2 of that Agreement Germans of Czecho-Slovak nationality who had entered Bohemia and Moravia since 1 January 1910 could be requested to leave that territory and Germany engaged to receive them, and non-Germans (i.e. Czechs) of Czecho-Slovak nationality in the annexed territories who had settled there since 1910 could similarly be required to leave. Option of Czech nationality was open to those Czechs and Jews who automatically became German subjects, and for German nationality to German citizens of Czecho-Slovakia, with the exception of those who had acquired Czecho-Slovak nationality since 1933. There was nothing to prevent either side from expelling persons of the opposite race who had not been settled in the country in 1910.

The pressure on living accommodation and food supply in Bohemia and Moravia was so great that Sir Neill Malcolm, the League High Commissioner, after visiting Prague, reported that speedy measures were needed to save many thousands of refugees from starvation.³ There were said to be 25,000 Sudeten refugees in Prague itself, housed mainly in the Masaryk stadium and in schools. On 1 November 1938, the Office for Refugees in Czecho-Slovakia stated the number of refugees (excluding the German refugees in Czecho-Slovakia before the occupation of the Sudetenland) as 91,625, of whom 72,912 were Czechs, 10,817 Germans, 6,765 Jews, and some Poles and other foreigners. Only three days later an official statement put the figure at 152,000 of whom 115,000 were Czechs, and the majority of the remainder Germans⁴; and by 13 February, after further inroads on Czech territory and the flight of many Czechs from Slovakia, Sir John Simon announced that the total had reached 186,000.

(1) A copy of the Police Order handed to German refugees ordering them to return to their homes is printed in the *Daily Telegraph* of 13 Oct. 1938.

(2) Text in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 24 Nov. 1938; summary in *The Times*, 24 Nov. 1938.

(3) *The Times*, 12 Oct. 1938.

(4) *News Chronicle*, 13 Dec. 1938.

Under these circumstances the Czech authorities were faced with an enormous problem. On 21 October a correspondent of the Refugee Survey wrote that Czech refugees were arriving at the rate of 1,000 to 2,000 a day and were housed temporarily in various parts of the city, until they could be distributed in provincial towns and villages where they were billeted on the local population. Working camps, intended as a temporary measure, proved to be a permanent necessity. Many Germans were also placed in camps. At that time the Czechs hoped to settle Czech peasants in the more thinly populated parts of Slovakia, a solution which became impracticable as Slovakia drifted away from Prague. By November Czech officials and others established in the country were being driven out of Slovakia, and it was feared that there would be a larger influx for whom accommodation would have to be found in Bohemia and Moravia.

On 23 October reports received from 37 only out of 187 districts showed 24,635 housed in camps, and the total must have been much greater. Children were removed from the camps and placed in children's homes or with private persons¹ and many adults found asylum with friends, but there were still 20,000 in camps in December. The "camps" usually consisted of improvised accommodation in public buildings, empty cinemas, halls, old castles, etc. There was much overcrowding, a great shortage of blankets and bedding, and in many cases washing and sanitary arrangements were quite inadequate. Few refugees had any change of clothing, and in some places towels, soap, and wash basins were lacking. It was extremely difficult to obtain fuel, as most of the coal mines were in the ceded areas. Food supply, for which the Government allowed eight crowns per head per day through local authorities, should have been adequate, except that it did not provide a suitable diet for children.² A certain amount of assistance was provided by the Lord Mayor's Fund, administered in Prague by Sir Ronald Macleay with the assistance of a committee representing the Czech Red Cross and the relief organizations, but distribution was difficult and the precarious political situation hampered the work. The Czech Government made great efforts to secure an orderly solution of the problem. By a decree of 11 November 1933 they established an Institute for the Assistance of Refugees attached to the Ministry of Social Welfare, with

(1) The Child Recovery Homes maintained by the Ministry of Health and the local committees of the Czech Children's Care Association assisted the children. Twenty-eight per cent of the Lord Mayor's Fund was spent in assisting the work done for children. Over 6,000 children were cared for by the local associations, daily rations were supplied in feeding and maternity centres and in the children's homes to many thousands, and a thousand were placed in private homes.

(2) See the Report on the Lord Mayor's Czech Refugees Fund issued in May 1939. The total of £375,000 subscribed is accounted for as follows:

four divisions: Social and Health, Internal Colonization, Emigration, and Finance. An initial sum of 50 million crowns was placed at its disposal.

2. EMIGRATION FROM BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA

Relief workers and others on the spot urged the necessity of concerted effort on a large scale to remove while there was yet time those refugees who were in the most urgent danger, namely the original German and Austrian refugees¹ and those Sudeten Germans who had taken an active part in political life as Social Democrats. There were many delays for various reasons, the most important being the paucity of the available finances from government or private sources; others were the difficulty of securing agreement on which were the most urgent cases,² the slow process of securing the necessary visas for European countries for either temporary or permanent refuge, the difficulty of finding avenues of definite settlement in overseas countries,³ and, even when all the necessary formalities had been completed, the serious obstacles in the way of evacuating refugees when communications were controlled by Germany or by Poland. Many refugees had to travel by air; special planes were chartered, but the process was necessarily slow and expensive. Some were sent via Gdynia, and as time went on the Poles gave better facilities. Under these difficult circumstances the foreign workers in Prague

Total received	£375,000	
Less collecting expenses	3,100	£371,900
Sums drawn by Sir Ronald Macleay for relief in Czecho-Slovakia	262,137	
Grant to the British Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia	80,000	
Grant to the Save the Children Fund	£5,000	
Less transfer to Sir R. Macleay's Account	3,880	1,120
Grant to the British Red Cross Society	5,000	
Goods sent to Czecho-Slovakia	1,400	
Sundry relief grants	2,333	351,990
Balance in hand		£19,910

Any remaining balance will be handed over to organizations working in Great Britain for the assistance of refugees from Czecho-Slovakia.

(1) On 27 December the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent reported that they had been asked to leave Prague before 31 December, but this rule was not enforced.

(2) At a meeting held in Paris under the auspices of the Bureau pour le Respect du Droit d'Asile et l'Aide aux Réfugiés politiques, on 22 October 1938, Mr Robinson, the representative of the *News Chronicle* Fund in Prague, had said that the lists of those in extreme danger (about 1,000 in all) included 450 Social Democratic trade union leaders, deputies, senators, and others from the Sudeten areas; about 450 of the original refugees from Germany, including writers attached to the Thomas Mann Foundation who had attacked the National Socialist régime in Germany, with smaller numbers of Communists, Jews, and Catholics. (See the printed report published by the Bureau, containing much information on the situation at the time.)

(3) The few who were able to arrange for direct immediate settlement overseas were able to draw the £200 emigration money provided for refugees from Czecho-Slovakia.

evacuated the men in imminent danger first, leaving the women and children to join them as opportunity offered.¹ After the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March and the installation of Gestapo agents in Prague, many of those who already had visas went into hiding, and others were arrested. Refugees from Germany and Austria fled from Prague. Among the arrests reported were those of many Czech workers who had co-operated with foreign relief organizations, and of Madame Schmolkova² who had been at the head of the organization for the assistance of German refugees in Czecho-Slovakia. Emigration was temporarily brought to a standstill. At the same time there were fresh additions to the refugees in Bohemia and Moravia of groups from the districts occupied by Hungary, from Slovakia, where the new Government developed anti-Semitic and anti-Czech tendencies, and from Carpatho-Ruthenia. Emigration for political suspects was only possible by illegal means, as permits to leave the country legally, even for those who had obtained visas for foreign countries, had to be endorsed by the Gestapo. Some escaped over the Polish border individually and in small groups.³ When the Deputy High Commissioner of the League of Nations visited Katowice on 31 March, he found that refugees were crossing at the rate of about thirty a day. All classes were represented among them—Austrian and German Jews and politicals, Sudeten Jews and politicals, Jewish refugees with means from the new Protectorate, and a growing number of Czech politicals. The Deputy High Commissioner was assured in Warsaw that the Government would suspend measures of expulsion in respect of illegal entrants until a representative of the British Committee had had time to make a selection of persons suitable for temporary emigration to the United Kingdom. In the meantime the Poles were anxious to be assured that no refugee Jews would remain in Poland.

Among the refugees from Czecho-Slovakia there were relatively few Czechs,⁴ the greater number being Sudeten Germans, Germans,

(1) On 14 March, arrangements were being made for two trainloads of refugees to be sent to Gdynia for distribution from there to countries prepared to receive them. In fact, one train was actually dispatched with refugees for England. Only very few refugees found shelter in the embassies, some found private shelter, others slept in the snow in the woods. Many learnt too late of the entry of the German troops, and were easily captured. Efforts to secure from the Gestapo permission for the emigration of some hundreds of women and children and some men were successful, but many were still in hiding. (See the *Service d'Information* of the International Bureau of the Right of Asylum, Paris, May 1939.)

(2) The release of Madame Schmolkova was announced in June 1939.

(3) It was reported at the end of May that the frontier was then so carefully watched that escape was almost impossible, but refugees were prepared to take all risks.

(4) There was a change in the situation after the renewed pressure put by Germany on Bohemia and on Slovakia in June, and it was reported in the press that some 2,000, mainly soldiers, had crossed into Poland and were put in a camp near the frontier, and that others were leaving daily.

Austrians, and Jews. Immediately after the cession of the Sudeten areas a certain number of political personages intimately connected with the Beneš régime left the country, but for the most part the Czechs who migrated into Bohemia and Moravia from the ceded districts and those who had to leave Slovakia remained in the two provinces after the declaration of the German Protectorate. At that time it was made a question of principle for them to remain. But there were already large numbers living abroad, especially in France, who found it inexpedient or impossible to return, and for these some legal protection will probably have to be found. In May the French Government were reported to be prepared to make special concessions to this group in respect of the right to work.

In the short respite before the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March further efforts were made to place the settlement and emigration of refugees on a sound financial basis. Immediately after the annexation of the Sudeten territories to the German Reich the British Government made a loan to the Prague Government of £10,000,000, part of which was to be used for the assistance of refugees. In December negotiations were begun between the Czech, British, and French Governments for financial assistance. An Agreement was concluded between the three Governments by which Great Britain and France would place at the disposal of the Prague Government £16,000,000, of which half was a gift, and half a loan. Out of the proceeds of the Guaranteed Loan of £8,000,000 the sum of £6,000,000 would be used to find part of the £10,000,000 already advanced to Czecho-Slovakia and the balance of that advance would be regarded as a gift. This £4,000,000 and a similar sum, the interest on former Czecho-Slovak loans issued in Paris, would be used for the relief and settlement of refugees. The execution of these arrangements was not complete when Germany established a Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia. The British gift of £4,000,000, however, though it remained in suspense, was still held at the Bank of England as available for the emigration of refugees. The fund was suspended on 15 March, but on 22 March the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced¹ that the balance of £3,250,000, remaining from the £4,000,000, would be available to provide necessary grants for emigration.²

(1) See Hansard, 22 March 1939, p. 1308.

(2) The agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and France on the one hand and Czecho-Slovakia on the other, signed on 27 January 1939, provided that emigrants possessing the necessary means would be provided by the Czecho-Slovak Institute before emigration with the required foreign exchange, and that emigrants without means would receive up to £200 in addition to the cost of transport. (See Treaty Series No. 9, 1939. H.M.S.O. Cmd. 5933 of 1939.)

On 15 January the Prague Government concluded an agreement with the Jewish Agency for the emigration of 2,500 Jews, most of them for Palestine. A group of young men were also to go to Scandinavia for re-education.

3. DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES FROM THE FORMER CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

In the interval between September 1938 and the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March considerable emigration took place. Many left for the United States, South American States, and destinations where they had relatives and others ready to befriend them. A group of 550 Austrian and German refugees, who had found asylum earlier in Czecho-Slovakia, left for Central American destinations in January, and other groups expected to follow. Schemes for emigration to Paraguay, Palestine, and Canada were prepared and there was a substantial assisted and unassisted migration to European countries of temporary refuge.

Among those known to have left the country between September 1938 and May 1939 were 3,800 to Great Britain, with a further 3,300 immediately expected, making a total of 7,100. Of these about 1,000 were expected to settle in Canada and an advance group were sent on to prepare the ground. A good many found refuge in France, but the numbers are very variously stated. Trade unions and allied organizations and the Matteotti Fund made arrangements for the emigration of a certain number of Sudeten Social Democrats and other refugees to go to northern countries. The figures given for some of these—Belgium 240, of whom 58 proceeded to Canada, Sweden 319, Holland 70—are probably on the low side. Others went to Norway and Finland. It was expected that many would be able to remain in Scandinavian countries, but that, with the help of the British Fund, some would emigrate to America.

The distribution of the large numbers who emigrated overseas direct before March 1939 is not known.

4. FOREIGN JEWS IN ITALY

In the autumn of 1938 when the Italian Government decided to take action against foreign Jews in Italy, it was estimated that the persons affected numbered about 20,000. The true figure was probably nearer 14,000, comprising 5,000 German refugees, 5,000 Polish Jews and 4,000 Eastern Jews of other nationalities. The decree of 1 September 1938 providing for the expulsion of those who had settled in Italy since 1919 d

and requiring that they should leave the country within six months has been put into operation. Some 9,000 had already left before the appointed date, the greater part of them by their own efforts. Foreign Jews in Italy, writes a correspondent on 24 April 1939, are now allowed to sell their property, and may transfer their blocked bank accounts by exporting Italian commodities to countries which have no clearing arrangements with Italy, and in this way some of them have taken out about 55 per cent of their capital. They may in addition take out small amounts of pocket money in Italian currency, and can book their passages, if on Italian ships.

Organized emigration, through the Jewish Committee of Assistance in Italy, in the first three months of 1939, accounts only for 385 emigrants, of whom 56 went to Palestine, 112 to overseas countries, and 270 to European countries. Some Eastern European Jews have been able to return to their countries of origin; about 300 Jews are reported to have succeeded in entering France illegally; many hundreds have affidavits for the United States and are awaiting their turn on the quota; but there is no detailed information on the destination of the majority of the emigrants. On 12 March there were still about 5,000 foreign Jews due to leave. Permission was given in individual cases to prolong their stay if applicants were able to prove that they were taking all possible steps to arrange for their emigration. The suggestion made at one time for emigration to Ethiopia has not gone any further.

The action taken to exclude new Italian Jewish students from the universities and the extreme difficulty that young Jews find in obtaining work have created a new class of aspirants to emigration. Also, there is a definite refugee problem for about 10,000 Italian Jews whose naturalization dates from since 1919.

Foreign Jews of German origin can claim the protection of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, but for the others there is at present no official international protection.

REFUGEES IN CHINA

1. CHINESE REFUGEES

THERE are three pressing problems in connection with refugees in China. Of these by far the most overwhelming and important is that of the Chinese fugitives before the Japanese advance in China, which may be said to have begun with the fighting around Peking in July 1937 and the attack on Shanghai in August of the same year. By the end of the year the situation may be described as follows. In the North-West the Japanese had established the nucleus of a government for Inner Mongolia to control Chahar, Suiyuan, and other regions. In the North they had occupied Hopei, Northern Shansi, and those parts of Shantung and Honan lying to the north of the Yellow River, and they had proclaimed a "Provisional Government of the Chinese Republics" at Peking, covering these areas, though their position in those regions was by no means consolidated and Chinese guerilla resistance continues. In the Yangtze region forces operating from Shanghai had driven the Chinese back into the interior, occupying Nanking on 15 December 1937 and controlling the Yangtze River from Wuhu to the sea. They were also threatening lines of communication southward.¹ By 8 March 1938, the Japanese claimed they were in control of the whole of Shansi. In the autumn of 1938 a "China Board" was set up by the invaders at Nanking to administer Chinese affairs, and substantial advance was made in the invasion of Southern China. On 25 October the Japanese entered Hankow, which had been set on fire before the city was abandoned by the Chinese, many thousands of civilians having been evacuated at an early date. On 21 October they entered Canton, where the principal buildings had been set on fire before the defenders retreated.

With the principal cities of the Northern, Eastern, and Southern provinces and large areas of the countryside in Japanese hands, armies of refugees were created. In the country in some districts villages were destroyed in order to prevent guerilla operations. After the experience of the capture of Nanking, large evacuations of civilian populations took place in the other cities which were abandoned to the Japanese. In the summer of 1938 the population of Tientsin was said to have fallen from one and a quarter million to 30,000. In January 1939 the population of Hankow, normally about 800,000, was reported to have fallen to about 150,000, and Canton was also largely evacuated.²

(1) See *China and Japan*, R.I.I.A. Information Paper No. 21, London, 1938.

(2) Information supplied by the China Campaign Committee, London.

A correspondent of the Survey, writing from the offices of the China International Famine Relief Commission on 22 April 1939, states that the big western migration began when the fall of Nanking was seen to be imminent at the end of 1937. Many homeless people were concentrated in Nanking, and evacuation on a military plan was ordered. The trek westward reached its maximum point after the fall of Hankow in October 1938. Since then not only have there been organized evacuations from threatened areas but also carefully thought-out plans for the employment of refugees, in the development of the potentially rich South-West and North-West provinces of China. It is estimated that from ten to sixteen million people have migrated to the provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechuan. Some part of the journey may be made by train, if rolling stock is available; where there is no railway primitive road and river transport and walking must serve.¹

The vast movement of refugees into the Western provinces would probably be impossible without some government help. Official refugee stations have been established on the Hunan-Kweichow border, where road money is given to the destitute, who are told where to go and what to do when they get there. The migration is effecting a revolution in the industrial balance in China, as industry is being developed throughout the Western provinces, partly by encouraging the refugees to produce articles for local consumption² under a widespread system of cooperative societies,³ and partly by the removal of whole industries. As soon as hostilities broke out in Shanghai, the Government persuaded industrialists to move their plants into the interior, and were prepared to pay subsidies towards transportation and other expenses. Some of them did move their factories to, or establish branches in, the interior. Architects, contractors, and engineers of all kinds have since flocked to Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan, and even Shansi, to develop the hitherto undeveloped provinces.

(1) "... Millions more are made destitute and have to move from the ruins of their homes, their shops, their little factories. They take what they can on their backs or on barrows or any wheeled vehicles that they can use, their surviving babies being carried in baskets or piled on top of the salvaged household chattels. People in flight fill the highways and crowd the mountain trails, climbing like ants westward and farther westward, hoping to achieve immunity from raiders and find safety from the tortures of war." (W. H. Donald, *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 24 Feb. 1939.)

(2) "The refugees who are finding their way into this great reservoir of human effort and future national greatness have among them many artisans and craftsmen. Some have brought tools with them, and those who could not will benefit by the Government's great efforts to transport machinery and workshop equipment from the areas in the East threatened with destruction. It is a common sight to see on the highways, streams of vehicles, from donkey-carts to trucks, piled with machinery, steadily and laboriously trekking westward through the mountains with thousands of men, women, and children, mostly heavily laden, patiently trudging after them." (*ibid.*)

(3) It is proposed to organize some 30,000 producers' societies for the decentralized small industry which has always been important in China. Many are already in operation for tanning, boat-building, weaving and spinning, flour-milling, etc.

The great untapped natural resources of these provinces in agricultural and mineral wealth will thus be brought into direct contact with industrial development. A report by Mrs Charlotte Haldane¹ states that from the beginning of the war up to September 1938 the Government had helped the movement of machinery and materials for 341 undertakings from the coastal areas to the interior; these include machinery, metal-working, chemical, electrical, printing, knitting and spinning, pottery and glass and mining industries. Up to the end of September 1938 the Government had loaned over six and a half million dollars worth of metals and machine tools to be sold to them at cost price. Side by side with these efforts, much work has been done on the improvement of communications and the reclamation of land. The most spectacular work in road and railway communication has been the opening of roads to Burma and to Russian Turkestan and railroad extension to Indo-China.

The destruction of Chinese universities and schools raised serious issues in a country where education is as highly prized as it is in China. By the end of August 1938 fifty-four universities and institutions for professional training had been destroyed or seriously damaged. Studies were pursued even under the worst conditions when there was constant danger of air-raids, classes being held at relatively safe periods, between five and eight in the morning and between the same hours in the evening. But the most spectacular step taken to secure the continuity of higher education was the removal of forty-one whole universities and schools into the Western and South-Western areas. Some have been twice removed. The whereabouts of some others are unknown. The National Central University loaded up on boats its 11,000 students, its teaching staff, its library and laboratory equipment, and moved to Chung-king where twenty-four temporary wooden structures were erected in thirty days. The removal of the Nankai University of Tientsin had been planned and carried out long before the capture of the city.²

The movement of refugees into the Western provinces is the brighter side of the picture. For many thousands there was no such escape, and there was nothing to be done but to remain within the fighting zone. An example may be taken from one of the Chinese "lost territories," the "hsien" or district of Fanchang on the Yangtze River to the west of Wuhu. The town of Fanchang fell to the Japanese on 20 December 1938. Villages in the district were burned to the ground, and the people

(1) *Report on the situation in China and the Far East*. China Campaign Committee, London, 1938.

(2) See *Reader's Digest*, New York, May 1939, p. 72.

fled to the hills. The Japanese have since been driven out of the district back to the Yangtze cities but the people have no houses left to go to, no tools, no seeds. A recent investigator, Miss Agnes Smedley, reports¹ the presence in the district of 74,286 refugees, of whom 58 per cent are able-bodied men, the remainder being old people, women, and children. She describes their situation as follows:

Only 12 per cent were receiving any relief. Of the rest, some had brought a few dollars with them, others chopped wood and sold it, transported rice to the rear, did odd jobs on farms, acted as servants—in other words, laboured where they could. The rest beg for a living—or die. On the floors of the temples we saw countless men, women, and children lying sick from malaria, dysentery, typhoid, colds, and pneumonia. Since the Japanese overran the district in December last two or more members of each family have died.

The refugees are clad mostly in bundles of unspeakable rags. It is doubtful if even one is without scabies, from the initial stage to open gashes in neck, hands, or legs; and we found many lying in bed with scabies infection. Many babies had all the symptoms of malnutrition, and diseased mothers, with diseased babies in their arms, fell on their knees before us, begging for help for themselves and some other sick member of their families near by. There is absolutely no medical relief at all for these refugees. Nor, apart from the New Fourth Army medical units, which move often, is there any modern medicine in the region, or any one to administer the medicine.

The main work of relief is carried out by the Chinese Government National Relief Commission, of which Dr H. H. Kung is Chairman. Mrs Haldane was informed that in the first nine months of 1938 the Government had spent more than a thousand million dollars Mex. on refugee work. Special offices were set up to provide work for 30,000,000 homeless people, and special sums were set aside for loans. Assistance was given to those in Japanese occupied areas, where Chinese life and administration still survive. The Chinese Red Cross, of course, works in close connection with this Commission. Considerable sums, about 600 million dollars Mex., for the work have been provided by Chinese residents abroad and of this money about one-fifth was sent direct to the Chinese Government. It is estimated that sums amounting to about £400,000 have been contributed for refugee relief from other countries; of this sum, up to the end of 1938 £151,849 had been contributed by the Lord Mayor's Chinese Relief Fund, London, and about \$800,000 from the United States.² Among other organizations sending assistance is the International Red Cross. A great part of the funds from foreign sources has been distributed for direct relief through foreign controlled agencies largely in the Shanghai, Nanking, and Canton areas. The League of Nations maintains Anti-Epidemic units. In Hongkong refugees from China are under the supervision of the Medical Office of Health of the Colony.

(1) *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 9 June, 1939.

(2) Cyrus H. Peake in *The Annals* (American Academy of Political and Social Science), Philadelphia, May 1939, p. 61.

In addition to the vast sums still needed for emergency relief large funds are required by the Chinese Government for reconstruction, famine prevention, and similar services. All observers write in praise of the competence with which the Government are carrying out a herculean task even in the midst of war.

2. REFUGEES FROM GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

The almost universal application of the visa system to emigrants from Central Europe has driven refugees to take advantage of such avenues as remain open, of which China has been the chief. The present condition of the country makes it a most unsatisfactory place of refuge, and Jewish organizations have been repeatedly advised to dissuade Jews from going to a country which at present offers little opportunity of earning a living and where existence even on the lowest level is precarious. Nevertheless, in despair of escaping anywhere else, large numbers have gone to Shanghai, where the uncertainty of political status explains the fact that there were no officials authorized to examine passports and where, consequently, landing was easy. In fact, Shanghai was practically the only port in the world where any one could land without a passport visa. In April 1939 there were already between 6,500 and 8,000 German-Jewish refugees in Shanghai, of whom 6,000 were registered with the refugee committee, which was spending 10,000 dollars a day on their maintenance. Three thousand more were expected in the next month on two German steamers coming via the Cape, as the Company could not provide exchange enough to pay the Suez Canal dues, and on an Italian steamer. It was expected that the numbers would be at least 10,000 in the near future.¹ The emigrants in the two German ships were said to have paid 2,000 RM apiece for their passages. In addition to these special sailings, the Lloyd Triestino boats, with bi-weekly sailings, bring about 500 at a time.²

It is stated that with charitable assistance 350 have been set up in business, and that 270 have found employment or have set up for themselves. In all 1,082 were thus independent. Other projects are in hand and a certain amount of work is available for doctors and engineers.³ The destitute are housed in camps in the Wayside district, where they are supplied with food and shelter, though even the supply of meagre necessities taxed the resources of the Committee, which in mid-April

(1) A correspondent writing from Shanghai on 19 May said 10,000 were already there and that the number was expected to reach 25,000 by the end of the year.

(2) George Leonof in the *China Press*, Shanghai, 12 April 1939.

(3) The same author in the *China Press*, 13 April.

had sufficient funds only to maintain the camps in their then state for three weeks.¹

It is difficult to justify expenditure on moving refugees to a place where the situation is so dangerous and the prospects of employment so poor. Their presence in Shanghai is a reflection of the generalized unwillingness to receive them and of the long-drawn formalities necessary for admission even where countries are relatively well disposed to them.

3. RUSSIAN REFUGEES

There is nothing to add to the rather melancholy account of the Russians in China. Only in Sinkiang does their position appear reasonably secure. Their position in the big ports where they are concentrated has steadily deteriorated, and arrangements for the removal at least of the younger Russians should be made. It might have been expected that the newcomers, the German Jews, would necessarily compete with them for the available employment, but this does not seem to have been the case. The best solution of the Russian situation in the Treaty Ports and in Manchukuo appears to be the removal of considerable numbers to other Pacific countries, where their knowledge of Chinese, and in some cases of Japanese, and of the methods of trade should be useful in countries having trading relations with Japan and China. This solution is the more promising because Russians have already made good in Australia and in California. But for this, finance on a considerable scale would be necessary, and the community is poor and for the most part barely self-supporting.

(1) For a description of the camps see the same writer in the *China Press* of 14 April.

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: FRANCE, BELGIUM, AND SWITZERLAND

1. FRANCE

(a) INTRODUCTORY

BY far the most important country of refuge in Europe is France. This was true before the events of the autumn of 1938 produced a new rush of refugees from Germany and before the fall of the Catalan Government precipitated a mass movement of armed men and civilians over the Pyrenean frontier. In 1936 France had already a foreign population of nearly 2½ million, including about 170,000 refugees. Both figures are now very much larger. No exact figures of the refugee population are available, but the following estimates may be accepted as approximate:

Russians	71,500
Armenians	63,000
Italians	30,000
Saarlanders	4,000
Portuguese	—
Spanish	350,000
Central Europeans	45,000

The position of the first four of these groups was described at some length in *The Refugee Problem*, and there has been little important change in their situation since that account was prepared. But the great incursion of 453,000 Spaniards, of whom 350,000 were still in the country in June, has completely changed the situation.

A Co-ordinating Committee has now been established, under the presidency of M. Georges Bonnet, for the co-ordination of all the work being done for refugees in France. On this body all the important organizations are represented, negotiations with government departments pass through it, and opportunities are provided for consultation and joint action by the societies concerned. The Co-ordinating Committee propose to establish sub-committees on (1) the employment of refugees in agriculture, (2) administrative measures necessary for giving asylum to old people, (3) the immigration of children, (4) co-ordination of effort for occupational reorientation. Proposals under these heads have been submitted to the immigration section of the Haut Comité de la Population.

(b) LEGAL POSITION

The increase in the foreign population of France, taken in conjunction with the strained international situation, has led to some change in the administration of the law respecting foreigners. The basic law is

the Décret-Loi of 2 May 1938.¹ After the passage of that law certain useful changes were made in the services for foreigners including the creation of an information bureau to direct foreigners to the competent offices, the provision of a special bureau for students, professors, and others, and the distribution of leaflets for the information of Austrian and Spanish refugees. The law itself provided rigorous penalties for illegal residence, leaving no option to the courts, and also the machinery by which a refugee without papers might ask for an inquiry into his case. It was often impossible for a refugee ordered to leave French territory to comply with the order for expulsion, and a law of 12 November 1938 made provision for the establishment of camps for such persons, though so far no such camps have been established. Consequently many refugees on the termination of their imprisonment are driven to lead a clandestine existence. This law also contains a definition of the "domicile" and of "residence" of aliens in France, which in certain respects is particularly onerous for refugees. According to section (1) of this law, aliens are entitled to such rights as are governed by laws or regulations concerning conditions of domicile and residence in France only if, at the time of acquiring and exercising such rights, they are authorized to remain on French territory for a period exceeding one year. Residence permits issued for one year or less will not be accepted in lieu of the above authorization, even if they have been renewed.² In March 1939 a plan was submitted to the Council of Ministers which, taken as a whole, would constitute a new immigration policy. One of the objects of this plan was to regulate the situation of aliens in France from the moment when they express a wish to settle in the country with a view to earning their living. The plan also provides for the establishment of an organization which will be responsible for centralizing useful information, will carry out frequent censuses of the alien population and will investigate the need for or the excess numbers of aliens in the various trades and districts. The question of admittance to France and to the various trades is also dealt with in the plan.³

In April two laws were promulgated which affect refugees. The one places on foreigners between the ages of twenty and twenty-four without nationality and persons enjoying asylum in France the duty of reporting to the military authorities for service; the other provides for the control

(1) See *The Refugee Problem*, p. 268. It may be worth noting that this Décret-Loi sprang from the fact that aliens formed 75 per cent of the workers in iron mines, 50 per cent in coal mines, and 35 per cent in potassium mines.

(2) Quoted in *Industrial and Labour Information*, 30 Jan. 1939 from the *Journal Officiel* of 13 Nov. 1938.

(3) Quoted in *Industrial and Labour Information* from the *Journée Industrielle*, 3 March 1939, *Journal des Débats*, 4 March 1939, and *La République*, 8 March 1939.

of foreign associations of all kinds, and will probably cause some reduction in the number of refugee organizations, though it is not in any way directed against useful representative bodies.¹ The Spanish refugees are regarded as temporary visitors only, and the general laws affecting foreigners do not apply to them. The men of military age are in camps under military discipline and old men, women, and children are for the most part in camps. They are provided with a simple safe-conduct in the expectation that most of them will return to Spain.

The procedure with regard to the admission of new refugees in general is that the immigrant should be provided with the necessary permit to enter beforehand. If his papers are not in order he may still be admitted if he can show to the frontier officials proof that he is a political refugee, such as denationalization, impossibility of obtaining a passport, or release from a concentration camp. As far as Germans are concerned, the special Office pour les Allemands has been dissolved and the decision on the *qualité de réfugié* is a matter of administrative regulation dependent on information in the hands of the police, who avail themselves of the knowledge of the case often possessed by the French League of the Rights of Man and other organizations.

Refolement of attested political refugees at the frontier is reported to be very rare. The would-be immigrant is allowed to communicate with a local committee in which the various groups are represented; this committee reports to the Federation of German, Italian, or other refugees, who study and report on the case and forward their findings to the French League of the Rights of Man. If the control committee of the League are convinced of the genuineness of the applicant they supply a *fiche* which is usually accepted by the police. The position is more difficult for refugees compelled to emigrate because they are Jews or for various other reasons, and many illegal entrants receive short sentences of imprisonment because they have not been able to secure regular papers. Although refugees illegally present are served with expulsion orders, actual expulsion is said only to take place on definite information that the refugee is undesirable.

In May some modifications of the present law were under consideration, especially in the matter of penalties for illegal residence, which are regarded as unnecessarily severe.² It was hoped also that the amnesty

(1) On the status of foreigners in France see M. Masuco, *Les Étrangers en France*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1934; *Le Statut juridique des étrangers en France*, Paris, Librairie de Science et de Littérature, 1938; and Morin et Farçat, *Codes des Étrangers*, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1939.

(2) At the end of the term the offender may be served with an order to leave the country which he cannot obey, and may therefore be re-arrested.

to be extended to prisoners on short term to celebrate the re-election of M. Lebrun to the Presidency would be so modified as to apply to refugees and stateless persons in prison for contravention of the law affecting the residence of foreigners, who are usually sentenced for longer terms than those made in the present amnesty proposals.

The conditions outlined above are of more importance for refugees from the German Reich than for the Nansen refugees, most of whom have been long established in France.

(c) *REFUGEES FROM GREATER GERMANY AND THE FORMER CZECHO-SLOVAKIA*

Estimates of the number of refugees from Greater Germany now in France are very conflicting. A reasonable guess at the number at any one time may be 40,000. One of the difficulties in assessing the number is the high figure of illegal entries. Prevention would mean not only close guard on the German frontier, but also on the frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium over which infiltration takes place. One estimate puts illegal immigration as high as 1,000 to 1,500 a month. The situation is made more serious by the existence of clandestine organizations in Germany for smuggling refugees over the frontier; in addition there are said to have been from time to time organized crossings connived at by the Gestapo.

Many important international Jewish organizations, including the American Joint Distribution Committee and Hicem, have offices in Paris. In earlier years the Paris Hicem was an important distributing centre for emigration overseas, but in 1938, for various reasons, including the difficulty of the provision of foreign exchange, a large proportion of overseas migration has taken place direct from Germany. There is a Federation for German Refugees and another for Austrians, and relief is provided by the Comité d'Assistance aux Réfugiés and other societies. Good provision has long existed for retraining of adults and training for boys and girls, as the Ort Union for the re-education of adults, the Ose Union, which includes a children's colony among its activities, and the Youth Aliyah for the preparation of young men for colonization in Palestine, all have branches in Paris. In addition the Centre de Réclassement Professionnel provides technical training for large numbers of adults mainly through admission to State technical schools. The centre seeks to train men for trades in which there is a shortage of French labour, and though information secured at the beginning of the training is sometimes no longer valid in altered circumstances at the end, and though permits to work are not always easily

obtained, the work is on the whole successful. Some ex-professional men have had surprising success as mechanics and in all sorts of trades. The various organizations concerned have placed a considerable number of men in agriculture. Ort has a market-garden at Chelles, and proposes the creation of a farm school, and twenty families have been established in one district on the land.

With the help of the Co-ordinating Committee, the Committee presided over by Madame de Rothschild (Comité Israélite pour les Enfants venant d'Allemagne et d'Europe Centrale) obtained in the first quarter of 1939 authorization for the immigration of 350 children. Of these 200 arrived in March, and 150 were expected to follow shortly. Of the first 200 a group of 70 young children were placed in a home at Montmorency in charge of a special committee. Another group of 130 children between the ages of ten and fifteen were placed in a hostel in Seine-et-Marne, where, in addition to ordinary schooling, the boys receive some instruction in manual work and the girls in domestic occupations. For those expected to arrive in May provision had been made for thirty-eight to be lodged near a communal school large enough to admit them all for schooling and the remainder were to go to private homes of persons who had already offered the necessary guarantees for their maintenance. A certain number of children came in to rejoin their parents.

It was understood that for the moment no further application would be made for visas. In permitting the entry of these children the authorities had stipulated that they should not be placed in the Paris district.

The guarantees required from persons willing to undertake the care and maintenance of a refugee child do not contain any stipulation for emigration, and it is apparently expected that a large proportion of the young immigrants will grow up as French children, though the children trained by the Youth Aliyah are expected to go to Palestine. Of children brought in under earlier schemes fifty per cent have remained in France.

Special arrangements have been made in homes at Nancy and Lunéville for the aged and infirm Jews expelled from institutions in the Palatinate. In general the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are reported to be favourable to the granting of visas for a certain number of persons over sixty-five years of age, if guarantors for their maintenance can be found.

No adequate information on the number of refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia is available. But before the events of the autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939 there were already some 40,000 Czecho-Slovak nationals in France, and probably a large proportion of these would be unable to return to their homes.

(d) *THE SPANISH EXODUS TO FRANCE*

On 21 January 1939 it was estimated that there were about 3,000,000 refugees in Republican Spain.¹ The problem of finding food and accommodation had become steadily more serious the further General Franco advanced, and by the above date the British and French Governments had even begun to discuss methods by which they could offer their assistance.

General Franco's Catalan offensive had begun on 23 December and by the New Year hundreds of square miles of new territory had been occupied. Thousands of new refugees fled to Barcelona in front of the advancing armies. By 21 January, however, it had become clear that the Catalan capital would fall within a comparatively short time, and the great northern exodus towards the French frontier had already begun. A large proportion of the men and women who filled the roads to Gerona and Figueras were not normal inhabitants of Barcelona but refugees who had already fled there from other parts of Spain.

On 25 January it was learned that the French authorities on the Catalan frontier were holding troops in readiness to prevent the mass influx of Spanish refugees which was already threatening. At the same time Señor del Vayo was negotiating with M. Bonnet. It was learned that the Spanish Foreign Minister had asked France to harbour some 150,000 refugees, but that M. Bonnet was unable to agree to this request owing to the financial and other technical difficulties involved.² It was understood, however, that the French Government had suggested to the Burgos Government the creation of a neutral zone on the frontier or in Andorra where refugees could be received, their maintenance to be assured by various foreign Powers, including France and Great Britain.

Barcelona fell to General Franco on 26 January, and on the same day the first batch of fifty refugees from that city arrived at La Junquera on the French frontier. At the same time trawlers with fleeing Republican militiamen on board were reported to be arriving at various points on the French coast. On the 27th it was learned that the plan for establishing a neutral zone for refugees on the frontier had not met with the approval of the Burgos Government.³ At the same time M. Didkowski, Prefect of the Pyrénées-Orientales, had allowed some 2,000 refugees to enter France, and it was announced that the same number would be permitted to enter daily until further notice. There were now about 8,000 massed along the French frontier.⁴ The Spanish Republican

(1) *The Times*, 21 Jan. 1939.
 (2) *ibid.* 25 Jan. 1939.
 (3) *ibid.* 27 Jan. 1939.
 (4) *ibid.* 28 Jan. 1939.

authorities were making every effort to prevent any disorderly exodus of refugees into France. Most of the refugees were sifted by carabinieri as they reached Gerona and again at Figueras. They were then distributed about the north of Catalonia in organized groups.¹

At first it was the policy of the French Government to send back all refugees of military age, but this order was reversed on 28 January in favour of the establishment of concentration camps for them. All militiamen, however, were immediately disarmed and detachments of Senegalese cavalry supervised the influx.²

On 28 January Señor Pascua, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, appealed to M. Bonnet to allow full access into France or French North Africa for Spanish refugees. M. Bonnet agreed to submit this proposal to the Council of Ministers. In any case 15,000 refugees had crossed the French frontier by the evening of the 29th, and on the next day it was known that 80,000 routed Spanish Government troops were scattered along the road from Gerona to the frontier.³ A concentration camp was being prepared for them at Argelès-sur-Mer, and refugees were already being housed there pending the creation of further camps in the "safety corridor" which was being established parallel to the frontier from Le Perthus to Argelès.⁴

By 1 February it was estimated that 300,000 starving Spanish refugees were massed along the French frontier. About 80,000 had been admitted, of whom 18,000 had already been sent into the interior of France. The situation was worst at Prats de Mollo, where about 2 per cent of the children died and cases of typhus and scabies were causing serious anxiety to the authorities.⁵ M. Sarraut, Minister of the Interior, and M. Rucart, Minister of Health, began an extensive tour of the frontier areas with the object of examining the relief measures taken by the local authorities. The result of this tour was a considerable reinforcement of sanitary and police measures all along the frontier. One of the measures adopted was that of turning back all able-bodied men who under the Spanish Government's conscription laws could be considered as military deserters.⁶ On his return to Paris M. Sarraut was able to announce: "The security of the frontier is assured. There is at the moment no question of taking military measures but only police precautions . . ." But at the same time there had been no conspicuous improvement in the

(1) *Manchester Guardian*, 28 Jan.
 (2) *Le Temps*, 29 Jan.
 (3) *Daily Telegraph*, 31 Jan.
 (4) *ibid.*
 (5) *Manchester Guardian*, 1 Feb.
 (6) *The Times*, 2 Feb.
 (7) *Le Temps*, 3 Feb.

living conditions of the refugees. Many were dying of exposure and under-nourishment, and there were still a growing number of typhoid cases. In some cases these conditions led to Spanish refugees entering France illegally in order to avoid the concentration camps. Depredations along the frontier by starving bands of armed deserters became quite frequent. As a result the authorities decided to send back all Spanish men found wandering the roads of France, whether they were in uniform or not.¹ Also any Spaniard believed to have committed crimes in Catalonia was arrested by the French police.²

On 5 February an important conference was held between the local French authorities and the generals commanding the retreating Spanish Republican army. It was decided that the greater part of the Republican forces should cross the frontier in formation on the following day, and that they would be interned at Argelès and Port Bou. Those who wished to join the Nationalist troops were to be allowed to do so by way of Hendaye.³ In fact the entry was not carried out with the discipline that was hoped. Civilian and military refugees were mixed and it was necessary to separate them after they had crossed into France.⁴ Nevertheless some 300,000 persons were safely shepherded by the French army to camps for the men and to trains to carry the women and children inland. That there were no casualties reflects great credit on the French soldiers who had to carry out the difficult operation and on the refugees themselves.

On 8 February some 17,000 of General Franco's prisoners were admitted into France on the understanding that a similar number of prisoners taken by the Republican troops and transferred into France should be returned to Insurgent territory. Within a week, however, it had become clear that the Burgos Government had failed to fulfil the agreed conditions, and the repatriation of refugee prisoners then ceased.⁵ At the same time it has always been the policy of the French authorities to return to Spain all refugees who were willing to go. On 8 February some 1,700 militiamen who had expressed a wish to be sent to Insurgent Spain were repatriated via Hendaye, and hundreds of others were repatriated in a similar way every day that followed.

On 11 February the first Navarrese troops arrived at Le Perthus and with their arrival the mass exodus of refugees naturally ceased. It was estimated at that time that the total number of Spanish refugees in France was about 340,000. They were divided as follows:

- (1) *The Times*, 4 Feb.
- (2) *Le Temps*, 5 Feb.
- (3) *The Times*, 6 Feb.
- (4) *ibid.*, 7 Feb.
- (5) *ibid.*, 14 Feb.

(a) <i>Civilians</i>					
Children	68,035
Women	63,543
Old men	9,029
Dispersed and disorganized militiamen					11,476
Unregistered	11,024
					Total <u>163,107</u>

Of these 148,105 were State-supported and 15,002 were supported by individuals or voluntary organizations.

(b) *Soldiers in the Camps* 180,000¹

In addition there were about 10,000 wounded Spanish soldiers in French hospitals, but it was estimated at the beginning of March that an equal number of militiamen had chosen to be repatriated to Insurgent Spain. On 6 March, however, it was learned that the Burgos Government had refused to take back any considerable number of refugees on the grounds that they were in no position to feed them.

On 8 March a further communiqué was issued by the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber in which it was estimated that there had been nearly half a million Spanish refugees in France at different times. Of these 50,000 had returned to Spain and there remained 220,000 soldiers, 40,000 male civilians, 10,000 wounded, and 170,000 women and children.² 40,000 of the refugees still in France could not be sent to Spain, either because of their past political record or because they were common criminals.³ Thus there were still 400,000 refugees in France at this time who were classified as suitable for repatriation. It must be admitted, however, that the official figures frequently contradict each other. It will have been observed, for example, that the figure of 340,000 quoted above⁴ is far smaller than the more recent figure of the 8 March communiqué, in spite of the fact that there had been no considerable immigration in the interval.

Official figures kindly supplied to the Refugee Survey on 27 April 1939 stated that since the end of January France had harboured 453,000 Spanish refugees, including 170,000 women, old men, and children scattered throughout seventy-seven departments of France and 270,000 militiamen housed in camps supervised by the military authorities. The sick and wounded among the militiamen numbered 13,000 and by the end of March 2,800 had been discharged from hospital.

- (1) These figures were quoted in *Le Temps* of 17 February from a communiqué issued by the Foreign Affairs Commission.
- (2) Quoted in *The Manchester Guardian*, 9 March.
- (3) *Pertinax* in the *New York Times*, 7 March.
- (4) Official communiqué quoted in *Le Temps*, 17 Feb.

(e) *ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR SPANISH REFUGEES*

The number of Spanish refugees still on French soil on 7 June 1939 was 350,000, according to an official statement.¹ The difficulty of handling a mass of disorganized, terrified and exhausted people of these dimensions would have been colossal under any circumstances. There were, however, added complications. The number expected was only 50,000, whereas the authorities had to deal with seven or eight times as many. The serious tension in international relations at the moment did not permit the use of French army personnel, material, camp equipment and medical reserves at a moment when the French army might itself be compelled to mobilize, and the serious financial burden came at a time when the most strenuous efforts were being made to balance the national budget. Moreover, large numbers of Spanish children and old people were already in France, and the only possible way to deal with the newcomers was to improvise camps for them.

The 180,000 soldiers were disarmed, and placed in enclosures under military guard mainly at Argelès and St Cyprien; the 13,000 sick and wounded were placed in hospitals, in hospitals in camps and on ships at Marseilles and Port Vendres, chartered for the purpose; and the old, the women, and the children were scattered throughout France, largely in groups in disused buildings and camps because accommodation in private homes was already used by refugees of earlier date. This dispersion meant the separation of families, and the process of collecting them again is not yet complete.

There has been a good deal of criticism of the accommodation in the military camps and in the hospitals. As far as the camps were concerned, the authorities probably took the best possible course in the emergency of placing them on the sand between the sea and the mountains, and many good judges think that sickness and mortality would have been much heavier in an inland situation. But equipment of every kind was lacking, there was little shelter, and though conditions were gradually improved the French authorities concentrated on preparing new and better camps with good wooden hutments and proper sanitary and other equipment rather than on the improvement of camps on soil that was already befouled. The hospital provision at first was extremely defective, and doctors and Red Cross nurses worked under terrible conditions. The position on the ships chartered for the purpose was far from good, but happily it was possible eventually to dispense with the ships² and to provide for the men on land, especially as many cases were discharged

(1) For the distribution of these people see Appendix II. The total is generally held to be an under-estimate, and new refugees arrive from time to time.

(2) In April there were still 1,800 men on two hospital ships at Port Vendres, and 2,657 on two at Marseilles.

and hospital cases diminished, and as good new hospital camps at Lamoresque and Besière were made available. An excellent general camp at Bacares was housing 50,000 men in May, and there is accommodation for 70,000. By the middle of June the camps at St Cyprien and Argelès had been closed and most of the inmates moved to the new model camp at Bacares.

The maintenance of the refugees cost the French Government about seven million francs a day, the charges incurred being calculated at fifteen francs per head for the healthy and sixty francs for the sick. This expenditure, which was still as high as six million francs a day in June, crippling as it is, would not have sufficed to create the reasonably good conditions which existed in May. The conditions under which the exodus took place meant that everything had to be supplied, clothing, blankets, bedding, and all other necessities. Even when the urgent needs for clothing and provision of other necessities have been met there will remain the problem of maintaining the morale and courage of the men in the camps by providing them with the means of education and employment and so preventing them from that demoralization following complete idleness, which would otherwise render their eventual settlement much more difficult. The worst of all camp evils in the long run appears to be the absence of any occupation.

The additional assistance necessary was provided by various organizations. The French Red Cross took urgent action and local committees in the South of France immediately organized first aid posts at the points of entry over the Pyrenees and at the ports of entry, Port Vendres, Sète, and elsewhere. These were later reinforced by Red Cross workers from all over France. Nurses were sent from Paris to Perpignan and to the principal hospitals opened by the public authorities at Clairville, Auch, Port Vendres and Marseilles, as well as to the hospital ships. In all 2,000 nurses were supplied. Assistance was mobilized from Red Cross Societies in Great Britain, Belgium, British India, Greece, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Switzerland, and Rumania, and from the Red Crescent in Turkey and Egypt. With this assistance it was possible to meet the most pressing needs for clothing, medical equipment, and apparatus, drugs and small luxuries.¹ The British Red Cross had the spending of £50,000 placed at their disposal by the British Government; this money was expended on material asked for by the French authorities, mainly blankets, beds and bedding, and men's clothing,² and a grant was made to the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief (Great Britain) for emigration of

(1) For particulars see an article in the *Bulletin de la Société de Secours aux Blessés militaires*. French Red Cross, Paris, April 1939.

(2) Commitments up to 31 May 1939 amounted to £28,684.

refugees to Mexico. With small exceptions British Red Cross assistance was restricted to the men's camps. The Commission d'Aide aux Enfants Espagnols, presided over by Madame de Montbrison, was created especially to co-ordinate the work being done in France for Spanish children, of whom large numbers were in France before the influx in 1939, and was accredited by the Ministry of the Interior to make inquiries at the prefectures. The Committee work in close co-operation with the International Commission, and receives financial aid from it. The Committee supplied 2,000 beds, 3,500 blankets, and other necessities. There was great distress among separated families, mothers without news of their children, lost children, some of them too young even to know their names. Much assistance has been provided by other charitable societies in France and other countries, which had been assisting Spanish refugees inside and outside Spain.¹

The danger of wasted effort and of overlapping when so many organizations were giving assistance was obvious. Happily the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees in Spain which had co-ordinated, organized, and to a large extent financed the work done in Spain, had moved its headquarters and the majority of its workers from Barcelona to Paris before the exodus took place. The position of this Commission was further enormously strengthened when the American Relief Commission, with its supplies of wheat and the support of the American Red Cross, joined forces with it. Judge Hansson, President of the Commission, found the work of relief in France much facilitated by the accession of these American resources, and by the presence in France of the experienced personnel, drawn largely from the American and British Friends who had directed the work of the two Commissions in Spain. The Paris office was managed by the American Food Commissioner, Mr Howard E. Kershner, and it became possible to co-ordinate a great deal of the work done by the various organizations. The funds of the International Commission are mainly supplied by govern-

(1) The International Commission was formed in July 1938, and a Swedish Commissioner, Mr de Lilliehook, reported on the situation, and arranged for relief to refugee children in Spain, the Friends' Service Council, the American Friends' Service Committee, the Ayuda Suiza and the Save the Children International Union undertaking the work of distribution. The Commission was placed on a firmer footing by the acceptance at the January meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see *Official Journal*, vol xx No. 2, Feb. 1939, p. 102) of the report prepared at the request of the Council by Sir Denys Bray and Mr Laurence Webster on the situation, and by the co-operation of the American Food Commission in charge of the distribution of the wheat sent by the United States. The Report suggested the appointment of a Relief Commissioner, working in close collaboration with the Spanish Republican Government, to supervise the work (League of Nations Document C.416.M.261, 1938 VII).

ments. The Commission probably spent about 40 per cent of its funds in France¹:

- (1) on clothing and bedding for the 400 camps for women and children;
- (2) on hospitalization and medical supplies for the men's camps;
- (3) on emigration.

By March the Commission had received in money and kind over £350,000.²

A combination of three means of dealing with the Spanish refugees in France may provide a solution of the refugee problem.

The first is repatriation, which has proceeded much more slowly than was hoped, the reasons given being the lack of accommodation and of food in Spain and the disorganization of communications. In May, however, repatriation was proceeding at the rate of some hundreds a day, the maximum rate being estimated at 400; even so it was calculated on 7 June that there were still 350,000 in France and that at the existing rate it would take over two years to repatriate all of them.³ It must be remembered that the influx into France included many non-political persons who were fleeing from bombardment by land and air, and whose repatriation should cause no difficulty. The militiamen were for the most part lads and young men, strong and healthy, with perhaps 20 per cent of less desirable elements, and the families were mainly peasants.

The second is absorption in French life. It is probable that France, which already has a considerable Spanish working class population, will consider the grant of permits to remain to a certain number of agricultural and skilled industrial workers if they wish to stay, and it is unlikely that orphaned or lost children will return to Spain. In fact 1,000 Spaniards have already been placed on the land under a French Government scheme, and about 5,000 have joined the French Foreign Legion. But there are political difficulties obstructing the settlement in

(1) At the time of writing the International Commission has about twelve workers in Spain controlling the supplies which are still being sent there for children. There was a good deal of difficulty in the early days of General Franco's victory in preventing diversion from the children for whom they were destined to other recipients, but order has now been restored in that respect. It is intended to close down the work in Spain in August.

(2) The largest sums of money and supplies were received from the United States (£80,073, of which the Government and Red Cross contribution, valued at £79,000, was in kind in flour and wheat); Great Britain (£104,000, of which £80,000 was from the Government); and Sweden (£89,471, of which the greater part was provided by the Government in cash and food). Other large grants were from the Governments and people of Denmark, Brazil, and Norway, and considerable sums were provided by the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Puerto Rico, South Africa, Switzerland, and Yemen. A further £40,000 was promised by the British Government and many gifts were received from private sources.

(3) *Daily Telegraph*, 8 June 1939.

industries and agriculture of any large number of Spaniards in a country which already has a foreign population, including a large Spanish element (351,000 at the census of 1931).

The third is emigration, which is essential for a minimum of about 40,000 political and other persons who cannot return home without danger to life and liberty. The most substantial single offer of hospitality to Spanish immigrants is Mexico. It was reported in March¹ that the Mexican Government would accept persons guaranteed to be genuine political refugees and would provide maintenance for them for three months after their arrival if money was found for their transport. No figure was mentioned, and the assumption that the Mexican Government were prepared to take the whole 40,000 asserted to be in danger is erroneous. The immigrants are not to be settled in groups but to be infiltrated into various occupations. The work of arranging this migration at the French end is in the hands of a Committee, SERE, presided over by Señor Azcarate, the former ambassador in London and President of the Spanish Committee in France. Assistance is also given by various committees interested in Spanish relief, and in fact the first large convoy was financed and provided by the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief of Great Britain, with assistance from the British Red Cross. This was a batch of persons selected from the concentration camps in France; they sailed on the "Sinaia," due to arrive in Mexico on 13 June 1939. A group of 325 is reported² to have arrived on 2 June. A second large group of 1,000, in a ship chartered by the Azcarate Committee, was on its way to Chile. These groups consisted mainly of working men, but the "Sinaia" had on board also 37 teachers, 28 doctors, 17 lawyers, and some other professional people. The criterion used in selecting the emigrants was the degree of danger to themselves if they returned to Spain. A certain number have been sent by the Azcarate Committee to North Africa, many of them to Tangier, to rejoin friends and relatives. Many have been able to emigrate individually by the help of friends and relations already established in overseas countries.

So far as is known the state of organized emigration in the middle of June was as follows³:

Country of immigration	Number(a)	Country of immigration	Number(a)
Great Britain	310(b)	North Africa	500
Mexico	2,125	U.S.S.R.	ca. 500
Chile	1,000	Other countries	500(c)

(a) These figures do not include the many thousands of unassisted emigrants.

(b) Of these 182 brought by the British Government, 77 by the National Joint Committee, 50 stowaways and others.

(c) Sent individually by the National Joint Committee.

(1) *Manchester Guardian*, 28 March 1939.

(2) *The Times*, 1 June 1939.

(3) Figures kindly supplied by the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief.

One class of refugees for whom it has been extremely difficult to provide is about 7,000 members of the International Brigade, especially those of German and Italian origin, who cannot return to their countries. The greater part of these men are in the camp at Gurs, which also harbours some of the more undesirable elements of the migration. A useful contribution to the solution of this problem has been made by the U.S.S.R., which has offered to take the maimed and seriously wounded in need of institutional care.

It appears that whatever success may attend these various efforts, France is likely to have left on her hands a certain number of persons whom no one is anxious to receive. In the meantime the situation as far as the refugees are concerned has become stabilized, sickness has declined and physical conditions have been improved. But the retention of many thousands of men in camps without occupation and with no assured future, dependent on the charity of the French Government, is a very serious matter and one for international treatment and consideration. The burden is left to France to carry as best she can, with such palliatives in the way of charitable assistance as have been indicated above.¹ It is time that the world realized that the existence of these people on French soil is a political as well as a humanitarian question and that the responsibility should be shared on a larger scale than that provided by the International Commission.

2. BELGIUM

In October 1938 comparatively small numbers of refugees were still filtering illegally into Belgium. A proportion of these were later discovered by the police and returned to Germany, although even at this time there was talk of establishing some sort of camp system as an alternative.² This policy of *refoulement* was soon abandoned. Towards the end of the month it was estimated that 5,000 German and Austrian Jews had entered Belgium since the Anschluss, and were without means of support. A definite decision had been taken to house 1,400 of these in camps until arrangements could be made for them to leave the country.³

After the German persecutions which followed the murder of vom Rath a mass exodus of Jews into Belgium was attempted, and the

(1) It must be remembered that France has the power to put some pressure on the new Spanish Government to receive the refugees, as there is still £7,500,000 Spanish gold in the Bank of France, and it may be held that the agreement under which Spanish assets were to be handed over presupposed willingness to facilitate repatriation. It is felt to be unreasonable that the money should be sent to Spain while the French Government are still compelled to spend millions of francs a day on the maintenance of Spanish refugees in France.

(2) *Daily Herald*, 13 Oct. 1938.

(3) *The Times*, 22 Oct. 1938.

Government were twice obliged to strengthen the gendarmerie posts along the German frontier.¹ On 18 November the Government decided to throw open the frontier for four days. At the same time M. Spaak, the Prime Minister, announced that Belgium had made plans to shelter 2,000 German Jewish children.² Soon afterwards the Belgian Chamber passed a resolution urging the Government to show generosity in the admission of refugees; and the Catholic Party decided by a large majority that Belgium should not renounce her traditional function of acting as a country of asylum.³ In fact the attitude of the Belgian people was both exceedingly hospitable and very clearly expressed.

Early in December the financial situation of the existing relief work was becoming serious. The local Jewish community in Brussels had already helped many thousands of refugees who were passing through Belgium, but they could no longer afford to maintain the reception centres, of which the running expenses amounted to nearly £215 a day. Consequently a general appeal for funds was launched, supported by the Burgomaster of Brussels.⁴ The chief problem at this time was that of refugees who had entered the country illegally. By the end of December the Belgian Jewish Aid Committee was looking after more than 3,000 refugees in Brussels and nearly 2,000 in Antwerp. These figures did not include the refugees able to maintain themselves. The rate of entry was about 200 a week, and four million francs had already been spent on relief, all of this coming from voluntary contributions and almost exclusively from Jews. By this time the Jewish Aid Committee had set up two camps, one of 600 inmates at Merxplas, near Antwerp, and the other, to which nearly a thousand were to be admitted by the middle of January, at Marneffe, near Namur. The Belgian Government had placed the premises at the disposal of the Committee but the Committee were responsible for all the running expenses of the camps and for their management.⁵ At a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee in February it was stated that between March 1938 and February 1939 Belgium had received 12,000 refugees of whom 9,000 had entered illegally. Of the 12,000, 7,500 were without any means of their own. When the problem of new child refugees from Spain arose at the end of January 1939, the Belgian Government decided to provide for 500 Spanish children in a home at Sète, in the south of France, which was to be under the control of the Belgian Consul there. At the same time the Belgian

(1) *The Times*, 16 Nov. 1938.

(2) *News Chronicle*, 19 Nov. 1938.

(3) *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 Nov. 1938.

(4) *The Times*, 6 Dec. 1938.

(5) The above information is taken from a detailed report published in *The Manchester Guardian* on 29 December 1938.

Socialist Party agreed to look after 400 of these children, and to provide for a further 600 if the Government would agree to defray the expenses of their upkeep for the first three weeks.¹

Sir Herbert Emerson, League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, visited Belgium on 22 and 23 February 1939. He drew up a report of refugee conditions there, from which the following principal facts emerge.² At this time there were approximately 9,000 Jewish refugees in Belgium, of whom 500 were children. The number of adults was continually increasing, because, although the Government had formally closed the frontier, it was virtually impossible to do so, nor had the Government any immediate intention of expelling illegal entrants. For several months past this illegal entry had been at the rate of about 400 a week, and it showed little sign of declining. At the same time the transmigration rate was far lower, and the excess of entries over departures was the main problem with which the Government were confronted.

Sir Herbert stated that the Merxplas camp now contained about 530 and accommodation was excellent. Training was not yet far advanced, but the equipment in the camp was sufficient for the initial stages. A small Government farm had been given to the settlement and Government agricultural experts assisted in the training of about ninety of the refugees. The remainder were trained in such occupations as leather work, carpentry, and electricity. They belonged mainly to the salesman, clerk, and petty merchant class, but some were skilled mechanics. There was also a non-residential but more advanced training centre in Brussels where fifty selected refugees were being trained in various branches of mechanical engineering. On the other hand the Marneffe camp was still empty, although it was capable of providing accommodation for as many as 1,500. It appeared that the Government were very sympathetic to the camps and were even prepared to defray some of the expenses. In the camps the cost of a refugee's upkeep was approximately the same as in the cities.

There were 530 refugee Jewish children in Belgium who were divided between private families and hostels. The majority had come in through regular permits, though in some cases children had been deliberately dispatched without previous notice, with labels consigning them to the Belgian Committee. Each hostel contained between thirty and forty children and they were cared for with great efficiency. In the case of the children all expenses were met by voluntary organizations.

(1) *Manchester Guardian*, 1 Feb. 1939.

(2) See *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees*, London, April 1939, pp. 19-22 for a summary statement.

As far as the financial position of the Jewish Aid Committee was concerned, it appeared that the Belgian Jews had been extremely generous in their contributions, but that the Committee were now obliged to rely to a very large extent on support from international Jewish organizations. The cost of a refugee's board and lodging was eight Belgian francs a day, or about 1s. 2d. This was very near the subsistence limit and could not be cut down any further.

In June the Belgian Government agreed to receive 200 Jews from the Hamburg-Amerika liner "St Louis" who had been refused admission to Cuba. By this time the funds of the voluntary organizations had fallen so low that the Government were obliged to ask Parliament for a credit of 5,640,000 francs (£41,000) for the maintenance of the 10,000 Jewish refugees then in the country.

Although Belgian Congo is not a country for white immigration the Belgian Government are reported to have granted 2,500 visas for the colony.

3. SWITZERLAND

Since the War Switzerland has gradually adopted a policy of restricting admission to refugees whose residence was likely to be more than temporary. The large immigration of German and Austrian Jews after the Anschluss obliged the Federal Government to accentuate this policy, and in August 1938 the frontiers were closed. The German authorities then began to issue their own passports to Austrian emigrants, and Switzerland was consequently obliged to introduce a visa system. No German refugee was to be allowed to enter the country without a pass from a Swiss consulate in Germany.¹

At the beginning of November it was reported² that 4,000 German and Austrian refugees had entered Switzerland since the Anschluss. By this time the Jewish community in Zürich had set up a camp for Jewish refugees in which it was hoped to house about 1,100 and to train them in agricultural and other occupations.³ Prominent Jews made representations to the Federal Government, urging a generous immigration policy; but the Government's reply was implicit in the answer which they gave to the Dutch request for international co-operation in finding a solution for the refugee problem. They reiterated that Switzerland could only provide temporary refuge for fugitives who were moving on elsewhere, since the country did not possess sufficient financial resources

(1) *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5 Oct. 1938.
 (2) *Völkischer Beobachter*, 6 Nov. 1938.
 (3) *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 26 Oct. 1938.

to do more than this.¹ Yet by 6 December the total number of German and Austrian Jewish refugees who had entered Switzerland since March had risen to 5,000,² and the Government had agreed to provide temporary refuge for a considerable number of refugee children.

Towards the end of February 1939, however, the police regulations regarding the registration of refugees were made more stringent, and the number of refugees allowed to enter was severely cut down. The prospects for early transmigration had worsened and, with certain countries refusing to renew the passports of their nationals abroad, Switzerland was confronted with the problem of supporting a large number of stateless people for a considerable period. Since then permission to enter Switzerland has been granted on individual merits to the following categories of applicants³:

- (1) Persons who have obtained a visa for another country as well as the necessary Swiss or other transit visas entered in a valid passport.
- (2) Persons who are not yet in possession of such visas but who can prove that they will be able to obtain them within a short period, and have relatives in Switzerland.
- (3) Persons over sixty who can provide the necessary guarantee through Swiss relatives.

In addition the Swiss Government have authorized the entry into Switzerland of about 300 children, most of whom have now been installed in children's homes.

It appears that there are now about 10,000 refugees in Switzerland, half of whom are still able to live on their own means or on those of their friends. The others are dependent on private relief organizations, 3,000 of them being supported by the Jewish communities. Their upkeep alone accounts for about 300,000 Swiss francs a month.

About 900 of these refugees have been installed in fifteen camps in Northern and Eastern Switzerland, but this does not imply any fundamental change in the Government's attitude.

The chief problem is still that of finding outlets for re-emigration.

(1) *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 18 Nov. 1938.
 (2) *ibid.* 6 Dec. 1938.
 (3) All the subsequent information contained in this section has been taken from a report published in the May edition of the *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees*.

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: GREAT BRITAIN,
THE NETHERLANDS, AND SCANDINAVIA

1. GREAT BRITAIN

(a) *INTRODUCTORY*

The British Government have made some direct contribution to the assistance of refugees from Central Europe. The balance of the £4,000,000 gift to the Prague Government still remaining in the Bank of England is available for the costs of emigrating refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia, and they have undertaken certain responsibilities for a limited number of families from Czecho-Slovakia in Great Britain pending emigration. They have also contributed to the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees in Spain, and, through the British Red Cross, they have made a small grant for the provision of necessities in the camps for Spanish men in France.¹ But with these exceptions provision for maintenance of refugees in Great Britain and for their eventual emigration must be made by private organizations. As permission to work is limited to a few categories the responsibility is heavy, and it has to be met from private charity.

The general attitude of the British Government on the admission of refugees from Central Europe is that while the country cannot absorb many tens of thousands of foreigners in employment, it can provide a temporary home for young persons requiring training for settlement elsewhere and for other transmigrants; in other words, Great Britain is a country of transit, not of settlement for the purpose of work, except in individual selected cases, and for certain specified occupations, or for retired persons who will not come on the labour market.² The insular situation of Great Britain makes it much easier to prevent illegal entry than in countries which have long land frontiers. The Government have insisted, however, that no refugee shall become a public charge, and the inflow has therefore been limited by the ability of societies and

(1) See p. 61.

(2) The categories for admission are:

- (a) transit emigrants, e.g. those with definite plans for further emigration within two years;
(b) children under the age of 18 to be prepared (in most cases) for emigration;
(c) persons between the ages of 16 and 35 for training;
(d) persons over 60 years of age (in the case of married couples the age of the wife is immaterial).

individuals interested to provide financial guarantees to that effect. The only occupations open to refugees without a special permit from the Home Office are domestic service, nursing, and a limited number of places (at present 1,000) in agriculture. Special permission to work is available for persons who supply a kind of skill or ability not readily available, but the limitations have been very strict, and permission to exercise trades and professions is generally subject to consultation with professional associations and trade unions.¹

The strict interpretation placed on the Home Office regulations prevented the influx of large numbers of Germans into Great Britain for a long time. But since November 1938 the machinery has been somewhat speeded up, especially where it has been possible to make the selection of persons to whom visas should be given in Berlin or Vienna or Prague.² In the summer of 1938 the number of refugees from Central Europe was thought to be between eight and ten thousand. In April 1939 the numbers and age distribution were given³ as follows:

	Men	Women	Children and young persons under 18
German	6,041	4,836	3,834
Austrian	4,248	3,277	841
Czecho-Slovakian	1,091	806	162

making a total of 20,299 adults and 4,837 children.

In correspondence with Colonel Wedgwood, M.P., published in *The Times* of 14 June 1939, Sir Samuel Hoare said the total number of refugees admitted since 1933 was 29,000, of whom 3,873 had emigrated by April 1939.

The letter showed the rapidity with which the process was being speeded up since the beginning of 1939. The figures for authorization of admission since 1 January 1939 were:

7,170 persons for domestic employment;
2,184 persons over 60;

(1) The requirements are roughly:

- (a) That the proposed employment of a foreigner is reasonable under the circumstances;
(b) that the wages and other conditions of employment are not less favourable than those commonly accorded to British employees for similar work in the districts concerned;
(c) that the employment of a foreigner will not prejudicially affect the employment of British subjects.

For an official account of British policy with regard to refugees, see a statement by the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, in the House of Commons on 21 November 1938 (*Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 341, cols. 1463-75).

(2) Recognized societies affiliated to the Co-ordinating Committee apply to the Home Office for visas on certified nominal rolls, the society being responsible for the admissibility of the refugee and his maintenance. The rolls are accompanied by cards bearing serial numbers. The cards, after being stamped at the Home Office, are sent by the society concerned to the refugee, who then receives an entry visa on application to the British Consulate or Passport Control Officer.

(3) By Lord Winterton, speaking at Worthing on 26 April, 1939.

10,000 with a view to emigration, including 2,067 for Richborough camp, of whom 1,500 had arrived, and 2,980 persons between 16 and 35 under a special training scheme;

5,060 children;
300 doctors, 150 trained nurses, 300 probationer nurses, and 80 midwives.

Most of the 6,600 children now in Great Britain were brought during the winter of 1938-9.

In the summer of 1938 the Co-ordinating Committee was formed to prevent overlapping of the various organizations existing for the assistance of refugees and to act as a channel of communication with the Home Office. In December, as the work of the committees had become much heavier, it was concluded that closer co-operation and a better system of demarcation between the committees was desirable, the Committee was recognized under the chairmanship of Lord Hailey,¹ and a small executive committee appointed. The work of the principal societies was gradually transferred to a single centre, Bloomsbury House, Bloomsbury Street, London, W.C.1.² The existing arrangements were briefly described by Lord Hailey in a recent broadcast.³

There is no one body responsible for directing refugee work as a whole, and it is carried on by a number of independent but closely allied voluntary organizations. The most important is the Council for German Jewry, which in this case operates through a subsidiary body, the German Jewish Aid Committee. This deals with far the largest number of refugees, since out of the total number coming to this country about 80 per cent are Jewish by race if not by faith. The main committee responsible for non-Jewish cases is the Christian Council for Refugees, but in this instance the actual case-work is carried on by the Germany Emergency Committee. The two major councils—the Council for German Jewry and the Christian Council—are also responsible for certain joint bodies dealing with both Jewish and non-Jewish refugees, such as the Children's Movement, which has brought over about 5,200 children from Germany, and the Domestic Bureau, which has brought over 4,500 domestic servants. Then there are in addition a certain number of independent bodies, such as the International Solidarity Fund, for which the Trades Unions and Labour Party are responsible, or again the two committees which provide specially for refugees of the student and academic classes. I may say Scotland has its own committee for refugees. With main committees and sub-committees for special purposes, such as emigration planning, hospitality, agricultural training, and the like, I suppose there must be well over thirty case-working bodies in London. The relief of refugees from Czecho-Slovakia is in the hands of a separate committee, which was originally created to expend moneys contributed by the Lord Mayor's Fund, and this has its own sub-committees for special purposes.

I have pointed out that there is no single body which directs all refugee work in Great Britain. But all the bodies which I have mentioned, and some others, send representatives to form a Co-ordinating Committee. The name is rather misleading, since this body is in fact designed mainly for joint discussion on matters of policy. It can give some help and guidance to the committees it represents, but has, of course, no control over them. It has connected with it over a hundred committees in most of the big towns of England, and the movement owes much to their activity in assisting to find maintenance or special training or temporary homes for refugees. But this does not end the full tale of committees working for refugees outside London. There are a number of committees devoted solely to the care of children, and the main Jewish organizations have also a considerable number of branch committees in the provinces.

(1) The approaching resignation of Lord Hailey was announced on 20 June.

(2) Details of the work of the societies are given from time to time in the *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee*.

(3) *The Listener*, vol. xxi, No. 544, 15 June 1939, p. 1248-9.

(b) ASSISTANCE TO JEWISH REFUGEES

A large proportion of the German and Austrian refugees are Jews. In 1933 when the Hitler régime was established the Jewish organization in England gave an assurance to the Home Office that no Jewish refugee sponsored by them should become a public charge. A very large proportion of the German refugees in Great Britain, namely 19,519, were registered with the German Jewish Aid Committee in March 1939. Expenditure in that month amounted to £27,775, of which over 30 per cent was for maintenance grants and 16 per cent for emigration. Registration figures month by month between January 1939 and April 1939 show the rapid increase of the work. Side by side with these figures are shown the monthly figures of emigration. It will be seen that the situation is fluid. Emigration figures will probably increase in July when the new United States quota is opened.

GERMAN JEWISH AID FIGURES FOR REGISTRATION AND EMIGRATION

	Registrations	Emigrations		Registrations	Emigrations
Jan. 1938	150	77	Sept. 1938	2,099	131
Feb. 1938	148	66	Oct. 1938	1,145	173
Mar. 1938	267	111	Nov. 1938	1,348	222
April 1938	255	49	Dec. 1938	1,199	217
May 1938	375	70	Jan. 1939	2,001	197
June 1938	413	56	Feb. 1939	2,832	243
July 1938	530	97	Mar. 1939	3,895	271
Aug. 1938	815	109	April 1939	4,333	311

The most serious feature is the diminished ratio of departures to entries. Departures in the first quarter of 1938 were 45 per cent of registrations; in the first quarter of 1939 they were just over 8 per cent. The distribution of emigrants in 1938 showed the following figures: Australia, 466; the United States, 319; the British Empire, excluding Australia, 98; Latin American countries, 207. In the first four months of 1939, 607 went to Australia, 449 to the United States, 35 to New Zealand, 48 to Canada, 32 to South Africa, 114 to South America, and 80 to other countries. Out of 411 emigrants in April 1939, 337 were assisted at a total expenditure of £8,382, of which £1,205 was for temporary maintenance. The emigration expenses included £2,743 on fares, £3,197 for landing money, and £1,236 for general emigration expenses, a total of £7,176, or assistance at the average rate of rather more than £21 per head.

An important part of the constructive work for German refugees is the training, mainly in agriculture, provided at various centres for young Jews in preparation for emigration, financed partly by the Council for German Jewry and partly by German Jewish Aid and other bodies. There are eight training centres, some, like Whittinghame House,

especially for Palestine and others for general purposes. The Wallingford Farm Agricultural College Scheme provides for 100 boys at a time and for 500 over a period of three years, and it is reported that the results have been so satisfactory that many boys have been placed direct on English farms. A more ambitious development is the transformation of the old military camp at Richborough into a place where men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five can be maintained pending emigration and can obtain training in a number of trades. It is estimated that the capital charge will amount to £20,000, and the cost of maintenance is estimated at ten shillings per head per week. The work of reconstructing the camp and fitting it for its new purpose begun by British workmen has been mainly continued by the refugees themselves. In May there were already 1,700 men in the camp, and it has capacity for 3,500. Most of them are selected by agents of Jewish Aid working with the Reichsvertretung in Berlin. The men are not all maintained by German Jewish Aid. The Germany Emergency Committee maintain 100, and some Czech refugees are now in the camp.¹

(c) *ASSISTANCE TO NON-JEWISH REFUGEES FROM CENTRAL EUROPE*

Christians and non-Aryans are for the most part provided for by the Germany Emergency Committee of the Society of Friends, who, since 1933, have assisted some 7,000 persons of whom about 5,000 have been emigrated. The Christian Council, formed in the autumn of 1938 to provide funds for the assistance of non-Aryan and other Christians, now provides funds both for this organization, for the Catholic organization and others assisting Christians. Since the introduction of the visa system for holders of German passports and Austrian subjects, the Germany Emergency Committee had by May 1939 obtained 2,500 British visas for refugees. The Society maintains centres in Vienna, Berlin, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and Haarlem. A study of the amounts provided in any one month for emigration shows that many of the grants made have been for direct emigration from the country of origin to the country of final settlement. The Society has established small group settlements in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Venezuela, and in islands in the Pacific, and in recent months Australia and New Zealand have taken many immigrants. The work has increased heavily in recent months, and the Committee obtained, in March 1939, 498 visas for new entrants. The Committee have small groups in training centres for

(1) An account of the camp is given in the *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees*, April 1939.

emigration by groups and by infiltration. Between 1 July 1938 and 31 March 1939, the Committee arranged for the entry into Great Britain of 2,331 adults and 301 children, of whom 185 came in with their parents. The entries came under the following groups:

Guaranteed pending emigration	1,291
Guaranteed indefinitely	490
Domestic employment	306
Other employment	138
For training (groups and individuals)	407

With this Committee, as with others, the tempo of the work has increased, and in March 1939, 350 visas were obtained and fifty-six persons emigrated. The average assistance per person emigrated in March was about £27.

(d) *CHILD IMMIGRANTS*

The immigration of child refugees is in the hands of the World Movement for the Care of Children from Germany. The Movement took over charge of the children who had already been brought in by the Inter-Aid Committee. The total number of children and young people under eighteen under the legal guardianship of the Movement for the Care of Children from Germany in April 1939 was 4,390, of whom the majority, about 3,000, were in private homes, some 690 in hostels maintained by local committees and 700 in schools of various kinds. By 15 May the total number brought over had risen to 5,230, about equally divided between boys and girls. Lord Samuel stated on 15 June that the total had already reached 6,600 and that the numbers would reach 8,000.¹ These numbers do not cover the whole child refugee populations in Great Britain, but only those who have come into the country without their parents and for whom the Movement is responsible. Children who immigrated with their parents are not included. The majority came from Germany and Austria, but some were brought from Prague, Slovakia, Italy, Hungary, and Danzig and a group of fifty on 15 February 1939 from No Man's Land on the Polish frontier.

Of the total 2,040 in April were guaranteed. About 800 of the children were brought in as "guaranteed cases," i.e. some friend or acquaintance before their immigration into the United Kingdom undertook complete responsibility for all charges in connection with the child until he attains the age of eighteen, and, since 1 March 1939, the guarantor has been asked to deposit with the Movement a sum of £50 to cover the eventual emigration of the child.² Careful investigations are made as to the financial stability of the guarantor and the suitability of the home before the

(1) *Daily Telegraph*, 16 June 1939.

(2) It is understood that the proviso is being reconsidered.

arrangement is concluded. Lord Samuel estimates the cash value of the hospitality received for the children at about £2,000,000.¹

A large number of children were brought to England without a preliminary guarantee, and for most of these guarantors have now been found. They were selected by the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland and the Kultusgemeinde in Vienna or by the representative of the Society of Friends in these cities, and by a representative of the British Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia in Prague. This immigration was organized after the pogroms in Germany in November 1938. The first transport arrived on 2 December, and the children were placed in a holiday camp at Dovercourt, and a second batch of 522 arrived on 12 December, the boys being sent to Pakefield Camp, Lowestoft. These transports were for the most part of unguaranteed children, but the batches who arrived in the first months of 1939 were mainly of children for whom guarantees had already been provided. The camps for non-guaranteed children have now been closed, as homes were found for the children, but two hostels for boys and one for girls are still maintained by the Movement. These provide for about 200 unguaranteed boys and twenty-seven girls, and it is only possible to receive new unguaranteed immigrants as these are provided for. Many children are placed in supervised private hospitality until a permanent guaranteed home can be found.

No children have been brought from Czecho-Slovakia except with a pre-arranged guarantee, except those who came with their parents.

The children must receive the same educational facilities as English children, and the local education authorities admit them to the elementary schools. Some of those in private hospitality receive a secondary education, and a few are accepted in public schools, which have remitted the fees for them. But the majority attend the elementary schools and will go on to technical or agricultural training. The Movement works on the assumption that it will be necessary to emigrate 80 per cent of the boys and 20 per cent of the girls on reaching the age of 18. Whether they remain in this country or emigrate it is thought that their best chance of acceptance is as artisans or as agricultural workers.

There is a good deal of uncertainty as to the religion of the children, but the accepted division is 4,480 Jews, 503 Christians, and 253 of no religion. A sample inquiry among 236 Jewish children showed 24.7 per cent as Orthodox, 61.0 per cent as Liberal, and 14.3 per cent as non-practising. The problem of placing the children in homes presented many difficulties, especially as people were reluctant to accept older boys. Some of these lads had left school, and what they needed was technical training to prepare them for emigration. At Whittinghame 85 boys and girls are being trained for agriculture in Palestine, 35 boys are training in the Richborough Camp, 100 are in Y.M.C.A. training centres, the Youth Aliyah have several training farms, and the Catholic Committee have a training scheme near Wigan. Wallingford Agricultural School has provided accommodation for 100 boys. In addition, 166 boys and 46 girls are trainees in various occupations, including 30 boys placed on private farms.

(1) *Daily Telegraph*, 16 June 1939.

Although most of the children are placed in private homes, some 34 local committees have started hostels, and other hostels have been provided by various people and organizations. Several schools have agreed to take a number of children, and the New Herrlingen School, which was transferred from Germany in 1933, has taken about 85 children, most of whom are supported by individual guarantors.

Already 52 children have been re-emigrated, either with their parents or to rejoin them, with the exception of 15 who have gone to Australia under the Big Brother scheme. It is expected that within eighteen months about 1,000 will have left the country. Of 503 cases of actual or proposed re-emigration, 315 are for the United States, 62 for Palestine, 44 for Australia, 13 for Bolivia, 12 for Chile, and 11 for Brazil.

(e) REFUGEES FROM THE FORMER CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

The greater part of the Sudeten German and other refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakian territory are under the care of the British Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia. The Committee received in the first instance £25,000 from the Lord Mayor's Fund, £7,000 from the *News Chronicle* Fund, £3,500 from the Solidarity Fund of the Trade Unions, and £1,696 from private subscriptions. At a later date a further contribution of £55,000 was made from the Lord Mayor's Fund. No allocation had yet been received (in May 1939) from the Lord Baldwin Fund. In the autumn the Committee obtained from the Home Office permission to bring over 350 families, and in January, when additional funds were available, arrangements were made to bring over a further 200 families, the Committee taking responsibility for maintenance pending emigration. They worked on the assumption that the period of residence in the United Kingdom would average about eighteen months. Owing to the urgency of the situation (explained on pp. 36-40) the men were brought first, with the intention that the women and children should follow later. Under an agreement between the British and Czech Governments on the expenditure of the £4,000,000 gift made by Great Britain, £200 per family for landing money and transport to overseas destinations was to be available for certain groups.¹ As money for emigration had not to be kept in hand the Committee were able to devote such funds as they had to the provision of temporary maintenance and thus to accept responsibility for a larger number than would otherwise have been possible. By the middle of March 1939 the Committee had already accepted the charge of some 3,000 individuals (about 1,500 families). By the end of May they had accepted responsibility for the care of a further 1,200 families together with about 1,200 persons who were not selected by the Committee's agents either in

(1) See p. 18 above for the exact definition of the classes covered. See Treaty Series No. 9 (1939), Agreement between . . . the U.K. . . the French Republic and . . . the Czecho-Slovak Republic regarding financial assistance to Czecho-Slovakia. H.M.S.O. Cmd. 5933 of 1939, p. 12.

Prague or in Poland but who have reached this country and who, for racial or political reasons, are unable to return. Of about 7,100 persons covered in this way, about 3,800 were already in Great Britain in May and the remainder were expected to arrive shortly. Others may be accepted if further funds are available.

At the time of the German occupation there were 400 Jews from the former Czecho-Slovakia in the United Kingdom, and other refugees came over without visas. Children coming with their parents are provided for by the Committee, those coming unaccompanied are under the care of the World Movement. A large proportion of the refugees are in hostels and a considerable number in private hospitality. Instruction in English is provided in all hostels, and some practical training is given in the larger groups, while education in English schools and vocational training for elder children is provided. The Government, in permitting the reception of these refugees, made it a condition that the majority of them should emigrate; it is not yet possible to say how many will be permitted to stay in Great Britain.

Plans for the emigration of these people include settlement for four hundred Sudeten families in Canada, and a pioneer group left early in 1939. In May negotiations were in progress for the emigration of several hundred people to Bolivia, and for a few families to Rhodesia.

(f) PROFESSIONAL PERSONS AND SCHOLARS

The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning tries to place those whom it accepts in university and similar institutions all over the world, or in posts specially created for refugees in this country. It discourages application for ordinary posts in British universities unless the refugee is of such outstanding merit in his own field that there is no British scholar to compete with him.¹

(g) SPANISH REFUGEES

The only important work for refugees in England outside the purview of the Co-ordinating Committee is the care of the Spanish children evacuated in May 1937, from Bilbao and other towns in Spain. This work is in the hands of the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief. Of the 3,800 originally brought to Great Britain, some 3,000 have been repatriated. The process of repatriation was gradual, some whose parents were able to claim them having returned as early as September 1937. The remainder are still living in hostels under the supervision of the Society, though many are maintained by local committees. The position

(1) *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, February 1939, p. 12.*

of these children is in many ways less advantageous than that of those under the care of the World Movement. Their admission was on the understanding that their residence was temporary and that they would shortly be repatriated, and consequently they were not generally sent to the elementary schools, and rather makeshift arrangements for their education had to be made.¹ As those not repatriated are most of them orphans or children of refugee parents it appears that they may have to be absorbed in Great Britain, and it is therefore unfortunate that they do not enjoy the facilities granted to German refugee children.

After the final defeat of Republican Spain a small number of political refugees were brought to Great Britain with the assistance of the British Government.

(h) FUNDS AVAILABLE

Until the autumn of 1938 the main burden of providing for refugees from Germany and Austria fell on the Jewish community in Great Britain. The Council for German Jewry assists not only British organizations, but certain international Jewish organizations such as Hicem, working outside the United Kingdom for the emigration generally. Lord Hailey estimates that since the spring of 1938 British Jewry contributed £750,000 for the assistance of refugees. The Lord Baldwin Fund provided some assistance, though here again Jewish subscribers made large contributions. All the societies working for refugees and many local committees collect funds on their own account, and most of them secure hospitality for refugees on a large scale, the monetary value of which cannot be estimated.

The major recent efforts in the United Kingdom to raise the enormous sums required for the assistance of refugees in the last nine months were:

- (1) A new appeal in the United Kingdom by the Council for German Jewry, the response to which amounted to over £500,000 before the end of 1938.
- (2) The Lord Baldwin Fund launched by Lord Baldwin in a national broadcast and through *The Times* newspaper on 9 December 1938, the amount contributed up to 3 June 1939 being £485,725. To this amount will be added the proceeds of a sale on behalf of the fund held at Christie's in May and some contributions from overseas. It is proposed to close the Fund on 31 July.
- (3) The Lord Mayor's Fund for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia opened on 5 October 1938, the proceeds amounting to £360,000.
- (4) The Christian Council, formed in October 1938, which raised some £23,000.
- (5) The *New Chronicle* Fund for Czech refugees which raised £44,420.
- (6) Other funds for special purposes for which smaller amounts were subscribed.

The allocation of funds from the Baldwin Fund and the Christian Council has been placed in the hands of an Apportionment Com-

(1) Out of the total of 30,000 children evacuated to various countries by the Republicans during the war, 9,000 have been repatriated. The party include 3,000 who were in Soviet Russia and 2,000 from Mexico. A party of 270 children returned to Madrid recently, and another 1,300 are expected shortly.

mittee acting in close connection with the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees. A large proportion of the money is allocated to the Council for German Jewry and the Christian Council, and grants to individual organizations are made by them. Practically the whole of the money subscribed has been provisionally allotted among the societies. In a broadcast made on 6 June, Lord Hailey stated that all the sums collected were nearly exhausted and that there was acute anxiety about the future.

2. THE NETHERLANDS

The restrictions maintained on the entry of refugees from Germany in the early autumn of 1938 are explained by the presence of large numbers already in the country, and by the slow progress of further emigration as compared with new entries. Holland is already a closely settled country and must be regarded as a country of temporary asylum. Yet of 25,000 refugees admitted between January 1933 and December 1938 only 8,000 re-emigrated.¹

The Dutch people were deeply stirred by the intensified persecution of German Jews in November 1938, and the Government were strongly urged to relax restrictions. The Prime Minister pointed out that Holland might be flooded by 200,000 fugitives if the frontier was opened, but that the governments of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Switzerland had been approached with a view to devising collective assistance for Jewish refugees.² Meanwhile refugee camps were being prepared and refugee children abandoned on the frontier were being admitted.³ The result of these statements was acute and increased pressure on the frontier. The guards were strengthened, and the decision was taken to close the frontier to all but the most desperate cases. Nevertheless more refugees were admitted into Holland during December than in any other single month before or since. The total amounted to 1,305 (824 from Germany and 408 from Austria), as against 710 in November. A large proportion entered illegally, but 332 of them came already provided with tickets and visas for transmigration. The figures for the early months of 1939 provided by the main Jewish committee, the Comité voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen, show the movement of Jewish refugees. Immigration of Jews from Austria from September 1938 to March 1939 shows 207 legal immigrants, fairly evenly distributed monthly; 431 illegal immigrants, of whom 227 arrived in December,

(1) Statement by Dr Colijn cited in *Daily Telegraph*, 3 Dec. 1938.

(2) The results of these inquiries appear to have been negative, though Dr Colijn continued rightly to insist on the international character of the problem. (*Manchester Guardian*, 3 Dec. 1938.)

(3) *The Times*, 16 Nov. 1938.

making a total of 638. About half of these were on the relief lists. In addition there were 712 transmigrants requiring temporary assistance.

Corresponding figures of arrivals from Germany were 534 legal and 998 illegal immigrants, making a total of 1,532, of whom not quite two-thirds required relief. There were in addition 881 transmigrants. The heaviest immigration was in the months of December and March.

Other refugees, of whom about 30 per cent came from the territories formerly included in Czecho-Slovakia accounted for 152 immigrants and 83 transmigrants.

For 914 departures from Holland in the first three months (excluding mere transmigrants who came with tickets and visas) the destinations included United States, 301; England, 167; Australia, 103; Bolivia, 60; Palestine, 44.

The expenses incurred by the Comité have been extremely heavy and frequent appeals have been launched. Receipts and expenditure for December were roughly equal, January showed a favourable balance, and in the months of February, March, and April 1939 there was a serious deficit. In April receipts were only 28,670 florins while the expenditure was 207,039 florins. The pressure on accumulated reserves was therefore serious, and the financial position of the Comité becomes increasingly precarious.

The International Catholic Office for Refugee Affairs at Utrecht reports the presence of about 500 Catholic refugees, of whom 258 were in camps and public institutions in May 1939.

In April 1939 the Children's Committee in Holland had under their charge 1,503 Jews, 45 Protestants, and 36 Catholics, a total of 1,584. At that time children not with their parents had to live in approved institutions, not in private homes.

When the High Commissioner visited Holland in February it was estimated that of the large number of Jewish Refugees who had entered the country since 1933 some 20,000¹ were still in Holland. Many of these were middle-aged and elderly people living with relatives in Holland dispersed throughout the country.² But in the last six months the pressure on the frontier led to a change in policy, and the more recent refugees have been segregated in camps from the general population pending emigration, even though they have friends in the country, in the belief that Holland cannot assimilate larger numbers than she already has within her borders. The process began in December 1938 with the rounding up of illegal refugees who were placed in two special camps.

(1) This number has since increased.

(2) Report in the *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees*, London, Bloomsbury House, April 1939.

Legal camps were begun at much the same time and these two categories were henceforth to remain sharply differentiated, the legal camps under the administration of the Home Office, the illegal ones under the Ministry of Justice. Although all camps are run by the Government, their expenses are met entirely by voluntary contributions, and primarily through the Comité voor Bijzondere Joodsche Belangen, which is the principal refugee relief organization in Holland. In May it was proposed to build a large central camp in the middle of Holland capable of housing about 2,500 refugees. The estimated expenses to the Government of providing the barracks, schools, and training shops is a million guilders, roughly £125,000 sterling. This camp would provide a centre through which relays of refugees could pass for retraining before further emigration,¹ the costs of maintenance being met from private funds. The Government hold in trust a large part of the funds collected for refugee relief, and it is expected that a portion of the maintenance charges will fall on these funds. A memorandum of the Minister of the Interior to the States-General, released to the press on 11 May 1939, states, however, that:

the Minister has grounds for believing that the Jewish community, supported by private charity, will be able to meet the charges incurred for some years. So long as possible each community concerned will pay for the maintenance of co-religionists. All charges incurred so far on behalf of the refugees have been financed by bank guarantees handed over by the different committees to the Government. There can be no question of repayment of expenses already incurred.

The same memorandum states that

separate camp arrangements are required for Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant families, and for children brought over without their parents. The plans for the proposed central camp are given as follows. The camp, to be established about 11 kilometres from Drente, will not resemble the camps erected for interned soldiers during the war. Without being luxurious, the barracks will meet all reasonable requirements both in summer and winter. The general atmosphere will be a constructive one. Young people between the ages of 13 and 18 will be given opportunities of technical training; though it will not be possible to install machinery or laboratories in the camp, a separate establishment may be provided for the purpose. Re-education under skilled supervision will be available on a farm of about 30-50 hectares, from which some supplies for the camp will be produced. Schooling will be provided for children, and the question of placing stray children with refugee families is under consideration. The central camp is expected to provide for 2,500 refugees.

The Minister is convinced of the suitability of the site in case of war.

The Dutch have already considerable experience in the work of re-training refugees with Government encouragement and assistance at the farm settlement at Wieringen, and there are two other Jewish training centres.²

In spite of the fact that the actual maintenance of the refugees falls on private organizations, Sir Herbert Emerson points out that "Holland has gone further than most countries in accepting the refugee problem as

(1) *Bulletin of the Co-ordinating Committee*, April 1939, p. 17.
 (2) *See The Refugee Problem*, p. 247.

involving some charge on public funds and in regarding it as an administrative question with which the State is intimately concerned."¹

3. SCANDINAVIA

Sweden. It has never been possible for Sweden to take large numbers of refugees and, like so many other European countries, she is obliged to consider herself primarily as a country of temporary refuge. At the same time the influx of refugees has increased very considerably since October 1938: There were many applicants for refuge after the cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany, one Swedish consulate receiving more than 52,000 applications. Early in November the Swedish Board of Social Welfare announced that a total of between 1,800 and 2,300 refugees had entered Sweden since January 1933. In February 1939 a special census was made of all aliens residing in Sweden, which revealed that there were then in Sweden 2,150 German Jewish refugees, 470 German non-Jewish refugees and 200 Czechs. Of the political refugees 100 were Communists and 400 were Social Democrats. It was also thought that there were between 100 and 200 refugees who had entered the country illegally.

On 19 February it was reported² that students had demonstrated in Stockholm against the influx of Jewish refugees; but a few days later the Riksdag voted 500,000 kroner (£26,000) for relief work. The money was to be used to support refugees, to help them to leave for other countries, and, in cases where this appeared suitable, to give them vocational training, mainly in the mechanical trades and in domestic work. A co-ordinating committee for all refugee relief work in Sweden has now been formed, and is meeting regularly.

Norway. In November 1938 the Norwegian Government initiated a scheme by which Denmark, Norway, and Sweden would each take about 400 Czech refugees who were then housed in a camp near Prague. This was accepted by the governments of the other two Scandinavian countries and in due course each country received its quota. Norway has been particularly generous in her reception of political and working-class refugees.

Denmark. There has been a considerable amount of illegal entry into Denmark since the persecutions which followed the assassination of vom Rath. But a close guard is now kept on the German frontier and only special cases are admitted.

(1) *Bulletin* already cited, p. 14.
 (2) *Völkischer Beobachter*, 19 Feb. 1939.

In conclusion it should be mentioned that though none of the Scandinavian countries has been able to admit large quantities of refugees, all have contributed generously to the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees in Spain, Sweden actually giving about £90,000. They have also maintained colonies for refugee children in Spain and elsewhere.

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: PALESTINE

THE total Jewish immigration into Palestine from Germany in the years 1933-8 is stated by the Jewish Agency to be 45,100 in round figures, but there are reasons (see p. 30 above) for thinking this may be an underestimate. The legal immigration of Jews from Germany in 1938 was 6,138 or 55 per cent of the total. This is the highest percentage since 1933. This total of 6,138 comprised 2,947 direct from Germany, 1,626 direct from Austria, 367 German and 171 Austrian refugees from other countries, and the remainder were Jewish refugees of other nationalities or stateless, coming from Germany and Austria. The categories under which the German and Austrian immigrants were registered show the composition of the immigration¹:

COMPOSITION OF THE IMMIGRATION	
Category	Number
Persons in possession of £P.1,000	2,038
Persons with secured income of £48 per annum	13
Persons with smaller capital	1
Pupils	1,659
Persons admitted on the Labour Schedule	1,389
Dependents on Palestine residents	1,038
	6,138

Total immigration and the German proportion of it are shown in the following table.

	IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE	
	Total Jewish Immigration into Palestine	Thereof Immigration from Germany
		Number
1933	27,289	6,803 25
1934	36,619	8,497 23
1935	55,407	7,447 13
1936	26,976	7,896 29
1937	9,441	3,280 35
1938	11,222	6,138 55

The restrictions on immigration were maintained in 1938, but a small quota for workers without capital was given for each half-year. Immigration in 1938 included 6,138 persons from Germany and Austria, a considerably larger proportion of the total than in former years. Settlement has been assisted by grants from important Jewish organizations; for example, from the Council for German Jewry for the settlement of 100 young people who had been trained in agricultural training courses

(1) For further particulars see Department of Statistics of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Jewish Emigration into Palestine from Germany during 1933-38*. Bulletin No. 3, Jerusalem, February 1939.

in Austria, and by assistance to destitute immigrants.¹ In November 1938 Palestinian Jews offered to take 10,000 Jewish children from Germany for adoption in Palestine, 5,000 at once and another 5,000 in December.² The children were to be placed in children's agricultural settlements, farms, and private homes. The Palestine Jewish Community and Zionist organizations throughout the world would bear the cost of transport, maintenance, and educational training. Almost immediately after this statement was made the Jewish Agency for Palestine, stirred by the violent attacks on Jews in Germany at that time, made a larger offer, declaring that the Jewish agricultural settlements and urban communities in Palestine under the direction of the Jewish Agency and the National Council for German Jewry, with assistance from Jews throughout the world would undertake the organization and the financial assistance required for the absorption into Palestine of 100,000 Jews, which would include practically the whole of the younger generation of German Jews.³ The proposals were endorsed emphatically by American Jewry. On 29 November at the annual assembly of the Jewish National Fund in New York a proposal was adopted for raising five million dollars immediately for the purchase of land in Palestine for the settlement of refugees.⁴ In Palestine itself offers for the reception of young refugees poured in to the authorities.

But the plans for the immediate absorption of young refugees came at a moment when the Mandatory Power was arranging a conference in London between Arabs and Jews in the hope that agreement might be reached on the future of the country, and was consequently unwilling to prejudice the issue by the admission of a large block of new immigrants. Mr Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, stated in the House of Commons, 14 December 1938, that the Government could not agree to the immediate additional immigration of 10,000 children. This did not mean that permission would be permanently refused, and it was possible to make temporary arrangements in Great Britain if their maintenance was guaranteed. He pointed out that considerable numbers of young refugees were at present being admitted to Palestine under existing arrangements both as dependents and as students in schools, colleges, and agricultural training centres.

(1) For particulars see the *Report of the Council for German Jewry for 1938*, p. 10.

(2) *Manchester Guardian*, 21 Nov. 1938.

(3) *Manchester Guardian*, 23 Nov. 1938. The scheme was developed in a memorandum submitted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine at the meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee on 2 December. It included provision for agricultural workers, training in agriculture for young people over 18, boys and girls between 15 and 17 for training, children to be adopted in Jewish families, skilled artisans, relatives of Palestinian Jews, and persons with independent means (*Manchester Guardian*, 3 Dec. 1938).

(4) *New York Times*, 30 Nov. 1938.

Some small concessions were made for particularly urgent cases. At the request of the Chief Rabbi in Palestine, Dr Isaac Herzog, thirty permits were given for the admission of German rabbis.¹

Under the pressure of intolerable conditions in the countries of origin, a certain amount of illegal immigration was organized. Jews released from prison or concentration camps in Austria and told to leave the country within a given time, sometimes only a couple of weeks, grasped at any chance of getting away. Many were conveyed on small Greek ships, sometimes in cattle boats, and landed at night on the coast.² At first the Palestine authorities appear to have winked at the irregularities. A case is reported of Austrian ex-officers brought before a magistrate on a charge of illegal landing. The narrative of their suffering led the magistrate to express the hope that their appeal against his sentence would be successful.³ No strong action seems to have been taken to prevent illegal entry until the practice became frequent. In a written reply to a question in the House of Commons, Mr Malcolm MacDonald said the coastguard system had been strengthened and marine police controls were being organized. Pending the conclusion of these measures, a naval patrol had been temporarily provided. The number of any illegal Jewish immigrants who could not be deported would in future be deducted from future immigration quotas.⁴ On 24 April it was reported that the Greek steamer "Assimi," carrying 270 refugees, had put out to sea at Government orders. A small schooner with 176 refugees on board was too unseaworthy to be sent out to sea, and the refugees were placed under guard at Haifa, pending arrangements for their deportation. Another party of 218 refugees were put ashore north of Gaza, after thirty-six days at sea.⁵ With the stricter

(1) *New York Times*, 5 Dec. 1938.

(2) The process was described by a writer in *The Times* (30 May) as follows: "Unscrupulous steamship agents have connived with Jewish enthusiasts and the policy of Jew-baiting Governments to facilitate refuge in Palestine for the frantic fugitives from persecution. The Odyssey of these unfortunates has yet to be written in detail. We catch glimpses of them making their way individually across Europe to the Black Sea or Eastern Mediterranean ports, or being allowed to hide in the holds of the great Danube barges drifting downstream to the East. Jewish agents with correspondents in Palestine then arrange for transport in small Greek or Roumanian steamers, and even sailing vessels, which are attracted to the trade by the exorbitant fares—£20 or £40 for hardly more than sitting room in an overcrowded, dirty vessel. Packed with their human cargo the ships set out for Palestine, and after perhaps three or even five miserable weeks at sea come in sight of the coast."

(3) Letter by Captain Victor Cazalet, M.P., to *The Times*, 6 May 1939.

(4) *Parliamentary report*, 26 April 1939. In a reply in the House of Commons on 5 June Mr MacDonald said the Government were trying to deal with a deliberate and large-scale attempt to flout the immigration law of Palestine. The people responsible were in many cases exploiting the misery of these unhappy people, they were charging outrageous fares and were counting on getting them into Palestine illegally at night at some unguarded spot.

(5) *The Daily Telegraph*, 24 April 1939.

patrol many vessels carrying refugees were intercepted and driven elsewhere. One party driven off in this way were permitted to land temporarily in Crete.

Since internment offered no solution, a harassed administration admitted some shiploads of illegal refugees with the promise that the numbers would be deducted from the next year's quota. But many are landed in small parties on the shore and are distributed among the Jewish population. The dimensions of illegal immigration are certainly very large. The Jerusalem correspondent of *The Times* estimates¹ that, while the number of legal Jewish immigrants admitted in 1938 was 12,868,² it is thought that 7,000 have gained admission illegally, and that "to-day the figure exceeds the thousand a month legally admitted."

Perhaps the most serious result of the illegal immigration is that it upset the scheme so carefully prepared and executed with such success in the past for orderly immigration into Palestine of persons selected and prepared for settlement in the Jewish National Home. The illegal immigrants, arriving destitute and unnerved by their terrible experiences, were not necessarily useful colonists, but common humanity imposed on the Jewish community the duty of caring for them and providing them, if possible, with occupation. It will be little short of a tragedy for the development of Jewish colonization if this disordered immigration prevents the acceptance of boys and girls and young people who are being carefully trained for emigration to Palestine in various centres throughout Europe, mainly for work on the land. It endangers the rather precarious balance which it is important to maintain between urban and rural occupations, and may nullify much of the careful work of years.

Unfortunately for the refugees the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine was not dependent solely on the generosity of the Jewish organizations. The situation in Palestine, serious enough at the time with a large section of the Arab population in open revolt, was complicated by international considerations. The success of Jewish colonization and the situation as it existed after the report of the Royal Commission presided over by the late Lord Peel have been described in *The Refugee Problem*.³ In spite of all the hostilities aroused within the boundaries of Palestine itself it is possible that agreement might have been reached between the contending parties. But the Palestine question arouses heated partisanship in half the countries of the world. Constitutionally the Council of the League of Nations must be consulted on the solution,

(1) *The Times*, 31 May 1939.

(2) This figure is higher than that given by the Jewish Agency above.

(3) pp. 430-41.

and an American-British Convention of 1924 on the rights of the two governments and their respective nationals in Palestine gives the United States some standing in the question.¹ All the three great religions of the West are interested in the Holy Places. The Arabs are able to claim the support of their fellow Arabs in neighbouring States and the Jews that of other Jews scattered throughout the world.

By the time when the Palestine Conference met in London in February the proposals for partition—the cantonal solution—had been examined by the Woodhead Commission² and rejected by the British Government as impracticable,³ and it was necessary to seek for some new compromise. During the debates in Parliament on the Woodhead report the Government were severely criticized for their vacillation and inaction in the past, but, while it was realized that the whole refugee problem could not be settled by immigration into Palestine, it was realized that the acuteness of the situation and pressure for enlarged immigration placed the Government in the dilemma of either intensifying existing bitterness among the Jews or increasing Arab fears of being swamped by increased immigration. This is not the place to relate the proceedings of the Conference given in the daily press,⁴ but its failure to reach any solution must be recorded.⁵

On 15 March the Colonial Secretary submitted to the two delegations separately the Government proposals for an agreed settlement, but no agreement was reached. Some hope was placed on the issue of conversations which took place in April in Egypt under the Egyptian Prime Minister, who received Dr Chaim Weizmann on 11 April and presided over a meeting of representatives of Arab States to discuss the question on 12 April. It was thought that under the urgent pressure of the international situation, threatening the interests of both the parties, agreement would be found. When all prospects of agreement by consent between the parties appeared to be exhausted, the British Government in May put forward their own plan, essentially one for solution on the basis of an agreed population ratio with guarantees for the rights of each party.

The publication of the British White Paper, *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, in May 1939⁶ in fact gave satisfaction to neither party. After

(1) See Cmd. 2559, 1925 and supplementary correspondence in Cmd. 5544, 1937.

(2) Cmd. 5854, 1938.

(3) A statement of policy issued on 10 Nov. 1938 (see *The Times* of that date) said that the practical, administrative, and financial difficulties involved in the schemes of partition put forward were so great that this solution of the problem was impracticable.

(4) A summary is given in the *Bulletin of International News*, 25 Feb. 1939, vol. xvi, No. 4.

(5) For a full account see a revised edition of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Information pamphlet on *Palestine* now in the press.

(6) H.M.S.O. Cmd. 6019, 1939.

setting out their view of the historical events leading to the existing impasse, the British Government declared their intentions on the future government of Palestine, which included the following points:

- (1) The establishment within ten years of an independent Palestinian State in treaty relations with the United Kingdom. This proposal involves consultation with the Council of the League for the termination of the Mandate.
- (2) Arabs and Jews to share in the government of the independent State in such a way as to assure the essential interests of both.
- (3) In the ten years' transitional period an increasing measure of participation in the administration to be offered to both.
- (4) As peace and order are restored Palestinians to be put in charge of government departments with British advisers, heads of departments to sit on the Governor's Executive Council. The offices to be held roughly in the proportion of the respective populations. When the stage is reached that all the departments are in Palestinian hands, the question to be considered of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers.
- (5) No proposals for an elective legislature, though machinery would be provided if desired and if circumstances permit.
- (6) After five years—half-way through the transitional period—a body representing H.M. Government and the people of Palestine to review the situation and to make recommendations on the constitution for the independent Palestinian State.
- (7) The treaty contemplated to implement point (1) and the draft of a constitution to be subject to adequate provision for
 - (a) the protection of and access to the Holy Places;
 - (b) the protection of the different communities in accordance with the obligations of H.M. Government in respect of the conditions laid down in the Mandate and the Jewish National Home;
 - (c) the requirements of the strategic situation as then existing; and
 - (d) the safeguarding of foreign interests.
- (8) If at the end of ten years postponement of the independent Palestinian State is necessary, all the interested parties to be consulted, including the League of Nations and neighbouring Arab States.
- (9) Municipal and local government to be promoted during the transitional period.

Important decisions were announced at the same time on Jewish immigration and on the land question.

Immigration arrangements propose the bringing up of the Jewish population to one-third of the total. It is calculated that on this basis 75,000 would be admitted in the next five years; an annual quota of 10,000 plus the admission of 25,000¹ refugees, especially children and young persons, as soon as their maintenance can be assured. At the end of five years there would be no further Jewish immigration without the consent of the Arabs.

On the land question the High Commissioner would receive general powers to regulate and prohibit transfers of land throughout the transition period.

(1) In reply to questions in the House of Commons on 5 June, the Colonial Secretary, Mr MacDonald, said he was in communication with the High Commissioner on a new immigration quota, including provision for refugees. The 25,000 would be admitted as soon as accommodation could be provided for them. "Refugee" in this connection meant a refugee within the terms of reference of the Evian Conference.

The White Paper had a bad reception in the Jewish quarters and was not enthusiastically received by the Arabs. From the point of view of the refugee question it does, however, offer a substantial immediate amelioration in the offer to admit 25,000 outside the small annual quota. But even so moderate a Jewish spokesman as Viscount Samuel, who has had official knowledge of the situation and has always maintained that a compromise solution must be found, is not prepared to accept the *numerus clausus* principle in the population under the immigration proposals.¹

The future of Palestine is still uncertain.

(1) "Particularly is it unwise to try to command the future in the vital matter of immigration. For the next five years Jewish immigration is to be reduced to perhaps one-half of the volume that the economic conditions would be likely to permit. At the end of five years it is to stop altogether 'unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.' Why should they acquiesce in it? It is this provision, more than any other, which must compel the Jews of Palestine, and their sympathisers everywhere, to oppose the Government plan." (Lord Samuel in *The Sunday Times*, 21 May 1939.)

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. QUOTA CONDITIONS

The fundamental difficulty of discovering the numbers of refugees admitted to the United States is that no distinction is made between refugee immigrants and others. But a very high proportion of the quota for Germany, possibly between 90 and 95 per cent, is undoubtedly filled by refugees, and Polish immigrants include many Jews who, though not technically refugees, are under some pressure to leave their country of origin. Immigration as a whole has recovered from the low level of the depression years, but though this recovery is in the main no doubt due to better business conditions in the United States, some part of it may be due to forced emigration from Europe.

In the fiscal year ending 30 June, 1938, 67,895 immigrant aliens were admitted to the United States and 25,210 emigrant aliens left. The net permanent immigration was therefore 42,685, as against 23,508 in 1937 and 512 in 1936. The German quota (in which is included the former Austrian quota) of 27,370 was not filled, as 17,868 were admitted; it will certainly be filled this year, and the waiting list is a long one.

The present position of the immigration quotas, some of which are filled for long periods in advance, is of considerable interest, not only from the point of view of the immigration of former German, Czecho-Slovak, and Italian nationals but because of the pressure existing on Jewish and some other sections of the population in other countries. The following summary of a survey issued by the Foreign Language Information Service of the United States¹ is taken from *Industrial and Labour Information*.²

As a general rule, applicants for an immigration visa, who are entitled to first or second preference quota status³ and can prove to the consular officers that they are otherwise eligible for admission, will experience little, if any, delay in securing a visa. Exceptions to this statement, however, are applicants born in Albania, Greece, Rumania, Spain,⁴ Syria, or Turkey—countries whose quotas were exhausted, or nearly so, even during the years (1931-7) when immigration was almost non-existent.

(1) For further detailed information see the *Annual Report of the Secretary of Labour for 1937-8*; *Interpreter Releases*, vol. xv, No. 50, 1 Dec. 1938.

(2) Vol. lxi, No. 8, 20 Feb. 1939.

(3) That is, the alien husband of an American citizen by marriage on or after 1 July 1932, the parents of an American citizen of 21 years of age and over, skilled agriculturists and their wives and dependent children under 18 (in the case of quotas of 300 or more), and the wife and unmarried minor children of an alien legally admitted to the United States for residence.

(4) The Spanish quota is a very small one, 252.

For example, a first preference quota applicant under the Rumanian quota must wait six to eight weeks, and the waiting time for visas under the other quotas mentioned is usually several months or longer; for non-preference quota immigrants the waiting period is, of course, much longer.

As regards other non-preference quota immigrants, there are still some countries where an applicant who can prove that he is not likely to become a charge on the public funds after admission, and is otherwise eligible under the immigration laws, is able to get a visa without undue delay. This is no longer true for applicants chargeable against the German and Polish quotas. During the fiscal year ending June 1938, as already stated, 17,868 quota immigrants of German birth were admitted, the annual quota for Germany being 27,370, and 4,218 quota immigrants of Polish birth were admitted, the annual quota for Poland being 6,524. Now, however, the situation has changed fundamentally. Non-preference quota applicants for visas against the German quota must wait two years or more, and for visas against the Polish quota, sixteen to eighteen months. Although the anti-Semitic movement in Italy has led to an expectation of pressure against the Italian quota, this does not seem to have been the case so far, and non-preference quota applicants of Italian birth, who are otherwise admissible, experience little delay in securing a visa at many American consulates.

Pressure against the quotas for Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia has also increased, and visa applicants are now told that they must wait eight to ten years for a Hungarian non-preference quota visa, and two years or more for a Rumanian or Yugoslavian non-preference quota visa.

The situation for Czecho-Slovakia is said to be almost the same, although it is not authoritatively known just how long applicants must wait.¹

The quotas for Palestine and for the Philippine Islands (100 and 50 respectively) are said to be exhausted for the year.²

It may be taken for granted that since July 1938 the quotas for the countries at present creating refugees have been filled. The practice is to allocate 10 per cent of the annual quota to each month, with the result that the quota is usually nearly full for each country by the end of the first ten months. A great proportion of the German, Austrian, and Czecho-Slovakian quota entrances are unquestionably refugees. The refugee proportion in the Italian quota is unknown, but there are probably no Spanish refugees in the Spanish quota for the year July 1938 to July 1939, because it was filled up some five years in advance. Although applications are taken in strict order of date the position of a claimant on this list does not necessarily fix his order in the quota.

The list of quota immigrants does not include all persons admitted as residents. The main additions are (1) a certain number of professors, ministers of religion, and students³ admitted each year, where the applicant gives proof of his status and his ability to follow his occupation in the United States; (2) wives and unmarried children of an American

(1) cf., however, a paper by Read Lewis and Marian Schibsky in *The Annals* (American Academy of Political and Social Science), May 1939, where it is stated that a person now applying for a visa under the quotas for Germany or the former Czecho-Slovakia must wait from four to six years, and that for visas under the Polish, Rumanian, and Yugoslav quotas the period is even longer, under the Hungarian quota perhaps for twenty-five years!

(2) Foreign Language Information Service: *Interpreter Releases*, vol. xv, No. 47, 25 November 1938.

(3) The *New York Times* reported (30 Nov.) that Harvard University had voted 20 new scholarships of \$500 each for qualified refugee students from Germany.

citizen; (3) some 15,000 individuals in the United States who had entered on tourist visas but were granted a special extension of tolerance by order of the President, as a result of the November 1938 persecution in Germany; and (4) a certain infiltration, the extent of which is unknown, of German and other refugees by illegal means from Latin America. The position of the third group is not finally settled, as they might be required to return to Germany if conditions in that country were so radically changed as to make return feasible.

In administrative practice full use is made in the case of refugee applicants by American consuls of a clause in the Immigration Act of 1924 permitting them to waive the demand for certain documents in cases where they obviously cannot be procured. A further concession is that the applicant need not remain within the jurisdiction of the consulate where he files his application until he receives the visa, but may have the visa forwarded to him wherever he pleases; this enables him to take temporary refuge in another country until he can travel to the United States.

At present American consulates in Germany are thronged with applicants for visas. Even if there were room in the quota, would-be emigrants would either have to be able to dispose of balances abroad, which is very rare, or have relations in the United States willing to support them, or secure the necessary affidavit that they will not become a public charge from some United States citizen able to prove that his financial resources are adequate.

Various new concessions have been proposed, the most important being embodied in a Bill before Congress for the admission of 20,000 refugee children in addition to the quota in the years 1939 and 1940. Proposals for the mortgaging of the German quota for three years in advance and thereby admitting 81,000 refugees in one year¹ do not appear to have received support from the State Department.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES AND THEIR PLACE IN AMERICAN LIFE

Within the United States an effort is being made to prevent the concentration of German immigrants in the large cities. The National Co-ordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Emigrants coming from Germany set up in 1927 a Resettlement Division to secure better distribution, working on an individual case-work basis and through local co-ordinating committees. During the year 1938, 797 families, totalling 1,256 persons, were "resettled" in southern, mid-western, and Pacific

(1) See *Daily Telegraph*, 18 Nov. 1938.

coast communities. The process has been more rapid in recent months. In the five months ending 31 January 1939 resettlement was proceeding at an average rate of 128 families per month. An experiment now being made in Iowa, if it is successful and imitated elsewhere, may prove to be a useful contribution to the problem. A reception home has been provided to accommodate forty persons, and is to form a kind of employment agency to act within a radius of two or three hundred miles.¹

The United States is the largest centre of refuge for dispersed scholars. The success with which the process of placing has been carried out is partly due to the cautious policy of the principal committee concerned, the Emergency Committee for Displaced Foreign Scholars. "While it has always shown its awareness that enlightened self-interest should impel a country to share in this work of human salvage," writes Mr David Cleghorn Thomson, "it has always been keenly aware of the dangers involved in indiscriminate or unplanned acceptance. It has left it to academic institutions to apply for grants or invitations to exiled scholars; it has restricted subventions for colleges to the initial stages and only when re-establishment seemed likely; and it has scrupulously sought to avoid all possibility of unfair competition with native talent. In this way it has been able to save for the world of culture many men of learning and distinction exiled by reason of national and political prejudice."² The work of the Committee has been made possible by the hospitable and generous spirit shown by the universities, and by assistance by some of the great charitable trusts.

The number of picked refugees of academic distinction, small relatively to the whole immigration, who have received refuge in the United States receive the most publicity and perhaps give a false impression of the status and condition of the average German refugee immigrant. For most of them the start in American life is hard enough, considering that they are largely of middle class and upper middle class origin. It may be assumed that 50 per cent find work; of these 60 per cent go into domestic service, for which there is practically no native American supply, and about 5 or 10 per cent are artisans with specialized skill acceptable in industry. The earlier immigrants brought some resources with them and could exist for a time without employment; the newcomers are penniless and must take any job they can find. "You find theatrical producers as bus boys and dishwashers, and the post of doorman or elevator boy comes as a gift from heaven to a family father and former justice."³ These no doubt are extreme cases. The makers of

(1) *The Annals*, op. cit., May 1939, p. 95.

(2) *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 16 June 1939.

(3) Eduard Heimann in *The Annals*, op. cit., May 1939, p. 110.

surgical and optical instruments are now being employed on their own jobs as soon as they arrive.¹ There are also many examples of commercial men who have been able to continue their salesmen's work in the markets. A former German exporter of men's wear to Latin American markets, writes Mr Levmore, now has a factory in a key southern city where he employs American labour to supply the same article to South American markets.

There is no doubt fear of refugee competition in the United States as there is in many European countries, and there has always been a certain social discrimination. But the essential difference must be borne in mind. A refugee in Great Britain or in France is an alien who requires a permit before he can take employment or practise his profession. In the United States he can take out first naturalization papers at an early date, and he is expected to obtain American citizenship as soon as possible. He is an ordinary immigrant, not a refugee, and, with the exception of certain professions he can take employment wherever he finds it.

Consequently the United States is likely to profit on a much larger scale than Great Britain and France from the specialized skill available among the "involuntary migrants" from Europe.

3. ORGANIZATION OF ASSISTANCE

The main organizations handling the refugee question in the United States are the great Jewish organizations existing before the problem arose, and a number of *ad hoc* societies formed to meet the emergency.² Efforts have been made to co-ordinate the work through the National Co-ordinating Committee formed in 1934. In 1938 the functions of this Committee have been extended to cover refugees from Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, and the Committee has encouraged the formation of some two hundred co-ordinating committees in various parts of the country on a State or regional basis to include representatives of cities where there are no Jewish communal organizations. An effort has also been made to co-ordinate the work of raising the necessary funds. The United Jewish Appeal for Refugees is a unification of the fund-raising campaigns of the American Joint Distribution Committee, the United Palestine Appeal and the National Co-ordinating Committee Fund Inc. Agencies supported by the Fund help refugees on a non-sectarian basis.

Large sums for refugee relief have been collected in the United States for other classes of refugees. Organizations in the United States which are registered with the State Department under the Neutrality

(1) Bernard Wolbarst Levmore, *ibid.*, p. 164.
 (2) For these see *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 186-7 and 476-7. See also an article by Erika Mann in *The Annals* already cited.

Law for the purpose of collecting funds for Spanish relief collected in the period from May 1937 to September 1938 inclusive a total of \$1,653,048, practically the whole of which was expended.¹ The American Committee for Relief in Czecho-Slovakia had raised \$72,532 by March 1939.² In that month the American Committee for German Christian Refugees launched an emergency campaign to raise \$250,000.³

Lord Hailey has stated⁴ that since the spring of 1938 the Jews in Europe and America have raised £2,500,000 for assistance to refugees, of which the Jews in Great Britain contributed about three-quarters of a million. It may be assumed that a large part of the balance was contributed in the United States.

(1) *New York Times*, 25 Oct. 1938, citing monthly report of State Department.
 (2) *New York Times*, 5 March 1939.
 (3) *New York Times*, 10 March 1939.
 (4) *The Listener*, 15 June 1939, vol. xxi, No. 544, p. 1248.

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES OF REFUGE:
LATIN AMERICA

1. GENERAL POLICY

South American countries, with their great natural resources and comparatively small populations, should offer the best field for immigration from Europe. Nevertheless, many of them were closed to refugee immigrants, and there were serious political and social obstacles to admission in those whose doors still remained open. Both in Central and South America restrictions on admission have steadily increased, and for the present Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua are virtually closed; some other countries, e.g. Venezuela, refuse Jewish immigrants but admit others. Paraguay, Guatemala, and Honduras¹ admit only farmers; Chile, Bolivia,² Ecuador, and Cuba admit refugees when certain conditions are fulfilled. The possibilities of considerable immigration into British Guiana (see p. 99) and San Domingo (see p. 102) have been recently investigated, and it is possible that large-scale immigration can be arranged into these countries if adequate financial arrangements can be made, including those necessary for the provision of communications. It is understood that the possibilities of Surinam (Dutch Guiana) are being studied by the Dutch Government. Even in Argentina and Brazil, where refugee immigration has been temporarily closed down, it is still possible to secure visas for close relations of settlers and citizens. In some Caribbean countries, including certain British colonies, admission can be secured for a period for persons possessing a United States quota number and waiting their turn for entry into the United States; assurances of the means of subsistence and an undertaking not to seek work are usually required.

Mexico and Chile have admitted considerable groups of Spanish republican refugees from refugee camps in France (see under France p. 62), and it is hoped that the problems of assimilation which have

(1) Honduras also admits a limited number of experts in certain branches of technology and science.

(2) On 10 March 1939 the Bolivian Foreign Minister announced that several groups of Jewish immigrants had been organized into farming colonies in the Eastern part of the country. He said that Jewish farm workers, manual and skilled labourers, and specialists would be allowed to enter "without rigorous restrictions." (*New York Times*, 11 March 1939.) Although not all the projected immigration schemes have succeeded, it would seem that Bolivia has been one of the most hospitable of the South American Republics. Arrangements are being made for the immigration of a certain number of Czech families.

proved difficult in some countries will be avoided because of community of languages and origin.

The governments of the countries imposing rigid obstacles against entry explain their action on the ground of fear of unregulated immigration of persons unfitted for agriculture and liable to drift into the towns and swell the urban proletariat. They also complain that persons who came in on tourist visas remained and could not be expelled because no country would receive them. For example, the Mexican Government reported that between 1933 and 1937 over 20,000 aliens had entered as tourists and remained as immigrants, and that there were many others who had entered with temporary work permits who remained after the permit expired. In future all foreigners found to be illegally living in the country will be fined and expelled, and fines will be imposed on persons assisting aliens to evade the law. Factories were combed to discover illegal workers, and many expulsion orders were issued. Of those illegal residents who sought to regularize their position favourable consideration was given to agricultural workers and others in sparsely populated areas.¹

In some countries refugee immigrants illegally resident have crossed the border into other States. At a meeting of the Finance Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay at Montevideo in February 1939 a draft Convention was adopted providing for a clear distinction between temporary and permanent residence, the standardization of papers provided, and close co-operation between the services concerned with aliens in the three countries.²

The Brazilian Federal Government took steps in December 1938 to allow immigrants illegally present who had entered since July 1934 to legalize their position before the new decrees became effective at the end of December. It was expected that about 5,000 applications would be filed, but 15,000 were received; probably many of these applicants were stateless persons.

Large-scale immigration into the less advanced countries would involve financial assistance to the States admitting immigrants to provide the necessary public utilities essential for settlement. The checks on immigration are not necessarily permanent, and they may be of some advantage in the long run if they convince the organizations concerned with migration of the necessity of properly thought out and adequately financed schemes so devised as to bring permanent advantage to the country of immigration.

(1) *Industrial and Labour Information*, vol. lxxvii, No. 8, 22 Aug. 1938, p. 229.

(2) *Industrial and Labour Information*, vol. lxx, No. 1, 3 April 1939, pp. 445-6.

Although increasing restrictions have been placed on immigration, especially of Jewish refugees, into Central and South American countries there are still a considerable number of entries. The emigration overseas organized by Hicem represents only a small part of the whole, but it is probably fairly representative of Jewish emigration. The records show that over 40 per cent was to Central and South America in 1938; for the first three months of 1939 the proportion was about 23 per cent. Of the persons assisted to emigrate by the Germany Emergency Committee, most of them "non-Aryans," in the first three months of 1939 about 40 per cent went to Central and South America; this percentage is however based on a smaller sample than those cited above for Hicem.

When the present difficulties are overcome Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are likely to offer the best opportunities for immigration as they have done in the past, as they are already equipped with the communication and social services necessary. Theoretically the Argentine decrees of August 1938 allow for as many immigrants under contract as the agricultural needs of the country require.¹ Brazil requires annually an influx of agricultural workers, and the arrangements for settlers are on the whole generous.² The Government immigration policy insists on the necessity of avoiding concentrations of alien settlers, and provides for wide distribution to facilitate assimilation.³ Although admittance into Chile rests on a strict basis of selection the country has offered considerable hospitality in recent months to qualified Jewish, German, Czecho-Slovakian, and Spanish refugees. Agricultural settlement may be insisted on, and the newcomers are expected to become assimilated Chilean citizens.

It has not been thought useful to include particulars of the details of conditions of admission into the various countries, because circumstances have led to so many changes in the last twelve months, and regulations may be again altered. The societies arranging for the emigration of refugees are fully informed. It is worth while to point out, however, that in many cases consuls in Europe must refer to their governments at home before visas are given.

(1) Full information on the costs of settlement is given in a memorandum submitted to the International Labour Organization by the Jewish Colonization Association, printed in *Industrial and Labour Information*, vol. lxix, No. 6, 7 Feb. 1939.

(2) Legal conditions of immigration and settlement are summarized in some detail in *Industrial and Labour Information*, vol. lxviii, No. 6, 7 Nov. 1938, pp. 192-7. On future prospects of settlement see also articles in the *International Labour Review* (Geneva), February 1936 and February 1937; also an article on "Refugee Settlement in Latin America" by Samuel Guy Inman in *The Annals* (American Academy of Political and Social Science), May, 1939.

(3) See memorandum by Alfonso de Toledo Bandeira de Mello submitted to the International Studies Conference at Paris, 1937.

Sudden changes in legislation or in administrative practice may have tragic results, an instance of which is provided by the refusal to allow a shipload of over 900 German refugees who had secured Cuban landing permits to land at Havana in the first week of June 1939. The New York correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*¹ says the decks were crowded with sobbing men, women, and children when S.S. St Louis was finally turned away from Havana.

The explanation appears to be that a recent emigration scandal had led the Cuban Government to enact a decree that all previous consular visas and Cuban immigration landing permits had been cancelled and that steps had been taken to communicate this decision to all shipping companies. The case aroused great sympathy in many countries. On 13 June it was announced that the Belgian, Dutch, French, and British Governments had agreed to admit them to their respective countries, and this arrangement has since been carried out. It is understood that the costs involved are being met largely by American Jewish organizations. Some of the 200 who have arrived in England will probably be placed in the Richborough camp.²

2. PROPOSALS FOR LARGE-SCALE SETTLEMENT IN BRITISH GUIANA

In a speech in the House of Commons on 21 November, the Prime Minister said that His Majesty's Government were contemplating the lease of large areas of land in British Guiana for refugee settlement if a satisfactory report were made by inquirers sent out to investigate, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies communicated with the Coordinating Committee in Great Britain with a view to such an inquiry. Meantime, however, the Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, appointed by the President of the United States, proposed to send out an expert commission,³ and the earlier proposal was dropped, an experienced British official in Guiana being attached to the Commission and additional members nominated by H.M. Government. Their terms of reference were (1) to report on the practicability of large-scale colonization, (2) to estimate the approximate numbers which might be settled

(1) 7 June 1939.

(2) In answer to a question in the House of Commons, the Under Secretary of the Home Office emphasized that the special arrangements made in this case, in which the circumstances were exceptional, could not be regarded as a precedent for the reception in future of refugees who might leave Germany before definite arrangements had been made for their reception elsewhere.

(3) For the personnel of the Commission, which was headed by Dr Edward Ernst, assistant director of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, see *Report of the British Guiana Refugee Commission to the Advisory Committee on Political Refugees appointed by the President of the United States of America*, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6014 of 1939.

immediately and over a term of years, (3) to calculate the probable costs, and (4) if mass colonization appeared feasible, to recommend a general plan of settlement. The areas to be examined were two in the southern districts of the colony and a smaller area in the north-west covering in all some 41,900 square miles, of which about 855 sq. miles were, however, Indian reservations and from 3,000 to 4,000 sq. miles already earmarked for mineral or grazing exploitation.

The Commission assembled at Georgetown on 14 February 1939, and, with the help of air transport, made extensive surveys. They came to the conclusion that:—

- (a) The climate of the area under consideration does not preclude the possibility of white settlement.
- (b) Severe tropical diseases at present do not occur with dangerous frequency or degree of malignancy.
- (c) There are considerable extents of soil suitable for immediate permanent cultivation, and others capable of subsequent improvement.
- (d) Bases for a certain industrial development appear to exist.
- (e) Construction of a transport route presents no insurmountable difficulties.
- (f) The present inhabitants of the Colony would welcome immigration by people of European origin.

There were, nevertheless, some important reservations, and the Commission felt that experimental proof on a considerable scale of the ability of Europeans to perform hard physical labour under the climatic and other conditions obtaining must be secured before human lives and money on a large scale were risked. Moreover, they thought isolated settlement dangerous because of the difficulty of protecting widely distributed settlers from possible disease. Pending fuller investigation on the actual area of fertile soil in the Kanuku and other mountain ranges, the possibility of closer agricultural and pastoral undertakings on the savannahs, health and transport conditions and the possibilities of industrial development, they proposed a preliminary plan of action. The main points of their plan were:

- (1) A number of receiving camps and trial settlements to be started at the earliest possible date involving a population of 3,000 to 5,000 carefully selected young men and women placed at properly chosen locations.
- (2) A properly equipped technical organization under competent leadership to be set up from the very beginning to supervise and direct the activities of these trial settlements and render them all possible technical, financial, and other assistance.
- (3) Each of these groups must contain a number of people with specialized training who would be capable of securing the necessary information and in order to make the settlements self-contained.
- (4) The approximate cost of establishing and maintaining these trial settlements for a period of two years, with a population of 5,000 people, is estimated at \$3,000,000. This is a rough figure and is to be accepted with caution.

The difficulties¹ of settlement in country so remote and so lacking in means of communication as the interior of British Guiana are self-

(1) For details see the *Appendices* (Cmd. 6029 of 1939) to the Report, which include papers on agricultural settlement, soil conditions, transport, and industrial possibilities, health problems, etc.

evident, and it is probably impossible to form an opinion on the usefulness even of a preliminary experimental settlement scheme until it is known how far the British Government are willing to spend money on the development of communications, access to the south being at present either via Brazilian rivers in the wet season, or by an arduous canoe or launch journey from Georgetown by the Essequibo and Rupununi rivers or by the Rupununi cattle trail, or for light transport, by aeroplane. Even if the initial difficulty of the necessary finance is overcome, road construction and clearing must occupy some years. The length of time required for opening up the country appears to have been the main reason for the rejection of the proposal for the immigration of the Assyrians of Iraq, though there were other adverse factors.

If the physical and financial difficulties can be overcome there would be many advantages in settlement in a British colony where a certain autonomy would be possible as soon as a considerable population developed, where there is security under the British flag, and where useful connections already exist with other British countries. One of the commissioners, Dr Rosen,¹ points out that the crown colony administration permits the adoption and execution of settlement projects in the simplest possible way; that there is no danger of political friction with neighbouring countries; and the country is practically empty, the bulk of the population of 337,000 being concentrated in the coastal districts.

The natural resources of the country are as yet insufficiently explored. No coal or oil have been located, but hydro-electric power development is possible throughout the country, with the aid of which industries could be built up to exploit the rich resources in timber, the bauxite deposits (for the production of aluminium), tanning, leather, and packing industries, and possibly pottery and glass industries, for which widely distributed supplies of kaolin and of quartz sand appear to be suitable. Possibly the gold and diamonds need not all be exported in the raw state as they are to-day.

The development of industry, however, demands as a foundation a sufficient stock raising and agricultural development to provide adequate food supplies. This in its turn would be easier if the cattle bred on the savannahs were not sent on the hoof to the coast as at present, but cattle products—meat, leather, etc.—prepared in the interior, as the packing plant would conserve for use on the land blood and other fertilizing products, which are at present lost to the soil.

(1) *Appendices* to the Report, p. 89. Dr Rosen has great experience in settlement, having acted for the Agro-Joint (of the American Joint Distribution Committee) in Jewish colonization in South Russia.

The British Guiana proposals are of considerable importance because there is the possibility of urban development side by side with land settlement. It has been pointed out in the introduction that land settlement alone cannot absorb the numbers necessary and that it is of necessity slower and more costly than urban development.

For the practical suggestions on the initial stages of settlement the reader must be referred to the *Appendices* to the Report and especially to the proposals for receiving and "scouting" camps suggested by Dr Rosen.

Obviously schemes of the kind outlined demand not only money, but picked pioneers and properly equipped and technical organization. The cost is estimated at about £150 per person, which would not be a total loss even if large-scale settlement did not prove feasible, as the majority of these pioneers could in any case be absorbed. Probably actual settlement under the most favourable conditions would require about £500 per family exclusive of the requirements of communications and communal facilities such as schools and hospitals. Under anything like conditions of normal success "after the settlement of ten or fifteen thousand families," writes Dr Rosen, "the country should begin to show a growth from within, and it should be possible to reduce the amount of public funds required from the outside."

3. POSSIBILITIES OF LARGE-SCALE SETTLEMENT IN SAN DOMINGO

In January 1939 it was learned that the Government of San Domingo had expressed a willingness to accept about 100,000 Jews from Europe,¹ provided certain conditions were fulfilled. Immigration visas are now obtainable but they must be paid for by a non-returnable landing tax of \$500.

Early in March an American commission, appointed by the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, began an investigation of possible areas of settlement.² The Commission, which consisted of Mr Henry D. Barker, Mr William P. Kramer, and Mr Arthur E. Kocher, were in San Domingo from 7 March to 18 April, and examined possible areas of settlement on Government lands and on land owned by the President, Generalissimo Trujillo. The results of their inquiries are contained in an exhaustive report to be issued shortly. Available forecasts indicate that certain areas offer good opportunities for group settlement. The climate and soil are generally favourable, and existing settlement is on a very small scale.

(1) *Daily Telegraph*, 17 Jan. 1939.

(2) *New York Times*, 8 March 1939.

The tracts examined in the north-east part, extending from Sabana de la Mar to beyond Rio Maymon offer perhaps the best opportunities, though communications are at present inadequate and existing harbour facilities poor. By the purchase of intervening areas in private ownership the 100,000 acres of land available could be extended to 500,000 acres, which might accommodate 25,000 families, after the necessary clearing. The isolation of the district and the prevalence of banditry have hitherto prevented development. There is abundance of forest land, which would provide a continuous revenue if carefully preserved. The next desirable area is in the regions lying to the north of Ciudad Trujillo, which is accessible as the high road from that port to Santiago crosses it. A good part of the highlands would have to be kept in cacao, coffee, etc., and in forest, and the average area per settler would therefore have to be higher. It is thought that 100,000 acres might be available, capable of supporting 3,500 families.

In addition to other areas which might be considered there is a very large tract of land on the Haitian border, which, for various reasons, is less desirable from the point of view of close settlement.

The Committee think that colonization of districts remote from towns would have much to recommend it, as the townfolk fear commercial competition. Before settlement could begin on any large scale various preliminaries would be necessary—on the political side, assurance of the security of settlers, and on the physical side, considerable pioneer work in road-making, drainage, clearing, etc. It is suggested that much of the work of preparing for settlement might be done by young men working in labour camps on the model of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps in the United States. The Committee recommend subsistence farming as the primary basis of settlement, with the marketing of "subsistence" crops as accessory, and the cultivation of export revenue producing crops as secondary to the main scheme.

The areas proposed for settlement in San Domingo are more accessible than the plateaux of British Guiana. On the other hand, the suggestions at present made appear to be for land settlement, and there does not seem to be the same willingness to see a *pari passu* urban development to absorb the necessary numbers.

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES OF REFUGE: BRITISH DOMINIONS AND THE BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE

The relatively small scale of refugee settlement in the British Dominions and in the British Colonial Empire is explained partly on economic, but, as in American countries, partly on social and political grounds. In the Colonial Empire there are few countries offering ideal conditions for European settlement, and in many territories white settlers are definitely discouraged in the interests of the native population. The British Dominions, on the other hand, do offer excellent climatic and other conditions, but since the experience of the depression of 1929-33 immigration has not been great. They are, of course, independent States and have their own immigration policies. On the whole they prefer Northern European immigrants, and to this extent German refugees have some advantage. It seems clear that one important motive for the caution shown in immigration policy in Australia and Canada is the fear of creating enclaves of unassimilated foreigners, and that for that reason suggestions for group settlement will be discouraged, though infiltration on a considerable scale may be permitted.

1. BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY

In the middle of October 1938 it was reported¹ that the British Government had asked the Governments of the Dominions for their assistance in the settlement of refugees from the former Czecho-Slovakia. About a month later, on 22 November, Mr Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons in which he outlined the difficulties in the way of settling refugees in the British Colonial Empire. Colonial Governments, he said, could co-operate in large- or small-scale settlement only if schemes were formulated and carried out by responsible organizations. Inquiries on the possibility of small-scale settlement were already being made. He reported replies received from certain African colonies, and stated that the British Government were willing to offer large tracts of land in British Guiana for refugee settlement on generous terms, provided that surveys of the district were satisfactory and that proper arrangements could be made. The area in

(1) *Manchester Guardian*, 19 Oct. 1938.

question covered some 10,000 square miles.¹ The main country of refuge under British rule is of course Palestine.

2. BRITISH DOMINIONS

(a) AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

In the autumn of 1938 many thousands of applications for admission to Australia were received. The policy followed by the Government of the Commonwealth has been laid down in various official statements:—

- (1) No mass immigration will be permitted, and every case will be considered on its individual merits.² Far-reaching proposals for group settlement will not be entertained and aliens must be distributed in areas where they are most likely to be assimilated to the Australian population.
- (2) Permission would be given for the admission of 15,000 refugees in the next three years, and in order to facilitate orderly immigration an official of the Commonwealth Government was sent to Australia House, London, to supervise and expedite the arrangements.
- (3) The immigration is expected to include (a) a certain number of refugees with substantial capital to engage in industry or establish new ones; and (b) a much larger number of artisans and manual workers. Unskilled labourers, ordinary clerical workers and salesmen are not desired. Immigrants must not attempt to contravene Australian Labour regulations and accepted standards.

The attitude of Australian Labour has undergone considerable modifications owing to the sympathy felt for the refugees. As late as March 1939 the Australian Trade Union Congress passed a resolution against State-aided immigration while Australians were still unemployed.³ But in June the New South Wales Labour Council recommended that European worker refugees should be admitted to union membership in New South Wales, and already one union was admitting refugees as members.⁴ Nevertheless there was some fear of competition felt by Australian Labour, and on 1 May the new Minister of the Interior, Senator Foll, found it necessary to make an explicit statement that additional precautions would be taken to ensure that alien immigrants were informed of their obligation to observe Australian industrial standards, and that Government policy was the rapid assimilation of newcomers in Australian life.⁵

In the first two months of 1939 landing permits were issued to 1,755 refugees—1,600 Germans, 104 of Czecho-Slovak nationality, and 51 stateless persons. About half the wage-earners among them were skilled artisans or agricultural workers, priority having been given to persons with special knowledge who were likely to increase the efficiency of existing industries or to assist in starting new ones.

(1) See p. 100 above for the results of the inquiry made.
 (2) Mr Lyons on 18 Dec. cited in *The Times*, 19 Dec. 1938.
 (3) *Manchester Guardian*, 9 March 1939.
 (4) *Daily Telegraph*, 9 June 1939.
 (5) *The Times*, 11 Oct. 1939.

There is little likelihood of land settlement on a large scale in Australia. The suggestion for a colony of 60,000 Jews in the Northern Territory was rejected. Experience of post-war Empire settlement schemes under the most favourable conditions does not make the Commonwealth Government enthusiastic for land settlement schemes of any kind, and any schemes proposed on these lines will certainly receive the closest scrutiny.

On the other hand a considerable expansion of Australian industry may be expected to result from the expenditure on the defence industries, including the manufacture of aeroplanes, made possible by recent loans, and the Australian authorities are fully alive to the advantages to be derived from the admission of skilled workmen and of entrepreneurs likely to be able to start new processes. There is evidence that both skilled workers and capital are available for the establishment of industries new to Australia. For example, former Czech industrialists made inquiries in January 1939 regarding the possibilities for the production of bed and table linen and curtains, earthenware, glassware, china ware, mother-of-pearl buttons, and women's fancy shoes. There is little doubt that some at least of these industries could be profitably established. In February the Refugees Emergency Council stated that new factories would soon be established in Victoria for the printing of dress materials and the manufacture of perfumes by refugees from Austria.

Various organizations have been established in Australia for the assistance of refugees, in addition to the Jewish Welfare Society, which indeed provides for refugees but was established long ago for other purposes. In December 1938 a Victoria International Refugee Emergency Council (VIREC) was set up in Melbourne. Similar organizations exist in other capitals, and large sums of money have been raised. The committees seek guarantors for the refugees, and provide for them on landing. Classes are provided for them in English, in Australian civic rights and duties, and arrangements are made in some cases for occupational re-education. VIREC has formed an economic committee for inquiry into the possibilities of employment.

Little information is available for New Zealand, though a certain number of refugees have gone there from Great Britain and appear to be making good. So far no large schemes have been mooted, but the recent building activity has created openings for a certain amount of labour and the Government are sympathetic to the infiltration of skilled men and of entrepreneurs likely to be able to work in and develop new branches of industry.

(b) CANADA

Canadian immigration conditions are outlined in the annual Report of the Director of Immigration.¹ The Report suggests that immigrants without capital would be an asset to an immigration country provided that employment, usually of an industrial character, could be found for them immediately on arrival. Many thousands of distressed people from Europe seek admission,² but most of them are without funds, and if accepted, must arrive in Canada with little more than willing hands accustomed to industrial or clerical work. Only very few applicants are in the class most welcome in Canada, that of farmers bringing their own capital for settlement. Under these circumstances, present-day immigration largely consists of dependent relatives, women, and children, coming to join their families, whereas in the past male adult immigrants preponderated.

The acceptance of some hundreds of refugee families from the former Czecho-Slovakia, mainly from the Sudeten territories, was made possible by long and careful negotiation and by the fact that they were provided with the minimum of capital required for farm settlement.³ At the moment it is impossible to make any accurate statement of the number of refugees who have been admitted, but steady headway is being made with the settlement of those who arrived in the early spring, and all have been most hospitably received.

The Canadian attitude to land settlement was recently outlined in the *Round Table* (March 1939) by the exponents, one taking the negative and the other a more positive view. Both agree that Canada has still land for development, but that a cautious immigration policy is essential. The most favourable opinion is that, though a certain amount of immigration would be beneficial, Canada cannot, in the present phase of her development, absorb the large numbers that she did in the past. The less favourable estimate on colonization of northern Alberta, the interior valleys of British Columbia and of northern Ontario and Quebec is that some of them are perhaps favourable enough to warrant gradual colonization by highly selected persons who have no illusions regarding the difficulties ahead of them.

(1) Included in Report of the Department of Mines and Resources for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1938, Ottawa 1939.

(2) A private member's measure which would improve the position of refugees in danger of expulsion was read a first time in the Canadian House of Commons on 30 January 1939. It proposed to amend the Immigration Act by giving the Board of Inquiry which investigates the facts of a deportation case power to report against an alien's deportation even though it is proved that he has become a public charge, if the Board are satisfied that his deportation would result in unjust persecution in his country of origin. (*Industrial and Labour Information*, vol. lxx, No. 1, 3 April, 1939.)

(3) See pp. 6 and 41 above.

(c) *SOUTH AFRICA*

A special correspondent of *The Cape Times*, reviewing *The Refugee Problem* on 24 February 1939, gives the results of an inquiry into the economic effects on the economy of the Union of the influx of refugees from Germany, most of whom arrived before the end of January 1938, when effective measures were taken to check the movement. It is estimated that there are about 5,000 refugees in the Union, and inquiries were made in respect of a large sample, about 2,000. The replies showed that 35 per cent are not earners at all, but aged persons, wives, minors, and people living on their means, who do not compete on the labour market but are of economic value as consumers of South African products. Their relatives in the Union would probably have had to assist them in any case, and, as they are in the Union, the money is spent there and not sent outside. Twenty-five per cent own their own business and two-thirds of these give employment. In Johannesburg 425 refugees employ 2,000 people (including only 249 refugees) in industries and processes many of which are new to South Africa. Among the industries introduced by German refugees are the smelting of antimony-lead, refining scrap metal, manufacture of tube-mills (for the mines), of fish refuse manure, of electric heaters and fans, of leather handbags, "French" perfumes, etc. There are some wholesale and retail traders, some semi-professional people and a few specialized salaried employees, and only ten professional men among the 2,000 cases investigated. Over a third earn living by manual labour. The writer concludes that many of the refugees were specialists in their own kind of work. They brought with them not only their individual skill and experience, but professional training and traditions which are of real value in many spheres of work.

Nevertheless it appears exceedingly improbable that South Africa will take further refugees in any considerable number. Very few have been admitted since October 1938, and all these have been chosen purely on individual merits. It is stated that no mass immigration scheme can be envisaged.

3. BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE

The conditions under which refugees are admitted to the British Dominions are separately noted. In the British Colonial Empire the entry of refugees is governed by the immigration laws and regulations of the various colonies and dependencies, which generally require that the applicant should be in possession of a valid passport and that he should produce evidence to show that he has definite prospects of employment or means of subsistence. In most colonies evidence of possession of a minimum sum is required before the immigrant can land.

Intending immigrants are advised to communicate with the colonial government concerned or with their agents in London to inquire before sailing whether they will be admitted. In fact the Colonial Office have asked all colonial governors to give sympathetic consideration to applicants likely to become useful citizens. In some West Indian colonies, in the Bahamas and some of the Windward Islands for instance, permission can be obtained under certain conditions for temporary asylum pending the receipt of a visa for the United States. In British Honduras temporary asylum of this kind is conditional on recommendation by the National Co-ordination Committee, together with a guarantee of maintenance and an undertaking not to seek employment or to engage in professional practice or business.

Though only about 2,000 refugees from Germany had been received in British colonies¹ up to 31 March 1939, the movement at present is larger than the total figures suggest, as four-fifths of the total entered in six months preceding 31 March 1939.² In the House of Commons on 7 June 1939 the Colonial Secretary said that in the last six months 200 refugees had gone to Kenya. A suggestion had been accepted for an experimental agricultural settlement in British Guiana and for an investigation into the possibility of industrial development. Recommendations from the Government of Tanganyika had been sent to the Refugee Committee. So far as the possibilities in various colonies turned out to be practicable, the Government intended to pursue them as far as they could in British colonies.

Speaking in the House of Commons on 21 November 1938, the Prime Minister stated that the Governor of Tanganyika had suggested that about 50,000 acres in the Southern Highlands and in part of the Western Province might be open to colonization and that he was prepared to give all facilities for examining the possibilities. A scheme of small-scale settlement for 200 families was already under consideration. The general possibilities are now being investigated and will be reported on by officials of the Tanganyika Administration.

In December 1938 it was reported that fifty new applications for admission to Kenya were being received every week. For fear of undesirable immigrants the Government moved a bill allowing immigration authorities to demand individual bonds up to £500 instead of the previous £50.³ In the House of Commons on 21 November the Prime Minister stated that a scheme was put forward by a Jewish organization

(1) Territories under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office. Southern Rhodesia, Newfoundland, and Palestine are not included, as they are not under the Colonial Office.

(2) For details see above, pp. 30 and 71.

(3) *Daily Telegraph*, 16 Dec. 1938.

in London for farm settlement by young Jews trained in agriculture. So far thirty had gone out under this scheme, and if they succeeded they would be joined in due course by members of their families.

On 24 November it was reported¹ that the Southern Rhodesian cabinet had decided that any large-scale refugee immigration was impossible. A limit of twenty families would probably be set. Towards the end of December, however, the Government were said to be giving favourable consideration to a scheme for a small agricultural refugee settlement near Bulawayo, financed by the Rhodesian Jewish community. Later information, however, suggests that further alien immigration is to be limited to a small fraction of British immigration.

In November the Governor of Northern Rhodesia received a draft scheme, forwarded through the Colonial Office, providing for the settlement in Northern Rhodesia of twenty-five selected Jewish refugees trained in agriculture. If the scheme were successful it was proposed to admit further refugees up to a maximum of 150. Examination of further possibilities in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland is taking place.

The Governor of Ceylon pointed out that the present state of trade and employment in the island did not permit the indiscriminate admission of Jewish refugees. At the same time he recommended that Jews "of eminence" should be allowed to enter the island as permanent residents.²

It has already been pointed out that some West Indian colonies offer temporary asylum for persons awaiting admission to the United States. Most of the colonies have placed severe, and in some cases, prohibitive restrictions on refugee immigration. In Trinidad, where these measures were not taken until 1939, nearly 500 refugees were admitted during the last six months of 1938. But in January 1939 the Government suspended all immigration pending the redrafting of the immigration law so as to permit only carefully selected aliens to enter the island.³ In accordance with this policy a German ship loaded with refugees was turned back at the end of February.⁴ Very few of the West Indian islands under British control seem to offer good opportunities for refugee immigration. But in a letter published in *The Times* on 21 March, Sir Hesketh Bell points out the advantages of Dominica for the settlement of refugees. He states that the island is suffering from severe under-population in spite of the fact that the Imperial Department of Agriculture for the West Indies has frequently drawn attention to the remarkable possibilities of the island for fruit culture.

- (1) *News Chronicle*, 24 Nov. 1938.
- (2) *The Times*, 19 Nov. 1938. Reply to circular letter from the Colonial Office.
- (3) *Manchester Guardian*, 10 Jan. 1939.
- (4) *The Times*, 28 Feb. 1939.

ANTI-JEWISH LEGISLATION IN GERMANY SINCE 1 NOVEMBER 1938¹

On 10 November, about two o'clock in the morning, anti-Jewish outbreaks began in many towns and cities throughout Germany. Many synagogues were burned, extensive damage was done to Jewish shops and houses, and thousands of Jews were arrested.

Further restrictions were placed on Jewish economic activity. These restrictions were at first imposed in the form of ministerial and local police orders.² Some of these restrictions proved to be temporary; others were embodied in decree-laws of the Reich promulgated later in the month. The more important of these decree-laws, and of later administrative measures, are enumerated below. Unless otherwise stated, the laws apply to Jews as defined in paragraph 5 of the first decree under the Nationality Law of 14 November 1935.³

Possession of Arms. Jews are forbidden to acquire or possess or carry weapons of any kind, and must deliver to the police any which they may have, under penalty of imprisonment or fine, or, in serious cases, penal servitude up to five years. (Decree of the Minister of the Interior, 11 Nov., *Reichsgesetzblatt*, pt. i, 1938, No. 188.)

Indemnity by Jews of German Nationality. For the execution of the Four-Year Plan Jews of German nationality are subject to a collective fine of one milliard marks,⁴ payable to the German Reich. (Decree issued by Minister Goering, 12 Nov. RGB, pt. i, 1938, No. 189.)

The Exclusion of Jews from German Economic Life. For the execution of the Four-Year Plan it is decreed that Jews shall not carry on business in retail shops, as forwarding agents and middlemen (*Versandgeschäften oder Bestellkontoren*), or as independent artisans, nor offer goods for sale nor take orders for them in markets, fairs, or exhibitions. In industrial undertakings no Jew may act as Führer⁵ in the sense of the Labour Law of 20 January 1934. Jews employed in leading positions in any undertaking may receive six weeks' notice, after which no further claims are valid. No Jew can be a member of a co-operative society⁶; membership lapses on 31 December 1938, no special notice being required. Exceptions may be made where necessary for the transfer of a Jewish business into non-Jewish hands, or for the liquidation of Jewish businesses, or in special cases when otherwise necessary.⁷ (Decree issued by Minister Goering, 12 Nov., RGB, pt. i, 1938, No. 189.)

For the Restoration of the Frontage (Strassenbilde) of Jewish Premises. For the execution of the Four-Year Plan it is decreed that damage done to Jewish business premises and dwellings must be immediately made good by the Jewish owners or occupiers, costs to be borne by them. Insurance claims by Jews of German nationality are forfeited in favour of the Government. (Decree issued by Minister Goering, 12 Nov. 1938, RGB, pt. i, 1938, No. 189.)

Executive Order on Laws of 12 November. The contribution of a milliard Reichsmarks is to be raised by a levy on property of Jews of German nationality and stateless Jews who had to declare their property under the Law of 26 April 1938. In cases of mixed marriages only the Jewish partner is liable. The contribution will be assessed on the basis of the total resources of the payee on 12 November 1938; it will not be levied on property of less than 5,000 RM, measured in round figures. The levy is 20 per cent on the total, payable in four instalments of 5 per cent each, on 15 December 1938, 15 February, 15 May, and 15 August, 1939, without individual notification. Married couples are jointly liable, except in the case of mixed marriages. Details on conditions

(1) A summary of anti-Jewish legislation in Germany from 1933 up to 1 Nov. 1938 is to be found in the *Manchester Guardian* of 30 Nov.

(2) See a summary in *The Times*, 14 Nov. 1938.

(3) See *The Refugee Problem*, p. 128.

(4) Equivalent to £84,000,000.

(5) See *The Refugee Problem*, pp. 132-3.

(6) The *Frankfurter Zeitung* (17 Nov. 1938) states that exclusion from co-operative societies was specially directed to facilitate the exclusion of Jews from housing societies, so that Jews must give up dwellings held under these societies.

(7) It was stated in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (17 Nov. 1938) that the Jewish owner must pay all salaries and wages up to 31 December 1938.

of payment follow.¹ The right is reserved to limit the levy when the milliard mark level is reached, or to increase it as far as is necessary if the milliard marks are not realized. (Executive Order issued by the Finance Minister, 21 Nov., RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 196.)

A circular issued from the Ministry of Finance to fiscal authorities on the payment of the Jewish indemnity laid down further regulations with regard to the assessment on property of man and wife, and on transferred businesses. The regulations applied to Jews of German nationality living abroad. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 28 Nov. 1938.)

Decree for the execution of the Law for the Exclusion of Jews from German Economic Life of 12 November 1938. Retail shops and delivery houses in Jewish hands are, in principle, to be wound up. Where the continuation of a Jewish undertaking is required for catering for the needs of the population, the undertaking may be transferred into non-Jewish ownership.² Permission for transfer must be obtained from the competent authority under the Law for the Protection of Retail Trade. (RGB, pt i, 1938, p. 262.) This permission supersedes the permission required under the Order for the registration of Jewish property of 26 April 1938. Otherwise the provisions of the last-named Order are applicable. The following rules are to be observed. (1) the former owner may not buy in the stock; (2) the stock is to be offered in the first instance to the local association of traders in the same goods, the price being fixed by competent valuers appointed by the President of the district Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Creditors' demands are to be met in the order fixed in the liquidation. The costs of winding-up are borne by the business concerned. Some reservations are made with regard to procedure. Jewish owners of small workshops are to be removed from the roll of artisans on 31 December 1938, and licences withdrawn. The same procedure as in the case of other businesses is provided for the transfer to non-Jewish hands. (Decree issued by Ministers of Economics and Justice, 23 Nov., RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 197.)

Public Assistance for Jews (not applicable in Sudeten German territories). In connection with existing public assistance legislation it is decreed that Jewish applicants are to be referred in the first instance to Jewish private organizations. Only if Jewish aid is exhausted can assistance of certain kinds be given, subject to strict examination of cases, and may be extended if necessary for purposes of emigration or other public interest. Further exceptions for men severely wounded in the Great War are made. Jews are excluded from the operation of the Kleinrentnerhilfe Law of 5 July 1934 as amended on 24 December 1937. This decree comes into operation on 1 January 1939. (Decree issued by the Ministers of the Interior, Labour and Finance, 19 Nov. RGB, 1938, No. 198.)

Second Order under the Decree for the Registration of Jewish Property of 26 April 1938 places responsibility for the execution of the measures necessary in the interests of German economy in the hands of the Ministers of Economics and the Interior, and the other Ministers concerned. (Order issued by Minister Goering, 24 Nov. RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 199.)

Supplies for Jews. Arrangements were announced in various cities for the purchase by Jews of the necessities of life in specially designated shops. (See *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 20 Nov. 1938, and other dates.)

Education. A preliminary order issued on 14 November by the Minister of Education addressed to rectors of German universities forbids access to colleges and universities by Jews. (*Völkischer Beobachter*, 15 Nov. 1938.) The Reich Students Fund informed all Jewish students who had been granted loans that they must refund the money within a fortnight. (*Manchester Guardian*, 26 Nov. 1938.)

Exclusion of Jewish Lawyers. The exclusion of Jewish lawyers from practice by the end of November 1938 did not apply to foreign Jews nor to *Mischlinge* of the first and

(1) In view of the difficulty experienced by Jews in making the payment an office was set up in Berlin by the authorities for the purchase of personal possessions—jewellery, works of art, etc. (*The Times*, 20 Nov.) In a circular letter to taxation authorities the Minister of Finance states that the capital value of pensions is not to be included in the assessment on Jewish property for the purposes of a collective fine. The same ruling applies to compensation payments to professional men compelled to abandon practice. (*The Times*, 6 Dec.)

(2) On 3 December it was stated that Jewish businesses still formed 1.6 per cent of the total in the Reich. The greater part of Jewish shops were in Berlin, until recently about 3,700; a considerable number of textile businesses existed in Frankfurt and in Bavarian towns. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 3 Dec.) The same issue of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* describes the procedure of 'aryanization' adopted in Hamburg.

second degree. Some exceptions were made for full Jews for various kinds of legal work outside the courts. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 Nov. 1938.)

Exclusion of Jews from Motoring. All Jews are forbidden to drive (prohibition to take effect immediately) and their licences are withdrawn. Jews may not own private cars or motor cycles, licences to be handed in at the latest on 31 December. Further orders are to be issued on commercial vehicles. (Police Order issued by the Chief of Police in the Ministry of the Interior, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5 Dec. 1938.)

Adjustment (Einsatz) of German Property. In connection with the above decree, provision is made for the appointment of trustees to carry out the transfer of German businesses. The competent authorities are empowered to compel Jews to sell or liquidate their business or to sell their real estate and other property. In future Jews may not acquire land. They must deposit their stocks and shares and other securities in a foreign exchange bank, whence they can only be removed or sold by permission of the Government. Jews are forbidden to buy articles of gold and silver, jewellery, etc. or to pledge or sell them freely. Sales of real estate must be with special permission, the buyer being required to make a payment to the Reich. (Decree issued by the Ministers of the Interior and of Economics, 3 Dec. RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 206. See also summary in *The Times*, 6 Dec. 1938.)

Registration of Jewish Property. Laws on registration extended to the Sudeten areas as from 2 December 1938. (Decree issued by Minister Goering, RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 205.)

Appearance of Jews in Public Places. The competent authorities in the various parts of Greater Germany may place restrictions on the movements of Jews in regard to certain areas and certain times. (Decree of the Minister of the Interior, 28 Nov. RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 201.)

Jews were prohibited from remaining in Nuremberg or Fürth for more than two days. (*Manchester Guardian*, 3 Dec. 1938, quoted from *Fränkischer Kurier*.)

Exclusion of Jews from German economic life. (Second Decree.) In all Jewish concerns the Reich's Trustee of Labour shall appoint an Aryan manager, and shall make conditions for the legal relationship between the manager and the proprietor. He can also appoint and dismiss the representatives of Jewish organizations in a concern. From 1 January Jews cannot even be assistant managers. The Reich has no obligation to compensate Jews who are excluded under the terms of this law, but the Reich's Minister of Labour may make exceptions in individual cases. (Decree issued by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice, 23 Nov. RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 197.)

Extension of Racial Laws. The Nuremberg Racial Laws are brought into force in the Sudetenland. (Decree issued by the Minister of the Interior, 29 Dec. RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 230.)

Adjustment (Einsatz) of Jewish property. (Second Decree.) The sale of Jewish valuables shall take place in the Municipal pawn-shops. All Jewish companies, associations, institutions, etc., are also to be obliged to deliver up their valuables. (Decree issued by the Minister of Finance, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, 16 Jan. RGB, pt i, 1939, No. 7.)

Registration of Jewish property. (Third Decree.) All Jews must surrender their valuables within two weeks. Penalties fixed. (Decree issued by the Minister of Finance, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, 16 Jan. RGB, pt i, 1939, No. 7.)

Regulation of the legal status of Jewish cultural organizations. Entry into and exit from such organizations shall be regulated by civil law. Any member of such an organization shall count as a member of the Jewish religious community. Those who no longer attend a synagogue but still belong to the Jewish religion shall be held to be members of their local Jewish cultural organization. The Jewish cultural organizations must keep the local civil authorities informed about the entry and exit of members. (Decree issued by the Minister of the Interior, 30 Jan. RGB, pt i, 1939, No. 21.)

Extension of period for Jews to hand over their valuables. Period extended to 31 March. (Decree issued by the Minister of Finance, 3 March, RGB, pt i, 1939, No. 39.)

Exclusion of Jews from Houses owned by Aryans. Aryan householders can terminate contracts with Jewish tenants, provided that the civic authorities certify that other accommodation is available. Jews may only make contracts regarding the letting of houses with other Jews. (Decree issued by Chancellor Adolf Hitler and the Ministers of Justice, Labour, and the Interior, 30 April, RGB, pt i, 1938, No. 84.) On 10 May the above law was extended to Austria and the Sudetenland.

APPENDIX II

DISTRIBUTION OF SPANISH REFUGEES IN FRANCE

The 350,000 Spanish refugees in France include 60,000 Basques scattered throughout France and 7,000 members of the International Brigade (German and Austrian chiefly) concentrated at Gurs Camp.

CAMPS, COLONIES, Etc.

<i>Concentration Camps</i>		
St Cyprien (Pyrénées Orientales)	30,000
Argelès	" "	43,000
Bacares	" "	80,000
Bram (Aude)	16,000
Agde (Hérault)	16,000
Gurs (Basses Pyrénées)	21,000
Sept-Fonds (Tarn et Garonne)	16,000
Mazères (Ariège)	5,000
Vernet (Haute Garonne)	15,000
Vernet-les-Bains (Pyrénées Orientales)	500
Monteaulieu (for intellectuals)	unknown
Bogghari camp (men only) N. Africa	3,000
Bizerta, N. Africa	1,500
Other camps	about 4,000
Total in Camps about		260,000
<i>Prison</i>		
Fort Collioure (Republican Officers)	400
<i>Basque Refugee Homes</i>		
14, maintained by Basque Government	3,440
<i>Hospitals</i>		
St Louis	500
Belgian Red Cross	350
La Roseraie	} Basque Soldiers	750
Bidart		
Souston		1,600
<i>Narbonne Home</i> (National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief)		100
<i>Children's Homes</i>		
In 85 homes and colonies	5,200
14 Basque homes and hospitals	1,320
		6,520
<i>Living on Private Hospitality or Partly Assisted:</i>		Many thousands
<i>Total Accounted for</i>		about 280,000 out of 350,000

A CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLICATION

ISSUED IN JANUARY 1939

THE
REFUGEE PROBLEM

REPORT OF A SURVEY

By SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON, K.B.E., C.I.E.

THE SURVEY of which this volume is the report was undertaken in September 1937 under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Its object was to collect and to make available all relevant information which might assist in the discussion of future action to be taken for the solution of the problem, and to this end local investigations were carried out of the social, economic, and legal conditions under which refugees live in the principal countries of refuge and settlement. While the work was in progress urgency was given to the whole question by intensified persecution of Jews, of so-called non-Aryans, and of opponents of the National-Socialist régime in Germany and by the extension of the area in which these conditions prevail through the annexation by the Third Reich of Austria and the Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia. A study of the efforts made to solve the earlier problems has a direct bearing on the questions now under discussion; and the history and results of these efforts give an indication of the measures which should be taken for the solution of the difficulties raised by the forced emigration of large numbers of citizens of the Third Reich and of other fugitives from political and religious persecution. The volume also contains a record of international action, of action by individual Governments, and of the immense efforts made by the great philanthropic organizations.

Demy 8vo. xv+637 pp. 3 maps, 5 charts.

Price 25s. net

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS