DIARY

Book 342-A

China: Bombers

December 3 - 22, 1940
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Ambassador Lothian called on me yesterday afternoon and I told him that I was very sorry that he had made the remark which he did on landing about the British finances as that would date the matter in the minds of the public. I explained further what I meant by saying that if Senator Nye or any other Senator called me on the Hill they would say, "Well, on such and such a date Ambassador Lothian said the English were running short of money. By what authority did you let them place additional orders in this country?" This seemed to be a new idea to him. He said that he had made the remark on his own authority.

I found Lothian very pessimistic. He told me how the German submarines were tipped off as to where the convoys were by long distance German bombers and that these submarines would come up in the midst of a convoy and shoot in all directions and then disappear and due to the fact that they only had a few destroyers guarding each convoy, it was next to impossible to get the submarines.

He said that England had to import 43,000,000 tons of goods a year and at the present rate they were only importing about 35,000,000 tons.

It is not difficult to understand why the impression has gotten around in Washington that things are going badly with England after one listens to Lothian.

I told Lothian that I am going to try to get, for the Chinese, three or four-engine bombers and train their crews here with the understanding that these bombers are to be used to bomb Tokio and other big cities. He seemed very enthusiastic and said that it might change everything. He said he would take it up with T. V. Soong.
December 7, 1940

P. M.

I called Ambassador Lothian and asked him what he had done about my idea of long range bombers for China. He said he had discussed it with his people but he had not mentioned it to T. V. Soong. He said that his people felt it was impracticable and that the Chinese wouldn't want it because it would mean the Japanese would only retaliate harder than ever.

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December 8, 1940

After lunch at the White House, T. V. Soong was with me going back in the car and, in the presence of Mrs. Morgen-thau and Mrs. Soong, I said that I had read General Chiang Kai-Shek's memorandum in which he asked for 500 planes, and could I say something to Mr. Soong which was only to be mentioned to General Chiang Kai-Shek and to nobody else in Washington? Soong said, "Absolutely," and that he had an impenetrable code. So I said, "Well, his asking for 500 planes is like asking for 500 stars." I then said that we might get him planes by 1942, but what did he think of the idea of some long range bombers with the understanding that they were to be used to bomb Tokyo and other Japanese cities? Well, to say he was enthusiastic is putting it mildly. He said, "This would give us a chance to hit back." I asked, "Would you be afraid of their bombing you?" and he said, "They are doing it any way." I told him that I had not discussed this with the President but intimated it was the President's idea, which it is in part, because he has mentioned to me that it would be a nice thing if the Chinese would bomb Japan. I told him that if we let American planes be flown to Canada, I did not see why these bombers could not be flown to China via Hawaii and the Philippines.

I told Soong that I noticed in Chiang Kai-Shek's memo that they have airfields within 650 miles of Tokyo, and that he also offered to furnish me with this information.
I said that I thought this could be done by January, and it would be possible to arrange to hire pilots who are experienced in flying this kind of bomber. He said he thought that would be necessary because it took the English a long time to learn how to fly these ships.

Soong is to let me know just as soon as he hears from Chiang Kai-Shek.

If the Chinese would do this, I am convinced that overnight it would change the whole picture in the Far East. Soong is convinced that it would have a very decided effect on the Japanese population because he said that they are at present in a very critical political state at home, and he pointed out to me the story which I had read of the 18 men who resigned from the Japanese steel corporation.
1. During her war with China Japan has already lost 1,100,000 soldiers through deaths and invalidation by battle and disease. She is obliged to keep about 1,250,000 soldiers in China, exclusive of Manchuria. Chinese success in resisting the vastly superior equipment and resources of the Japanese army has been due to deliberate strategy of yielding ground whenever unavoidable but without ever allowing the army to break, and the employment of intensive guerilla warfare so that the enemy is bogged down in China.

2. Japan now realizes that it is not possible to crush the Chinese armies and is withdrawing troops from China for her southward advance into Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, and Malaya. She is more than anxious to conclude an "easy" peace with China, because in the event of final victory over the British Empire any favorable peace terms with China could be renounced. Germany is of course trying to mediate between China and Japan.

3. After three and a half years of destructive warfare Chinese people and army are feeling the exhaustion because (1) with the loss of their richest territory and sources of revenue, and being obliged to keep in the field a regular army of 2,500,000 men with 2,000,000 guerillas, their financial and economic situation is rapidly growing worse. Internal prices have risen seven or eight fold and uncontrolled inflation is directly upon China, unless substantial outside assistance is immediately forthcoming; (2) Chinese national resistance has been sustained under greatest adversities due to belief that the democracies will eventually win the war. The collapse of France, the surrender of the little countries by default, and the continued success of German arms tend to shake this belief. (3) In the air the Chinese army in the beginning relied on American machines, and in the second and third years of the war on Russian planes. These
were well handled and with the manifest advantages of interior lines, despite overwhelming superiority of the Japanese air force in numbers some resistance in the air had been maintained. Russia has stopped sending planes, and since September this year Japanese planes are much superior in quality as well as in absolute numbers, so that today no existing Chinese planes could take the air. The effect of constant bombing on the Chinese troops, and especially on the civilians in the principal cities, without the possibility of any defense, is telling on the general morale.

4. In the present military situation by concentrating on a few strategic centers in China the Japanese could withdraw a large portion of their army and transports, because the hardy and seasoned Chinese army could not counter-attack well fortified areas without air-support. With air-support on a moderate scale they could easily recapture Canton and Hankow, and oblige the Japanese to retain their forces in China. As experience has shown, operating on interior lines an air force of say 500 planes will certainly contain an enemy air force of four times their number. In addition, the presence of this striking force, which could be based on Chinese air fields near the coast would, by its threat to Japan proper, Formosa, and their newly acquired base in Hainan, act as a most effective deterrent to Japanese designs on Singapore and Dutch East Indies.

5. This Special Air Unit need not exceed 200 modern bombers and 300 pursuits but must be adequately manned and staffed, and above all serviced by requisite mechanics and ground organisation. While Chinese pilots and mechanics are available in part, it is clear that for the greatest efficiency personnel from the British and American Training Centers should be drawn upon, these foreign pilots forming a Special Air Unit. Special consideration must be given to the status of this force, according to the political development of the situation in the Far East.
This air force should be created at once so as to be assembled in China ready to operate before the start of the Japanese Spring offensive on Singapore.

6. Planes could be assembled in Rangoon or India and flown to airbases in China, or transported by water from Rangoon to the Chinese frontier and assembled there. There are 136 airfields available in China, more than half of which are in excellent condition, and all serviceable for both bombers and pursuits. Several of these airfields are within 650 miles from Japan; and they are so located that they are not easily vulnerable to army attacks. Japanese garrisons are nowhere in proximity and land attacks would require in most cases the concentration of several divisions over extremely difficult terrain without communications, thus leaving adequate time for defence or for transfer of menaced airbases.

The Special air Unit could operate in conjunction with the Chinese army which so supported could effectively take offensive actions against Canton, to relieve Hongkong; against Hankow to clear the Yangtze Valley; or again the Unit could operate independently in attacking Japan proper, Formosa and Hainan.

According to the political strategic necessities of the war in Asia and Europe it will be possible to take a decision as to the advisability of carrying the air war into Japan proper. One should not be dogmatic as to the reaction bombing will have on Japanese psychology but every day evidences accumulate of growing internal dissensions in Japan and the severe strain and privations the Japanese people are put to by the prospect of a war without end, when at the beginning of their Chinese adventure they were told that hostilities would only last a few months.

* If desired a confidential map could be furnished showing the location of these airports.
7. The organization and equipment of this Special Air Unit would require fully some three months of intense effort on this side as well as in China. The decision to create the Unit should therefore be taken within the next two weeks if operations are to start in the critical Spring of 1941.

General Chiang Kai-shek is laying all the relevant considerations before the British and the U. S. A. Governments as frankly as the gravity of the situation and his responsibility make it incumbent upon him, and he most earnestly renew his request for prompt decision; in this he is of course animated by complete identity of purpose in the common struggle for independence and democracy.
Dec. 9, 1940

Dear Mr. Morgenthau,

In connection with General Chiang’s secret memorandum to the President concerning China’s air needs, I take the pleasure of enclosing a map of China, showing the location of the airfields now in the possession of our Air Force, which I hope will prove of interest.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

P.S. This map is of course very secret, and is for your personal information only.
I called on Hull this morning at 20 minutes of nine. He came in with his mouth full of breakfast and he said that he had been to see the doctor at eight. Before I could even open my mouth, he said, "What we have got to do, Henry, is to get 500 American planes to start from the Aleutian Islands and fly over Japan just once." He said, "That will teach them a lesson." Well, his opening remarks took my breath away, and then he said, "If we could only find some way to have them drop some bombs on Tokyo." I asked, "Well, who do you mean?" and he said, "The Chinese." So I said, "Well, Cordell, you leave me speechless. I didn't know that you felt that way." Then I said that I had a confession to make. I said, "Sunday I suggested to T. V. Soong in the greatest of confidence and secrecy that he wire Chiang Kai-Shek that we could make available to him a limited number of long distance bombers provided that they were used to bomb Tokyo." So Cordell said, "Fine." But, he said, "That proviso doesn't have to be part of the contract, does it?" I replied, "Of course not." So he said, "How would you get them over there?" I answered, "We are letting them fly planes from San Diego to Halifax. Couldn't we let them fly the planes to Hawaii and the Philippines and then to their destination in China?" and Cordell said, "Absolutely. I will be for that." Hull said they have airfields in China within 600 miles of Tokyo, and I said, "I know that." Then he said, "But couldn't we fly them to the Philippines ourselves in order to make a demonstration to Tokyo, and then let the Chinese take title for them in the Philippines?" I replied, "It might be worked out but I think it is more difficult."

I told Hull that as soon as I heard from Chiang Kai-Shek I would need his help in his own Department, especially with Joe Green, and I know that most likely I will need it with Stimson because I doubt whether Stimson will release any more planes. Then he told me how he had gone up asking Stimson to arrange a meeting with the Defense Commission so that he could tell them that unless they really got the U.S. industry producing that it would be too late by the spring to keep Hitler from winning. (It seems that Hull has been
the fountain of inspiration with Stimson and Knox and the Defense Commission, and I have been giving credit to Knox. However, I am convinced now the credit belongs to Hull.

Cordell Hull told me that he had tried to get the President to do something on speeding up production on the 5th of October, but the President told him he was doing it himself, and Hull said he knew that ended the argument. He has been talking to the head of the American Manufacturers' Association. He is just a bundle of fervor and vitality on this thing.

I told him of what I had done with the William Allen White Committee about their advertisements which they are going to start, and he knew nothing about it.

I told him that I had talked to Douglas and he said that he had, too.

What has come over Hull I don't know, but his whole talk is that unless we get this country really producing that we can't help England.

He told me he had a letter from Churchill to the President on the financing, and that he would send a copy over this morning and let me see it because he should have done it long ago.

Then Hull got on the Dies Committee and he was the one who advised the President to put Dies on the defensive. I brought up the question then of Germany and Italy taking their funds in and out of this country and I said, "We ought to press that matter." Hull said, "I will have a meeting today, but I told him that I couldn't do it today but that I would do it tomorrow. So he agreed on 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

I am going to see a lot more of Hull because we evidently are thinking absolutely along the same lines as to what are the necessary steps to take to get this country ready to defend itself.
I asked the usher whether the President could see me tomorrow morning, and to my astonishment he got on the wire himself and asked whether it was anything we could do over the telephone. I said, 'No. It was something we could do over the telephone.' He said, 'Wonderful. That's what I have been talking about for four years,' then he said, 'That's what I have been talking about for four years.'

I said, 'Just make the remark that O'Hara Ki-hack's message was the last one to attack Japan.'

December 15, 1940
T. V. Soong called and said that General Chiang Kai-Shek feels that the only way to stop the Japanese from going down and attacking Singapore in April is for the Chinese to attack Japan and Chiang Kai-Shek is ready to do so provided that we can furnish him with Boeing bombers and the escort planes necessary to accomplish it. He said it is also important that they be given the materiel to build up a ground organization. He left with me a map, which he says is very secret, which shows the various airfields in China. There is a big field located at Chekiang which he says is only 500 miles from Japan.

He is leaving at my house tonight a more detailed memorandum on just what General Chiang Kai-Shek said. I promised him I would lay the whole thing before the President sometime tomorrow. He also asked if I could deliver to the President a personal message from General Chiang Kai-Shek rather than go through the State Department and I said I could.
December 18, 1940

I told T. V. Soong that Cordell Hull has brought up the question himself of the advisability and feasibility of bombing Japan from China. When Hull did this, I told him then of my conversation with Soong. I also told Soong that not only did Hull approve the plan of their having these bombers with which to bomb Japan, but he also approved the idea of having them fly from the West Coast via Hawaii, Wake Island, and the Philippines directly to China. I told him that Hull was the only person who knew of this besides myself but I would be in touch with the President tomorrow.

He told me that he had information that the Germans and the Italians expect to go right ahead with their campaign, irrespective of temporary reverses that they are having in Greece and Africa.

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Mr. President:

At this crucial moment for China when Japan formally recognized its puppet organization in Nanking, your generous and timely announcement of a substantial loan to China has infinitely increased China's powers of resistance, strengthened its social and economic structure, and enhanced the confidence of the army and people in its final victory over the aggressor.

It is the deep and widespread conviction of my countrymen that the solution of the Far Eastern situation and the establishment of lasting peace could only be brought about by the pursuit of the far-sighted policy and lofty ideals in which the world has looked upon you as its great leader. Peace and reconstruction in the Pacific will require the cooperation and common endeavor of the United States and China, and it is my sincere hope that you will constantly give us your counsel and guidance.

In connection with the proposals for an air force for China to prevent the spreading of the war to Southern Asia, and to accelerate its termination, which I entrusted to Dr. T. V. Soong to communicate to you, I should be grateful if in view of the urgency of the situation you could indicate to him your views on these grave matters as soon as possible.

Please accept Mr. President, my sincerest thanks and highest esteem.

(signed) Chiang Kai-shek
Most grateful for your message. Although the Italians are hard pressed
we have information from sources of proved reliability that the Axis Powers
are going through with their plan of synchronised attempts to take Gibraltar,
the Suez and Singapore in the Spring.

In order to cope with the threat on Singapore it is necessary for us to
carry the war into Japan proper. For that purpose I am most anxious to ac-
quire as many of your latest Flying Fortresses as you could spare, which from
our air bases could effectively bomb all the vital centers of Japan, and harass
their fleet and transports. The effect of this upon the Japanese people who
are already much divided and dispirited will certainly be far reaching.

The Flying Fortresses should be complemented by a proportionate number
of pursuits and medium bombers, so that the air force thus constituted could
also support the counter-offensive which I am preparing with a view of retak-
ing Canton and Hankow, and of forcing the Japanese to recall their troops, trans-
ports and airplanes from the contemplated attack on Singapore, the safety of
which is as vital to us as to the British.

I earnestly hope you will support me in presenting these views to Presi-
dent Roosevelt so that a decision will be made in time for us to block the
Japanese move.

(signed) Chiang Kai-shek
December 19, 1940

After Cabinet, the Secretary gave Mr. Hull a copy of each of the two letters from General Chiang Kai-Shek.
December 20, 1940
4:00 p.m.

Present: T. V. Soong
       Mrs. Klotz
       Mr. Young

HM Jr: I have good news for you. Yesterday morning I had a chance to deliver both of your memoranda to the President. He was simply delighted, particularly with the one about the bombers. Yesterday after Cabinet I asked for a chance, and the President had Hull, Stimson and Knox stay, and we all had your map out, and the President gave it his approval. I said, "Should we work it out and come back?" and he said that it was not necessary. He said, "The four of you work out a program." Just how we are going to do it, I do not know, but I wanted you to know that the President was delighted. I am meeting again with these gentlemen on Monday. I wanted you to get word to Chiang Kai-shek that he has the approval of the President, and the President said he had been dreaming about this for four years. Just to show you how the President feels, he said to Knox, "How about that long distance bomber that you have? How about the Admiral of the Fleet? He has a four-engine bomber. Does he need that?"

The President was thinking of these four-engine flying boats. Is there anywhere on the coast that they can be based or any big inland lake? They are bigger than the Clipper ship that you came over on. I understand that the Japanese Navy has a new kind of fighting ship which takes off from an aircraft carrier, which is so much better than anything you have.

Soong: I understand that they do not take off from the decks of ships but from the water.

HM Jr: This Colonel Chennault, where is he?

Soong: He is here now in Washington.
(At this point, the Secretary put in a call for Colonel Knox but was advised that he was at a meeting and would not be available for a while. The Secretary left word that he wanted to talk to Colonel Knox before he went home. See telephone conversation at 5:13 attached.)

HM Jr: I have not told anybody about this outside of Mr. Young and Mrs. Klotz. I have told them because I need their assistance.

I said, and I hope you will back me up, that if they could get a man who knew how to fly these four-engine bombers, that China would be glad to pay up to $1,000 a month in United States dollars. Was that too high?

Soong: No. Not at all.

HM Jr: What are your plans for the next two days? Something might break over the weekend.

Soong: I will be available at any time.

HM Jr: Find out whether a four-engine flying boat will be any use to you.

Soong: It is the best news I have had since I came here.

HM Jr: I am going to put all of my energy behind this because it has to be done at once.
Frank Knox: Hello, Henry.

H.M. Jr.: How are you?

K: I'm feeling - top of the world, Henry. I think that thing worked out beautifully.

H.M. Jr.: Well, I want to hear about it when you've got time.

K: Well, I'll give you the rough outline now. Do you know what it is?

H.M. Jr.: Well, it's on the ticker.

K: Oh, it is, eh.

H.M. Jr.: It said that there'd be a 4-man Board. That's all I know.

K: Well, that was done to take care of the labor situation and largely for political considerations and with Sidney Hillman the kind of a man he is I don't think it's going to make any embarrassments at all.

H.M. Jr.: I think it's going to be a help.

K: I think he'd be a help, yeah.

H.M. Jr.: I think it's going to be a help.

K: And I just had a talk with Bill Knudsen and he's taking it in a fine way and I think we're going to get a little order out of thing now and - oh, what's been going on over there is a gradual development of the sense of importance of each one of the seven. See? And when you get that then they get crosswise and delays and what have you.

H.M. Jr.: I see. Well, I am delighted. Now, Frank, whenever you're ready on that hush-hush thing which we were talking about ....
K: Yeah. I'm worried about that. I wanted to talk to you about that today but the President kept me pretty busy on this other thing.

H.M. Jr: Well, when are you going to be ready?

K: I'll be ready any time. We must do it quickly if we're going to do it at all.

H.M. Jr: Well, shall we do it Monday morning in Hull's office?

K: Yeah.

H.M. Jr: Whoever's there we can "shoosh" them all out after we get through dividing up these 300 Curtiss P-40's.

K: Where - what office, Henry?

H.M. Jr: I sent you a list - I don't know whether you've got it. There are 300 Curtiss P-40's which can still be ordered ......

K: 300 Curtiss P-40's.

H.M. Jr: Yeah.

K: For the British?

H.M. Jr: Well, for anybody. They've got the engines.

K: Well, by God, we ought to grab some of those for the Chinese.

H.M. Jr: Well, that's the point and I sent you a list of all the requests from all of the countries for the various things.

K: When did you send it to me?

H.M. Jr: Oh, two days ago.

K: Well, then I've got it here. There's a lot of stuff here I haven't had a chance to ......
H.M.Jr: Two days ago - and the point - I mean, I'm sick and tired of all this hemming and hawing, you see, and I thought I'd lay the whole thing and decide what you're going to do with this new order. See?

K: Yeah.

H.M.Jr: And I'll keep pushing these foreign orders and playing nurse to them until the President tells me not to.

K: Uh-huh.

H.M.Jr: I suppose, as far as I know, he wants me to continue doing this as I have.

K: Why sure. I don't know why not. There's nothing in this new set-up that interrupts that. You're, as I've always recognized your efforts, to help the British get what they want.

H.M.Jr: Or any other foreign country where it doesn't interfere with our own progress.

K: That's right.

H.M.Jr: Well, there are 300 Curtiss P-40's that this fellow can still make. The English have got the engines because they've cancelled the Lockheeds, you see. They've got over 500 of these Allison engines. Now, we've got the Greeks and Chinese and South Americans -- I sent the whole list over and I thought - the four of us would get together with Hull at 9:30. Did you get the note?

K: I got that note. Hull called me up about it. That's the one - 9:30 a.m. at Hull's office. O.K. I've got that.

H.M.Jr: Now what we'll do is, when we get through with that, I'll ask Hull to ask the other people to step out and we'll talk about the hush-hush mission.

K: All right. That's fine.
H.M.Jr: How's that?
K: That's O.K.
H.M.Jr: Thank you.
K: All right, Henry.
H.M.Jr: Good-bye.
Notes on Conference at Home of the Secretary, 5:00 P.M., Saturday, December 21, 1940

Those present, Secretary Morgenthau, Dr. T. V. Soong, General Mow, Colonel Chennault, and Philip Young.

The Secretary explained that as a result of Dr. Soong’s memoranda the President was seriously considering trying to make some four-engine bombers available to the Chinese in order that they might bomb Japan. The Secretary said that the discussion had centered specifically around Flying Fortresses, but that he wanted to find out more about the situation and just what the Chinese wanted before going into it any further.

Dr. Soong asked General Mow to explain just what it was that China needed. General Mow referred the question to Colonel Chennault who got out some maps of China and gave a brief discourse on the location of the Chinese air fields and the parts of China occupied by the Japanese. The Secretary inquired as to the type of equipment needed in order to reach Japan. Chennault replied that long range bombers would be required and that it would be necessary to have pursuit ships to accompany them. Dr. Soong said that he felt the bombers were more important than the pursuit ships, but both General Mow and Colonel Chennault disagreed.

In response to a question from the Secretary as to the kind of bombers wanted, Chennault suggested either the Lockheed Hudson or the Flying Fortress. Chennault said that the Lockheed Hudson had a radius of 1100 miles with a good load but that it was 1300 miles to Tokyo, so that the Lockheed would not be able to reach that city. However, Nagasaki, Kobe, and Osaka were within range of the Hudson bomber. The Secretary inquired as to whether bombing could be done at night and Chennault said that it would have to be done at night because their pursuit ships did not have sufficient range to defend the bombers in the daytime on such a long tour.

The Secretary suggested that the big bombers could use different bases, that is, take off from one base and land at another and keep moving around so that the Japanese would not know where they were. Chennault said that could be done as there were two fields near the border of occupied China which were good enough for the Flying Fortresses and four fields good enough for the Lockheed Hudsons. One of the big fields had an 1800 yard runway which was plenty for the Flying Fortresses.
Colonel Chennault added, however, that he felt China should have about 150 pursuit ships in order to defend the bomber bases. General Now said that he thought another 100 pursuit ships were needed to keep the supply line open along the Burma Road and hold back Japanese planes operating from Indo-China.

Colonel Chennault inquired as to whether or not it might be possible to fly the big planes into China from the Philippines, and the Secretary said that that problem had already been solved and that it would be possible.

The Secretary asked as to the crews required for the bombers, and Colonel Chennault replied that each bomber would need an American pilot, an American bombardier, and about five mechanics. The Secretary said that that matter had been discussed and that the Army would release enough men from active duty at $1000 per month to help the Chinese with the ships. Both Soong and Now seemed to think that a $1000 per month was all right to pay.

General Now inquired again as to the possibility of getting pursuit ships. The Secretary said that China would have to have at least a hundred as ten or twenty would not do any good. He further inquired from General Now as to what could be done about bombs. Colonel Chennault replied that China had a lot of bombs that he thought could be adjusted to fit into the Flying Fortresses.

The Secretary asked as to whether or not he was having a pipe dream or whether it might really be possible to take these bombers, put one on each flying field and hide them from the Japanese. Chennault said it was not sound tactically, but that he felt it could be done and that a terrific amount of damage could be accomplished before the Japanese found them. Dr. Soong added that he thought it was the only practical thing to do.

The Secretary inquired as to whether or not incendiary bombs could be used inasmuch as the Japanese cities were all made of just wood and paper. Chennault said that a lot of damage could be done, and that, even if the Chinese lost some of the bombers, it would be well justified.

The Secretary inquired as to whether the Chinese had adequate weather reports and asked if it might not be possible to put our radio transmitters on Chinese junks in order to get adequate data. Both General Now and Dr. Soong said that the Chinese were getting
adequate weather reports. Colonel Chennault added that if the
bombers carried incendiary bombs, which were lighter than the
ordinary bombs, they could carry more gas and increase the range.

After some more discussion, it was determined that nothing
would do the Chinese much good except the big bombers if they
were going to go after Japan. Chennault said that he had some
find Chinese gunners and radio operators, but that he needed some
pilots and mechanics for the ships.
December 22, 1940

At five o'clock this afternoon I went to Mr. Stimson's house, and Colonel Knox and General Marshall were present. We went over the whole question about the bombers for China. It seems that General Marshall had two meetings himself with T. V. Soong, an American Army Colonel who is advising the Chinese, and General Mow.

General Marshall questioned the advisability of simply letting them have the bombers. He also questioned the advisability of taking these bombers away from the English at this time. During the long, dark nights in England, these bombers would be most useful. He is going to work on a plan for China. He thinks the English might better give up some of their pursuit ships rather than these bombers. Mr. Stimson had evidently not told General Marshall anything about tomorrow morning's meeting. He was very much interested because he said it was most embarrassing to him. He said he had been unable to do practically anything for South America with the exception of something he said with regard to one ship. With all these South American countries around, evidently there is one man from South America - some Army officer - who is here contacting General Marshall trying to get something for South America.

I sent a memorandum to Stimson three or four days ago and also to Knox. Stimson keeps forgetting, and evidently he doesn't show these memoranda to General Marshall, so Marshall will not be prepared for the meeting tomorrow morning. I asked Stimson if he had any objection to my working with Marshall this coming week on the Chinese program while he was away, and he said that he had not, and he would be glad to come back if we wanted him to.

When I returned to the house at 6:30, Sir Frederick Phillips was waiting for me there. He gave me a memorandum from the British Air Mission, saying that they were ready to put down $14,000,000 for the 300 Hawke 81-As, known to us as the Curtiss P-40s.

Sir Frederick also brought up the question of their money. He said that they are now down to about $400,000,000 gold. They are spending it at the rate of about $50,000,000 a week, and that if something doesn't come forth from America
soon in the way of assistance, they will have to do something else. It seems that there is gold in Canada belonging to France, part of it under Canadian custody and part of it under English custody. The French gold, under Canadian custody, according to Sir Frederick Phillips, amounts to $360,000,000, and what Sir Frederick wants to do is when he takes the French gold, he wants to take all of the French gold in Canada. They expect to have trouble with Mackenzie King on this.

Sir Frederick tells me that they are selling now about $9,000,000 worth of securities a week, and he says Gifford admits that I was right because this is at least three times as much as they have ever sold before. I asked him whether he wouldn't please speak to Gifford and say that I again wanted to recommend that on the first of January they make some announcement to the public saying how many securities have been sold. I suggested that they say, "We have sold all of the securities which we vested in certain companies," and give themselves a leeway by saying that possibly they will have to vest some more in that particular kind of company. I gave him an example; for instance, if they have 100,000 shares of United States Steel, they could say, "We have sold all of this, but there is a possibility that we may vest some more later on." He said he would take the matter up. I told him that I thought if he did this it would be extremely helpful to the market and that my associates whom I had talked to here in the Government agreed with me on that.

Phillips said he had two or three other matters which he would like to talk to me about, but he wouldn't bother me now. I told him that I would give him an opportunity tomorrow.
December 22, 1940

To: The Secretary
From: Mr. Young

None of the planes listed have armor plate, turrets or leak-proof tanks, except the LB-30's. Provision has been made for these items in all of the other planes, but it is unlikely they will be available in time to meet deliveries as scheduled in the attached table.

Consolidated B-24 A
(1) Speed - about 300 miles per hour
(2) Range - 3000 miles
(3) Bomb Load - 2500 pounds
(4) Ceiling - 15,000 feet
(5) Armament - 7 flexible .30 calibre guns
    including nose gun, tunnel gun, top gun, tail gun and side guns.

Consolidated LB-30
(1) Speed - about 300 miles per hour
(2) Range - 3000 miles
(3) Bomb Load - 2500 pounds
(4) Ceiling - 15,000 feet
(5) Armament - Same as B-24 A, except British will use .303 calibre. Has tail turret with two .30 calibre guns, two .30 calibre top guns, one or two .30 calibre nose guns, and one .30 calibre tunnel gun.
Boeing B-17-C

1. Speed - 300 miles per hour
2. Range - 2000 miles
3. Bomb Load - 2500 pounds
4. Ceiling - 25,000 feet
5. Armament - 7 guns including nose gun, tunnel gun, top gun, side guns (no tail gun).

Boeing B-17-D

Approximately same as B-17-C.

Republic P-43

1. Speed - about 300 miles per hour
2. Range - one and one-half hours
3. Bomb Load - none
4. Ceiling - 25,000 feet
5. Armament - two .30 calibre guns, two .50 calibre guns (no wing guns)

Curtiss P-40

1. Speed - 365 miles per hour
2. Range - two hours
3. Bomb Load - none
4. Ceiling - 30,000 feet
5. Armament - four .30 calibre guns in the wings, two .50 calibre guns in fuselage.
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Many will not release Underpilot if they did plane could be ready.

U. S. Army

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U.S. wants why Q of these why not let British have them.