Refugees (Jewish)

December 13-31, 1943

Book 688
Part II

(See succeeding books)
## Refugees (Jewish)

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December 13, 1943
3:00 p.m.

JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. White
         Mr. Pehle
         Mr. Luxford
         Mr. DuBois

H.M.JR: Believe me, you boys have to have a brain to answer this letter (referring to letter to the Secretary from Secretary Hull, dated December 6, 1943, copy attached).

I don't know what the answers are. But whoever prepared that letter was nobody's fool.

MR. LUXFORD: That is perfectly true.

H.M.JR: What do you boys have to say for yourselves?

MR. PEHLE: It might be helpful, Mr. Secretary, if Mr. DuBois could indicate briefly to you what he found out about the background.

It is not news, but it is helpful in talking to Mr. Meltzer, who is now in the Navy, who was in State at that time.

MR. LUXFORD: He is one of the two men who really worked on this.

H.M.JR: Is that what they mean when they say that the Bureau was closed?

MR. DuBOIS: Should I summarize?
H.M.JR: You had better summarize. It is a bad way to introduce a memo; it is too long to read.

MR. DuBOIS: I talked to Meltzer sometime ago on this, back in July or August. We were trying to get the thing through at that time.

When we finally got the cable out, he called me and told me that he had been instructed to say that the State Department had no comments to make on the matter, but they wouldn't have any objections if the cable went out.

At that time he told me that he would like to discuss the matter in more detail with me after he got in the Navy. I had lunch with him Friday, I guess it was, and he related the story in the State Department on this whole matter.

It appears that the thing started about April of last year, at which time Welles referred the matter to Feis. He said whether Welles referred it to Feis because he thought that Feis would handle the matter most expeditiously or because there were economic matters involved, he wasn't sure. Feis called Meltzer in on it.

Meltzer at that time was Acting Chief of the Foreign Fund Control Division. They put their heads together and he said they both decided that the thing would be very difficult to ever get through Long and his crowd to whom the thing would normally have been referred, and not to Wise. So they drafted the cable that went out in May, which raised the issue about Bern, on the financial end. They drafted that cable specifically.

H.M.JR: He means by Bern, our Minister, Mr. Harrison.

MR. DuBOIS: Meltzer pointed out they worded that telegram specifically so that it would only request clarification and asked for further information. By arguing with Long and Brandt that it was merely a request for further information as a result of Feis' carrying it directly to Welles, the cable was finally dispatched.
Then when they got the reply back from Riegner of the World Jewish Conference in June, indicating that the program might make some sense, there was considerable discussion in the Department, and Meitser pointed out that he and Dr. Feis were the only two men in the Department who favored taking any action to implement the proposal aside from a young fellow there under Meltzer named Hall, who also worked on it - and also isn't in the Department any more, incidentally.

And there was then considerable discussion between Meltzer and Feis, on the one hand, and Long, Brandt, and Reams over in the State Department, on the other; Reams being a Foreign Service Officer assigned to the European Division. He is their refugee expert over there. The Foreign Service group argued that on economic warfare grounds this program would make foreign exchange available to the enemy, and therefore was bad.

Meitser said that he and Feis argued along the lines that that was a matter for the Treasury to decide, that on allocations of this character the Treasury was the one that had views on economic warfare grounds, and therefore finally he obtained, on that basis, agreement from them that the thing would be presented to the Treasury.

Then they came over here and talked to Mr. Pehle and a few others about it. And at that meeting Meltzer recalled the fact that we had already well known, that Reams, who was in at the meeting, attempted to throw cold water on the whole proposal, while Meitser, of course, tried to argue in favor of it.

Then the day after that conference they had with us, we called them back and said that we were prepared to issue a license. The fight started all over again, despite the fact that they had agreed that they would present this issue to us. They again began arguing economic warfare issues.

They sent a memorandum to Hull - Brandt and Long - arguing that this was the type of transaction which would
benefit the enemy, and Feis and Meltzer sent a contrary memorandum. Then Brandt was called up into Secretary Hull's office and Meltzer pointed out that although he and Dr. Feis were there at the time, neither one of them was asked to be present.

Meltzer said that apparently, the way he understood it, Brandt had argued very strongly with Hull that the transaction was one that would benefit the enemy financially.

After that discussion with Hull, Feis and Meltzer sent another memorandum to Hull, very strongly, arguing that it wouldn't benefit the enemy financially.

And, subsequently, we transmitted over to them the memoranda, or rather the letter which the President sent over to you for reply to Wise.

H.M.JR: Wise?

MR. DuBOIS: Yes, Wise had written the President, and as a result of their strong memo to Hull, and also this letter from Wise, which we sent over - probably also as a result, Meltzer said he wasn't sure of this, of your letter to Hull.

Hull finally took the position that he wouldn't object to the program, although Meltzer was instructed at the time to say that State Department had no comments to make, and the letter that Hull sent to you, incidentally, took the same position, if you recall.

H.M.JR: You are talking now about this letter of December 6?

MR. DuBOIS: No, the letter that Hull sent to you back in August. I say, he took that same position.

H.M.JR: I can't remember. I have a memory, but my memory doesn't function along those lines.
MR. DuBOIS: The question Meitzer has is to the motives of these men and the program such as the Tunisian program - he commented along these lines; that although he couldn't accuse these people of proposing these proposals because of anti-Jewish sentiments, since he couldn't support them with concrete evidence, and he preferred to be charitable, anyway, in cases such as this, that nevertheless, it was striking that these Foreign Service Officers should be arguing economic warfare grounds, whereas, in all other cases it was usually his Division that was arguing economic warfare, and the Foreign Service group which was arguing that economic warfare was not important.

He confirmed the fact that Hull knew that he and Feis were the only two men in the Department who had been in favor of this program, and that the rest had opposed it.

Then when I asked him about the question of clearance with the British, he said that he hadn't attempted, originally, to formally clear it with the British because of so many obstacles already in his way. Yet the British did find out about it from Goldman.

H.M.JR: Who?

MR. DuBOIS: Goldman, of the American Jewish Congress, and the British had called him about it and he had furnished them with copies of some of these cables.

Mr. LUXFORD: That was in early summer.

MR. DuBOIS: We have since confirmed with the British. After we got this information from Meitzer, we called the British. They then admitted for the first time, although they never told us before when we were discussing it with them in the last two weeks, that they had discussed it with Goldman and he had given them cables, and they had asked him to furnish them with all future cables and they didn't get those cables from Meitzer, so they finally wrote him a letter.
H.M.JR: The British?

MR. DuBOIS: The British had finally written Meltzer of State a letter asking for the cables and they never got a reply to their letter. Realize, too, the significance of that, when the whole program now is being held up because of failure of clearance with the British.

Meltzer also made a few general comments. He said he felt that the only men in the Department that were left that would be willing to fight on issues such as this were Dean Acheson, and Donald Hiss, and Thomas Finletter, although he didn’t feel that normally matters like this would be brought within their jurisdiction unless they went out after them.

He also mentioned on this whole Tunisian program, after cables had been sent out by State pursuant to the President’s request, the President had sent a note to the State Department congratulating State on the message, and we, of course, have never seen a copy of that note.

Well, that was the inside dope I got from him.

MR. LUXFORD: I might just complement that by saying I talked to Hiss the other day regarding the Tunisian cable we were worried about. He gave me exactly that same story as to exactly the same personalities being involved on that cable - just tying it up - Foreign Service Division, particularly Atherton, of the European, and Wallace Murray, of the Near East.

MR. PEHLE: In other words, there is no question as to what the underlying facts and motivations are. We all feel that the exchange, of course, so far, even, has been very helpful, because it has put Mr. Hull on record with the strong statement, and I am sure it has scared some of his underlings into worrying about holding up things in the future.

However, we feel that the letter contains certain implications which we should answer.
H.M.JR: There are two things that bother me. In the first place, they are talking as though Dr. Riegner in Switzerland wasn’t entirely in sympathy with this thing. That is number one. Let me point out the impression I got, and see.

The letter says, "On August 22, the Legation at Bern reported that Dr. Riegner was not prepared to express an opinion on the feasibility of the plan until he had consulted with the Romanian Jewish organization."

I don’t know whether that is true or not, but it ought to be found out. It looks as though he is holding back.

MR. PEHLE: I don’t think he is holding back. What they are trying to say is that shows they weren’t guilty of delay.

H.M.JR: No, no; excuse me. I am sorry, but I don’t agree with you. The implication is that even Dr. Riegner and it goes on and says, "As far as the Department is aware, no further word has ever been received from Dr. Riegner in this connection." So the direct implication is that even Riegner is holding back.

MR. PEHLE: In what sense, Mr. Secretary?

H.M.JR: Approving this transaction.

MR. PEHLE: Dr. Riegner is the one who worked this out in Switzerland. I am fairly confident, Mr. Secretary, what they mean by that is that is to show that until they have received final word from Regier, who is going to consult the people in Romania, which is obviously difficult, that they were not guilty of holding it up. That is really what they are trying to show.

H.M.JR: I don’t agree with you.
MR. DuBOIS: We have their cable here in which Riegner made that sort of a comment.

He pointed out that one of the difficulties involved when he made that comment was that they would need money for relief as well as for evacuation, and when we got that comment from Riegner we cabled back and said that money could be used for relief preparatory to evacuation as well as for evacuation, itself.

That was one of the main things that troubled Riegner, and he wanted to check on it.

The implication, if there is any implication in their letter that Riegner was holding back, is entirely false. We can easily rebut that.

H.M.JR: I think you should.

MR. DuBOIS: Among many other implications we can rebut.

H.M.JR: The other thing I got - this is the other implication I got, you see - sort of sitting on the outer edge - the Treasury kept saying, "We are only willing to do this thing if the State Department will approve."

And on account of the regulations that the Treasury threw around this thing, it made it impossible for the State Department to approve it.

Don't interrupt me for a minute.

Then he finishes up and says that, in view of this, if the Treasury will say they want it, solely on their own responsibility, the State Department will say O.K.

MR. PEHLE: May I answer that?

H.M.JR: Yes.
MR. PEHLE: That is right. They are saying the plan, the way we set it up, is unworkable and, therefore, Harrison can't issue the license.

H.M.JR: Then he finishes by saying, "All right now, we are wholly in sympathy with this thing, but it is up to the Treasury to say it at once; and if the Treasury says so, it will go through." That is throwing the entire responsibility on us.

MR. PEHLE: They have been doing that all the way through.

H.M.JR: Not as clearly as this.

MR. LUXFORD: We could recite a couple of the facts there, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: In the next to the last paragraph he says, "It would appear, however, from the correspondence cited above that it has not been found possible to put the present proposal into execution in the manner intended. It is for this reason, together with the expressed British objection, that final action has been deferred and not because of any fault on the part of Minister Harrison or the Department.

"I suggest, therefore, if as a result of the discussions with the British, it is decided to carry the plan into effect, the Treasury issue any license which it deems appropriate."

MR. PEHLE: But not ask Harrison to issue it, which we have been doing. We have been asking Harrison to issue the license. Now the reason we did that, Mr. Secretary, is because it safeguards what we set up; and if we hadn't set up the safeguards, State would also have objected to this plan on the ground it gave help to the enemy.

The safeguards we set up involved Harrison checking the source of the exchange in Switzerland.
H.M.JR: Now let me put my two bits in. Supposing the British say yes. We have asked Winant to find out, haven't we?

MR. WHITE: Yes, we cabled, and he said he would take it up at once.

H.M.JR: Supposing the British say it is O.K. Then do we take full responsibility in issuing the license?

MR. LUXFORD: That is what we proposed to do; instead of using Harrison as our issuing agent in Switzerland we proposed to set up a committee over there of the relief agencies to pass on the observance of our conditions in procuring these francs and Romanian leu.

MR. PEHLE: We propose to take full responsibility in the Treasury; yes, sir, full responsibility. There is no reason why we shouldn't take it. If we were willing to tell the Minister to issue it we should be willing to issue it ourselves. The only reason we told Harrison was he was involved in the procedure of checking the source.

H.M.JR: No, no, no. Now let's be frank. I think you were trying to safeguard us and really put the responsibility on the State Department.

MR. PEHLE: No, sir, not from my point of view we weren't, because we were all convinced that the policy being followed was entirely correct, that the Treasury Department was willing to stand for it and we would be perfectly willing to issue the license ourselves.

H.M.JR: Now, there was one man in Switzerland—I think he is still there—if I can think of his name.

MR. PEHLE: Royall Tyler?

H.M.JR: Yes, what about Tyler?

MR. PEHLE: I don't know. I know that we have heard from him at times before. You can't get anything through to Switzerland anymore except through State. I don't think
it is a question of use of anybody in Switzerland. Is he a Foreign Exchange man? Does he know foreign exchange in--

H.M.JR: No, but I know the man. He sent us in some very useful information, you know. He was the American Financial Adviser to Hungary and did a very good job.

MR. WHITE: This might be an excuse to get a Treasury man in Bern.

MR. PEHLE: You can't get him in except by paratroop.

H.M.JR: The reason I am thinking of him is, he is socially very, very high.

MR. PEHLE: What would his leanings be, Mr. Secretary?

H.M.JR: He certainly was anti-Nazi.

MR. PEHLE: State is anti-Nazi, too.

H.M.JR: I have been around with the man. His wife, I think, was Italian. But I have seen the man. I would think of putting a bet on him, not because he is one of the greatest living authorities on Byzantine art besides everything else. He is quite a fellow. He is one of the greatest living authorities on Byzantine art. But I just felt—you see what I am thinking about is this: You have somebody like that on the spot, and the name Royall Tyler carries weight, and they just can't say it is a bunch of Treasury people, you see.

MR. PEHLE: It may be a good suggestion.

MR. LUXFORD: We had a different alternative.

H.M.JR: If you had a committee up there—then you see, he was Financial Adviser to the League of Nations for a while and did a lot of work for them. I think he is a fairly safe bet.

MR. PEHLE: We were thinking as an alternative--
H.M.JR: I don’t mean the only man, but when you said committee, I immediately thought of Royall Tyler. You know, he sent us the name of this Representative of Worms; all that stuff I got about Worms, you know, came through him. So there is no question about his being anti-Vichy. And his dope was good, too. Remember?

MR. PEHLE: I do.

H.M.JR: I think you could do lots worse.

MR. PEHLE: We had considered, Mr. Secretary—we wanted to get your feeling about it.

H.M.JR: You can’t get anybody into Switzerland?

MR. PEHLE: No, sir, there is no plane service into Switzerland. Consequently, there is no way of getting uncensored mail into Switzerland. The only thing is to cable. We had thought of setting up a committee consisting of representatives of the World Jewish Congress—the JDC have a very good man, Sally Mayer—who are familiar with this type of thing—and possibly either the International Red Cross or the International YMCA or the Friends man.

Now, we asked the JDC whether they would sit on such a committee, and they said, "Not with the World Jewish Congress." I may be able to talk them out of it.

H.M.JR: You tell them I said they should, and no damned nonsense about it.

MR. PEHLE: I think it is important they do.

H.M.JR: You tell them there should be no damned nonsense about it and I say they should.

MR. PEHLE: I think that would be very helpful.

H.M.JR: I would have a man on for Friends and a man from the International YMCA.
MR. PEHLE: I don't think we want to get too big. I mean, the JDC man could do it alone.

H.M. JR: That isn't too big if you had on it the International YMCA, somebody from the Friends, and Royall Tyler.

MR. LUXFORD: We don't want to get a substitute for Harrison; that is what we are worried about.

H.M. JR: Some of these other agencies such as the Red Cross and YMCA—just to be sure we are not going to run into further delays. I know the International Y.

MR. PEHLE: They have a good man named Donald Lowrie.

H.M. JR: But I know the International Y. Everything I know about them is good.

MR. PEHLE: Shall we leave these two Jewish organizations out of this?

MR. LUXFORD: Put them on.

MR. PEHLE: Then you would have a large group.

H.M. JR: I would leave them both off.

MR. PEHLE: In a comparable circumstance involving the JDC, I would be willing to let them check their own transactions.

H.M. JR: But you can't do that here. I think it would be smart to leave them off.

MR. LUXFORD: They are the only ones with the know-how here, Mr. Secretary.

H.M. JR: We can use them, but this is an advisory committee that the Treasury is setting up.

MR. WHITE: Unless Harrison has a friend among them—
MR. LUXFORD: That is what I am afraid of. They owe obligations to Harrison. They owe much to Harrison in that area, and there is more than one way to operate these things.

H.M.JR: You know, this is an awfully dangerous piece of business; and if we have to take it, I have got to take the full responsibility for this thing. I would like an advisory group to advise me.

MR. PEHLE: I don't think you can use them that way, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: What do you propose?

MR. PEHLE: That the Treasury issue a license; the license lays down certain terms, and the terms are cabled to Switzerland. Harrison will know them as well as the World Jewish Congress man. One of the terms is that you require French francs in Switzerland, provided that the person selling them—the French francs—has been checked by this committee. The committee isn't advisory; it just operates out there. You won't hear much from them, because it is very difficult to get cables through. You can't get any mail or anything else through.

I don't think we ought to ask them for advice, because they may give us all sorts of cock-eyed things when you can't talk to them. I think if you put them in this narrow thing and don't get the committee too large it will work. It will take Harrison out of the picture, and State wants him out.

H.M.JR: Supposing I find out whom General Donovan has in there.

MR. PEHLE: Allan Dulles is in there.

H.M.JR: Of Sullivan and Cromwell—I don't want that. Who is it who made a financial survey for the whole of Europe for Donovan? I'll tell you in a minute—something Morgan.
MR. WHITE: Frazer?

H.M.JR: No, something Morgan—the last name. He is not one of the Morgans.

MR. WHITE: There is a Henry Morgan.

H.M.JR: No. I will think of his name. It is Preston Morgan or something like that. He is just back recuperating.

MR. PEHLE: Did we get a copy of it?

H.M.JR: No.

MR. PEHLE: We can work this out.

H.M.JR: I don't understand what the hell you are going to do in Switzerland.

MR. PEHLE: All right, we have done the same thing here, Mr. Secretary, repeatedly; Foreign Funds did. It is not a difficult operation. They want to acquire some French francs. They don't want to acquire them in a neutral market for Swiss francs because if they do the chances are ten to one they will be buying them from someone who bought them from the Germans, and thereby they will be helping the Germans get foreign exchange.

On the other hand, there may be a perfectly genuine Swiss who has French francs which he had in France before France fell. That is perfectly legitimate, to buy his French francs and give him Swiss francs.

Now, we just want to be sure when they buy French francs from somebody in Switzerland they check who he is and where he got them.

H.M.JR: How?
MR. PEHLE: Our suggestion was to have a committee consisting of the World Jewish Congress man, Doctor Riegner, Sally Mayer, or whoever the JDC man is, and one other man, maybe the Frenchman.

H.M.JR: I don't think that is so good.

MR. PEHLE: What is wrong with it?

H.M.JR: I wouldn't have either the World Jewish Congress or the JDC.

MR. PEHLE: I would be satisfied with anything those three agreed upon. They are far enough apart so if the three agreed you would be pretty sure.

H.M.JR: I know, but I can't explain that.

MR. WHITE: Have the JDC, or the Friends man; or the International Red Cross.

MR. PEHLE: I don't want to put the JDC on if the other isn't on.

MR. WHITE: Have the World Jewish Congress on.

MR. PEHLE: That is what I want to do.

MR. WHITE: One, and two of the others.

H.M.JR: I don't want either one of them. You can't put the JDC on to check up on the World Jewish Congress.

MR. PEHLE: Not unless you put the World Jewish Congress on, too.

H.M.JR: I don't want either of them on. Who is the Friends man?

MR. PEHLE: I don't know the Friends man, Mr. Secretary, although I understand they have a good man there who the JDC tells us is an intelligent fellow.
I also know that the International YMCA man is an intelligent man. Either one of those would be satisfactory. We can work that out.

H.M.JR: I will take either one of those men or both, but my hunch is I would have on no Jewish organization.

MR. LUXFORD: It is all right to get their recommendations as to who goes on, though. That might be a good way to work it out. Let them name a good man.

MR. PEHLE: We can work that out.

H.M.JR: No, no, I won't do that. I would say "We are proposing to do this, to name these people. Do you think they would be O.K.?" I would name a couple of people and say, "Do you think you can work with them?" because the cables all have to go through the State Department.

MR. PEHLE: Ask State to come back?

H.M.JR: No, no. I would say to Doctor Riegner, "We are thinking of putting Mr. X of the Friends and Mr. Y of the YMCA on. Do you feel you could work with these two gentlemen?"

MR. PEHLE: Send a cable through State to that effect?

H.M.JR: How else?

MR. LUXFORD: Work with the American and Jewish Congress here?

H.M.JR: Oh, here. But I would put on those people, see? Who was the Catholic Church guy in Switzerland?

MR. WHITE: They have one, but I don't know who.

MR. PEHLE: Undoubtedly they have men there. I think that is too cute.

H.M.JR: Why?
MR. PEHLE: Because this is a foreign exchange matter.

H.M.JR: Yes, but look at that fellow who came over who was so smart. And look what we have done for the Catholic Church in Switzerland.

MR. PEHLE: I know, but I don't know that that gets over to the guy who would be over there, Mr. Secretary. I think we can work this within the group that work together and know something about it.

H.M.JR: Now listen, don't brush that off. I would ask the Papal delegate, tell him what I want and ask him if he has a man there who is an expert and would be willing to do this. Don't brush the thing off.

MR. WHITE: There is no doubt in my mind that they will do it.

H.M.JR: Do you remember the man?

MR. PEHLE: I know whom you are referring to.

H.M.JR: That the Vatican had over here?

MR. PEHLE: Yes.

H.M.JR: He said he knew foreign exchange.

Well anyway, I am glad I had this talk.

MR. PEHLE: We will have a letter to State.

H.M.JR: I am not sure, but I think I am on the right track in doing it this way, see?

MR. PEHLE: Now, do you agree, Mr. Secretary, that we should have a letter for you to send to Mr. Hull in response to this?

H.M.JR: Oh, yes.

Regarded Unclassified
MR. PEHLE: What we thought we would do is have a memorandum that goes into detail on this thing from Mr. Paul to you which you could transmit right with it, so that you don't have to go into all the details.

H.M.JR: Oh, yes, this thing has to be answered.

MR. DUBOIS: We can answer all their points.

H.M.JR: Do you think what Hull says is helpful?

MR. PEHLE: I think it is helpful. I think the fact that he is going into it, Mr. Secretary, and that he knows that the people down the line know he is going into it is helpful.

MR. LUXFORD: It will be more helpful if we establish that the reasons he assigned are not good.

MR. DUBOIS: To leave him with that impression is nowhere near as helpful as to dispel that impression in his mind.

H.M.JR: You fellows have to be smart to do that.

MR. DUBOIS: That is not hard to answer.

H.M.JR: All right, let's see then. Did they just wipe out Fels and close up his Bureau?

MR. DUBOIS: They are referring to Foreign Funds Control.

MR. PEHLE: I have been trying to get them to abolish that Bureau.

H.M.JR: Now let's stop; White has something.
In reply refer to EH

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to your letter of November 24, 1943, expressing concern over the delay which has occurred in bringing into effect plans developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from Rumania and France. In view of certain implications contained in your letter, particularly those referring to Minister Harrison, I have had the entire matter reviewed.

The two proposals referred to in your letter have, as I understand it, never been fully developed in all of their fundamental details. The feasibility of the Rumanian proposal on the basis on which the Treasury has indicated its approval, was submitted early in August to Dr. Riegner, the representative in Switzerland of the World Jewish Congress. On August 22, the Legation at Bern reported that Dr. Riegner was not prepared to express an opinion on the feasibility of the plan until he had consulted with the Rumanian Jewish organization. As far as the Department is aware, no further word has ever been received from Dr. Riegner in this connection.

In the case of the French plan, Dr. Riegner expressed the opinion that the attempt would be worthwhile. However, the plan for the establishment of blocked accounts referred to in your letter was, as the Department understands it, abandoned in favor of the purchase of French currency in Switzerland, which the Treasury was prepared to approve on condition that the American Legation at Bern or some other responsible agency approve each purchase to insure certain conditions as to the origin of the currency. The Legation has made clear that these conditions are impossible of fulfillment. In this connection, Censorship reports, which are assumed

The Honorable
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury
assumed to be available to Treasury, indicate that the Swiss market in French currency is supplied at least in part by the smuggling of notes into Switzerland by the German Government through the use of the German diplomatic pouch.

The three and one half month delay which you say has occurred, appears to have commenced with the Department's telegram of August 6, stating that the Treasury was prepared to issue a license covering Dr. Riegel's plan, subject to certain stipulated conditions. The conditions were (1) that foreign exchange must not be made available in enemy or enemy occupied territory during the war; (2) that the possibility that funds may ultimately reach persons who have furnished neither local currency nor services must be reduced to an absolute minimum.

During the ensuing month, Dr. Riegel submitted his views which, as stated above, were that the French proposal was worth trying, and that further investigation was required with regard to the Rumanian proposal. Several telegrams were exchanged, clarifying certain details of the arrangement. Insofar as the Legation was concerned, it had reported in a series of telegrams, beginning in June, it's opinion that the contemplated arrangements were of such a nature as to make impossible any assurance that the enemy would not benefit from the plan. The Legation's reports indicated further that it was implicit in the Rumanian plan that the arrangement would be carried out by means of bribing Rumanian officials, and that the plan involved the danger that it would be converted into an instrumentality for benefiting those who were persecuting the Jews, and that the suppliers of funds would be subjected to new penalties and persecutions. The Legation also reported, as I have already mentioned, its complete inability to implement Treasury's stipulated safeguards with regard to the purchase of French francs.

Following the submission of this information, the Legation, on September 9, requested advice as to whether a license had been issued by the Treasury. The message was referred to Treasury on September 13, and on September 28, a telegram was dispatched communicating Treasury's reply of September 24, in which the Treasury for the first time authorized the Legation to issue the license, subject to all of the previously stated conditions. Previously, Treasury
Treasury had indicated that it would issue the license. On October 6, Minister Harrison replied that in accordance with his standing instructions, (from which he had never been authorized to depart) he had consulted his British colleague, who objected to the proposal because of the opportunities which it would undoubtedly afford for abuse, involving substantial benefit to the enemy. The Minister therefore asked for specific instructions in view of his own previously reported inability to comply with the conditions imposed by the Treasury and of the doubts expressed by the British. To this telegram, no reply was made until October 26. This delay was in part caused by the failure of the Department to transmit the message to the Treasury until October 19. This is to be explained, although not excused, by the fact that the Division which had previously handled the matter had been abolished.

In the reply, Minister Harrison was advised that Treasury had informed the Department that the factors raised by himself and the British had been fully considered in Washington before the dispatch of the telegram of September 28, and he was instructed, pursuant to the Treasury's wishes, to issue the license as specified in the telegram of September 28.

On November 14, Minister Harrison reported that he had been advised by the British Commercial Counselor that the Ministry of Economic Warfare had expressed objections to the proposal, which it was taking up in Washington, and had requested that the license be withheld pending the outcome of these discussions. Minister Harrison sought specific instructions as to whether he was to ignore this request. It is understood that the British Embassy has entered upon discussions with the Treasury regarding the proposal.

From the foregoing, it would seem clear to me that Minister Harrison was placed in a very difficult position. He was authorized to issue a license to cover an arrangement which he had reported to be incomplete in many details. Treasury had imposed conditions which he had reported he could not meet. Treasury never relaxed these conditions on the one hand, nor offered a method by which compliance could be obtained on the other hand.

In conclusion, may I say that this Department has the deepest sympathy for the desperate plight of the persecuted
persecuted Jews in Europe. I have always been horrified at the unspeakable treatment which these poor people have received, and it has always been the policy of the Department to deal expeditiously and sympathetically with proposals offering hope of their relief.

It would appear, however, from the correspondence cited above that it has not been found possible to put the present proposal into execution in the manner intended. It is for this reason, together with the expressed British objection, that final action has been deferred and not because of any fault on the part of Minister Harrison or the Department.

I suggest, therefore, if as a result of the discussions with the British, it is decided to carry the plan into effect, the Treasury issue any license which it deems appropriate. This Department will be glad to transmit the license and any necessary messages to the Mission in Bern, and to assist in any other way possible. The Department, on the other hand, cannot accept responsibility for putting into operation a plan to which are attached conditions which our Mission, in the light of information available to it, states are impractical.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Cordell Hull
The cable to the Treasury group in Algiers requesting a full report on the developments with respect to fines and levies imposed on the Jewish Community and war damage in general in Tunisia was despatched by the State Department on December 9, 1943. This cable crossed with a cable and letter from the Treasury representatives advising that the position of Washington in this matter was presented to M. Mendez-France, Finance Minister of the French Comite, on November 29, 1943.

The presentation of Washington's views to the French was delayed because the Lebanon crisis was at its height and the State Department representatives felt that it would be advisable to present a matter of such controversial nature to the Comite at that time. State representatives also felt that it would be a mistake to proceed without British support. At the end of November the French advised that unless they heard from the United States representatives within a week they were going to act without further delay. It was finally agreed to submit a statement of Washington's position to the French in the form of an unsigned memorandum. The British views still had not been received at the time this action was taken.

During the discussion with Mendez-France he stated that this matter concerned relations between Frenchmen and must be decided by the French as their own affair. He also evidenced concern over taking action which would provide a basis for the claim that the Jewish people had been singled out for special and favorable treatment by the Comite. He felt that such action would have an unfavorable effect on the political situation in France. It was pointed out to Mendez-France that the views of Washington were presented only for the consideration of the Comite and that there was no intention of forcing such views on the Comite. It was also pointed out that Washington's proposal applied not only to the Jewish Community but to any group which had suffered discriminatory economic action at the hands of the enemy. Mendez-France advised that Washington's proposals would be given further study and that the Comite's reaction thereto would be submitted in a few days.

We discussed this matter with Mr. Sonnet after his conference with you Tuesday. He expressed sympathy with our view and said that he would get in touch with the Comite about the matter himself.

Mr. Sonnet also said he would inquire what had been done in the case of the State Bank of Morocco.
Secretary Morgenthau

Mr. Paul

You have requested me to review again the developments relating to the program of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from Rumania and France, particularly in the light of Secretary Hull's letter of December 6, 1943.

In Secretary Hull's letter of December 6 the State Department disclaims responsibility for the delays which have occurred in connection with bringing into effect the financial arrangements of this program. Instead his letter would indicate that Treasury is responsible for the delays because:

(1) Treasury has never formulated a workable proposal for financing such a program; and

(2) Treasury has never obtained British approval of the program.

After carefully reviewing again our file in this matter we feel that the conclusions arrived at by Secretary Hull are predicated upon his incomplete knowledge of the facts.

I. Treasury has formulated a workable proposal for financing the program.

(a) The analysis of the financial arrangements contained in Secretary Hull's letter, including the point which he makes to the effect that the fundamental details have not been sufficiently developed to permit the issuance of a license, is inaccurate.

It is true that in the cable of August 6, 1943 (889), the Treasury merely stated that it was prepared to issue a license covering the plan, subject to certain stipulated conditions, and that at this point certain details had not been sufficiently worked out to warrant the issuance of a
license. (You will recall that this matter was expedited at this point by the exchange of correspondence between the President and Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress. In the letter you prepared for the President and cleared with Secretary Hull it was made clear to Wise that, although the Treasury was prepared to license the transaction, the matter was awaiting a further exchange of cables between the State Department and our mission in Berne regarding some of the details.)

However, as a result of the ensuing exchange of cables between State and Harrison (Harrison’s cable of August 16--499; State’s cable of August 26--2077; Harrison’s cable of August 23--5149; and State’s cable of September 4,--2162) the necessary details had clearly been sufficiently ironed out so as to permit the issuance of an appropriate license. This was certainly the opinion of the Treasury and it seemed clear to us at that time that Harrison also felt that such was the case, inasmuch as he specifically inquired in a cable of September 9 (5598) whether a Treasury license had been issued, and suggested that if a license had been issued its number and date be transmitted by the World Jewish Congress to Riegener through the Legation and that specific instructions from the World Jewish Congress to Riegener, outlining operations which might be undertaken under the license also be transmitted. This action on Harrison’s part appears utterly inconsistent with the contention in State’s letter that the financial arrangements were not sufficiently complete to warrant the issuance of a license.

In this particular case, it was and still is our view that, at the time Treasury authorized Harrison to issue a license (cable of September 28--2373), sufficient safeguards had been imposed to prevent abuse, and sufficient powers authorized to permit real progress in the financial arrangements. From the standpoint of getting results, whatever time has elapsed since then has been time lost, and time which is precious in the light of the urgency of this matter.
It is well recognised by those dealing with licenses in this field that licenses may be issued notwithstanding the fact that all of the details of the transaction to be licensed are not known, so long as sufficient details are known to permit an intelligent appraisal of the major factors involved from the standpoint of workability and possibility of abuse. Licenses do not permit transactions in violation of their terms, and appropriate provisions can always be inserted to safeguard against abuse. Furthermore, licenses can always be amended if it develops that their conditions are unduly restrictive, or not sufficiently restrictive. The Treasury and our Legations have issued many licenses which have had to be amended from time to time.

In connection with the financial details, it should also be noted that the statement in Secretary Hull’s letter, that the plan for the establishment of blocked accounts referred to in your letter has been abandoned, is not correct. It is correct that the Treasury did request in the cable sent to Harrison on August 26 (2077) that Rieger of the World Jewish Congress should be notified that if the plan should be imperiled by the requirement of a blocked account established in the United States, the Treasury would be willing to relax this requirement (by permitting the purchase of French francs from persons in Switzerland; and permitting the blocking of accounts in Switzerland). However, it should be noted that Rieger had indicated prior to this (see cable of August 23--5149--from Harrison) that it was worthwhile to attempt the financing of Jewish refugee evacuation from France to French North Africa and Spain pursuant to the arrangements and subject to the conditions originally outlined by the Treasury ($25,000 was suggested by Rieger as an initial deposit). It is our understanding that the procurement of local currencies against the establishment of blocked accounts in the United States will be one of the methods of financing used in this case. This method imposes no obligation to check the source of the local currencies (since the enemy can derive no benefit out of the blocked dollars here). Accordingly, there is no reason known to us why financing under this method could not have commenced when we authorized the issuance of a license on September 28. (It should be noted that the J.D.C. in connection with similar proposals which they are considering have indicated that the purchase of currency in enemy territory against blocked accounts will be one of the methods of financing employed).
(b) With respect to the feasibility of the Rumanian proposal, Secretary Hull's letter refers to a report from our Legation at Barne (cable of August 23--5149) that Riesener was not prepared to express an opinion on the feasibility of the plan until he had consulted with the Rumanian Jewish organization.

No reference is made in Secretary Hull's letter to the main point which seemed to have raised doubt in Riesener's mind and which was referred to in the August 23 cable, namely the question of the feasibility of evacuating children from Rumania unless they were first provided with adequate food and clothing. In answer to this point, we stated in the cable of September 4 (2182) that for the purposes of our proposal, expenditures for food and clothing necessary for preparing refugees for journey to free territory might be considered as expenses in connection with evacuation.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the fact that transactions authorized by a license may not be consummated is not a reason for not issuing the license. Treasury has issued hundreds of licenses authorizing transactions which have never been consummated. The prompt issuing of a license in a deserving case, even though the transactions cannot be immediately consummated, frequently prevents considerable delay (which is what the Treasury is trying to avoid in this case).

In any event the license which Treasury authorized Harrison to issue would have covered the evacuation of refugees from both France and Rumania. The fact that some details were still unsettled regarding the Rumanian phase certainly did not interfere with the functioning of the French phase of the program. The prompt issuance of the license in question at worst would have resulted only in the French program having been started before the Rumanian program was fully worked out. No one would consciously claim that technicalities relating to the Rumanian phase of the program should have held up the issuance of the license, if the failure to issue the license might result in condemning to death more refugees in France.
(c) With respect to the objections which have been raised by Harrison, any impression that the Treasury had authorized the issuance of a license in the cable of September 28, knowing that Harrison was opposed to its issuance, is not correct.

It is true that in his cable of June 14 (3657), Harrison had indicated that the Rieger plan offered many possibilities of abuse and might even facilitate transfer of enemy funds. However, these objections were raised prior to the presentation to Harrison, in the cable of August 6, of the definitive program approved by the Treasury. The cable of May 25 (1249), to which Harrison was replying, merely set forth, as expressed therein, State Department’s "interpretation of the proposed financial arrangements" and requested further information.

After the presentation of the Treasury program in the cable of August 6, which was drawn in the light of the objections raised by Harrison, no comments were received from Harrison, so far as this Department is aware, to the effect that this program, or its modifications, was unworkable or objectionable until we received his cable of October 6 (6269). This was two months after we had presented the basic program to him, requesting his comments and suggestions as well as the comments and suggestions of Rieger, (see cable of August 6) as well as being after he had inquired in his cable of September 9 whether a Treasury license had been issued and we had authorized him to issue a license in the cable of September 28. During this two months period, although the aforementioned cables had been exchanged with Harrison, in which he referred to a number of points raised by Rieger and in which we felt we had given satisfactory answers, no points were raised by way of criticism or suggestion by Harrison himself.

It is precisely delays of this character at which our letter of November 24, 1943 was addressed since if Harrison’s objections had been forthcoming more promptly, much time might have been saved. When we finally received the objections in his cable of October 6, we reviewed the points involved (which had all been carefully considered before we
authorized the issuance of a license) and, after consulting with the State Department (Breckinridge Long), instructed Harrison to issue the license.

(d) In his cable of October 6, Harrison raised the objection that the relief plan might facilitate enemy acquisition of funds and flight of enemy capital, and indicated that the British Commercial Secretary thought the plan might result in leakage of funds to the enemy.

The Treasury has been and still is of the view that sufficient safeguards have been imposed (see above-mentioned cables) so that the enemy will not benefit from the financial transactions. And in Secretary Hull's letter to you of August 7, after stating that the Treasury itself was entirely free to act on the matter and grant the necessary licenses, Secretary Hull stated:

"Any view that this would make funds available to the enemy is not correct; the funds would remain blocked in Switzerland until the end of the war."

That this form of objection at such late date was coming from Harrison and the British is not less than surprising in view of the fact that this consideration has not been regarded as controlling in the past by our Legation or the British Legation in Berne. Thus, in the outstanding case, with which you are no doubt familiar, involving the purchase of substantial amounts of material in enemy territory by Standard Telephone and Radio S.A., Zurich (and also the manufacture by such company of radio transmitters for installation in trucks and use by the German war machine) both our Legation and the British Legation recommended that favorable consideration be given to the issuance of a license in the light of other factors which were deemed by them to be compelling. With respect to the financial aspects of this transaction (aside from the question of the manufacture of radio equipment actually destined for German use) our Legation argued that
in view of the generous credit supplied by the Swiss to the Germans "transactions of this type cannot be regarded as actually increasing the enemy's purchasing power in Switzerland which is already believed to be at a maximum" (cable from Bern of May 1, 1942--2439). The British also took this position, at least at one time. Thus in a cable from our Embassy in London relating to this case (September 26, 1942--5394), after pointing out that undeniably the amount of Swiss francs available to the enemy would be increased, it is stated that

"However, the British believe that enemy holdings of Swiss francs are already so large that they cannot possibly be used for the purchase of Swiss goods for export to Germany."

In fact our Legation, with the concurrence of the British Legation, allowed Standard to engage in these transactions, with the Legation's knowledge, up until late July of this year, (and would undoubtedly have continued to permit these transactions except for strong cable of July 17--4344--giving the views of State, Treasury and OEM), even though a license had never been issued by the Treasury (see cable from Bern of August 12--3704; cable from London of April 19--2724; and cable from Bern of April 30--2472). The principle thus announced in the Standard case, namely that supplying the Germans with Swiss Francs does not benefit the Germans, has been repeated by our Legation in Bern in expressing its desire that particular transactions be approved.

We are not citing the Standard case in this memorandum to prove that Harrison was not justified in view of the "secret" facts alleged to have been involved, in allowing equipment to be manufactured by Standard for the Germans (our battle on this issue is not relevant here); but merely to show the attitude which Harrison adopted with respect to the question of permitting the Germans to acquire purchasing power in Switzerland.
(s) The other objections raised by Harrison on October 6, 1943 was the impossibility of the Legation assuring the fulfillment of the conditions of the proposed license, principally those relating to the procurement of French francs as not to aid the enemy.

It is difficult to understand why the Legation feels that it is unable to check the sellers of French francs in Switzerland to ascertain whether or not the francs, being purchased from them, had accrued under such conditions that their purchase would not give the enemy benefit. The Treasury has repeatedly been called upon to make this sort of a determination in connection with applications for the sale and purchase of blocked currencies and the Treasury has frequently not been in a position to obtain as much information as the Legation in Berne should be able to obtain in Switzerland with respect to holders of French francs in Switzerland. There are a great many persons in Switzerland holding French francs which they either acquired prior to the fall of France or which are now accruing to them through investments or dividends in France or through similar transactions.

Furthermore, if the principle which was followed by the Legation in the above-mentioned case involving the furnishing of funds to Germany by Standard is sound, the question of the source of the French francs which are purchased would be immaterial. Whatever their source, their purchase under that principle would not give benefit to the enemy. The Treasury, however, has never agreed with the principle of the Standard case and accordingly in this case made the requirement that the source of the French francs should be checked.

Accordingly it seems clear that Harrison was furnished with a positive financial program approved by the Treasury after consultation with State and after having fully weighed Harrison's belated objections. In any event Harrison's delay in voicing his doubts was itself one of the principal reasons Treasury had difficulty in formulating a program which would meet with his approval.
II. It is no answer to Treasury's letter of November 24, 1943 to say that Treasury never obtained British approval of the program.

In the first place after focusing on the issue, the State Department concurred in the sending of the cable of October 26, 1943 to Harrison instructing Berne to issue the license without the approval of the British.

In the second place, one of the principal objections raised by Treasury in the letter of November 24, 1943 was not the fact that it was unnecessary to clear the matter with the British (although Treasury knows of no instructions which it has approved which requires any mission in any foreign country to clear with the British after Treasury has exercised its licensing authority in a specific case), but the fact of the tremendous delays that occurred before Harrison (and apparently State) finally decided that the matter required British clearance. Although Harrison in his cable of June 14, 1943 (3657) raised the matter of discussions with the British, it was not until we had authorized him to issue a license about three and one-half months later (cable of September 28) that he definitely decided that the matter should be discussed with the British; and, of more importance, to our knowledge it was not until then that he even mentioned the matter to the British (although he knew about it since April). Furthermore, if Treasury had been authoritatively and promptly advised by State that clearance was required, Treasury would have sought such clearance contemporaneously with three months negotiation with Berne. It was these delays that we criticized.

Finally, even when it became clear in November, 1943 that State did expect Treasury to clear the program with the British, we were not even informed that early last summer State had discussed the matter with the British Embassy in Washington; that the cable to Berne asking for further details of the program was furnished to the British representative; that he had requested State for copies of the incoming cables from Berne; and that he had written a letter to State asking
for details; and that he had never received a reply to this letter. (These facts were made known to the Treasury during our recent discussions with the British Embassy, growing out of the fact that Harrison had raised the matter with the British in Berne). Certainly as a minimum Treasury should have been notified of such discussions at the time State indicated that Treasury should assume the responsibility of clearing the case with the British and ordinarily we would have expected to have been kept currently informed as to the fact of negotiations of this character. In any event, if State had decided in early summer to clear the matter with the British it would have facilitated our handling of the whole case to have been so informed at that time - rather than months later.

Although it is difficult to understand why the significant facts mentioned above were not included in Secretary Hull's letter, the explanation may well be the fact that two of the men in the State Department, with whom my men dealt on this matter from the beginning, and who my men tell me "were carrying the ball" on this matter in the State Department for some time, are no longer with the State Department. The difficulties involved in having a matter reviewed by men who have not played a leading role in all of its developments since the beginning are apparent.

JED:AFI:nrd - 12/14/43.
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I thank you for your letter of December 6, 1943 concerning the delay which has occurred in bringing into effect plans developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from France and Romania.

While we may still disagree regarding some of the points involved in this particular case, these matters I must agree are insignificant in terms of your willingness to review the whole matter and your assurances that it is the policy of your Department to deal expeditiously and sympathetically with proposals of this nature.

I would like to end here, but the confused state of the record in this particular case at this point makes further comment necessary. Your letter gave me the impression that you may have been led to believe that the Treasury had handled this matter in such a way that our Legation in Berne has not been in a position to issue a license. Specifically, your letter would indicate that a license has not been issued because:

(1) Treasury has not formulated a workable financial program for the evacuation of these refugees; and

(2) Treasury has not cleared the proposal with the British.

Accordingly, I have had the entire matter carefully reviewed by Randolph Paul, who acts for me on all matters relating to foreign funds control.

I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Paul's memorandum for your information. This memorandum has satisfied me that the conclusions reached in your letter of December 6, 1943 are
not supported by the facts in this case and that my letter of November 24, 1948, can be fully documented.

As you will note, Mr. Paul makes the following significant points in his memorandum:

(1) Treasury has formulated a workable program, under which, if an appropriate license had been issued when it was authorized by the Treasury, real progress might have been made in the financial arrangements involved. The objections of our Legation to the program are not sound, but even assuming they had some merit, the Legation's objections to the basic Treasury program were not furnished to us until two months after it had received the program, which is precisely the kind of delay to which we are referring.

(2) Treasury did not clear the program with the British because Treasury knew of no requirement that such a program be cleared with the British, and State failed to advise us that such clearance was required. On the contrary, State joined with Treasury in instructing our Legation to issue a license without British approval. And our Legation had over five months prior to that during which it could have mentioned the matter to the British, if it thought that this was essential.

Moreover, when State did finally indicate that we should obtain British clearance, State never advised us that State had discussed the matter with the British early last summer and that State had failed to keep the British advised of subsequent developments (despite the request of the British to State that they be kept informed of developments).

After you have again reviewed this matter I feel sure that you will understand why I was greatly concerned and am still greatly concerned about the delay which has occurred.
In view of the urgency of this matter, you will also appreciate the point which I made in my letter of November 24 that the benefits of a program such as this can be just as effectively lost through delay as through the failure to issue a license.

Very truly yours,

Secretary of the Treasury.

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure.
Secretary Morgenthau

Mr. Paul

You have requested me to review again the developments relating to the program of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from Rumania and France, particularly in the light of Secretary Hull's letter of December 6, 1943.

In Secretary Hull's letter of December 6 the State Department disclaims responsibility for the delays which have occurred in connection with bringing into effect the financial arrangements of this program. Instead his letter would indicate that Treasury is responsible for the delays because:

(1) Treasury has never formulated a workable proposal for financing such a program; and

(2) Treasury has never obtained British approval of the program.

After carefully reviewing again our file in this matter we feel that the conclusions arrived at by Secretary Hull are predicated upon his incomplete knowledge of the facts.

I. Treasury has formulated a workable proposal for financing the program.

(a) The analysis of the financial arrangements contained in Secretary Hull's letter, including the point which he makes to the effect that the fundamental details have not been sufficiently developed to permit the issuance of a license, is inaccurate.

It is true that in the cable of August 6, 1943 (1889), the Treasury merely stated that it was prepared to issue a license covering the plan, subject to certain stipulated conditions, and that at this point certain details had not been sufficiently worked out to warrant the issuance of a
license. (You will recall that this matter was expedited at this point by the exchange of correspondence between the President and Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress. In the letter you prepared for the President and cleared with Secretary Hull it was made clear to Wise that, although the Treasury was prepared to license the transaction, the matter was awaiting a further exchange of cables between the State Department and our mission in Berne regarding some of the details.)

However, as a result of the ensuing exchange of cables between State and Harrison (Harrison’s cable of August 16-2003; State’s cable of August 26-2077; Harrison’s cable of August 23-5149; and State’s cable of September 4,--2182) the necessary details had clearly been sufficiently ironed out so as to permit the issuance of an appropriate license. This was certainly the opinion of the Treasury and it seemed clear to us at that time that Harrison also felt that such was the case, inasmuch as he specifically inquired in a cable of September 9 (5588) whether a Treasury license had been issued, and suggested that if a license had been issued its number and date be transmitted by the World Jewish Congress to Riehner through the Legation and that specific instructions from the World Jewish Congress to Riehner, outlining operations which might be undertaken under the license also be transmitted. This action on Harrison’s part appears utterly inconsistent with the contention in State’s letter that the financial arrangements were not sufficiently complete to warrant the issuance of a license.

In this particular case, it was and still is our view that, at the time Treasury authorized Harrison to issue a license (cable of September 28--2978), sufficient safeguards had been imposed to prevent abuse, and sufficient powers authorized to permit real progress in the financial arrangements. From the standpoint of getting results, whatever time has elapsed since then has been time lost, and time which is precious in the light of the urgency of this matter.
It is well recognized by those dealing with licenses in this field that licenses may be issued notwithstanding the fact that all of the details of the transaction to be licensed are not known, so long as sufficient details are known to permit an intelligent appraisal of the major factors involved from the standpoint of workability and possibility of abuse. Licenses do not permit transactions in violation of their terms, and appropriate provisions can always be inserted to safeguard against abuse. Furthermore, licenses can always be amended if it develops that their conditions are unduly restrictive, or not sufficiently restrictive. The Treasury and our Legations have issued many licenses which have had to be amended from time to time.

In connection with the financial details, it should also be noted that the statement in Secretary Hull's letter, that the plan for the establishment of blocked accounts referred to in your letter has been abandoned, is not correct. It is correct that the Treasury did request in the cable sent to Harrison on August 26 (2977) that Wiegner of the World Jewish Congress should be notified that if the plan should be implemented by the requirement of a blocked account established in the United States, the Treasury would be willing to relax this requirement (by permitting the purchase of French francs from persons in Switzerland; and permitting the blocking of accounts in Switzerland). However, it should be noted that Wiegner had indicated prior to this (see cable of August 28--3149--from Harrison) that it was worthwhile to attempt the financing of Jewish refugee evacuation from France to French North Africa and Spain pursuant to the arrangements and subject to the conditions originally outlined by the Treasury (125,000 was suggested by Wiegner as an initial deposit). It is our understanding that the procurement of local currencies against the establishment of blocked accounts in the United States will be one of the methods of financing used in this case. This method imposes no obligation to check the source of the local currencies (since the enemy can derive no benefit out of the blocked dollars here). Accordingly, there is no reason known to us why financing under this method could not have commenced when we authorized the issuance of a license on September 28. (It should be noted that the J.D.C. in connection with similar proposals which they are considering have indicated that the purchase of currency in enemy territory against blocked accounts will be one of the methods of financing employed.)
(b) With respect to the feasibility of the Humanian proposal, Secretary Hull's letter refers to a report from our Legation at Berne (cable of August 23--549) that Hiegner was not prepared to express an opinion on the feasibility of the plan until he had consulted with the Humanian Jewish organization.

No reference is made in Secretary Hull's letter to the main point which seemed to have raised doubt in Hiegner's mind and which was referred to in the August 23 cable, namely the question of the feasibility of evacuating children from Humania unless they were first provided with adequate food and clothing. In answer to this point, we stated in the cable of September 4 (2132) that for the purposes of our proposal, expenditures for food and clothing necessary for preparing refugees for journey to free territory might be considered as expenses in connection with evacuation.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the fact that transactions authorized by a license may not be consummated is not a reason for not issuing the license. Treasury has issued hundreds of licenses authorizing transactions which have never been consummated. The prompt issuing of a license in a deserving case, even though the transactions cannot be immediately consummated, frequently prevents considerable delay (which is what the Treasury is trying to avoid in this case).

In any event the license which Treasury authorized Harrision to issue would have covered the evacuation of refugees from both France and Humania. The fact that some details were still unsettled regarding the Humanian phase certainly did not interfere with the functioning of the French phase of the program. The prompt issuance of the license in question at worst would have resulted only in the French program having been started before the Humanian program was fully worked out. No one would consciously claim that technicalities relating to the Humanian phase of the program should have held up the issuance of the license, if the failure to issue the license might result in condemning to death more refugees in France.
(c) With respect to the objections which have been raised by Harrison, any impression that the Treasury had authorized the issuance of a license in the cable of September 28, knowing that Harrison was opposed to its issuance, is not correct.

It is true that in his cable of June 14 (3657), Harrison had indicated that the Higer plan offered many possibilities of abuse and might even facilitate transfer of enemy funds. However, these objections were raised prior to the presentation to Harrison, in the cable of August 6, of the definitive program approved by the Treasury. The cable of May 25 (1249), to which Harrison was replying, merely set forth, as expressed therein, State Department's "interpretation of the proposed financial arrangements" and requested further information.

After the presentation of the Treasury program in the cable of August 6, which was drawn in the light of the objections raised by Harrison, no comments were received from Harrison, so far as this Department is aware, to the effect that this program, or its modifications, was unworkable or objectionable until we received his cable of October 6 (6200). This was two months after we had presented the basic program to him, requesting his comments and suggestions as well as the comments and suggestions of Higer, (see cable of August 6) as well as being after he had inquired in his cable of September 9 whether a Treasury license had been issued and we had authorized him to issue a license in the cable of September 28. During this two months period, although the aforementioned cables had been exchanged with Harrison, in which he referred to a number of points raised by Higer and in which we felt we had given satisfactory answers, no points were raised by way of criticism or suggestion by Harrison himself.

It is precisely delays of this character at which our letter of November 24, 1943 was addressed since if Harrison's objections had been forthcoming more promptly, much time might have been saved. When we finally received the objections in his cable of October 6, we reviewed the points involved (which had all been carefully considered before we
authorized the issuance of a license) and, after consulting with the State Department (Breckinridge Long), instructed Harrison to issue the license.

(c) In his cable of October 8, Harrison raised the objection that the relief plan might facilitate enemy acquisition of funds and flight of enemy capital, and indicated that the British Commercial Secretary thought the plan might result in leakage of funds to the enemy.

The Treasury has been and still is of the view that sufficient safeguards have been imposed (see above-mentioned cables) so that the enemy will not benefit from the financial transactions. And in Secretary Hull's letter to you of August 7, after stating that the Treasury itself was entirely free to act on the matter and grant the necessary licenses, Secretary Hull stated:

"Any view that this would make funds available to the enemy is not correct; the funds would remain blocked in Switzerland until the end of the war."

That this form of objection at such late date was coming from Harrison and the British is not less than surprising in view of the fact that this consideration has not been regarded as controlling in the past by our Legation or the British Legation in Berne. Thus, in the outstanding case, with which you are no doubt familiar, involving the purchase of substantial amounts of material in enemy territory by Standard Telephone and Radio S.A., Zurich (and also the manufacture by such company of radio transmitters for installation in trucks and use by the German war machine) both our Legation and the British Legation recommended that favorable consideration be given to the issuance of a license in the light of other factors which were deemed by them to be compelling. With respect to the financial aspects of this transaction (aside from the question of the manufacture of radio equipment actually destined for German use) our Legation argued that
in view of the generous credit supplied by the Swiss to the Germans "transactions of this type cannot be regarded as actually increasing the enemy's purchasing power in Switzerland which is already believed to be a maximum" (cable from Berne of May 1, 1942--3429). The British also took this position, at least at one time. Thus in a cable from our Embassy in London relating to this case (September 28, 1942--3894), after pointing out that undeniably the amount of Swiss francs available to the enemy would be increased, it is stated that

"However, the British believe that enemy holdings of Swiss francs are already so large that they cannot possibly be used in the near future for the purchase of Swiss goods for export to Germany."

In fact our Legation with the concurrence of the British Legation, allowed Standard to engage in these transactions, with the Legation's knowledge, up until late July of this year, (and would undoubtedly have continued to permit these transactions except for strong cable of July 17--4344--giving the views of State, Treasury and GW), even though a license had never been issued by the Treasury (see cable from Berne of August 12--3764; cable from London of April 19--3750; and cable from Berne of April 20--3472). The principle thus announced in the Standard case, namely that supplying the Germans with Swiss francs does not benefit the Germans, has been repeated by our Legation in Berne in expressing its desire that particular transactions be approved.

We are not citing the Standard case in this memorandum to prove that Harrison was not justified, in view of the "secret" facts alleged to have been involved, in allowing equipment to be manufactured by Standard for the Germans (our battle on this issue is not relevant here); but merely to show the attitude which Harrison adopted with respect to the question of permitting the Germans to acquire purchasing power in Switzerland.
(e) The other objections raised by Harrison on October 6, 1943, was the impossibility of the Legation assuring the fulfillment of the conditions of the proposed license, principally those relating to the procurement of French francs as not to aid the enemy.

It is difficult to understand why the Legation feels that it is unable to check the sellers of French francs in Switzerland to ascertain whether or not the francs, being purchased from them, had accrued under such conditions that their purchase would not give the enemy benefit. The Treasury has repeatedly been called upon to make this sort of determination in connection with applications for the sale and purchase of blocked currencies and the Treasury has frequently not been in a position to obtain as much information as the Legation in Bern should be able to obtain in Switzerland with respect to holders of French francs in Switzerland. There are a great many persons in Switzerland holding French francs which they either acquired prior to the fall of France or which are now accruing to them through investments or dividends in francs or through similar transactions.

Furthermore, if the principle which was followed by the Legation in the above-mentioned case involving the furnishing of funds to Germany by Standard is sound, the question of the source of the French francs which are purchased would be immaterial. Whatever their source, their purchase under that principle would not give benefit to the enemy. The Treasury, however, has never agreed with the principle of the Standard case and accordingly in this case made the requirement that the source of the French francs should be checked.

Accordingly it seems clear that Harrison was furnished with a positive financial program approved by the Treasury after consultation with State and after having fully weighed Harrison's belated objections. In any event Harrison's delay in voicing his doubts was itself one of the principal reasons Treasury had difficulty in formulating a program which would meet with his approval.
II. It is no answer to Treasury's letter of November 24, 1943 to say that Treasury never obtained British approval of the program.

In the first place after focusing on the issue, the State Department concurred in the sending of the cable of October 28, 1943 to Harrison instructing Berne to issue the license without the approval of the British.

In the second place, one of the principal objections raised by Treasury in the letter of November 24, 1943 was not the fact that it was unnecessary to clear the matter with the British (although Treasury knows of no instructions which it has approved which requires any mission in any foreign country to clear with the British after Treasury has exercised its licensing authority in a specific case), but the fact of the tremendous delays that occurred before Harrison (and apparently State) finally decided that the matter required British clearance. Although Harrison in his cable of June 14, 1943 (5567) raised the matter of discussions with the British, it was not until we had authorized him to issue a license about three and one-half months later (cable of September 23) that he definitely decided that the matter should be discussed with the British; and, of more importance, to our knowledge it was not until then that he even mentioned the matter to the British (although he knew about it since April). Furthermore, if Treasury had been authoritatively and recently advised by State that clearance was required, Treasury would have sought such clearance contemporaneously with three months negotiation with Berne. It was these delays that we criticized.

Finally, even when it became clear in November, 1943 that State did expect Treasury to clear the program with the British, we were not even informed that early last summer State had discussed the matter with the British Embassy in Washington; that the cable to Berne asking for further details of the program was furnished to the British representative; that he had requested State for copies of the incoming cables from Berne; and that he had written a letter to State asking
for details; and that he had never received a reply to this letter. (These facts were made known to the Treasury during our recent discussions with the British Embassy, growing out of the fact that Harrison had raised the matter with the British in Berne). Certainly as a minimum Treasury should have been notified of such discussions at the time State indicated that Treasury should assume the responsibility of clearing the case with the British and ordinarily we would have expected to have been kept currently informed as to the fact of negotiations of this character. In any event, if State had decided in early summer to clear the matter with the British it would have facilitated our handling of the whole case to have been so informed at that time - rather than months later.

Although it is difficult to understand why the significant facts mentioned above were not included in Secretary Hull's letter, the explanation may well be the fact that two of the men in the State Department, with whom we dealt on this matter from the beginning, and who my men tell me "were carrying the ball" on this matter in the State Department for some time, are no longer with the State Department. The difficulties involved in having a matter reviewed by men who have not played a leading role in all of its developments since the beginning are apparent.

(initial) R.E.P.

JED:ATL:nrd - 12/14/43.
British Embassy
Washington, D. C.

W.T. 1050/6/7/43

13th December, 1943.

Dear Mr. Pehle,

We have now received a reply from London to the telegram which we sent to them following our recent discussion on the subject of your proposals for the evacuation of Jews from Roumania and France.

This matter has evidently received very full and careful consideration in London. The Ministry of Economic Warfare inform us that from the purely financial angle, they would have been prepared to agree to the proposed licence for the transfer of $25,000 on certain conditions which they would regard as necessary in view of the grave objections which they see in general to obtaining cash from residents in occupied territories against blocked credits in dollars or Swiss francs. They think it would be very difficult indeed to devise safeguards against Nazi agents and other objectionable persons using this scheme to their own advantage. However, I do not propose at this stage to set out in detail the conditions which they suggest, since they inform us that the Foreign Office sees grave disadvantages in general to the scheme and are telegraphing separately on the matter.

I expect very shortly to be in a position to put the views of the Foreign Office before you, but I am sending you this letter in the meanwhile since I know how urgently you wish to deal with this matter and I wanted to let you know that there appear to be certain political disadvantages involved.

Yours sincerely,

(s) G.F. Thorold

G. F. Thorold

Mr. J. Pehle,
U. S. Treasury Department,
Foreign Funds Control,
Washington, D. C.
Secretary of State

Washington.

U.S. URGENT

8717, fifteenth.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ONLY.

Reference your 7506, November 27 for Winant.

MEW has addressed following letter to Embassy dated December 15 respecting plan for evacuation of Jews from France and Rumania: "We have now received the views of the Foreign Office on the proposal of the United States Treasury to license the remittance to Switzerland of $25,000 as a preliminary installment to be expended on the rescue of Jews from France and Rumania. The Foreign Office are concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy occupied territory. Certain schemes with a similar object in which both the Foreign Office and the State Department are interested are greatly hampered by the difficulties of transportation, particularly shipping, and of finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East for any but a very small number."
small number of Jewish refugees. They foresee that it is likely to prove almost if not quite impossible to deal with anything like the number of 70,000 refugees whose rescue is envisaged by the Riehmer plan. For this reason they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements. We understand that they are telegraphing to this effect to Washington, asking them to place these considerations before the State Department.

As a result of this expression of views by the Foreign Office we have telegraphed to Washington stating the terms on which we should have been prepared to agree to the license proposed, i.e., (A) for the time being the currency to be procured only by purchase from unobjectionable Swiss owners of French francs or Rumanian lei acquired in an unobjectionable manner, (B) both Legations in Bern to be responsible for checking the Swiss owners and the origin of the currency they proposed to sell, (C) no further transfer to be licensed until a report is received which should include information as to the amounts procurable on these terms and as to the general progress of the scheme. But we have added that the Foreign Office see grave objections in general and are telegraphing separately about these."

PLEASE INFORM TREASURY

WINANT
December 17, 1943
10:30 a.m.

JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. Pehle
Mr. Luxford
Mr. DuBois
Mrs. Klotz

H.M.JR: I have read this thing, and I have certain objections. Have you seen this? (Referring to memorandum from Mr. Paul to the Secretary, and draft of letter to Secretary Hull, both dated December 17, 1943, copies attached)

MR. PAUL: Yes, I went over it yesterday.

H.M.JR: I like the opening and I am not going to argue. I don't know why you put it in about Paul, but that is all right with me.

MR. PAUL: What do you mean, about me? That is just a mechanism for getting this into the State Department files. That is just a device.

H.M.JR: Oh, I see. I didn't read your memorandum.

MR. PAUL: That is just the way of taking the heat off you and putting it on me.

MR. DuBOIS: That memorandum from Mr. Paul is very strong.

H.M.JR: I didn't get to that.

MR. LUXFORD: That is where we go into details.

H.M.JR: Well, the main thing - I have no way of knowing whether one or two is accurately stated, but I have to take it for granted it is.
MR. LUXFORD: Although you can check the memorandum from Paul to you if you wish to. That goes into detail.

H.M.JR: The last paragraph bothers me - "The Treasury is prepared to issue an appropriate license" - and so forth; "In view of the reluctance of our legation in Bern to accept" - and so forth - the thing that bothers me in this last paragraph is that we have not yet heard from the British - we sent this cable--

(Mrs. Klotz entered the conference.)

MR. LUXFORD: We have received one preliminary report from the British.

MR. PHILE: haven't you heard about the letter we got from the British?

H.M.JR: No. We left ourselves wide open on that last paragraph. How would I hear about it?

MR. PHILE: It was sent to you, Mr. Secretary, I think.

H.M.JR: What!

MR. DUBOIS: Three or four days ago.

MRS. KLOTZ: I never saw it.

MR. LUXFORD: Sent to you three or four days ago.

H.M.JR: Could be. (The Secretary sent for Miss Chauncey.)

MRS. KLOTZ: Didn't send it to me.

H.M.JR: It is not attached here, is it? That is where it should be. This even makes my point more cogent. (Referring to letter from Ambassador Winant to Secretary of State, dated December 15, 1943, copy attached.)
MR. PEHLE: We had the letter drafted, Mr. Secretary, to say that in the last paragraph that after hearing from the British we were prepared to do that. Harry White suggested we take out "...after hearing from the British," so as to leave the Treasury's hands free and see what the British finally came through with after that rather shocking letter.

(Miss Chauncey entered the conference.)

H.M.JR: I am still awake! (To Miss Chauncey) Is that letter in there? (Points to the brief case.) Have you seen it? It doesn't look familiar. (Referring to Mr. Paul's memo transmitting message from G. F. Thorold, attached)

The point that I am making is, it seems to me that Mr. Hull or anybody else in Congress could say, "How could you, in the light of that--you were put on notice that the British Foreign Office was going to object--go ahead and issue the license?"

MR. PEHLE: We don't propose to go ahead and issue the license. We just didn't want to say in this letter we were holding it up.

H.M.JR: "...prepared to issue appropriate license."

MR. PEHLE: It is difficult for me to defend it because it was Harry's position that we take it out.

H.M.JR: Who represents Harry?

MR. LUXFORD: I am not fully in accord, but I understand his point.

H.M.JR: Do you understand mine?

MR. LUXFORD: But I believe I would agree with Harry on this point.
H.M. Jr.: Well, as a matter of plain English, "The Treasury prepared to issue an appropriate license here in Washington," and so forth and so on. That means that we are going to go ahead.

Mr. LUXFORD: That does not commit us to do that, however, without checking with State if we decide we want it.

H.A. JR.: There is nothing in here. I interpret that as just plain English, and we are in the process of going ahead and issuing that license.

Mr. LUXFORD: I would go further and say that Harry believes that is what we should do, but we did not want to state that categorically in here. We wanted to leave it open so we could take whatever course is necessary, once we hear from the British.

MISS CHAUNCEY: It is not there, but I think I can get it. I think it is with those three carbons.

H.M. JR.: It is the original they claim they sent to me.

MISS CHAUNCEY: I thought it was with the material that is in your desk.

MRS. KLOTZ: No, no, I haven't seen this.

H.M. JR.: Where would it come from?

MR. PAUL: From me.

MRS. KLOTZ: I think it is maybe in your shop.

MR. PAUL: Why don't you ask Miss Alger if it is there. I don't believe it is.

H.A. JR.: Let's see who has got what.

(Miss Chauncey left the conference.)
Mr. PEHLE: I don't think, Mr. Secretary, it makes much difference whether we put it in there or not. We were trying to write that letter on the assumption that you hadn't seen - or at least the letter wasn't written in the light of the preliminary thing from the British, because we thought it made a better record without referring to that. We would rather not refer to that thing.

H.M. JR: Yes, but look, gentlemen, let's call a spade a spade. I am Secretary of the Treasury for one hundred and thirty-five million people, see? That is the way I think of myself; I represent all of them. But if Mr. Hamilton Fish was to go after me, he goes after me because I am a Jew. Let's use plain, simple language. He doesn't go after me because I am Secretary; he goes after me because he thinks that I have done something for the Jews because I am a Jew.

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Secretary, that is what I certainly feel, and I think the rest of us feel that we would not issue the license.

H.M. JR: But that is a badly drafted letter.

MR. PAUL: I don't get your point. I wish you would explain it.

H.M. JR: Well, the point is simply this, that these people are going to interpret it that we are in the process. Isn't that what it means? And there is nothing to indicate that the English will file a temporary protest or hold the line.

Mr. LUXFORD: Nothing to indicate we would hold up by virtue of what the English have done.

H.M. JR: Or that we have received a protest and have been put on notice that the British Foreign Office is sending us a protest. That is my point.

In other words, we are leaving ourselves, I consider, wide open to go ahead, in spite of the fact that the
British Foreign Office is putting us on notice they were going to send us a cable protesting against this.

MR. PEHLE: We can put it back in. We had it in there first, Mr. Secretary. We had that exact language in there saying, "...after clearing with the British, we are prepared," and so forth.

MR. PAUL: We ought to argue this out with Harry White. He feels strongly the other way.

MR. LUXFORD: White feels strongly that at this point, knowing what the British are going to do, we should say, "This is none of your business"—

MRS. KLOTZ: It was on Paul's desk.

H.M.JR: That is all right. I never tit-for-tat. We have got it. If I had had it, I wouldn't have read it anyway, if that makes you feel better.

MR. PAUL: It is that high on my desk.

H.M.JR: The place where it should have been was attached to this.

MRS. KLOTZ: They are pretty good. They generally send things direct to me.

H.M.JR: I am talking too much. This is what I would suggest. I wouldn't put in the last paragraph at all. I wouldn't say, "...we are waiting for the British," or, "...we are going to be guided by the British," or anything else. I would simply clear up the record in answer to Mr. Hull. We don't have to cross it.

MR. LUXFORD: That is the trick. We just don't commit ourselves on that point. That satisfies it.

MR. PEHLE: Take the last paragraph out entirely?
H.M. JR: Entirely. Does that satisfy you?

MR. PAUL: Yes, I think that is much better than the first way we had it.

MR. PEHLE: Yes.

H.M. JR: Now, wait a minute, you have to help me on this thing, because you fellows live with this and I don't.

The question that also bothered me when I read it the first time, Riegner in Switzerland was sort of holding back. Is that cleared up?

MR. PEHLE: Cleared up very extensively in the memorandum.

H.M. JR: Point that out. (The Secretary hands Mr. Paul's memorandum of December 17, 1943, to Mr. Pehle, copy attached.)

MR. PEHLE: Top of that page, Mr. Secretary.

H.M. JR: Let me just take time, do you mind? Is this the one I read from Paul to me? Oh, I see; I didn't get to this.

MR. LUXFORD: This will be transmitted with your letter.

MR. DUBoIS: This just completely devastates their letter, in our opinion.

H.M. JR: It does. (The Secretary reads document over to himself.)

MR. PAUL: Part of it shows--

MR. LUXFORD: That is the point.
H.M.JR: Now, I don't want to tie up a lot of people - is everybody satisfied? I mean, is there anything in here which I might question?

MR. PEHLE: I think the last paragraph, Mr. Secretary, is probably the most - the last paragraph in the memorandum-

H.M.JR: Because this is an awfully long thing.

MR. PEHLE: It is a strong memorandum.

MR. LUXFORD: It is no stronger than the situation warrants, however.

MR. PAUL: That last paragraph gives him a sort of an out, in a way.

MR. PEHLE: In a way, but it does other things, too. I agree with it, but it is a strong inference.

H.M.JR: I don't want to hold this up while I read the thing, though.

MR. PAUL: There is not a statement in this letter that can't be documented.

MR. LUXFORD: We have gone through it with a fine-toothed comb, on that very point.

H.M.JR: Can he rebut on this?

MR. DuBOIS: He may try.

MR. LUXFORD: If he uses the same tactics he used in the last letter, yes, Mr. Secretary.

MR. PEHLE: You never can be sure that you won't get a blast-back, but we have gone to every length to be sure this letter is sound, and shows the first letter is sound.
MR. PAUL: If he has blasted back once, you have got to get it straightened out on the record.

MR. LUXFORD: The point is, if he misrepresents his position as he did in the last letter, yes, he can blast back; but on the record, he can't.

H.M. JR: If you people feel it is all right - I mean, this is a straight - what would you call it - a brief, isn't it - prepared for trial? Is that what you would call it?

MR. PAUL: It isn't technically that, but it is in the nature of a brief.

H.M. JR: Is there anything here that you couldn't show on the Floor of the Congress?

MR. LUXFORD: I think they would be delighted to see it on the Floor of Congress.

H.M. JR: All right. Well, now, you haven't a good copy that I could read. I don't want to hold this up. All you have to do is rewrite that last page, isn't it?

MR. PAUL: That is right.

H.M. JR: Could you, Pehle, get hold of Oscar Cox, who isn't familiar with this? he said he would like to familiarize himself so he could bring it to the attention of the Under Secretary, Stettinius.

MR. PehLE: Are we free to give him copies of the documents? I don't see why not.

H.M. JR: I don't either.

MR. LUXFORD: Oscar Cox is familiar with the Tunisian program; you might tie it together for him.
H.M.JR: I did, and he said he didn't know about that. He said he was very helpful on the Tunisian.

MR. LUXFORD: He was.

H.M.JR: Who pulled him in on the Tunisian?

Mr. LUXFORD: We worked with Milton Handler, who is one of Cox' assistants.

H.M.JR: Whichever way you did it, do it again, will you?

MR. LUXFORD: Yes.

MRS. KLOTZ: He is British, isn't he?

MR. LUXFORD: Yes.

H.M.JR: Somebody walk this last thing in to Mrs. Klotz and I will sign it; and I will read this thing, myself.

Now, let me say something, while you people are here a minute. What I am thinking about is this: Would it be at all helpful, do you suppose any of this has gotten over to Winant, do you think he should have any of this?

MR. LUXFORD: Off the record?

H.M.JR: Can't do it off the record. I could do it in a letter.

MR. PEHLE: You sent a very strong cable to Winant. I don't think that would be helpful. I think the thing we haven't focused much on is that Thorold letter. That is a strong, shocking thing, to me. (Referring to letter to Mr. Pehle from G.F. Thorold, dated December 13, 1943, attached)

H.M.JR: Why?
Mr. Phle: Because it now indicates the British not only are going ahead very grudgingly on the economic warfare side, and specified twenty-five thousand dollars, which we never told them was to be the limit, but they are saying the Foreign Office has political objections. Now, what can they be?

Mr. Luxford: I can suggest some, Mr. Secretary. You are moving it just into Palestine and into North Africa, and that precipitates the Arab problem. The same argument you get on every turn.

Mr. Phle: In any event, to me it is crystal clear that any such argument is going to be made with their tongue in their cheek, and that is the real thing that we have got to fight.

I think we have gotten far enough with these letters, as far as stopping delays in the State Department, but this sort of approach will hit the thing head on.

Mr. DuBois: The same argument they used in North Africa.

H.M. Jr.: What I am thinking about is this: How much good would it do to see Halifax, because the time to see Halifax is before he gets these cables from the Foreign Office.

Mr. Luxford: I think it is important.

Mr. Phle: That is a possibility.

H.M. Jr.: Before he gets his orders.

Mrs. Kutzi: He has been pretty good.

Mr. Phle: Give Halifax the idea that this isn't an issue that should be dealt with by a letter from Thorold, who is down the line, over there, to me. This is an issue that is of the highest policy importance. I think it might make a lot of sense to see Halifax.
MR. LUXFORD: I think it is important, too, in this field, to keep in mind this isn't a choice of the British saying "no action" and our saying "action." The British by doing nothing, are condemning these people to death.

MR. PAUL: I don't know how many of them have died so far.

MR. LUXFORD: That is right. Inaction here is a positive action to that end.

MR. DuBOIS: The British say condemn them to death and we say they should get out.

MR. PAUL: I don't know how we can blame the Germans for killing them when we are doing this. The law calls them para-delicto, of equal guilt.

H.M.JR: Who should be there tomorrow if I get him? Are you people going to be available tomorrow afternoon?

MR. PAUL: I can be available any time. I was going to loaf around a day or so, but even if I am home--

H.M.JR: We will try to get him between four and five, Saturday. Could you and John come over?

MR. PAUL: Yes.

MR. PAUL: Yes.

H.M.JR: Well, I will let you know.

I would like Mr. Paul to stay; I want to hear a little bit about the tax bill.

Mr. PAUL: You don't want to go into the Argentine situation? The cables have been received from the five leading countries. Most of them are good. Brazil isn't quite as good as we hoped.

MR. PAUL: There isn't a point, Mr. Secretary--
H.M.JR: The next move is from Mr. Hull?

Mr. LUXFORD: I don't think he will do anything.

Mr. PAUL: We ought really to discuss that other monetary situation with him.

H.M.JR: I don't know whether they told you - the War Department is going to work on it.

Mr. PAUL: They just told me.

H.M.JR: I think we will let that wait - let that soften up over the week end.

Mr. PAUL: We don't want to be in the position later of saying we wouldn't discuss this.

Mr. PEHLE: Hull has asked Collado again. Are we free to discuss it with him?

H.M.JR: Sure.

Mr. PEHLE: Then we can come back and report and you can say you don't like it.

Mr. LUXFORD: That is all we want.

H.M.JR: All right.
By dear Mr. Secretary:

I thank you for your letter of December 6, 1943 concerning the delay which has occurred in bringing into effect plans developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from France and Rumania.

While we may still disagree regarding some of the points involved in this particular case, these matters I must agree are insignificant in terms of your willingness to review the whole matter and your assurances that it is the policy of your Department to deal expeditiously and sympathetically with proposals of this nature.

I would like to end here, but the confused state of the record in this particular case at this point makes further comment necessary. Your letter gave me the impression that you may have been led to believe that the Treasury had handled this matter in such a way that our Legation in Berne has not been in a position to issue a license. Specifically, your letter would indicate that a license has not been issued because:

(1) Treasury has not formulated a workable financial program for the evacuation of these refugees; and

(2) Treasury has not cleared the proposal with the British.

Accordingly, I have had the entire matter carefully reviewed by Randolph Paul, who acts for me on all matters relating to Foreign Funds Control.

I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Paul’s memorandum for your information. This memorandum has satisfied me that the conclusions reached in your letter of December 6, 1943 are
not supported by the facts in this case and that my letter of November 24, 1943, can be fully documented.

As you will note, Mr. Paul makes the following significant points in his memorandum:

(1) Treasury has formulated a workable program, under which, if an appropriate license had been issued when it was authorized by the Treasury, real progress might have been made in the financial arrangements involved. The objections of our Legation to the program are not sound, but even assuming they had some merit, the Legation's objections to the basic Treasury program were not furnished to us until two months after it had received the program, which is precisely the kind of delay to which we are referring.

(2) Treasury did not clear the program with the British because Treasury knew of no requirement that such a program be cleared with the British, and State failed to advise us that such clearance was required. On the contrary, State joined with Treasury in instructing our Legation to issue a license without British approval. And our Legation had over five months prior to that during which it could have mentioned the matter to the British, if it thought that this was essential.

Moreover, when State did finally indicate that we should obtain British clearance, State never advised us that State had discussed the matter with the British early last summer and that State had failed to keep the British advised of subsequent developments (despite the request of the British to State that they be kept informed of developments).

After you have again reviewed this matter I feel sure that you will understand why I was greatly concerned and am still greatly concerned about the delay which has occurred.
In view of the urgency of this matter, you will also appreciate the point which I made in my letter of November 24 that the benefits of a program such as this can be just as effectively lost through delay as through the failure to issue a license.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) Henry Morgenthau

Secretary of the Treasury.

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure.
TO: Secretary Morgenthau

FROM: Mr. Paul

You have requested me to review again the developments relating to the program of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from Rumania and France, particularly in the light of Secretary Hull's letter of December 6, 1943.

In Secretary Hull's letter of December 6 the State Department disclaims responsibility for the delays which have occurred in connection with bringing into effect the financial arrangements of this program. Instead his letter would indicate that Treasury is responsible for the delays because:

(1) Treasury has never formulated a workable proposal for financing such a program; and

(2) Treasury has never obtained British approval of the program.

After carefully reviewing again our file in this matter we feel that the conclusions arrived at by Secretary Hull are predicated upon his incomplete knowledge of the facts.

I. Treasury has formulated a workable proposal for financing the program.

(a) The analysis of the financial arrangements contained in Secretary Hull's letter, including the point which he makes to the effect that the fundamental details have not been sufficiently developed to permit the issuance of a license, is inaccurate.

It is true that in the cable of August 6, 1943 (1889), the Treasury merely stated that it was prepared to issue a license covering the plan, subject to certain stipulated conditions, and that at this point certain details had not been sufficiently worked out to warrant the issuance of a
license. (You will recall that this matter was expedited at this point by the exchange of correspondence between the President and Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress. In the letter you prepared for the President and cleared with Secretary Hull it was made clear to Wise that, although the Treasury was prepared to license the transaction, the matter was awaiting a further exchange of cables between the State Department and our mission in Berne regarding some of the details.)

However, as a result of the ensuing exchange of cables between State and Harrison (Harrison's cable of August 16--4989; State's cable of August 26-2077; Harrison's cable of August 23-5149; and State's cable of September 4,--2182) the necessary details had clearly been sufficiently ironed out so as to permit the issuance of an appropriate license. This was certainly the opinion of the Treasury and it seemed clear to us at that time that Harrison also felt that such was the case, inasmuch as he specifically inquired in a cable of September 9 (5598) whether a Treasury license had been issued, and suggested that if a license had been issued its number and date be transmitted by the World Jewish Congress to Riegner through the Legation and that specific instructions from the World Jewish Congress to Riegner, outlining operations which might be undertaken under the license also be transmitted. This action on Harrison's part appears utterly inconsistent with the contention in State's letter that the financial arrangements were not sufficiently complete to warrant the issuance of a license.

In this particular case, it was and still is our view that, at the time Treasury authorized Harrison to issue a license (cable of September 28--2373), sufficient safeguards had been imposed to prevent abuse, and sufficient powers authorized to permit real progress in the financial arrangements. From the standpoint of getting results, whatever time has elapsed since then has been time lost, and time which is precious in the light of the urgency of this matter.
It is well recognized by those dealing with licenses in this field that licenses may be issued notwithstanding the fact that all of the details of the transaction to be licensed are not known, so long as sufficient details are known to permit an intelligent appraisal of the major factors involved from the standpoint of workability and possibility of abuse. Licenses do not permit transactions in violation of their terms, and appropriate provisions can always be inserted to safeguard against abuse. Furthermore, licenses can always be amended if it develops that their conditions are unduly restrictive, or not sufficiently restrictive. The Treasury and our Legations have issued many licenses which have had to be amended from time to time.

In connection with the financial details, it should also be noted that the statement in Secretary Hull's letter, that the plan for the establishment of blocked accounts referred to in your letter has been abandoned, is not correct. It is correct that the Treasury did request in the cable sent to Harrison on August 26 (2077) that Riegner of the World Jewish Congress should be notified that if the plan should be imperiled by the requirement of a blocked account established in the United States, the Treasury would be willing to relax this requirement (by permitting the purchase of French francs from persons in Switzerland; and permitting the blocking of accounts in Switzerland). However, it should be noted that Riegner had indicated prior to this (see cable of August 23-6149-from Harrison) that it was worthwhile to attempt the financing of Jewish refugee evacuation from France to French North Africa and Spain pursuant to the arrangements and subject to the conditions originally outlined by the Treasury ($25,000 was suggested by Riegner as an initial deposit). It is our understanding that the procurement of local currencies against the establishment of blocked accounts in the United States will be one of the methods of financing used in this case. This method imposes no obligation to check the source of the local currencies (since the enemy can derive no benefit out of the blocked dollars here). Accordingly, there is no reason known to us why financing under this method could not have commenced when we authorized the issuance of a license on September 28. (It should be noted that the J.D.C. in connection with similar proposals which they are considering have indicated that the purchase of currency in enemy territory against blocked accounts will be one of the methods of financing employed).
(b) With respect to the feasibility of the Rumanian proposal, Secretary Hull's letter refers to a report from our Legation at Berne (cable of August 23--5149) that Riegner was not prepared to express an opinion on the feasibility of the plan until he had consulted with the Rumanian Jewish organization.

No reference is made in Secretary Hull's letter to the main point which seemed to have raised doubt in Riegner's mind and which was referred to in the August 23 cable, namely the question of the feasibility of evacuating children from Rumania unless they were first provided with adequate food and clothing. In answer to this point, we stated in the cable of September 4 (2182) that for the purposes of our proposal, expenditures for food and clothing necessary for preparing refugees for journey to free territory might be considered as expenses in connection with evacuation.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the fact that transactions authorized by a license may not be consummated is not a reason for not issuing the license. Treasury has issued hundreds of licenses authorizing transactions which have never been consummated. The prompt issuing of a license in a deserving case, even though the transactions cannot be immediately consummated, frequently prevents considerable delay (which is what the Treasury is trying to avoid in this case).

In any event the license which Treasury authorized Harrison to issue would have covered the evacuation of refugees from both France and Rumania. The fact that some details were still unsettled regarding the Rumanian phase certainly did not interfere with the functioning of the French phase of the program. The prompt issuance of the license in question at worst would have resulted only in the French program having been started before the Rumanian program was fully worked out. No one would consciously claim that technicalities relating to the Rumanian phase of the program should have held up the issuance of the license, if the failure to issue the license might result in condemning to death more refugees in France.
(c) With respect to the objections which have been raised by Harrison, any impression that the Treasury had authorized the issuance of a license in the cable of September 28, knowing that Harrison was opposed to its issuance, is not correct.

It is true that in his cable of June 14 (3657), Harrison had indicated that the Riegnier plan offered many possibilities of abuse and might even facilitate transfer of enemy funds. However, these objections were raised prior to the presentation to Harrison, in the cable of August 6, of the definitive program approved by the Treasury. The cable of May 25 (1249), to which Harrison was replying, merely set forth, as expressed therein, State Department's "interpretation of the proposed financial arrangements" and requested further information.

After the presentation of the Treasury program in the cable of August 6, which was drawn in the light of the objections raised by Harrison, no comments were received from Harrison, so far as this Department is aware, to the effect that this program, or its modifications, was unworkable or objectionable until we received his cable of October 6 (6269). This was two months after we had presented the basic program to him, requesting his comments and suggestions as well as the comments and suggestions of Riegnier, (see cable of August 6) as well as being after he had inquired in his cable of September 9 whether a Treasury license had been issued and we had authorized him to issue a license in the cable of September 28. During this two months period, although the aforementioned cables had been exchanged with Harrison, in which he referred to a number of points raised by Riegnier and in which we felt we had given satisfactory answers, no points were raised by way of criticism or suggestion by Harrison himself.

It is precisely delays of this character at which our letter of November 24, 1943 was addressed since if Harrison's objections had been forthcoming more promptly, much time might have been saved. When we finally received the objections in his cable of October 6, we reviewed the points involved (which had all been carefully considered before we
authorized the issuance of a license) and, after consulting with the State Department (Breckinridge Long), instructed Harrison to issue the license.

(d) In his cable of October 6, Harrison raised the objection that the relief plan might facilitate enemy acquisition of funds and flight of enemy capital, and indicated that the British Commercial Secretary thought the plan might result in leakage of funds to the enemy.

The Treasury has been and still is of the view that sufficient safeguards have been imposed (see above-mentioned cables) so that the enemy will not benefit from the financial transactions. And in Secretary Hull's letter to you of August 7, after stating that the Treasury itself was entirely free to act on the matter and grant the necessary licenses, Secretary Hull stated:

"Any view that this would make funds available to the enemy is not correct; the funds would remain blocked in Switzerland until the end of the war."

That this form of objection at such late date was coming from Harrison and the British is not less than surprising in view of the fact that this consideration has not been regarded as controlling in the past by our Legation or the British Legation in Berne. Thus, in the outstanding case, with which you are no doubt familiar, involving the purchase of substantial amounts of material in enemy territory by Standard Telephone and Radio S.A., Zurich (and also the manufacture by such company of radio transmitters for installation in trucks and use by the German war machine) both our Legation and the British Legation recommended that favorable consideration be given to the issuance of a license in the light of other factors which were deemed by them to be compelling. With respect to the financial aspects of this transaction (aside from the question of the manufacture of radio equipment actually destined for German use) our Legation argued that
in view of the generous credit supplied by the Swiss to the
Germans "transactions of this type cannot be regarded as
actually increasing the enemy's purchasing power in
Switzerland which is already believed to be a maximum"
(cable from Berne of May 1, 1942-2429). The British also
took this position, at least at one time. Thus in a cable
from our Embassy in London relating to this case (September 28,
1942-5394), after pointing out that undeniably the amount of
Swiss francs available to the enemy would be increased, it
is stated that

"However, the British believe that enemy holdings
of Swiss francs are already so large that they cannot
possibly be used in the near future for the purchase
of Swiss goods for export to Germany."

In fact our Legation with the concurrence of the British
Legation, allowed Standard to engage in these transactions,
with the Legation's knowledge, up until late July of this
year, (and would undoubtedly have continued to permit these
transactions except for strong cable of July 17--4344--giving
the views of State, Treasury and OEW), even though a license
had never been issued by the Treasury (see cable from Berne
of August 12--8704; cable from London of April 19--2724; and
cable from Berne of April 20--2472). The principle thus
announced in the Standard case, namely that supplying the
Germans with Swiss francs does not benefit the Germans, has
been repeated by our Legation in Berne in expressing its
desire that particular transactions be approved.

We are not citing the Standard case in this memorandum
to prove that Harrison was not justified, in view of the
"secret" facts alleged to have been involved, in allowing
equipment to be manufactured by Standard for the Germans
(our battle on this issue is not relevant here); but merely
to show the attitude which Harrison adopted with respect to
the question of permitting the Germans to acquire purchasing
power in Switzerland.
(e) The other objections raised by Harrison on October 6, 1943, was the impossibility of the Legation assuring the fulfillment of the conditions of the proposed license, principally those relating to the procurement of French francs as not to aid the enemy.

It is difficult to understand why the Legation feels that it is unable to check the sellers of French francs in Switzerland to ascertain whether or not the francs, being purchased from them, had accrued under such conditions that their purchase would not give the enemy benefit. The Treasury has repeatedly been called upon to make this sort of a determination in connection with applications for the sale and purchase of blocked currencies and the Treasury has frequently not been in a position to obtain as much information as the Legation in Berne should be able to obtain in Switzerland with respect to holders of French francs in Switzerland. There are a great many persons in Switzerland holding French francs which they either acquired prior to the fall of France or which are now accruing to them through investments or dividends in France or through similar transactions.

Furthermore, if the principle which was followed by the Legation in the above-mentioned case involving the furnishing of funds to Germany by Standard is sound, the question of the source of the French francs which are purchased would be immaterial. Whatever their source, their purchase under that principle would not give benefit to the enemy. The Treasury, however, has never agreed with the principle of the Standard case and accordingly in this case made the requirement that the source of the French francs should be checked.

Accordingly it seems clear that Harrison was furnished with a positive financial program approved by the Treasury after consultation with State and after having fully weighed Harrison's belated objections. In any event Harrison's delay in voicing his doubts was itself one of the principal reasons Treasury had difficulty in formulating a program which would meet with his approval.
II. It is no answer to Treasury's letter of November 24, 1943 to say that Treasury never obtained British approval of the program.

In the first place, after focusing on the issue, the State Department concurred in the sending of the cable of October 26, 1943 to Harrison instructing Berne to issue the license without the approval of the British.

In the second place, one of the principal objections raised by Treasury in the letter of November 24, 1943 was not the fact that it was unnecessary to clear the matter with the British (although Treasury knows of no instructions which it has approved which requires any mission in any foreign country to clear with the British after Treasury has exercised its licensing authority in a specific case), but the fact of the remendous delays that occurred before Harrison (and apparently State) finally decided that the matter required British clearance. Although Harrison in his cable of June 14, 1943 (3657) raised the matter of discussions with the British, it was not until we had authorized him to issue a license about three and one-half months later (cable of September 23) that he definitely decided that the matter should be discussed with the British; and, of more importance, to our knowledge it was not until then that he even mentioned the matter to the British (although he knew about it since April). Furthermore, if Treasury had been authoritatively and promptly advised by State that clearance was required, Treasury would have sought such clearance contemporaneously with three months negotiation with Berne. It was these delays that we criticized.

Finally, even when it became clear in November, 1943 that State did expect Treasury to clear the program with the British, we were not even informed that early last summer State had discussed the matter with the British Embassy in Washington; that the cable to Berne asking for further details of the program was furnished to the British representative; that he had requested State for copies of the incoming cables from Berne; and that he had written a letter to State asking...
for details; and that he had never received a reply to this letter. (These facts were made known to the Treasury during our recent discussions with the British Embassy, growing out of the fact that Harrison had raised the matter with the British in Berne). Certainly as a minimum Treasury should have been notified of such discussions at the time State indicated that Treasury should assume the responsibility of clearing the case with the British and ordinarily we would have expected to have been kept currently informed as to the fact of negotiations of this character. In any event, if State had decided in early summer to clear the matter with the British it would have facilitated our handling of the whole case to have been so informed at that time—rather than months later.

Although it is difficult to understand why the significant facts mentioned above were not included in Secretary Hull's letter, the explanation may well be the fact that two of the men in the State Department, with whom my men dealt on this matter from the beginning, and who my men tell me "were carrying the ball" on this matter in the State Department for some time, are no longer with the State Department. The difficulties involved in having a matter reviewed by men who have not played a leading role in all of its developments since the beginning are apparent.

initialed R.E.P.

J&D; AFL:nrd 12/14/43
Secretary of State

Washington
US URGENT
8717, Fifteenth

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Reference your 7506, November 27 for Winant

M EW has addressed following letter to Embassy dated December 15 respecting plan for evacuation of Jews from France and Rumania: "We have now received the views of the Foreign Office on the proposal of the United States Treasury to license the remittance to Switzerland of $25,000 as a preliminary installment to be expended on the rescue of Jews from France and Rumania. The Foreign Office are concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy occupied territory. Certain schemes with a similar object in which both the Foreign Office and the State Department are interested are greatly hampered by the difficulties of transportation, particularly shipping, and of finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East for any but a very small number of Jewish refugees."
refugees. They foresee that it is likely to prove almost, if not quite, impossible to deal with anything like the number of 70,000 refugees whose rescue is envisaged by the Riegner plan. For this reason they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements. We understand that they are telegraphing to this effect to Washington, asking them to place these considerations before the State Department.

"As a result of this expression of views by the Foreign Office, we have telegraphed to Washington stating the terms on which we should have been prepared to agree to the license proposed, i.e., (A) for the time being the currency to be procured only by purchase from unobjectionable Swiss owners of French francs or Rumanian lei acquired in an unobjectionable manner, (B) both Legations in Bern to be responsible for checking the Swiss owners and the origin of the currency they proposed to sell, (C) no further transfer to be licensed until a report is received which should include information as to the amounts procurable on these terms and as to the general progress of the scheme. But we have added that the Foreign Office see grave objections in general and are telegraphing separately about these."

PLEASE INFORM TREASURY

WINANT
I know you will be interested in the attached letter which we have just received from the British Embassy concerning the World Jewish Congress program for the evacuation of refugees from Romania and France.

Attachment
Dear Mr. Pehle,

We have now received a reply from London to the telegram which we sent to them following our recent discussion on the subject of your proposals for the evacuation of Jews from Roumania and France.

This matter has evidently received very full and careful consideration in London. The Ministry of Economic Warfare inform us that, from the purely financial angle, they would have been prepared to agree to the proposed licence for the transfer of $25,000 on certain conditions which they would regard as necessary in view of the grave objections which they see in general to obtaining cash from residents in occupied territories against blocked credits in dollars or Swiss francs. They think it would be very difficult indeed to devise safeguards against Nazi agents and other objectionable persons using this scheme to their own advantage. However, I do not propose at this stage to set out in detail the conditions which they suggest, since they inform us that the Foreign Office sees grave disadvantages in general to the scheme and are telegraphing separately on the matter.

I expect very shortly to be in a position to put the views of the Foreign Office before you, but I am sending you this letter in the meanwhile since I know how urgently you wish to deal with this matter and I wanted to let you know that there appear to be certain political disadvantages involved.

Yours sincerely,

(s) G. F. Thorold

G. F. Thorold

Mr. J. Pehle,
U. S. Treasury Department,
Foreign Funds Control,
Washington, D. C.
December 17, 1943
11:05 a.m.

Operator: Go ahead.
HMJr: Hello.
Miss Randall Sec'y to Lord Halifax: Yes.
HMJr: Mr. Morgenthau speaking.
R: Yes, Mr. Morgenthau.
HMJr: I'm sorry -- uh -- how long do you think Lord Halifax will be layed up?
R: Well, he only retired to bed last night.
HMJr: Oh.
R: He had a very heavy cold yesterday afternoon and he's put off -- he was supposed to go to Philadelphia today.
HMJr: Yeah.
R: Well, he's cancelled that and retired to bed. I think he's staying in bed all day today, but he hopes it won't turn into influenza. He says he's got no temperature.
HMJr: Oh.
R: He thinks it's just a very heavy cold and I think he hopes to be up again in a day or two -- a couple of days.
HMJr: Well, would you tell him that when he is ready....
R: Yes.
HMJr: ....that I would like very much to see him....
R: Yes.
HMJr: ....about a matter that your Mr. G. F. Thorold.
R: Yes.
HMJr: T-h-o-r-o-l-d.
R: Yes.
HMJr: Wrote me on December 13th.
R: Yes.
HMJr: Wrote to Pehle -- Mr. Pehle in the Treasury -- P-e-h-l-e.
R: Yes.
HMJr: So, whenever Lord Halifax is ready, I'd like to talk to him about it.
R: Thank you very much. And you'd like for him to come down and have a word with you about it?
HMJr: He can come here or he can come to my house, whichever is more convenient.
R: Yes. Thank you. I'll give Lord Halifax your message and he'll telephone you as soon as -- I think he ought to be up again by Saturday or Sunday.
HMJr: And I'll be home over the weekend if he wanted to do it then.
R: Yes. Thank you very much.
HMJr: Good bye.
December 18, 1948
12:00 m.

JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. DuBois
Mr. Luxford
Mr. Pehle
Mrs. Klotz

H.M.JR: Now, the reason of calling you people in is this cable which, I take it, you have all read. (Referring to cable to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, dated December 15, copy attached.)

MR. PAUL: We were smart to anticipate that.

H.M.JR: Not to deprecate you, but don't be too smart.

MR. PAUL: I was trying to make a modest statement of how bright we are.

H.M.JR: I think it is an over-statement. (Laughter) Anyway, it is kind of a sad cable. I want to read it again: "(A) for the time being the currency to be procured only by purchase from unobjectionable Swiss owners of French francs or Rumanian lei acquired in an unobjectionable manner."

MR. PEHLE: Consistent with our plan.

H.M.JR: This is the English Foreign Office view.

MR. PEHLE: Minister of Economic Warfare on this part of it.

MR. LUXFORD: The Foreign Office is still objecting, but they are saying the conditions under which MEW would have been willing. They are not willing to do anything now.
MR. DuBOIS: They might have been willing to do this, but now they are not willing to do anything.

H.M.JR: MEW was willing to have gone along on this basis, but now--

MR. PEHLE: The Foreign Office say they don't want it - "...they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements."

MR. DuBOIS: Amazing cable.

MR. PAUL: "...grave objections in general."

The second paragraph proves we are right on our technical ground.

H.M.JR: What is that?

MR. PAUL: The second paragraph proves - the conditions in the second paragraph are substantially the conditions that we have previously suggested. They are saying that is all right, but the Foreign Office sees grave objections in general - on general grounds - so we are away from all this smoke screen, now; we are into the real issue.

MR. PEHLE: In other words, the program Harrison said was unworkable, is to all intents and purposes the program MEW accepted.

H.M.JR: Now, can you people put down on two pages for me, so I could have it by noon tomorrow, what we propose to do - what State's objection is, if you know what their objections are - and then I don't see any easier way than attaching this cable, because I am seeing the President tomorrow at lunch, and after lunch I might have a chance to bring it up, although I have the Chinese thing which he asked me for, which will take precedent. I am quite sure I can work this in.
What I want to say tomorrow is - I want a letter - "My dear Mr. President: I am recommending that we go ahead on the following basis." And down at the bottom "Approved: Franklin D. Roosevelt."

MR. PEHLE: I think we ought to do some real thinking at this point, Mr. Secretary. As I understand it, the financial thing is out of the way, really, and the British are saying, in effect, that they don't propose to take any Jews out of these areas. That is what they say in the first paragraph. They say seventy thousand - they couldn't - therefore they are not going to go ahead on anything.

Now, that is the general, broad, enormous issue that has been, to some extent, flushed out.

MR. LUXFORD: Foreign policy.

MR. PAUL: Issue of foreign policy, over which, unfortunately, the State Department has jurisdiction.

MR. DuBOIS: Their position is, "What could we do with them if we got them out?" Amazing, most amazing position.

H.M.JR: Somebody said they thought that was what was the matter. Was that your hunch?

MR. PAUL: Luxford said that.

MR. LUXFORD: That is a stock reply when you hit the Jewish problem.

MR. DuBOIS: A little background on that - when we had the conference in August with this man Reams, of the State Department, and Meitzer - at that time they raised the same point. Here is what they said, they pointed out that under the provisions of the British White Paper only about thirty thousand Jews can be admitted to Palestine. They said they did not know of any other areas
to which the remaining Jews could be evacuated, since the Turkish Government has refused entry to Jewish refugees, and so far as North Africa is concerned, the military authorities have, for military reasons, been unwilling to permit their entry into Africa.

As a matter of fact, it was indicated that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have decided that refugees could not be admitted even in Dakar, for military reasons, but they believed that the President was about to overrule this decision.

Now, even at that point, they raised with us the problem of what we are going to do with them.

H.M.JR: Then why don't I ask to see Mr. Hull about this thing Monday?

MR. DuBOIS: Mr. Secretary, the only question we have in our mind, I think, is the bull has to be taken by the horns in dealing with this Jewish issue, and get this thing out of the State Department into some agency's hands that is willing to deal with it frontally.

For instance, take the complaint, "What are we going to do with the Jews?" - we let them die because we don't know what to do with them.

MR. PAUL: We are speaking as citizens, now.

MR. PEHLE: It seems to me the only way to get anything done is for the President to appoint a commission or committee consisting of sympathetic people of some importance.

H.M.JR: But I still think I have got to go to Mr. Hull.

MR. PEHLE: That may be, but I think--

H.M.JR: Wait a minute, excuse me. I have got to be in a position to say to the President, "Well, I have satisfied myself that Mr. Hull won't go along." I can't say that now. I don't know that Mr. Hull might not go along.
MR. PEHLE: That may be, as a matter of tactics. You want to say to Mr. Hull, "The financial thing has been disposed of."

MR. PAUL: We wanted to make it clear that in going to Mr. Hull you are going to him not as Secretary of the Treasury, exactly, but in an individual capacity, because now the issue is not something about licenses any more.

MR. PEHLE: The financial thing has been disposed of.

MR. PAUL: It is a broad international political issue.

MR. PEHLE: That is a gain, in a sense - a minor one. But it is a gain to say the financial thing has been taken care of. The real issue must now be faced.

H.M.JR: If that is the issue, I still think - I mean, if I talked to the President about it tomorrow he would say, "What does Cordell Hull say?" If he called him on the phone he would say, "I am just in the process of answering Henry." So I think the thing to do is to ask to see Hull. I might better go and see him alone.

MR. PEHLE: I think that is correct.

H.M.JR: What do you think? I will take one person, maybe.

MR. PAUL: Here is what I think, if you don't mind my saying it. I think that in your position you ought to have somebody with you who can't possibly be accused of any undue sympathy. Take John Pehle with you.

MR. PEHLE: Or Paul. I would be delighted to go.

H.M.JR: Look, gentlemen, let's be entirely frank; I can't one minute be Secretary of the Treasury and another minute be a private citizen, see?

MR. PEHLE: I think you can.
MRS. KLOTZ: Yes, you can.

H.M.JR: You don't know what I am going to say. And I am not going to say to Hull, "I am coming as a private citizen." I can press this thing as Secretary of the Treasury as a question of treating minority races.

MR. PAUL: All right, then you are speaking as a member of the Cabinet.

MR. LUXFORD: I think you should take that position if you are willing to. You have a real voice.

MR. PAUL: Not on a narrow front of licenses.

H.M.JR: I want to go as Secretary of the Treasury. Just because I am a Jew, why shouldn't I look after the Jews, or the Catholics, or the Armenians?

MRS. KLOTZ: You got into this thing on a Treasury basis - on a financial basis. It has led into this thing, you see.

H.M.JR: Somebody said as a private citizen. I don't want to go - I can't be a private citizen.

MR. LUXFORD: I think we are all delighted you are taking that position.

MR. PAUL: We don't differ on that. I said as a private citizen contrasted with the technical Treasury position. You are talking on a broad humanitarian basis - talking as a Cabinet member.

MR. PEHLE: I think that is the term.

MRS. KLOTZ: It is tragic.

MR. LUXFORD: They are not facing up. The issue is very simple for Hull. That is, you can find a million reasons why you can't get them out of Europe, but if somebody put their mind to getting them out, you can then spend the next ten years on what you are going to do with them.
MR. PAUL: Say to the French, "You take them down there."

MR. PEHLE: It has got to be done by somebody who is free to act. But I think you are entirely right that before you go to the President you ought to have Hull's reaction to this cable.

H.M.JR: I was told last night that the State Department and the Foreign Office are very sensitive to criticism on this Jewish business.

MR. LUXFORD: The shoe fits--

H.M.JR: So, unless you people disagree, I think the thing to do is to exhaust Hull first.

MR. PAUL: I think you ought to.

MR. DuBOIS: Because you notice in this very cable they are saying--

H.M.JR: I would like to say to Mr. Hull, "After all, if you were a member of the Cabinet in Germany today, you would be, most likely, in a prison camp, and your wife would be God knows where," because Mrs. Hull is a Jewess, you know. Did you people know that?

MR. LUXFORD: Yes, sir.

H.M.JR: Her name was Wirtz. And if he was in Germany today, he couldn't hold the position he has, because he is married to a Jewess, even though she changed her name to Whitney. Did you people all know that? (General agreement)

MR. PAUL: I didn't know she changed her name.

H.M.JR: From Wirtz to Whitney. If I was going from Wirtz, I would have picked up better than Whitney!

MRS. KLOTZ: Now you are being very funny. (Laughter)
H.M.JR: It is too much the same. Well, anyway, I think I will call up his office and find out. Where is my calendar? Here it is.

(The Secretary placed a call to Secretary Hull or one of his secretaries.)

H.M.JR: I wonder if it would do any good to take Judge Rosenman along?

MRS. KLOTZ: I think so.

Mr. PAUL: Well, I don't know. I have been told that he is generally "hands off" on this sort of question.

MR. LUXTORF: How about the Governor?

MR. PAUL: Lehman might.

H.M.JR: If I am going as Secretary of the Treasury I don't think we want to make a Jewish delegation out of this. I think we will just go as the Treasury. This is Treasury business. We are interested in this.

MRS. KLOTZ: Mr. Morgenthau, nobody would do - none of these people you mentioned, when they are put on the spot, will do what you will do.

H.M.JR: I think Lehman might.

MR. LUXFORD: I would have more confidence in him.

H.M.JR: But I don't want to take a delegation.

MR. PAUL: I think that is right.

H.M.JR: I just saw Rosenman's name for lunch. That is what made me think of it.

Now, I wonder if you fellows couldn't brief this thing. Think about it, will you?

(The Secretary holds a telephone conversation with Mr. Brown, Secretary Hull's secretary.)
MR. PAUL: We have been talking about it for nearly an hour. We can brief it up.

H.M. JR: So we can give Hull a brief. This brings the whole thing to a head. In fairness to Hull, I want to give him a chance, and then if he turns me down I will say, "Well, Cordell, I am going to tell you now I want to see the President with you on this matter."

MR. LUXFORD: It is awfully hard to simplify the measure more than the British have simplified it for us.

MR. PEHLE: We can write up a little memorandum.

H.M. JR: This is awfully good.

MR. LUXFORD: That is what I say. That is the best brief we have.

MR. DuBOIS: They say they won't let them come out, because if they let a few come out they might get more and wouldn't know what to do with them; therefore they won't let any come out.

MRS. KLOTZ: Tragic!

MR. DuBOIS: It just speaks for itself—contradicts itself.

H.M. JR: Have any of you people heard, Lehman told me last night that Breckinridge Long told him a lot of Jews were transferred from Rumania up to Hungary, and then over the protest of, he thought, State, they transferred them back from Hungary to Rumania?

MR. PEHLE: No, but I have heard, Mr. Secretary, that they have been bringing some Jews in successfully from Trans-Nistria.

H.M. JR: He said the country next to Rumania.
MR. PEHLE: That is in German-occupied Russia, that they have brought some of those into Rumania where they are relatively more safe.

H.M.JR: At the insistence of the State Department?

MR. PEHLE: No.

H.M.JR: Long was claiming that he had talked on that front.

MR. PEHLE: He takes that position all the time. When the World Jewish Congress and the J.D.C. came in to see them they got the impression that Long was with them. It is clear to me that he is not.

H.M.JR: All right.

MR. PAUL: Too clear!

H.M.JR: All right. Well, I will ask you all to be here sharp at nine Monday morning, will you please, so we can review this thing again. If, Paul, over the weekend you have any ideas on it, would you call me on the phone?

MR. PAUL: Sure.

MRS. KLOTZ: Are you going to see the Ambassador Sunday?

H.M.JR: It is my understanding with his secretary that as soon as he is well he will call me.

MRS. KLOTZ: If you do, you want to talk about this?

H.M.JR: Oh, yes.

MRS. KLOTZ: Do you want this material for Sunday?

H.M.JR: This is enough (referring to copy of cable).
MR. PAUL: You can call me; I will be home.

I have one other little matter.

H.M.JR: It doesn't affect these people?

MR. PAUL: No.

H.M.JR: Again, I can't say how much I appreciate your sympathetic interest in these things.

MR. LUXFORD: We appreciate yours, too, Mr. Secretary.

MR. PAUL: Sympathetic! God!

MR. LUXFORD: It is our gain that you feel that way.

H.M.JR: Anyway, there is nothing more tragic.

(Mr. Pehle, Mr. DuBois, and Mr. Luxford left the conference.)

MR. PAUL: This is a matter Sammy Klaus brought up yesterday afternoon, Wenchel--

He has run onto a situation; he has been pretty diligent about it. It involves contributions through the Steuben Society by - we don't know, we are not sure whom, but we think some lawyers representing Weir in Pittsburgh.

They are political contributions and they have not been reported under the Corrupt Practices Act. It is not a Treasury matter, but it has a lot of political implications at this time.

The difficulty is that the thing hasn't been discovered until now and the Statute of Limitations runs out December 31. There isn't much time left to act. There is a Grand Jury in session now under John, to which John Rogge is presenting some issues. That is set up to do something.
Wenchel was concerned about it from this standpoint. It is kind of late. We don't want to be in the position of having Justice say we reported to them so late they couldn't do anything. We have just run across it accidentally.

Wenchel says that if we give it to Berge nothing will be done about it because he is too slow. Because of Berge's slowness, they will say the Treasury didn't report it in time.

I was wondering whether it was a matter you thought - now, if I go to Biddle I am afraid he will brush me off to Berge.

H. M. JR: If you prefer a letter, I will transfer it to Biddle and tell him it is coming, that I would like him to give it his personal attention.

MR. PAUL: Then I could go to see Biddle Monday. But I want some excuse for going above Berge to Biddle.

H. M. JR: If you have a letter for me here when I see you Monday morning I will sign it and call him up on the phone. I will say that I have a letter that is so important that I would like you to deliver it in person.

MR. PAUL: That will be fine. He ought to see it, too - a bunch of Republicans.

H. M. JR: I will make an appointment for you Monday afternoon. How is that?

MR. PAUL: All right. Sammy might go with me.

H. M. JR: That is up to you.

MR. PAUL: He has a report on this thing.

H. M. JR: Sammy must be very happy!
MR. PAUL: He says it is the juiciest one he has had for a long time.

H.M.JR: This is what - a tax practice?

MR. PAUL: No, corrupt practice case. We ran across it in the tax investigation. We ran across it because we were questioning the exemptions of this Steuben Society.

MRS. KLOTZ: S-t-e-u-b-e-n.

MR. PAUL: I used to know German pretty well.
Secretary of State

Washington
US URGENT
8717, Fifteenth

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Reference your 7506, November 27 for Winant

MEW has addressed following letter to Embassy dated December 15 respecting plan for evacuation of Jews from France and Rumania: "We have now received the views of the Foreign Office on the proposal of the United States Treasury to license the remittance to Switzerland of $25,000 as a preliminary installment to be expended on the rescue of Jews from France and Rumania. The Foreign Office are concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy occupied territory. Certain schemes with a similar object in which both the Foreign Office and the State Department are interested are greatly hampered by the difficulties of transportation, particularly shipping, and of finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East for any but a very small number of Jewish refugees."
refugees. They foresee that it is likely to prove almost, if not quite, impossible to deal with anything like the number of 70,000 refugees whose rescue is envisaged by the Riegner plan. For this reason they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements. We understand that they are telegraphing to this effect to Washington, asking them to place these considerations before the State Department.

"As a result of this expression of views by the Foreign Office, we have telegraphed to Washington stating the terms on which we should have been prepared to agree to the license proposed, i.e., (A) for the time being the currency to be procured only by purchase from unobjectionable Swiss owners of French francs or Rumanian lei acquired in an unobjectionable manner, (B) both Legations in Bern to be responsible for checking the Swiss owners and the origin of the currency they proposed to sell, (C) no further transfer to be licensed until a report is received which should include information as to the amounts procurable on these terms and as to the general progress of the scheme. But we have added that the Foreign Office see grave objections in general and are telegraphing separately about these."

PLEASE INFORM TREASURY

WINANT
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington.
TO: Embassy, London
DATED: December 15
NO.: 7969

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to your telegram December 15, no. 5717.

Your telegram under reference has been read with astonishment by the Department and it is unable to agree with the point of view set forth. Very shortly the Department will communicate with you as to the differential between this situation and others which may be related to preventing the enemy from obtaining the foreign exchange. It is desired by the Department to inform you immediately of the fact that the philosophy set forth in their telegram is incompatible with the policy of the United States Government and of previously expressed British policy as it has been understood by us.

HULL

cc: copy 12-37-43
This memo not to be shown to Oscar Cox.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Since the first cable which the Treasury has in its files relating to information received from Minister Harrison in Bern concerning the plight of the Jews in Europe (cable of April 20, No. 2460) referred to a previous cable from the State Department of February 10 (354), we requested the State Department for a copy of cable 354. We were advised that this cable did not relate to any matters that concerned the Treasury; that it had been seen by only a few people in the State Department; and that it could not be furnished to the Treasury. Thereafter I called Donald Hiss, State Department, (over a week ago) and requested that, if possible, he get me a copy of this cable. Several days later I again called Donald Hiss, at his home, and he advised me that he was having considerable difficulty getting a copy of this cable and the cable to which it referred and that he would let me know as soon as he was able to get copies. Today I received a call from Donald Hiss's office requesting that, if possible, I be in his office at 2:30 inasmuch as he had something to speak to me about.

When I saw Hiss this afternoon he gave me the signed copies of cable 354 and a previous cable to which 354 referred, a cable of January 21, 482. In showing me these cables Hiss stated that it had been made clear to him that cable 354 was none of Treasury's business and that in no event should it be shown to Treasury. He added that if it were known that he had shown me this cable he might well lose his job. (At this point he also mentioned that he was confident that his telephone was tapped and that others listened in on conversations which he had with Treasury officials.)

The first cable which he showed me, dated January 21 (482), relayed a message which Harrison requested be furnished to Rabbi Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress. This message described a horrible situation concerning the plight of Jews, particularly in Poland and Rumania. It reported the following significant facts: That 6,000 Jews were being killed in one place in Poland daily; that before being killed, they were stripped of their clothing which was sent to Germany; that many Jews in Poland
were being deported; that many Jews in Poland were committing suicide; that ration cards were being withdrawn from the Jewish population, etc.; that in Rumania 130,000 Rumanian Jews were being deported to Transnistria; that about 60,000 of these Jews had already died and that the remaining 70,000 were starving to death; that living conditions of Jews in Rumania were indescribable; that they were being deprived of all of their possessions and had no money, no clothing, no foodstuffs, etc.; that illnesses were widespread - particularly fever, etc. (There was a pencilled notation on this cable to the effect that a letter had been sent to Rabbi Wise. According to our records the Treasury has never received a copy of the cable.)

The cable of February 10, 1943, (354) was sent in direct response to the above mentioned cable of January 21 and read as follows:

"Your 462, January 21.
It is suggested that in the future reports submitted to you for transmission to private persons in the United States should not be accepted unless extraordinary circumstances make such action advisable. It is felt that by sending such private messages which circumvent neutral countries' censorship we risk the possibility that neutral countries might find it necessary to take steps to curtail or abolish our official secret means of communication."

This cable was signed "For Hull by S.W. (Summer Welles)" and had the initials of Jimmie Dunn and Ray Atherton and two men in the European Division, Durbrow and Hickerson.

It should be noted that the instructions contained in cable 354 would undoubtedly still be outstanding were it not for the fact that Harrison stated in his cable of April 20 (2460) that: "***While I have not transmitted R's messages as such in compliance with the terms of your 354, February 10, I have at the same time felt that information which he is able to furnish and which appears to be reasonably authentic should be in your hands. ***May I suggest that messages of this character should not (repeat not) be subjected to the restriction imposed by your 354, February 10, and that I be permitted to transmit messages from R more particularly in view of the helpful information which they may frequently contain?"

J. E. DuBois
January 18, 1943

Conference with Consul General Wiley

Re Jewish Refugees.

I conferred with Consul General Wiley today with respect to the telegram from the Treasury relating to the remittance of 2,000,000 francs by the J.D.C. for the initial expenses of the release of 1,500 refugees.

He stated that it was not true that the refugees would be released upon the receipt of the "initial expenses" of their release; that a Joint Commission had been established to deal with the whole problem of the release of prisoners, including the Jewish refugees referred to, "Red" Spanish refugees, Polish refugees, Belgian refugees, Czech refugees, Russians, etc.; that this Commission was composed of the British Consul General, American Consul General, one representative of each, a psychologist, warfare representative and Dr. Strode (loaned by Rockefeller Foundation to Red Cross); that the whole problem was a very difficult one and had to be carefully studied; that in general the prisoners would only be released after it was decided what should be done with the groups involved (as groups); that plans would have to be made for taking care of the refugees after they had been released before their release; that Elie Gozlan referred to in Treasury cable was a Frenchman (Jewish) heading up the organization referred to; that Gozlan had misunderstood the arrangements contemplated; that he did not believe that Gozlan was fully trustworthy; that Schwartz, European head of the J.D.C., had been requested to come to Algiers and was expected soon; that it would be better to deal with Schwartz rather than with Gozlan.

When I asked Wiley how long he thought it would take before the refugees would be released he replied three or four months; that a considerable study of the problems involved would have to be made.

I expressed to Mr. Wiley my failure to understand why it was taking so long to solve a problem which it seemed so important to solve as rapidly as possible; that he knew probably better than I the great amount of criticism which had been leveled at our position in this matter; that this type of criticism tended to hurt the war effort; and that it would seem to me that it would
pay solely from the standpoint of the war effort for the Allies to spend a certain amount of time, effort and money to solve the problem without delay. Wiley agreed that considerable criticism had been leveled and that the problem should be solved as soon as possible but claimed the solution was difficult and would take time.

I questioned him about the possibility of having the Army hire these refugees as they were hiring the Arabs. Wiley stated that the possibility of placing them in labor battalions had been discussed but the British had finally turned it down. I explained that I was not speaking of regimentation but of voluntary employment. Wiley indicated that there should not be such concern over regimentation; that Americans were being conscripted every day. I explained why I thought the democratic method of selective service was different from telling a group of prisoners that their "choice" was to remain in prison or go in the Army. Wiley then stated that the voluntary employment of the refugees differed from the employment of Arabs in that if the Army no longer needed the Arabs they could go back to their former way of life; and that there was also the problem of finding a place for the refugees to live. I voiced the view that it would be worth the effort and expense to hire the refugees even if they did not put in a full day's work "earning their money" and to supply them with living quarters; that even if they slept in pup tents they would probably enjoy life more and from our selfish point of view we would at least avoid the harmful criticism.

Wiley stated that there had been so much criticism of things done that "they" (he and others) were becoming "hard skinned" about it and that "the only guide was whether or not their conscience was clear about this and similar matters." I expressed the view that the test should not be one's conscience in issues such as this but what was best in the interests of the war effort.

J. E. DuBois, Jr.
U. S. Treasury Department.
December 19, 1943
5:30 p.m.

JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mrs. Morgenthau
        Mr. Paul
        Mr. Luxford
        Mr. Pehle
        Mr. Cox
        Mr. DuBois

H.M.JR: Gentlemen, this is some memorandum!
(Referring to memorandum to Secretary Hull, attached)

MR. PAUL: I suggested strengthening it, but--

H.M.JR: Where?

MR. LUXFORD: He has a good point.

H.M.JR: What is the point, then?

Shall we take it paragraph by paragraph?

MR. PAUL: Yes.

H.M.JR: (Reading) "You will recall that on November 27 we appealed to Ambassador Winant for his assistance in getting British approval for the financial arrangements to implement the plans developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from France and Rumania."

There is nothing so far.

Mr. PAUL: The second page.

H.M.JR: "Ambassador Winant has just replied"—don't you think we should say, "Ambassador Winant has just replied in cable number so-and-so"? Is there any harm in identifying the cable?
MR. PEEKLE: We can do that.

H.M. JR: All right. (Continuing) "...replied, in substance, that while the British Ministry of Economic Warfare would have been prepared to agree in principle with the financial arrangements proposed by the Treasury, the British Foreign Office sees 'grave objections' because of the difficulties which they perceive in the evacuation of 'any considerable number' of Jews from enemy-occupied territory in view of the problems of 'shipping' and of 'finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East'."

Nothing on that. It is more or less factual, isn't it?

Oscar, did you sit in on this memo, or collaborate?

MR. COX: I read it over this morning. No.

H.M. JR: Already had it this morning?

MR. PAUL: It came to Oscar, then I had a copy.

H.M. JR: "In my mind the British response is most significant because: (1) The British concede by implication that Treasury's financial program is workable and will not benefit the enemy (points raised in your letter of December 6 and in cables from our legation in Berne);"

MR. PAUL: You might say, instead of "points," "objections."

MR. LUXFORD: We were trying to be neutral here, to be conciliatory.

H.M. JR: I think when you say "cables" I would identify the cables.

MR. LUXFORD: There are about twenty-five of them, Mr. Secretary.
MR. PEHLE: We can put in the significant line.

H.M. JR: We got as far as (1), didn't we? I will read (2). "The British acknowledge that the real issue from their point of view is that raised by their Foreign Office as to what to do with the Jews evacuated. The British argue that since it would be difficult to deal with any considerable number of Jews, nothing should be done to work out the World Jewish Congress plan even as to a limited number of Jews, and accordingly they are 'reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements.'"

Well, I haven't got the cable. Is that accurate?

MR. LUXFORD: That is a quote.

H.M. JR: Of course, I realize that you are putting me in a position. I am out of the position, now, of discussing the financial thing.

MR. PAUL: That is the point we tried to make to you yesterday.

H.M. JR: I am arguing about resettlement; that is what I am arguing about.

MR. LUXFORD: That is right.

H.M. JR: I take it you people are conscious of that.

MR. PEHLE: That is the point we discussed the other day.

MR. PAUL: Resettlement in a different orientation; resettlement away from the English; in the shadow of murder and complete annihilation. It isn't the old type of resettlement where you simply were taking people away from some comparatively moderate type of persecution.

MR. PEHLE: It is not a permanent resettlement, necessarily, either.
MR. DuBOIS: Any Cabinet Officer should have a right to express his views.

H.M.JR: (Continuing) "To me, Mr. Secretary, this position is astounding. I know that you, too, must share my surprise since you have already indicated that it is the policy of your Department to deal expeditiously and sympathetically with proposals of this character."

MR. PAUL: We might quote those words.

MR. LUXFORD: We do our best to achieve that. Those are his words.

MR. DuBOIS: Right out of his letter to you.

MR. PAUL: That is in his last letter to you.

H.M.JR: You don't think you should put them in quotes?

MR. LUXFORD: The words will have a familiar ring, because we repeated them back to him in our last letter to him.

H.M.JR: "I know that neither of us would have agreed to the President advising Stephen Wise of the World Jewish Congress in August that this Government was prepared to license this transaction after clearing up certain details with Berne, if we had had any idea that the British had objections to our even trying to work out the plan."

On that you will have to refresh my memory. I have forgotten what happened between the President and me.

MR. PEHLE: You remember Stephen Wise wrote to the President asking him about this matter; the President referred the matter to you, and a reply was drafted by the Treasury indicating that the Treasury and the State Departments were in agreement with it. It was sent over to the State Department for his comment. It was at that time that this big fight went on at the State Department.
Finally Mr. Hull wrote a note back to you which said that the Treasury was perfectly free to issue the license, and that the State Department would be glad to transmit it abroad.

H.M.JR: What did the President have to do with this?

MR. PEHLE: Then you wrote a letter for the President's signature saying that we were prepared to facilitate these arrangements.

MR. LUXFORD: Upon the completion of certain details.

Mr. PEHLE: He presumably sent it to Stephen Wise.

H.M.JR: What did he do?

MR. PEHLE: As far as we know he sent the letter you sent him.

H.M.JR: I didn't ask him to say "Approved by the President," or anything?

MR. LUXFORD: We wanted his clearance on the line we were taking. As a matter of fact, he weaseled on us.

Mr. PEHLE: Wait a minute. He is asking about the President. We didn't ask him to approve anything. He referred over Wise's letter, and you prepared a reply saying we were prepared to go along with this. That is the last we heard. As far as we know, he sent out that type of reply to Stephen Wise.

H.M.JR: Wasn't there another letter from Wise to me saying he had heard from the President?

MR. PEHLE: I think there was.

MR. DuBOLS: He enclosed a copy of this letter the same time he sent it to the President.

H.M.JR: Didn't Wise hear from the President and advise me to that effect? I think I heard afterwards.
from Wise, giving me the impression he had heard from the President, thanking me for what I had done.

MR. LUXFORD: Well, you see what happened was--

H.M. JR: I am trying to see how much the President has committed himself on this.

Mr. DuBois: Let's put it this way; the letter from Wise to the President which was forwarded over here, recited a conversation. You might read that letter, John, reports of it, which he had with the President, which stated according to Wise's letter, the President had been extremely sympathetic on the whole issue.

Mr. Pehle: He started out by saying, "Dear Chief: It gave me deep satisfaction to find that while with you yesterday, that out of the depth of your understanding and sympathy with Hitler's victims, you welcome the proposal which is now before the State and Treasury Departments to permit funds to be forwarded to Switzerland by Jewish organizations from our country."

H.M. JR: That is what Wise says the President says. Now, what knowledge do we have?

Mr. Pehle: I am afraid we don't have.

Mr. Luxford: Nothing.

H.M. JR: But after I drafted the letter for him to send to Wise, didn't Wise write me saying he had gotten that letter?

Mr. Pehle: We will have to check that, Mr. Secretary. I recall that you had some independent correspondence with Wise, but I don't have it here. We will check that.

Mr. Paul: There is another implication to this sentence. This sentence is put in with the idea that Hull wouldn't have agreed to letting the President get in that hole.
MR. LUXFORD: That is what we were driving at.

MR. PAUL: That is the implication of the sentence. But on the other hand, it may have bad cross-implication from the standpoint of what you are going to do if the British do object—which they are doing now. "I know that neither of you would have agreed to the President advising us."

MR. PEHLE: "...if we had any idea the British would object."

We propose now to get Hull to go back at the British and tell them that their objections aren't consistent with our policy.

MR. PAUL: Suppose we are not able to persuade the British.

MR. COX: Why do you have to persuade the British?

MR. PEHLE: We don't have to. If the President really is in earnest about this, the British cannot maintain this position.

MR. COX: They cannot prevent you from executing it.

MR. PAUL: That is my point. The implication here is, "I think we can get the same point across."

H.M.JR: The point that I haven't finished reading this thing yet—is that I thought the attitude that I would take, vis-a-vis Hull tomorrow, is, "Now, look, Cordell, I want you to join me and tell me now, on the record or off the record, is it all right if Treasury goes ahead and does this thing." To hell with the British.

MR. PEHLE: I think it is much broader than that, Mr. Secretary. Issuing this license isn't going to satisfy this thing.
H.M.JR: But this is the only thing now that is pending, as far as I am concerned.

MR. PEHLE: Well, there are other things pending.

H.M.JR: Let me go through with this thing.

(Continuing) "In simple terms, the British position is that they apparently are prepared to accept the possible—even probable—death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of 'the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued.' "Since that is not our view and does not represent the views of your Department, the remaining question is how to implement our convictions, keeping in mind my conviction that the benefits of this program may be just as effectively lost through delay as through the failure to issue a license."

That is kind of involved, isn't it? What are you trying to get over, there?

MR. LUXFORD: We are ringing that same bell we have used twice before, that delay is just as significant here as actual unwillingness to proceed.

H.M.JR: I don't get the sentence - "...remaining question is how to implement our convictions--"

MR. LUXFORD: That follows in the next paragraph, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: I still think that is an awfully long sentence, and an awfully involved sentence. "Since that is not our view and does not represent the views of your Department" - I mean, we have got to keep, "...the remaining question is how"--

MR. PEHLE: We can break that up.

MR. PAUL: We can say, "This is not our view, and does not represent the view of your Department. The question then is how to implement our convictions."
H.M.JR: I think that would be better, leaving out the words, "the remaining"?

MR. PAUL: You don't need that.

H.M.JR: "The question is how to implement our convictions." I think you can make two sentences there.

"I propose for your consideration that we cut the Gordian Knot now by advising the British that we are going to take immediate action to facilitate the escape of these Jews from Hitler and then discuss what can be done in the way of finding them a more permanent refuge."

Couldn't you say, "I propose for your consideration that we cut the Gordian Knot now, after a delay of "X" number of months--"?

MR. PEHLE: I know, but if you do that, Mr. Secretary, you tend to focus on this particular case, rather than the broad issue.

MR. LUXFORD: Secondly, if we are anxious to get Hull's cooperation we are not going to get it, probably, by emphasizing again the several months' delay that State Department has instituted here.

H.M.JR: The only thing is, for the record, why do we do it now? What is the hurry?

MR. DUBOIS: Really preceded that in that previous paragraph, saying that the benefits will be lost through delay.

H.M.JR: But nowhere have you said in here how long the delay is.

MR. LUXFORD: Two previous letters telling him how long.

H.M.JR: But not in this memorandum. This memorandum has to stand on its own.
MR. PAUL: We could add a sentence.

H.M.JR: This memorandum stands on its own. Nobody saw the other memorandum. Why this sudden rush? I mean, I know why, but it doesn't say this thing has been going on and on for months.

MR. LUXFORD: I would say independently, Mr. Secretary, the thing is just as much of a rush as it was nine months ago.

MR. PAUL: You could put a sentence at the end of that "Since" paragraph.

MR. LUXFORD: "This matter has now been pending since April."

MR. PAUL: One short sentence.

H.M.JR: Well, think it over, will you?

MR. PAUL: Either shouldn't mention that at all, or you ought to drive the point home harder.

MR. COX: I would put a sentence at the end of that paragraph saying that this matter has been pending since April, 1943.

H.M.JR: Just register the thing.

(Continuing) "I am confident that the prestige of this country abroad is sufficiently great that we can prevail upon one of the neighboring countries to give these evacuees temporary asylum if we are prepared to take the responsibility for assuring such countries that it will not be permanent and that the essentials for life will be provided. Even if we took these people and treated them as prisoners of war it would be better than letting them die."

Has anybody - Churchill or Roosevelt or anybody, made the statement about asylum?
MR. COX: When you get to it I would like to tell you some of the history of this problem.

H.M.JR: Is there any statement they have made that we could refer to?

MR. COX: They have taken action on it so far in the French African thing at Casa Blanca.

H.M.JR: That is that camp. But somebody, for me, made a study of the various—not this previous famous remark of people going back and offering asylum. That has nothing to do with this. Darned few of them, incidentally. But has either Roosevelt or Churchill said anything publicly about giving people—

MR. PEHLE: Not that we know of.

MR. LUXFORD: I don't recall it.

H.M.JR: "With this much done I am confident that of necessity a permanent solution will be found. As for myself, I would assume that most of these people will be only too happy to return after the war to their homes in a Europe purged of Hitler and his ideas."

Now, why do you add that last thing?

MRS. MORGENTHAU: Do you think that?

H.M.JR: No. I don't think it adds anything.

MR. LUXFORD: I, for one, feel that way.

MR. PEHLE: Take the people out of Rumania; suppose that you take them and put them in a camp some place and that after the war you have a democratic government in Rumania. Do you think they would be willing to go back?

H.M.JR: How do you know?
MRS. MORGENTHAU: I think you are getting yourself into a terrific argument.

MR. LUXFORD: It has a reason in that you can say this problem isn't a permanent problem. Many of these people will be most anxious to return to their homes.

H.M. JR.: I think you are taking in unnecessary territory in that sentence. I don't see that it is necessary.

MR. PEHLE: No, it isn't essential.

MRS. MORGENTHAU: You are getting into something which is a terrific argument amongst organizations. I don't see why you should put yourself into that.

H.M. JR.: I personally think the last paragraph should be left off entirely.

MR. PEHLE: I think if you take off the last sentence you want to take off the other one, too. Take off the whole last paragraph.

H.M. JR.: Yes.

MRS. MORGENTHAU: I didn't like it when I read it before.

H.M. JR.: No. Paul wants to strengthen this?

MR. LUXFORD: Sure. It is a good point. He has a good point.

MR. PAUL: You tell it, Luxford.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Paul wants to add, right after the second paragraph on Page 2, where we state the British position--

MR. PAUL: I want to call it by its right name.
MR. LUXFORD: That is right. He wants to say that this appears to be the same position as that taken by the Germans.

MR. PAUL: That isn't exactly what I said. I said that there isn't any difference between the British position, as you have described it there, and the German position. If anything, the Germans are somewhat more merciful. They proceed much more rapidly. How can we ever accuse the Germans of cruelty to these Jews in Europe when we decree the same sort of death or a more lingering death for them?

Mr. DuBOIS: In that connection, there was a very interesting article in the Post a few days ago by Winkler John read it, too, in which he advanced a rather new theory. He said that despite the thousands of Jews which the Germans were killing, there is one group of Jews which they aren't killing and that is the group who have visas to Palestine. They are specifically setting them aside in camps so that after the war they can say that the United Nations were just as much to blame as Germany. "Here is a group of Jews who had visas to Palestine whom we were willing to let out and they wouldn't let them come out."

That was his theory.

H.M.JR: Who was this man?

MR. DuBOIS: Winkler.

H.M.JR: Who is he?

MR. DuBOIS: I don't know too much about him. I read his articles once in a while in the Post.

MR. COX: Mr. Secretary, can I pose what your major objective ought to be in terms of the history of this thing, and see what you are shooting at?

MR. PEHLE: What shall we do with this point?
MR. COX: I don't think you can answer that until you decide what you want to do. In the first place, this is a problem which we have gotten facts on. It is much broader than the Rumanian thing. It covers all the occupied areas. It covers Poland and Czechoslovakia, and so forth.

There isn't any question that the German policy has been clearly one of extermination of the Jews, complete and final, and we have talked to people from the Polish underground who also, incidentally, have talked to the President about that first-hand observation.

H.M. JR: I am listening.

MR. COX: Now, one of your first problems is that people with a good deal of courage will get out one way or another, or through the underground, and come to a neutral country. What normally happens, what happens in almost all countries under immigration laws, they say, "Do you have any money? Can you support yourself? If you don't have any money, have you got somebody who'll go on bond for you so there are assurances you won't become a public charge?"

The other type of question is through the health authorities, and that is, "How do we know you haven't got typhoid, or what-not?"

The practical fact is that unless you get effective action in all the countries bordering occupied Europe, a good many of these people are turned back, and being turned back means certain death as far as the Germans are concerned, because if you have tried to escape through the underground and haven't succeeded, you are either killed quickly or else you are put in concentration camps and the slow process is used on you. That applies to all of occupied Europe.

The financial problem is not a major problem, because both in terms of U.S. resources and in terms of all the private agencies, you can get plenty of money to handle this thing. This happens to be true in the Rumanian situation - one mechanism financial-wise by which you can handle the problem.
That fact that the job can be done was indicated by the Swedish action on the persecution of Jews in Denmark, in which you had people like Bohr and others who are internationally famous in their own scientific field.

But that is not the solution in terms of the major problem, because there are a lot of people who aren’t well enough known to be taken care of because of their fame and what-not.

The first problem, therefore - and you will never get it solved unless the American Government takes a very strong, firm, and persistent position with all the neutral countries where they want to have established places of asylum - is that the people who escape or otherwise get out of the occupied areas can be taken care of in the sense that the neutral country doesn’t have to worry about their being charges, that their health is looked after so they don’t have to worry about epidemics or contagious diseases, and so forth.

Now, in addition to the strong position of the Government, you need people in those places who are competent, who have got their heart in it and are willing to spend the time and effort to get this thing done, because the Embassies are not now equipped - or the legations - to handle this problem, which is a very complex and tough problem. There isn’t any question about that.

You have already had two cases established where the asylum was only temporary and where further steps have been taken; one is the Mexican camp which has been a joint Polish-Mexican government operation, financed out of the President’s Emergency Fund. The other is the North African one.

H.M.JR: Where is the Mexican camp?

MR. COX: Right outside of Mexico City. Three million dollars used from the President's Emergency Fund.
The North African camp was agreed to by the President and the North African authorities.

Now, the second problem: Once you get them into the neutral countries, and particularly in view of the shipping and transportation situation now - it is by no means difficult to go to the shipping authorities and say, "Now, you have "X" thousand ships; you can let two ships go to move these people."

We already have arrangements with Mexico, North Africa, Brazil, or whatever countries you go to, and I think you can even get the British agreement to the Palestine thing, not on any theoretical agreement on White Paper, but saying, practically, "Here is an emergency problem." We have "X" thousand refugees in these neutral countries. They have been there seven or eight months, and now we have to move them. Also, it happens that the quotas here are by no means filled up, and the one great deterrent has been that we have been super-strict in saying that anybody who has any relatives abroad can't come in under the quota.

Now, you have a good deal of margin in terms of the U.S. as well as other places in the world to get them out. Then, when you get them at the camps, you need people who are competent and know the job of running the camps, not as concentration camps, but so these people can either be re-absorbed in the community where they are to work, or to take the next additional steps, to move them to some place, semi-permanent, whether they want to go back to where they came from or not.

I think that is too complex a problem to try to blueprint at this point.

Now, within the State Department there have been basic differences of view on this problem. On the hill there has been pending before the House Foreign Affairs Committee the so-called Rogers-Gillette resolution to create a special commission to handle this problem. There has been a fight within the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the thing.
Now, my view is that the only way you will solve this thing is if the President, taking yourself, Stettinius, and Crowley as the three principal officers of the Government who are concerned directly with the functions that are required to be performed here, and responsible directly to him - not through whatever machinery happens to be in the State Department - to utilize, as far as this group thinks is necessary, in a Governmental Committee - the Africa thing, the Bermuda conference, the private corporations, and so forth; but you need a driving force in this thing that brings the viewpoint before the neutral countries, sees to it that the proper personnel is set up, sees to it there is no defect in the financing, whether the financing is done through the War Contributions Act, through the Lend Lease Act, and so forth.

You ought to be in because of the financing thing. Crowley ought to be in because he is responsible now for these two camps, and also Lend Lease funds are available, in large part, for this thing.

H.M.JR: How is he responsible for the two camps?

MR. COX: Because they were taken over by AFHQ, which has since been consolidated into FMA.

H.M.JR: I see.

MR. COX: Now, I would suggest - and this is one of the difficult problems of how you get Stettinius in it - because I have no doubt that he has not only got his heart in this thing, because just as a sheer humane problem, the thing ought to be done.

The other thing in terms of the President that is basic here, which has come out on the Hill, is you also have, incidentally, a domestic political problem, and the people who have been backing the resolution on the Hill are, interestingly enough, with some exceptions, all people opposed to the President.
Now, this whole proposition of setting up this Committee has been discussed with the President. He is in favor of it. The thing was to be taken up with him and that is where the people who have been handling this thing oppose any new setup.

Now, my hunch is that the way practically to do it is to put up to the President, you don't need an Executive Order or anything else to do that, where he just announces this is being done, and he writes a letter to you three and says, "I want you to take this job on; I want you to do it; do it fast and immediately, and let nothing stand in the way of getting that job done."

Now, it can be done. It is a difficult job, and the major difficulty is that the people who have been working on this really don't feel it strongly enough and emotionally enough that the job ought to be done.

Now, as a matter of fact, one thing in this memorandum, when you set up the British you are setting up a straw man, because their attitude is basically not different than the attitude of the people who have been working on this thing. And you can get these people out, and you can find the next hop-off point for them, if you really want to do it.

H.M.JR: I think your presentation is a most interesting one, and well-rounded. I think as far as Randolph's suggestion is concerned, just to set up the British as a straw man, I think it weakens the thing, because if this gets out, and it should get out into British hands, we have been trying to treat the State Department - not to ruffle them unnecessarily. I don't see any sense in doing that to the British. It isn't going to get anything.

By calling them names, saying, "You are worse than the Germans," that isn't going to help the thing. I don't see that.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, there is a question of marrying these two plans.
H.M. JR: What two?

MR. LUXFORD: We have the specific excuse before us right now for this thing being presented to the President. You will be seeing Mr. Hull tomorrow morning--you are not going to get satisfaction as long as this is left with Long.

So you can say, "I think that the two of us should go see the President on this matter right away. It involves the British.

At the time you go to see the President it would give him an opportunity to come back and say, "Look, we want this committee. I have been worried about this thing for many reasons."

H.M. JR: Well, I think Oscar's idea about a committee is good; the only suggestion I would make is to say that it be Hull, Crowley, and myself, and then if Hull says, "I am too busy--"

MR. COX: I want to raise that strategic question with you. I agree. You can't say Stettinius, because the minute you do that you put Stettinius in the same position that Welles was in. I mean, you tend to do that. So I think you have either got to say, yourself, Hull, and Crowley--because Hull has got to run his own Department and pick whoever he thinks ought to be in. If you do that, you run certain dangers. It is a question of whether you want to take those risks.

H.M. JR: I think you have to take the risk, because I know Hull so well, he will say to me--he has this way of saying, "Well, whom would you suggest?"

MR. COX: The only question I have is whether, informally, the President, without telling them, doesn't want to say, "Well, I am putting you, Morgenthau, and Crowley on," and since Stettinius was in on this stuff on the Lend-Lease stuff, and is interested--you might want to tag him as your Deputy.
H.M.JR: That can be done that way. But I think you should ask Hull, in the first instance, whether he doesn’t want to. You don’t know. He may be all right on this.

MR. COX: There is no question about that. The major question is the people who have been working on this thing, and have a vested interest in it.

H.M.JR: I agree. I don’t think we should take the attitude that Hull won’t help, until we know definitely he won’t. After all, as a matter of fact, all these people have been saying all along, “what a wonderful guy Welles was.” I have always had my fingers crossed on that thing.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, the thing that worries us is how Hull could have tolerated this for two years with Long. Now, he probably hasn’t focused on it, I agree.

H.M.JR: There are so many wheels within wheels over there that Hull just doesn’t know about.

MR. COX: That is what I said.

H.M.JR: It isn’t a question of tolerating; it is one of fifty things going on over there.

MR. LUXFORD: I just want to be sure he knows, now.

H.M.JR: He will.

MR. COX: I think the other thing, they forget about it. The Secretary of State has never professed to be, and hasn’t, in fact, been the kind of administrator you are. He just doesn’t know a lot of things that are happening inside of the Department until they eventually explode in his face.

On this thing, it has been coasting along; there have been a lot of recommendations written on it, and a lot
of testimony up on the Hill. But when you see specific
cases like this one, then you realize that the failure
of action means that hundreds of thousands of people are
being killed.

H.M.JR: Well, Oscar, I am intrigued by your
suggestions, which I think you have told me once before,
but a little bit differently, didn't you?

Mr. COX: Yes, well, we have had a lot of evidence
since then, which corroborates the need for it.

H.M.JR: In view of that, how are we going to present
this to him?

MR. COX: How?

H.M.JR: Yes. Are you going to present this as an
isolated question or over-all?

Mr. COX: I would take this as a typical example of
what happens, unless you handle the whole major problem.
I mean, this is just a case illustration. Now, the
President, as I say, has heard this fellow, Karski,
who came out of the Polish underground. He knows what is
happening there. He knows what the need for the French
North Africa camp was. What had happened was those people
had escaped from Occupied Europe into Spain, and Spain
didn't want to leave them there. Now, are we going to
send them back, or take care of them? It is a perfectly
obvious case, and obvious solution. They have just said
to the French, "Now we have this problem; we have to do
something about it." They agreed to let them come to
French Africa.

H.M.JR: Who got the President to get him to give
up three million dollars for the camp?

MR. COX: State Department. Pressure was from the
Poles on the State Department and Long had been handling
it. He got through the Secretary of State, the allocation
on the President's Emergency Fund.
H.M.JR: Long. And were these Poles or Spaniards?

MR. COX: Poles, and amongst them, of course, are Polish Jews, as well as other Polish refugees.

H.M.JR: How many are there now?

MR. COX: I don't know the exact number, but I can get it for you very quickly.

H.M.JR: It makes it a little hard to get from the way this memorandum is set up.

MR. COX: I don't think it does, because this thing has all been discussed with the President.

H.M.JR: I don't mean the President; I mean Hull.

MR. LUXFORD: But look what happens; if you go to Secretary Hull tomorrow morning and you say, "Now, look, we have to have action," he will say, "I don't know what to do; the British say no."

He is going to be very much troubled. You then say, "This looks like a problem the President should have knowledge of. Here are the British taking this dogmatic attitude; let's discuss it with the President. I have a real interest in it."

MR. COX: There is another reason for doing it - raising it with the President - which is one of the things that has caused the dispute inside the State Department. The people who have been working on it claim that they have already presented to the neutral countries the proposition that they ought to offer asylum to the refugees who get out from Occupied Europe. Up to now they have refused to do it, so that gives some validity to the British position that even if you go through with the financial operation, you won't be able to let these people remain in Switzerland. Therefore you have to promptly get them out.
The question they then pose is where you take them to. Now, since the State Department hasn’t been able to do it without the President’s backing — to enlist the President’s support in imagination, and so forth — the question is how to meet that problem, because it is inter-related with a lot of other problems which the President must have discussed at Teheran and Cairo, and in Turkey.

For example, you just can’t — take Turkey as an example, you can’t say “Hell or high water, nothing else considered, we want an asylum in Turkey.”

Now, it may well be that as a part of discussion that the President had — whether it involves additional Lend Lease aid or other arrangements, that this may be an integral part of the thing which he can present in terms of other things being offered to the Turks.

Mr. DuBois: The British cable was very convenient for arranging the whole issue, because the British position really is addressed much more to the whole problem rather than this specific issue. They raised the whole broad question of what can you do with the Jews. I think you can use that British position very well to get into the whole issue. If the British position is true on this case, it is true of any case.

Mr. Cox: You have got to remember one other thing. In the testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which was all secret testimony when originally given, and it has since been released publicly, Long said that one of the major problems that he had had on this thing was financing of the operations, which gives you a jurisdictional position in the thing, quite aside from anything else.

Mr. Luxford: Coupled with trading with the enemy, Oscar.

Mr. Cox: I mean, even aside from this Humanian thing. He said that the problem in some of these other cases was they couldn’t get the operation financed.
MR. LUXFORD: I think the Secretary has another jurisdictional basis, that is, trading with the enemy. We have to control all trade with the enemy.

MR. COX: But I checked on the financial thing, and both with individuals and organizations, and they said that any such plan as I have discussed, if put into operation, you would have absolutely no difficulty in terms of getting contributions through the War Contributions statute which is under your jurisdiction, either from individuals or organizations, because every organization I know of says they have funds which can be used for this purpose, but they can't use them because you can't get the people out.

H.M. JR: Of course, I went to certain groups - when was it - a couple of years ago - and talked about it when there was still a chance of getting these people out of Poland and humanity. They didn't think that was the right time to use their money. Two years ago - we had them all down here.

MR. DuHOIS: You get a committee set up with their heart in it, I feel sure they can do something.

H.M. JR: At that time the President had his heart in it and he had a lot of commitments with individuals, running up to ten and fifteen million dollars - individuals who were willing to--

MRS. MORGENTHAU: But, subsequently, he couldn't have gotten them out.

H.M. JR: No, but at the time I discussed the thing the borders were open.

MR. COX: In some of these cases the borders are still open, you know, as a practical matter. If you don't turn them back--

MR. LUXFORD: What we are really doing is getting out of this passive role of listening, and getting right down into helping.
H.M.JR: I am with you. There is no question about it, but I am stumped a little bit. I don't think this memorandum opens up into the broader thing at all.

MR. LUXFORD: As Mr. DuBois points out, the force is the main issue, because there are no ifs and ands in the British position. You can't work out any plan within the terms of their position. They just say, "We don't care how you get them out; we don't know what to do with them."

H.M.JR: Let me just read this again in the light of Oscar's presentation.

(The Secretary reads the memorandum over to himself.)

H.M.JR: This is the backward way of doing the thing, cut the knot by finding the license first and then finding a place for them afterwards.

MR. PEHLE: No, it isn't. It is cutting the knot by telling the British it is our policy to get these people out. I think we have to forget about licenses here. I think we have to talk about something wider than the World Jewish Congress plan which may or may not be a good plan, anyhow.

H.M.JR: But in the light of Oscar's discussion, do you think this memorandum covers the thing?

MR. COX: I think there is one other strategic question and that is, if you can convince the Secretary of State, either with this memorandum or some modification, that you want to jointly discuss with the President and possibly with Crowley, whether you want to get the President prepared somewhat in advance, before the conference, as to what the tentative solution of the thing may be - because it is going to be a lot easier at the conference if he has some notion of what he wants to do.
H.M.JR: No argument about that, but if you gentlemen had heard Oscar's argument, would you have read it in the memorandum that way?

MR. PEHLE: Yes, because after we wrote it we went over it with Oscar this morning and we still felt the memorandum was--

MR. LUXFORD: Here is what you have. Oscar has a whole of a good plan, but he has to have an excuse to get it to the President. We have the excuse to get it to the President. We have a beautiful issue here to take to the President and say, "We want a solution to it. The British have taken a dogmatic attitude that we can't solve any of these problems." There is where you marry them.

H.M.JR: Well, I am tired, now. Let me sleep with this thing tonight. I will be fresh at nine o'clock tomorrow morning, but I can't think any more tonight.

MR. DuBOIS: One question: Has anybody approached the Russians at all?

MR. COX: No.

MR. DuBOIS: My guess would be that Russia would be--

MR. COX: I don't know that the thing has ever been presented to the Russians; all I know is that the Russians did take a lot of Polish refugees and were willing to let supplies go in for those Polish refugees under Lend-Lease. My hunch is that if they have taken Polish refugees they would certainly take Jewish.

MR. PEHLE: Did they insist on regarding those Polish refugees as citizens of Russia?

MR. COX: No.

MR. DuBOIS: To my limited knowledge Russia has done more for the Jewish people than any other country in the world.
MR. LUXFORD: One other possible solution that shouldn't be overlooked and that is setting up a temporary camp in Southern Italy or in Sicily. In other words, that is completely under our control.

H.M. JR: Have you been there? I have been there. Were you?

MR. LUXFORD: Not yet.

H.M. JR: There is no room. The place is just overrun with people now.

MR. LUXFORD: There must be some vacant space that you could put them. I am not talking of anything permanent, but just a camp. It is better than where they are.

H.M. JR: My God, in Sardinia there is a little over a million one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand troops running around the island. I don't think that that particular selection, if you don't mind, is a very good one.

MR. PEHLE: That is the one spot over there, Mr. Secretary, where the United States can say, "we want them to come in here; we are bringing them in." It is the only place where we really have--

MR. PAUL: Under military control?

MR. LUXFORD: We are not envisaging any kind of a settlement; we are only envisaging a stopping place, if you might put it, as the evacuation centers on the West Coast which we helped on. You just put a transitory spot - set up a camp - give them barracks and leave them there until you can work out a more permanent place.

MR. PAUL: So they are not turned back from the borders day after day and murdered.
MR. LUXFOARD: What we have in mind is there may be objections to going to DeGaulle and asking for his cooperation. I am sure that you could get that, but whether the President would want to do that—

H.M.JR: All right, listen, I am tired now. Let me have this thing to simmer, and we will meet at nine o'clock tomorrow morning. I will see where I am then. This is tough. Everybody has made a mess of it up to now.

Have you discussed any of this at all with Stettinius? Have you any reason to believe he is sympathetic?

MR. COX: Yes, sir, I have good reason to believe he is sympathetic.

I have also discussed it with Crowley and he is sympathetic. But I know Stettinius is, because, as a matter of fact, he has been having his problems inside of the State Department for the last six weeks on this.

H.M.JR: He has. I have my own.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HULL:

You will recall that on November 27 we appealed to Ambassador Winant for his assistance in getting British approval for the financial arrangements to implement the plans developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from France and Rumania.

Ambassador Winant has just replied, in substance, that while the British Ministry of Economic Warfare would have been prepared to agree in principle with the financial arrangements proposed by the Treasury, the British Foreign Office sees "grave objections" because of the difficulties which they perceive in the evacuation of "any considerable number" of Jews from enemy-occupied territory in view of the problems of "shipping" and of "finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East".

In my mind the British response is most significant because:

(1) The British concede by implication that Treasury's financial program is workable and will not benefit the enemy (points raised in your letter of December 6 and in cables from our legation in Berne);

(2) The British acknowledge that the real issue from their point of view is that raised by their Foreign Office as to what to do with the Jews evacuated. The British argue that since it would be difficult to deal with any considerable number of Jews, nothing should be done to work out the World Jewish Congress plan even as to a limited number of Jews, and accordingly they are "reluctant to agree to any approval being
expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements."

To me, Mr. Secretary, this position is astounding. I know that you, too, must share my surprise since you have already indicated that it is the policy of your Department to deal expeditiously and sympathetically with proposals of this character. I know that neither of us would have agreed to the President advising Stephen Wise of the World Jewish Congress in August that this Government was prepared to license this transaction after clearing up certain details with Bernes, if we had had any idea that the British had objections to our even trying to work out the plan.

In simple terms, the British position is that they apparently are prepared to accept the possible—even probable—death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of "the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued."

Since that is not our view and does not represent the views of your Department, the remaining question is how to implement our convictions, keeping in mind my conviction that the benefits of this program may be just as effectively lost through delay as through the failure to issue a license.

I propose for your consideration that we cut the Gordian Knot now by advising the British that we are going to take immediate action to facilitate the escape of these Jews from Hitler and then discuss what can be done in the way of finding them a more permanent refuge. I am confident that the prestige of this country abroad is sufficiently great that we can prevail upon one of the neighboring countries to give these evacuees temporary asylum if we are prepared to take the responsibility for assuring such countries that it will not be permanent and that the essentials for life will be provided. Even if we took these people and treated them as prisoners of war it would be better than letting them die.

With this much done I am confident that of necessity a permanent solution will be found. As for myself, I would assume that most of these people will be only too happy to return after the war to their homes in a Europe purged of Hitler and his ideas.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Embassy, London
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: December 19, 1943
NUMBER: 8826

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram of December 18, No. 7969, has just been received and have reviewed Department's message of November 27, No. 7506, directed to me as well as Embassy's reply of December 15, No. 8717. I was absent at conferences when these messages were handled. Tomorrow I shall bring this issue to Mr. Eden's attention personally for reconsideration. It is requested that Secretary Morgenthau be informed.

WINANT
December 20, 1943
9:00 a.m.

JEWSH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. Pehle
Mr. Luxford
Mr. DuBois

H. M. JR.: One thing that may take a minute or two: I want to ask you, where do I look, in what cable, to say casually to - Where is 354? Do we keep a record of who takes things out of the file and who puts them back?

MR. LUXFORD: We have been waiting a long while for this particular cable, so it couldn't be tied down too closely.

MR. DUBOIS: Hiss didn't seem to be troubled about your asking this morning.

H. M. JR.: What is this? (Mr. Pehle hands the Secretary draft of "Memorandum for Secretary Hull," attached)

MR. PEHLE: It is a new draft.

H. M. JR.: But where do I say to Mr. Hull I want 354? Oh, I see. You want me to read this in the meantime?

MR. PAUL: You can almost show him the changes there.

MR. LUXFORD: On the first page we simply made the cable citations you requested.

On the second page, in order to meet the point Mr. Paul made about Stephen Wise, that last sentence in that paragraph has been changed by saying, "...and these objections would prevail."

MR. PAUL: We added four or five words.

H. M. JR.: I don't get your point.

MR. PAUL: The point is we didn't want to be inconsistent in that sentence—which didn't say that the President
would have done this if he had known the British had objected, because we may want to do it, even though the British object. And our sentence is addressed to another point.

H.M.JR: "These objections would prevail." Another one of these terrifically long sentences. How do you know that their objections are going to prevail?

MR. LUXFORD: We say, "...if...they were to prevail."

MR. PAUL: We hope they don't!

H.M.JR: Do you think that is important?

MR. LUXFORD: You mean about the President in here?

H.M.JR: No; "would prevail."

MR. LUXFORD: Yes, I think that takes the heart right out of the objection that Randolph had last night. He was afraid we were putting ourselves in a position by this sentence that we would have to clear with the British. Now, all we're saying is that if we had thought that the British were going to prevail, then we would have been very worried.

H.M.JR: If you lawyers think it is important -

All right, what else?

MR. PAUL: It is not legal so much as State Department.

H.M.JR: What else? What other change?

MR. LUXFORD: Then we divided this paragraph up into a couple of sentences. (Points to document) The last paragraph goes out.

H.M.JR: Now, let me ask you gentlemen this: Do I leave this with Mr. Hull?

MR. PEHLE: That is what we had in mind.
H.M.JR: Why?

MR. PEHLE: Hand it to him and let him read it out loud the way he did the Argentine document. He may have seen, Mr. Secretary, that ad in this morning's paper, which is very crucial. It is in the Post this morning. It is right on the head on this issue. (Refers to article in Washington Post of December 20, 1943, entitled, "The Conscience of Our Nation Has Been Deeply Shaken.")

H.M.JR: Got a copy for me on this thing?

MR. LUXFORD: Yes, sir.

(The Secretary signed memorandum for Mr. Hull.)

MR. PEHLE: Now, here is the reference, Mr. Secretary, to that cable underlined in blue. (Hands Secretary copy of memo of April 20, 1943, from Mr. Harrison to Secretary Hull, copy attached.)

H.M.JR: We asked for it?

MR. PEHLE: We have asked for it several times and they say it is none of our business.

H.M.JR: Well, it refers to Riegner, doesn't it?

MR. PEHLE: Yes, it does. I think you can get it all right.

MR. PAUL: One other possible way to approach this—one different paragraph on the second page along the lines you suggested yesterday afternoon—we have another second page here with a paragraph—"The British position has much broader implications than its relationship to this particular proposal. If it prevails, it means that we should give up trying to work out any proposal to rescue Jews in enemy territory." It is a broader thing.

MR. DUBOIS: And a few other phrases have been changed in the remaining paragraph so you are not tied to this specific proposal.
H.M.JR: Read it to me.

MR. PAUL: (Reading) "The British position has much broader implications than its relationship to this particular proposal. If it prevails, it means that we should give up trying to work out any proposal to rescue Jews in enemy territory."

H.M.JR: Why do you say Jews? Is it just Jews?

MR. PEHLE: That is the real problem.

H.M.JR: I think that is an improvement.

MR. PEHLE: I do, too. It takes out the Stephen Wise thing.

MR. PAUL: It substitutes for this long paragraph which refers to this particular problem?

(Mr. Paul hands the Secretary attached revision of Memo for Secretary Hull. The Secretary deletes his signature on the original copy.)

MR. PAUL: It ties better into this committee business.

H.M.JR: Look, boys, I am under awful pressure. Let me read this thing. That was Mrs. Morgenthau's objection.

MR. PAUL: Yes, we discussed it, and there was a good deal to it.

H.M.JR: I think that is all right; that is an improvement. I think that puts it on a better basis. Fix up that copy for me.

MR. PEHLE: Yes, sir.

H.M.JR: Whose bright idea was that?

MR. LUXFORD: Dubois'.

H.M.JR: I think that is better.
MR. PAUL: It also gets us away from all technical arguments better in this situation.

MR. PEHLE: These people are driving at the same thing.

MR. PAUL: There is great unanimity in the press—makes it clear this is really our underground movement. It is a underground movement in this country in another sense of the term.

H.M. JR: How do you mean?

MR. PAUL: This movement to let the Jews be killed is an underground movement here. All the open and above-board stuff on top that gets in the press is the other way.

H.M. JR: You mean underground against it?

MR. LUXFORD: That is right.

MR. PAUL: Underground in the State, and it is underground in the country.

MR. PEHLE: Surely.

MR. LUXFORD: Cox mentioned that particularly yesterday. There is a strong feeling in the House committee for something like this (Points to newspaper).

H.M. JR: Who introduced that?

MR. PAUL: Will Rogers.

MR. PEHLE: Baldwin and Will Rogers, I think.

H.M. JR: The funny thing on the radio last night that I heard was, Mr. Hull announced he had served notice on Sumner Welles that if he wrote anything about foreign affairs in his articles about the State Department he would invoke the Espionage Act.
MR. PEHLE: Really?

H.M.JR: Oh, yes, that was on the radio last night.

Did you get that, Paul? On the radio last night, I don't know whether Drew Pearson or somebody else said that Hull had served notice on Welles that if he wrote anything about the State Department--

MR. PAUL: Yes, I heard Drew say that.

H.M.JR: ... he would invoke the Espionage Act.

MR. PAUL: Yes.

H.M.JR: Now, one other thing--

MR. PAUL: There is one sentence left out here. I don't think it is important.

H.M.JR: One other thing, while we are talking, should I bring up today--oh, by the way, what about the Argentine?

MR. LUXFORD: Very apropos, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: He has heard from how many countries?

MR. PEHLE: Five. They weren't from the countries; they were from our Ambassadors. He didn't ask the countries.

H.M.JR: What did the five say?

MR. PEHLE: Mexico and Columbia were good, and Peru was good. Chile was not; it was not expected to be good. Brazil was a little disappointing.

H.M.JR: But nobody said anything about the big United States. Nobody took the Berle position?

MR. PAUL: No. These were our Ambassadors, of course, but they didn't take it, and they were on the spot.
H.M.JR: I understood we were going to take it up.

MR. PEHLE: He was going to take it up with the countries, but after we got out of the room and there were more discussions, they decided to just ask the Ambassadors at this point.

H.M.JR: But it is all right to say--

MR. LUXFORD: So far as we know those are the only five countries they sent that question to, so they have replies from every one.

MR. PAUL: If you don't feel embarrassed, leave me out of this conference if you would like to have a smaller number there. I would be delighted to go, but I didn't want you to feel--

H.M.JR: Smaller by what?

MR. PAUL: Numbers.

H.M.JR: This Foreign Funds comes under you, doesn't it?

MR. PAUL: Yes, but I wanted you to feel perfectly free.

H.M.JR: On Monday morning I can't take this excessive modesty.

MR. PAUL: Well, maybe it is the only time of the day I have it. (Laughter)

H.M.JR: I told them you two fellows were coming.

MR. PAUL: I know.

H.M.JR: If I didn't bring you, he might think you were in disagreement.

MR. PAUL: That is the kind of implication the State Department lives on.
MR. PEHLE: It certainly does.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, you recall that Oscar Cox said he had a program of this kind on paper. I wonder if it wouldn't be worth while for us to get a copy.

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. LUXFORD: Do you want us to do it?

H.M.JR: Yes. Good! I am so pressed as it is.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

2460, April 20, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

In compliance with instructions contained in your 877, April 10, I am transmitting in my 2461, April 20, text of a communication from R on the subject indicated for communication to your correspondent in your discretion.

While I have not transmitted R's messages as such in compliance with the terms of your 354, February 10, I have at the same time felt that information which he is able to furnish and which appears to be reasonably authentic should be in your hands. In consequence my telegram No. 1597, March 17th, contained in substance information which R requested me to transmit on behalf of himself to his New York correspondent previously named.

R, has, however, requested me to transmit for him routine messages which I felt could be conveyed through regular channels and I so advised him. Most of the information contained in R's current message has not previously been brought to my attention by R and while I have already reported similarly in part to the Department from other sources I nevertheless transmit R's message in full. "May I suggest that messages of this character should not (repeat not) be subjected to the restriction imposed by your 354, February 10, and that I be permitted to transmit messages from R more particularly in view of the helpful information which they may frequently contain?

SECTION TWO

In that event I would request R. carefully to differentiate between fact and unverified rumor and clearly to indicate his opinions regarding credibility of information (?) which he provides. It is obvious that facilities are lacking to enable a satisfactory check on any of the statements made.

For my guidance in further dealing with association I would appreciate your instructions as to the propriety of transmitting that part of the current message which relates to activities of the organization concerned and contains an appeal for funds. This subject is a many sided one of delicate significance.

END OF MESSAGE  
HARRISON

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HULL:

You will recall that on November 27 we appealed to Ambassador Winant for his assistance in getting British approval for the financial arrangements to implement the plans developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from France and Rumania.

Ambassador Winant has just replied, in substance, that while the British Ministry of Economic Warfare would have been prepared to agree in principle with the financial arrangements proposed by the Treasury, the British Foreign Office sees "grave objections" because of the difficulties which they perceive in the evacuation of "any considerable number" of Jews from enemy-occupied territory in view of the problems of "shipping" and of "finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East".

In my mind the British response is most significant because:

(1) The British concede by implication that Treasury's financial program is workable and will not benefit the enemy (points raised in your letter of December 6 and in cables from our legation in Berne);

(2) The British acknowledge that the real issue from their point of view is that raised by their Foreign Office as to what to do with the Jews evacuated. The British argue that since it would be difficult to deal with any considerable number of Jews, nothing should be done to work out the World Jewish Congress plan even as to a limited number of Jews, and accordingly they are "reluctant to agree to any approval being..."
expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements".

To me, Mr. Secretary, this position is astounding. I know that you, too, must share my surprise since you have already indicated that it is the policy of your Department to deal expeditiously and sympathetically with proposals of this character. I know that neither of us would have agreed to the President advising Stephen Wise of the World Jewish Congress in August that this Government was prepared to license this transaction after clearing up certain details with Berne, if we had had any idea that the British had objections to our even trying to work out the plan.

In simple terms, the British position is that they apparently are prepared to accept the possible—even probable—death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of "the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued."

Since that is not our view and does not represent the views of your Department, the remaining question is how to implement our convictions, keeping in mind my conviction that the benefits of this program may be just as effectively lost through delay as through the failure to issue a license.

I propose for your consideration that we cut the Gordian Knot now by advising the British that we are going to take immediate action to facilitate the escape of these Jews from Hitler and then discuss what can be done in the way of finding them a more permanent refuge. I am confident that the prestige of this country abroad is sufficiently great that we can prevail upon one of the neighboring countries to give these evacuees temporary asylum if we are prepared to take the responsibility for assuring such countries that it will not be permanent and that the essentials for life will be provided. Even if we took these people and treated them as prisoners of war it would be better than letting them die.

With this much done I am confident that of necessity a permanent solution will be found. As for myself, I would assume that most of these people will be only too happy to return after the war to their homes in a Europe purged of Hitler and his ideas.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HULL:

You will recall that on November 27 we appealed to Ambassador Binant for his assistance in getting British approval for the financial arrangements to implement the plan developed by the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of a large number of Jews from France and Rumania.

Ambassador Binant has just replied, in substance, that while the British Ministry of Economic Warfare would have been prepared to agree in principle with the financial arrangements proposed by the Treasury, the British Foreign Office sees "grave objections" because of the difficulties which they perceive in the evacuation of "any considerable number" of Jews from enemy-occupied territory in view of the problems of "shipping" and of "finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East" (Cable 6717, December 15).

In my mind the British response is most significant because:

(1) The British concede by implication that Treasury's financial program is workable and will not benefit the enemy (points raised in your letter of December 6 and in cables from our legation in Bern--see particularly cable 6269, October 6);

(2) The British acknowledge that the real issue from their point of view is that raised by their Foreign Office as to what to do with the Jews evacuated. The British argue that since it would be difficult to deal with any considerable number of Jews, nothing should be done to work out the World Jewish Congress plan even as to a limited number of Jews, and accordingly they are "reluctant to agree to any approval being..."
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The British position has much broader implications than its relationship to this particular proposal. If it prevails, it means that we should give up trying to work out any proposal to rescue Jews in enemy territory.

In simple terms, the British position is that they apparently are prepared to accept the possible—even probable—death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of "the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued."

This is not our view and does not represent the views of your Department. The question then is how to implement our convictions, keeping in mind that the benefits of any program in this field may be just as effectively lost through delay as through the failure to issue a license. This is especially pertinent with respect to the particular proposal in question since it has been pending since April.

I propose for your consideration that we cut the Gordian knot now by advising the British that we are going to take immediate action to facilitate the escape of Jews from Hitler and then discuss what can be done in the way of finding them a more permanent refuge. I am confident that the prestige of this country abroad is sufficiently great that we can prevail upon one of the neighboring countries to give these evacuees temporary asylum if we are prepared to take the responsibility for assuring such countries that it will not be permanent and that the essentials for life will be provided. Even if we took these people and treated them as prisoners of war it would be better than letting them die.
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December 20, 1943
10:30 a.m.

JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. Luxford
Mr. DuBois
Mr. Pehle

H.M.JR.: Have you heard the news?

MR. LUXFORD: Don't you see us smiling?

MR. PAUL: You fellows register good, because the Secretary didn't think John and I did.

H.M.JR.: Don't worry. This is one of the greatest victories.

MR. LUXFORD: It is coming our way.

H.M.JR.: You fellows don't know old man Hull. He has his teeth in this thing. I have told you fellows consistently not to say a fellow won't come through until the facts are in. The most significant thing he said today was, "The trouble is, the fellows down the line, there are some of them - I don't get a chance to know everything that is going on."

MR. PEHLE: He said, "You just sort of have to rip things out if you want to get them done."

MR. DUBOIS: Had he read the letter?

MR. PEHLE: He didn't say so, but it is clear he had.

(The Secretary asks Mrs. McHugh to take a letter to Cordell Hull on the Chinese situation.)
(Mr. Bernstein enters the conference)

H.M.JR: Bernstein, this is for you and White. When I drafted this thing for the President yesterday, did you know anything about a cable of December 9 from Gauss?

MR. BERNSTEIN: I'd have to know the content.

H.M.JR: About a loan to China.

MR. BERNSTEIN: No, sir.

H.M.JR: The other thing is, you fellows might have suggested to me--because, God, I have driven into White long enough--when you do a thing like this, don't you think you ought to supply State with a copy?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Of the memorandum? Well, of course, we only had it ready yesterday.

H.M.JR: I know, but you are the Treasury. Anyway, the President has both of mine, so you have got to get Mrs. McHugh a ribbon copy and one for me. The President has the original and the ribbon copy. Will you get the thing to her?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir, we have those ready.

Do you want a report on that cable of December 9?

H.M.JR: No, unless you know something about it. If you know something about it, I don't want to put in that sarcastic statement.

MR. PAUL: Well, we want to be sure we didn't have the previous -

MR. BERNSTEIN: Let me see whether we have it.

H.M.JR: Mrs. McHugh can wait to write this; but be sure we didn't know about it. We don't want to say, "It has been lying over on E. M. Bernstein's desk." (Laughter)

(Mrs. McHugh leaves the conference)
MR. LUXFORD: So Hull was worried?

H.M.JR: Worried! Wait until you hear what he has done!

MR. PEHLE: Can I go ahead and dictate the meeting?

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. PEHLE: Before we had had a chance to present the memorandum to Mr. Hull, Mr. Hull said that he had focussed on the cable from Winant and he had sent a reply. The reply was read and was to the effect that this Government was astounded with the position which the British had taken, and that it was not in accordance with the position of this Government and that Winant should press the matter.

MR. PAUL: ...This Government or previous statements of the British Government.

MR. PEHLE: And that Winant should immediately take the matter up with the British. Mr. Hull indicated that a reply had been received from Winant indicating he was seeing Eden about the matter.

MR. PAUL: We saw that.

MR. PEHLE: I didn't see it.

H.M.JR: In Winant's answer to Hull, he said he had left this matter to subordinates, but he would now take it up, himself.

MR. PEHLE: At this point, Mr. Hull indicated that some of these matters did not always have his attention, and that he found that it was necessary to go into such matters from top to bottom and avoid people down the line raising technical points, and that in order to get any action it was necessary to "rip" through any objections. It was then indicated that a cable had gone to Harrison.

H.M.JR: Wait a minute. I said that I just "thought you would like to know that we had in mind setting up a committee of the representatives of Friends and a representative of the International YMCA to handle this matter, not to have any Jewish representative on this committee."
And then Long interrupted to say, "Well, I don't know whether you are going to like it or whether you are going to approve or disapprove, but I drafted personally a license Saturday and issued it and cabled it to Switzerland as of last Saturday."

MR. PEHLE: That is right. Long then described -

H.M. JR: I have a couple of cold fish here! (Refers to Mr. Luxford and Mr. DuBois)

MR. LUXFORD: We'll join them in wanting to get to the next step.

MR. PEHLE: There were a number of situations in which an attempt had been made to rescue the Jews from occupied Europe. Long pointed out that the German Government had succeeded in thwarting most of these rescue attempts.

Now, do you want to recite in the record this thing about the Rumanian Government?


MR. PEHLE: For example, Long indicated very confidentially that about three weeks ago the Rumanian Government had petitioned for a separate peace and that this Government had replied that it was not willing to enter into such negotiations with Rumania at this time, but that if Rumania conducted herself in an appropriate way she would be given more favorable terms when the peace did come.

One of the specific items on which the Rumanian government was asked to conduct itself better in the future was the treatment of Jews. Long then said that within two weeks the Rumanian government had replied saying that the Jews in the Trans-Nistria area were being repatriated to Rumania.

H.M. JR: And they did this through Ankara.

MR. PEHLE: That was the second, "...was being repatriated to Rumania in order to protect them from the Germans." Later a cable was received from Ankara, Turkey, indicating that some four thousand Jews had been repatriated to Rumania from Trans-Nistria before the Germans stopped this
movement.

Long also referred to attempts which had taken place in the past to get German Government permission to bring four thousand children into the United States. In connection with this, the State Department issued visas to all of such children, but the German Government refused to allow the children to leave.

He also referred to the attempts to get German children into Sweden, where again the German Government raised difficulties and there was no movement of the children.

MR. PAUL: Also Madagascar.

MR. PEHLE: He also said that there had been an attempt to get Jewish evacuees into such places as North Africa, Madagascar, and Palestine.

In this connection, Mr. Hull mentioned confidentially that he was working on the British to get a revision of their attitude in the White Paper.

H.M.JR: Was it he or Long who said that they just can't let Churchill do all the talking on this thing; that we'll have to do some talking? He told me that privately, afterwards - Long told me - that they just can't let Churchill do all the talking about the White Paper; we have a responsibility, ourselves, and we have got to do something. The White Paper refers to White Paper on Palestine, which, incidentally, I wish you people would dig up. I have never read it, I am ashamed to say. Have you ever read it?

MR. PEHLE: No.

H.M.JR: Anybody? (No reply) Good, then I am no worse off.

MR. LUXFORD: We know what it would say, Mr. Secretary, without reading it.

H.M.JR: I know, but I'd like to read it.

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Long said that if Secretary Morgenthau had the time, he might read Mr. Long's testimony before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Mr. Morgenthau assured him he would do so.

In this testimony, Mr. Long said that he explained the various attempts that this Government had made to get the Jews out of occupied territory.

H.M. JR.: I didn't say I had read what P.M. said about Mr. Long's testimony, though!

MR. PAUL: I think you should make it clear, John, that the memorandum was handed to Secretary Hull by Secretary Morgenthau.

H.M. JR.: I want to talk on that, if I may. When we came in, before we could say a word, Mr. Hull said to me, in effect—he didn't say it in so many words—"I want to let you know that I have already sent a cable in answer to cable 8717 from Winant." And he hands me this cable, which was a very powerful cable, which I am to get a copy of. And in that way he took the wind completely out of my sails. And Paul and I did some murmuring to each other, and between us we decided that we should go ahead and submit my memorandum, anyway, for the record.

MR. PAUL: Which Hull read.

H.M. JR: Very hastily.

MR. PAUL: Particularly on the second page. I watched him.

H.M. JR.: But the point is that from the time I called the State Department and said that I wanted to have an appointment with Mr. Hull—from that time on something must have happened damned fast. Because Hull must have answered this cable from Winant. I told him in the message what I was going to see him about. He must have gotten hold of Breckinridge Long. Long must have issued a license. When I walked in there Monday morning, the decks were clear.

MR. PAUL: Of course.

H.M. JR.: But that is all to the good. It was that telephone call plus this fact that I was coming over, plus this outrageous cable from the British.
MR. PEHLE: Plus the letter that went last Thursday.

MR. LUXFORD: That is the letter.

H.M.JR: Plus the two letters that went.

MR. LUXFORD: Yes, they saw the record being built up against them.

H.M.JR: It just dynamited this thing loose which has been hanging for five months.

I just want to say on the record for you boys—I have said consistently that until I faced Hull on this thing, I wouldn't say that Hull wouldn't do the right thing.

MR. PAUL: We didn't disagree with that.

MR. DuBOIS: We didn't disagree with that. Just as a general statement, I think we all predicted that Long would come through with some very prize statements as to how much he had been doing. My prediction still is to the extent that this is left in the hands of Long and isn't dealt with by Hull that you are not going to have any substantial—

H.M.JR: That is over-obvious.

MR. DuBOIS: I shouldn't have said it!

H.M.JR: No, that's all right.

MR. PAUL: No, it can't be said too often.

H.M.JR: No, that is all right. Are you through?

MR. LUXFORD: Is there anything about 354?

MR. PEHLE: As matters were left, it was agreed that Breckinridge Long was to send to Secretary Morgenthau, promptly, the exchange of cables with Winant which we do not have, and cable 354.

H.M.JR: Let me explain. Then when they were getting all these cables, I said, "By the way, I have a cable in my hand from Harrison, No. 2460, in which it mentions a cable
No. 354. While you are getting all the other cables, would you mind getting that one for me?" Hull said to Long, "Make a note of that and see that Morgenthau gets that." I mean, it was a perfect opportunity, you see.

MR. PAUL: One question which hasn't been referred to was asked of Long by John Pehle.

(The Secretary telephones Oscar Cox, requesting him to join the conference)

MR. LUXFORD: We have been trying to get that material from Oscar this morning.

H.M.JR: He hasn't been in his office.

MR. LUXFORD: I called his assistant, who was at home with him yesterday, on this subject. They are coming back to Milt Handler who had worked on the Tunisian program. We are having lunch with him today. He will try to give it to us at this time, although they indicated they had nothing in writing. It is still in the talking stage.

MR. PAUL: John, you might get on the record that question you asked of Long, about whether his principal difficulty was from the German Government or elsewhere; and then both Long's and Hull's reply.

MR. PEHLE: It is on there.

MR. PAUL: You give the answer as you remember it.

MR. PEHLE: In view of Breckinridge Long's statements as to the difficulties encountered with the German Government, I asked Long whether the German Government constituted the principal difficulty, or whether the difficulty was in finding a refuge for the evacuees.

This is my recollection--you correct me. Long and Hull both indicated that both elements were substantial difficulties. Is that right?

MR. PAUL: But they seemed to turn to the difficulty of finding a refuge, and Hull told about his efforts in South America.
MR. PEHLE: At the Havana Conference.

MR. PAUL: Some place in South America. And how he couldn't get the governments down there to agree.

MR. PEHLE: Hull said that at the Havana Conference he had pleaded with all of the governments to allow refugees to come in their countries without any success whatsoever, and that they had not been able to make any headway with the French in North Africa or the British on these problems.

Can we get in something about your talk privately with Long?

H.M.JR: Yes, then we'll go back on the Argentine business. You are a little curious as to what he told me, huh!

MR. PEHLE: Well, you told us part of it.

H.M.JR: Do you mind leaving the room? (Laughter)

Mr. Long took me into another room and said he wanted to talk to me privately. "I just want to tell you," he said, "that unfortunately the people lower down in your Department and lower down in the State Department are making a lot of trouble." He said, "There is a fellow by the name of Meltzer who used to work ..."

MR. LUXFORD: Meltzer! That is our ally over there!

H.M.JR: Well, he said, "He is the fellow who used to be associated with Feis, and he has been spreading this stuff." And he says, "I am storing it up." He spoke about everybody being anti-Semitic and all the rest of that stuff.

As a matter of fact, he said, "Meltzer is one of the fellows who has been raising technical difficulties. I think you ought to know it. I know that he has been creating a lot of trouble."

So I said, "Well, Breck, as long as you raise the question, we might be a little frank. The impression is all around that you, particularly, are anti-Semitic!" I looked him
right in the eye. He said, "I know that is so. I hope that you will use your good offices to correct that impression, because I am not." I said, "I am very, very glad to know it." Is Meltzer no longer with the Department?

MR. DuBOIS: He is the fellow in the Navy whom I got that information from.

H.M.JR: You have got a report for me on that?

MR. DuBOIS: Yes. Meltzer is the one who gave me all this information, how he and Feis were in favor of it and all the rest had opposed it, and how he had tried to fight to put the thing through.

H.M.JR: You gave me a report.

MR. LUXFORD: Let's say, if you are looking for objective evidence on that, when Meltzer came over to the Treasury, he was the only State man that argued for it.

H.M.JR: So that was the gist of his conversation. So I said, "Well, look at this cable from Ambassador Gauss." I said, "Here I go over to see the President at his request; and I may have recommended something to him diametrically opposed to what your Ambassador said, because I haven't the benefit of that cable." And when I went outside I talked to one of Hull's secretaries. I said, "Here it is." He was ready to give it to me, and it was un paraphrased and it was dated December 9. They always give me those unparaphrased. Hull said, "No, no, no; it can't go out of the Department." He said, "I'll have it paraphrased by one o'clock." I talked to this Secretary. It wasn't Stone; it wasn't Brown. He said, "You know, it is nothing willful about withholding these things." I said, "I know it isn't. It is just plain sloppiness."

(Secretary requests Miss Chauncey to bring in Meltzer report) You have never seen it.

MR. DuBOIS: It is a memorandum for the files which I signed, Miss Chauncey.

(Miss Chauncey leaves the room)

H.M.JR: Then Breckinridge Long said, "A cable came in here from Winant on this thing. It was two o'clock in the
afternoon, and I didn't get it until the next afternoon. I said, "Well, what do you expect me to say?"

Anyway, boys, thank's to all of you, all of us working together; we have done a job on them.

MR. DuBOIS: This is just the beginning, I am afraid.

H.M.JR: That is all right. You don't know Hull. Now, when Hull has his teeth into this thing, he will not let it go.

MR. PEHLE: Oscar Cox indicated, Mr. Secretary, that the State Department was very, very sensitive about being criticized on this issue. They are being criticized from every front at this point.

H.M.JR: Now, go on the Argentinian thing, and don't forget the dirty crack on me about Japan.

MR. PEHLE: At the close of the conference Secretary Morgentau raised the Argentine problem.

H.M.JR: Excuse me just one moment. This is the biggest victory that has happened on this front this year, and I am not going to let you couple of old owls sit there and say, "Yes, this is good, but what about tomorrow?" (Laughter)

MR. PEHLE: Maybe they agree with us, Mr. Secretary.

MR. LUXFORD: No, sir, I am very happy.

H.M.JR: We have got Hull on the thing now, and by God, in the face of the Foreign Office they have issued a license. This is what you wanted?

MR. LUXFORD: Exactly.

H.M.JR: And don't forget that I also said that this isn't just this question. I said the thing that I am interested in and the thing that bothers me--and I said this--it was that day--that is, to the British Foreign
Office, "These poor Jews are locked up in these countries; and when there is opportunity for them to get out, not one of them can get out. They have to stay there and die." Didn't I say that? On the broader front, it isn't Jews, this one license--

MR. PEHLE: That is right.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, there is one little thing in the discussion here that sounded as though State was again taking the line they couldn't find a permanent refuge for these people.

MR. PEHLE: Talked about Sicily.

H.M.JR.: I talked about Sicily, and I mentioned Sardinia, and what's-his-name mentioned Southern Italy. Southern Italy wasn't so good, but it would be a camp. But Breckenridge Long said, "We don't want any concentration camp, just a nice place for them to stay."

MR. LUXFORD: Let them die.

H.M.Jr.: No concentration, just a camp.

(Miss Chauncey reenters the conference.)

MISS CHAUNCEY: I am not finding it.

H.M.JR.: Then maybe he didn't give it to me.

MR. DUBOIS: I handed it to you about a week and a half ago.

H.M.JR.: There is nothing at the house now.

MR. LUXFORD: Can't you give him a copy right now?

MR. DUBOIS: I don't have one here.

H.M.JR.: All right, let it lay.

MR. DUBOIS: Here is a copy right here. (Hands the Secretary a copy of the report)
H.M.JR: Let's get this Argentinian thing over, if Cox is coming in. I have not seen that.

MISS CHAUNCEY: I haven't either, Mr. Secretary.

MR. DUBOIS: Remember, I gave you all that information orally, and then you asked me to bring you up the memorandum, which I did. I handed it to you directly.

MISS CHAUNCEY: I will see if we have it in there, but I don't remember it; that doesn't mean it isn't there.

H.M.JR: I don't think there is anything in her basket, but you might look. I have nothing at the house, and it is not in that box?

MISS CHAUNCEY: I don't find it. You might look on Mr. DuBois desk. (Laughter)

MR. DUBOIS: I won't take that lying down. You sent me a note asking me to bring it up. I came up and handed it to you personally.

H.M.JR: Well, look at my desk. There is no other catch-all. What I have done is, I kept the stuff in here (Indicating file); to stop all this argument, there is no catch-all other than that basket.

MR. DUBOIS: I bet you five dollars it is somewhere in your office.

H.M.JR: That is too much money. (Laughter)

How about ten cents? Do you smoke cigarettes?

MR. DUBOIS: Yes.

H.M.JR: Well, a package of Camels.

MR. LUXFORD: He has a big advantage. He remembers handing it to you personally.

MR. DUBOIS: Mrs. Klotz was sitting there.
H.M.JR: I have a very simple system now.

MR. PAUL: It might have wandered to my desk.

H.M.JR: A package of cigarettes that it is either Miss Chauncey, Mrs. Klotz, or me—-is that right?

MR. DUBOIS: Or at your house?

H.M.JR: No, there is nothing at my house.

MR. LUXFORD: For a nickel I will put it back on DuBois' desk.

H.M.JR: I will give you a nickel to find it.

MR. PEHLE: At the close of the conference, Secretary Morgenthau asked Mr. Hull where we now stood on Argentina. Mr. Hull said that replies had been received from the five countries which gave divided answers. Mr. Morgenthau pointed out that none of the Ambassadors had followed Mr. Berle's line of worrying about the United States using the big stick and acting inconsistently with the good neighbor policy.

Mr. Hull said that he was working constantly on dropping Argentina from the Inter-American Defense Council and two other important Latin American committees. He said that it would be very significant if this action was taken, since it would be taken on the basis that the actions of Argentina are inimicable to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, and that such action would be joined in by the other Latin American countries.

(Mr. Cox entered the conference.)

MR. PEHLE: Secretary Hull then said that the Government of Argentina now consisted of hard-boiled military people who, as a group of buccaneers, had grabbed control of the Government by force, and that due to the war the Argentine people were getting sleek and fat and filled with lethargy and would not exert themselves to overthrow their present Government, but that he was
working constantly on taking effective action. He felt that dropping Argentina from the Council of the Latin American Countries would be a very significant step.


MR. PEHLE: It would be a very significant step against Argentina, and that he was still considering other action which could be taken.

In this connection Mr. Hull referred to the fact that a group of Congressmen had recently publicly recommended that this country take possession—permanent possession—of the Galapagos Islands, and that as a result of this public announcement, the United States had not even been able to renew its lease on these Islands for the duration of the war.

Mr. Hull seemed to be making the point that the State Department knew best about such matters and that they should not be aired in the press.

He then referred to the situation with regard to Japan, where there had been some insistence that Japan be frozen and that Mr. Hull had had to postpone this action because of the responsibility which he had in being sure that the country was ready for war, and the fact that Mr. Hull bore the ultimate responsibility in such matters.

H.M.JR: ...that other people didn't know all the facts.

Now, this is what happened: This is one of the most amazing stories since I have been in Washington, it is unbelievable. Around twelve Saturday I phoned Hull's office and found he was home. I made an appointment to see him Monday with regard to this cable from Winant. I walked in there this morning, and Hull handed me a cable on a pink sheet which he had sent to Winant, calling down the Foreign Office in the kind of language I have never seen before, saying it was unbelievable, outrageous, and so forth, and so on, that he should send such a message.
He was wholly out of sympathy with the British Foreign Office. A much stronger message I have never seen.

He already has an answer back from Winant, in which he said that he had left it to some of his underlings to follow through on this thing, but in the light of Mr. Hull's cable he would personally see to it. That is incident number one.

Incident number two, on Saturday, the great liberal, Mr. Breckenridge Long, sat down and drafted a license to be issued to Riegner himself, and said he didn't have time or anything else to show it to the Treasury, but he drafted it and ordered Harrison to issue this license to Riegner, and he hoped that we liked it—a license was issued on Saturday in the face of what the British said. Now, that was the reasoning I got this morning.

MR. COX: That was wonderful—looks like that one telephone call started something.

H.M.JR: That, plus these other messages. Then when we did a little consultation and decided we would go ahead anyway and give them our memorandum, which Hull read very shortly—and during the course of the conversation I had a chance to say this wasn't just this incident. It seemed to me that due to the attitude of the British Foreign Office the Jews had been locked up in Europe and were not permitted to escape where there were avenues of escape. Then Mr. Long went on to recite to us the various things he had done the last two years to get them out, and how the German Government and Army had always blocked them.

And we are now sitting here waiting impatiently for an answer as a result of Winant calling on Anthony Eden. I asked that when that message came in would they please let me know. They said I could go over and get it and see Mr. Hull himself.

Mr. Hull said, "Of course, the people down the line get hold of these things. When I don't know about them, I just can't handle them. But down the line they just don't understand these things."
MR. COX: Your judgment last night was that, and I think it is true. I think if you call these matters to Hull's attention, in terms of specific situations, you get action down below, and are likely to get pretty tough action.

Administratively he doesn't know all these things happen.

H.M.JR: I have been saying all along, "Until Mr. Hull turns me down I am going to take the position I think he is all right." It was proven this morning that he was all right, because around twelve Saturday with Hull home a license had been issued. A powerful cable has gone to Winant, and Winant comes back with a wire in which he said that he left this thing to supporters. Now, he would get busy himself, and this was as tough a message as I have ever seen.

MR. COX: I think it is also very significant that Winant has been brought into this thing, because as far as the will to do anything is concerned on this kind of a problem, Winant will be a hundred percent.

MR. PEHLE: We brought him in.

MR. COX: I know, but the fact is, he is in now, and the likelihood of a recurrence way down the line -

H.M.JR: In Winant's shop?

MR. COX: That is right.

H.M.JR: One thing I didn't say. These things come back as we talk. This is really, if it weren't tragic, funny. They told me that Breckinridge Long asked to take me out to talk to me alone. Of course, he realized that the fellows down the line in his shop were making all the trouble with Meltzer who was telling everybody in the State Department that Long was anti-Semitic. I said, "Well, of course, Breck, you might just as well know it, the person they think is the most anti-Semitic is you." So he said, "Well, I am relying on you to see that that impression is changed, because I am not." So I said,
"Well, also, since we are being so frank, you might as well know that the impression has grown in the Treasury that the feeling in the State Department is just the same as expressed in that cable from London about the Foreign Office; there is no difference." The gloves were off in a nice way.

I didn't tell you that.

MR. PEARLE: No, that is right.

H.M. JR: And he protested and he hoped he could work with me, and hoped I would read his testimony.

I said, "After all, Breck, the United States of America was created as a refuge for people who were persecuted the world over, starting with Plymouth."

And I said, "That was the concept of the United States, and as Secretary of the Treasury for one hundred and thirty-five million people—I am carrying this out as Secretary of the Treasury, and not as a Jew."

So he said, "Well, my concept of America as a place of refuge for persecuted people is just the same." So I said, "I am delighted to hear it."
MR. COX: That is what he testified to before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

H.M.JR: I didn't know. Well, I think these boys and everybody, and yourselves, these exchanged letters, these tough letters, this memorandum of Paul's which was tough as hell, and all of that stuff is just dynamite to this thing.

But the tragic thing is that--dammit!--this thing could have been done last February.

MR. LUXFORD: We had to get the evidence on them.

H.M.JR: But why get the evidence?

MR. PEHLE: He means they should have gone ahead last February.

MR. LUXFORD: We agree.

H.M.JR: But just stop and think. Here, suddenly, out of a clear sky, without consultation with the Treasury, Breckinridge Long on his own issues a license that this thing can be done.

MR. DuBOIS: When way back in February they were even trying to prevent messages from coming over.

MR. LUXFORD: You see why that was, Mr. Secretary; what I suspect happened is that when we sent our first letter they came back and said, "We don't like your implications." They tried to give an excuse. We devastated their excuses. That left them only one thing.

H.M.JR: Don't you fellows feel a little good about this? (To Cox) These fellows are regular icicles over here.

MR. PAUL: What do you want us to do?

H.M.JR: Well, kick up your heels! I once saw Lew Douglas get on that table, roll over on his back, and throw his heels in the air.
MR. COX: These fellows are more conservative than Lew Douglas. Mr. Secretary, this is not dissimilar to the job you did on aid to the Allies in the early days. That is, you get a great deal of inertia, and finally you blast something out and set a new path.

The most significant thing in my mind in this case, quite aside from the water that has gone over the dam and things that should have been done, is that by having started on this Rumanian thing and this particular problem it is likely to have a major effect on the whole shooting match. That is really the significant thing.

H.M.JR.: And I don't know whether you will agree with me, that this was the time to bring up this idea of a committee, because if Hull personally is going to carry the ball and by walking across the street we don't need any committee.

MR. PEHLE: Not only that, but that would have been a poor time to raise it.

MR. COX: I think under the circumstances the committee shouldn't have been raised at this point.

H.M.JR.: Now, the other thing which Hull told us is that he has taken upon himself to begin to look into this matter of the Palestinian White Paper.

MR. COX: The problem is not only the looking into it, but the practical sequel to this problem; that is, the British can't possibly resist letting refugees go into Palestine, if you have them an asylum in the neutral countries, because then you don't get into theoretical discussions of whether the White Paper should be permanently or temporarily amended. You decide as a practical matter they are going to let 42,000 just go into Palestine at a certain time. They have already done that kind of operation.

H.M.JR.: Yes, I feel very, very happy, inside, because I was taking an awful risk with the people over there, you know. You didn't know who would take this memorandum, who would take this thing. Supposing Hull was cold on this thing, and didn't want to be bothered--that my memorandum was slipped to Nye or Wheeler or Fish. I realized all of it.
MR. COX: Sure. You were sticking your neck out.

H.M.JR: I realized it could get into their hands, and it still could.

MR. PEHLE: The State Department cable is exactly your position.

H.M.JR: So we are all right.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, I think that any solemnity that may have been evidenced here is at the next step.

MR. COX: These fellows give up hard.

MR. PEHLE: You see, their issuing a license, Mr. Secretary, doesn't get anybody out of Rumania.

MR. DuBOIS: We have got to still put -

H.M.JR: All right, now don't spoil it. I still taste it! I haven't quite digested it. I have seven stomachs like a cow, and I like to ruminate. I am in the process of ruminating now, and chewing my cud until I go through the seventh stomach--not the seventh veil, but the seventh stomach!

MR. PAUL: There will be a chance to move when this answer comes from Eden.

H.M.JR: Oh, and then in talking with Long I said, "I have got a call in for Halifax," because I was going to go to Halifax on this thing. I said, "Now that Mr. Hull has gone to Winant and to Eden, I don't think that is necessary." I said, "I wish Mr. Hull would talk to Halifax; if Halifax gets well, I am going to tell him what I was going to talk to him about." I'll let Hull talk to him. I don't think I should go to Halifax now. It would just muddy the water.

MR. COX: I agree.

MR. PEHLE: I agree.

H.M.JR: Now, what else is there?

MR. PAUL: What do you want?
H.M.JR: Well, I am just trying to think. I mean, the committee de luxe - you should let that die. That's my own feeling.

MR. PAUL: But he shouldn't have brought it up this morning.

MR. LUXFORD: He said, "You shouldn't let that die."

MR. COX: This is connected with a discussion which Stettinius had with Hull and Long last Thursday in which Stettinius took a very strong position on not only the license, the financial kind of thing, but setting up the refugee asylums.

Now, I think the follow-up, coming as it did, has made Hull much more aware of what is happening in his own department. Since it has gone that far, I don't see any difficulty in our proceeding to draft the documents on a committee.

H.M.JR: You could draft a document on the committee and you could put Hull on that committee. Then I can get that thing to the President.

MR. COX: I was just wondering whether you want to get it to the President for this reason: I think you had better leave that in suspense. I don't think you necessarily want in your relationship on this kind of problem with Hull to feel that you kind of steam-rolled him on it.

Now, if we get it out, it may be that when you see Hull and the thing develops after the Winant thing, that you may want to do it with him jointly; or you may want me as a free agent so to speak, through Crowley or otherwise, to get it to the President after you see what the piece of paper is.

H.M.JR: Well, let's have a look at the paper.

MR. COX: See what Winant's cable is--his report on the Eden conversation.

H.M.JR: Of course, there may be an explosion any minute, when they look at 354.
MR. PAUL: I don't think so now, now that they have amended their position.

MR. COX: One thing concerns me a little bit, and that is whether there is any likelihood that they may go after Meltzer on this thing.

H.M.JR: He is out.

MR. COX: But even so.

H.M.JR: He is in the Navy. What can they do?

MR. PEHLE: I don't think they'd dare to.

MR. DuBOIS: I think he knows too much for them to go after him.

MR. PAUL: Of course, they are after Welles for espionage.

MR. COX: Summer Welles?

H.M.JR: He simply told me that Meltzer talked, and so forth and so on. He said, "Do you know Meltzer?" and I said, "I have simply heard the name. That is all I know."

MR. LUXFORD: State could never touch him.

MR. COX: All I am saying is that somebody better keep an eye on it, just to make sure.

MR. LUXFORD: Except as far as his position in the Army.

H.M.JR: Is it the Army or Navy?

MR. COX: They may prejudice his position in the Navy.

MR. PEHLE: For further advance.

MR. LUXFORD: More than that.

H.M.JR: Oh, I don't think so; but who knows Meltzer?

MR. DuBOIS: I know him. We all know him.
H.M. JR: Tell Meltzer if any day a ton of brick falls on his head to let you know, and I'll take it up with the President. I don't want to go and say, "Frank Knox, don't let anything happen to Meltzer." Then he'll say, "Why?" Wait for the ton of brick to fall.

MR. LUXFORD: You know, Mr. Secretary, in this particular field Meltzer has always been one of the boys we had the most trouble with over there; not on this issue, but on others. It just shows how strongly he felt on this issue, that he lined up with the Treasury.

MR. PEHLE: We had an awful lot of trouble with him.

H.M. JR: Is Meltzer Jewish?

MR. PEHLE: Yes. On other issues he was terrible.

MR. DuBOIS: On this issue he and Feis carried the whole ball in the State Department.

MR. LUXFORD: It shows the extremes he had to go to, to come to Treasury.

MR. PAUL: That is what we meant by that phrase.

MR. DuBOIS: In our memorandum— in Mr. Paul's memorandum— we said it was unfortunate this thing had to be reviewed by people who weren't carrying the ball; that the two men in his Department who had been carrying the ball weren't there— one was Meltzer and one was Feis.

H.M. JR: Well, it is a good day's work. "Sufficient unto the day,"— but I never let the thing drop.

MR. PEHLE: We know that!

MR. PAUL: Yes, we have had some experience! (Laughter)

H.M. JR: And if and when we got ready, I think we could find that Stimson would be very sympathetic in helping us establish a refuge in Sicily or some place like that. I mean, Stimson would be sympathetic.

MR. DuBOIS: Nobody said anything about Russia?

Regraded Unclassified
December 20, 1943
2:25 p.m.

JEWSH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. Pehle
Mr. Luxford
Mr. White
Mr. DuBois
Mrs. Klotz

H.M. JR: Isn't that something?

MR. WHITE: They are scared. Long is scared—no doubt about it, in my mind. It has thoroughly frightened him. I don't think for one minute he is sincere, but it doesn't matter; he is frightened.

H.M. JR: About this thing in Bolivia—are they putting in a pro-Nazi?

MR. WHITE: That is right. One of the things we said about Argentina was that she was extending her influence into Paraguay and Bolivia. I didn't realize it was that imminent, but that is an illustration of what happens when you let a country like Argentina get away with the sort of thing she is doing.

H.M. JR: Well, I have got some stuff working on Mr. Hull. The Army is working with me. Has that happened since you have been here?

MR. WHITE: Probably in the last day or two.

H.M. JR: Did you know the Army has been up to see me?

MR. WHITE: Yes, Colonel Towson.

H.M. JR: Did you have a good time in Boston?

MR. WHITE: Yes, a very successful couple of meetings. They were the presidents of the biggest banks.

H.M. JR: Aren't you excited about what has happened this morning?
MR. WHITE: Yes. I am more excited about the way you are pushing them around. I think you are right in your evaluation of Hull’s willingness to go along, but I think that the other fellows are quite insincere in that they are just thoroughly scared. This was piled on top of the other things, and they probably feel very guilty and very vulnerable, and they will go along for the time-being, anyhow.

But I don’t think they would have done the thing if it wasn’t for the fact you pushed them and they are frightened.

H.M.JR: Well, it is high time somebody pushed them. Without undue modesty, I don’t know anybody in town who could have done it, unless the President, besides myself.

MR. WHITE: Unless there was danger of it becoming public. But they managed to keep those things pretty secretive.

(Mr. Pehle and Mr. Luxford enter conference)

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, you did not get the cable of January. You didn’t even get the reference to it.

MR. PEHLE: They took the reference out.

H.M.JR: You mean 354 isn’t there?

MR. LUXFORD: 354 started in the true text: “Your number 42,” so and so, which was deleted in the copy we got.

(Mrs. Klotz enters conference)

They left out the reference which would have been the clue to the first cable.

H.M.JR: Which is the first cable?

MR. LUXFORD: That was the one which described the conditions.

H.M.JR: I did not get that.

MR. LUXFORD: You did not?

MR. PEHLE: We didn’t ask for it. We did ask for this
cable, and when they gave it to us they left out the reference to the previous thing.

MR. WHITE: They were afraid you might tie it in.

MR. LUXFORD: You can easily fox them on that. Somebody walk over and say, "Let's see the original to see the kind of paraphrase this is." There you see the number. We do that frequently where there is doubt about an interpretation.

H.M.JR: You mean the January cable isn't here?

MR. LUXFORD: It is not there. And they have left out a reference to it so we cannot go and ask for it unless we go over and ask to see the original.

H.M.JR: How can we do that?

MR. LUXFORD: We do it very frequently where, in looking at a paraphrase, something is ambiguous, we'll go to them and say, "This is ambiguous in the paraphrase; let's see the original."

MR. WHITE: They may want to ask you what is ambiguous.

MR. LUXFORD: We can make up something ambiguous out of it.

H.M.JR: This is the one they said they wanted back today--December 18.

MR. LUXFORD: They have transmitted the paraphrase here.

H.M.JR: This is the paraphrase.

MR. LUXFORD: I know--two copies.

MR. WHITE: Who gave you this cable--under whose direction?

MR. PEHLE: Breckinridge Long.

MR. WHITE: I don't think Hull knows that is deleted; I'm sure he doesn't.
H.M.JR: The thing that bothered me and made me blow up through the ceiling--who do you suppose brought this over?

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Riegelman.

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. PEHLE: Sure. There is the conversation, Mr. Secretary, that took place between Mr. Riegelman and Mr. Fox in my office. Mr. Fox is my assistant. (Refers to file)

Now, I would guess they are using Mr. Riegelman on this thing, because of his relationship.

MRS. KLOTZ: Isn't that funny!

MR. LUXFORD: We have seen something like that.

H.M.JR: Well, Riegelman said, "Don't worry, from now on we'll not have any trouble on Jewish matters in the State Department. I am looking after them." And I got so mad that I have just telephoned his father to telegraph the boy at home to come to see me.

MRS. KLOTZ: We did it a little differently, because he may not go home, so he is going to call them at the State Department and say to call him from the outside; he wants to talk to him. So the boy will call the father and get the message.

MR. DUBOIS: We have some indication that Riegelman was in on drafting that letter that came over from State.

MR. PEHLE: The one you said had been so artfully drafted.

MR. LUXFORD: He was used in the drafting of it.

H.M.JR: And Riegelman said, "Don't worry, Cousin Henry, nobody knows I'm related to you."

MR. PEHLE: Not much. We knew it.

MR. DUBOIS: What a remark to make, anyway!
H.M.JR: "Don't worry."

MR. PEHLE: That is an interesting conversation, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: This is between whom and whom?

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Fox, who is my assistant on licensing matters - Riegelman called up urgently this morning, very excited. This is what Riegelman said: "I have been working on the World Jewish Congress case over here for some time, about two months. I am new in the Department, and have not been in on the background. This morning Mr. Morgenthau had a conference with Hull on the whole picture, which I hope has led to clearing the air. There have been some rather unfortunate things going on which are not wholly warranted on either side. Mr. Long asked me to contact you today urgently for this reason. On the receipt of Mr. Morgenthau's letter the other day and Paul's memorandum, we discussed the matter with the Secretary and it was determined we had better stop bickering and start something rolling."

MR. WHITE: "We had better stop bickering." Who is bickering?

MR. DuBOIS: Another way of saying they are licked.

MR. PEHLE: "As a result, we got off on Saturday a license. I urgently requested Mr. Long to show it to the Treasury, and he said, 'No, send it out and we can amend or cancel it later, if that is necessary.'"

"Fox: "When did the license go out?"

"Riegelman: It was sent Saturday night. I don't believe it meets your requirements. I told Mr. Long so. He, Long, said if Treasury is angry about the matter, it is 'on my neck.' Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Hull had a rather frank discussion. I think Morgenthau is likely to be talking with various people in your Department. Mr. Morgenthau read the license and asked for a paraphrase, which I have now prepared and am having typed and it will be sent to him today. I would like to show it to you and sit down and discuss the matter with you. The people who handled this thing did not handle it too well. I drafted
the thing, but I knew it would not meet your requirements. Could I see you sometime?"

H.M.JR: He, Riegelman, drafted it?

MR. PEHLE: He insisted he drafted it, in spite of the fact Mr. Long said he drafted it. He said, "Could I see you sometime today? I have a meeting at 2:30, and it will have to be sometime after that. I don't believe this meeting will last too long. If we can discuss this, and after seeing the license you do not approve, we should urgently send off a message to Harrison."

H.M.JR: Well, now, let me tell you who this kid is. He is a kid who has heart trouble. I know it, because he tried to get in an overseas organization and got turned down. I didn't know he was in the State Department. I didn't know he was there until he came through that door and insisted on seeing me, because he is related.

He drove an ambulance for the Canadians or English and made a good record. And then he came back. He is a very courageous boy; I mean, he was under fire and everything else over there in Africa.

As far as I know, he has no economic training; he has nothing.

MR. PEHLE: He is a neophyte in here, Mr. Secretary, and I am sure they are using him.

H.M.JR: What does that mean?

MR. PEHLE: He is a novice. He doesn't understand what is going on. He thinks this is bickering back and forth on technicalities.

MR. LUXFORD: Because I was worried about it today, I told the man he had been dealing with in my shop I didn't want him to have any further conversations with him on anything related to this unless he was given instructions, because I was afraid they would be using him against you.

MR. WHITE: They probably thought it would be smart to have some fellow who is dumb in these matters, so they will be able to say, "We have in our Department Mr. So-and-so;
he is even a cousin of the Secretary's."

H.M.JR: Let's put it this way: "He is a nephew of Ambassador Morgenthau's."

MR. WHITE: They'll make him a first cousin!

MRS. KLOTZ: Isn't that funny. That is just what he said this morning.

H.M.JR: I got so mad when I saw him. This boy says, "Don't worry, Cousin, everything will be all right on the World Jewish problem. I am looking after it!"

I don't know what to do with this boy, because he is a source of danger.

MR. DuBOIS: No question about it.

MR. PEHLE: He had tentatively arranged to discuss this thing this afternoon, and I cancelled that, so we have that whole thing open as far as we are concerned.

H.M.JR: I don't want him as a go-between.

MR. LUXFORD: That is what we are stopping.

H.M.JR: That is exactly what I don't want.

MR. PEHLE: That is right. And still, if he is selected by them, it makes it difficult for us to -

H.M.JR: Still more difficult when we try to get to see somebody over there.

MR. WHITE: Who is he supposed to deal with?

MR. PEHLE: He is working for Breckinridge Long.

MR. WHITE: At what level does he operate?

MR. PEHLE: About three stages below me, I should think.

MR. LUXFORD: He deals with one of my attorneys, or has been.
MR. PEHLE: Mr. Secretary, I just checked up on a number of Treasury matters, and my impression today is that he is not a dummy. He is right reasonably smart, but he is inclined to be very over-technical, and on things involving no big policy issue we have been held up by him on a number of things in the past two months, because he just raises all sorts of technical objections and has been an obstacle in getting things done.

MR. LUXFORD: Either an obstacle, or they are using him that way.

MR. PEHLE: That is the effect of it.

H.M. JR: Sending a kid like that over this morning! We sent the cable, in front of this kid, down to Harry White. I was expecting a Chinese cable. They were all bunched together.

MR. WHITE: It seems to me, under the circumstances, that you or Mrs. Klotz or somebody should inform Mr. Long that for reasons you don't care to go into, you would prefer that that young man was not used on matters which had to be taken up with the Treasury.

H.M. JR: I have another way of doing the thing. In the first place, I have sent for him through his father, you see, so he will be at the house tonight. And I have communicated with his father.

MR. WHITE: It is pretty hard to come from him, unless he resigns, which I presume it wouldn't be fair to ask.

H.M. JR: I can get him that job with Lehman. I think the thing to do is to get him the job with Lehman.

MRS. KLOTZ: Supposing you do that, though, and they put somebody else in just like that?

H.M. JR: They can't find anybody else like that. I didn't know the boy was here.

MR. LUXFORD: You still might want to call Long, though, for the record.
MR. PEHLE: I don't know. I think the thing to do is to deal direct with Long. We haven't had a chance yet, Mr. Secretary, to go over this license. My hasty glance at it makes me think it is not going to be adequate, in which case we will want to re-write that thing and then at that point we can either take it up--you to Mr. Hull--or we can take it up direct with Mr. Long. We don't have to deal with this person.

H.M.JR: I wouldn't dream of dealing with him.

MR. PEHLE: I know, but I say it isn't necessary to get him kicked out of there.

H.M.JR: No, no. The word that you want to use is persona non grata, as far as the Treasury is concerned.

MR. LUXFORD: As long as he remains over there, he can be used.

H.M.JR: I think it would be stupid for me to say I don't want him. I think the smart thing is to get the boy moved to Lehman--either with Lehman or ask Oscar Cox to take him over. Oscar will do it, see?

MR. PEHLE: I think that is much better.

H.M.JR: One or the other, but not tell Long. Oh, all kinds of implications Long will put, you see? I think it is necessary to get the boy moved out of that responsibility.

MR. LUXFORD: Will Long release him?

MR. WHITE: I think your suggestion is the best one.

H.M.JR: I have enough influence with his father.

MR. LUXFORD: You know you have to be released to transfer from one agency to another.

H.M.JR: Well, he applied to Lehman.

MR. LUXFORD: We don't have to cross that bridge, anyway. My hunch is to say he is persona non grata. "Well, why?" it
would be. "Can't your nephew be over there?" etc. But if he is just quietly moved from one place to another, we have got it. Don't you think so?

MR. DuBOIS: I would think so.

H.M.JR: We won't do it lightly. Long said, "I know Meltzer is the fellow who has been giving you that dope, prejudicing you." "Aha, Morgenthau put that boy in there. He is the fellow. We never would have had any trouble on the Jewish thing if it hadn't been for this cousin of Morgenthau's who was put in here as a spy."

MR. LUXFORD: That is what prompted me to suggest you still might want to call them and tell them not to do that--to make the record clear.

MR. WHITE: Or they could also say, depending on the occasion, "How can they be prejudiced? Why, the very man who worked on this, who is in charge of these matters for the State Department, is a cousin."

H.M.JR: I have had some experience, and after ten years in the Treasury I wouldn't know how to sit down and draft a license. I don't know how to.

MR. WHITE: What prior experience has this chap had?

H.M.JR: None.

MR. PEHLE: I wouldn't want to underrate his ability, Mr. Secretary. He may be all right. It isn't too difficult to draft those things if you go over all the documents.

H.M.JR: I know his sister. She is one of the freshest, pushiest girls I ever saw in my life. She was secretary to some professor over at the League of Nations. I never saw a pushier girl in my life. This boy may be the same way.

MR. PEHLE: He may very well be.

H.M.JR: His sister has the nerve of I don't know what.

MR. WHITE: The best thing would be if this lad were to apply for a transfer to another job, if arrangements were
to be made that he would get it.

H.M.JR: I don't know how much you can tell the boy.

MR. PEHLE: I wouldn't tell him very much, because he has gone into this thing and he had the feeling that the Treasury was in the wrong.

MR. LUXFORD: In fact, he was bragging about how he had stopped us—the last letter they sent us.

H.M.JR: Whom did he do this with?

MR. LUXFORD: One of my attorneys, Moskovitz.

H.M.JR: Where is that conversation? The second I saw him I got mad, because I smelt something. Why should they send my second cousin over here as a messenger?

MR. PEHLE: We smelld the same thing when he called, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: Has he ever called before?

MR. LUXFORD: Only on an informal basis. He has other business with the Treasury, and in the course of that he would mention this.

MR. PEHLE: He knows one of Luxford's attorneys personally.

MR. LUXFORD: Each time this man didn't know anything about it; he wouldn't give him any information, but he would say, "This fellow Riegelman is telling us about this case." Today I told him, "You shouldn't even discuss this thing with him."

H.M.JR: When you consider there are a thousand men taking the State Department examinations every year! They get the cream of the crop—people with Ph.D's. This boy, I'll gamble, hasn't anything better than a B.A. And they get these boys, fifteen out of a thousand.

MR. LUXFORD: I would doubt that he is on a Foreign Service.
H.M. JR: But when you can get boys like that - you can get all the Ph.D's who have been trained for six years.

MR. PEHLE: Wasn't he working for State in the field? I had the feeling he had worked for them at Cairo or some place.

H.M. JR: No, the boy drove an ambulance. He did well with it.

MRS. KLOTZ: I have something to take up with you before you go away, too.

H.M. JR: I don't know why you don't let him go through with the thing this afternoon.

MR. PEHLE: That is what I would like to discuss with you here. We haven't had time to study that license yet.

H.M. JR: There is some merit. It is my judgment it is a cheap trick, and my own inclination would be to call up his Royal Highness and tell him how does he get that way, and that you don't want that man working on those problems with the Treasury.

MR. LUXFORD: That is my feeling. We should be shocked that they would do it.

(The Secretary leaves the room)

MR. WHITE: The point is that a fellow like that better be out of the State Department, anyway.

MRS. KLOTZ: That is step number two.

MR. WHITE: But I don't think you should let Long, if he is responsible for it, get away with that. Maybe I am hyper-sensitive. It is little less than an insult, if you ask me, to assume that because he happens to be a relative he can smooth over matters of this basic importance.

MRS. KLOTZ: But he sensed it right away.

MR. PEHLE: He is entirely right.
MR. WHITE: Did you read this morning's P.M. on Long? That will partly explain his attitude this afternoon, in my judgment.

MR. PEHLE: Harry, there is no possible doubt but that he is scared.

MRS. KLOTZ: He should be. This is a dreadful thing. This is the most outrageous thing I have ever experienced.

MR. WHITE: It is criminal to leave this thing obscured in the files at this time.

MR. PEHLE: Suppose the Secretary calls Mr. Long and says that he receives these documents and that he would prefer that Long assign somebody else to deal with the Treasury on these matters.

MR. LUXFORD: It is more than just dealing with the Treasury, as long as he can be identified with this issue on State.

MR. PEHLE: But you can't tell Long that. You can just say, "Have somebody else deal with the Treasury on these matters.

MRS. KLOTZ: Why can't Long do it, himself?

MR. PEHLE: He can.

MRS. KLOTZ: Why not? This is the chance to ask for it. It is an important enough issue.

MR. WHITE: Another way to handle this is to do it all through the mail. I mean, he should be moved out of State. That is quite independent. But secondly, in order to make this issue, you can handle it the way State Department frequently handles it. They can do it all by letter; send it by messenger.

MR. PEHLE: You can do it, Harry, but it is hard to avoid -. You can't handle everything at the Secretarial level. There is a lot of stuff going on all the time.

MR. WHITE: I don't mean between Secretary and Secretary.

MR. LUXFORD: If you want it positive that we are
after action, you can't do that by letter. All you are doing is making a record. If you want positive action, you have to have some sympathy plus.

(Mr. Paul enters room and Secretary returns)

H.M.JR: My hunch is that you people go through today and see this fellow. That is my hunch, unless somebody has strong objections.

Now, I want to know what happens, see, because I was just checking with Mrs. Morgenthau. He met her in the hall and she didn't know what he was talking about. He said, "I have been sent over here from the State Department to straighten this thing out with the Treasury, because your people over here are very suspicious. I have been sent here to straighten it out."

I am going to have to stop now.

MRS. KLOTZ: They are all in favor of your calling Long and saying that you don't want to do this.

H.M.JR: I want to first see the boy.

You men don't want to use him?

MRS. KLOTZ: I am in agreement.

H.M.JR: I can't do it.

MR. PEHLE: We don't have to see anybody this afternoon.

H.M.JR: I am going to see him tonight. I'd rather let the boy talk and see what he says, so you can tell me. I always say, the greatest mistake Hugh Johnson made was to make decisions when he was over-tired.

MR. PAW: This is - is doing -

MR. ABOIS: The amazing thing - the omission of the reference to that cable.

H.M.JR: All right.
On Monday afternoon (December 20) at the Secretary's request, Mr. Paul called Breckinridge Long regarding Cable No. 354 of February 10, 1943. He advised Long that the Secretary appreciated receiving the documents Mr. Long had sent his earlier in the day but that we were having some trouble understanding Cable No. 354, in the light of Harrison's cable of April 20, 1943; that the Secretary felt that perhaps the paraphrase of Cable No. 354 might have been garbled and had requested that I check the original cable to see if it threw any light on the matter. Mr. Long stated that he would be very glad to get the cable and that I could come over at once and that the file should be available by the time I arrived.

Upon arriving at Long's office at 5:20 p.m., he advised me that Mr. Kiepolman, who was handling these matters for him, was in the Treasury Department at the moment discussing the license State had issued to Berne on this matter and that in Kiepolman's absence, he had requested his "assistant", Mr. Jack Neinstein, to locate the original of Cable No. 354. I avoided any detailed discussion with Mr. Long about Cable No. 354 (seeing that we already had his commitment to examine it), and similarly, avoided any detailed discussion regarding this whole issue. While we were waiting Long took the opportunity of advising me of how shocked he had been at the cable setting forth the British attitude on this issue and how he had personally prepared the reply, the tremendous amount of work that was constantly flowing over his desk, and how impossible it was to check in detail each of the many cables going out daily, how difficult it was to coordinate the various offices that had to participate on matters of this kind. He also mentioned how little reward there was for a man in his job, since the public in general misunderstood the State Department, and Congress would never give them enough money to do the job.
After waiting about twenty minutes for the cable, I mentioned to Mr. Long that it was unfair for me to be keeping him from his work while we were waiting for the cable and that probably I should wait outside for the cable, since it was only a matter of checking it. He insisted that I remain while he made a further effort to expedite it. He called in his secretary and requested that she call Keinstein again "and very politely ask him if it would be possible to hurry the matter up". She returned in a few minutes with a file and stated that Mr. Keinstein had said that Mr. Long had had the cable in question all the time in his file. She handed the open file to Mr. Long, and I noticed that it contained the mimeographed text of cables customarily used in State (not in paraphrase). Mr. Long stated that this was not what Treasury wanted, since Treasury wanted to see the original cable. At that point, sensing that there might be greater delays, I suggested to Mr. Long that if the cable he had in his hand was the unparaphrased text of 354, it might be just as helpful as the original cable. He handed it to me and after a few minutes of examination, I called his attention to the fact that the paraphrase which he had transmitted to us earlier in the morning had omitted the reference to Cable No. 482 of January 21, which appeared in the heading to Cable No. 354. The specific reference in the unparaphrased text was: "Your 482, January 21, 3 p.m." I stated that this appeared to explain the difficulties we had in understanding 354, since obviously it could only be understood in terms of the cable referred to, that is, No. 482, particularly in understanding Harrison's reference to it in the cable of April 20.

Riegolman had come in about the time Long handed to me the unparaphrased copy of 354 and reported to Mr. Long regarding his discussion with the Treasury representatives concerning the license. He stated that Treasury was continuing to examine the license which State had issued and did not appear to have very many objections.

Long stated that he did not know what the contents of the missing 482 were. Riegolman interrupted, stating that he "thought" that it was a cable from Harrison transmitting the objections of
the Swiss to the use of the diplomatic pouch for the transmission of private messages. I advised Mr. Long that if it were agreeable to him, I knew that the Secretary would want to have the text of Cable No. 482 and he indicated his willingness to obtain it. He then called Mr. Geist, who is in charge of the files, and asked him if it would not be possible to obtain that file at once, since the Secretary of the Treasury wanted it. He then advised me that Mr. Geist had stated that their file rooms closed at 5:30 and there was no one in the files, and that Cable No. 482 could not be obtained until morning. He turned to Kiegolman and instructed him to obtain Cable No. 482 the first thing in the morning and to make it available to me. Mr. Kiegolman promised to do so.
December 20, 1943

Dear Secretary Morgenthau:

Attached is a copy of the House Foreign Affairs Committee document on refugees that I mentioned in our discussion yesterday.

Again I take my hat off to you for having struck some good blows for the cause of the nation.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

The Secretary of the Treasury

Attachment
RESCUE OF THE JEWISH AND OTHER PEOPLES IN NAZI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H. Res. 350 and H. Res. 352
RESOLUTIONS PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE OF A COMMISSION TO EFFECTUATE THE RESCUE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE OF EUROPE

NOVEMBER 26, 1943

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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HEARINGS

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NOTICE

Since this hearing was held, during which time the testimony contained herein was given, it has been determined that it need not be held in confidence any longer and it is consequently released for public information.

By order of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
SOL BLOOM, Chairman.

REScue OF THE JEWISH AND OTHER PEOPLES IN NAZI-occupied TERRitory

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., Hon. Sol Bloom (chairman), presiding.

The Chairman. The committee will kindly come to order. The committee is now in executive session for further consideration of House Resolution 350 providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe, and House Resolution 352 providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe.

The Chairman would like to state that I asked Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to appear before this committee and give us information regarding these two resolutions. The Secretary asked me if we were to be in executive session so that he may be able to give certain testimony that up to now it has been considered advisable to hold strictly confidential, and I informed the Secretary that this committee has always kept its word when we were in executive session, and he would be asked to testify, and everything that he testified to before this committee, will be strictly confidential and not go outside of the committee room until released.

Mr. Long, you can testify with the assurance that whatever you say here will be in strict confidence.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I present Mr. Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRECKINRIDGE LONG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Long, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am glad to come before you, and I asked Mr. Bloom about the executive nature of the session because there are certain things which I think you will appreciate, as we get into them, that are for the time being confidential, and if they were not retained within the confidence of this committee and kept from our enemies, the actions contemplated and the operations would not be possible to be carried forward, and it would react against the interests of the people that we are trying to help and are interested in.

You have before you these two resolutions. I think that for a full understanding of them, it would be necessary for you to have an idea of what has happened and something of the history of this whole refugee question. It has never been disclosed, or put together or given to any governmental agency, and with your permission I would like to start at the beginning and carry it through. It will be a long
story. I think that it will be worth while for your fuller understanding.

I came to Washington the day after the war started in Europe. I came here by pre-arrangement on an "if" basis, if the war started. I arrived here on the 2d day of September 1939, and went to work for the Department of State and took charge of a division called, for the lack of a better name, the Special Division, which in itself was a basket in which were put all the emergency problems growing out of the war affecting the United States, for which there was no other agency existing in the Department to handle them.

The first thing that we had to do was to get American citizens back home, and through our efforts—directly and indirectly—more than 100,000 American citizens were safely returned to the United States from enemy territory.

ADMISSION OF REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES

About October or November, Mr. William Green, of the American Federation of Labor, came to see me one afternoon, and he depicted this situation:

There were in Lithuania a number of persons who had fled from Germany and Poland who were heads of the trade unions in eastern and central Europe. He thought that they were going to be destroyed and that this movement would be dealt a vicious blow by the Fascist governments because the leaders of the movement were going to be killed. Four or five of these men had been arrested, separated from their families or were held incommunicado. He asked me if we could do something to help them. We sat there and discussed the general principles involved, and among other considerations, we went back over the functions of the Department of State. Up to that time the Department of State had been the agency of the American Government to protect solely the interests of United States citizens abroad. If an American citizen got into a difficulty abroad and his rights were being infringed, the State Department immediately intervened in his behalf. He, as an American citizen, had a right to the protection of his Government. Furthermore, if he owned property in other lands and that property was confiscated by law or some damage done to its physical being, the State Department immediately intervened and tried to secure for him a reparation. Up to that time, the State Department had never intervened or undertaken movements on behalf of persons who were not American citizens, but as he and I discussed it that afternoon, we came to the conclusion the trade-union movement in the world was of interest to the United States and was a system that had its counterpart here and was a vital part of American economic and social life, and on that account it would be a legitimate activity for the Department of State to intervene in behalf of these persons who were threatened, as Mr. Green had portrayed.

We immediately took up the matter. Lithuania was then an independent government and we had a Minister there. The name of these men I forget.

We succeeded in getting them released from confinement. Each of these men and each of the members of their families were given visas to come to the United States. Two of the men took advantage of our

help and accompanied by their wives and children came, but two of them sent their families and decided to stay behind.

Actually, this was not the first action of the State Department to rescue persecuted persons because we had admitted to the United States as refugees from persecution in Germany, Austria, and other places, several hundred thousand of these people in the period from 1933, when the Hitlerite government began its efforts, until 1939. At that time we found ourselves at the outbreak of the war, but we had been active and had given refuge in the United States to several hundred thousand of them.

When the war began and Germany invaded Poland, there was a mass of people frightened to death. They had been frightened by the broadcasts emanating from Germany. The Germans tried to terrify the neighboring people of those countries, and when the destruction started, and the airplanes and the big guns and the big tanks rolled through Poland, the people were frightened, and literally several million of them moved eastward in front of the German armies. The roads were filled with people walking and riding with donkeys and horses and carts and automobiles. The people that did not have any conveyance were traveling on foot, the young and the old and the weak and the strong and the sick and the well, and as they went east they were eventually dispersed over various parts of Russian territory and found themselves behind the Russian lines. Some of them died at the roadside. Some of them were sick. Some of them were killed by machine guns of the Germans. Some of them rested where they were. Some of them, their shoes worn-out and their feet bleeding, were in a terrible state of affairs. Hundreds of thousands of them finally settled in Siberia. About 100,000 of them trickled down east of the Caspian Sea, and crossed into Iran, and we subsequently picked them up down there. The British took the able-bodied men and organized them into fighting units and amalgamated them with what they called the Middle East Command.

The women, the children, the young, the old, the sick, were given attention through the instrumentality of private organizations. We and the British took care of about 40,000 of these people. A few of them are still in Iran. Thousands of them are in Africa where places were vacated. The question arose of where to put these people, how to clothe them, how to feed them, and how to transport them. Our ships were busy taking supplies to the British in the Near East, and the British ships were busy reinforcing their own forces there and carrying supplies and ammunition to them, and it was difficult to find transportation to move them away from there. It was impractical to move them across deserts and walk them 500 miles from there to Palestine.

The United States contributed I don't know how many dollars to feed and succor these people. The Red Cross did yeoman service and it was one of our first big-scale activities. Some of these people got to Karachi, India, and were taken care of by the British Government. We arranged with the British Government to take many prisoners of war held by the British and thus permitted the cantonments which they had built for these prisoners of war in East Africa to be used by these poor refugees. We continued to send them relief supplies. Others of them came to us and through the allotments from the President's emergency fund which the Congress voted him to use in his discretion, he agreed to pay the expenses of bringing some
thousands of them to Mexico which country had promised to give them refuge.

Many of those people are in Mexico and others of them have not yet arrived, but arrangements have been made and they are on their way.

Now, that was the eastern movement. There was a northern movement. People fled from Poland, northern Poland, and from northeast Germany and fled north to Lithuania, Estonia, and Russia. Subsequently, the war in the west had started. Germany invaded France and the Low Countries, and when she attacked Holland and Belgium, the migration started westward. It was a worse migration and a more complicated migration than that which had occurred in the hejira eastward. This hejira westward preceded the onslaught of the German armies, and the German airplanes flew over the roads and strafed these people. The roads were so crowded that sometimes there was no movement on them. Automobiles would break down, tires would get punctured, cars would break, and the people that were in them could not move. There was no opportunity for repairs. The roads were clogged and literally millions of people went from northern France westward, and from Holland and Belgium westward, until they got in the neighborhood of Paris, and then converged on Paris. They went through Paris and around Paris as the German armies approached. They kept on going. All of them wanted to come to the United States as a haven of refuge. Our consulates were swamped. We then had consulates all through France. Some of the consulates were closed temporarily because of the war and some of them were burned, and the personnel had often to go into shelters just as the other people did. Some of our consulates were destroyed, but except for those interruptions, both before and after, our consulates were busy granting visas to these refugees as they applied to come to the United States. As the Germans occupied the territory which later became known as occupied France, they left temporarily, free and partially untrampled this region known later as unoccupied France, and we found ourselves in the position where, still having relations with Germany, we had our consulates and our diplomatic officers in northern France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and for a while we had them in Poland. We granted visas to a great many of the Polish people so that they could get out. Then Germany autocratically closed our consulates in Poland and we were unable to give visas to persons unless they could get to some consulate outside of Poland, and the Germans made it very difficult for people to travel so that they could get to an American consulate. Nevertheless, our consulates in Austria and in Germany, and in all the other occupied territories, were busy granting visas.

Then, finally, in June 1941, Germany notified us that our consulates would have to be removed from all of Germany and from occupied territory and the exercise of the consular function would have to cease as of the 30th of June of that year. So on that date we no longer had agencies within that territory to grant visas to these people, and we could not take care of persons and give them visas unless they got out of Germany, or out of control of Germany. There was no way by which they could reach our consuls, or by which our consuls could get to them because Germany had autocratically said, "You will have to get out by June 30," and we did have to get out, and we did get out, and the consulates were closed as of the evening of June 30, 1941.

The situation that developed outside of the occupied territories was such that some of them could get out and elude the authorities, and a great many of them did, and our consulates during this period of migration, during the westward hejira, were literally swamped. There were lines a half mile long every day, all day. It was not possible to give the proper attention to the people and comply with the requirements of law quick enough to take care of them, and besides that, we were bound more or less by the limitations placed upon us, bound by the limitations and by the law in regard to the granting of immigrant visas, and we exercised at that period a very generous and I think humane attitude toward the granting of visitors' visas which I will relate to you in some detail.

We found that some people got down as far as Marseilles, they got to Barcelona in Spain, and there were so many people that they got on boats and went across to north Africa, to Casablanca and places in north Africa where we had consulates. They trickled down through Spain and across the Pyrenees, and down to Barcelona and cities in Portugal where we had consulates, and in every one of these places our consuls were just so busy, busy as they could be for months and months and months, with the constant demands of the most horrifying personal experiences of these people.

Literally, the records of the reports of the consular officers to the Department of State form one of the most thrilling and one of the most saddening and awful pages of our humanitarian history.

One man tried to kill himself right in front of the consul because he was ineligible to a visa to the United States under the immigration laws. Another man fell down and grasped the knees of the consul and begged, and the other would fall down and kiss their feet and pray for a visa. Others that were able to and were in a different status and of some little means would slip in the passport a sum of money. They resorted to every expedient and manifested every form of human expression of a desire to get a visa to come to the United States. Under those circumstances, we found ourselves in a situation that the quotas were exhausted in the territories from where the people originated, and under our law, a man who is born in Germany comes under the German quota irrespective of where the man finds himself. If he is born in Germany he is under the German quota and the countries from which these refugees originated—Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, northern France, Austria, and so on, have relatively small quotas. The total quota for that area is about 37,000. Well, 57,000 visas were just insufficient to express the humane desire of the American Government and the American people to try and save these persons. During the 12 months which ended in June 1941, enough visas were granted to physically save 185,000 of these people, and in the period from 1938 to 1942 a total of over 307,000 visas of all kinds were granted to persons coming from enemy or enemy occupied territory.

Before I get into the home situation, I want to give you something about the problem to the north, the northern hejira. It was not the same problem to the north, the northern hejira. It was not the same because they did not have a chance to move. The people had moved out of Lithuania and Poland and out of northern Germany into the territory lying immediately north. They found themselves
under the jurisdiction of the Germans, and immediately thereafter, under the jurisdiction of the Russians, and then those States were incorporated into Russia. I received a delegation here of orthodox rabbis who came from an area to which I now refer, that is, Lithuania, northern Poland and northern and eastern Germany, and East Prussia, and they said that there were in those areas groups of rabbis, rabbinical colleges, persons who were the light of the church and who carried the torch of truth and the essence of the Jewish religion.

They were the cultural exponents of Judaism in these rabbinical colleges. These young men were being educated by the best minds of the Jewish people in that area. These young boys had been collected, and their teachers were trying to educate them to carry on the religious leadership of their people. Could I help them? I said that, of course, we would do everything we could. So they gave us lists of names on which there were hundreds of those people. We telegraphed those lists to our Embassy in Moscow with instructions for the Ambassador to communicate with each one of those persons and tell him that a visa would be given to him if he appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and identified himself. A great many of them came. The news got around that visas were to be had at the American Embassy in Moscow. Thousands of those who had not received notices and whose names had not been given to us also went to Moscow.

Many of them got visas, but many of them who were entitled to visas under our arrangement did not get them. They got on the trains and went on through to Siberia, down to Korea, through Korea to Manchuria, and finally to Japan. Some of them got to the United States. The names of others we telegraphed to the Embassy in Tokyo, saying, "If these people appear, you are free to give them visas." We did the same thing through our Embassy in China, which was then at Nanking.

Then transportation across the Pacific Ocean ceased. We got into the war. All shipping stopped, and there were thousands of these people in Tokyo. The Japanese Government allowed them to stay there for several months and then ordered them to move on further. They could not move, so the Japanese loaded them onto ships and took them down to Shanghai. They are now at Shanghai.

I have just recently had a supplication from another group of rabbis who are interested in one of the rabbinical colleges which started from northern Poland, went through Lithuania, all the way through Russia, and is today intact in Shanghai. There are 464 persons in this particular group. The rabbis want to bring them over here. They wanted to bring them on an exchange ship. I had to take the position that we could not accommodate them on an exchange ship, because that was for American citizens, and for every non-American who got on board, it would be necessary to leave an American citizen in a Japanese internment camp. I did not think we were justified in leaving Americans over there and bringing other persons out of there.

That is a faint impression, a very hurried painting with a very big brush, of the disturbances in central and eastern Europe, that precipitated these people, like the fragments of a bursting bomb, east through the Urals, south through the Indian Ocean, north through the Arctic, and south again through the Mediterranean and western ports of Africa, one of the most terrible and tragic experiences any

man ever had to go through. I have sat and wrested with the different problems that grew out of this, gauging the capacity of the American Government to do it, the instrumentality that could be used, and the moneys available. It is difficult to make a promise that we are going to help half a million people if you have not money with which to help them—and you cannot get money in 15 or 20 minutes or 2 weeks. Sometimes these problems do not wait that long for solution, and I will take up a few of them later, when I come to specific problems in connection with some of these activities.

That was the position in Europe, generally speaking, as we here, back home looked at it. We were bound by laws—immigration laws. We could do certain things; certain things we could not do. We did every legitimate thing we could do, and we observed the laws of the United States. The President set up what is called the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, headed by Mr. McDonald, of New York, and the acting secretary of which was Mr. George Warren, capable, able, industrious, intelligent gentlemen, each of whom had considerable experience in refugee work.

That committee was trying to save particular persons who were worthy to be saved in the cause of humanity—intellectuals—that is, authors, painters, orators, statesmen, political leaders, and publishers of newspapers, men who had, because of their race, religion, political beliefs, and opposition to the Nazi regime, incurred the enmity, animosity, and violent opposition of that regime, and who would be killed. That committee considered those people and submitted lists to the State Department, and we tried to help everybody that they recommended to us. They would receive from other sources the names of persons, and they would investigate those people and recommend to us the issuance of visas to them so that they might be saved. They did a very good work. We had some difficulty, of course, in meeting all of their desires, because from time to time we ran up against the problem of the security of the United States. Since I have been in supervisory control of this activity for the Secretary, I have never lost sight of the security of the United States. I might say, too, that we finally came to realize that it would be necessary to take a little different step, different measures, in order to protect the security of the United States, because we found that Germany was putting its agents in the guise of refugees in some of these migratory movements and that the idea was to have them get visas, come to the United States, and here engage in a pernicious activity against the United States. I think the records of the F.B.I. will show that there was quite a good deal of that at one time and that there were in this country certain persons to whom these persons were under instructions to report when they arrived here. So when that developed, we decided that it would be to the advantage of this country, and easier for the refugees, to handle the refugee problem if we set up in the State Department a control commission through which these persons would have to be screened. So we did. It took a little time to get it set up, but it was set up, and it has been functioning ever since. And more fortunately, it was functioning 6 months before we entered the war, and the screens through which these applications had to go, served to prevent entry into the United States of many agents who otherwise would have been here.
It has not interfered with the flow of refugees under the law. Of course, in 1941, shipping across the Atlantic stopped. When we got into the war, there was no neutral shipping. In December 1941, neutral shipping disappeared from the seas. Prior to that there had been neutral shipping, and some American ships had been running; but as of that time there was practically nothing. There are today a few little Spanish and a few little Portuguese vessels which are coming in here, and the State Department continues to issue visas to refugees. We are issuing visas to the extent of about 100 a week. Perhaps it is a little under, perhaps it is a little more; but it is in the neighborhood of 100 a week. They are all carefully screened, and they are persons in whom I think the people of the United States can have entire confidence.

But the point is that the historic attitude of the United States as a haven for the oppressed has not been stopped. The Department of State has kept that door open. It is carefully screened, but the door is open, and the demands for a wider opening cannot be justified for the time being because there just is not any transportation. There are vacancies on the list of quotas, and any wholesome, proper person who applies and applies for permission to enter the United States can, under the laws and under the direction of the Department of State, enter the United States.

Mr. Long. The movement of people has stopped. You cannot move anywhere in the world today except in the United States. You can go from the United States to Canada, you can go from the United States to Mexico, you can go from the United States to Cuba. This is the only place in the world where you can move. Anywhere else you have to go in across rivers. Everything is under military control throughout Europe. There is not one town in Europe today from which you can leave to go to another town in Europe without military control or some supervision or some permission. This is the only country in the world today which admits alien enemies by nationality into its intimate midst as citizens if they care to come—the only country in the world.

This is roughly—very roughly—the situation that appeared in the United States and the situation that existed in the United States. I have used the word "screening." I mean by that that there is a procedure set up in the State Department. It is an interdepartmental activity. Representatives of the War Department, Navy Department, Department of Justice, and Department of State sit, and through this committee persons are examined. If there is a negative decision, there is a right of appeal to a review committee which sits and holds public hearing. If there is a negative decision there, it goes above to two men, one of whom is former Senator Burke, of Ohio; the other member unfortunately died recently, Mr. Fredrick Keppel, former Assistant Secretary of War. Those two gentlemen served as a board of appeal. They were appointed by the President and were not subject to the control of the Department of State.

They could exercise their discretion in the admission of persons who had been denied admission below. Mr. Keppel, after a very long public service, unfortunately died suddenly. His place has been taken by Judge Helmick. Judge Helmick was formerly of the United States Court in China and has had a long record of public service and, I think, has the confidence of the people. Mr. R. B. Ribble, dean of the Law School of the University of Virginia, is the alternate member of the board.

If the decision is negative all the way through, at the end of six months there is an opportunity to reinstitute the application. That is as to the situation here, and we have glanced at the situation as it was in Europe.

All the efforts that we made to secure help for the people who were actually within the confines, jurisdiction, and control of the German Government ceased as of July 1, 1941. After that we were unable to do anything in Germany, in Austria, in northern France, in any of those places, as we had done before. We could not issue visas to those people because we could not reach them to deliver the visas. So there the situation has changed somewhat.

Something over a year ago a delegation of some of the Jewish leaders talked to me, and they thought that it would be far better if there could be, instead of one government being active, other governments taking part in this activity. Of course, we had no desire to inject any difference of thought in the circle of the governments which are united in the war. It was the United States Government itself and alone, practically, which had done most of these things. However, we did have the solid help and cooperation of the British Government.

We and the British were looking toward the placing of some of these people who found themselves in Persia. We have had the support of other governments, like Mexico, in its gracious movement to receive thousands of these refugees there. But by and large it was the United States and Great Britain which formulated the policy and which carried it into execution. We have taken into this country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 580,000 refugees. The whole thing has been under the quota, during the period of 10 years—all under the quota—except the generous gesture we made with visitors' and transit visas during an awful period. But, as I say, the United States Government is the one that formulated the policy and which carried out these various steps and kept on being helpful in every instance to every person who was persecuted, and we have recognized from the start that the Jews were the most persecuted and were the object of more antipathy than any other section or class of the people, though they were not the only ones. From time to time there have been terrible wholesale executions of other people, like recently in Poland after Hamburg was bombed out and made uninhabitable, just as Berlin and the country along the Ruhr are now being made uninhabitable. The Germans went into northern Poland with their armed forces and just hunted down the people there and killed them like rats and threw them away. Then they took over the houses of the Poles and transported to them their own people.

As I said, about a year or more ago several of these gentlemen came to see me and said that they appreciated the fact that we had carried a pretty heavy load, and they thought it would be more effective if we had other nations associated with us; if we could make this an international governmental movement and identify other governments with it. I
readily agreed. We then tried to cast about for a method of cooperation with other governments. The first suggestion made was that the United Nations be the body that would do this. However, after considering that suggestion we came to the conclusion that that would be inadequate, because there were the countries who were neutral and who were contiguous to the territory in which these people were being persecuted, and they would not be available as avenues of egress if they were not included in the movement. Then the idea was to get some of them or all of them, if possible, identified with us. When we had considered that, we came to the conclusion that it probably would be difficult to get some other countries to join a new organization during the war.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

So we considered a little further, and then we chose the product of President Roosevelt’s suggestion back in 1935, when he called the Evian meeting to consider the plight of the refugees and persons who had been persecuted by this oppression. There had grown out of that what was called an intergovernmental committee. Thirty-two nations belonged to that committee, neutrals and belligerents; but Germany did not belong, of course, because at that time this action was aimed more or less at a program which was being carried on by Germany. Likewise, Austria and the little satellite countries did not belong. But the other governments did.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Russia belong?

Mr. LONG. No; I do not believe Russia ever belonged. Thirty-two nations belonged. Here is a list of them, and I shall be very glad to read them: The United States of America, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Venezuela; that is 29. There were three others who belonged—Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala—but they have not yet joined in the present movement. They have been invited along with 17 additional countries, and if all accept it will mean a membership of 49 nations on the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees.

We decided that the thing to do since we had already a number of governments parties to this, was to revitalize it, reform it, invigorate it, hitch up the horse to the old servitude, and go down the road with it. That was the best instrumentalities that we had. We could not form another one because some might not join. It was carefully considered at the White House and the State Department. Mr. Myron Taylor, in whom the country has confidence, was the American member of the executive committee, and still is. He takes a very great interest in this whole thing. We confer every week. Sometimes two or three times a day we have talked about this.

BERMUDA CONFERENCE ON REFUGEES

So it was decided that we would do that, but it could not be done except with the cooperation of the British Government. Other governments were not as interested as we were, and along with the British Government in this activity, we thought we could induce the other nations to come along, because several of the units of the British Empire were members of the organization as well as of the United Kingdom. So we asked the British Government if they would confer with us to see what we could do along this line, and they said they would. We did not want a meeting either here or in London, and when the British Government learned of it, it said, “Let us meet at Bermuda; it is half way across.” So we said that was all right; we would go to Bermuda. At Bermuda we conferred.

This is a part of the record that is going to be extremely confidential from now on, until it is released, and I must ask you, gentlemen, to respect the whole of it, because it is difficult to pick out this part and that and say that one is more confidential than the other.

The conference at Bermuda came to some very definite findings and recommendations. While this goes on the record, I am asking the committee to consider it most confidential for the time being.

The discussion. Everything you have stated here today is strictly confidential. We are in executive session, and you need not be afraid that anything will leak out, because it is all confidential.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE

Mr. LONG. We have reached the point in my rather rough, rambling narrative of the refugee movement where we have tried to get an intergovernmental body to do the job which the United States had for so long been doing. We came to an understanding on the following recommendations of the Bermuda Conference. That the United States and the United Kingdom Governments should consult together with the view toward immediate action to obtain the use of neutral shipping for the transportation of refugees, this duty to be assumed by the Intergovernmental Committee after a revision of its mandate. Its charter did not provide for some of the activities which we considered it would be necessary to engage in. So we proposed to the British Government and have urged the member nations to enlarge the scope of their activity.

Another point was that the United States and the United Kingdom should continue their efforts for the release from Spain of the French refugees and other allied nations; if this should be unsuccessful, then both categories would be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee. There were in Spain at that time about 30,000 people who had come across the Pyrenees. There were French citizens, there were German refugees, there were all manner of people who had escaped into Spain. The Spanish Government had placed them in internment camps. Before we got to Bermuda, before this was engaged in, we engaged in an effort to try to get these people moved, and we had the cooperation of the British Government. Eventually it became necessary to get the cooperation of the Portuguese Government and the French National Committee in north Africa, because it was to French territory that we were planning to take these people, part of them for permanent residence, and part of them for temporary residence. But today the movement has been so successful that there are remaining now in Spain only a few thousand of these allied nationals. Of the stateless refugees who found their way in, there are remaining today only about 1,200. Provision has been made to transfer them—and the movement is now current; it has all been agreed to by the governments concerned, and the French Committee—to a place of residence temporarily in north Africa. About 600 or 700
The United States and the United Kingdom Governments adopted, and are urging adoption by the European Allied Governments, of a joint declaration concerning the return of the refugees to their homes after the war. That was a very important matter which will require the cooperation of our governments in the peace treaties. It is one of those things you do not want to talk about. We do not want to talk about it now. But the Axis Nations from which these people have been forced to flee must be forced by the peace treaties to allow the military, if necessary, to allow these people, if they desire, to return home.

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain and Russia alike have agreed on that post-war condition. It takes some time to get governments to agree on solemn matters, but we have agreed.

The next conference recommendation is that the Intergovernmental Committee be invited to revise its mandate. That mandate was not sufficient to allow these activities. We and Great Britain have agreed on the revised mandate and the whole thing is under way.

The next recommendation is that the membership of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened to include any nations which desire to participate in the work, and to invite other nations to do so.

The next is that provision be made for the procurement of public and private funds adequate for the work of the Intergovernmental Committee. The funds of the Intergovernmental Committee are to be provided. The United States and Great Britain each pay one-half of the cost of the entire project which the Intergovernmental Committee decides upon as being possible of execution, and which is recommended and acceptable to both of our Governments. Nobody knows what the cost of these projects will be or where the activity will be.

The administrative expenses of the Intergovernmental Committee are to be paid by the United States through a regular appropriation of the Congress. There has been in years past a small appropriation out of which we paid the secretariat and contributed our small share of the administrative expenses.

The next recommendation was that the staff of the Intergovernmental Committee be increased and a management committee created; that is to revitalize it and give it an executive committee with an executive secretary. Mr. Patrick Malin, who is well-known in the United States—he is a member of the Quakers, and their relief societies, and has had much experience in relief and refugee work—thus became the vice director under Sir Herbert Emerson, the director.

Furthermore, the Bermuda Conference stated that the following points be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee for its urgent consideration immediately subsequent to the ratification of its mandate; the possibility of finding countries of asylum for those refugees in Persia, for whom no destination has hitherto been allotted. Those are about 6,000 or 8,000 who still remain as a remnant of that mass migration, of which some 100,000 got into Iran.

The next recommendation is the admission of refugee children of France through any neutral country. We tried to save some children from France and offered to accept in this country about 5,000 of them. We made arrangements with the French Government to do so. The German Government refused to sanction the agreement. There
were about 200 of them who entered the United States instead of 5,000. The German Government absolutely and positively refused to agree to it but went on record as stating that it did not desire to have those children leave and would not permit it.

Another recommendation was to ascertain the possibility of the reception of refugees into various overseas countries.

So much concerns the Bermuda recommendations. Now, as regards feeding and financing refugees in neutral countries, since that time Switzerland has had an influx, like Sweden, except very much greater than Sweden—perhaps about 60,000 of them, if my figures are correct. About 60,000 persons have sought refuge in Switzerland since the declaration of war. Not all of them are Jewish people. Some of them are military; they are from the Italian Army and wanted to quit and get out. Some are American citizens who were living in northern Italy. Many are Jewish people from northern Italy, and some are Jewish people from that part of France which was under Italian occupation. Then, there are various other categories of persons making up the total of approximately 60,000.

Switzerland is confronted with a situation where she has to have some help. She cannot take care of 60,000 people when she is living on a ration. We ration Switzerland, Germany rations Switzerland as to the food she can import and the things she needs and what things she can export in return for it. Switzerland cannot just say, "Come in, there is a turkey for dinner"—there is no turkey. So there is under consideration by our governmental authorities the making of an allowance to the Swiss economy in order that she may be able to feed these people.

Another situation developed in Sweden, with reference to refugees who went there. Sweden graciously opened her doors and admitted somewhere between 8,000 and 9,000, of whom about 6,000 were Jewish. There were 6,000 registered Jews in Denmark, and about 8,000 people fled, and about 80 percent of them were Jewish and arrived in Sweden, so practically all the Jews in Denmark were saved. There were two small boatloads which we understand—not authoritatively, for it is hard to get information as to what exactly goes on in Germany but we understand there were two small boatloads taken from Copenhagen to Gdynia and put to work there. Germany is looking for labor. She has got all her own German men in the army, and she wants labor back home. She is making the people work as hard as she can for long hours and under hard conditions. It is forced labor. She has done it with a million French prisoners of war that she has had with the Italians that she has induced to go to Germany and with all the people she can drag out of Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and all surrounding countries, that are not German, and she makes them go into the German productive machinery and work 15, 16, or 18 hours a day.

Now, those were the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference. They constituted evidences of agreement between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on this general refugee problem. Since then, as a result of that, this committee set up in London is actually there at work today. There are proposals being made to it today and every day. It has regular stated meetings.

These are the recommendations which the conferees at Bermuda considered feasible to make at that time. It should be remembered, however, that the Bermuda Conference considered many other questions not named by these recommendations. The conferees in whom the British and American Governments had and have the greatest confidence considered every possible phase of the refugee question and particularly the tragic situation of the Jewish people of Europe. They examined every possibility for their rescue and relief no matter how remote it seemed at that time. It should also be remembered that the conferences, while not competent finally to pass upon the military considerations involved in many of these questions, had nevertheless to keep them constantly in mind.

UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF ADDITIONAL REFUGEE PROJECTS

I have here another memorandum. I think I can take up the things that have the support of our Government irrespective of projects that we have discussed in the Intergovernmental Committee program and the results of the Bermuda Conference.

The first is the question of an assembly center in north Africa for the refugees from Spain, which since its institution has been carried on by the United States and British Governments independently of the Bermuda Conference, although it was initiated by the Bermuda Conference, and it has actually borne fruit in that the larger committee have actually now given their formal consent to the camp and everything. Arrangements are presently being made for the transportation of perhaps 12,000 stateless persons out of Spain into Africa. I might also mention in this last transaction Portugal graciously answered our request to let them go through Portugal to Portuguese ports on the Atlantic, there to take ship down to Africa.

We have had also—we still have—the program for refuge for Jewish children in other neutral countries. In one case the neutral Government asked the German Government to let her take persons that would be selected for her somehow by some charitable or proper organization in Germany—20,000 Jewish children—and take them out of Germany and into its own territory, and that she would take care of them there and that we would contribute to their expense. The neutral Government was unable to get any favorable response from the German Government. The original inquiry is still in process.

The German Government, the request having been made some time ago, has not indicated that it will accept; nevertheless, we are trying to get the neutral Government to continue its activities.

Mr. Voris. Are there more than 20,000?

Mr. Long. There are 20,000 children in addition to other refugees.

Then we are going to support the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in its efforts to send food from Turkey, through the International Red Cross Committee, to the Jews in Transnistria. It is hard to get things. We have been trying to help the J. D. C. get food supplies, but the food supplies must be obtained within the blockade. The blockade military officers and the blockade authorities will not permit food to be shipped through the blockade to German-occupied territory or to Germany. I think that, with every assurance of success, this arrangement will be concluded.
There is the maintenance of Polish refugees in Mexico, which I mentioned on several occasions. It is not necessary to refer to that now except to say that that movement is still current. Only about 2 weeks ago another boatload arrived, and there are other boatloads expected. It is a question of finding ships that can carry people, even coming back from the fronts today, coming back across the ocean.

Then there is the offer to Switzerland of assistance in caring for refugees escaping from Axis-held territory into that country. We offered to help Switzerland and as far as our economy permits.

Then, there is the project of cooperation with the British Government in an endeavor to evacuate refugees from the Balkans to Palestine through Turkey. That has not been successful in the past. We had tried various schemes at the time of the Bermuda Conference. There was a proposal that two ships would be chartered; they would leave a port on the Black Sea and go to Turkey, from where the refugees would go directly to Palestine. They would carry 5,000 Jewish children. When they called me one morning, we could not find money to underwrite this. It is an expensive proposition when it comes to moving a lot of people and paying for their transportation and their keep en route. The estimated cost was about a half million dollars for this one trip. In the course of the day I could not secure funds. I approached the White House and got an allocation of $300,000 or so much as might be necessary to defray the expenses on the part of the United States, which would be one-half. Unfortunately, although we had the money and were ready, the project could not be accomplished because the German Government, in the last analysis, got wind of it and stopped the movement of ships and told the Rumanian Government she was not to be a party to any such movement.

Then there was a joint warning with Great Britain, through the Swiss Government, to Balkan authorities against the mistreatment of the people under Nazi oppression. I wish I had that document with me so that I might read it to you. I think it is the strongest one that the State Department ever sent.

The CHAIRMAN. You might put it into the record.

Mr. LONG. No; I understand that we cannot put it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you wished you had it here, and I was wishing that we had it.

Mr. LONG. But it was without effect. Telegrams sent to those people are not going to be given any attention.

Then there is the offer of assistance to Sweden in connection with her reception of Jews and other people from Denmark. We offered to do our part in making generous contributions, but she said she did not think it was necessary; she thought it was an obligation on the Swedish Government. She did not even want to receive contributions from the Danish Government in exile; that she would endeavor to advance all the costs necessary herself, and that some settlement could be made if any was deemed proper in the future.

There is a request for the International Red Cross to endeavor to investigate and report on Jewish atrocities in Poland, which has not been permitted by the German authorities. We have tried to get the Red Cross to act as an agent in order to get an authentic story, but the German authorities have absolutely prevented the Red Cross from taking any steps concerning the activities going on in Poland.

There is maintenance, in cooperation with British authorities, of refugees in Spain and the provision of means for their evacuation by intercession with the Spanish Government. It is still going on and about to be completed.

Then there is the support of the plan for removing children temporarily from Axis-held territory to neutral countries in varying numbers up to a maximum of 100,000 for rehabilitation in those countries where they could get food and where we would put the food where the children could be nourished and brought back to something like a normal state of physical well being and, after they had been there for 2 or 3 months and had gotten strong, they would go back home and some other children would come in.

Then there is the agreement with the British Government to underwrite costs of approved refugee relief projects put forward by the intergovernmental committee. The British Government and ourselves will each underwrite half of that expense. It is expected that other member governments will make contributions toward these expenses.

Now that, briefly, is the picture of Europe as it was, the United States as it was, and the present activities in which we are now engaged and the instrumentality which we set up, which was done after very careful consideration and deliberation in the setting up of this intergovernmental committee and revising it and amending it with funds and authority and everything we had to give it.

You are faced now with a resolution which "urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany."

Everybody that I know, everybody in the Department of State, and everybody that I have come in contact with is interested, and a lot of them have been active in endeavoring to save the Jewish people from the terrorism of the Nazis.

The State Department has had from the beginning quite an organization, which has been the agency of the Government which has been in charge of it. Acting for the Secretary of State, I have been in supervisory control and direction of its movements. Under me, as advisers and assistants, are three gentlemen who serve more or less as a council—Mr. Brandt, Mr. Travers, and Mr. Reams.

Mr. Brandt is my executive assistant and is concerned with all the activities of my office.

Mr. Reams is in the European division and brings to the conferences an understanding of the political situations developing in Europe and the benefit of his advice generally concerning the European theater.

Mr. Travers is chief of the visa division which, from the beginning, has been active and which is the organized center of the Department of State through which all of these movements above enumerated have been carried on. That is, the visa division is large, well staffed, and competent, and has been the working nucleus, the working ganglia in the Department which has functioned and is part of the organization which is carried on.
In that division also is the machinery for examining and screening the persons who come into the United States. They originate abroad and they come out of the same situation as the refugees abroad. So, naturally, it has been part of the same movement in two different sections of the Visa Division: one concerning refugees abroad and one concerning immigrants entering into this country.

That organization has been functioning, now, for 4 years and it has been very active in each of the phases of all this movement.

I have described the Intergovernmental Committee and the way in which it was set up and the fact that neutrals might not be induced to join a new movement the activities of which would be directed against what Germany would consider to be its interests.

There has been an agency of the American Government actually attending to these affairs for a little more than 4 years. There is now an international agency set up at the instigation and cooperating with the United States Government; and I think your committee will desire to consider whether any step you might take would be construed as a repudiation of the acts of the executive branch of your own Government, or whether any action on your part would be interpreted as a repudiation of the cause of the Jews—which would be very unfortunate or whether the action which you might take would constitute a reflection upon the actions of the Intergovernmental body and the other governments, members of that body, which have been associated with the American Government in its activities and which are currently very actively engaged in these matters. I think you will have been pointedly to consider that the Jewish people are entitled to every encouragement and expression of sympathy, and that you certainly would not care to make a statement or pass a resolution, now that one has been introduced, that would fail to include some very definite statement about the interest of the American Government in the Jews, because the Government has been interested in them. They have not been the only refugees we have been interested in. We have been interested in refugees; and I think there has been some indisposition on the part of some officers to accept the thought that the American Government ought to specialize and make it particularly direct that we are interested only in the Jews. We have felt from the start that we could not exclude other persons from our governmental and official activities.

I have thought many times of the very definite and pertinent fact that there is no man or woman in this room that I know of whose ancestors were not refugees. Mine were, every one of them. So far as I know, the ancestors of almost all of my friends came here because conditions abroad, and some of them were conditions of persecution—some from France, some from Sweden, some from England, Scotland, and Ireland. I know that a great many Germans came here after the movement of 1848, and their descendents are some of the very best citizens that we have here. We all run back, sooner or later, by nearer or farther degree, to a refugee who was our original ancestor; and nobody can think of the United States except as being a government composed of the descendents of refugees and interested in saving those who are in danger of their lives or their liberties because of religious, racial, or political persecution.

Members of the committee, I think I should bring my statement to a close and leave it on that basis.
possible to take while we had diplomatic representatives and consular representatives within German territory, but, when we got into a state of war with Germany, and prior to the state of war, when they excluded our consular officers, we were unable to carry on that function in Germany. We have been trying to get back into Germany since, but have not yet succeeded. I hope the day will be soon.

Mr. Johnson. I think that most of the witnesses who appeared in support of this resolution have agreed that the specific thing that they think might be accomplished by the resolution would be to find places for the Jewish and other refugees to go. They say that they think it is possible for refugees to escape from Germany and the occupied countries if they had any place to go. So they seem to think that if this new commission should be set up it would be able to get countries to say, "You can come here and we will give you a place to come."

This joint committee has been doing that very thing, has it not?

Mr. Long. Yes; and the United States Government, incidentally, and its representatives on that committee.

Mr. Johnson. So, if we had a new commission set up there would simply be two committees trying to do one and the same thing? Am I right in that conclusion?

Mr. Long. I do not like to state that categorically, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Johnson. I see your position. Your position is that we would want you to give this committee all of the facts in reference to what has been done and what is now being done, and then let the committee draw its own conclusion. In other words, you do not like, as a representative of the State Department, to tell this committee what you think ought to be done; you want us to exercise our own independent judgment. Is that right?

Mr. Long. I will say this, Mr. Johnson, that the State Department has always been, during the 4 years I have been connected with the matter, and is today ready to receive any suggestion from the Congress, from any Member of the Congress, or from any interested public official, and we will do the best we can to carry out any suggestion that is feasible.

Along the line of that thought may I read the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. Johnson. I wish you would.

Mr. Long (reading):

The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral or allied states or organizations and to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain, and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The operation of the Committee shall extend to all countries from which refugees come, as a result of the war in Europe, or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse, for the purposes enumerated above, funds both public and private.

In other words, they are given plenary authority to do whatever they can, within and without Germany and the occupied territories.

Mr. Johnson. I believe that is all I care to ask, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Chiperfield?

Mr. Chiperfield. Mr. Long, I want to compliment you on your statement. I think you have done a splendid job, and I think you

are doing everything that can be done. From the testimony which you have given, it is obvious to me that a great deal of the negotiations must be secret, because, as you stated, there was one movement out of Germany that the Germans learned of, and then it was not successful. Under those circumstances, if we were to vote this resolution down, I wonder if the statement that we might give out to the press should be very carefully drawn, and I am wondering if it would be within your province, if this committee did draw up some kind of a statement and asked for your approval, for you to give it to us.

Mr. Long. I think it would be very dangerous to vote it down, very unwise, in a way. It is on the table, and receiving the consideration of the members of the committee. I think this is a very important moment in the history of this refugee movement, and I think the Jewish people are looking forward to this action and the decision of the committee, and I think that if entirely negative action were taken here it would be misconstrued and might react against the Jewish people under German control.

Mr. Chiperfield. I certainly would not want that to happen. Is it your suggestion that we pass the resolution?

Mr. Long. Yes; and the United States Government, incidentally, and its representatives on that committee.

Mr. Chiperfield. We all want to be helpful.

Mr. Long. Yes; I am sure of that.

Mr. Chiperfield. It is simply a matter of the best way to accomplish the result.

Mr. Long. You may come to that decision in your deliberations. If you are finished with me, I should be glad if you would allow me to retire.

Mr. Chiperfield. That is all, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Burgin?

Mr. Burgin. I do not know that I have any questions. I want to tell the Secretary, of course, how I appreciate his coming here and telling the committee about his activities in connection with this matter. I did have in mind asking you if you thought it would be advisable or necessary to pass a resolution that would implement your efforts.

Mr. Long. I will have to leave that to the committee. I can tell you what the circumstances are and what the history of the movement has been and how we have participated and how we have organized to handle the situation, but I must allow the committee to draw its own conclusion.

The Chairman. Mr. Voris.

Mr. Voris. Mr. Secretary, after hearing your statement I am not very much disposed to take any action which would be in the nature of saying, "Call a policeman," or that I would simply say to the President and the Secretary of State, "Why don't you do something about this?"

There are two things I wondered about. Possibly you have covered them in your earlier statement. One was that we have before us another resolution urging action with reference to feeding of children with an attempt to have this committee and the Congress make a gesture toward breaking the blockade to that extent.
Would you care to give us your view on that?

Mr. Long. Yes; I would be very glad to, Mr. Voris. The fact is that those matters, in the last analysis, were decided by the blockade authorities, and there has been imposed an absolute prohibition against the importation of bulk foodstuffs into occupied territory through the blockade. They have permitted and we have permitted and encouraged the purchase of foodstuffs within the blockade for distribution in Turkey, Spain, and Portugal; and we have even generously construed Portugal as being within the blockade, to include sardines and other fish which she goes out of the blockade to catch. But we have considered that as within the blockade, and not penetrating the blockade. This goes only to neutral countries or to Red Cross agencies. The neutral countries get allowances further under the Board of Economic Warfare's negotiations carried on under the supervision of the Department of State on economic matters, and they are allowed to import and to buy in exchange for certain exports and certain political actions certain quantities of food and material to carry along their economic life.

As regards the Red Cross activities, the importations consist of food and clothing. The food is in the form that goes to prisoners of war and consists of packages of about 11 pounds weight, of which every American soldier gets one package per week. It consists of concentrated foods and one thing and another, and there are great warehouses and places where we reserve supplies shipped in advance so that they will always be allowed to have it, both in Switzerland and in Sweden, and they are actually delivered to the persons for whom they are intended and receipts are received. Clothing goes to prisoners of war and to our allied prisoners of war. We have allowed our allies under lend-lease and by direct purchase clothing which the Board of Economic Warfare has permitted. The clothes have to be marked and made distinguishable. They are not military uniforms, but stripes are woven into the material so that the Germans cannot get and use the things. They include caps, coats, underclothes, pants, shoes, and also medical supplies. For instance, there is just now being sent to France 20,000,000 units of insulin for distribution to the people in France, the general population.

Mr. Voris. We have been told that the Germans would be willing to relax the blockade sufficiently to permit food for children to go through. There have been experiments which show that this food would go through and get to the children and not get to the Germans and would not be a substitute for German food. But while the blockade is on it cannot be done, which sounds like an extremely harsh view.

Mr. Long. The blockade authorities, Mr. Voris, have two points of view in mind. The first is the fact that if you send a week's supply of food, and supply it each week to a family in Antwerp, the German Government uses the food that the family would otherwise use; and irrespective of whether this food reaches that family, it is a contribution to the welfare and the fighting strength of the German Army, because that much food is released for the German Army.

The second is that we have tried time and again to get the consent of the German Government to have an organization go into it and have direction and control of the articles in question, and we have not succeeded in obtaining the consent of the German Government, excepting in certain matters of the Red Cross under the Geneva Convention. Everybody except the Japanese were parties. I think the Russian Government was not a party either.

Mr. Voris. One further question. Two or three of the witnesses have stated to the committee that either the direct or the ultimate purpose of this resolution is to open Palestine to the Jews.

Mr. Long. I do not consider it as concerned with the Palestine question.

Mr. Voris. Some of the witnesses have said they did not consider it as concerned with it. Others have said they considered it as concerned with that question; and one said it was the only solution to any commission which would be created. So we have had a good bit of discussion about that matter before us. Would you care to give us the facts as to that situation?

Mr. Long. I cannot give you the facts; I can only give you my own reaction. I have not heard that point of view expressed, and the thought had never occurred to me that it had any relation to Palestine except that incidentally persons who were going out of Africa might go to Palestine if there was opportunity; and I understand there is continuing opportunity.

The Chairman. I have a letter from the British Government saying that it is a continuing opportunity. The British Government wrote me a letter to that effect. I will read it afterward to the committee.

Mr. Long. I am glad that Mr. Bloom is able to make that statement. Therefore, the Department of State has been unable to talk about it.

Mr. Voris. One witness said that what was necessary was to break down any of the regulations which were preventing any of the 4,000,000 Jews of Europe that could get away from getting into Palestine, and that therefore that was what we should follow up in this resolution. Other witnesses disagreed entirely with that. But that matter was injected into the hearings on this resolution very vehemently by two or three of the witnesses.

Mr. Wadsworth. May I interrupt there?

Mr. Voris. Certainly.

Mr. Wadsworth. That is emphasized in a page advertisement in the New York Times.

Mr. Roosa. This resolution was specifically drawn up to eliminate Palestine. Any time that you inject that into the refugee situation it reacts to the harm of the refugees.

The Chairman. I would like to have the clerk read a letter received today by me from the British Embassy.

The Clerk [reading]:

Hon. Sol Bloom,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Congressman: You may recollect telephoning to me on November 12 about the position which the British Government has taken to permit Jewish immigration into Palestine after the end of the White Paper period, if the quota is not filled up then, as it probably will not be. The substance of the conversation was telephoned to Mr. Law who has asked me to thank you for your kind message. He would see no objection at all to your telling your friends that you did raise this point during the general discussion on Palestine assistance to refugees which was
dominated territories, have the same prejudice against Jews, to a
certain extent, that the Germans have, and that for this reason they
are not so sympathetic toward any attempt to rescue the Jews
people. In other words, we tried to leave the impression with the
committee that the Jews were entitled to separate treatment and
special efforts on our part because this prejudice against the Jews
is not only in the Nazi-dominated countries, but in other countries,
and that therefore they are not given as much kindly treatment and not
as much effort has been put forth to rescue the Jews as has been put
forth to rescue refugees of other religions and nationalities.
Have you in your experience come across anything like that, or any
attitude like that?
Mr. Long. No, Judge. I have not seen any evidence of any
prejudice against Jews in any of the neutral states in Europe or in any of
the governments outside of the satellites of the Axis authority. Hungary
has acted, I must say, generously, compared with its satellite associ-
ates, toward the Jews. Rumania has been very bitter. Bulgaria has
responded to the whip of Germany; and Germany itself forced Italy
into anti-Jewish activity. But except for the German Government
and the sphere of its immediate powerful influence over governments
within its Axis framework, I have seen no evidence of actual antipathy
or opposition. We have had sincere cooperation at every turn—with
the Swiss Government, the Swedish Government, the Spanish Govern-
ment, the Portuguese Government, and the Government of Turkey.
As regards Turkey, I will simply make the statement that in some
of the early negotiations we were trying to get the Turkish Govern-
ment to go along with the European nations in trying to rescue the
Jews by sea, but they were opposed. Of course, you know, that the
Turkish Government was trying to get Jewish immigration into
Palestine by rail instead of by the boats. The Turkish Govern-
ment took the position that these people could go in transit through
that part of Turkey which lies between the Straits and Bulgaria.
It would give them access to Istanbul, and that was the way we
were trying to get into this kind of transportation; but finally the
German Government acted on the basis that it would prevent it.

The answer to your question, in short, is "No."
Mr. Eberharter. If a commission were formed, Mr. Secretary,
any intended action they had in mind would necessarily, for practical
purposes, be kept secret, the same as the actions of the Intergov-
ernmental Committee?
Mr. Long. That I do not know.
Mr. Eberharter. If they were to be effective?
Mr. Long. If there was another committee I would not know
what methods it would use.
Mr. Eberharter. If a commission were formed under this resolu-
tion do you think they could act alone and independently of your
Intergovernmental Committee?
Mr. Long. It might; I do not know.
Mr. Eberharter. From the very nature of things, do you not
think, Mr. Secretary, that the new commission would probably get
in contact with the Intergovernmental Committee and want to co-
operate with them and advise with them, and perhaps it would end
in embarrassment and annoyance in connection with the actions of
the Intergovernmental Committee?
Mr. Long. I am not prepared to say that I do, Judge. I do not
know. It would depend upon the course of action which the Com-
mision would follow.
Mr. Eberharper. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, Mr. Richards. I did not notice you sitting down there. I will call on you after Mr. Stearns.

Mr. Richards. I just wanted to say to the Secretary that I think every member of this committee fully realizes the difficulties that the Intergovernmental Committee has been operating under, and has every confidence in the action that has been taken so far. I do not have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stearns?

Mr. Stearns. I am very grateful to the Secretary for his statement. I have been more or less in touch since the Special Division was set up, but I have never had such a good picture before as has been given to us today, and I am very grateful for it.

There is just one question that I would like to have cleared up in my mind. You stated that you felt that the neutral governments would not want to cooperate in going into a new organization. Do I understand that the neutral governments are now cooperating definitely?

Mr. Long. Oh, yes. I have read the list of them here.

Mr. Stearns. I mean, when new measures are being proposed they are continuing to cooperate?

Mr. Long. They are.

Mr. Stearns. That is all I wanted to know.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gordon?

Mr. Gordon. Mr. Secretary, I am very grateful for hearing your statement. I have one question, however. You mentioned that some 8,000 refugees were shipped into the northern part of Africa. Does that include just the one race, Jews? Are there not Poles going into the northern section of Africa?

Mr. Long. Into north Africa, from Spain?

Mr. Gordon. Yes.

Mr. Long. It includes portions of all categories. It was more than 8,000. I think it was close to thirty-thousand. A great many were Jewish people, but they were not the stateless variety of Jewish people whom it is very difficult to move because of passport regulations and one thing and another; and it was that category, of which 1,200 remain. A number of them have come to the United States, about 600. England has given 600 of them visas for Palestine of the 1,200 who still remain. Even after the 600 visas for Palestine were taken out there were still about 600 of them, and provision has now been made to take care of 1,200 temporarily in north Africa; but the whole number in north Africa is above 8,000.

Mr. Gordon. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mundt?

Mr. Mundt. Like the other members of the committee I thoroughly appreciate your testimony, and I think it has given a rather complete response to the implications by earlier witnesses that the Bermuda Conference was ineffectual in that nothing is being done by the Government to solve this very troublesome problem concerning the Jews.

I have a series of questions, most of which I think you can answer rather briefly, but all of which, at least to me, are of importance.

You used two different figures about the number of Jews that have come into this country. I think you said 380,000 had been taken in in total, and then you used the figure of 145,000.

Mr. Long. refugees came in 1 year, one 12-month period. That was in the fiscal year 1942. The other was the 10-year over-all figure.

Mr. Mundt. In arriving at those figures and discussing them you used two different terms. You said that the quotas of these various nations had been filled and then you also spoke about some coming in under temporary visas. Of the total of 580,000 how many have come in as permanent entries under quotas and how many have come in under temporary visas?

Mr. Long. Most of them came in under the quota; and in that 1 year that I have mentioned in which the 135,000 came in we used all the quotas for that area during that year, but that was inadequate to meet the situation, and then during the period mentioned we issued visitors' and transit visas, which would probably cover 85,000. The difference is between the quota limitation and the actual entries into the United States, which was about 135,000. In other words, 85,000 to 90,000, or somewhere along there. I can say only roughly.

Mr. Mundt. Under the terms of those temporary visas it is quite possible that if the war runs along the visas terminate. Then what happens?

Mr. Long. They are here illegally after a certain period and are deportable. During the period many of them will probably take advantage of an opportunity to apply for a change of status and resettle the country as permanent immigrants under the quota. They will have to leave the United States and go somewhere else. A number of them have taken advantage of that opportunity. They have gone to Canada, Mexico, and Cuba and have applied for reentry to the United States. The purpose of it, Mr. Congressman, was, to an emergency that was unparalleled in history, to save the lives of human beings. Many of these human beings were brilliant, able leaders of thought. Some were not considered anti-Fascist, but were persecuted. There were literary people and leaders of thought and religious movements and cultural movements; professors in universities, doctors. There were not only the educated leader type, but a lot of people who were just plain human beings and were going to be shot because they had engaged in some kind of an activity, or because of their religious beliefs.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like, for the benefit of Mr. Mundt and the committee, to say that when they come here as visitors and reapply to become immigrants or to be here permanently, they would have to make an application, and that is tried by the Interdepartmental Committee, and if the Interdepartmental Committee finds that they cannot pass all the requirements, after investigation by five members of each committee, State, War, Navy, and Intelligence, then if they are granted an application to reapply they must come in under the quota. None of these people come in permanently as immigrants.

Mr. Long. You are right.

The CHAIRMAN. They must come in here, and then in order to go—

Mr. Long (interposing). They would be given a temporary refuge.

The CHAIRMAN. And then they can come back as immigrants.
Mr. Long. They might go to Mexico for the duration of the war, and then go on home. They are here as temporary persons.

Mr. Mundy. How often can their stay be extended?

Mr. Long. It has to be actually extended, and it is always within the discretion of the Government to refuse additional extension, at which time the person becomes illegally here.

Mr. Mundy. You stated that the Nazi Army within the last 6 months had gone into Poland and shot down people and killed them off and had stolen their homes and houses. Is that shooting and killing limited to Jews only?

Mr. Long. No. They were not Jews at all. They were Polish citizens who were non-Jewish. That information was given to us formally by the Polish Ambassador.

Mr. Mundy. Does the fact that Russia is not on this Intergovernmental Committee serve as a handicap in any way to the successful escape and evacuation of Jews trapped in Nazi countries?

Mr. Long. No. Russia has been cooperating with us, long before there was an Intergovernmental Committee, and it was partly through her collaboration that people came over the Caucasus Mountains, and she has made homes for them and has really treated them very well. Of course, there have been limitations upon Russia's ability to treat them with the same hospitality as other countries. She has been engaged in terrible experiences during most of the course of this war, but she has been receptive to them and has offered them such hospitality as she was able to give.

Mr. Mundy. In the beginning of the war there was a large number of political refugees in France. What happened to them?

Mr. Long. It is hard to say. A good many of them have got over into Africa. A good many have gone into Mexico.

Mr. Mundy. Are there any manifestations of anti-Semitism in Spain?

Mr. Long. I do not know what the attitude of that Government is; but their cooperation with us has been, I would say, very generous. I think, maybe that is the wrong word, but they have collaborated and permitted the entry into Spain and their residence in Spain under assurances that we were trying to take them somewhere else.

Mr. Mundy. I think you said you felt that it was the policy of the Intergovernmental Committee that all of these Jewish refugees who are finding temporary havens in north Africa, Mexico, and here and elsewhere should be returned to their homelands after the war; and you were quite emphatic about that, I believe.

Mr. Long. No; I say they should have the right to return to their homelands after the war.

Mr. Mundy. The thing I was speaking about was this, that after the war, after a lot of people's minds have been poisoned, I do not think you have solved the Jewish question if it came to the reason why these Palestine movements have gotten into these hearings to the extent they have. There has to be some community acceptance, and it is going to be pretty hard by a treaty of peace to return them and say, "Treat them right," because there are many ways that you can discriminate against them in peacetimes.

Mr. Long. I quite agree, Mr. Congressman; but my remarks were directed only to giving these people the right to return to their homes in case they wanted to return.

Mr. Mundy. With respect to the question of feeding 60,000 refugees in Switzerland, the question comes to my mind, how are we going to get the food in? You say the President has made money available, and so forth. Is he going to get the food in through the blockade, or does he have to be bought from inside?

Mr. Mundy. It has to go through the blockade. We have a written arrangement with Switzerland to implement our food supply. She manufactures things which will come out to us, and we give such things as her economies demand for her economic satisfaction and operation. We get the consent of the blockading authorities, but they are well guarded.

Mr. Mundy. One witness before the committee this week made the categorical statement that one of the benefits to come from this resolution would be that Jewish refugees leaving Europe would then be permitted to have transit through Turkey. He said specifically that the Turks were turning them back at the border. I am sure from your testimony that that is not correct.

Mr. Long. I make the categorical statement on the direct evidence of our Ambassador who was here recently, and he said that he had direct, first-hand knowledge. He had himself been to the border between Bulgaria and Turkey and that he had seen on the other side of the border the Bulgarian troops alternating with German troops, and they were guarding the border and preventing the ingress and egress. It was not the Turkish Government. One of the gentlemen who had been interested on the part of one of the groups asked for permission to go to Turkey, to verify this statement and I granted him the right to have a passport. Whether or not he has availed himself of it I do not know. But they selected a gentleman in New York, a vice president of one of the big department stores in New York, and we gave him the right to go to Turkey and make his own investigation and return and report to the people here.

We have several other persons in Turkey, representatives of these organizations, and they have all applied to us to send representatives to each of these places, but we have thought it was inadvisable to be too free in granting them, because they are not always in entire accord with the purposes of the policy. I have urged them to get together to have some common understanding and to select a common agent. If that should be done it would facilitate their troubles as much as possible provided the military authorities would consent to activities behind the lines. That is the only bar I have met. We have to submit to General Eisenhower anything that goes into the Mediterranean area.

Mr. Mundy. Then the statement that the witness made was untrue?

Mr. Long. It was an incorrect statement. I say that on the basis of my direct information from Mr. Steinhardt, our Ambassador, and he has discussed this question with me quite recently on two or three occasions during his recent visit in the United States.
Of interest along that line I might state two things. It has been proposed that the Intergovernmental Committee establish agencies of its own abroad and we have sent that proposal to the Intergovernmental Committee with our endorsement that they do so, which will bring the direct gangs of this organization into wider fields.

Mr. MUNDT. Another statement made by a witness before the committee this week, of which I was somewhat skeptical, was this. He said that this resolution was necessary in order to force the admission of the Jews to Palestine after they had escaped from Europe, and the Chairman and he had some controversy about that. But he said there was a shipload of Jews from Turkey to Palestine that had been turned back, and after they were turned back the ship struck a mine or was hit by a torpedo, and all on board were murdered. Do you have any record of that?

Mr. LONG. There was a ship in 1941 which approached Istanbul. I do not know whether it ever got there or not. The boat was rerouted back, and something happened in the Black Sea, and I think the boat was destroyed and there was only one survivor.

Mr. MUNDT. Why was it turned back?

Mr. LONG. I do not remember now all the details of it. I could look it up, Mr. MUNDT, and have you advised. It never passed Istanbul.

Mr. MUNDT. The chances are the boat was turned back?

Mr. LONG. It never got to Palestine. It never got through the straits.

Mr. MUNDT. Was the boat simply trying to get to Palestine?

Mr. LONG. It was trying to get out of the Black Sea through the straits, the Dardanelles.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, the failure of the boat to arrive safely at some port was in no way due to the failure of the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. LONG. No; it was before the United States got into the war and before the Intergovernmental Committee was very active. The boat was blown up in the Black Sea, east of the Dardanelles. It was a terrible thing to happen, but it was one of those things that do happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain for the benefit of Mr. MUNDT and the committee the geographical location, so that we will all have an idea of it?

Mr. LONG. The Dardanelles separate Turkey into two parts, one very small part in which Istanbul is located. The other portion of Turkey is in the continent of Asia. Turkey retains jurisdiction over those straits. She owns both sides of them.

Mr. MUNDT. The witness led us to believe that a commission such as would be formed by this resolution would prevent that kind of thing. I do not see how it possibly could.

Mr. LONG. It could not prevent a boat hitting a mine or a hostile submarine from shooting it. The boat exploded; I do not think anybody knows why. I remember the incident. There may be other incidents that I do not know about, but I do remember that one.

Mr. MUNDT. With reference to the negotiations which have so far failed, but which I believe one of your associates said are still going on in an effort to have 100,000 children rehabilitated by taking them to neutral countries, namely, Switzerland and others, and to feed them and treat them well for 2 or 3 months and then return them back to occupied Europe, are those 100,000 children to be selected exclusively from Jews, or are they to include children who are French and Dutch, for instance?

Mr. LONG. They are children of all groups and nationalities to be selected because of their physical condition. The Nazi children would not be included. It would not include German children. The Germans have taken food from those other countries and their children have it.

Mr. MUNDT. I appreciate your reticence in offering suggestions to the committee in connection with this resolution, and I think it is justifiable. But we have got this hot poker on the table and we must dispose of it in the most diplomatic and effective manner. Simply to pass it as such, I infer from what you stated earlier, might be considered a criticism of the efforts which have been made to date, and simply to turn it down might be an implication to the Jews of Europe and this country that this committee is cold-hearted in its consideration of the problem.

I have in mind offering an amendment, Mr. Secretary, to this resolution, which would make it applicable to all refugees and persecuted peoples in groups, regardless of nationality, and I wondered if, from the standpoint of the State Department, you would find any objection to such a proposed amendment.

Mr. LONG. Mr. MUNDT, the State Department has maintained that attitude all through, but the situation has come to a state of publicity today where I think the Jewish interests have emphasized the fate of the Jews as such; and while the Department has maintained all along the policy which you state, and, I think, must continue to maintain the policy, as far as the Department is concerned, unless the Congress directs otherwise—of course we will conform to whatever law Congress passes—the State Department's policy I think must be that we cannot exclude persons from our sympathy and our sympathetic attention if they are not Jews. I think we must treat all persons, irrespective of their race, religion, or political beliefs, in the same way; but I do think that the situation has arrived today, as evidenced by the fact that this committee is considering this matter formally, where something definite ought to be said concerning the Jews.

Mr. MUNDT. I gather from your very splendid discourse on what the committee has been doing that it has operated regardless of creed or religion, straight down the line, which I think is splendid. I have this conviction, Mr. LONG, and if I am wrong I want to be straightened out on it. As a general policy for this country it is not good practice for us to establish a precedent, or if the precedent is already established, to emphasize it, whereby we pass legislation which singles out groups of people by their religion, or by their color or their faith, or their political affiliations, either for special consideration or for special penalty. It seems to me that that would be treating a pretty dangerous path. It is sort of doing the Hitler thing in reverse. The repercussions at home, at least, are bound to be insidious if we engage too much in that sort of thing. For that reason I have studied long
and studiously on this resolution to see whether it could not be couched in such language that it would avoid what I believe is a dangerous practice. If I am utterly wrong in that, I should be happy to bow to your more mature experience in that connection; but I would like to know why I am wrong, and have you explore my conviction if it is erroneous.

Mr. Long. Mr. Mundt, I appreciate the compliment you pay me.

Mr. Johnson. But——

Mr. Long. No, not "but." It is "and"—I appear here as an officer of the Department of State, appearing before your committee. If I were just Breckenridge Long you probably wouldn't invite me to come up.

The CHAIRMAN. I would.

Mr. Long. Well, I appear before you as an officer of the Department of State, and I belong to the executive branch of the Government. We do not try to tell the Congress of the United States what its policy should be. Congress fixes policy. Laws are the definition of policy.

Mr. Mundt. But as a representative of the Government we are in the legislative branch, and we are not so far removed that we could not advise one another. We certainly welcome your counsel on a diplomatic question like this, which I think also has the possibilities of repercussions at home as well as abroad. We are all trying to do the thing that is best in this job.

Mr. Long. I think I might repeat the words I used a little farther back, when I said I thought that this was a very serious moment in the history of the refugee movement, in the deliberations of your committee on this matter.

Mr. Richards. Do you consider that the passage of this resolution would help the plight of the Jewish refugees? Do you think so personally?

Mr. Long. That is a very difficult question to answer. I am sure the resolution was introduced with the intent of being of assistance. I am sure the Department of State has viewed this whole refugee problem from the point of view of being of assistance. I am sure that we all have the same thing in mind. It is only a question of instrumentalities to be used in effectuating the purposes of humanity. It is only a question of the choice of instrumentalities.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Mundt?

Mr. Mundt. Not quite. We are approaching the termination of it. In work of this kind I think your Department and your committee has done a perfectly grand job. I am gratifyingly surprised in what you have accomplished, because witnesses had certainly led me up to now to think that Congress should step into the breach. It seems to me now that you are doing everything possible and feasible in that connection, and that the President's statement and Mr. Hull's statement in this document are vindicated by the evidence. It seems to me, also, that if the work is to continue successfully, the less we advise the Nazis about what our plans are, the more likely we are to succeed. I wonder if you can see any possibility that the passage of a resolution of this kind and the establishment of a formal commission specifically instructed, as it has been in this resolution, to set up havens of refuge to aid people to escape from Europe, might not just serve as a sort of advance notice to the Germans that if they intend to exterminate the Jews they better intensify their efforts and go right on with the job. It may redound to the disadvantage of the Jew instead of to his advantage. Is there such a possibility?

Mr. Long. That is one of the theories that you have to follow and eventually reach a decision. You must keep in mind the consequences of the action of this body.

Mr. Mundt. Is it a plausible theory?

Mr. Long. That I do not know. I would be very glad if I could say yes or no, Mr. Mundt. It might do good; it might do serious harm. Mr. Mundt. I have only one other question, and it is another attempt to get from you an evaluation of the situation.

After I had suggested in open committee at our last meeting that I intended offering such an amendment as I have discussed previously, a committee of people who had been witnesses here called upon me and said, "I wish you would not offer that amendment, for this reason. Every persecuted group in Europe today has an official body of representatives some place among the United Nations. There is a refugee government in Poland; there is a refugee government in Norway; and so forth and so forth. And they said, "The Jewish people have no official governmental body or refugee government representing them; and this resolution would establish an official Jewish representative body"—which, it seems to me, must imply that that group intends that this official body of Jewish representatives should function as a little refugee government if it were Polish or Belgian or Norwegian, but must be tied in pretty definitely with the post-war problem as it relates to Palestine, because if it has official sanction and status, obviously its interest in the solution of the problem as an official representative body would not terminate with the war.

Would you care to say whether you think that it is important from the standpoint of solving the Jewish problem now and after the war for us to establish by congressional action and Presidential appointment an official Jewish representative body? Do you feel a need in your work for an official Jewish representative body with which to consult, which can speak for the Jews and the Jews alone, as the Polish Government speaks for the Poles and the Poles alone?

Mr. Long. I would have to refer, first, to your premise.

Mr. Mundt. It is not my premise; it is the premise of the committee.

Mr. Long. The premise of the question that you just asked—that the Jews have nobody to represent them. I think that depends upon the desire of the individual. In America we look upon them as Americans. They have all the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizenship here. If a Jew with American nationality gets in trouble in any part of the world the Department of State goes after it and tries to do as much for him as for anybody else, no matter whether he is a Methodist or whatever else he may be. We look upon them as American citizens. There are a great many of them here. Some are members of our council. Some of them are in office in the Halls of Congress, in the executive departments of the Government, and in the judicial structure. We have no distinction in this country on account of religion or race. I think an answer for other governments. I know there are a few persons who are not able to claim a government, a comparatively few, those who are called the
stateless Jews, who are deprived of their citizenship in the countries in which they live. However, those persons are being taken into other countries, and if they desire they can become a part of other countries and become citizens of other countries. They can here. They have an opportunity to be here just like anybody else is here, through regular and due processes of the law. They can become citizens of the United States as such, and even without being citizens of the United States they can confer with you and with me, with any member at this table, and they can make known their beliefs, their understandings, their desires. They can contribute to the formation of policy. They can contribute to the election of Members of Congress and make known their views through the representative system.

I cannot answer for other governments, but I am sure that I speak the situation as it exists in this country.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. I came into this room rather recently, but I know some of the work that you have done. There has been an impression around that the State Department and the Intergovernmental Committee had not been active; and I think that that is false and fallacious. I think a statement such as you have just made, if it could be printed, and those parts which you feel could not be said openly, should be deleted, but some part of it could be known to the general public; it would do a great deal toward allaying fears. I think it is an excellent statement and an excellent record and one which you and this country should be proud of and one which, if you feel it can be said openly, should be published. I do not envy you your position. I know that it is very difficult. When people get frantic they go to all sorts of extremes. Their friends or relatives, they feel, are under the machine guns and they bring all sorts of pressure to bear. It seems to me you have been doing your best and the people here have certainly been doing their best; and it is unfortunate that pressure should exist between those that you are trying to save and people that are doing their utmost to save them.

I would like to correct a few impressions if I can about this resolution. It was introduced to be helpful. It is in no sense to be construed as being critical of past actions. It was simply that I and others felt that with the imminent collapse, we hope, of Germany the satellites would be more willing to cooperate now than they were before; that our prestige with the neutrals must be greater now than it was before; that there was a possibility for redoubled action, and a chance that if any request was made it would be thoroughly in keeping and in line with the idea that everything that had been done in the past was all that should have been done.

But now we have additional opportunity. It may be false, but it did appear to me that there was a chance for additional effort both to get people out and to take additional steps.

The work of the Intergovernmental Committee has been excellent. Of all that you have said I was most pleased, I would say, with the fact that they are going to establish offices and that there is hope or possibility of the establishment of offices. That has been one of the difficulties. We have never known in the past exactly where to go. There is no regular Intergovernmental Committee with an office, or none that I know of. In England, when I was there, they were just beginning to set it up. I think if there was one particular place through which all these frantic efforts could be channeled, one place that you could show them, and if there were branch offices, it would be a great forward step.

About some of these questions, especially that Mr. Mundt spoke of, in my opinion—and I wish you would correct me if I am wrong—those are post-war problems. The Rehabilitation Commission is going to have a difficult task. One of their jobs is going to be the resettlement of the Jewish and non-Jewish. I do not envy them that job, but I do not think that is a function of the Intergovernmental Committee at all. Am I correct in that?

Mr. LONG. If the Rehabilitation Administration was not doing it the Intergovernmental Committee probably would.

Mr. ROGERS. But it is assumed that the Rehabilitation Administration will eventually take it over in the future, just as it was assumed and hoped that it would take over the function of this little commission. As I understand it, when a refugee has escaped here comes under the jurisdiction of the Intergovernmental Committee. If he gets across the border and the Intergovernmental Committee can help him, it will. If he happens to be a refugee a year or so after the war is over and he comes under the jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation Administration, the function of this Commission was to try to get him out before he would come under the normal jurisdiction or notice of the Intergovernmental Committee.

It may be that if the Intergovernmental Committee does set up these offices it can actually start to take such steps as we would envision with this Commission, and it may be that that might not be necessary if the Intergovernmental Committee will have sufficient authority and power to try and save people in advance of becoming refugees.

But another one of the difficulties in treating with the Jewish problem is that they are not exactly refugees; they are potential refugees, and it is difficult to deal with them because they are not yet outside of the country.

There are really no questions that I want to ask. I just thought that your statement was a fine and brilliant exposition of a very complicated subject, and I do commend for your consideration the thought of having a part of the story printed, certainly as regards the set-up of the different organizations. I think that would be most helpful.

I would like to again express the fact that this resolution is not in any sense critical of past actions. I do not think it should be interpreted as being critical of past actions. It was introduced with the idea of supplementing past actions at a time when we thought future action would be possibly more helpful than it would have been 6 months ago.

Do you feel that there is a better chance? Is this supposition correct, that as we get nearer to winning the war there is a better chance of getting people out?

Mr. LONG. There is no apparent disposition on the part of the German Government to let anybody out.

Mr. ROGERS. How about the satellite governments?

Mr. LONG. They are not permitted by the German army. German control is exercised throughout all those countries. They are not
independent agencies. I think we are all just as interested as we can be in seeing the quickest possible defeat of enemy powers, and everything we can possibly do to contribute to the defeat of the enemy powers as quickly as possible; but it is not until we do defeat those powers that you are going to exercise actual control over the people inside German jurisdictions, whether they be Jew or Gentile.

Mr. Rogers: All this is simply an interim hope.

One other question, sir, about Denmark and Sweden. Is it true that it was Sweden opening its doors that allowed those refugees to come in, or was it that the German pressure had increased so greatly in Denmark that they finally decided to leave?

Mr. Long. The German Government took advantage of Denmark. Denmark had had, up to that time, a sort of fantastic Danish government which was subservient to the will of the German Government, and it more or less operated as a semi-autonomous state. Then the German Army suddenly took over Denmark, and the King was practically a prisoner; the parliament dissolved, and the German Government immediately started to institute against the population of that little country the same steps it had undertaken in Germany, and the Jews knew instantly that they were going to be singled out. So they started to fly. When they started to fly they had no advance notice from Sweden that they could come in, but instantly Sweden said, "Come in."

Mr. Rogers: Did Sweden make that statement officially?

Mr. Long. It made some communication to that effect, and Germany did not react very favorably. But it is only a short distance across from Denmark, and you can swim it if you are a good swimmer. But they have all kinds of boats. Some of the people were shot at and some were killed. Some of the boats were sunk in the sound, but most of them got out, all but a few hundred.

I asked the Swedish Minister to come down to the State Department, and he came within the hour. I said, "I would like to express to you the thanks of the American Government and its deep appreciation for the contribution you are making to the refugee cause in opening your doors to those poor people; and if there is anything that we can do to help, we will be very glad, if you will let us know how and what we can do."

He thanked me very much for the kindly expression and said he would immediately telegraph his government. He did telegraph his government, and they accepted that as an encouragement to go ahead, and they are continuing to let people come in. Almost 9,000 got out of Denmark. That action has been an encouragement to keep her going.

Switzerland has taken about 60,000 of these people. We have got to make some arrangement with Switzerland to uphold our share of the cost. But they are going to continue as long as the war lasts. There will not be great sums involved, but they will have to be sufficient to pay for certain actual costs.

Mr. Rogers: Do any private contributions come to the Intergovernmental Committee?

Mr. Long. They can. I will give you another incident. One of the Jewish agencies came to us the other day and said they would like to get a clearance from the Treasury to send some money over to Switzerland so that, under the instrumentality of the Intergovernmental Committee, they could have money there so that when the opportunity arose they could use it through the International Red Cross to buy food to take care of certain remnants of the Jewish populations in parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland; that there were still extant these remnants and they were going to starve unless they could, and would we be willing to endorse it? I said, "Of course," They said it would cost about $10,000,000. I said, "All right; if you can get the project set up and go before the Intergovernmental Committee with the assurance that the International Red Cross can handle it, so that it does not fall into the hands of the German Government and the supplies sent in there will not be taken by the German Government we will be glad to approve it and to forward it as far as we can, and we will recommend it to the Treasury." They wanted to put up $2,000,000 and send a first amount of $250,000. I asked them to make an application to the Treasury, which they have already done. We are supporting the application to the Treasury, so as to have money there in cases of necessity which the Intergovernmental Committee can approve. We have agreed to finance half of the cost. It would be $4,000,000 for each government if we are required to spend as much as $10,000,000 — $2,000,000 from the United States, $4,000,000 underwritten by the American Government, and $4,000,000 by the British Government to finance this project.

Mr. Rogers: Is there any office of the Intergovernmental Committee any place other than in London?

Mr. Long. No. That is the seat of the committee.

Mr. Rogers. They have no branch office?

Mr. Long. They have not up to now, but we have made that proposal to them.

Mr. Rogers. How many members are there that are active on it? Just a few? I know there must be some.

Mr. Long. There are 29 members that are active. The executive committee is composed of a smaller number. I might as well give you the names, just to show you that it is not a fly-by-night organization.

Myron Taylor is the American member. His alternate or substitute is the American Ambassador in London, Mr. Winant, who sits on the committee under the guidance of Mr. Taylor.

The Vice Director is Patrick Malin, an American citizen.

For Great Britain the member is Lord Winterton, and a director above Patrick Malin and cooperating with him is Sir Herbert Emerson.

For Argentina, the Argentine Ambassador, Señor Dr. Don Miquel Angel Carcano.

The Brazilian member of the executive committee, who is cooperating with us every day, is the Brazilian Ambassador, Señor J. J. Moniz de Aragao.

The French member of the executive committee is Maurice Dejean, representative in London of the French Committee of National Liberation.

The Netherlands member of the committee is the Netherlands Ambassador, Johnkeer E. Michiels van Verdunen.

The director is Sir Herbert Emerson; the vice director is Mr. Patrick Malin; the honorary assistant director is Dr. Kullman (Swiss), and the secretary is Mr. Sillen (Dutch).
Mr. Rogers. I think Mr. Malin is an excellent man and a very fine, high-class person. Is he the only paid person on the executive committee?

Mr. Long. I am not sure of that. There are several others.

Mr. Rogers. Just one last word about Switzerland. I have spoken to some people about Switzerland, and they felt that if it were possible to have a committee constantly in Switzerland it would be very very helpful. Switzerland has more refugees than she can afford. If we can give Switzerland the assurance that after the war these refugees will no longer be a burden on her, and if we had some committee to cooperate with her—

Mr. Long (interposing). We are giving assurances to Switzerland, and did not only before the war, but during the war and offering her assistance. How are we going to send a committee into Switzerland?

Mr. Rogers. You can fly in.

Mr. Long. I do not think you can.

Mr. Rogers. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jonkmam?

Mr. Jonkmam. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your very fine, comprehensive statement. I want to say that it has only driven home a conviction which I have felt that this committee is on the horns of a dilemma that Mr. Mundt has referred to as a hot potato. Mr. Rogers tells us, and I believe him absolutely, that the Palestine question is in everyone's mind in connection with this resolution, and three witnesses who appeared before us apparently, from their testimony, did have it in mind. So I do not think we can get away from the fact, and I think you have intimated that, that if we pass this resolution we are putting a club in the hands of certain people to accomplish something that was not intended by the resolution.

Mr. Long. I have not intimated that. I am sorry, but you are not attributing that to my statement, I hope?

Mr. Jonkmam. No, not that part, but the situation is there. I think it is also true, if you read the resolution, that while that also is disclaimed, it might be read as a repudiation or criticism of work that has already been done by the Administration. There are a number of things against the resolution, in my mind, and yet I think you also said that it would be difficult for us to turn it down, and with that I agree. I was inclined to go along with Mr. Mundt and see if we could not make it somewhat broader by taking in the other oppressed peoples. It seems to me that would in itself amount to a repudiation. Personally, I feel that what we need here is diplomacy, at which you and your associates are experts.

Suppose, under the second paragraph of the resolution, we say:

Whereas under the American tradition of justice and humanity, all possible means, under existing facilities, have been employed to save from this fate.

And then, as the last paragraph—

Resolved, That the House of Representatives recommends and urges the consideration of the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people.

Do you think that would be acceptable to the State Department and to the administration?
Mr. WADSWORTH. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that we have not tired you out.

Mr. Alfange, the first witness in support of this resolution, in a carefully prepared statement read in a public hearing, made it perfectly plain that he regarded the failure of the Government of the United States in this field to be disgraceful. That was the general tenor of his remarks. I think the efforts of our Government are to be highly commended, and I am glad to hear the story.

Now, in respect to the alleged embarrassments, perhaps I do not take them quite as seriously as some other people; but let us assume that there are some embarrassments here. You read to the committee a few moments ago, Mr. Secretary, the terms of the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee. I think you took about a minute, did you not?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Will you read it again? It was the document which you denominated as the mandate.

Mr. LONG. That is part of the document which has been under the agreement with the British Government considered secret.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Will you read it again?

Mr. LONG. I will read from it (reading):

The Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee is hereby empowered by the member states to undertake negotiations with neutral and Allied states and organizations to take such steps as may be necessary to preserve, maintain, and transport those persons displaced from their homes by their efforts to escape from areas where their lives and liberty are in danger on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs. The operation of the committee shall extend to all persons from which refugees are expelled, including the war in Europe or in which they may find refuge. The Executive Committee shall be empowered to receive and disburse for the purposes enumerated above funds both public and private.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Is that secret?

Mr. LONG. It is secret.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I regret it.

Mr. LONG. I am sorry that it is, and perhaps we can arrange to get it released. This new mandate is being circulated amongst the subscribing governments. We have agreed, the British have agreed.

Mr. WADSWORTH. If it is signed by a considerable number, a clear majority of the member governments, to me it is a complete answer to this whole problem, so far as the action of the Congress of the United States is concerned. It is a complete answer. Whether or not the executive branch of the Government and the representatives of other governments would believe that a thing of that sort should not be made public to the world, I do not know. I realize that a good deal of this work in rescuing these people must be under cover, in view of the ironclad obstinacy of the German Government where many people are doing their best to permit people to escape, but it must be a matter of common knowledge that there is an Intergovernmental Committee and it must be a matter of common knowledge that the only function of that Intergovernmental Committee is to help refugees. I think the expressions used in that mandate are so clear, so definite, so vigorous that, if made public it would bring reassurance and do away with all these embarrassments that we sit here and talk about.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Wadsworth, if it would comport with your idea I would be glad to initiate this afternoon, by telegram, the question of the release of this document to make it public as soon as we have agreement with the essential governments.

Mr. WADSWORTH. In my judgment, Mr. Secretary, such action, if it could be brought about, would clear this table, and our committee, in my humble judgment, could rest its case for failure to act affirmatively on any specific resolution upon the declaration which you have read to us.

Mr. LONG. The committee might paraphrase its understanding of the contents of the document.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes. We might write a report which would be submitted to you and the appropriate officials of the State Department, and it might throw further light on this matter—

Mr. Vorvis. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Certainly.

Mr. Vorvis. It seems to me it would be a great pity if our embarrassment because of some resolution should require the making public of some statement which I can well see many good reasons for keeping secret. I can see repercussions in this country at the publication of this mandate which would not be altogether helpful. I can see many reasons why it has been far better to keep the deliberations and activities secret since the Bermuda Conference, in addition to military reasons, and I would question whether we would help those situations by urging the other governments to make public any statement at this time.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That is something that our own State Department and the other governments can decide for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a member of the Bermuda Conference, and the Secretary will bear me out in this. It was specifically understood that nothing should be given out by any government until it was agreed upon and given out simultaneously by the other governments.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we have to contend with. Nobody knows what the Bermuda Conference has done. I agree with Mr. Wadsworth that if that could go out, if that statement were made public, it would answer the entire question.

Mr. Johnson. It strikes me, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wadsworth has the floor.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I have nothing further.

Mr. Johnson. It strikes me that Mr. Wadsworth's position is sound, but I cannot agree with Mr. Vorvis' suggestion that there might be adverse effects by giving publicity to this. That is based, of course, upon the assumption that Mr. Long can get permission to release it. I understand that all agreements that are pending are not released until the governments involved pass upon them.

Mr. Chipperfield. Could not this committee draw the conclusion that powers had been given to this committee without making a quotation?

Mr. Johnson. Yes; that could be done. I wanted the country to know that the very purpose sought to be accomplished by the commission here proposed to be created is already being carried out by an agency of not only the United States but 31 other countries, and
that is the most effective way in which to deal with it. The very purpose of this mandate is to try to do the job by eliminating entirely the question of the necessity for legislation.

Mr. Wadsworth. May I make one more statement. I can well understand your hesitancy in making any affirmative suggestions as to the wording of the resolution or the deletion of phrases. Obviously your hesitancy is well founded. But may I say to you that in our contacts with other representatives of the State Department there have been exchanges of views as to phrasing and expressions across the table in executive session, the representatives of the Department indicating that some of our suggestions were worthy of consideration and perhaps, in their judgment, subject to further study and should be inserted in the instrument. An outstanding case of that was a long conference around this table with Dean Acheson and Mr. Sayre, in which we were shown the then secret draft of the international agreement for relief and rehabilitation. We discussed nearly every sentence in it. We made certain suggestions. No votes were taken. Before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate a similar discussion was held, and many weeks afterward the final draft was agreed upon by the State Department and others interested, and it was brought to us and shown to us, and several of our recommendations had been incorporated, and it was going out to all nations for signature.

I cite that, Mr. Secretary, to indicate that this committee — and I am sure I am speaking the truth — is anxious to cooperate closely with you and the State Department.

Mr. Long. That is what I like.

Mr. Mundt. Mr. Chairman —

The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. Mundt. May I ask the Secretary whether it is not correct that our State Department participated in the phrasing and wording of the mandate which he read at the suggestion of Mr. Wadsworth?

Mr. Long. Yes.

Mr. Mundt. I want to say, in connection with my proposed amendment and my series of questions to you, that I am highly gratified by the wording of that mandate, which it seems to me excludes entirely the things which I stated I had convictions about and feared as an American policy of singling out individual groups. It seems to me that that phrasing, that wording, completely covers all the subject matter of this resolution, and that there cannot be any possible adverse repercussions. I want to join with Mr. Wadsworth in saying that I hope you will initiate telegrams and see whether the other countries will agree to use the words and the phrases of that document. I entirely disagree with my good friend here that that could have any serious repercussions if they all agree to publish it. I think that is a perfect answer to the dilemma in which we all find ourselves.

The Chairman. I knew that the members of the committee would be very glad if the Secretary could give a little information.

We thank you very much for appearing here, and I am very sorry that we have taken up so much of your time.

I also want to thank the gentlemen who came with you, Mr. Brandt, Mr. Travers, Mr. Reams, and Mr. Kupinger. All of those gentlemen

are very much interested in this refugee problem. If you gentlemen do not know them you ought to go up and get acquainted with them.

Mr. Long. I would like to thank the members of the committee for their long-suffering courtesy, and I would like you to feel, collectively and individually, that I am always at your service, and I would like to feel, as Mr. Wadsworth says, that we are on the same team.

(Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.)
RESCUE OF THE JEWISH AND OTHER PEOPLES IN NAZI-OCUPIED TERRITORY

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

OCTOBER 30, 1942.

In commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of the Balfour Declaration by the British Government on November 2, 1917, a memorandum was presented to the Secretary of State by a group of rabbis. Secretary Hull observed that the Balfour Declaration had aroused wide attention in the United States, and that this country had followed with interest and sympathy the work which had been done under it, in which American citizens have played a useful part. He added:

This country was shocked and outraged when tyranny and barbarity again commenced their march, at the brutality which was inflicted on certain races, and particularly on the Jewish populations of Europe. Apparently no form of abuse has been too great, and no form of torture or oppression too vile, to be meted out to these populations by the Nazi despots. And, in taking this attitude towards the Jewish race, they have made it plain by concrete acts that a like attitude would be taken towards any other race against whom they might invent a grievance.

The Jews have long sought a refuge. I believe that we must have an even wider objective; we must have a world in which Jews, like every other race, are free to abide in peace and in honor.

We meet today when the battle for freedom is being carried on in the East and in the West and our every effort is concentrated on a successful issue. We can with confidence look forward to the victory when liberty shall lift the scourge of persecution and the might of the United Nations free mankind from the threat of oppression.

Of all the inhuman and tyrannical acts of Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants, their systematic persecution of the Jewish people—men, women, and children—is the most debase. The fate of these unhappy people must be ever before us in the efforts we are making today for the final victory: at the moment of triumph under the terms of the Atlantic Charter the United Nations will be prepared not only to redeem their hopes of a future world based upon freedom, equality, and justice, but to create a world in which such a tragedy will not again occur.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECEMBER 17, 1942.

The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Greek, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslav Governments and also of the French National Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has been
extended, the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into
effect Hitler's oft-repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people
in Europe. From all the occupied countries Jews are being trans-
ported in conditions of appalling horror and brutality to eastern
Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi slaughter-
house, the ghettos established by the German invader are being
systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly skilled workers
required for war industries. None of those taken away is ever heard
of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked to death in labor
camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation or are
deliberately massacred in mass executions. The number of victims
of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many hundreds of thousands
of entirely innocent men, women, and children.

The above-mentioned Governments and the French National
Committee condemn in the strongest possible terms this bestial policy
of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such events can
only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving peoples to overthrow
the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny. They reaffirm their solemn resolu-
tion to insure that those responsible for these crimes shall not escape
retribution and to press on with the necessary practical measures to
this end.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The following is the text of a note delivered to the British Gov-
ernment by the Secretary of State on February 25, 1943:

February 25, 1943.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency
the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the British
Embassy's aide memoire of January 20, 1943, relating to the situation
of persons fleeing from persecution for religious, racial, and political
reasons and to the necessity for intergovernmental relief action in
their behalf.

It is evident that the problem of the refugees in question cannot be
solved in a satisfactory manner by any one of the governments of the
United Nations group nor of the neutral countries. It has been, and
is, the traditional policy of this country to seek every available means
by which to extend to oppressed and persecuted peoples such assistance
as may be found to be feasible and possible under the laws of the
United States. In pursuance of that policy, this Government has
been and is taking steps to extend assistance in a large measure to those
European people who have been subjected to oppression and persecu-
tion under the Hitler regime. The measures of assistance afforded
have assumed several forms, as follows:

1. Joint and several declarations of official attitude of condemnation
   of the policies and acts of the Axis Governments and their satellites in
   oppression or persecution of religious, racial, and political minorities;
2. The appropriation and expenditure of large amounts of public
   and private funds for the relief of persons in need as a result of oppres-
   sion and persecution because of their racial origin or religious or politi-
   cal beliefs;
3. The application of the immigration laws of the United States in
   the utmost liberal and humane spirit of those laws;

4. The calling by the President of the United States of the first
   Intergovernmental Conference at Evian-London in 1938 for the pur-
   pose of seeking a solution of refugee problems. There may be repeated
   here the statement made in that conference by the Honorable Myron
   Taylor on behalf of this Government, as follows:

   In conclusion, I need not emphasize that the discrimination and pressure
   against minority groups and the disregard of elementary human rights are
   contrary to the principles of what we have come to regard as the accepted standards
   of civilization. We have heard from time to time of the disruptive consequences
   of the dumping of merchandise upon the world's economy. How much more
damaging would be forced and chaotic dumping of unfortunate people in large
   numbers. Racial and religious problems are, in consequence, rendered more acute
   in all parts of the world. Economic retaliation against the countries which are
   responsible for the condition is encouraged. The sentiment of international
   mistrust and suspicion is heightened, and fear, which is an important obstacle to
generous appeasement between nations, is accentuated.

The problem is no longer one of purely private concern. It is a problem for
intergovernmental action. If the present currents of migration are permitted to
continue to push anarchically upon the receiving states and if some governments
are to continue to toss large sections of their populations lightly upon a disreased
and unprepared world, then there is a catastrophic human suffering ahead which
can only result in general unrest and in general international strain which will not
be conducive to the permanent appeasement to which all peoples earnestly aspire.

At the Evian-London Conference and through the intergov-
ernmental committee which grew out of that conference, this Government
exerted its most earnest efforts to persuade the various countries
represented to provide asylum for as many refugees from the Axis
countries as the laws of the several countries would permit. This
Government has also approached other countries for the purpose of
finding places of settlement for refugees with funds of the United
States origin being made available.

5. As shown by the records of the Department of State, from the
   advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 647,775 visas
   were issued by American diplomatic and consular officers to natives or
   nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis Powers,
   the great majority of which were refugees from Nazi persecution.
   Of this number 228,964 were issued in the war years 1939-42.
   Many more than that number of visas were denied during this
   latter period, the aliens in whose behalf such authorizations were
given having been unable to depart from their places of foreign resi-
dence to reach the United States. Yet, of the number actually issued
practically all of the aliens who received them during the war years
1939-42 have actually arrived in the United States and have remained
here, many of them having entered in a temporary status and not yet
having departed.

6. Over 5,000 visas were authorized for the admission into the
   United States and permanent residence here of refugee children com-
   ing from France, Spain, and Portugal under arrangements with cer-
   tain private persons and organizations in the United States for their care.
   Visas were also authorized for the parents accompanying them, in
certain cases. This Government has sought the friendly assistance of
   the Government of Switzerland to effect the release from France of
   such of these children who have not been permitted to leave France
   for entry into Spain where visas may be issued to them by the Ameri-
   can consular officers.

7. Since the entry of the United States into the war, there have been
   no new restrictions placed by the Government of the United States
   upon the number of aliens of any nationality permitted to proceed to
rescue of Jews and others in Nazi-occupied territory

this country under existing laws, except for the more intensive examination of aliens required for security reasons.

8. Considerable sums of money have been made available by the American Red Cross and from other American sources to the American Ambassador at Madrid for the care of refugees now in Spain pending their evacuation. A number of these refugees have already been removed to North Africa. The continuation of this movement and its extent are dependent upon military considerations.

9. The American Red Cross and other American organizations have provided assistance for refugees who have been able to reach other neutral countries, such as Iran, and have undertaken extended feeding among children, including refugee children, in France.

10. In evacuating refugees to neutral areas, the full influence of the United States diplomatic and consular representatives has been from time to time invoked, not only with the oppressor nations but with any government concerned, on behalf of the refugees.

This Government understands that, in addition to the refugee classes under immediate consideration, the British Government has certain undertakings for the care of British evacuees and of prisoners of war. Likewise, the Government of the United States has certain similar undertakings; as follows:

1. For the successful prosecution of the war and for hemispheric safety, the Government of the United States has offered to receive dangerous Axis nationals from a number of the American Republics where facilities for the internment or close safeguarding of such Axis nationals do not exist. A considerable number of such Axis nationals have thus been brought to the United States and arrangements are being made for the receipt of more of them.

2. This Government has a number of camps in the United States and more camps are under construction or planned for the internment or detention of civilian enemy aliens. There are being maintained in these camps thousands of such aliens.

3. This Government has also established other camps for prisoners of war which are now in use and in which, by arrangement, there will also be placed large numbers of United Nations prisoners. The accommodation of these prisoners in the United States will leave available abroad considerable quantities of food, clothing, etc., for refugees there which would otherwise be used by those prisoners abroad, while on the other hand, the maintenance of the prisoners in the United States will result in a considerable reduction of supplies available here.

4. There have been set up in the United States a number of relocation centers where approximately 110,000 persons of the Japanese race are being housed and maintained at public expense after removal from vital military areas.

The Government of the United States fully shares the concern expressed by the British Government for the situation of the refugees. It feels, in view of the facts set forth above, that it has been and is making every endeavor to relieve the oppressed and persecuted peoples. In affording asylum to refugees, however, it is and must be bound by legislation enacted by Congress determining the immigration policy of the United States.

The United States is of the opinion that further efforts to solve the problem may best be undertaken through the instrumentality already existing, the executive committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. To this end it may be considered advisable in order to facilitate action by the committee that a preliminary exploration of ways and means be undertaken informally by representatives designated by the Government of the United States and the British Government. Such exploration might be undertaken along the following lines:

A. The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths, as well as other persons because of their political beliefs.

B. Wherever practicable, intergovernmental collaboration should be sought in these times of transportation difficulty, shipping shortage, and submarine menace, to the end that arrangements may be determined for temporary asylum for refugees as near as possible to the areas in which those people find themselves at the present time and from which they may be returned to their homelands with the greatest expedition on the termination of hostilities.

C. There should accordingly be considered plans for the maintenance in neutral countries in Europe of those refugees for whose removal provision may not be made. Their maintenance in neutral countries may involve the giving of assurances for their support until they can be repatriated, which support will necessarily come from the United Nations augmented by funds from private sources. It may also involve the giving of assurances in all possible cases by their Governments in exile for their prompt return to their native countries upon the termination of hostilities.

D. The possibilities for the temporary asylum of the refugees, with a view to their repatriation upon the termination of hostilities in countries other than neutral, and their dependencies, should be explored, together with the question of the availability of shipping to effect their movement from Europe.

It is suggested that the British and United States representatives meet at Ottawa for this preliminary exploration.

[8, Con. Res. 9, 76th Cong., 1st sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 Whereas the American people view with indignation the atrocities inflicted upon the civilian population in the Nazi occupied countries, and especially the mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children; and

Whereas this policy of the Nazis has created a reign of terror, brutality, and extermination in Poland and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That these brutal and indefensible outrages against millions of helpless men, women, and children should be, and they are hereby, condemned as unworthy of any nation or any regime which pretends to be civilized.

Resolved further, That the dictates of humanity and honorable conduct in war demand that this inexcusable slaughter and mistreatment shall cease and that it is the sense of this Congress that those
guilty, directly or indirectly, of these criminal acts shall be held accountable and punished in a manner commensurate with the offenses for which they are responsible.

Passed the Senate March 9, 1943.

Attest: EDWIN A. HALSEY,
Secretary.

Passed the House March 18, 1943.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 19, 1943.

The delegates appointed by the American and British Governments to confer at Bermuda upon the refugee problem have now terminated their discussions and have submitted a report to their respective Governments. The two Governments have received this report and are at present engaged in carrying out its recommendations. Throughout the discussions at Bermuda, the United States and British delegations as well as the two Governments worked in complete harmony and in a spirit of mutual cooperation. The report was submitted as a joint report and contains no divergence of opinion.

While the details must be regarded as confidential so long as a knowledge of the recommendations contained therein would be of aid or comfort to our enemies or might adversely affect the refugees whom all are trying to aid, certain facts may now be made public.

The two delegations accomplished the useful task of dividing suggestions and proposals for the solution of the refugee problem into two categories: (1) what was possible under existing war conditions and (2) what was impossible under these same conditions.

All suggestions were measured by two strict criteria. In the first place, nothing could be recommended that would interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations, and, secondly, any recommendation submitted must be capable of accomplishment under war conditions.

The shipping problem was recognized to be of the utmost urgency and it was agreed that any plan looking to the diverting of allied shipping from the war effort to remove or care for refugees would present considerations of a military character which would disclose almost insuperable difficulties. It was also agreed that no negotiations with Hitler could be undertaken since his entire record has left no doubt that he would only agree to such solutions as would be of direct aid to the Axis war aims.

The conference was, however, able to recommend measures both for removing refugees from neutral countries and, in those cases where such removal was not possible, for giving assurances of international cooperation in the future of the refugee problem so far as it affected them.

It also recommended a number of temporary refugee havens to which refugees could be transported and maintained if and when shipping should become available. At least one such movement has been effected.

Certain measures of a financial nature to cover necessary expenses and a declaration of intention to provide for repatriation upon the termination of hostilities were also recommended.

The conference also submitted a plan for an expanded and more efficient intergovernmental organization with increased authority to meet the problems created or likely to arise under war conditions.

Some of these measures are now being put into effect and others, it is hoped, will soon be possible. It is therefore believed that the practical results of the recommendations submitted by the conference will soon become apparent.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, ADDRESSED TO DR. MAX LERNER, CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JEWISH CONFERENCE, HOTEL COMMODORE, NEW YORK CITY, JULY 26, 1943

In reply to your telegram of July 15, 1943, asking a message to the Emergency Conference to Save the Jewish People of Europe, I am glad to transmit a message from the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, which has my full concurrence. You are aware of the interest of this Government in the terrible condition of the European Jews and of our repeated endeavors to save those who could be saved. These endeavors will not cease until Nazi power is forever crushed.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADDRESSED TO DR. MAX LERNER, CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JEWISH CONFERENCE, HOTEL COMMODORE, NEW YORK CITY, JULY 26, 1943

The rescue of the Jewish people, of course, and of other peoples likewise marked for slaughter by Nazi savagery, is under constant examination by the State Department, and any suggestion calculated to that end will be gladly considered. An intergovernmental agency has been created designed to deal with these problems. You will readily realize that no measure is practicable unless it is consistent with the destruction of Nazi tyranny; and that the final defeat of Hitler and the rooting out of the Nazi system is the only complete answer. This Government in cooperation with the British Government has agreed upon those measures which have been found to be practicable under war conditions, and steps are now being taken to put them into effect.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONVENTION OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

SEPTEMBER 9, 1943.

As the delegates to this conference assemble to consider means of alleviating the suffering of the Jewish populations of Europe, I cannot but express my horror at the cruelties visited upon innocent peoples by the Axis authorities in the territories they occupy. The attitude of this Government in regard to these atrocities was ably expressed by the Secretary of State in the statement issued on October 30, 1942, and I wish to emphasize that all feasible measures are being adopted to lessen the sufferings of the persecuted Jews of Europe. I am
confident that the helpful contributions made by American citizens toward the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine will be continued.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
September 29, 1943.

The Secretary of State has issued the following message on the occasion of the celebration of the Jewish New Year:

On the occasion of the celebration of the Jewish New Year I desire to extend my greetings to all Americans of the Jewish faith. It seems appropriate at this season to express again my constant sympathy with them in their sorrow over those of their religion who still live and die in the deep shadow of persecution. It is also appropriate at this time for us to rejoice together over the world's quickening hope for the dawn of a new year in which we may realize peace at last for all the great brotherhood of mankind.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

October 15, 1943.

I have been informed that the Argentine Government has suspended the publication of Jewish newspapers some of which have been in existence for many years. While this matter is of course one which concerns primarily the Argentine Government and people, I cannot forbear to give expression to my own feeling of apprehension at the taking in this hemisphere of action obviously anti-Semitic in nature and of a character so closely identified with the most repugnant features of Nazi doctrine. I believe that this feeling is shared by the people of the United States and by the people of the other American republics. In this connection I recall that one of the resolutions adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima in 1938 set forth that "any persecution on account of racial or religious motives which makes it impossible for a group of human beings to live decently, is contrary to the political and judicial systems of America."

STATEMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND PREMIER STALIN

November 1, 1943.

DECLARATION OF GERMAN ATROCITIES

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres, and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation, the receding Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid 3 Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the 32 (33) United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invasion parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, and Italy. Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies.

(Signed) Roosevelt.

Stalin.

Churchill.

EXTRACT FROM ADDRESS OF HON. CORDELL HULL, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE JOINT MEETING OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

*** The Conference also served as an occasion for a solemn public declaration by the heads of the three governments with regard to the perpetrators of the bestial and abominable crimes committed by the Nazi leaders against the harassed and persecuted inhabitants of occupied territories—against people of all races and religions, among whom Hitler has reserved for the Jews his most brutal wrath. Due punishment will be administered for all these crimes. ***
RESOLVED, That any unexpended balance of the appropriation of $50,000,000 for relief of refugees rendered destitute by hostilities or invasion, contained in section 40 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, fiscal year 1941, and the appropriation of $35,000,000 for foreign war relief, contained in the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, are hereby consolidated and made one fund effective as of December 17, 1941, which fund shall be available until June 30, 1943, for all the objects and purposes of such consolidated appropriations.

Approved, July 2, 1942.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FOREIGN WAR RELIEF

\* \* \* The appropriation "Foreign war relief" contained in the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1942, is hereby continued available until June 30, 1944.  \* \* \*  

Approved July 12, 1943.

(H. Res. 352, shown below, is similar to H. Res. 350 and S. Res. 203.)

(H. Res. 352, 78th Cong., 1st sess.)

RESOLUTION

Providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe.

Whereas the Congress of the United States, by concurrent resolution adopted on March 15 of this year, expressed its condemnation of Nazi Germany's "mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children", a mass crime which has already exterminated close to two million human beings, about 30 per centum of the total Jewish population of Europe and which is growing in intensity as Germany approaches defeat; and

Whereas the American tradition of justice and humanity dictates that all possible means be employed to save from this fate the surviving Jews of Europe, some four million souls who have been rendered homeless and destitute by the Nazis: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives recommends and urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 20, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Secretary Morgenthau:

On the action committee that we discussed:

Attached is a draft of a proposed press release, as well as a draft of a proposed Executive Order on the subject.

The Executive Order is not necessary, but it might give a stronger foundation to the committee in terms of the necessary power to make it work and in terms of public acceptance. I should think that there would be a fair chance of getting Wayne Coy interested in this matter sufficiently to get the Executive Order cleared as an administrative matter and signed as a policy matter. It might also be that getting the Executive Order signed would forestall some of the action on the Hill in connection with the Rogers - Gillette Resolution.

These are very rough drafts and you and your staff will, I am sure, have some fruitful suggestions to make about them.

If the press release is used, it might be a good idea to have letters from the President to the three members go out simultaneously with the release. These letters could, in strong affirmative language, indicate that the President wants effective and quick action on this matter. It might also be desirable to release the letters at the same time the press release is put out.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

The Secretary of the Treasury

Attachments
President Roosevelt announced today that he had requested Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator, to take joint action for the immediate rescue of victims of enemy oppression, for their relocation in havens of refuge and such other measures as may be necessary for their relief.

The President stated that the existing facilities and personnel of the State and Treasury Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration would be employed to furnish aid to Axis victims to the fullest extent possible. He stressed that it was urgent that action be taken to forestall the plot of the Nazis to exterminate persecuted minorities and other Allied sympathizers.

The President indicated that Mr. Hull, Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Crowley, in formulating the program, would cooperate with the Intergovernmental Committee, with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and other interested agencies.

The President pointed out that the American people, who have shown an intense interest in alleviating the sufferings and oppression visited on the victims of Axis aggression, could contribute to the financing of this program by making donations to the United States which would be used only for this purpose, in accordance with the Second War Powers Act establishing the War Contributions Fund.
of the Committee. The money and property so received shall be expended under the direction of the Committee to carry out the purposes of this order.

4. The Committee and the Foreign Economic Administration are authorized to accept the services of any private persons, private organizations, State agencies, Federal agencies or departments, or agencies of foreign governments in carrying out the purposes of this order. The Committee shall cooperate with all existing and future international organizations concerned with the problems of refugee rescue, relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement.

5. The Committee, within the limits of funds which may be made available, may employ necessary personnel and make provisions for supplies, facilities and services necessary to discharge its responsibilities. [The members of the Committee shall serve without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence and other expenses incidental to performance of their duties.]

6. The Committee shall report to the President at least once every three months concerning the plans and programs formulated by it and the arrangements consummated and the measures taken to carry out such plans and programs.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

1943.
Dr. J. Schwartz
and/or Mr. Hubert Katski
American Joint Distribution Committee
NEW YORK CITY

Dear Friends,

As you know, the Committee we formed here last autumn has never ceased its efforts to assume the emigration overseas of abandoned children from France. I recently sent you a copy of a memorandum which gave a summary of the present situation, but shall resume briefly, here.

The Germans are evidently now out to get all the Jewish children they can. They are demanding lists of names from homes and other institutions, often "blocking" a given group. This means that hostages are taken to emphasize the visitors demand that no children disappear from the group. Later, the children are deported. There are now 6,500 children in concealment so good that they are not in much danger. But there are about 1,500 whose lives are in real peril, and the only hope of saving them is getting them out of France, where already about half of the population is hiding the other half, and the possibilities of concealing further children are exhausted.

In view of this desperate situation, I finally appealed to the Swiss authorities. Children are constantly coming into this country clandestinely, and up to now the Swiss have practically not refused a single child. But the time is so short and the difficulties on the other side of the frontier constantly increasing. Thus it would be a real help if Switzerland would give its permission for the entry of a thousand or more children. After all the trials and anguish of clandestine travel through France and the escape through the frontier cordons, it would be a great relief if the passage into Switzerland could be legal and free from anxiety. The Berne authorities were quick to appreciate the situation and equally quick in their action. Within a few days they told us they would accept up to 1,500 children. This must not be known outside our own circle; if the Germans get wind of it, the whole project would be ruined.

At any rate, the plan is under way. We are only waiting now for the right person (who has been sent for) to come in from France to arrange all the
final details. Most of us have no illusions about saving 1,500 children. In view of the almost superhuman difficulties involved, we can hope for only a few hundred, at best. But even that, in view of what will happen to the rest, is almost a miracle.

Naturally the Swiss authorities made some conditions. Part of them concerned the care of children after their arrival here. Another condition was that the organizations represented in our Committee should promise to continue their efforts to assure the emigration of these children after the war. All these conditions have been fulfilled. But it is now even more important than ever that somehow, somewhere, some visas be secured, valid until after the war. We know you are working on this — but do not relax your efforts. If formal visas are not available, some sort of assurance to the Swiss Government that these children they are so generously taking in will not remain permanently on their hands, would be most valuable.

Another thing which might be done would be financial. If a fund could be guaranteed, as was done for the 1000 children we hoped to move from Marseille to the States, destined to assure the emigration of one to three thousand children from Switzerland, it would be a great strengthening of our position here. I submit this for your serious consideration, although Cour. and Dr. W. have probably already done so.

All of us here are full of admiration for the heroism of your people who still remain in France, risking their lives, and all too often sacrificing them, to help the children. We trust that those of you abroad are aware of their courage and devotion, and that no effort will be spared to help, from your side.

With warm good wishes to all, I am,

Yours faithfully,

/s/ Donald A. Lowrie

pp Donald A. Lowrie
Thorold of the British Embassy called Pehle at 10:30 today. He said that Lord Halifax had now recovered and would be ready to discuss the matter which you called him about, but had indicated he did not see much point in having the discussion until he had heard further from the Foreign Office. Pehle said he would pass this word along to you.

Pehle gathered from Thorold's remarks that the British Embassy had merely heard that the Foreign Office saw "grave disadvantages" to the Riegner plan, but had not been advised as yet as to the nature of the objections of the Foreign Office.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Following the call from Thorold of the British Embassy I dictated to Alger a memorandum from Paul to the Secretary advising him of Thorold's call and of the fact that while Lord Halifax had now recovered Halifax didn't see much point in discussing with the Secretary the matter which the Secretary had called him about until he had heard further from the Foreign Office.

The Secretary called me during the afternoon and advised me to tell Thorold that the matter was now being handled by Mr. Hull personally and accordingly, it was not necessary for the Secretary and Halifax to discuss it. I promptly advised Thorold to this effect.

/s/ J. W. Pehle
December 21, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Not having heard from Riegolman I called his office at 11 o'clock this morning. He opened the conversation by stating:

"Now don't accuse me of delay. I have had five people working on that cable since 9 o'clock this morning, but we have not been able to find it. There appears to be only one copy of it in the department and that is not in the files. The file room indicates that it was charged out to Acheson's office. I have checked in Acheson's office, and there is no record of the cable there and they advise that Acheson's assistant, Hiss, had requested it and according to one of the girls in his office, he showed it to someone in the Treasury but the Treasury man said he did not want it. Hiss isn't in today and I am doing everything I can to find it. I have not been able to find out who it was in the Treasury that saw the cable."

I advised him that it looked as though we were up against a blank wall and that I would appreciate it if he would continue his search. He stated that he will. I asked him to call me at 12 o'clock and advise me where we stood.
December 21, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Riegolman called me back about 12:15 and stated that he had found Cable No. 482 and the conditions set forth therein are pretty horrible. I asked him whether he had a paraphrase. He stated, "no", but that he would read it to me over the telephone which he did. (Mr. Paul's secretary, Miss Alger, was on the telephone too and took the message but Riegolman read very rapidly and it was difficult to get).

The cable was in all respects as shocking as Mr. DuBois' memorandum of December 18 indicated.

I asked Riegolman if he would send me a paraphrase as soon as possible. He stated that he would dictate a paraphrase as soon as his secretary returned from lunch and that it should be ready by 3 o'clock. I told him that I would send a special messenger for the paraphrase as soon as he called.
JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. Pehle
Mr. DuBois
Mr. Luxford
Mrs. Klotz

H.M.JR: All I had was you wanted to see me right after lunch.

MR. PAUL: It was about this curious break that happened with State on this cable.

(Mr. DuBois and Mr. Luxford enter conference)

H.M.JR: Did you get the cigarettes?

MR. DUBOIS: Yes, thank you.

MR. PAUL: I don't think you won those. What were the terms of that bet?

MR. DUBOIS: As I understood them, they (referring to missing documents) were in the Secretary's office or Mrs. Klotz' office or Mrs. McHugh's office.

MR. PAUL: That is right. It depends on your definition of the term, "the Secretary's office."

MR. LUXFORD: That includes everybody who is on his appropriation.

MRS. KLOTZ: That is right.

H.M.JR: They were in that box. The first time Chauncey went through, she missed it.

MR. DUBOIS: I think I won them!

H.M.JR: You will rule that way, anyway.

MR. PAUL: Well, who wants to tell the story?
MR. LUXFORD: Well, I can pick up for you what you already know. I have a file here.

You will recall, Mr. Secretary, that you asked for cable number 354 in the Secretary's office the other day. We got 354, but there was a very significant omission; namely, the reference to cable number 482, and on its face 354 looked very innocuous.

Well, you then called Mr. Paul and suggested that we go back and get the true text, so Mr. Paul called Mr. Welles yesterday afternoon.

MR. PAUL: Not Mr. Welles!

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Long. He explained to him that we were having trouble understanding Harrison's cable of April in terms of the text of 354 that had been transmitted to us, and that the Secretary had asked that I come over and check the original text to see if there had been a garble in paraphrase.

MR. PAUL: I don't know that I said the Secretary had asked.

MR. LUXFORD: That is the gist of it.

MR. PAUL: I said, "Would there be any objection..."

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Long said that was quite all right. So I went over yesterday afternoon and got over there about five-thirty. Long had me in his office and said the man who was in charge of this kind of work, Mr. Riegelman, had the files and was over in the Treasury, but that in his absence he had asked Mr. Riegelman’s assistant, Mr. Reinstein, to run the matter down—would I wait? So we sat around and talked for maybe fifteen or twenty minutes. I avoided any discussion of this issue except on broad, general lines, because we already had a commitment on this point.

At the end of that time I said, "Mr. Long, I hate to be bothering you waiting for this cable and holding you from your work. Why don't I wait out in the other office until you get the cable?" He said, "Before you do
that, I'll call in my secretary."

He called in his secretary and said, "Will you again try to get that cable from Mr. Reinstein and be very polite about it?"

H.M.JR: He said, "...be polite"?

MR. LUXFORD: That is right. She came back in about five minutes and said, "Well, Mr. Long, Mr. Reinstein says you have got that cable and you have had it all the time." She said, "Well, here it is; it is in this file." And she pointed to it. He said, "Well, no, the Treasury wanted the original cable, and this is only a copy of it."

I said, "Well, if this is the text that is without paraphrase, this will be all right. Let me take a look at this." So I took the cable and examined it for a few minutes, and I said, "Well, this must be the clew to it. This cable says, 'Re your 482,' which wasn't in our copy, and maybe that explains the situation."

By this time Mr. Riegelman had come in, and Long said, "Well, I don't know what is in these cables." Riegelman says, "I think I know what is in that 482. I think that is a complaint by the Swiss against the use of the diplomatic pouch for private purposes." I said, "Well, I'd like to see the cable." And Mr. Long says, "Why, yes, you can have the cable."

H.M.JR: Did he hesitate?

MR. LUXFORD: No. How could he?

H.M.JR: From the way you tell it -

MR. LUXFORD: I said, "I am sure the Secretary will want to see 482." He just couldn't hesitate on that.

(Mr. Pehle enters conference)

(Secretary takes telephone call from General Strong)

H.M.JR: Ha, ha, ha! Boy! The President sent for Hull and Strong, at my suggestion, and let Hull have it.
MRS. KLOTZ: Who was that?

H.M.JR: General Strong. He let him have it; and I warned Strong it was coming. He said, "Well, the President said it was time to take firm action."

I put up the present strength of Bolivia. General Strong said, "Bolivia is serious, but not near as serious as Chile."

The President asked about the funds. He said, "We have tied up two banks, but that is the least of it. The Nazis have free access." Strong said, "I told the President the situation was very serious."

I said, "What was Hull's attitude?" He said, "Hull's attitude was he was very worried and seemed very much upset."

Now this is all terribly in the room. Another thing I thought was very amusing. I got him to speak to Stimson and get Stimson and Knox and Hull to meet once a week. How did Stimson react? He says, "He was too tired to react."

MR. PEHLE: Strong said that?

H.M.JR: Strong - "...too tired."

MR. PEHLE: I was about to tell you, Mr. Secretary, that Colonel Towson called me just before I came over and said that Strong had seen Stimson and that Strong had been called to see the Great White Father.

H.M.JR: What they do, being in G-2, you can't call him the President, so half the time it was "Great White Father," and the rest of the time it was "Number One." Otherwise, you wouldn't know whom they were talking about.

MRS. KLOTZ: They'd never guess who the Great White Father was!

H.M.JR: But boy, oh, boy! the pincer movement is on. I said, "Could he smell Morgenthau - fe, fi, fo, fum?" They said the President was very definite that he thought...
it was time to move.

MR. PEHLE: How did he leave it?

H.M.JR: They were to review the thing, and Hull was to get in touch with me.

MR. PAUL: You better have this story before Hull does.

MR. LUXFORD: Well, at that point Long called the files. It was ten minutes of six, and he said that the Secretary of the Treasury wanted this 482 right away. They said their files were closed completely at 5:30, and there was no way under the sun to get it. Then Long assured me personally that he would deliver that cable over the first thing this morning. He said to Riegelman, "Now, you get it and get it over there."

I didn't receive it by eleven this morning, so I called Riegelman, and asked where the cable was. The answer I got—-I want you to get the full flavor—I'll read what he said. He said, "Don't accuse me of delay. I have had five people working on that cable since nine o'clock this morning, but we have not been able to find it. There appears to be only one copy of it in the Department, and that is not in the files. The File Room indicates that it has been charged out to Acheson's office. I have checked in Acheson's office, and there is no record of the cable there and they advise that Acheson's assistant, Hiss, had requested it, and according to one of the girls in his office, he showed it to someone in the Treasury, but the Treasury man said he did not want it. Hiss isn't in today, and I am doing everything I can to find it. I have not been able to find out who it was in the Treasury who saw the cable."

I then told him it looked like we were up against a blank wall, and I wished he would continue to look for it. He told me that he would try again, and I asked him to call me again by twelve.

H.M.JR: I told you I thought Monday was too early to ask for this thing. Remember?
MR. LUXFORD: Hiss had assured us it would be back.  

H.M.JR: I said it was a little bit too soon.  

MR. LUXFORD: Then Riegelman called me back at 12:15 and stated that he had found the cable and the conditions set forth therein were pretty horrible. I asked him if he had a paraphrase. He said, "No," but that he would read over to me on the telephone a copy of it.  

H.M.JR: On the telephone - the original cable?  

MR. LUXFORD: He did read it over the telephone. Miss Alger took the thing down.  

H.M.JR: Un-paraphrased? That is contrary to all security rules and regulations.  

MR. LUXFORD: This is garbled enough so there is no need to worry about there being a true copy and breaking the code. But it certainly, in many respects, confirms what DuBois described it as. It describes conditions as being perfectly horrible in Poland, Germany, and Rumania, as well as in other parts. They are putting them in the ghetto, shooting the Jews four thousand a day, and taking their clothes from them and shipping them to Germany. They are revoking their ration cards and not allowing them to buy rationed goods.  

Well, you can't read it without being horrified. I am getting a paraphrase by three o'clock today.  

H.M.JR: What was the cable which Wise wanted to show me that he had in which-he said he got it from somebody in the State Department--they were doing horrible things?  

MR. LUXFORD: This must be it.  

MRS. KLOTZ: Because he is mentioned in here.  

MR. PEHLE: He was given the text of that.  

MR. PAUL: They were refusing to give us something they had shown to Wise.  

H.M.JR: Wise had something which he came in with.
If I could read it, I could remember the thing. It was referred to in the thing.

MR. LUXFORD: This is a loose statement. (Hands Secretary file copy, held in Mr. DuBois' files)

H.M.JR: This is the one that Wise had. Did Wise get a copy?

MR. DuBOIS: A pencilled notation on the original said the letter had been sent to Wise.

H.M.JR: You (Klotz) will have to remind me, because you were with me. Don't you remember when Wise came in?

MRS. KLOTZ: I wasn't here, but you told me about it.

H.M.JR: He said, "What is your advice about giving this thing out to the public? It only makes things worse." I said, "No, the only way you can get reaction is to give the thing to the public." Where they boiled the bodies down to get the fat out of them!

MR. PEHLE: There have been all sorts of cables like that.

MR. DuBOIS: The amazing thing about this is this cable plus the other one, in which they tried to stop these messages from coming through.

MR. LUXFORD: You have enough here.

MR. PEHLE: You have got the full flavor of what they have done.

MR. LUXFORD: That is the important thing here.

MR. DuBOIS: After they get that cable describing the horrible conditions, in direct response they sent out a cable saying that private messages of this character shouldn't be transmitted. Riegelman pointed out yesterday that they are getting private messages by the hundreds from commercial firms in Switzerland, and yet they try to stop this on that ground. No wonder they tried to hide the facts.
MR. LUXFORD: The thing that is significant is the cable that went out; by no way of reading it could you determine what they were doing. It was very innocuous. It is a thing that every one of us would initial, so the man who signed that cable didn't have the slightest notion what he was signing. It just said, "482," and gave an innocuous statement saying no more cables for private persons. That cable was initialed by Atherton and Dunn.

H.M.JR: Now, just take it easy. The question is, did Wise ever get this?

MR. PAUL: The original was noted.

MR. LUXFORD: That he did get it.

H.M.JR: Well, if he got it, our case isn't as strong as if nobody got it.

MR. PEHLE: Yes, it is.

MR. LUXFORD: He didn't get the reply. He got that, but he didn't get a message back.

MR. PEHLE: Assume, Mr. Secretary, that that cable came in to State, and this is the reply they sent. They refer to that cable and they say, "In the future we would suggest that you do not accept reports submitted to you to be transmitted to private persons in the United States unless such action is advisable because of extraordinary circumstances."

H.M.JR: If this isn't extraordinary circumstance, what is?

MR. PEHLE: Practically said they didn't regard this as an extraordinary circumstance, because they referred to it.

MR. DuBOIS: Harrison later on said he hadn't been sending cables.

H.M.JR: Harrison asked if it couldn't be released.

MR. DuBOIS: Really, it is one of the most signifi-
H.M.JR: Did you fellows see any change in the attitude of Riegelman today?

MR. LUXFORD: In speaking to Riegelman today he was very cooperative; but this is the only time I have ever talked to him. He was cooperative.

H.M.JR: I had that boy for two hours last night, and I want to just give you this report.

In the first place, in his application he gives me as reference and he thinks that they don't know who he is. I think this: I think the boy is a sincere boy. He practiced law for four years. He is 4-F on account of his heart. When he came back he had five different offers of jobs. This is one of them. He is P-5, $5100. He got other offers; he said Economic Warfare and different places, because they seemed to be so short of lawyers.

Anyway, he, like so many lawyers or economists or farmers—so as not to be personal!—was interested in getting a good brief, a debate before a court, see? He also, I think, has had his eye on us, and so forth and so on. He doesn't like the World Jewish Congress. But the picture I painted to him and which he got, opened his eyes—that I didn't care whether we wrote a better memorandum than they did, or vice versa, but that you have got this prison in Europe where people are dying.

He said, "Did you know that Hull sent a memorandum some time in August, telling his people to do nothing more than this, just let the Treasury do what it wants, not to assist or resist the Treasury?"

MR. PEHLE: We knew in effect.

H.M.JR: I said, "Billy, did it ever occur to you that is no worse than being passive—that somebody in the State Department might wake up some morning and say, 'What can I do to help?' instead of all the time writing memoranda?" I said, "You wrote this article for the Atlantic Monthly about the future of the world, as it is today. Thanks to
the Foreign Office and the State Department, if the war were settled today, what is there for the minority races?" He said, "Nothing." I said, "Can't the State Department say, 'Come on, we'll take off our coats and help solve this thing?'"

He said, "I guess you are right." So he said, "Now what do you want me to do—quit?" Because I had suggested he go over to Crowley's office. I said, "No, I don't want you to quit, but I want you to tell them that you are related to me, and see what happens to you. I think plenty is going to happen to you, but let's see what happens to you."

MR. PAUL: Is he a nephew?

H.M.JR: His father, Charles Riegelman, married my first cousin.

MR. PAUL: Very distant.

H.M.JR: He is a second cousin. But I think the boy is honest.

Now, as to the other matter. He said, "I can't understand it. Here I am; I decide things; I sent an eleven-page cable to Sweden"—I think he said—"on international business." He mentioned the man who was his superior.

MR. LUXFORD: Reinstein.

H.M.JR: No, another man, entirely new name. Acheson to this man to another. He said, "This is really important. I wrote it as best I could. I go in and he thumbs it to see if it is eleven pages, says it is all right, and initials it, signs the name "Hull," and it goes. I send another one to Switzerland and Sweden."

He said, "I was waiting for the answer. Somebody from the Treasury calls up and says, 'Riegelman, why don't you get busy on this? We have had the answer for ten days.' I say, 'What answer?' I find out there has been an answer. The Treasury has it, and I don't have it."
He says, "I can't get cables. You can't believe a small organization would take so long for things to come down."

"But," he says, "cables are there for me to get. I can't get them." And the boy, thirty years old, is really running Economic Warfare over there.

Now, my wife was there and she was listening very, very closely. She told him he was far too trusting--thinks he is completely sold on Breckinridge Long. But, after all, the boy has only been there since the first of November. Far smarter, older people than he have also trusted him. If I know human nature, and I do--at least, I have had a little experience on that front--the boy is honest. If you have ever read his article, you would see what he wrote. But it just never occurred to him.

Now, how long, once he has seen the light --. He said you (Pehle) helped him. After a talk with you, he saw more clearly. A very sensitive boy like that, how long can he stand it? I don't know; but I don't distrust the boy. I decided to let him tell them. I said, "They suspect Meltzer. I don't want them to suspect you, if there are any leaks. I am not worried about myself."

MR. PEHLE: They have got a concentration of suspicion now.

H.M. JR.: It is too bad, but the fat is in the fire.

Now, let me just put it this way. There is nothing particularly to be gained for me hitting this cable. Let's say the cable comes over today or tomorrow. You fellows draft a letter for Hull, see? Say, "My dear Mr. Hull," or, "Dear Cordell: In view of your very sympathetic interest when I was there, in view of the fact that you said at times you were unaware of what went on below -". You have got to be very careful. "...I want to draw the following shocking facts to your attention." See? And, "I am confident that you will agree with me that the kind of information contained in this cable certainly should come out. It not only should be expressed, but should be encouraged to come
out so we can evaluate the situation, and certainly private corporations every day are allowed to send their stuff out. "Matters affecting thousands or millions of humans beings are as important as a cable from a trade concern."

MR. LUXFORD: That doesn't hit it quite, though, Mr. Secretary. The big point is when we asked for that cable three times we didn't get it.

MR. FEILE: Can we hit that?

H.M.JR: Try it. You fellows write it.

MR. PAUL: I'd like to add one footnote to what you say. I think that we ought to do whatever we can at any point to protect Hiss in the situation.

H.M.JR: That is why my inclination is to let it lie a week so it doesn't come too close.

MR. LUXFORD: I'd say that Hiss is in, and I think he is resigned to the fact that he is.

H.M.JR: But what damage can we do to the Jews in Rumania if we wait one week, as far as these cables are concerned?

MR. LUXFORD: One thing, Mr. Secretary, we have got them wobbling right now. Hit them again while they are wobbling. A week from now Hull may be thinking about something else.

MR. DuBOIS: I think there is a possibility, Mr. Secretary, that through this you may be able to get Long out of there. I think we can either get him out or divorce the issue from him.

H.M.JR: You fellows write a letter. I do want one thing. I do want, before the letter comes to me, I would like again to get the benefit of Oscar, see?

MR. PAUL: Oscar doesn't know about this latest; but we can tell him.
H.M.JR: You might as well tell him. This is where Oscar shines, on this kind of stuff.

MR. DuBOIS: Hiss was over here. He takes it awfully like a man.

H.M.JR: He has been here today?

MR. PAUL: He came over.

MR. PEHLE: He is going to admit the facts tomorrow when they ask him. He is going to say, "Sure," he showed it to the Treasury.

MR. LUXFORD: In fact, our letter should refer to it. We are on the defensive.

MR. PEHLE: It has to be very carefully done.

H.M.JR: When you are ready, I am ready. How's that?

MR. DuBOIS: There is a question in my mind whether this should be done by letter. But that is something else.

H.M.JR: The last thing Riegelman said to me last night was, "Look, Cousin Henry, one thing is bothering me. Those two letters you sent were awfully tough." He said, "Gee, they are tough." I said, "That is wonderful." He said, "Some of your people were practically ready to hit some of the State Department." I said, "Isn't that wonderful!"

I said, "Isn't that wonderful! That's the kind of people I have. They are a swell crowd." He reared back.

MR. PEHLE: When he came over yesterday he had the original with him of the second letter, and I think he had back in his mind that we might take the letter back, because he said these things cannot be allowed to stand on the record. "We, in the State Department," he said.

H.M.JR: Well, look, boys. I don't think the boy is wrong. He is in charge of Economic Warfare. He is terrifically impressed with his importance in the State
Department. He has been suddenly thrown all of this power. They let an eleven-page cable go out on his say-so. Put yourselves in the thing like that.

MR. LUXFORD: We saw his predecessor ruined.

MR. DuBOIS: You don't really feel that they know that he is your cousin.

H.M.JR: I said so. Listen, do you know what I told my wife last night? I said this is a typical German police method.

MRS. KLOTZ: That is right.

H.M.JR: A typical German police method. Just the way when I was in France in 1938, I am confident that the German police sent a man down to stay at the same hotel, and gave him the same name as mine. I am ashamed to say he was a Jew; at least, I think he was.

He tried his best to make friends with me. Any time I played tennis, he'd be there; any time I took a walk, he'd be there. Finally, he said his French wife would come down and stay with him. We got a letter, and his French wife got a letter in German.

The last day I was on the dock going for a swim—fortunately, in a bathing suit!—he said, "I want to talk to you about Hitler." Do you know," he said, "that I have been waiting for two hours to see you? I have been telephoning you for two hours, and you have had the impudence not to answer me?" He was suddenly a changed man.

I said, "Well, I was busy." Says he, "I am not accustomed to being kept waiting. I want to know what is your attitude about Hitler?" I said, "Goodbye," and I dove into the Mediterranean and swam away from him.

MR. PAUL: Where was that?

H.M.JR: Down at Antibes.

Now, this boy isn't that kind of a boy, but it is the same kind of method.
MR. LUXFORD: They ruined his predecessor, Mr. Secretary. Bernard Meltzer was a very fine man. He was a young fellow like him until he went into the State Department in exactly the same position, and that man came out a year and a half later fighting everything the Treasury did except this issue. And he was with us in heart.

MR. PAUL: They ruined Dean Acheson.

H.M. JR: Anyway, you people go do a job. Please let Oscar assist in the drafting. I want to see him when he is over here. When you people are ready - you have no objection, have you?

MR. PAUL: No.

H.M. JR: Because Oscar, knowing this stuff, can feed it to Stettinius.

MR. PAUL: Yes.

MR. PEHLE: The only question in my mind is whether this Hiss part of it would die at State.

MR. LUXFORD: It can't, now.

H.M. JR: I thought you told me Hiss was going to tell them.

MR. PEHLE: He is when he is asked.

H.M. JR: You didn't say that.

MRS. KLOTZ: Yes, he said that.

MR. LUXFORD: He is flushed.

H.M. JR: Why do you have to bring Hiss into the picture?

MR. PEHLE: Because when you write that letter to State -
H.M.JR: It will take you fellows at least until tomorrow morning to do this letter?

MR. PEHLE: Certainly.

H.M.JR: Do the job, and let's see what happens on Hiss between now and tomorrow morning.

MR. LUXFORD: Nothing will happen.

MR. PEHLE: May I mention one more thing in this connection?

H.M.JR: Again, may I compliment all of you?

MR. PEHLE: This is too good to last, Mr. Secretary! You are going to be sore yet.

MR. LUXFORD: Wait until we get on Argentina!

H.M.JR: Let's see if I can do this correctly, as a member of the 4-H Club: the hand, the heart, the head, and health. I don't know what you do when you demonstrate health, but, anyway, I congratulate you on the heart and the head, anyway.

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Secretary, in the Times this morning a significant newspaper clipping says that Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved unanimously yesterday a resolution by General Gillette and eleven others proposing that President Roosevelt set up a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to devise ways to save the surviving people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany.

Now, that is the resolution which was referred to in that ad. It was aimed right at the State Department. So they are under terrific pressure right now. This is a resolution that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed.

H.M.JR: I had Harry Hopkins for lunch. I have been with the President a couple of times. And Uncle Joe Stalin has had his effect on all of these boys. He is in our corner, or we are in his corner on being aggressive
against our enemies.

MRS. KLOTZ: In Stalin's corner - not Hopkins.

H.M.JR: We are in Uncle Joe's. All Uncle Joe wants to do is shoot fifty thousand top Germans.

MRS. KLOTZ: Not enough, says I!

H.M.JR: All Churchill wanted to shoot was fifty, and he couldn't get it by his Cabinet. His Cabinet wouldn't approve.

So I mean the trend is for a much more aggressive approach towards our enemies. We may still be on the winning side, on account of the fact that the Russians know what this means.

MR. PAUL: That is very true.

H.M.JR: Fluff around with the Argentinians for a year and a half--all the rest of the stuff. Of all the damned nonsense I have heard in my life.

MR. PAUL: I have to report to you on Forrestal.

(Mr. Pehle, Mr. DuBois, and Mr. Luxford leave the meeting)

I asked them to write up the conversation I had. I just sent for it. I am not complaining it is on anybody's desk! It is on my desk and I sent for it.

I talked to Forrestal, and I'll send you in the conversation. I asked him what he talked to George about. He said he would tell me about these closed contracts - should bring them up for review.

The thing that astounded me was his statement which he reiterated a couple of times. George didn't feel very strong about this thing. He doesn't seem to be very strong. I think we have a Fifth Column there, in Forrestal.

H.M.JR: I am afraid so.
MR. PAUL: I'll send you in the exact conversation. I want you to see it.

H.M.JR: All right. Well, keep up the good work, Randolph.

MR. PAUL: How about talking to Patterson?

H.M.JR: Would you do that?

MR. PAUL: Would you object if I talked along the line of keeping a stiff front and not settling on the July 1 issue, because that is what I told Forrestal?

H.M.JR: I am entirely in sympathy.
December 21, 1943
4:25 p.m.

HMJr: ....lined up.
Operator: All right.
HMJr: Hello.
Operator: There you are.
HMJr: Pehle?
John W. Pehle: Yes, sir.
HMJr: This is what -- I don't know what it is -- in baseball they say from one to another and then you get struck out or whatever it is.
P: (Laughs)
HMJr: Well, anyway....
P: Double play?
HMJr: Yeah. I got this from Paul for Pehle, from what the hell is this....
P: Thorold.
HMJr: Thorold?
P: Yeah.
HMJr: Well, this is from Pehle to Thorold to Halifax.
P: I see.
HMJr: That the matter is now in Secretary Hull's hands.
P: Is it?
HMJr: So it will not be necessary for me to see Ambassador Halifax on this issue.
P: All right.
HMJr: Mr. Hull is handling it personally.
P: I have it.
HMJr: And I'll do it from Pehle to Thorold to Halifax.
P: Tinker to Evers to Chance.
HMJr: That's what I was trying to get.
P: All right.
HMJr: Well, say that again. What was that?
P: Tinker to Evers to Chance.
HMJr: Yes. Then they get struck out, don't they?
P: That's a triple play.
HMJr: Triple play. That's it. Well, this is from Pehle to Thorold to Halifax.
P: All right. We have it.
HMJr: And that's the way we'll do it.
P: All right, Mr. Secretary.
HMJr: Righto.
P: Yes, sir.
HMJr: Thank you.
TO: Mrs. Klotz

FROM: Mr. Pehle

I think the Secretary will be interested in the attached article which we mentioned to him the other day.

JOHN W. PEHLE
Program Of Death

By Paul Winkler

Jewish Persecutions

IN THE speeding up of the German campaign for the extermination of the Jews of Europe, which is occurring at the very period when it might seem more reasonable to expect that the Nazis would be abandoning their persecutions for fear of imminent punishment, some categories of Jews are momentarily, at least, escaping the general fate. There is no guarantee that their immunity will last, or continue for there have been examples in the past of Jews, originally passed over when the modern tribunals of death were filled, being included in later groups. But for the moment, it is possible to report that Jews coming under a few headings have remained comparatively unscathed.

In Holland, for instance, husbands and wives of non-Jews have not been sent off to death with the others—but during the last three months they have all had to submit to sterilization. Also able to escape the executioner, were certain favored persons whose friends were able to pay 30,000 Swiss francs (about $5000) apiece to save their lives.

For somewhat higher amounts permis to travel to Switzerland were sometimes granted.

Palestinian Immigration

Finally, special treatment has in most cases been given to Jews not sent to a death camp in central Germany, and have been told that eventually they will be permitted to leave the country. It appears that the reason for this treatment of Jews with exit visas is that the Germans want to be able to use the propaganda argument that the Allies share the responsibility for their extermination of the Jews of Europe by closing to them the doors of Palestine and the Western Hemisphere.

The "scientific system" behind this German madness is clearly discernible, though its motives are often obscure. It is obvious that this slaughter of the Jews, which is occurring throughout occupied Europe through the operations of a vast and complicated administrative machinery, is no case of hap hazard satisfaction of feelings of hate or revenge experienced by certain Nazi leaders. Indeed, that the slaughter of the Jews has now become more than a Nazi project.

It is a German project. Alfred Rosenberg, the mystic who gives ferocious adherence to the doctrine of racial purity (and has been openly identified as the inspirer of these operations by some of the German "special commissions" for hunting down the Jews in various countries), seems to have succeeded in convincing non-Nazi German leaders, as well as the party heads, of the importance of cleaning all the Jews out of Europe.

Rosenberg's Argument

Rosenberg's argument is said to be that, far from calling off the campaign because numbers now seem small, it must be speeded up so that the extermination of the Jews can be finished while Germany is still able to attend to it. Whether victorious or not (this time), Rosenberg insists, Germany must continue its campaign to de-Judaize and de-Christianize all of Europe, and return to the old Teutonic ruthless paganism.

This is an angle of the situation which few outsiders have considered—that the campaign against the Jews is part of the campaign against Christianity. For Rosenberg holds that the Jewish and Christian religions alike are part of the same general doctrine of human concepts which are directly opposed to the Teutonic dogma that might make right might make might make right might make right might make right might make right might make right might make right might make right might make right might make right might make right make right. In uprooting Judeo-Christian philosophy is to uproot the Jews. It will then be easier to win over the Christian countries to the Teutonic way of thinking, or at least, perhaps, to win over enough of them so that they can be used to exterminate the others.

Rosenberg's theory, which seems to have secured general official acceptance, is that Germany's future plans of expansion, this is a necessary step in the German plan. Germany goes down to military defeat, but succeeds in the meantime in getting rid of this entire body of her races. Rosenberg believes that Germany has actually won a victory for they will not see this defeat as final, and if it is incurred under conditions which will improve the chances of winning the military victory next time, they will consider that the Second World War has advanced them on their way to the ultimate goal. After a defeat, the spirit of Nazism, which is the spirit of Prussian-Teutonism, will of course have to go underground; but its chances of emerging again, more powerful than ever, and the chances of official Germany's being able to stage a comeback, will be enhanced in a Europe "freed of Jewish influence."

Such considerations account for the speed with which the slaughter of the Jews is being pressed. It is not being done in spite of the probability of a German defeat, but because of the probability of a German defeat. A victorious Germany would have time to proceed slowly in carrying out its program of death. But a Germany which is losing the war cannot wait.
December 23, 1943
3:00 p.m.

JEWSH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
Mr. White
Mr. Pehle
Mr. Luxford
Mrs. Klotz
Mr. DuBois

H.M.JR: Now I am to read this? (Refers to attached Secret Memorandum)

MR. PAUL: Read the first page.

MR. LUXFORD: There have been further developments, Mr. Secretary.

MR. PEHLE: More evidence.

MR. PAUL: Read the first page and see if you don't want to read the whole thing - down through (3).

(The Secretary reads the document to himself)

H.M.JR: Well, isn't the case weakened, the fact that Sumner Welles signed a cable which said not to send any more?

MR. PEHLE: We deal with that, Mr. Secretary.

MR. PAUL: That is why it is put in the form - see the top of Page 4.

H.M.JR: Without going into sentences, taking the thing as a whole - see what I mean? What did you people think I was going to do with this?
MR. PAUL: You ask what should be done with this? I think there is only one thing to do. I think that is the ideal opportunity to get three of the most vicious men removed from their offices in the State Department that you will ever have.

H.M.JR: You still haven't answered my question.

MR. PAUL: I think you have to talk to Hull about it.

MR. PEHLE: This document, Mr. Secretary, was written to bring you up to date. To write the kind of a document that you would hand to Mr. Hull would take more time and should be very carefully done. This is for you, so that you would know there are certain documents in there that you had not seen before which we obtained yesterday.

H.M.JR: Which?

MR. PEHLE: The earlier ones. The documents that show that in October '42 Welles sent a message marked "personal" to the Minister telling him he wanted that information. (Refers to file of cables)

MR. PAUL: The language of that cable shows he was most anxious to get that information. In the face of that, his subordinates--

MR. LUXFORD: ...countermanded that.

MR. PEHLE: Following the countermanding he again asked for it, showing that he didn't realize it had been countermanded.

H.M.JR: Of course, the whole thing is terrifically upsetting. I was under the impression you wanted this thing to go to Hull.

MR. PAUL: No, no. This is to you. We were trying to get something to you today because we thought you might want to be thinking about it.
In the meantime we were going to work on something that would be inter-departmental. This is even marked "secret" here in the Treasury.

MR. LUXFORD: There is one approach to this. You would go to Hull on a very personal basis and say, "Mr. Hull, this is the report that I have received. I am shocked and I think you ought to know about it."

MR. PEHLE: A report which we will write.

H.M.JR: You are condemning people before you have heard--

MR. PEHLE: I agree with that. I think it is more powerful if you write it less emotionally.

MR. WHITE: The point is, we need time.

MR. PEHLE: We wanted to be sure you got the full flavor.

H.M.JR: I get it. I mean, when you call these people accomplices of Hitler in this program, they are war criminals in every sense of the term.

MR. PEHLE: I agree with you.

H.M.JR: You are finding them guilty without trying them.

MR. PEHLE: That is right. We are awfully sure of our position, Mr. Secretary. But we all agree, I think, that when you take this up with Hull you want a polished, careful, cautious memorandum.

MR. LUXFORD: I think they have had a trial for two years, while they have been working on this program, and they have kicked it around in every possible way.

H.M.JR: Look, I am with you, but what is going through my mind is--
MR. LUXFORD: I was looking for an excuse and not a trial.

H.M.JR: No, let me make myself very clear. If I took this thing - you see, I have got to get myself out of the frame of mind of having read this thing, because it is such a shock. Hull would immediately begin to defend his people.

The way to do this thing is to get all the facts before him and again assuming that he is a man of fine principle, sympathetic, let him draw his own conclusions, you see? Give him all the facts. I don't know who it was, but some famous moving picture producer said the greatest way to do is to give the audience the story, but don't try to interpret their emotions for them. Let them interpret their emotions for themselves and then the audience comes back at you.

MR. PAUL: This is for your information.

H.M.JR: All the way through I kept thinking, well, what is Hull going to think about this?

MR. PAUL: But there isn't a statement there that isn't, in my opinion, justified completely as a conclusion. But the technique for getting things across is a different matter entirely.

H.M.JR: I am willing and anxious to bring this to Mr. Hull's attention. I think what you people have to do is to draft the thing so you present him with the facts, and then if we find he doesn't react properly, then we can make the verbal argument.

But after all, he reacted quickly enough to the English thing, and believe me, sometime when I see Mr. Halifax I am going to tell him that getting an answer from him third-hand, through three people - he didn't want to see me - the first time he walks in here he is going to get it right there! ( Strikes himself) I didn't mean to do it that hard. (Laughter)
MR. PEHLE: I thought you would like the way that was done, on this issue, particularly.

H.M. JR: Now you men go to work.

MRS. KLOTZ: It is true to form, Halifax--

MR. PAUL: One of the cleverest conspiracies of silence and suppression. If they are doing this, it has a larger significance and issue than this issue. If they are doing this, what else are they doing with other issues?

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Secretary, we agree on two points. One of them is that it must be presented to State in such a way that Hull will not rise to the defense of his Department, as such.

H.M. JR: That is the point.

MR. PEHLE: Secondly, we must not put him in a position so that this becomes a fight between Mr. Welles and people who are still in the Department.

Thirdly, we don't think this ought to go to the President and have the President tell Mr. Hull how to run his Department, because that is what got the Welles difficulty at least stirred up.

H.M. JR: No, you have got, just in the first instance, from the line that this man is an American and that his sentiments are--

MRS. KLOTZ: God, with all these facts, they will have to be right.

H.M. JR: And we have to put it to him in a way -- after all, he was a judge. "Now here, Judge, are the facts." Let him issue the sentence. Then, if after he has had ample time, he doesn't act, there is always time to find other ways.
MR. PAUL: Well, there is no dispute between us.

MR. PHELLE: We have not gone to Oscar Cox, Mr. Secretary. We have been worried about taking it out of the Department.

MR. PAUL: I think it would get right back to Stettinius.

H.M.JR: All right. I am physically ill.

MR. DuBOIS: Could I mention one point, Mr. Secretary?

H.M.JR: I think I would stop right here. You have nothing new, have you, Joe?

MR. DuBOIS: It is a new point, yes; briefly, that as I see it, it may be over-obvious, Riegelman is being made to bear the cross for some of this work. Secondly, it wouldn't surprise me that at some stage of the game they may even accuse him of acting as a spy for you.

H.M.JR: I have told him that. I have told Riegelman, and my wife sat there and heard me.

MR. LUXFORD: I think the point Joe is bringing up is whether you shouldn't tell State that we don't appreciate his operating in this field under the circumstances.

MR. DuBOIS: It is very dangerous.

MR. LUXFORD: They are putting you in a compromising position.

H.M.JR: I told Riegelman to tell them that he was related to me. Now, let's say that he didn't; now, supposing I call up one of Mr. Hull's secretaries - "I just want to bring it to your attention." He will say, "What do you want us to do?"
MR. LUXFORD: The point Joe and I are making is that you are in a compromised position.

MR. PAUL: I don't think so.

H.M.JR: Why? How am I compromised?

MR. LUXFORD: Particularly on a record like this where we are obtaining information. We got these cables from Riegelman.

MR. PEHLE: We asked for them.

H.M.JR: Wait a minute. Let's say that they say Riegelman is a spy for Morgenthau. All they are giving me is information after the crime.

MR. LUXFORD: That is right.

H.M.JR: So the crime is still there. It is after the crime. Supposing I was trying to find a murderer in the State Department, which is what it amounts to.

MR. LUXFORD: You were looking for one--

H.M.JR: And Riegelman gives me information to help convict the murderer and the act was done, the murder was committed. That doesn't in any way involve me; if they accuse Riegelman of giving evidence against them to help convict the man, I can't see, because I put him on notice. It involves him, but I don't see as I am involved. I am collecting evidence.

Now, there are four lawyers here.

MR. PAUL: I am not too worried about that.

MR. PEHLE: We all think it would be better if he weren't there. On the other hand--

H.M.JR: I don't see--if I call up, it just doesn't make sense.
MR. LUXFORD: He has been very cooperative.

MR. PAUL: As the Secretary says, if he calls up, they will say, "What do you want us to do?"

H.M. JR: What should I say?

MR. PAUL: He is a second cousin.

H.M. JR: He would say, "What do you want us to do?"

If you said to me, "We want to wait and see what the next move is, we have to catch him at the murder," that would be something else. But the whole plot is finished, done.

MR. PAUL: After all--

H.M. JR: And I will go a step further.

MR. LUXFORD: I can't argue with you; you are absolutely right.

H.M. JR: Is he being sympathetic and helpful this week?

MR. PEHLE: Yes.

MR. LUXFORD: You are absolutely right, but you may be made a target for criticism.

H.M. JR: My God, I gave him two and a half hours of the best I had in me.

MR. PEHLE: It is obvious he has been affected by it.

H.M. JR: And he is being helpful.

MR. PEHLE: That is right.

H.M. JR: O.K. I would keep him there.

MR. WHITE: Have him become very helpful, and they will fire him.
H.M.JR: I told him as soon as he got uncomfortable I could get him a job.

Have you any worries, Harry?

MR. WHITE: It is a little late. I think they put him in there for their protection, not as a spy, but because they wanted to say, "I don't know what his complaint is; we have one of his relatives working in this field." I think the time has passed when it is appropriate to say something about it. The first time he came over you might well have said you didn't like it. But it is sort of raking over old coals now by getting them to work on it.

H.M.JR: But, Harry, I call him up and say to Mr. Stone, "Mr. Stone, Mr. Riegelman is my second cousin," and so what?

MR. WHITE: That is right. You can't say anything about it now.

H.M.JR: And in fairness to the boy—he is a decent boy—

MR. WHITE: I don't think that is pertinent, because he is out of the picture. It isn't that he is decent or indecent; the fact remains that he was deliberately put in there. His training and experience shows that he was put in to serve their purpose and not yours. The time has passed. I wouldn't do anything about it now.

H.M.JR: If he is being helpful, I think the pertinent thing is to keep him there.

MR. PAUL: It is a wonderful defense for murder. You found out about the murder through some stool pigeon. What the hell!

H.M.JR: The murder has been committed. You are a judge sitting on the bench, and the Treasury Department has a stool pigeon. That doesn't influence you.
MR. PAUL: Not at all. I would say, as a judge, that I am perfectly familiar with the necessity. Suppose he was a stool pigeon; that is the way evidence is frequently obtained. It doesn't affect the murder; it doesn't make the murder not a murder.
We report to you herewith a story which is so shocking and so tragic that it is difficult to believe.

On the basis of the cold facts contained for the most part in State Department documents (which we have finally managed to obtain despite the strenuous opposition of certain State Department officials, including what appears to have been a deliberate falsification of one of the documents), the following points stand out so clearly and so sharply that, despite our efforts to explain them away, we have been unable to do so:

(1) In October 1942 Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State instructed our Minister in Switzerland to obtain full information confirming the plans of the German Government for the complete extermination of the Jews in Europe.

(2) Notwithstanding the specific instructions of the Acting Secretary of State, Atherton and Dunn not only failed to facilitate the obtaining of this information but in their official capacity went so far as to stop the obtaining of information concerning the murder of the Jewish population of Europe.

(3) Breckinridge Long is responsible for the attempt to conceal this whole situation from this Department.

To put it bluntly, Mr. Secretary, it appears that certain responsible officials of this Government were so fearful that this Government might act to save the Jews of Europe if the gruesome facts relating to Hitler's plans to exterminate them became known, that they not only attempted to suppress the facts but, in addition, they used the powers of their official position to secretly countermand the instructions of the Acting Secretary of State ordering such
Facts to be reported. We leave it for your judgment whether this action made such officials the accomplices of Hitler in this program and whether or not these officials are not war criminals in every sense of the term.

The facts which support statements (1) and (2) above are the following:

(1) On October 5, 1942 Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State sent a cable (2314) for the personal attention of Minister Harrison in Bern stating that leaders of the Jewish Congress had received reports from their representatives in Geneva and London to the effect that many thousands of Jews in Eastern Europe were being slaughtered pursuant to a policy embarked upon by the German Government for the complete extermination of the Jews in Europe. Welles added that he was trying to obtain further information from the Vatican but that other than this he was unable to secure confirmation of these stories. He stated that Rabbi Wise believed that information was available to his representatives in Switzerland but that they were in all likelihood fearful of dispatching any such reports through open cables or mail. He then stated that Riehner and Lichthiam were being requested by Wise to call upon Minister Harrison; and Welles requested Minister Harrison to advise him by telegram of all the evidence and facts which he might secure as a result of conferences with Riehner and Lichthiam.

(2) In response to Welles' cable of October 5, Minister Harrison in a cable of January 21, 1943 (432) relayed a message from Riehner and Lichthiam which Harrison stated was for the information of the Under Secretary of State (and was to be transmitted to Rabbi Stephen Wise if the Under Secretary should so determine). This message described a horrible situation concerning the plight of Jews in Europe. It reported mass executions of Jews in Poland; according to one source 8,000 Jews were being killed daily; the Jews were required before execution to strip themselves of all their clothing which was then sent to Germany; the remaining Jews in Poland
were confined to ghettos, etc.; in Germany deportations were continuing; many Jews were in hiding and there had been many cases of suicide; Jews were being deprived of rationed food stuffs; no Jews would be left in Prague or Berlin by the end of March, et.; and in Rumania 130,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria; about 60,000 had already died and the remaining 70,000 were starving; living conditions were indescribable; Jews were deprived of all their money, food stuffs and possessions; they were housed in deserted cellars, and occasionally 20 to 30 people slept on the floor of one unheated room; disease was prevalent, particularly fever; urgent assistance was needed.

(3) The famous cable 354 of February 10, which State officials tried to keep from us, was in direct response to the above mentioned report requested by the Acting Secretary and read as follows:

"Your 462, January 21

In the future we would suggest that you do not accept reports submitted to you to be transmitted to private persons in the United States unless such action is advisable because of extraordinary circumstances. Such private messages circumvent neutral countries' censorship and it is felt that by sending them we risk the possibility that steps would necessarily be taken by the neutral countries to curtail or forbid our means of communication for confidential official matter.

Hull (SW)"

Although this cable on its face is most innocent and innocuous, when read together with the previous cables it is the most vicious document we have ever read. It was obviously designed to suppress information requested by this Government concerning the murder of Jews by Hitler. One would have thought, however, that the diabolical men in the State Department who were responsible for this cable would have been intelligent enough to have picked a better excuse, since it is well known that private messages from commercial companies in neutral countries are transmitted every day through State Department channels.
Although this cable was signed for Hull by "S. W." (Sumner Welles) the persons responsible for it were so crafty that there is not a word in the cable that would even suggest to the person signing it that it was designed to countermand the Department's specific requests for information on Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews. The cable was obviously contrived as a normal routine message which a busy official could sign without question.

Who was responsible for this vicious cable? The initialed file copy of the cable indicates that the men responsible were Atterton and Dunn as well as Dubrow and Mickerson.

(4) On March 10, 1943 a cable (354) was received from Bern, reading "From Burns for Victor", and stating that "From a Berlin source which he considers responsible, following was obtained by 474". This cable stated in part that "The new policy is to kill the Jews on the spot rather than deporting them to Poland for killing there".

In a later cable of April 19, 1943 (see below) Tarrason indicated that the cable of March 10 contained in substance information which Kiepner requested him to transmit.

(5) A cable of April 19, 1943 (377) signed "Hull (SW)" read as follows:

"The Department has been informed by Rabbi Wise that Dr. Gerard Kiepner, the representative in Geneva of the World Jewish Congress, is in possession of important information regarding the situation of Jews in Nazi-occupied territories, which he wishes to convey through the Legation to the Department for transmission to Rabbi Wise. You are requested to get in touch with Dr. Kiepner and report the information which he has to the Department."

What seems likely is that Sumner Welles actually signed cable 377, not knowing of the existence of cable 354. It is significant that no reference was made in cable 377 to cable 354. 

Regraded Unclassified
(6) The cable of April 20 (2460) from Harrison is most revealing. It indicates that he was in a most confused state of mind as a result of the conflicting instructions which he had received. Thus he points out that he is transmitting certain information in compliance with the cable of April 10. On the other hand he points out that he has not transmitted "C's messages" as such in compliance with the terms of cable 354. He points out that the cable of March 10 had contained, in substance, information which Kieger requested him to transmit on behalf of himself to his New York correspondent. At the same time he stated that "I say I suggest that messages of this character should not (repeat not) be subjected to the restriction imposed by your 354, February 10, and that I be permitted to transmit messages from K more particularly in view of the helpful information which they may frequently contain."

The facts which support statement (3) above are the following:

(1) Several men in our Department had requested State Department officials for a copy of cable 354. We had been advised that it was a department communication; a strictly political communication, which had nothing to do with economic matters; that it had only had a very limited distribution within the Department (the only ones having anything to do with it being the European Division, the Political Adviser and Sumner Welles); and that a copy could not be furnished to the Treasury. This clearly shows that this was not the routine cable that it appeared to be on its face but rather a message of special secret significance.

(2) At the conference in Secretary Hull's office on December 20 you asked for a copy of cable 354, which you were told could be furnished to you.

(3) By note to you of December 20, Breckinridge Long enclosed a paraphrase of cable 354. This paraphrase of cable 354 specifically omitted any reference to the cable of January 21—thus destroying the only tangible clue to the true meaning of the message.
(4) This trick would have succeeded but for the fact that as you know we had previously learned the true facts.

It is most clear to us that the omission in cable 354 of any reference to the January 21 cable was not inadvertent but that Breckinridge Long intentionally left this reference out when he paraphrased the cable. The fact that we had already requested this cable from State and it had been refused us; the fact that you personally requested Secretary Hull for this cable in Long's presence; the fact that Long must have known therefore that we regarded this cable as an important cable; the fact that the whole viciousness of the cable was revealed by its reference to the cable of January 21; the whole attitude which Long has displayed in our attempts to get a license issued in this case after over six months of delay; the fact that he ordered the issuance of this license the day after we built a record against him in our letter of December 17 despite the previous six months delay; the completely misleading nature of the diabolical testimony which he furnished to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the question of relief to the Jews; all point to only one fact -- Long deliberately deleted the reference to the cable of January 21 from cable 354.
CONTENTS

Cable No. 2314, dated October 5, 1942, from the Secretary of State, to the American Legation, Bern ............................................. 1.

Cable No. 482, dated January 21, 1943, from the American Legation, Bern, to the Under Secretary of State .............................. 2.

Cable No. 354, dated February 10, 1943, from Secretary of State, to American Legation, Bern ......................................................... 3.

Cable No. 1597, dated March 10, 1943, from American Legation, Bern, to Secretary of State .......................................................... 4.

Cable No. 877, dated April 10, 1943, from Secretary of State, to American Legation, Bern .............................................................. 5.

Cable No. 2160, dated April 20, 1943, from American Legation, Bern, to Secretary of State ............................................................. 6.
Personal from the Acting Secretary for the Minister.

During the past few weeks, the leaders of the Jewish Congress have been receiving reports from their representatives in Geneva and in London to the effect that many thousands of Jews both in Poland and in other German occupied portions of eastern Europe are being slaughtered pursuant to a policy now embarked upon by the German government of complete extermination of Jews in Europe. As you are probably aware, Tittmann has cabled that information may be available to the Vatican which would provide confirmation at least to a part of these reports, and I am awaiting in this regard further word either from Tittman or Myron Taylor. Other than this, I have been unable to secure confirmation of these stories.

I was told by Rabbi Wise today that he believes there was available to his representatives in Switzerland factual evidence in this connection, but that they were in all likelihood fearful of dispatching any such reports through either open cables or mail. Dr. Kieger or Mr. Lichtheim, the representatives of the Congress in Geneva, are being requested by Dr. Wise to call upon you and make available to you such evidence and other information as they may have. You are requested to forward by telegraph any reports which they may make to you, and to advise me of all evidence and facts as you may secure as a result of your conferences with Dr. Kieger or Mr. Lichtheim.

Wells
Acting

12/22/43
The following is for your information and to be transmitted to Rabbi Stephen Wise, if you so determine. Reference Department's 2314 of October 5.

"It has now been confirmed from different sources that mass executions have taken place in Poland and it is reported from one source that 6,000 are killed daily. The Jews are required, before execution, to strip themselves of all clothing, which is then sent to Germany. The remaining Jews in Poland are now confined to approximately fifty-five ghettos - in the old ghetto insofar as the larger towns are concerned, and in small places transformed into ghettos in other localities. Some Jews, both Polish and those deported from other countries, are in labor camps in Silesia and Poland. No news is received from the ghettos, although occasional reports are received from some people in the labor camp and in the Resienstadt. The ghetto in Poland is comparatively worse than the Resienstadt, insofar as those remaining and working there are concerned. The Resienstadt is a self-governing Jewish community under Edelstein, Stricker, Friedmann, Zucker, among others. No delegate is allowed to be sent to the Resienstadt by the International Red Cross. Reports about the situation in Germany indicate as of the end of November and the middle of December, that deportations are continuing. Special agents of the Gestapo, having completed the job of arranging deportations from Vienna, have been sent to Holland and Berlin for the purpose of speeding up the job in those localities. Female war workers in Berlin, whose parents have already been deported, were suddenly deported after arrest, and occasionally parents returned from work to find their children have been deported during their absence. About 2000 are in hiding, and there have been many cases of suicide. People who have been arrested, and whose deportation is pending are put in buildings which have neither furniture nor beds. Twenty-one members of the German Community Council and members of the German Jewish Representation who were arrested on November 9, and held as hostages have disappeared, and it is reported that eight of them have been shot
in reprisal for the fleeing of some Jews from the locality.

Jews in Czechoslovakia, Germany and Austria are not allowed to buy live fish, poultry, vegetables or rationed food stuffs, and under a new order, the local authorities are empowered to withdraw their rationing cards. Thus, Jews in Berlin are unable to buy milk, meat or eggs. It is reported from Prague and Berlin that no Jews will be left in either city by the end of March.

Fildermann has filed a special report from Rumania stating that in the fall of 1941, 130,000 Rumanian Jews were deported to Transnistria. Of these, 15,000 came from the district of Dorohoi, 30,000 from Gernauti, 45,000 from Bessarabia, and 40,000 from other parts of Bucovina. During the summer of 1942, 6,000 were deported from other parts of Rumania. These deported people have been distributed among ninety places in five districts, and some of them are confined to ghettos which are comparatively free Jewish settlements, while others are in labor camps. The living conditions are indescribable. They are deprived of all money, food stuffs and possessions, and are housed in deserted cellars, and occasionally twenty to thirty people sleep on the floor of one unheated room. Disease is rife, particularly spotted fever. These conditions have resulted in the death of approximately 60,000 while 70,000 are starving.

Fildermann insists that the community requires urgent assistance, because the Jews in old Rumania have been ejected from most provisions and property has been confiscated, and they have been deprived of money and are therefore unable to provide large amounts.

This report is signed by Richard Lichthim and Gerhars Riegnor of Geneva, and is dated January 19, 1943.
TO: American Legation, Bern
From: Secretary of State, No. 354
Date: February 10, 1943

Your 432, January 21

In the future we would suggest that you do not accept reports submitted to you to be transmitted to private persons in the United States unless such action is advisable because of extraordinary circumstances. Such private messages circumvent neutral countries' censorship and it is felt that by sending them we risk the possibility that steps would necessarily be taken by the neutral countries to curtail or forbid our means of communication for confidential official matter.

HULL
(SW)

lag
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN LEGATION, BERN
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATE: March 10, 1943
NUMBER: 1597

From Burns for Victor.

From a Berlin source which he considers responsible, following was obtained by 474.

Fifteen thousand Jews in which were included Jews with Aryan wives and Jewesses with Aryan husbands were arrested in homes in factories between January twenty-sixth and March second. For this purpose all closed lorries in Berlin were requisitioned. They were brought to four centers including Bohemian Church and two of the main Gestapo prisons. There have died several hundred children who were separated from parents and left without food. In Berlin the shooting of several hundred adults took place. Officers who are high in the SS and who took the initiative in this action are reported to have made the decision that before the middle of March Berlin should be liberated of all Jews. Friends are sheltering about eighteen thousand Jews. That the above methods will be extended within the near future to other regions in Germany is definitely expected. The new policy is to kill the Jews on the spot rather than deporting them to Poland for killing there.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

TO: AMERICAN LEGATION, BERN.
FROM: Secretary of State, Washington.
DATE: April 10, 1943.
NUMBER: 877

The Department has been informed by Rabbi Wise that Dr. Gerard Riegner, the representative in Geneva of the World Jewish Congress, is in possession of important information regarding the situation of Jews in Nazi-occupied territories, which he wishes to convey through the Legation to the Department for transmission to Rabbi Wise. You are requested to get in touch with Dr. Riegner, and report the information which he has to the Department.

HULL
(SW)
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Bern
Dated April 20, 1943

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2460, April 20, 1 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

In compliance with instructions contained in your 877, April 10, I am transmitting in my 2461, April 20, text of communication from R on the subject indicated for communication to your correspondent in your discretion.

While I have not transmitted R's messages as such in compliance with the terms of your 354, February 10, I have at the same time felt that information which he is able to furnish and which appears to be reasonably authentic should be in your hands. In consequence my telegram No. 1597, March 10, contained in substance information which R requested me to transmit on behalf of himself to his New York correspondent previously named.

R. has, however, requested me to transmit for him routine messages which I felt could be conveyed through regular channels and I so advised him. Most of the information contained in R's current message has not previously been brought to my attention by R and while I have already reported similarly in part to the Department from other sources I nevertheless transmit R's message in full. May I suggest that messages of this character should not (repeat not) be subjected to the restriction imposed by your 354, February 10, and that I be permitted to transmit messages from R more particularly in view of the helpful information which they may frequently contain?

SECTION TWO

In that event I would request R. carefully to differentiate between fact and unverified rumor and clearly to indicate his opinions regarding credibility of information (?) which he provides. It is obvious that facilities are lacking to enable a satisfactory check on any of the statements made.

For my guidance in further dealing with association I would appreciate your instructions as to the propriety of transmitting
that part of the current message which relates to activities of the organization concerned and contains an appeal for funds. This subject is a many sided one of delicate significance.

END OF MESSAGE

HARRISON
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM: AMERICAN LEGATION, BERN.

TO: Secretary of State, Washington.

DATE: December 23, 1943

NUMBER: 8096

I have personally delivered to Dr. Riegner the license transmitted in Department's 3168 of December 18. Dr. Riegner has selected the Geneva branch of the Union Bank of Switzerland, with which the World Jewish Congress has previously banked, and he proposes that the equivalent in Swiss francs of $25,000 be transferred thereto. The selection of this bank is not objected to by the Legation. It is Dr. Riegner's suggestion that a deposit of the funds be made in the name of WJC (special account) with power in him alone to draw upon such account, which power is only to be exercisable pursuant to Treasury Department's permission in each instance.

Dr. Riegner proposes to explore the possibility of evacuating Jews from Rumania, and upon receipt of the funds, to begin with arranging the evacuation of Jews from France to Spain and Switzerland.

HARRISON
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington.
TO: AMERICAN LEGATION, BERN.
DATE: December 24, 1943.
NUMBER: 3228

The arrangements suggested in your 8096 of December 23 have been considered by the Department and Treasury and are found to be satisfactory. We have been advised by the World Jewish Congress that they are transferring to Dr. Riegner the Swiss franc equivalent of $25,000. A full report should be filed by you with the Department with respect to further progress and developments, and you should report specifically regarding any obstacles which may be encountered in connection with the financial arrangements.

MR:WIR:MAN 12/24/43
December 27, 1943

Dear Secretary Morgenthau:

You asked me for the number of refugees in the Mexican and North African camps.

There are 1,447 in the Mexican camp. It's capacity is 1,500. The North African camp is not yet in operation. It was anticipated that 6,000 might go there from Madrid, but recent cables to the State Department indicate that this may come down to 1,500 to 2,500.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Treasury
Randolph Paul: Hello.
Operator: The Secretary, Mr. Paul. There you are.
P: Hello.
HNJr: Could I talk with White first?
P: Yes, he's right here. Just a minute.

Harry White: Hello.
HNJr: Good morning, Harry.
W: Good morning, sir.
HNJr: Am I making a record?
W: Yes.
The young lady turned something on. There's a light on. I think she -- there's a light on on the left, so I guess it's a record.

HNJr: That's it. Am I on the loud speaker?
W: Yes.
HNJr: Good. Now, Harry, in approaching the President on Friday on this question of English balances....
W: Yes, sir.
HNJr: I think that the most effective way to do it would be to show him a list of things that we bought during the calendar year of 1943, which we feel the English, or United Kingdom, or the -- could provide themselves with, or that Congress would feel that way, in view of the fact that -- of how far we have gone along with the war.
W: That we bought for the U.K.? Right?
HNJr: I mean I have a list of things that Oscar Cox sent me. See?
W: Yes.
HNJr: And on thinking the thing over, if we just go in there with the President -- I know him pretty well.
W: Yeah.

HJr: And say, "We think it should be down to a billion," and what's-his-name says, "Well, I think we should leave it at a billion, six," we may lose the argument.

W: Yes, sir.

HJr: But then, on the other hand, if we can show that we bought baby carriages for Cairo, or handkerchiefs or plows for this and oil well supplies for that, and molasses for this and that. There are a thousand and one things. You can get a copy of the list that Oscar sent me.

W: Yes.

HJr: The President will say, "My God, do we do that for U.K.? I didn't know that. Do you mean to say that we buy the fish in Iceland and -- though we never see the fish?" And we do this, and he immediately -- his eyebrows will go up and he'll say, "Well, this is ridiculous." You see? Hello?

W: I think it's a good idea.

HJr: And he will immediately say, "Well, I'd stop this. I'd stop that." Well, now we may not win the whole battle. See?

W: Yes. But at least you feel that....

HJr: We'd get that thing started. And I think we can do the thing by making him say, "Well --uh -- it's something that -- these things -- you can't defend it." See?

W: All right.

HJr: And then, having won that position, we can start on that and then go back at him, after we have exhausted those things. See?

W: All right.

HJr: After we have exhausted all those possibilities, we can do it again.

W: All right, sir.
But my own feeling, and I've thought a lot about it up here, is that that is the way to approach him.

W: Now, we have to get that list, of course, from Lend-lease?

HXJr: Yeah. Well, I would tell Oscar that this is what I have in mind.

W: I see. Okay.

HXJr: He already has furnished me with such a list.

W: I see.

HXJr: And I think we should have such a thing ready.

W: Is the list which he has furnished sufficiently detailed or has he got to do more work?

HXJr: He's got to do more work.

W: I see.

HXJr: I think -- I think you've got to break it down further.

W: I see.

HXJr: But -- and I think the important thing would be -- now get this -- that Oscar show that to Ed Stettinius before we meet Friday.

W: To show the list to him?

HXJr: Yeah.

W: Do you mean the list that we will have culled out?

HXJr: Yeah. And also the approach.

W: To Stettinius as well as Crowley?

HXJr: Yeah. Sell them on it before they come over.

W: All right. There was a little note which was sent to me from Waley which said that Halifax felt it was no use seeing you about this matter inasmuch as the P.M. would take it -- had taken it up or would take it up with the President prior to your seeing him, so when you see him, as the presumption is, that the P.M. will have discussed it, though we
W: don't know definitely. I had the letter sent to you. It's just a little note.

HMJr: Well, that's the second message that Halifax has sent me thirdhanded now.

W: Well, huh. Well, this is "Waley informs me to inform you." He said he didn't want to trouble you.

HMJr: Well, I got another one on this Jewish question; through some other man, it came to me.

W: I see. Yeah.

HMJr: Halifax....

W: Uh huh. Well, I mention it because if the Prime Minister did see Roosevelt about it, then the President probably has some definite ideas on the subject already.

HMJr: Well, if that is true, then my argument is better....

W: That's right.

HMJr: ....than I thought it was.

W: That's right.

HMJr: And Cox ought to fall into line because I know this is the way he felt some time ago.

W: Yes, I know that he would -- he would prefer this approach.

HMJr: Now, I have thought a lot about it, Harry.

W: All right.

HMJr: And I think we'd have a 75% chance winning on this front.

W: All right. And is your thought also that we put the amounts, because....

HMJr: Oh, yes.

W: ....the amounts won't be very great, but....
That doesn't make any difference.

Okay.

But, I mean, I want as many items as possible.

That's right.

See?

All right, sir.

And show, oh, the medicine we sent to Cairo, even though they stopped the thing. What happened during the calendar year 1943.

All right.

And -- hello?

I'm listening.

Even if they have corrected some of the things, I'd put it down.

Yes. As having -- I see. Even though they have stopped doing it now.

I'd put it down just the same.

I see. This is a record of what they did in '43?

That's right.

All right, sir. Now, Mr. Pehle is here.

Yeah.

And Mr. Paul.

Now, I want to talk -- I've got another -- I want you in on this.

Yes, all right. I'll -- I'll....

I'll talk to Paul.

Hello.
Paul, I have another suggestion to make as to the approach to the President. In talking to Dr. Wise, his first question was, "Have you...?" "Oh, yeah, that's wonderful," he said. Dr. Wise said, "That was the result of me having seen the President." Wise having seen the President.

P: Yeah.

HMJr: He said, "Have you let the President know?" And I said, "No, I haven't, but I will." So he said, "I'm sure you will, because the President will be so pleased." Well, this thought came to me. We could let the President know. And my thought was along these lines: "My dear Mr. President: As a result of a conference between you and Dr. Wise, and your letter to me and so forth and so on." I don't know just what happened. He asked me to write a letter for him to Dr. Wise.

P: Yeah.

HMJr: "I am pleased to inform you that on Christmas Eve the license for him was issued. I think that you ought to know why there was such a delay in issuing this license, and the following are the facts: Bang!" See?

P: Do you want those facts summarized briefly in this letter or enclosed in some memorandum?

HMJr: Well, as for the mechanics, whatever you think is the best.

P: Well, we can write a letter but it will be a page and a half or a couple of pages to get those facts in.

HMJr: That's all right. If it's a memorandum, it might get detached.

P: Yeah. I think that's true.

HMJr: I think if we let the President know. Hands off, he asked us to do a job and there was a delay of months, and he should be informed of the "when" and "why".

P: Of course, Hull may resent that.

HMJr: And so what?
P: All right. I'm just making that point.

HKJr: Well, I mean, after all, the President of the United States asked me to do something. I'm now reporting that it was done and why there was such a delay.

P: Yeah. Now, suppose we write that letter, what will we do? Read it to you over the phone or what?

HKJr: Well, if it's written today -- no, I'd like that to wait until I come down, because I want to go over it with you.

P: All right.

HKJr: I think it's better....

P: When are you -- did I hear you say you were going to be here Friday?

HKJr: Early Friday morning. I have to be for this ten o'clock meeting. I'm coming down on the midnight Thursday.

P: Yeah. I didn't know about any meeting Friday.

HKJr: Well, it's -- it's on English dollar balances.

P: Oh, I see.

HKJr: I take it that the way the railroads are, they will continue to run and handle civilian passengers.

P: I imagine so.

HKJr: If not so, will you have -- let Fitz know and tell him to phone me?

P: Yeah, I will.

HKJr: If I'm incorrect on that.

P: Yeah.

HKJr: And what do you think of this second thought of mine, of letting the President know?

P: Oh, I think it's all right. I think the President should know. He should know more than he ever gets to know. That's....
Well, I think, after all, if I just sat down and wrote a letter to the President....

(Aside: What other thing?)

...about this thing, Hull would say, "Why, did you do this?" And I could say....

Well, anyway, we can decide that -- we'll get the letter together and we can decide then when you're down here.

Well, I have every reason to inform him and I think every reason that he should be informed. I think I'd be negligent in my duty if I withheld the information.

Well....

That's the way I feel. That's country air for you.

(Laughs)

All right?

All right. Well, wait a minute. The boys are troubled by something here.

(Pause)

Well, there's some disagreement here but -- the boys are wondering whether you should inform him of this one aspect of the thing before you tell him the whole story about everything. But we can decide that Friday.

Well, just let the boys work on it and we'll....

Yeah, we'll -- after all, we're not sending the letter yet.

Now, third and last, Bell was talking to me about what he wanted in the annual budget message on taxes and I was very definite, and I want the President to back me up with a ten and a half billion dollar figure. I hope he agrees.

Oh, certainly, I....

Well, Bell was a little uncertain about that.
P: You want me to talk to Bell about that then?

HKJr: If you agree with me, you might as well talk to Bell.

P: Yeah. Well, certainly the President should back you up.

HKJr: There's no sense of humor to you.

P: What?

HKJr: That was supposed to be funny.

P: Well, that's country-air humor. I'm in the city.

HKJr: As long as you agree with me, you might as well see Dan.

P: You mean that I shouldn't see him if I don't agree?

HKJr: That's it.

P: All right. Well, I certainly think that the President ought to back you up.

HKJr: I do and he says Harold Smith is very cooperative and....

P: Yeah. Who said that?

HKJr: Bell.

P: Oh, I see. Okay.

HKJr: I'm going to ask for Crowley and if I can get him, I just want to tell him....

P: We -- we haven't -- he -- he was not supposed to get back until this morning, so we haven't seen him yet.

HKJr: Okay.

P: All right.

HKJr: Thank you.
December 30, 1943

Mrs. Henrietta S. Klotz
Secretary's Office
U.S. Treasury
Washington D.C.

My dear Henrietta,

Referring to our talk of last night, I would like to inform you that Dr. Nahum Goldmann will be arriving in Washington this coming Tuesday, January 4th, and will be available any time during the afternoon of that day as well as all day on Wednesday.

As I told you, Dr. Goldmann is a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, of which Dr. Weizmann is the President. The Executive is the supreme body of the Agency. In the absence of Dr. Weizmann he is in charge of the activities carried out by the Jewish Agency Executive in this country. From 1935 until the outbreak of the war in Europe, he was our representative at the League of Nations in Geneva. He has been in this country since 1940.

In his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the World Jewish Congress, he also has a great deal to do with the present activities concerning the rescue of Jews in Europe. He told me that when he was in Washington yesterday he had a long conference at the Treasury with Mr. Randolph Paul and Mr. Paley. He is therefore very familiar with this particular aspect of the present efforts.

In view of his forthcoming trip to England which he is going to undertake for the purpose of conferring with Dr. Weizmann and other members of the Executive coming from Palestine, he would be very happy to have a chance of meeting with the Secretary. He would greatly appreciate to have also a talk with you. I told Dr. Goldmann that you will be good enough to try and make the necessary arrangements and that I will be in touch with you.

Affectionately,

P.S. If you want to get in touch with me already during the weekend, kindly call me at the Salisbury Hotel: Tel: Circle 8-1300. Otherwise I will telephone you on Monday.
December 31, 1943
11:45 a.m.

ARGENTINA
JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Paul
           Mr. Pehle
           Mr. Luxford
           Mr. DuBois

H.M.JR: The reason I asked you to come, well, I only had this one thing from General Strong. I wanted to read it to you.

MR. PAUL: This is Argentina?

H.M.JR: Yes. I'll read it to you. There is only one copy.

"It is reported that Argentina has found a way to make the freezing of her dollar assets meaningless, that is, by requiring any of the American Republics desiring to make purchases in Argentina to make payment in some exchange other than dollars. This is attributed to a sub-manager of the Banco de la Nacion in charge of exchange and a director of the bank. These men are further quoted as referring to Americans as scoundrels and by even stronger epithets, as saying that Argentina is the only South American nation which refuses to be subdued by the United States and as stating that the two banks recently frozen 'resisted American desires that local firms such as the German bank be put on the blacklist.' The Military Attache observes that the Argentines respect and understand toughness, but that half-way measures are ineffectual."

(Signed) Geo. V. Strong
        Major General
        A. C. of S., G-2
Is there anything new in there?

MR. PHELLE: If they are talking about evasion of total freezing of Argentina, that doesn't make any sense, because we won't let them be paid through a third country. If they are talking about evading partially the effect of freezing these two banks, it is true that these banks can operate under a cover of either the Argentine Bank or through some other country, but it has been realized all the time that freezing of two banks is not an effective measure.

MR. LUXFORD: One other thing, too. Argentina is threatening to put pressure through the other countries on the United States by having the other countries say that we can't buy from Argentina, because you have frozen their assets.

H.M.JR: Your man over there - what is his name?

MR. PHELLE: Towson.

H.M.JR: Why don't you get hold of Towson? Tell him I have had this thing.

MR. PHELLE: He probably wrote it.

H.M.JR: Find out about it, will you?

MR. PAUL: I wanted to report to you.

H.M.JR: Since I sent for you, this has come in. I am not going to ask Paul to read it. It is a letter - third or fourth copy. I don't know what is in it. (Refers to folder containing letter of December 30 from General Strong, transmitting copy of a memorandum prepared for General Strong on Argentina, dated December 28)

MR. PHELLE: I have some idea.

H.M.JR: It is a complete file on the Argentine.

MR. PHELLE: After they had talked to you, they said they were going to do a study on Argentina. This presumably is it. Towson said that that is an indictment of Argentina.
H.M. JR: Diamond smuggling and all that kind of business.

If it is all right with Paul, I wanted to give it to one person to read, and hold one person responsible, because they mark it so secret. I thought I'd give it to Fehle.

MR. PAUL: That's all right.

H.M. JR: I don't want anybody else to read it until you discuss it. Have you a safe?

MR. PEHLE: Yes, sir.

H.M. JR: Now, you know that nobody is to see it. You can tell me personally what is in it. You can say the Secretary never saw it. You see what I mean? You are young. The fact that it is about a fourth carbon won't ruin your eyes. Old men like Paul and me can't take it.

MR. PAUL: Well, it was the Treasury work that made me get glasses. I never wore them before.

H.M. JR: If you please.

H.M. JR: That (referring to file) just came in after I sent for you.

MR. PAUL: We have been in touch with them trying to arrange something with Crowley, but Harry White had a talk the other day with Crowley, and Oscar seems to think there was no need at the present time to have a further conference with Crowley. Harry White could tell you just what he brought him up to date.

H.M. JR: Crowley and Acheson were here for an hour and a half this morning on English problems. I'll say this for Crowley, he certainly is playing with us and we are with him. The State Department just leaves him way, way out on the end of a limb. If it wasn't for us, he wouldn't know half the time what is going on. So he feels very kindly toward us just now.

MR. PAUL: May I give you a brief report on that other matter?

H.M. JR: If you please.
MR. PEHLE: Do you want to bring in Harry?

MR. PAUL: Yes, we have had Harry right in on everything.

(The Secretary speaks to Mr. White over phone)

H. M. JR: He has both Cox and Currie back there now. I don't want to bother him. Who keeps him posted?

MR. PAUL: Bernstein. He hasn't been in.

MR. LUXFORD: We'll keep him posted.

MR. PAUL: We simply wanted to report that Dr. Goldman came down. He didn't really know enough.

H. M. JR: Is he the same gentleman?

MR. PAUL: No, he didn't seem same. He is rather corpulent. He didn't seem to know very much. He didn't bring his records with him. He was pretty vague, so we decided it was necessary to go to the spot where the records are, Joe and -

MR. PEHLE: Orvis Schmidt.

MR. PAUL: Just got back yesterday afternoon. And they went all through the records. As the story unfolds, what we have said is more than confirmed. But it has become so serious that we want to write it up very carefully for you, and we want to have a time when we can discuss it really in some detail. There are other things.

H. M. JR: I am ready any time. You just give me half a day's notice and I'll give you all the time you want.

MR. PAUL: Do you want to do it Monday?

MR. PEHLE: I think we'll have to have more time.

H. M. JR: You tell me when you are ready.

MR. PEHLE: I think that is better.
H.M. JR.: You give me a day's notice, Saturday, Sunday, or Monday.

MR. PAUL: What we want to do is have plenty of time with you.

MR. DuBOIS: These gentlemen finally became very frank, Mr. Secretary, and we have an awful lot of information from them on the whole picture. It is really an amazing story.

H.M. JR.: There is one thing which stuck in my head. I know Dr. Wise came over here and he had this cable. He asked my advice, should he give it out—telling about what they were doing to the Jews. I wonder—now that came through the State Department.

MR. DuBOIS: That is right.

H.M. JR.: A letter came through.

MR. DuBOIS: There have been a lot of developments, Mr. Secretary, that we have just learned about.

H.M. JR.: Take five minutes and tell me.

MR. DuBOIS: Well, I can give you a brief outline. I'll try to give you some highlights in five minutes.

The whole story reveals not only tremendous delays from beginning to end, failures to act on the part of the State Department officials, but further what appears to be wilful attempts by State Department officials to prevent any action from being taken in this whole field.

As Rabbi Miller put it, and I think it is an understatement, the action of this Government has been such as would indicate to Germany and its satellites that we don't give a damn what happens to the Jews.

H.M. JR.: That was his language?

MR. DuBOIS: I wouldn't say word for word, but in effect.

MR. PAUL: He didn't say "damn."
MR. DuBOIS: I don't think he did, but he -
MR. PAUL: We have been all over the story.
H.M.JR: Weren't you going to give me something new? Do you mind?
MR. PAUL: No.
H.M.JR: Do you have a conference back there?
MR. PAUL: No.

MR. DuBOIS: A little background on this to show you the thing may still be extremely important.

They estimate there were about eight million Jews in Europe before. About two million of these have escaped, mostly to Russia. About three million are dead. There are about three million yet who still might be saved.

H.M.JR: How many?

MR. DuBOIS: About three million still might be saved with real action. They point out, however, as invasions come experience shows the death to the Jews follows immediately.

For example, in northern Italy they claim most of the Jews have now been killed. As the Germans retreat in Russia, they kill the Jews as they go back. The minute they reach Trans-Nistria, for example, they are sure they will kill all the Jews in Trans-Nistria unless we can get them out.

But on the tragic story of State Department's delays in this matter, I'll highlight a few points. The thing started in 1942 when they began receiving reports from various sources relating to the treatment of the Jewish population. Finally, in August of 1942 they got a cable that plans were under consideration to exterminate all the Jews in Europe. That cable came from Riegner through the Foreign Office in London, the Foreign Office saying they couldn't confirm this.
Immediately Wise took the cable to Welles and showed him that together with other documents.

Welles said, "Don't publish this story just yet; wait until I confirm it."

Then Welles sent out this cable on October 5.

H.M. JR: 1942?

MR. DuBOIS: 1942, asking for confirmation. Confirmation came back from Riegner in the form of four documents containing affidavits and everything else relating to the details of the murder of Jews in each of the countries of Europe, containing also an affidavit stating that the decree had been issued that all Jews would be exterminated by December 31.

On November 19 Welles delivered these documents to Wise. Of course, he had never seen these documents until just now, and said he was satisfied on the basis of these documents which were obtained from Riegner that the Jewish organizations could publish this story.

At that point the Jewish organizations decided that the first big job was to elicit public support, that before they could get this Government to act they would have to get public support. So they did a number of things. December 2 of 1942 was declared a day of mourning and fasting. They held a meeting with the President on December 8, at which they presented him with two documents setting forth all the information they had, and a press release was issued pursuant to that December 8 meeting which was cleared with Steve Early, which said that it was a policy of this Government, (a) to punish those who committed these crimes; (b) it was a policy of this Government, together with the United Nations, to save all the Jews who could be saved.

They also had meetings in London. They finally had a United Nations declaration issued in December, which didn't say an awful lot, except it was designed to arouse public support, and it did say we would punish the perpetrators. He had even read that to the House of Commons, and gave the story to the House of Commons, and then they
described one of the most dramatic scenes in the House of Commons, in which everybody rose simultaneously for two minutes and stood in silence, and so forth.

At that point they felt that they had so aroused public opinion that the governments would act. But from then on, in Rabbi Miller's own words, "They got nothing but a run-around from our State Department." They approached our State Department week after week, in December and January.

H.M.JR: Whom did they see?

MR. DuBOIS: They saw Welles and Atherton, Mathews, Berle, and Long—all those gentlemen. Finally on February 9 Welles received this January 21 cable—this horrible cable we had relating to the conditions. When they got that cable on February 9 they immediately decided that there was probably no further chance of preventing this action from going forward.

The cable confirmed what they had been informed of was taking place four months ago; it showed that what they had been informed as going on was still going on and probably being intensified; and that nothing was being done. So on the basis of that cable, as soon as they received it, they decided to call a mass meeting in Madison Square Garden, at which they would again try to elicit public support and map out a program.

During all this time they had been presenting specific proposals to the State Department—a twelve-point program as to what could be done. Nothing was done. Notice—on February 9 when they got this cable, they decided to hold this mass meeting. On February 10 a cable from the State Department went out expressing information from Riegnor—

(Secretary on White House telephone)

Hello....

Grace?....

Fine. We had a very nice one. Well, that is, the
Missus more than I.

I'll tell her.

We enjoyed the firewood you sent us. It worked beautifully.

Grace, I think it was last Monday that I gave the President a memorandum about Chiang Kai-shek on loans to China. He said, "I like it so much I am going to send it as a cable to Chiang Kai-shek."

Now, what I'd like to know is, one, did he ever send it; and, two, has he had an answer? Because in the meantime our Ambassador over there has sent a cable to Hull saying what is going on. I don't know anything. Do you see? If you want to tie this thing together, it is a cable from Gauss, December 23, but that doesn't interest me. What interests me, did the President ever send a cable to Chiang Kai-shek? He said he was going to use my memorandum just in that form—and, two, has he heard from him?

Right.

Yes.

Yes.

Okay.

* * * * *

H.M.JR: All I have had so far today is foreign affairs. Go ahead.

MR. DuBOIS: Well, this February 10 cable, which just becomes a small part of this picture, really—but it still reveals one of the obviously deliberate acts which the State Department took to prevent action.

H.M.JR: December 11, 1942?

MR. DuBOIS: February 10, 1943. That is that cable you asked for, it is that famous cable.

MR. PAUL: Where they said not to send any more reports
through.

H.M.JR: Previous?

MR. DuBOIS: What had come previous is that Riegner had sent the cable in August which caused Welles to get confirmation. Riegner was the one who then sent the information which caused Welles to say to publish the story. It was Riegner's cables, in other words, which resulted in the meetings which took place. It was the information which had come from Riegner which had caused all the action which had been taken to date. It was his information which caused Welles to get confirmation. It was Riegner's information which caused Welles to say, "You can release your story," and resulted in all this other action being taken.

H.M.JR: Two things I want to ask you. Who is Riegner?

MR. DuBOIS: He is the World Jewish Congress representative.

H.M.JR: But what is his background?

MR. PEHLE: I don't know.

H.M.JR: I'd get a dossier on Riegner. And, too, let's find out who he is, what nationality and all the rest of it. It seems fairly important.

MR. PEHLE: He is a Swiss—but we'll get a dossier.

H.M.JR: The Jewish people all go on the assumption that Welles was their friend. I have always had a question in my mind.

MR. PAUL: He shows up pretty well.

MR. DuBOIS: This doesn't disprove it, Mr. Secretary.

MR. PEHLE: It doesn't prove it, either.

H.M.JR: I have always had a question.

MR. PAUL: I don't think you can conclude from this whole story that Welles has been against them. In fact, he
has done more than anybody in the State Department.

H.M.JR: The reason I am raising it, I'd like to get your opinion when you get through.

MR. PEILE: We have some suggestions.

MR. PAUL: We suggest that you see Welles, before we take any action. We have found out where he is.

H.M.JR: I know where he is.

MR. DuBOIS: Further information, too, that bears on the fact of Welles. Now, that February 10 cable which was designed to stop all the information which had been causing pressure in this country, as you know, was so drafted that Welles might well not have known what was in it when he signed it.

Therafter, they had this meeting in Madison Square Garden on March 1, in which a twelve-point program was approved. The day after that meeting Welles came out with a statement to the President. The press said that Welles had seen the President, and that this Government was going to give immediate consideration to the twelve-point program of the World Jewish organization. At that point they said they felt that something might be done by this Government.

On the very next day Hull came out, in Miller's own words, with what was "a very cruel statement."

H.M.JR: C-r-u-e-l?

MR. DuBOIS: That is right. A statement which, as you will see, just cut the ground out from under Welles' statement the day before. Hull, in effect, said that he was going to arrange for a conference in Ottawa to explore this whole situation, and he revealed for the first time that he had gotten a note from the British way back in January, dealing with the matter. And he pointed out that, after all, this wasn't just a problem relating to refugees of one race; that you had to deal with the whole refugee problem; that there were many difficulties in the way of shipping and transportation and the like. Furthermore, that we had
to be bound by legislation determining the immigration policy of this country, and winding up, as I said, with a proposal to explore the situation.

Well, that statement following Welles’ statement of the previous day came as a tremendous shock to the Jewish organizations.

MR. PAUL: Complete cold water on it.

MR. DuBOIS: That is right. Complete cold water on everything that Welles had said. It just cut the ground right out from under Welles’ position.

Thereafter, as you probably are familiar with, this Ottawa conference was changed to Bermuda, because according to Rabbi Miller they could keep people from getting there. They excluded the press. No one representing the Jewish organizations was even allowed to go, let alone be represented. This country was represented by Senator Lucas, President Dodds, and Congressman Bloom. They went into detail as to why the Bermuda conference accomplished nothing, substantially nothing. I won’t burden you with that detail.

H.M.JR: I said five minutes; you are giving me more; we have been going fifteen.

MR. DuBOIS: I am sorry.

H.M.JR: No, that is all right.

MR. PAUL: From here on it is a matter of technical obstruction.

MR. DuBOIS: Some time when you have more time, the whole story of how the State Department has handled the visa situation is amazing.

H.M.JR: Well, when you are ready—whatever it takes. I am responsible for asking you, so naturally I am very curious. Whenever you fellows are ready, you let me know.

MR. PAUL: We regard this as very important. We want to think over every phase of it. We had a long discussion yesterday afternoon. Harry White was in with us.
H.M.JR: All right, gentlemen, if there is nothing else.

MR. LUXFORD: I might say there is more indication that Hull isn't the right man to go to on this.

H.M.JR: Well, you still will have to follow my tactics on the thing until he turns me down. He can reverse himself, too, you know.

MR. PAUL: Let's hold that in abeyance.

H.M.JR: I mean that so far I have been right by going to him.

MR. DuBOIS: We haven't gotten much, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: We have got the license. You have a strong cable to the British Foreign Office.

MR. DuBOIS: That is just peanuts compared with this overall problem.

MR. PAUL: Let's not get into that.

H.M.JR: I still say you don't know how much he knows. I don't know whether that was a formal statement he gave out the day after Welles', or whether it was simply one of these Hull-Welles episodes where he was piqued and more interested in doing something against Welles.

MR. PAUL: That might have something to do with it.
December 31, 1943

Dear Mr. Cox:

In reply to your letter of December 27, there is nothing that I want to do at the moment concerning the proposed Executive Order or press release on refugees.

We are continuing to work on the whole matter here in the Treasury, and studying the question very carefully.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Oscar Cox
Office of Lend-Lease Administration

Happy New Year!

Envelope marked "Personal"
December 27, 1943

Dear Secretary Morgenthau:

Do you want to do anything more about the proposed Executive order or press release on refugees?

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Treasury
December 31, 1943.

Mr. John W. Pehle, Director
Foreign Funds Control
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Pehle:

For your personal information, I enclose a copy of a letter I have written to Dr. Bruggmann. He asked that I send him a little note of our needs so that he could have it on the file.

With all good wishes for the New Year, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Moses A. Leavitt
Moses A. Leavitt

MAL:JO
enc.
December 31, 1943.

Dr. Charles Bruggmann
Legation of Switzerland
Washington, D. C.

My dear Dr. Bruggmann:

May I express to you my appreciation for the very courteous and sympathetic reception which you accorded me yesterday when we discussed the problem which the Joint Distribution Committee faces in securing Swiss francs for its program of work in Switzerland. I advised you that at the present time our needs were in the neighborhood of the equivalent in Swiss francs of $150,000 a month, or a total of $1,800,000 for the year 1944.

Since I saw you, we have received additional information of a rather tragic character concerning the situation of children in France. This new development may require us to provide additional funds, but we are at the moment not thinking in terms of any large sum to provide for the entire year and we will have to proceed month by month as the needs develop.

The Joint Distribution Committee at present is supporting completely 3,000 refugees who had arrived in Switzerland prior to August, 1942. In addition, it is granting twenty Swiss francs a month to some 13,000 refugees in the camps in Switzerland, these refugees having arrived after August, 1942. Furthermore, we are also providing the full maintenance of over 1,000 children whom the Swiss authorities were good enough to release from the camps so that they could be brought up in more normal home surroundings.

We are deeply appreciative of the generous hospitality and shining humanitarianism which the Swiss Government has demonstrated to these unfortunate people. We are anxious to do our share in lightening the burden of the Swiss Government and Swiss people in providing for their care.

We hope you will be able to give favorable consideration to our request to secure Swiss francs at the official rate to cover our needs and we shall look forward to your early reply.
May I take the liberty of reminding you that you suggested that you would send us a copy of the letter which you received from the Israelitisches Gemeindebund of Switzerland which came to your desk.

With all good wishes for the New Year, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Moses A. Leavitt
Secretary

MALJO
RELIEF UNIT SCORED
BY JEWISH GROUP

Conference Assails Emergency Committee as 'Disservice' to Rescue Program

The American Jewish Conference yesterday assailed the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe as one of a "series of fronts" whose leaders had "constantly assumed to speak for the Jewish people in this country without having or endeavoring to secure a mandate from any constituency" and whose activities had caused "discord, resulting frequently in a disservice to the cause they had assumed to represent."

The conference's statement was made through its interim committee in the form of a memorandum issued in response to inquiries from a committee representing sixty-four affiliated national membership organizations.

"Instead of cooperating with established and recognized national Jewish agencies, they have entered into competition and sought to undermine them," the statement charged, referring to the leaders of the Emergency Committee. "They have conjured up the illusion of activity by press agency, financed by the appeals for contributions invariably accompanying their advertisements."

Recent Advertisement Criticized

The statement asserted also that it was "unfortunate and regrettable" that "many men and women of good will, moved by humanitarian sympathy for the Jews in Europe, have been misled into believing that organizations like the Emergency Committee represented the Jewish people and have contributed to them."

The statement recalled an advertisement by the committee which implied that 70,000 Rumanian Jews could be saved at a cost of $50 each.

"From the content and phrasing of this advertisement, many persons were led to believe that a $50 contribution would save a Jewish life," the statement declared. "The public is waiting to hear how many Jews were ransomed with the money that was collected and what disposition was made of the money."

Referring to the Baldwin-Rogers resolution sponsored by the Emergency Committee in Congress, the statement declared it was introduced "in complete disregard of the rescue program which is being actively pressed in Washington by representative Jewish agencies," and that it "does not reflect the totality of that program."

The resolution has been approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but has not yet been acted upon by the House committee.

Committee Leaders Reply

A reply to the statement and charges was issued last night by Dean Alfange, former candidate for Governor of the American Labor party; Herbert B. Moore, president of Transradio Press News, and Fletcher Pratt, military analyst and writer, as vice chairman of the emergency committee.

Characterizing the conference statement as a "tragic error on the part of whoever took upon themselves the responsibility of such vindictive action," these three non-Jewish leaders pointed out that the emergency committee was non-sectarian and non-partisan and, therefore, could never have consistently assumed to speak for the Jewish people in this country.

"Since its inception, it has been a united manifestation of the deep feeling of Americans of all creeds regarding the horrible plight of the Jews of Europe and an expression of the will of all Americans to see large-scale governmental action to alleviate their plight," the emergency committee spokesmen declared.

They asserted that the emergency committee was formed in response to a call by a delegation of Palestine and European Jews, "who believe that their agonized people in Europe are desperately in need of the help of the entire American people and not only of the Jewish-American organizations."
Refugee Figures Questioned

Faults Found in Testimony of Under-Secretary of State Long

To the Editor of The New York Times:

A pamphlet was recently released by the Government Printing Office entitled "Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives* on * * resolutions providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe." It contains lengthy testimony by Breckinridge Long concerning the refugee problem.

Many parts of Mr. Long's statement as well as the spirit permeating it may evoke criticism. But while we would not like to touch upon matters of opinion or evaluation, we cannot refrain from questioning the fundamental figure that was presented to the committee—namely, Mr. Long's statement that "We have taken into this country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 580,000 refugees."

In giving this figure, Mr. Long followed the line of another statement issued by the Department of State on Feb. 25 that "from the advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 547,775 visas were issued by American diplomatic and consular officers to natives or nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis powers, the great majority of which persons were refugees from Nazi persecutions."

Statistics Differ

When the latter statement was first published in March, 1942, the Yiddish Scientific Institute assigned members of its staff to study the official annual reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in order to establish the number of the visa holders actually admitted to this country, as well as the number of Jewish refugees among them. The results may be summarized as follows: As of June 30, 1942, of a total of 453,205 persons actually admitted since 1933, only 364,020 came from countries in Europe now dominated by the Axis. Only 183,623 persons admitted during these years were Jews and not more than 81,943 came from Nazi-dominated countries.

The testimony of Mr. Long speaks of "approximately 580,000 whom 'we have taken into this country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews until today.'"

A new study of the basis of the previously mentioned official sources reveals the following facts:

1. During the ten years July 1, 1933, to June 30, 1943, only 479,929 aliens were admitted into the United States from all the world.

2. This figure includes aliens admitted from Canada, Mexico, Central and South America and Africa. If we deduct the number of these aliens—180,896—who came to this country irrespective of European developments, there remain 298,032 aliens admitted from all European countries for the ten-year period.

Not All Refugees

But even this figure does not represent the number of refugees, because the immigrants who arrived here between 1933 and 1938 from Poland, Romania, the Baltic, Balkan and Scandinavian countries, Great Britain, France and even Italy were by no means persons persecuted by the Hitler regime. A study now being conducted by this institute intends to establish the number of actual refugees among the 298,032 aliens admitted from Europe into the United States between 1933 and 1943.

3. The wording of Mr. Long's testimony may leave the impression that since the major impact of the Hitler persecution was felt by the Jews, the great majority of the persons admitted to the United States were Jews. In reality, according to the official immigration statistics, the total number of Jewish immigrants admitted from all European countries during the ten-year period was 165,706.

4. But in the case of the Jews a large number must likewise be deducted in order to obtain the number of actual refugees, because Jewish immigrants from Poland, Romania, the Baltic and Balkan countries up to 1938 cannot be considered as refugees from Hitler oppression. The same is true of the Jewish immigrants from Austria and Czechoslovakia up to the beginning and the fall of 1938, respectively. It seems that when all these deductions are made no more than about 185,000 Jews admitted to the United States during the last ten years may be described as actual refugees from Nazi persecution.

5. The foregoing figures concern aliens who were admitted as quota or non-quota immigrants. According to some sources, about 42,000 Jews entered this country as non-immigrants, that is, on the basis of temporary visas. But whatever the figure, it cannot simply be added to the number of immigrants proper. The reason is obvious.

Up to 1938 all temporary visitors had to leave the United States. Since the outbreak of the war in Europe the holders of temporary visas were advised to apply for permanent visas at a United States consulate in Canada or some other near-by country. Thus, in order to get the immigration visas, the applicants had to leave the United States. When they returned they were included in the official statistics as aliens admitted in the corresponding year as immigrants.

LEIBUSH LEHNER,
President, Yiddish Scientific Institute

New York, Dec. 27, 1943.
Plot Uncovered To Overthrow Chilean Regime

Anti-Democratic Move Laid to Argentina and Bolivia, Assailed by All Parties

By John W. White

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SANTIAGO, Chile, Dec. 30—Chile's many quarreling political parties have united as rarely before in this country's history to defend their democracy against a recently uncovered plot from Argentina and Bolivia to overthrow the Chilean government and to set up here an anti-democratic regime similar to the present governments at Buenos Aires and La Paz.

Both Houses of Congress were in session until late last night to permit an energetic denunciation of the anti-democratic plot. Spokesmen of all shades of political thought were heard.

As Senator Horacio Walker, spokesman for the Conservatives, expressed it: "We may fight here in Congress and in our newspapers over problems affecting our democracy, but all parties are solidly united in a determination that democracy itself must be preserved."

Accuses Chile's Neighbor

He charged, for the record, that the plot was "engineered by neighboring countries which desire a government in Chile which will be a copy of the anti-democratic regimes they have recently set up."

He then asked, "Can any one be so stupid as to think that Chile will accept anti-democratic plotting such as that which caused events in other near-by countries?" If so, they have forgotten that Chile is a nation extraordinarily proud of its long tradition of democracy and its civil institutions, firmly founded on constitutional rights of man. To plot against our democracy in an effort to set up an anti-democratic regime is an insult to our intelligence as well as our patriotism."

It was charged during debate in the Chamber that Argentine and Bolivian agents had been stirring up labor trouble in this country's coal mines, copper mines and nitrate fields in an effort to sabotage Chile's production and transportation of war materials for the United Nations.

All Political Parties Unite

While the government of Chile has carefully avoided mentioning Argentina and Bolivia by name, referring to them only as 'neighboring countries,' Senators and Deputies repeatedly have made the direct charge that the plot was engineered by Argentina and Bolivia.

A spokesman of the Socialists in the Senate said that the best evidence of progress attained by Chilean democracy is the energetic unanimity with which all parties and all classes have united to repudiate this attempt to overthrow democracy and set up something else. The Senate sent a dispatch of the debate to the Minister of Interior with a unanimously voted assurance that all political parties are standing solidly behind the government in its resistance to all anti-democratic pressure from outside.

The government has announced that it has identified and is watching the ring-leaders of the plot and will punish them to the maximum permitted by national security laws. It is presumed that foreign agents identified with the plot will be deported and that Chilean collaborators will be brought to trial on charges of seditious plotting to overthrow the government. Such activity may bring long terms of imprisonment under Chilean law.
STATEMENT OF POLICY

In the Statement on Palestine, issued on 9th November, 1938, His Majesty’s Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission† and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty’s Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty’s Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to, and discussed with, the Arab and Jewish delegations.

2. The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate. There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows:

(i) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.

(ii) To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

(iii) To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self-governing institutions.

* Cmd. 5893. † Cmd. 5479. ‡ Cmd. 5854.
3. The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression "a national home for the Jewish people", and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under the three heads, (1) The Constitution, (2) Immigration, and (3) Land.

1.—The Constitution.

4. It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognised that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922* which reads as follows:—

"Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that "Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English". His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated ... the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a

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* Cmd. 1700.
Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine ".

But this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows:--

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection ".

6. His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the
assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

7. In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October, 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their Report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no need to summarise here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

8. His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to secure the development of self-governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain for ever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two
peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in
government in such a way that the essential interests of each
are secured.

9. The establishment of an independent State and the com-
plete relinquishment of Mandatory control in Palestine would
require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as
would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth
of self-governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries,
must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will
be required before independence is achieved, throughout which
ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will
be retained by His Majesty’s Government as the Mandatory
authority, while the people of the country are taking an
increasing share in the Government, and understanding and
co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the
constant endeavour of His Majesty’s Government to promote
good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty’s Govern-
ment make the following declaration of their intentions regard-
ing the future government of Palestine:

(1) The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the
establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine
State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom
as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and
strategic requirements of both countries in the future. This
proposal for the establishment of the independent State
would involve consultation with the Council of the League
of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs
and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure
that the essential interests of each community are safe-
guarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be
preceded by a transitional period throughout which His
Majesty’s Government will retain responsibility for the
government of the country. During the transitional
period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing
part in the government of their country. Both sections of
the population will have an opportunity to participate in
the machinery of government, and the process will be
carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently
restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this
policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part
in the government of their country, the objective being to
place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of
Government, with the assistance of British advisers and
subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With this object in view His Majesty's Government will be prepared immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads of Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are at present performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:

(a) the security of, and freedom of access to, the Holy Places, and the protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

(b) the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(c) such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing.
His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

(8) His Majesty’s Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

II.—Immigration.

12. Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced", is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions". Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate. But in the Command Paper of 1922 it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr. Weizmann in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of

the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored. Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

13. In the view of the Royal Commission, the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish
National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty’s Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty’s Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself require this. Therefore His Majesty’s Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty’s Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty’s Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:

(i) Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to
the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:

(a) For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

(b) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependants.

2. The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

3. After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

4. His Majesty’s Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

15. His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

III.—Land.

16. The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, “while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced”, to encourage “close settlement by Jews on the land,” and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land
must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

17. The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the rights and position of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

18. In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practise mutual tolerance, goodwill and co-operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.