TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING OF A SPEECH BY SECRETARY MORGENTHAU AT NELSON HOUSE, POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK, ON JUNE 14, 1945.

CHAIRMAN MILLARD: And so it gives me great pleasure to introduce our neighbor and our great friend, Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States of America. (Applause)

SECRETARY MORGENTHAU: Chairman Millard, Mrs. Roosevelt.

When I came here this evening I didn’t know that I was going to be called on to speak. So I would just like to say a few words to you from my heart about my friend and neighbor, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I had the privilege of being in his Cabinet at Albany, and I have tried to serve him faithfully the last twelve years in Washington. When I look back to that period I think of the very first days when he became President, when he had the courage to close the banks, and told us in this country that the only thing that we had to fear was fear itself. Then, step by step, he showed us how to rebuild this nation back towards full employment after having gone through one of the most severe panics and depressions that this country had ever gone through.

I would just like to mention a few of the things that he initiated and saw started. When we go back and think first of the G.C.C. Camps and the W.P.A., which he conceived to give work to the men and women of this country to put them on the road towards prosperity, and I know that you know that during the time he was President the business people and the banks of this country were earning more money than they had earned at any time in the history of this country.

If that is any measure of a man’s success, certainly his measures were successful. All the work that he did, in my opinion, was leading up toward a more prosperous people. He knew that over a third of the people of this country earned less than fifty dollars a year, and I think it was the very careful planning that he did through all the time up to Pearl Harbor that raised the morale of this country so that when we were attacked at Pearl Harbor the country was prepared to pitch in and learn how to fight and to produce the articles necessary for war.

Nobody thought it was possible, but he always raised the sights beyond the highest mark any of us thought he
could achieve, and the people of this country rose and met the mark that he demanded and requested of them.

As more and more of the secret documents come to light, we will learn that Franklin Roosevelt was one of the greatest military leaders in all time. It was largely due to him—his planning, his courage, and his foresight—that we were able to defeat the Germans. We still have a full-sized war—(record not clear at this point)

Once we have achieved this world peace, I hope that this nation will go back and pick up the threads that he left while we were still at peace, namely, these various organizations which were so successful during peacetime, to give the people of this country better homes, better clothing, and better shelter.

On account of the war, these various national planning organizations had to be done away with, but when the war is over, and we gain this peace that we all pray for, I hope we will again pick up the threads that he left and start once more these various important organizations to give the common man in this country a better chance and a better opportunity.

I am very appreciative that the Elks have allowed me to come here tonight and join them in honoring the memory of my dear friend, Franklin Roosevelt. (Applause)

CHAIRMAN MILLARD: Thank you, Mr. Henry Morgenthau.
June 31, 1948

Memorandum for Mr. Folk:

Sometime ago we discussed the vacancy in the position of Internal Revenue Agent in Charge of the Nashville Division by reason of the retirement of Mr. Harold T. Nolz, on August 31, 1948.

In a communication dated May 4, 1948, Senator McFarland of Tennessee endorsed the appointment of First Field Deputy Joe V. Hales, Office of the Collector of Internal Revenue at Nashville. The Senator was advised that there were also other endorsements under consideration and the matter contained in his communication would be discussed with him, should Mr. Folk retire.

As you may recall, the candidate for this vacancy is Mr. Grady W. Beaney, Grade CAF-14, SSNO, a former internal revenue agent of the Nashville Division, at present associated with the Technical Staff and assigned to the Birmingham office; Mr. James R. Bailey, Grade CAF-13, SSNO, Chief Reviewer in the Nashville Division; and Mr. Nash T. Richardson, Grade CAF-13, SSNO, Assistant Internal Revenue Agent in Charge of the Nashville Division.

There is attached for your information and consideration a resume of the general qualifications and experience history of each of the candidates mentioned above, all of whom are employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with long service records. You recall that my first choice for this vacancy is Mr. Bailey, feeling as I do that his long continuous service and capabilities warrant the promotion. This is also the view of Mr. Folk who is retiring. My second choice is Mr. Beaney, a thoroughly competent man, who has previously demonstrated excellent capabilities as an Internal Revenue Agent in Charge.

Grady W. Beaney - Technical Advisor in Charge - Grade CAF-14 - $6200

Born - October 30, 1890 - Age 58

Legal Residence - Birmingham, Alabama

Education - Grade and high schools - 11 years
State Normal College - 1 year
Special bookkeeping courses - Wesley Business College
Study of special bookkeeping and higher accounting.

Appointed August 1, 1918 as U.S. Collector at $3.00 per day
Appointed Internal Revenue Agent at $2700 on June 10, 1926, Nashville Div.
Designated Acting Agent in Charge, Brooklyn Division, April 14, 1928.
Promoted to Agent in Charge, Brooklyn Division, May 10, 1928, Grade 13, $6200.
Transferred to position of Field Office Inspector, Birmingham, Ala. on
November 10, 1928 - due to illness in his family.
Transferred to Nashville Division as Internal Revenue Agent at $6200 -
Grade 13, September 1, 1929, due to abolishment of position of Field
Office Inspector.
Transferred to Southern Division, Technical Staff, Birmingham Office,
as Assistant Technical Advisor, May 1, 1939 - Grade 12 - $5200

Efficiency ratings - Efficiency ratings excellent during entire service.

Endorsements - Senator John N. Bankhead in letter dated May 20, 1942, recommends Agent Beaney to become Agent in Charge at Nashville when Mr. Folk retires.

Senator Lister Hill in letter dated April 4, 1942, also recommends Agent Beaney as successor to Mr. Folk when vacancy occurs.

Deputy Commissioner

Enclosures.
James H. Haley - Internal Revenue Agent - Grade CAF-12, $4200
Born - June 17, 1928
Legal Residence - Florence, Alabama - Age 52
Education - Public School and State Normal College - 12 years - Graduate
Experience - Bookkeeper - 2 years, Ass't. Cashier - 2 years, Cashier - 2 years in Traders & Farmers Bank, Haleyville, Alabama
Appointed Auditor on August 9, 1919 at $1800 in Washington, D. C., Transferred to Nashville Division, January 15, 1925, post of duty Birmingham, $2,000.
July 1, 1926, promoted to CAF-12 - $4500 - Chief Reviewer.

Efficiency ratings - Efficiency ratings excellent during entire service.
Endorsements - None

Noah P. Richardson - Assistant Agent in Charge - Grade 13 - $5600
Date of birth - May 25, 1884 - Age 61
Legal Residence - Nashville, Tenn.
Education - Grade and high school - 12 years
Lexington, Tenn., Training School - 4 months
LaSalle Extension University of Chicago, by correspondence, 18 months. Certificate in Higher Accounting.
Sardis Normal College, Sardis, Tenn. - 2 years
Appointed as Internal revenue agent in the Nashville Division, September 30, 1922, at $2250 per annum.
November 1, 1927, promoted to Grade 11 - $3500 as Chief Collector.
August 1, 1928, designated Assistant Agent in Charge - Grade 12, $4600
February 1, 1944, promoted to CAF-13 - $5600.

Efficiency ratings - Efficiency ratings excellent during entire service.
Endorsements - None
OFFICE OF THE COLLECTOR, NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

June 15, 1944

Joe F. Hales - Chief Field Deputy - Grade CAP-12 - $6400

Born - January 9, 1901 - Age 44

Legal Residence - Tennessee

Education - Boone's Creek High School - 4 years,
Teachers College, Johnson City - 1 year.
Manager Farm and Dairy.

Appointed as Zone Deputy Collector - CAP-4, $1800, August 2, 1933, in
District of Tennessee, post of duty Johnson City.

August 24, 1942 - Appointed Collector of Internal Revenue for the District
of Tennessee - CAP-12, $6400 (Vice Hon. Lips Hanesie
on military furlough, indefinite).

April 17, 1944 - Conversion to permanent position - CAP-12, $6400, Chief
Field Deputy. (Mr. Hanesie returned from military
furlough and restored as Collectece).

Efficiency ratings - Efficiency ratings Very Good during entire service.

Endorsements - Mr. D. W. McKeller, Secretary to Senator McKeller of
Tennessee, letter dated July 3, 1944, recommending
Mr. Hales for position of Internal Revenue Agent in
charge at Nashville upon retirement of Mr. Hurl Folk.
Senator McKeller, letter of May 1, 1940, same recommendation.
June 25, 1945

Mr. Reams was here this afternoon. He is very much interested in the Jewish problem, and I asked him if he might just as well know that I had raised the question of the Jews going into Palestine. I said I was interested in this as a Jew and as a citizen, and his answer was, "Why in Jew? You are interested in humanity." He was a good deal shocked.

Pehle came in and I told Pehle to prepare a memorandum and take it over to him tomorrow. I then called up McCloy and told him the same story, and Pehle is seeing McCloy tomorrow at five.

July 26, 1944

RECONVERSION
FRENCH LEND-LEASE

Present: Mr. B. W. Bell
Mr. Bernstein
Mr. Glasser
Mr. Dulles
Mrs. Shanahan
Mrs. Klotz

MR. BELL: This is about debt, expenditures, and gold?

H.M.JH: Yes, and I mean debt, expenditures, monthly rate of expenditures. What I really want is a little budget summary, see?

MR. BELL: You just want some statistics that you can take along that you can refer to in case you are asked a lot of questions.

H.M.JH: That's right. A little budget. A really up-to-date budget summary, forecasting, if you can, this fiscal year.

MR. BELL: I just made up some expenditure figures, but they are largely my own, and they are not based on the budget. This budget is about five billion higher than I have got mine, if you would like to use those.

H.M.JH: I would like to take yours.

MR. BELL: You couldn't very well use them in the country, I mean.

H.M.JH: What we are doing here today is terribly confidential. I think—well, you put yourself in my position, do you see?

MR. BELL: I know what you want.
H.J.: I would like a little something on what is the last word on reconversion, what are we doing. I am giving you this, and you can parcel it out. Do you see what I mean? Just what are we doing? I would like something up to the minute on our manpower situation, and then that would also be production.

Mr. BELL: You want production indices.

H.J.: What is the latest thing on the production, which are the things we are stressing, and which we are going up on, and which we are going down on?

Mr. BELL: I think we have something recent on that. We are working on it.

H.J.: I mean, what are we going up on, and what are we going down on. If we had a little map of the areas, showing which areas were short on labor or which aren’t, the WPA, or whatever it is—

Mr. BELL: There is an excellent map in this month’s Federal Reserve Bulletin from the Chicago District, and they have the whole map, and the dots all over the country where you have a manpower shortage, and blocks showing the type of shortage. You may like to have that.

H.J.: Let me see. The manpower thing, production—well, that’s the main things, And also what is happening to our shipbuilding program. I am particularly interested in that. I mean, merchant ships, when I say ships. I think I better take Tidken’s latest book along with me. He has a book with a red cover on it, involving production figures. He gets it either once a week or once a month.

Mr. BELL: I never saw it.

H.J.: It has a red shiny cover, and has every item in it.

Mr. BELL: That is just what, production?

H.J.: It is by items, each gun, each ship, and so forth.

I will take that red book of Tidken’s. Then I want to be brought up to date on this French situation, and I take it the fellow to do it is DuBois, if he can keep me up to date.

Mr. BELL: Yes, I can give you what happened yesterday, if you want it, in a few minutes.

H.J.: Let’s let that wait a minute.

Mr. BELL: Now, do you want anything on the French, or are you going to let Harry carry that? I understood Harry was coming back on the third.

H.J.: While I am waiting, why don’t you start on this French business? All of this I am doing now I started to do at seven this morning.

Mr. BELL: As we told you, we went over to McCoy’s office the day before yesterday, and submitted to him a memorandum of objections to the French draft of the financial agreement, and made a suggestion that it would be better if we sent that memorandum to the French. In other words, that our objections would be a matter of record. But after some discussion of the memo, it was the consensus of the meeting that it would be better not to send the memo, but let McCoy use it as a basis for discussions with the French. He is chairman of the committee. So, we drafted a new agreement, new memorandum, to be signed or agreed to by the two Governments, and yesterday morning Jack sent that memo to the French representatives suggesting that this was our new draft, and that we would like to discuss it at three-thirty p.m. They came down and Jack did use the memorandum as a basis for discussion. He told them quite frankly that there were many provisions that we couldn’t agree to, and the reasons why we couldn’t agree to their draft.

(Mr. Glasser and Mr. DuBois enter the conference.)
MR. BELL: When he gave his objections to the provisions, why, they usually come back that, well, that is exactly what we meant, what we were trying to drive at, but they always generally insisted on using their language. But toward an agreement, and it was agreed that the technicians would get together this morning, make some new drafts of the points in which there was a disagreement, and get back together this p.m., and this p.m., will include the British, I understand.

(Mr. Bernstein and Miss Shanahan enter the conference.)

MR. BELL: The main points of disagreement in this memorandum to the French was that it looks as though they said that wasn't the case, but it looked as though they were thinking of a definite agreement to pay in dollars for the troops, and that they were going to pay dollars for civilian supplies after we concluded the Lend-Lease Agreement, which they could have delayed indefinitely, and also, they said that they would eventually use gold if the dollars were not sufficient.

Well, we didn't know what eventually meant, and Jack in explaining it, they said, "Well, what does eventually mean in English?" Jack said, "Well, that means maybe a long time away." They said, "Oh, it doesn't mean that in French. We mean when we run out of dollars.

B.M.: That's like manana. It can mean tomorrow or next week.

MR. BELL: I think they said, didn't they, in most cases that they meant just what we were talking about, but it wasn't clear at all? So, they agreed at the end that what they would put into the memorandum was that we would agree to pay dollars in the end, but for the time being, we would just keep accounts on both sides, and that there would be a provision in the memorandum that there be a settlement in the end, and dollars would go both ways. Is that right?
Mr. H.J.: Can't I have these men over here tomorrow?

Mr. Bell: I suppose so.

Mr. H.J.: I think I will call up Molloy and ask him.

Mr. Bell: If there is a possibility that Hildring goes, well, that will give you a whole week.

Mr. H.J.: You will have this all in shape, won't you?

Mr. Dubois: We have got it right now.

Mr. Bell: You mean the history and everything.

Mr. Dubois: Oh, sure.

Mr. H.J.: Well, what I wanted was Shanahan and Bernstein and Glasser here for, was that the last minute, things like this French business, collar balances, German currency, and anything that we might be asked over there should be gotten in shape, do you see? We don't want to wait until the last minute.

Now, Glasser or Bernstein or somebody, ought to get a whole pile ready for Harry. I have told Mr. Bell what I wanted on the investment front, but you ought to have a file of any impending business, anything past, future, and so forth, that we might be asked over there. As I understand it, Mr. White will be back on the third.

Mrs. Shanahan: I thought he was coming back next Monday. That is the first.

Mr. H.J.: Well, I thought you might be sort of getting the stuff together, beginning to pick it up. You might put your heads together, do you see? Then, the other thing is: Now, this letter came in asking that we let somebody go over there who is going to France with this military commission.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I am sure Harold has it under control, but I will join with him.

H.J.: I hear you are here just this morning.

MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir.

H.J.: Go back and talk it over for fifteen minutes. I won't use the phone—oh, this is terrible, isn't it?

MR. GLASSER: I think it is best if we wired Mr. White and had him call in.

R. BELL: A letter would get there by Saturday, wouldn't it?

R. J.: No, it took five days to go to Chippenham. I think you better send him a wire to phone in, because I really would like a couple more top-flight people in London right away. But I won't take anybody out of Washington. We are down to the irreducible minimum.

I am talking about economists, anyway. I am very serious about that. A dozen different people in the armed services have left White's section.

R. BELL: We are going to look that over.

R. J.: I don't know whether we need any accountant or people like that. But I would like to build the thing up. You said that the British top us all the time.

R. BELL: Yes. They did it in Italy.

R. J.: I don't care whether they top us in rank, as long as we have the ability. I mean, it is ability that I want. I don't care about the rank.

R. BELL: Well, the fellow at the top usually has the final say.

R. J.: Well, they do and they don't. You take Colonel Bernstein. He seems to get along all right.

MR. GLASSER: They don't keep us in ability.

R. J.: I don't care so much about rank, it is the ability.

But the main thing is, I want to pull together, so that anything that might come up, you know, lend-lease, German exchange rates, anything that is pending, if somebody asks us about that, we will know.

MR. GLASSER: You mean unsettled questions.

R. J.: That's it.

R. BELL: Do you want anything on this other one on taxes?

R. J.: What do you mean?

R. BELL: What our rates are, and so forth? A one-page memorandum with the different rates?

R. J.: Okay.

The other thing, and I am glad Bernstein is in, we just can't have in this office somebody continuously whose full-time job it is to watch the results of the monetary conference. People get dirty in editorials, we ought to have someone to answer them, also the papers, and so on and so forth. I mean, we can't just all pull out of here and leave this thing. You know, in the air, and I was just wondering—Luxford is going away. When Luxford comes back, we will practically detail him on that as a full-time job. You might suggest that to Mr. White, and Mr. O'Connell, and Danny Bell. I would like an answer on that promptly. What do you think about that?

MR. BERNSTEIN: I think they will probably have to detail an accountant to be working on it, though Luxford might easily be doing the supervising and will put him into the jobs needed.
H.M.JR: I agree with you, but I think that somebody should be here. My gosh, look at all the propaganda that little group under Fehele got out.

MR. DUBOIS: Somebody here has to be focusing on the problem of the press; an awful lot.

H.M.JR: Just look at what Fehele was able to do. And he didn't have any publicity people. You fellows just want to it.

MR. DUBOIS: There are ways of doing it when you want to go to it.

MR. BELL: Are you thinking about taking him out of the General Counsel's Office for this job or just detailing him as Assistant General Counsel?

H.M.JR: No, no. If Luxford and Bernstein would team up and devote themselves exclusively to that, it would be wonderful. That would be what I would like to see done.

MR. BERNSTEIN: We will probably try to do something in our shop. I have talked to Harold, and Mr. White has it in mind to redistribute the work a little bit to make possible more attention to the Fund and the Bank. It is more than one man can do, bearing in mind what you have,

H.M.JR: I think if you and Luxford could team up and devote yourselves practically exclusively to this until it has gotten through Congress, it would make a good team.

MR. BELL: What do you want done about the matters that will come up when you are away? Do you want them handled exclusively down there or passed through the channels?

H.M.JR: What would you suggest?

MR. BELL: I really don't care. I am asking you for guidance. Say the letters that come in--do you want them signed by Luxford or Bernstein or somebody down there, or signed by the Acting Secretary, Under Secretary, or Assistant Secretary? And also the press releases--should they go through me and Sheaffer?

H.M.JR: I think they should be handled as any other Treasury business, that they should go through channels. So there is no misunderstanding, I expect Mr. White to continue to devote himself to this, as he has in the past, but he can't devote himself exclusively to this. Do you see?

MR. BELL: No, he will have other problems.

H.M.JR: I expect him to give it a great deal of time and supervision. And I think that he should when he is back. I think he should see the thing through and supervise it. I am looking to him to supervise it.

But on the other hand, he can't do it exclusively, that and nothing else. And I think that Bernstein and Luxford could sort of be detached under Mr. White's supervision, but still go through channels like any other Treasury business; that would be a good way to do it. What do you think?

MR. BELL: It meets with my approval, yes.

H.M.JR: You (Mrs. Channan) get those thoughts over to Mr. White. Then if he has any ideas when he gets back Monday, if he wants to talk to me on the farm after he has got the thing cleared--although I hate to talk on the telephone up there, so if he wants to get me, any letter mailed to my name will reach me in the morning. I am going to try not to hang on the telephone. I wish he would put his thoughts on paper.

Now, Bernstein, what have you got on your mind?

MR. BERNSTEIN: Not a thing on my mind, except the publication of some papers now that we will be ready to distribute next week.

H.M.JR: But I mean, looking forward to the next month, is there anything I have overlooked here?

MR. BERNSTEIN: No, sir, I am assuming that everything we said at Bretton Woods on the continuation of a program for informing the public, informing Congress, and all that
would be worked in with what you said this morning.

N.R. Jr: Yes, but I am going away, White is away. He will be away for a couple of weeks. I just don’t want to do anything that will be done in his capacity as acting Secretary. No, you see? Somebody else will do it, somebody makes some wild statement. It should be answered. Somebody from the Bankers Trust shot off his mouth this morning. The headlines were bad, but what he said sounded all right.

Mr. HEL: Is that advisable?

N.R. Jr: I think so. When you read it it sounded all right, but they give him unfavorable headlines.

Mr. BERNSTEIN: That has happened in the past.

N.R. Jr: So they tell me! But I am repeating myself; I don’t want this thing suddenly to go if the--

Mr. BERNSTEIN: The most important thing is not to allow the public interest in it to lag, because if it goes down, it is harder to revive than it is to keep up to a high pitch.

N.R. Jr: I will review it. Mr. White is supervisor. My own recommendation is that Laxford and Bernstein will devote themselves exclusively to that, but whatever is done should be done just as it has in the past, through regular channels.

Mr. HEL: Are the proceedings at Bretton Woods to be made public?

Mr. BERNSTEIN: Yes, sir. A document will be gotten up. We are planning now, I think, to talk to Charley Bell later in the day about it, to publish the agreements with an introduction by the Secretary to be available for the public here in much the same form we publish the other documents.

N.R. Jr: Use me as window dressing.

Mr. BERNSTEIN: We use you because you are responsible. If things go bad, they will blame you, not us.

N.R. Jr: You will find that out as you go along, as I have in the past.

Well, so much for that. I would like Mr. Daniel Bell to stay, but I am counting on both White and you (DuBois) to get ready so that anything I am asked for in regard to Treasury business we will have an answer on. And I also think it is important that we get a couple more good Treasury men into London right away, Dan. We have been talking about it, but I don’t want to fool around with it any longer.

Mr. DuBois: I have just one comment on this French thing, and that is the inherent weakness in what we are doing now with the French. Although the surface looks good, it ties in with just what you were talking about the other day, and that is that Lend-Lease can take the whole heart out of this. If their negotiations with the French because everything is tied in with subsequent negotiations, Lend-Lease and reciprocal aid, and they can conceivably take the heart out of what we are providing for by in fact shifting the civilian suppliers that we say will be paid for over to Lend-Lease on a straight Lend-Lease basis, and I am sure the French have that in mind.

N.R. Jr: So what?

Mr. DuBois: I am just raising the point.

Mr. HEL: That is the weakness in this present setup.

Mr. DuBois: And also a weakness in the general setup whereby all these sorts of things aren’t tied together.


Mr. GLASSER: The proposal is that the Secretary would ask the President to prepare an Executive Order that would place in a new committee of which the Secretary of the Treasury is chairman, all questions of financial aid to foreign countries or all financial problems related to foreign countries, and thus you would get the coordination of all financial activities under one single authority.
MR. BELL: And under the fiscal branch of the Government.

MR. MASTEN: Under the appropriate branch of the Government.

H.R. JR.: You take an item like this, the disposal of United States property overseas. Now, that affects balances both ways. Do you see? It might be good for the French, or bad for the French, a thing like that. I mean, you are very, very vulnerable to criticism on this thing, and anybody who is smart can find that out. I think it ought to be tied up in a package. The reason Bretton Woods was a success--and I told this to Mr. Hull yesterday--was that there was no interference of any kind--but here in Washington I mean there was complete coordination. I was head of the delegation, President of the conference, and I had a letter from the President giving me complete authority which I didn't even have to refer to once. You fellows never referred to it, did you?

MR. HERSTEIN: No, sir.

H.R. JR.: But here you are constantly undermined. As Joe said, we make a good arrangement, and these fellows can come along on this thing and completely pull the rug out from under us.

MR. DUROSE: Yes, sir.

MR. BELL: Who is Hannigan? Is he FEA?

MR. CLASSEN: He sits at the French desk in FEA.

MR. BELL: I don't know whether he has control.

MR. CLASSEN: That is right, he is just a desk man.

MR. BELL: There is a division of the Lend-Lease Act referred to as 3-C under which they can give long-time credit arrangements. As I understand it, the purpose of it was to let them work out arrangements where they committed themselves to make lend-lease available after the Army had pulled out, like they did in North Africa. Then they would let that go over a long period. Is that what it was for?

MR. DUROSE: Yes.

MR. BELL: They tell me they have made one of those arrangements with Russia, which means rehabilitation of Russian territory on Lend-Lease. And the French are looking for the same thing, I think.

H.R. JR.: The trouble is, we have got to be so careful. By the way, tell Mr. White if he gets here by Wednesday that is plenty of time.

I don't know, and I don't think anybody is smart enough to know what the American public is ready to do, see, in the way of rehabilitation, and when you get these things like Lend-Lease and all that--I mean, it is all mixed up in the people's minds, is the Bank going to do this thing, is the Fund going to do this thing, is Lend-Lease, in USSR? How far is the American public going to be called upon to help? And what is the overall pattern?

Now, here am, Secretary of the Treasury. I don't know. If I send on 'Information Please,' and somebady asked me the question, I couldn't answer it. You don't know, Dan. I don't think the President knows. If he does, he hasn't told anybody. And I think all of that stuff ought to be tied together for his sake and for the country's sake. And I am going to ask him to let me do it. Then if he doesn't want to let me do it, he had better get somebody else. Somebody has to tie it together so that these foreign countries can't play one department off against the other.

And I think, Dan, in preparing this document we ought to have cases where we have been involved, like in the Middle East or Italy where the English--don't know, the President is sensitive on this thing where the English have pulled a fast one on us. I don't blame them. Heck, it is up to them. He got the impression that the French wanted to come out of the war richer than they went into it. All we have to have is a few examples. "Look, Mr. President, here are examples."
MR. DURBIS: The French negotiations themselves with all the finagling that went on behind the back doors are  

enough to prove that.

MR. GLASSER: A classic example in this administration  
is the way the French have gone from one person to another  
in the Government, playing off one individual or one depart-  
mment against another.

MR. JR.: All you have to do is give me some examples,  
and when I go over there I am going to take Mr. Bell with  
me, and I am going to see whether between us we can't sell  
this thing to the President for the country's sake. It  
isn't that I want power; I would just love to sit here with  
my feet on the desk and smoke a pipe. I would love it.

MRS. KLOTH: Oh, Mr. Morgenthau, you would not.

MR. JR.: But I hate to see these other countries get  
the best of it all the time. White should put his brain on  
this, too.

MR. GLASSER: You suggested yesterday that John Pehle  
would be available. I have talked to him about this, and  
he is going to do some work on it this week.

MR. JR.: Be sure it is coordinated with Mr. Dan Bell,  
or if it is legal that it is coordinated through Mr. O'Connell.

MR. BELL: Well, this is just exploring it. Joe will  
be away, and we put John on it to get the groundwork done.

MR. JR.: Is this agreeable to you?

MR. BELL: Oh, yes. We talked about it. I think that  
is a good way to start.

MR. JR.: If it is legal, please tell Mr. O'Connell  
about it.

MR. BELL: He will be in on it.

MR. JR.: You have already talked to John? That will  
keep him from being restless. This gives him a little  
assignment. I think Pehle would love this.

MR. GLASSER: Yes, he was very enthusiastic about it.  
This is a very big thing, Mr. Secretary, very important.

MR. JR.: It is with your approval that Pehle gets it?

MR. BELL: Oh, yes, very much.

MR. JR.: Let O'Connell know about it.

MR. BELL: Joe will be brought in on it when he gets  
the first draft. I think we have to do something about  
getting this French memorandum fixed--talk to FRA so they  
don't give everything away. I have a lot of confidence in  
Charlie Tait. I think he is on our side of the fence. But  
apparently there are two groups working on Lend-Lease.

MR. JR.: I think Acheson envisions himself as the man  
on the committee who will do just the sort of thing we are  
talking about, and he just isn't temperamentally suited to  
do this kind of work, that is all. He permits his personal  
apprehensions to run away with his judgment. I mean, after  
even, we have had cases after case where Acheson has permitted  
his personal sympathies to rule his judgment.

MR. DURBIS: Oscar Cox turned very bad on us, too, Mr.  
Secretary.

MR. BELL: They think they have the authority to do  
everything, and they really want to do it.

MR. DURBIS: The trouble is, they have given away  
billions of dollars, and this is sort of a drop in the bucket.

MR. JR.: What I am trying to do is to get through this  
committee a policy so that I can occasionally talk to the  
President and make the President think about it so they  
don't get the President off base on this thing, and at the  
same time do a good job for Europe to get Europe back on its  
feet, but to do it as economically as possible, and to make
each country assume the maximum share that she can without bleeding her.

Now, there is a way to do this thing which will help them and put them back on their feet, and there is a way to do it to make a monkey out of us and to end up the way we have in North Africa without having a friend. Now, I want to do a job. I won't take second place to anybody for wanting to do a job, but I would like to do it so that somebody would once in a while say, "Thank you, I think the United States is wonderful," and not have happen what we had in Italy. We paid the piper, but they look to Russia as their friend. I don't mind their looking to Russia as their friend, but I would also like to have them look to us. We are paying the bill. I would like to see the American flag on the homes of a few Italians instead of the sickle and hammer.

It was very funny, but I went around these towns in Malta. They had two little houses sort of built out of rubble, and over one was the name of Roosevelt, and over the other one was the name of Stalin. That is all right. That is fifty-fifty, both houses the same size.

MR. BELL: Why is Russia so popular in Italy?

MR. GLASSER: They feel that the Russian Army is defeating Germany.

H.W.JR: They haven't put one ruble in there, but they feel we haven't done a good job, and the English haven't so they are going to look to somebody else.

MR. GLASSER: They look at the strongest army in Europe, and the army that is defeating Germany. It is prestige, of course.

H.W.JR: I never did see your report on inflation. What happened to it?

MR. GLASSER: I still have it on my desk.

H.W.JR: Just around the corner, huh? I have a long memory.

MR. BERNS: He didn't take advantage of the last six weeks to write it quietly.

MR. BELL: He will testify that he has had plenty to do in the last six weeks.

H.W.JR: I didn't say he was leaving.

I have just this one more thing: I think we ought to show the President two things, ask him to appoint this committee and give him a little over-all policy saying we do want to do something, and he will say, "This is the right place to put it, because they have a constructive program." He won't say, "Kogentau just wants another job." He will say, "The Treasury is thinking clearly; I can trust them."

Now, are you going to the War Department?

MR. BELL: No.

H.W.JR: I need you.

Thank you all.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM

1. The appropriate United States and French authorities will continue negotiations immediately on the basis of this memorandum with a view to concluding as soon as possible, in accordance with the general principles governing lend-lease aid, a lend-lease and reciprocal aid agreement applicable to continental France, which, when and as concluded, shall be deemed to have been in effect on and after June 6, 1944.

2. (a) The agreement contemplated in Article 1 above will determine the aid which the United States will furnish to France and, in particular, to the French armed forces (including the French forces of the interior) under the provisions of the Land-Lease Act, including credit arrangements under Section 3(c) of that Act.

(b) The contemplated agreement will also determine the aid which the French authorities will furnish to the United States and, in particular, to the United States forces in continental France in the way of supplies, materials, facilities, and services.

(c) The contemplated agreement will provide that, while each party retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, as far as possible, be made in common, in pursuance of the common plans for winning the war.

3. The contemplated agreement will also be based on the following principles:

(a) The United States will make payment in dollars to the French authorities for the equivalent of the amount of French francs used for the expenditures of the United States forces in continental France for purposes other than those treated as reciprocal aid under 2(b) above; in particular, for the net pay, allowances and other emoluments of the United States troops in continental France and for the cost of any articles requisitioned which are not supplied under 2(b) above.

(b) The French authorities will make payment in dollars for civilian supplies furnished to continental France by the United States other than those furnished under the Land-Lease Act pursuant to 2(a) above, and will use for this purpose French public dollar and gold assets including the holdings of the Bank of France.

SECRET

4. Pending the conclusion of and without prejudice to these negotiations:

(a) The United States will make current payment in dollars to the French authorities for the net amount of French franc currency used for the pay, allowances, or other emoluments of the United States troops in France, on or since June 6, 1944. Whenever it is mutually ascertained that supplies purchased with francs or requisitioned shall not be supplied under 2(b) above or will not be repaid in kind, payment in dollars will be made.

(b) The French authorities will make current payment in dollars to the United States for supplies furnished to continental France on or since June 6, 1944, by the United States under the agreed procedure under Plan A and Plan B. If the amount of dollars acquired by the French authorities on account of troop pay or from other sources is inadequate to make current payment for such supplies, the French authorities will use for this purpose other French public dollar and gold assets including the holdings of the Bank of France.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
20th June, 1945.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 5th June about Article VIII of the Final Act of the Fund.

I agree that the question of inconsistency between Section 2(a) and Section 4(b) of Article VIII will not arise immediately, and may, indeed, in practice have little effect.

But I must confess that I do not see the meaning quite so clearly as your letter suggests. It rather depends on the interpretation given to the words in Section 2 "no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions".

We have assumed that these words forbid a member to impose legal restrictions which would prevent a holder of its currency from spending it to pay for goods or to buy any foreign currency, provided that the price of the foreign currency is within the permitted range; and that the currency offered in exchange represents the proceeds of current trade. Section 2(a) does not, in our view, put the central monetary authority of any member under an obligation to buy its own currency or to sell foreign currency arising out of a current transaction which may be offered to it, or to provide in return for its own currency any foreign currency which a trader may desire to cover a current transaction. In our view, the obligation of the United States Monetary Authority, for example, to provide foreign

The Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
foreign currency arises solely out of Section 4.

You may rely on me not to raise the matter unnecessarily, but if it is necessary to allay doubts, I may have to tell Parliament that if at some future time the question were to arise on an actual issue, we should ask the governing body for an interpretation to the effect that the only obligation of a member's monetary authority to provide foreign currency is that which arises out of Article VIII, Section 4; convertibility of foreign-held balances.

I am glad that as a result of our correspondence we have this point narrowed down to dimensions which need not in practice give us difficulty.
TO Secretary Morgenthau

FROM Charles S. Bell

The President signed the "Federal Employees Pay Act of 1946" at Kansas City today, June 30th.

Some of the major features of this Act are as follows:

1. It provides a basic increase in salaries of all classified personnel in the Federal service of 20 per cent on the first $1,250, 10 per cent on all in excess of $1,250 but not exceeding $4,000, and 5 per cent on all over $4,000.

2. The Act provides for a basic workweek of 40 hours. Practically all Departments will work 8 hours a day from Monday through Friday, which will constitute the basic administrative workweek. Any time in excess of 40 hours will be regarded as overtime, therefore, Saturday will be the "overtime" day.

A survey was made by the Bureau of the Budget and it was found that most of the Departments are in favor of reducing the workweek from 48 hours to 44 hours a week. If the President directs this change, 4 hours of overtime would be performed on Saturdays.

War, Navy, Veterans Administration, and Treasury have indicated opposition to any reduction in the 48-hour workweek and may be permitted to continue on the 48-hour basis.

3. The Act provides for the payment of overtime at the rate of time and one-half for employees receiving up to $2,999. The maximum amount of overtime is 864 for a base salary of $2,999. Employees receiving more than $2,999 and less than $6,440 will be subject to a tapering schedule of overtime rates. Employees whose salaries are $6,440 or more will receive $828.

Total overtime to be paid in the Federal Service will be approximately $837,800,000 per annum.
A night differential of 10 per cent is established under the new Act for employees assigned to regular night shifts, such as telephone operators, guards, etc. This provision will not affect the 15 per cent night differential now being paid to Engraving and Printing employees.

Under the new Act, the existing within-grade salary advancement plan is modified. Employees in the lower grades will be automatically promoted every 12 months instead of every 18 months and higher grade employees will be promoted every 18 months instead of every 20 months.

This Act provides a more liberal policy of salary increases as rewards for "superior accomplishment." The old law provided for such advances only in cases of "especially meritorious" service.

The Act requires all Federal agencies to change their paydays to a bi-weekly basis prior to October 1, 1945. Each pay period will cover 2 administrative workweeks.

Treasury employees, except those in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, will receive their first pay under the new Act on Wednesday, July 25, 1945, covering the period July 1st to 14th. The next payday will be on Wednesday, August 8th and will cover the period July 15th to 28th. Thereafter, paydays in the Treasury Department will occur on alternate Wednesdays.

The following telephone conversations are to be inserted:

The Secretary with:
Mr. Wagner Page 4
Mr. McClintic Page 6
Mr. Luxford Page 16
July 2, 1946
4:30 p.m.

BRENTWOOD WOODS
LEND-LEASE TO INDIA AND BRITAIN
PERSONNEL TO GERMANY
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES AND INFLATION
ARGENTINA

Present: Mr. White
        Mr. O'Connell
        Mr. Cox
        Mrs. McHugh
        Miss Joan Morgenthaler

H.M.JR: This is what I want to say: I have gotten just a little insistent over at the White House as to why they didn't let me know what was going on. You had better read some of this stuff.

MR. O'CONNELL: I read the last conversation with Wagner.

H.M.JR: This is the last one. I called this fellow Matt Connelly and said, "Why didn't you let me know what was going on? I asked you." I thought I might as well get a little insistent. There is too much at stake.

He called me back at 4:01 and said, "I finally got the information for you."

(Reading telephone conversation with Mr. Connelly at 4:01)

"H.M.: Yes."

"CONNELLY: The Big Four were in today."

"H.M.: Yes."

"CONNELLY: And they told him that they were going to work on it and it would be--"

"H.M.JR: I don't hear you very well.

"CONNELLY: The Big Four told the President they would go to work on it.

"H.M.: Yes."

Get this:

"CONNELLY: And it would be passed before the charter was ratified."

Come on over and shake hands.

MR. WHITE: Yes. (Shakes hands with the Secretary.)

MR. WHITE: Whether it was the 9th or 10th—they didn't expect to ratify it.

H.M.JR: But I don't know where the President stood. That was what was bothering me. They sold the bill of goods out at San Francisco.

MR. O'CONNELL: I heard that Connelly and Vandenberg--

MR. WHITE: --got together.

H.M.JR: "And it would be passed before the charter was ratified."

MR. O'CONNELL: That is all right.

H.M.JR: I was afraid that you--

MR. O'CONNELL: Our weakness has been that we haven't had anyone in Wagner's position to prevent Connelly or Vandenberg and these fellows from giving us the run around for months.

MR. WHITE: They are meeting this afternoon.

H.M.JR: Don't you think it would be good to tell Wagner that?

MR. O'CONNELL: Wagner knew of that, too, because--
H.W. JR: No, he didn't.

MR. O'CONNELL: That was the impression I got.

MR. WHITE: I think the more you tell Wagner, the better.

MR. O'CONNELL: I thought he said he was at lunch.

H.W. JR: He said to the President he was for Bratton Woods. Well, you can be for Bratton Woods, and--

MR. WHITE: Was he at this meeting you are going to describe to him?

H.W. JR: No, he was not.

MR. WHITE: He is not one of the Big Four. Who are they?


MR. WHITE: Oh, I see. This afternoon they asked Taft to give them his amendments.

He said he wouldn't be ready for them.

They said, "Give us some idea of what you have in mind so we will be able to think it over and not vote on it." That is what they were doing this afternoon, and they said that they wouldn't have anybody in.

MR. WHITE: So they weren't going to vote on it today; presumably they are going to vote on it tomorrow. They were just going to listen to Taft today, but apparently they are doing more than listening or it wouldn't take two hours. Gee wiz, Tobey is a most effective driver there. He is really a tower of strength.

H.W. JR: Did you tell Wagner about his son?

MR. WHITE: Oh, yes.
MR. WHITE: That's a good way to state it, because that is a little ambiguous, and it might mean he wants it to go up sooner. That is what I would gather.

H.M. JR.: And it would be passed before the charter was ratified.

MR. WHITE: There you say it would be passed, and you told Wagner that he wants it passed. All right, it is O.K.

H.M. JR.: You always have to paraphrase them.

Who are you to complain?

MISS MORGENTHAU: Anyway, your way sounds better.

MR. WHITE: Who am I to cast a stone?

Is it your thought, Mr. Secretary, that we ought to sort of start the machine going again of getting more radio commentators and writers now? I think we need all the public assistance we can get. Felts isn't in today, but I thought we would get to him and initiate another program.

MR. O'CONNELL: You don't need me.

H.M. JR.: No, I will see you.

MR. O'CONNELL: I was going to say that when we get the thing all together it would be a couple days— it would be a couple days, it would seem to me. I can talk to John about it, too, if you want, and if not, we can handle it. We would have to sit down and talk to the Senate Committee, at least the top Senator, George, and be sure that having come to the conclusion we can do this, you will be willing to do it on your own only if they have no objection.

H.M. JR.: I would like to go with you.

MR. O'CONNELL: We are not quite ready for that. John agrees we ought to have time to get a well-considered document ready for signature. At the same time we have to clear up this twenty-five hundred dollar question. We have to clear up the allowance for State Legislators, which is more mixed up. If you give us a few days, we will be ready.

H.M. JR.: I will give you the 4th of July off.

MR. O'CONNELL: Thanks.

H.M. JR.: How was it in New York?

MR. O'CONNELL: Very hot.

H.M. JR.: Thank you, Joe.

(Mr. O'Connell leaves the conference.)

(Secretary holds telephone conversation with Mr. McCloy, as follows:)

-6-
(Mr. Coo enters the conference.)

MR. WHITE: Incidentally, Sproul's brother is already with Pauley. It's nauseating.

H.M.JR.: Do you know Hank Knight?

MR. WHITE: No, but I know Bernstein. I know the guys he is suggesting. It is a very good crak about the breadth of Bernie. It fits, anyway you want it to. He has no intentions of taking a good man—he has every intention of bringing the same crew back.

H.M.JR.: I said it would be nice to have somebody to carry out IPOCO I who would head the financial section over there.

MR. COE: They still aren't satisfied.

MR. WHITE: He claims he checked with a lot of people and Bernie is a very able man but doesn't have the breadth. How about Allan Sproul?

MR. COE: Oh—someone like Major General Eckols, who they have in charge of the German education system.

MR. WHITE: He doesn't know enough to put on his shoes.

H.M.JR.: Is that what he is doing?

MR. COE: He is head of the Interior, which includes education and culture. I understand they haven't got an educator in there in the group. I wouldn't say how he didn't have one.

H.M.JR.: Come on now, you asked for it.

MR. COE: May we give India under Lease-Lease forty-one million ounces of silver?

H.M.JR.: What was the agreement we worked out, two hundred million ounces?

MR. WHITE: They have asked for two hundred and eight million.

H.M.JR.: How much did we agree to?

MR. WHITE: I thought forty.

MR. COE: We never did on that, two hundred and eight, which is the request.

MR. WHITE: I mean what you agreed to as far as Murdock is concerned.

H.M.JR.: Who?

MR. WHITE: Senator Murdock.

H.M.JR.: No, there was an agreement that goes back a year.

MR. WHITE: That gave them one hundred million ounces. They have already gotten that, and they have used it all up practically. The total of how much we have given them is there, one hundred and thirty or forty—what is it? This is another two hundred eight million ounces. They have asked for two hundred for the next sixteen months. We propose to give them forty-one for three months.

H.M.JR.: Mr. Coo said he had just a couple little things, a couple hundred million ounces of silver, and ten million to China, and five million France—

MR. COE: Five and one-half million.

H.M.JR.: ...for the soldiers in France. Now, how many ounces are there? I just want you to see what they do to me.

MISS MORGENTHAU: O.K.

H.M.JR.: We will put up a big sign, "Unfair to Morgenthau." (Laughter)
MR. COE: We have made a calculation of the needs to carry them through the end of September, which is around forty-one million. They had asked for forty-eight million, but we are separating out seven million to be handled by the other Indian States. Somehow the State Department is splitting India up and has asked us to make this difference between certain non-Indian States in India. This is in pursuance of the general policy of reviewing every three months which we are still on, rather than granting them the request over.

H.M.JR: Where do you stand, White?

MR. COE: He has initiated it.

MR. WHITE: I am for forty-one million ounces.

H.M.JR: Do you think they need it? How is inflation there?

MR. COE: Nothing like China. On the other hand, we have stopped selling gold out there, and there is a little relation.

H.M.JR: This will take them through September?

MR. COE: Yes.

H.M.JR: Do I sign something?

MR. COE: If you would initial it--

H.M.JR: This is the same basis as the other, ounce for ounce we get it back?

MR. COE: Yes, sir.

(Secretary initials "Memorandum to Secretary Morgenthau," dated June 23, 1946, attachment A.)

MR. COE: There will be some formal documents?

MR. WHITE: They are getting it without interest, of course, for a five-year period.

MR. COE: We will send you the formal documents later.

H.M.JR: I may keep this? Yes, it is addressed to me.

MR. COE: Yes.

H.M.JR: All right.

MR. COE: Two, you remember you talked to Braden about Argentina.

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. COE: Braden has finally come through with a telegram which is asking for--a request asking for help, but in this form: He talks about wanting all control in the Embassy down there about what is blocked and unblocked in the way of banks; and if either State or Treasury up here are approached on any such propositions we should tell them that that is being handled down at the Embassy. He said he would welcome a Treasury expert being attached to this Embassy, and under his entire control to assist the Embassy personnel in the examination of bank records and preparation of the report thereon. We have prepared for your reply thereto a very brief statement which we think is appropriate. (Hands Secretary letter addressed to Mr. Grew.)

H.M.JR: Wouldn't this go now to the Secretary of State?

MR. COE: I am sorry, it was prepared before he was appointed. Is he it now?

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. COE: Or is he still Acting Secretary? Was Byrnes confirmed today?

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. COE: I will have to have it redone.

(Mrs. McHugh enters the conference, and Secretary hands her letter addressed to Mr. Grew to be retyped.)
H.W.Jr: He was confirmed.

Mr. Cohn: We signed that dated this morning.

H.W.Jr: That is all right.

Mr. White: Now do it over again.

We are going to have difficulty finding a good man to go down there. There isn't any available.

Mr. White: That business about Bernie burns me up. They couldn't get a more competent man. The next thing they will ask is, how is Jake Crane? They went through the same routine.

H.W.Jr: The trouble is, Harry--I will be magnanimous in the presence of my daughters--we have not offered them a very good man, and I say--

Mr. White: We have offered them better men than what they have, just presidents of banks. The title seems to be enough to overwhelm them.

H.W.Jr: We haven't offered them a good man. You notice he didn't say he asked about Brown. I didn't say anything because Broman--

Mr. White: Brown is not my idea of a man they need for that kind of a job.

H.W.Jr: We will talk about it tomorrow. Brown would be all right. He is lots better--

Mr. White: Oh, yes, he would be better than Sproul.

H.W.Jr: But think about somebody else.

Mr. White: He wouldn't take anybody that looked good to us. The only thing is whether they satisfy their qualifications. What do we care whether they get a good man or a poor man?

---

H.W.Jr: What else have you got?

Mr. Cohn: Some substantial period ago Secretary Stimson wrote you a letter on this same thing we were discussing a little earlier, troop pay and exchange rates. It seems to have been written oblivious to the day-to-day operations we have with the War Department in the whole history of this matter. Therefore, we thought it was written for the record. He said that among other things the War Department believed that the purchasing power of our soldiers should be the same in every country. They thought it wasn't, and they thought a subsidiary arrangement hadn't been made to carry this out. We prepared a reply, also somewhat for the record. (Hand Secretary letter addressed to the Secretary of War, dated June 29, 1945, attachment B.)

H.W.Jr: This is what you sent? Does he suggest doing this before seeing the Congressional leaders?

Mr. Cohn: I am sorry.

H.W.Jr: "...differences be discussed"--"...that these differences be discussed and a common point of view reached before discussing with Congressional leaders." Discussing what?

Mr. Cohn: Any discussions on Congress. He suggests we may have to go up and get additional legislation.

H.W.Jr: If you don't mind me saying so, I don't think this is good English, "...a common point of view reached before discussing with Congressional leaders." Discussing what?

Mr. Cohn: Before discussing the question of any--

H.W.Jr: But it doesn't state what. It says, "...before discussing with Congressional leaders."

Mr. White: Before a discussion of the matter takes place.

H.W.Jr: There is something wrong there.
MR. WHITE: Dan Bell doesn't like that.

MR. COE: He just initialed it.

H.M.JR.: Look, there is something the matter with that phrasing, "...that these differences be discussed and a common point of view reached before discussing with Congressional leaders."

MR. WHITE: Say, "...before discussion taken place."

H.M.JR.: There is something wrong.

MR. COE: It struck me all right.

H.M.JR.: Read it again yourself, just read that sentence.

MR. WHITE: He assumes that the discussion refers to the whole letter above.

H.M.JR.: Let me just put in an it.

MR. WHITE: Maybe that would not be right.

H.M.JR.: Would that be right, "...discussing it"?

MR. WHITE: "...before discussing the matter."

MR. COE: "...before discussing the matter," would be perfect.

(Secretary signs letter.)

MR. WHITE: Secretary Stimson's letter is an unreasonable one.

MR. COE: I told him I thought it was for the record and he didn't want to have any controversy, so I said I thought we had to answer it.

MR. WHITE: Stimson's letter is a very controversial letter.

(Secretary signs letter to Mr. Stimson.)

(Mrs. McHugh enters conference and hands Secretary letter addressed to Secretary Byrnes, attachment C, which is the Secretary signs.)

H.M.JR.: You might as well sit down. This fellow says he has a couple of things, and he is throwing everything at me, including apples.

MR. COE: I have one more.

H.M.JR.: How many more have you got?

MR. COE: One simple little thing, the matter of praising two men who did a very good job on that Executive Order.

H.M.JR.: What Executive Order?

MR. COE: The Executive Order transferring the property over to Allen Property Custodian. Will you just initial that? (Hands Secretary "Office Memorandum" addressed to Messrs. I. H. Aik and E. Arnold, attachment D, which is the Secretary signs.)

MR. WHITE: And Kamarek—we just got a report that he is doing splendid work, and Ness—we got a report from one of the Senators or Congressmen that he is doing very splendid work.

(Secretary dictates letter to Mrs. McHugh.)

H.M.JR.: I want to get it.

MR. WHITE: Contact Mr. Irving Friedman. (To Mrs. McHugh.)

(Mrs. McHugh leaves the conference.)

H.M.JR.: Now you have one more thing.

MR. COE: The last thing is financing imports into Germany.

H.M.JR.: Will you be interested in that?
I didn't have a chance to tell you fellows, but Mr. Lewis Douglas asked me—was told to ask me at lunch how I felt about using captured German gold to pay for American wheat or pay for imported wheat into Germany, and I told him I was unalterably opposed.

MR. WHITE: Good. I am very glad you did. I don't know how the other fellows feel. We discussed that earlier and we objected to the use of that gold. It is something they have been planning for a long time, and we were opposed.

H.M.JR: I said, "This is something that should be more fully considered. We don't know whose property it is."

Douglas said, "That is the way I feel. There has been a discussion, and I am happy that is the way you feel."

MR. COE: Lew Douglas said that?

H.M.JR: Yes. Does that take care of that?

MR. COE: No, sir.

H.M.JR: K.O.

MR. COE: The British want to continue combined financing into the three zones of Germany. The American agencies have so far been united in opposing it. This coal question which you and Monnet discussed may put the thing to a test, because supplies have to go in the British zone. They may have to come from us, and the British won't want to pay for them. We have so far stuck to it and we had the other agencies with us on the proposition that as soon as may be, which I indicate may be very soon, in our view all financing into the zones in Germany of any imported supplies be by the nation occupying the zone. This doesn't prejudice any arrangements that any one of those nations wants to make with another.

H.M.JR: Look, old man, this is important. I have been shooting, and I hope I have hit the bull's-eye, but let me tell you something. I am not going to do this at five o'clock. Let me just finish. If we are going to just pay for the stuff in our zone, we are going to completely lose control. Now, directly or indirectly, we are going to finance England and France, anyway, and Russia, and every time I pick up any document, or any time I talk to a fellow like Schmidt or anybody comes in contact with England anywhere in Europe in the office here, it makes me very angry. I think that with the new Secretary of State and the President we ought to lay the cards on the table and say, "How long are we going to be partners with England and let England continue doing business with the Nazis and Fascists?" I am up to here. We don't give England the money directly to pay for the imports for Germany, but money directly to pay for the imports for Germany, but for us simply to say we will pay for the imports in our zone, England pays for hers, and Russia hers—let England go ahead and continue to cooperate with these Nazis. I am opposed to it. If something doesn't happen around here pretty soon, I am going to get very anti-British Government. Take a leaf from Mr. Roosevelt. I am not for the British people, but I think the time has come—and for the British people, but I think the time has come—and I can't do it in five minutes, and I can't do it at five o'clock—that we have got to sit down and lay this thing out as to how much longer by indirectness we are going to finance the English to do the kind of thing they are doing in Italy and in Germany. I am just fed up.

(Washington enters the conference temporarily.)

H.M.JR: Sit down.

(Secretary holds a telephone conversation with Mr. Luxford, as follows.)
H.M.JR: You have got to give me time on this thing. I tell you boys now I have thrown at you the whole review of the Argentinian situation. Didn't I? I threw it at you. I don't know about Stimson's letter. I threw it at you the question that what have we been doing in each could be true for the American soldier, see? But I have gotten to the point where my blood is beginning to boil on the British thing.

MR. WHITE: Yes, wait until after the election.

H.M.JR: It is most irritating to Harry White.

MR. WHITE: Let's wait until after the election. I suppose he will be re-elected, but there is a bare chance--there are seven or eight million unknown votes there. If it should happen there is a difference, I think they will want to re-examine the whole situation, and maybe they will want to have a conference or something with him. But I think if he goes back into office you might have an assignment to re-examine all the ways in which we are helping Britain and what we are not getting from them. Do it in the Treasury first before you--

H.M.JR: That is right, and lay it on the table. We can't do it for President Truman before he leaves, we haven't the time, but--

MR. WHITE: It may be just as well.

MR. COE: Mr. Secretary, you won't object, will you, if we continue participating with these other departments? The position is being crystallized there.

H.M.JR: What is that?

MR. COE: The one we are taking on the general method of financing imports is being crystallized there on a zone basis, but with an interim combined basis, a certain period--two or three months--of combination you have, and we can't very well pull out.

H.M.JR: On the interim basis, Russia, England, and ourselves will join?

MR. COE: On the interim basis, Britain, Canada, and ourselves will continue to let the supplies which were on a military basis go into Germany.

H.M.JR: On the military basis.

MR. COE: Where we had a military plan as a basis.

H.M.JR: Where you had a military formula, the stuff will go that way?

MR. COE: That is right.

H.M.JR: The stuff will go in for civilians on the military formula.

MR. COE: In November after that clearance of pipeline it will go out--new things that come up between now and then.

H.M.JR: That is what I am for, but before we change the basis that we are just going to pay for our own stuff and England pay for its own--that is what I want to re-examine. Is that right, Harry, for reasons quite different?

MR. WHITE: Yes, you have raised a different point, and I don't know whether before you make a decision you want to go into the whole situation. It is a question as to who is going to pay for the material to mine coal, the coal that goes back to France.

H.M.JR: This is difficult. It is new. I have got to have a fresh mind. When I am tired I will not make decisions, but I will give you a chance. You can start in at ten o'clock tomorrow morning.

What did he say about when they were going to vote?

MR. WHITE: I thought he said tomorrow.

H.M.JR: What did he say?

MR. COE: Ten-thirty, I thought.
H.M.JR: I thought he said tomorrow afternoon.

MR. WHITE: I only heard him say tomorrow.

H.M.JR: Well, I can start at nine-thirty tomorrow morning on the French. Can you be here?

MR. WHITE: If you are going to start on this thing, I think we need a little more time to present the material in the form you want.

H.M.JR: Tomorrow afternoon.

MR. WHITE: That will give him a little more time.

H.M.JR: Three o'clock? Some of this stuff is not coming in. That is what I whispered to him. I don't want to criticize him in front of his own men.

MR. COS: Remember, German imports of French coal is just a specific case. If you want to help get coal to France--by the way, Judge Vinson is considering it now, using American coal. If you have got the energy--

MR. WHITE: Aside from that, Mr. Secretary, I was much impressed this morning with that suggestion of yours about employment.

H.M.JR: Sir?

MR. WHITE: I forgot that joke about the French.

H.M.JR: That is my joke. When Harry White is impressed, by golly, that is something.

MR. WHITE: Well, I was wondering if you couldn't make a bigger thing of it with George and let him get some labor man here, somebody from the AF of L or the CIO and set that up as a big thing right within the Treasury and not outside at all to follow it from week to week. And I think that the idea you have about keeping the President informed possibly of what the situation is in very important, particularly in the next six months or year, and I don't think anybody is doing it in that form. And unless it is made even more important than you made it this morning, I think that you might not get it.

H.M.JR: I am very serious about it, and when I am serious about anything, I get it by hook or crook.

MR. WHITE: He needs more help in his shop to get it because it is not an easy job, and there are a lot of sources, and the important thing is to be current, because after a month or two he gets it from anywhere, and it loses a great deal of importance.

H.M.JR: Now, sir, would you read that informally? That is the kind of thing before Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer of the British Empire, would do, he normally would consult me. I think it is a very stupid way.

MR. COS: I saw the thing.

H.M.JR: Tomorrow morning, O.K.

MR. COS: Thank you very much.
Secretary Morgenthau (For action)

Mr. Geo

Subject: India's request for the land-leasing of 250 million ounces of silver.

1. The Treasury has been requested by the Government of India to land-leasing 250 million ounces of silver for coinage and open market sales for price stabilization purposes for the six-month period of March 1, 1945, to June 30, 1945. This request for 250 million ounces is in addition to the 115 million ounces already land-leasing to India.

2. It is felt that the Treasury should not attempt to assess India's need for silver for the entire six-month period in view of the dynamic and rapidly changing conditions in India. Instead, it is thought that we should review India's silver requirements every three months with a view to making periodic recommendations covering the ensuing three-month period. We have discussed this procedure with representatives of the Government of India and they have indicated no objection to it.

3. As indicated in the attached table, the Government of India, as of June 30, 1945, will have a little less than enough silver to meet its needs during the following three-month period, July through September, 1945. Unless India is given immediate assurance that at least three months' supplies will be forthcoming through land-leasing during the next few months, she will have to curtail sharply her use of silver or face the prospect of complete depletion of her silver stocks.

4. It is therefore suggested that the Treasury recommend the immediate land-leasing of 11 million ounces of silver to India, an amount equivalent to about 11 months' requirements.

5. If these 11 million ounces of silver are land-leasing, it will bring the total of silver land-leasing to India up to 267 million ounces. We will still have outstanding for future determination the remainder of India's 250 million ounce request, i.e., about 167 million ounces.

6/26 - Copy to Geo.

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<th>Government of India Silver Position</th>
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<td>Stock on hand June 30, 1945</td>
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<td>Coinage</td>
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<td>Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stock on hand Sept 30, 1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coinage</td>
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<td>Sales</td>
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</tbody>
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(million ounces)

Net balance on hand, March 1, 1945: 267.0
Land-leasing silver received in March: 20.0
Land-leasing silver received in June: 15.0

Silver Consumption March 1 - June 30, 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coinage</th>
<th>Sales</th>
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<th>Lead-lease silver received in June</th>
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<tr>
<td>15.0</td>
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</table>

| Stock on hand June 30, 1945       |
| Coinage                           |
| Sales                             |

| 267.0                            |

| Stock on hand Sept 30, 1945       |
| Coinage                           |
| Sales                             |

| 167.0                            |

<p>| Needs for three months period June 30 to September 10, 1945 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coinage</th>
<th>Sales for stabilization purposes</th>
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</table>

| 267.0 |

| 167.0 |

R/0s 6/26/45
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of June 16 in which you discuss foreign exchange rates and price inflation abroad as they affect the purchasing power of military personnel and procurement of supplies for the military in foreign countries.

Your letter would make it appear that this Government has to date not given adequate consideration to the welfare of United States troops in foreign countries. It is my understanding that Treasury, State and War Departments have been discussing these problems from day to day during the past few years and that each of the Departments is intimately acquainted with the views of each other, but that decisions on these matters have been agreed to and in most cases formulated by the three Departments together. Moreover, as you know, I have personally participated in the important decisions concerning the establishment of exchange rates and I have consistently urged the establishment of rates which would be more favorable to our troops than the rates finally adopted.

Therefore, I would like to ask if your letter of June 16 represents views which had not previously been made known to this Department. If so, I would appreciate receiving specific details as to the countries you had in mind, the particular problems the military is meeting in these countries, and any suggestions you may have for further action. It is my feeling that if there is any difference in viewpoint at this time between the three Departments that these differences be discussed and a common point of view reached before discussing with Congressional leaders.

Sincerely,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of War.

[Signature]

Date: 4/20/43
July 2, 1945

Dear Mr. Byrnes:

It would be appreciated if you would send the following cable from me to Ambassador Braden in Argentina:

"The State Department has transmitted to me your cable No. 1215 of June 11, 1945, containing your program for dealing with the Argentine bank situation. The Treasury is prepared to send two investigators to assist you whenever you so request."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ H. Morgenthau, Jr.

The Honorable James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

To: Messrs. I. G. Alk and E. Arnold
From: Secretary Morgenthau

Date: 25 June 1945

Subject:

I want you to know that I appreciate your fine work in connection with the recent agreement with the Alien Property Custodian concerning the disposition of German and Japanese assets.

OA 10/45
July 8, 1945

My dear Mr. President:

When Franklin D. Roosevelt came to Washington, he asked me to come with him, stating that when he was through we would go back to Dutchess County together. For 16 of the most eventful years in American history, I was associated with him, actively participating in meeting the important problems confronting the country both before and during the war.

Immediately after President Roosevelt's death, I told you how I felt, and stated that I wanted you to know that your hands were untied as far as I was concerned. You were good enough to say that you needed my help and urged me to remain.

Since then, with your support, I have completed many of the most urgent tasks that were then pending. As I told you this morning, I feel the time has now come when I can appropriately be released from my responsibilities. Accordingly, I now tender my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury. My preference was to have this resignation effective immediately, but since you stated this morning that you wish me to remain until you return from Europe I will, of course, comply with your wishes.

Permit me to express my appreciation of the fine support you have given me since you became President.

I most fervently hope for the great success of your administration in solving the difficult problems which lie ahead.

If you wish to consult me at any time, I shall always be at your service. Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1945

Dear Henry:

I am indeed sorry to learn that you have come in the conclusion that the time has arrived to be relieved from your responsibilities as Secretary of the Treasury. I am grateful, however, that you are willing to remain until I return from Europe so as to carry on the essential work of the Treasury during my absence.

There has been a very long and efficient service to our country - both in peace and in war, and your departure from the Treasury will be a distinct loss.

Your service to the nation began in 1933 in the days when you supervised the merger of the Farm Credit agencies into the Farm Credit Administration which has done so much to help the farmers of the nation.

Since you have been in the Treasury you have participated in formulating and administering a federal tax program which has raised unprecedented tax revenues with a minimum of disturbance to our economy. These tax laws have been an impartial and efficient administration under your supervision.

Under your supervision the Treasury has raised over two hundred billion dollars with which to finance our defense and war activities. Noting this many one in itself a great achievement; but, in addition, it was accomplished by a substantial reduction of the average rate of interest on the public debt.

You have been a steady champion of international monetary stabilization ever since the early days of your administration as Secretary of the Treasury. Through many years of activity and accomplishment in this field, your efforts are now bearing fruit; today's legislation now pending before the Congress of the United States. In this, and in other ways, you have helped bring about the close fiscal cooperation which this government has had with its Allies during this war. Besides, in the days before the lend-lease statute was enacted, many measures of cooperation with our Allies were formulated in your office.

I am sure that you must feel a great sense of accomplishment in this outstanding record of service to our country. On behalf of our people I extend to you the thanks of the nation.

I am appreciative of your offer of service in the future, and I am sure that there will be many occasions on which I shall seek your counsel.

With kindest personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

H.R. (Harry) Truman

Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C.
No.1577167.

Government of India
Finance Department

Simla.
The 5th July 1945.

To

The Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir,

As the Minister for Finance, the Honorable Sir Archibald Sinclair, is away at present in the United Kingdom, I write to acknowledge the receipt of your letter addressed to him, dated the 15th June, 1944, enclosing copies of the hearings before the Finance Committee on banking and currency and the report from the Committee to the House of Representatives recommending the adoption by the United States of the Atonen Ideas Proposal, and thank you for the courtesy in sending these.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

(Keith C. Roy), M.B., I.C.
Private Secretary to the Hon'ble
the Finance Member.
SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington.

4156, Tenth
FOR SECRETARY INCENTIVE

The opening of the exposition for the French war and reconstruction bond drive which I attended yesterday was most impressive. Adams, Shelton and Watson are to be congratulated for doing a splendid job.

CAPTAIN

IND
TO:  Dear Secretary Morgenthau

I certainly appreciate your nice note.

I, too, hope that we will get an opportunity to see more of each other than we have in the past few years.

July 11, 1945   ESC

Oscar Cox
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE 7/11/48

TO Secretary Morgenthau
FROM E. B. Fussell

CONVERSATION WITH FRED SMITH

I told Smith you had asked me to find out where he stood on his book or article, because the situation had obviously changed since your resignation and you might want to do some writing yourself. I told him no decision had been made on that point, but of course you would want to know how far he had gone, whether there were any commitments between him and publishers, etc.

Smith said there were no commitments, that he had been talking to two or three publishers, with an idea of getting as much leeway as possible, that he had anticipated, with your resignation, the situation might be changed. He said specifically:

"I am not in any place where he is not at liberty to make up his mind anyway he wants to. I sort of anticipated when I heard he had resigned that he might want to do something about it himself. That would be more effective from one standpoint, if he were at all interested in doing that it would be very easy to close that one quick (with the publishers). I would not object to it. I would just call mine off because I haven't any investment in it to speak of."

The connection was very poor and I told Fred I would call him tomorrow (today) after speaking with you, unless you talked to him directly.

If you are not going to talk to him directly, I would appreciate having some message, of thanks or otherwise, to give him today.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Gen., 12th Army Group
APO 635, U. S. Army

Germany, 13 July, 1945.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Your kind note of thanks for my 7th War Loan Drive statement was forwarded me here from Washington. It was a pleasure to be of some small assistance to you in the great effort you have devoted to this war.

Like your many friends, I am sorry to learn of your resignation even while remembering how deserving you are of a rest. The fact that we have not wanted for the tools your funds have provided is evidence enough of your service to the Nation.

Sincerely,

D. D. Bradley
General, U. S. Army

The Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.
July 13, 1945

My dear Mr. President:

When I wrote to you on July 6th, submitting my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury, I agreed, at your request, to remain in office until your return from Europe.

I have been giving further thought to this matter, and now take the liberty of suggesting that you may wish to reconsider this arrangement. Since you have now made your decision as to my successor, it seems to me that the delay we contemplated is no longer necessary but, on the contrary, may prove a handicap to Judge Vinson for whom I have the highest admiration. It is my earnest desire to be of every assistance to him in taking over the great responsibilities of this office.

Such matters as the continuation of war financing, the tax enforcement drive, revenue legislation, and many other Treasury problems call for prompt decisions. My successor should be given the opportunity to make these decisions, since it will become his duty to carry them out.

These considerations are given added weight by the possibility of a recess of the Senate, which would delay Judge Vinson's confirmation.

Accordingly, I urge that you appoint my successor at your earliest convenience, and make my resignation effective upon his appointment and qualification.

Sincerely yours,

Morgan H. Morganhan, Jr.

The President,

The White House.
Dear Henry:

I have given careful consideration to your letter of July urging that I send to the Senate immediately the nomination of Judge Vinson as Secretary of the Treasury.

I am inclined to agree with you that for the reasons you mention it would be preferable to take this action now instead of waiting for my return from Europe.

I appreciate very much the fine spirit and keen sense of public responsibility in which you have approached this matter.

With personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Dear Henry:

I have given careful consideration to your letter of July urging that I send to the Senate immediately the nomination of Judge Vinson as Secretary of the Treasury.

I am inclined to agree with you that for the reasons you mention it would be in the public interest to take this action now instead of waiting for my return from Europe.

I appreciate very much the fine spirit and keen sense of public responsibility in which you have approached this matter.

With personal regards,

Sincerely yours,
Dear Henry:

While I fully appreciate the reasons which prompted you to resign as Secretary of the Treasury, nevertheless I want you to take on a further important assignment for me.

The Bretton Woods legislation will soon be enacted. Your contribution to the formulation of these proposals and the negotiation of the Agreements has been outstanding. I now want you to assume the task of making them work.

With that in mind, I plan, with your consent, to name you as the American Governor of the Fund and Bank on their establishment. I further hope that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will designate you as its President.

In the meantime, much work must be done preparatory to the actual establishment of the Fund and Bank by the end of this year. I am counting on you to participate in these discussions, and to give us the benefit of your close familiarity with these problems.

When I sign the Bretton Woods legislation, I should like to announce to the public that I intend designating you as the American Governor of the Fund and the Bank.

Sincerely yours,
Dear Henry:

While I fully appreciate the reasons prompting you to resign as Secretary of the Treasury, nevertheless I want you to take on a further important assignment for me.

The Bretton Woods legislation will soon be enacted. Your contribution to the formulation of these proposals and the negotiation of the Agreements has been outstanding. I now want you to assume the task of making them work. With that in mind, I plan, with your consent, to name you as the American Governor to the Fund and Bank on their establishment. I further hope that you will be named President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In the meantime, much work must be done preparatory to the actual establishment of the Fund and Bank by the end of this year. I am counting on you to participate in these discussions, and to give us the benefit of your close familiarity of the problems.

When I sign the Bretton Woods Legislation, I propose announcing to the public that I intend designating you as Governor of the Fund and the Bank.

Sincerely yours,

My dear Mr. President:

When I wrote to you on July 5th, submitting my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury, I agreed, at your request, to remain in office until your return from Europe.

I have been giving further thought to this matter, and now take the liberty of suggesting that you may wish to reconsider this arrangement. Since you have now made your decision as to my successor, it seems to me that the delay we contemplated is no longer necessary but, on the contrary, may prove a handicap to Judge Vinson for whom I have the highest admiration. It is my earnest desire to be of every assistance to him in taking over the great responsibilities of this office.

Such matters as the continuation of war financing, the tax enforcement drive, revenue legislation, and many other Treasury problems call for prompt decisions. My successor should be given the opportunity to make these decisions, since it will become his duty to carry them out.

These considerations are given added weight by the possibility of a recess of the Senate, which would delay Judge Vinson's confirmation.
Accordingly, I urge that you appoint my successor at your earliest convenience, and make my resignation effective upon his appointment and qualification.

Sincerely yours,

My dear Mr. President:

When I wrote to you on July 6th, submitting my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury, I agreed, at your request, to remain in office until your return from Europe.

I have been giving further consideration to this arrangement, especially since you have made your decision as to my successor, with the result that I now take the liberty of suggesting that you may wish to reconsider it. It seems to me that the delay we contemplated will not serve the public interest, and in addition I think it unfair to my successor, Judge Vinson, for whom I have the highest admiration. It is my strong desire to be of every assistance to him in taking over the great responsibilities of this office.

Such matters as the continuation of war financing, the tax law enforcement drive, in which we have been engaged and to which you have given your strong support, and many other Treasury problems call for and really should have my successor's immediate attention. I should not be making plans that it will become his duty to carry out, but the plans should be made now.

These considerations are given added weight by the possibility of a recess of the Senate which would delay my successor's confirmation.
My dear Mr. President:

When I wrote to you on July 5th, submitting my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury, I agreed, at your request, to remain in office until your return from Europe.

I have been giving further consideration to this matter, and now take the liberty of suggesting that you may wish to reconsider this arrangement. Since you have now made your decision as to my successor, it seems to me that the delay we contemplated is no longer necessary but, on the contrary, may prove a handicap to Judge Vinson for whom I have the highest admiration. It is my sincere desire to be of every assistance to him in taking over the great responsibilities of this office.

Such matters as the continuation of war financing, the tax law enforcement drive in which we have been engaged and to which you have given your strong support, and many other Treasury problems call for prompt decisions. I should not be making plans that it will become his duty to carry out.

These considerations are given added weight by the possibility of a recess of the Senate, which would delay my successor's confirmation.
Accordingly, I urge that you appoint my successor at your earliest convenience, and make my resignation effective upon his confirmation.

Sincerely yours,
My dear Mr. President:

When I wrote to you on July 5 submitting my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury I agreed at your request to remain in office until your return from Europe.

Since that time you have had time to give more adequate consideration to this same question than was possible when I first suggested it to you in my last letter. It is obvious to me now that it is wholly inequitable to ask the country to continue a tax enforcement drive in which we have engaged and in which you have given such hearty support. With a change in Treasury administration so near, it is becoming difficult to supply the force and momentum to this work that it ought to have.

Other matters, most notably the continuation of war financing, call for and really should have the immediate attention of my successor, as it is obvious that I should not lay plans which he will be called upon to carry out.

These reasons are given added weight by the possibility of a recess of the Senate which would delay my successor's confirmation.

If you agree with me as to the importance of these considerations, I urge that you appoint my successor immediately and permit me to make my resignation effective as soon as he has been confirmed.

Faithfully,
Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Morgenthau:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of Administrative Order No. 9 which covers the establishment of the Central Field Commissioner's Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, which I promised to send you when I wrote you of the appointment of Mr. James E. A. Anderson as the Central Field Commissioner, European Theater of Operations.

It would be deeply appreciated if you would have the appropriate representatives of your office acquainted with the contents of this Administrative Order.

Very sincerely yours,

ThOMAS B. McCANN
Commissioner

Incl.
Adm. Order No. 9

[Stamp: 23 MAY 1945]
OFFICE OF THE
ARMY-Navy LIQUIDATION COMMISSION
NEW GUAM REGIMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

9OGLC
Administrative Order
Number 9

SUBJECT: Establishment of Central Field Commissioner's
Office in European Theater of Operations

1. Under date of 22 May 1945, Notice of Appointment
of Mr. James H. Keohane as Central Field Commissioner in the
European Theater of Operations was issued.

2. On 4 July 1945, the Central Field Commissioner,
STO notified Mr. Thomas B. McCabe, the Army-Navy Liquidation
Commissioner, that he had established his office at A. R. Rose
Arsenal, Nancy, France and had issued notice to the
Theater Commander, and Commander, Army Area, that he was ready
to receive declarations of Army and Navy surplus, and to
dispose of such surpluses under the Surplus Property Act of
1944 and authority delegated to him in the Notice of Appoint-
ment mentioned in paragraph 1 above.

FOR THE COMMISSIONS:

[Signature]

LIEUTENANT W. MILLER
Brig. Gen., USA
Executive Officer
The Chase National Bank
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
New York
July 13, 1945

Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir,

In Mr. Aldrich's absence from the office on a short holiday, I communicated to him by telephone the contents of your letter of July 12th.

Mr. Aldrich has asked me to thank you for your letter and to tell you that he has asked Mr. William H. Evarts of Milbank, Tweed & O'Hare, counsel for the Bank, to call upon Mr. Frank Coo, Director of Monetary Research, as you have suggested. Mr. Coo will hear from Mr. Evarts during this coming week.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary to the Chairman
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF New York

July 13, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. White:

I am enclosing our compilation for the week ended July 3, 1945, analyzing dollar payments and receipts in official British, French, Canadian, and Australian accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Very truly yours,

R. L. Sanford,
Assistant Vice President.

The Honorable Harry D. White,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosures.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

July 15, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Received this date from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the confidential information of the Secretary of the Treasury, compilation for the week ended July 3, 1965, showing dollar disbursements out of the British Empire and French accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the means by which these expenditures were financed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>Other Credits</th>
<th>Total Credits</th>
<th>Advances</th>
<th>Net Advances</th>
<th>Other Advances</th>
<th>Total Advances</th>
<th>Discount</th>
<th>Net Discount</th>
<th>Total Debts</th>
<th>Net Debts</th>
<th>Total Credits</th>
<th>Net Credits</th>
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See attached sheet for footnotes.

Reports and Analysis Division
Includes payments for account of British Ministry of Supply Mission, British Supply Board, Ministry of Supply Timber Control, and Ministry of Shipping.

Estimated figures based on transfers from the New York Agency of the Bank of Montreal, which apparently represent the proceeds of official British sales of American securities, including those effected through direct negotiation. In addition to the official selling, substantial liquidation of securities for private British account occurred, particularly during the early months of the year, although the receipt of the proceeds at this bank cannot be identified with any accuracy. According to data supplied by the British Treasury and released by Secretary Morgenthau, total official and private British liquidation of our securities through December, 1942 amounted to $334 million.

Includes about $205 million received during October, 1939 from the accounts of British authorized banks with New York banks, presumably reflecting the requisitioning of private dollar balances. Other large transfers from such accounts since October, 1939 apparently represent current acquisitions of proceeds of exports from the sterling area and other accuring dollar receipts. See (a) below.

Indicates net change in all dollar holdings payable on demand or maturing in one year.

(a) For breakdown by types of debit and credits see tabulations prior to March 31, 1943.

(b) Adjusted to eliminate the effect of $20 million paid out on June 26, 1942 and returned the following day.

(c) For monthly breakdown see tabulations prior to April 23, 1943; October 2, 1942; October 14, 1942; September 29, 1942; September 6, 1944.

(d) Transactions for account of Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer included for first time in week ended December 6, 1944.

(e) Includes $4.5 million apparently representing current and accumulated dollar proceeds of sterling area services and merchandise exports, and $1.4 million transferred from an account held in this market for the Bank of Ireland, Dublin.
### Reports and Analysis Division

**ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTS**

(In Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Debts</th>
<th>Other Credits (1)</th>
<th>Total Credits</th>
<th>Other Credits (2)</th>
<th>Net Debts</th>
<th>Net Debts (3)</th>
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<td>352.8</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>488.4</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>354.4</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>489.0</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>354.4</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>489.0</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>354.4</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>489.0</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average Weekly Expenditures for**

1. First year of war: 6.5 million.
2. Second year of war: 6.5 million.
3. Third year of war: 6.5 million.
5. Fifth year of war: 6.5 million.
6. Sixth year of war: 6.5 million.

(1) For monthly breakdown see tabulation prior to April 23, 1945; October 9, 1945; October 14, 1946; September 30, 1947; September 6, 1948.
(2) Reflects changes in all dollar holdings payable on demand or maturing in one year.
(3) Includes $5.1 million deposited by War Supplies, Ltd.
(4) Reflects net change on all dollar holdings payable on demand or maturing in one year.

Additional notes:
- $2.7 million transferred from official Netherlands account at this bank.
- $2.7 million transferred from official Netherlands account at this bank.
Judge Rosenman: Henry, I just got this memo now. They must have given it an awful lot of thought. It just came in.

HN Jr: Yes.

R: It says: "I have received your dispatch of the 18th in reference to Secretary Morgenthau. I concur only in the exchange of the first two cables and you may order their release from the White House. Do not release third cable."

HN Jr: I see.

R: How this just this minute came in and it must be five O'clock there so it is not very good.

HN Jr: Well, what does that mean it is going to be released?

R: Well, when should I release it. I just got this and haven't done anything about it. It just came in - do you think it ought to be released for Monday or for immediate release, or tomorrow or what?

HN Jr: I think for Monday.

R: For Monday?

HN Jr: Yeah. They can't gain anything by releasing it now, can they?

R: The only thing they could gain would be to avoid any rumors or anything like that.

HN Jr: I see. I see. Just repeat what he said again and let's just see.

R: "I have received your dispatch of the 18th in reference to Secretary Morgenthau. I concur only in the exchange of the first two cables and you may order their release from the White House. Do not release third cable."

HN Jr: And that's all.

R: That's all it says here.

HN Jr: Well, what is your advice? I just don't.....

R: Well, I think the sooner it gets out the better - before it starts leaking, don't you?

HN Jr: Yeah, I think so.

R: I'm sorry about this thing. I don't....

HN Jr: I'm not surprised.

R: Well, I am, and I do not think that it is a final decision.

HN Jr: Well, I'm not surprised. It is what I expected, but it leaves us now under no obligation of any kind.

R: Well, I think that is right.

HN Jr: Of any kind. Well, I think it has come in and - is the Senate in session today?

R: No.

HN Jr: It's not.

R: No. I'm pretty sure it is not.

HN Jr: So, I don't think it is either. I think it is in, Dan, I think I would release it.

R: You think you would.

HN Jr: Yes.

R: All right. Well, Henry, I'm terribly sorry. I do not think, maybe I'm Pollyannaish about it, that this is a final decision.

HN Jr: Well, I disagree with you. I think it is.

R: Do you think that other fellow knows something and that is why he didn't want to join in the recommendation.

HN Jr: That I don't know. Do you see Vinson?

R: Yeah.

HN Jr: I don't know. I don't know.

R: All right. Well, Henry, I'll just take your letter. It isn't signed. I don't think that makes any difference. I'll just type your name on it.

HN Jr: Yeah.
R: Do you think there ought to be anything signed by both of you for the record?

MMJr: Yeah.

R: I'll get up his in the right form and send it out to him.

MMJr: Right.

R: And that will be in a pouch, but let's keep them dated the same. Yours was dated the 13th - should we do that?

MMJr: Yeah.

R: The 13th and I'll date his the -- date his today, the 16th.

MMJr: O. K.

R: Is that the way we ought to release it?

MMJr: Yes, I should think mine would be the 13th and he answered on the 16th.

R: Yeah.

All right, boy, I'm sorry.

MMJr: You mean, -- well, anyway, it is cold-blooded business-like way of doing it. It is what I expected Sam.

R: The thing that amazes me is that if he had made up his mind on it, that it took as long...

MMJr: Took as long as what?

R: For this cable to come back.

MMJr: Well, I think it came back very promptly.

R: No, you see he has had this all day now.

MMJr: Yeah.

R: It's--there--about five o'clock in the afternoon and that's what surprised me more than anything. I was wondering what the delay was about.

MMJr: You can't prove it by me.
July 14, 1945 1:10 P.M.

Judge
San Rosenman: Yes.

NM: I was just curious. How from that cable there were no instructions about sending Vinson's name up.

Ri: No, but....

NM: Hello?

Ri: Yes.

NM: He didn't say send his name up.

Ri: No, but don't you assume that is what he meant.

NM: Well, I'm asking you.

Ri: Oh, yes, I'm sure he did.

NM: He didn't say so.

Ri: No, I can -- we just assumed that he did.

NM: Well, why assume that?

Ri: Well, what else....

NM: You might ask for instructions.

Ri: Yes, I can send over a cable. I can do that. I just assumed that is what he....

NM: Well, he didn't say so.

Ri: No.

NM: Why don't you ask him for instructions?

Ri: Yeah, I can send a wire over to him. O.K. let me talk to Latte about that.

NM: What?

Ri: Yeah.

NM: Let me know what you decide.

Ri: Yeah. O.K.

NM: Thank you.
(Laughs) Or we can go to a hotel.

HM Jr: I'm going to find some -- if we are short on motion points, we'll find a nice little Rhinkellar in the neighborhood.

R: Look, I still have a cellar dining room here where I'd like to have you come if you don't mind sitting with a couple of secretaries, and once in a while an ex-secretary like Early comes in.

HM Jr: It would be a pleasure (laughs) to be treated -- a novelty to be treated by you to lunch.

R: (Laughter) Yes, isn't it.

HM Jr: What?

R: You are damn mintin' it is a novelty. Want to make it... well, I'll call you Monday.

HM Jr: You call me.

R: All right.

HM Jr: Thank you.

R: All right, boy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1940

Dear Henry:

I have given careful consideration to your letter of July thirteenth urging that I send to the Senate immediately the nomination of Judge Vinson as Secretary of the Treasury.

I am inclined to agree with you that for the reasons you mention it would be preferable to take this action now instead of waiting for my return from Europe.

I appreciate very much the fine spirit and keen sense of public responsibility in which you have approached this matter.

With personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honorable
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.
TELETYPE MESSAGE FOR:

Mr. H. J. Patridge,
113 South Sixth Street,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Dear Pat:

Could you send me a confidential character report on Elmer Benson. Regards.

Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

Sent 11:34 A.M. - July 14

July 14, 1945

Charles Bell
Secretary Morgenthau

What is going to happen to the Diary of Mr. Oliphant? As I understand it, the Diary was in two parts and one part had to do with me. If I am correct, I would like to take that part home and read it Sunday. In fact, if the Diary isn't too big, I would like to take the whole of the Diary home and read it before I turn it over to his son, Charles.
Mr. Haas
Secretary Morgenthau

Do we want the attached in our annual report?

Att:

CSBell's memo on history of enforcement program and tax evasion drive dated 20 June
CSBell's memo Summary Monthly report on top Treasury activities
Thum's letter and memo dated May 20
Dunell's memo on debt reduction dated May 21
Dunell's memo on debt retirement dated May 18

July 14, 1945
Mr. Klaz.

Sey said he would read over the work end.

He said he would sign something he this before he left office.

7-14
Treasury Department
Office of the Under Secretary

Date: 7-14-45
To: The Secretary
From: This is the 13 page letter to Sen. Wagner on the Field Employment Bill. It has been suggested that the letter be put in memorandum form and that you sign a short covering letter.

S.W.B.
as to specific improvements for S. 330.

Very truly yours,

Secretary of the Treasury

Honorable Robert F. Wagner
Chairman, Committee on Banking
and Currency
United States Senate
Washington 2, D. C.

Not sent
My dear Mr. Chairman:

Further reference is made to your letter of 3 March 1945 transmitting a copy of S. 380, "To establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free competitive economy, through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and the Federal Government." I am asking for my preliminary comments on four stated questions. I share your views that the bill involves issues of the greatest magnitude, and I strongly believe that these issues must be met squarely and resolved as soon as possible if we are to maintain full employment and free enterprise in a prosperous America after the war. For this reason I am glad to learn that your Committee is planning to have public hearings on the bill in the near future.

Before answering your specific questions, I should like to make some general comments with respect to the problem of employment.

The problem of employment has two aspects. The long-range problem is how to obtain the greatest amount of production with the least effort, and thus to assure the highest standard of living consistent with a reasonable amount of leisure. The great technological achievements of the post-war period have made this question seem much less important than it did at an earlier date; nevertheless, it remains a basic problem.

The second aspect of the employment problem, the more immediate one, is the possibility that the economic mechanism will get jammed in some fashion so that people who want to work, are willing to accept rates of wages generally recognized as fair, and are able to perform satisfactory work, are nevertheless unable to find work or, at least, unable to get as much work as they want. It is to this second problem that S. 380 is primarily addressed.

Full employment implies an aggregate demand for goods and services equal to the productive capacity of the country. The present level of production -- which is made possible only by the abnormal additions to the labor force, the especially intensive effort, and the overtime work which are required by the war effort -- is not necessary to assure full employment. However, full employment, as contemplated in S. 380, does, in our opinion, definitely imply all the production of which an unfettered economy working at a reasonable pace is capable. Full employment secured at the expense of shortening the hours of labor, although workers would prefer additional income to additional leisure, or at the expense of retarding technological improvement -- at the expense, that is, either of making labor load against its will, or of setting it to do easy things in a hurry -- is not an ideal worthy of a dynamic democratic economy.

If aggregate demand falls short of the amount of goods and services which the economy is able to produce, some of the factors of production, including labor, will be unemployed.

If aggregate demand is adequate and the factors of production are available at reasonable rates of compensation and are relatively mobile, the whole labor force will be employed, subject only to minor frictional unemployment. Every member of the labor force will either have a job or a reasonable prospect of finding one soon.

If aggregate demand is adequate to produce full employment, but the factors of production are immobile or over-reaching in their demands for compensation, part of the demand which might have resulted in full employment at stable prices will, instead, be dissipated in the form of rising prices. This danger must be safeguarded against by appropriate measures. Such measures, of course, would fall outside the scope of the activities of the
Treasury Department -- must be considered as integral and important parts of any policy of full employment.

With these prefatory remarks, I shall now answer more specifically the four questions asked in your letter.

1. "If we were assured of continuing full employment after the war, what might the effect be on the sectors of our economy with which your agency is concerned?"

The sector of the economy with which the Treasury is principally concerned is the fiscal sector, comprising the financing of the Government through taxation and borrowing, the management and retirement of the public debt, and national and international monetary and banking policies. Together these make up a large part of what may be designated fiscal policy. The achievement and maintenance of full employment is recognized as an important objective of fiscal policy.

The aggregate demand for goods and services determines the amount of employment. This demand is constituted by consumers' demand for goods and services, industrial demand for capital goods, and public expenditures.

The effect of full employment on fiscal policy will depend greatly upon the relative strength of these three types of demand; and upon this relative strength will depend, in turn, the appropriate type of fiscal policy for the Federal Government to pursue.

If the demand for goods and services by consumers and business, together with necessary public expenditures, is adequate to produce full employment, primary attention may be given to other objectives of fiscal policy, such as the balancing of the budget and the reduction of the public debt.

If the demand for goods and services, however, exceeds the productive capacity of the economy, there is a serious danger of inflation. Under these circumstances, fiscal policy should be utilized as a device for stabilizing the economy by increasing the level of taxation and applying the budgetary surplus to the reduction of the debt. If, on the other hand, the aggregate demand for goods and services by consumers and business, together with the necessary level of public expenditures, is inadequate to produce full employment, Federal fiscal policy should be directed toward providing additional employment. The role of Federal fiscal policy in achieving and maintaining full employment is more fully discussed in the answer to the next question.

It should be emphasized, however, that fiscal policy -- while it is the primary concern of the Treasury Department -- is only one of the types of measures which may be adopted by the Federal Government to achieve and maintain full employment, and that measures of fiscal policy requiring an excess of Federal expenditures over Federal receipts should be used only as a final reserve after other means of achieving and maintaining full employment have been utilized to the fullest extent practicable.

Finally, in considering the effect of full employment on the sectors of the economy with which the Treasury Department is concerned, it should be observed that full employment in the United States would contribute greatly to world prosperity. It would, in fact, be the greatest contribution which the United States could make toward this end. The achievement of full employment in the United States would, therefore, contribute greatly to the stability of international exchanges and the other problems of the international sphere with which the Treasury is concerned.

2. "If S. 360 were enacted by the Congress, what might be the role of your agency in helping achieve continuing full employment?"

The field of governmental activity in which the Treasury Department has a part is that of tax policy. The Treasury Department has the function of advising the President and the Congress as to desirable tax policies, including those which
would be helpful in promoting continuing full employment. This involves the continuing study of the relation of taxes to the operation of the economy.

The promotion of full employment is not, of course, the only consideration affecting tax policy. Fairness and equity in tax distribution are and must continue to be objectives of major importance. Likewise, the difficulty and cost of administering various taxes as well as their cost and annoyance to the taxpayer are factors of significance. These considerations are subordinated in the present discussion but they take their place in actual tax policy formulation.

It may be helpful to review briefly what is known or commonly believed about the relation of tax policy to employment.

One of the principal ways in which taxes affect employment is that they may reduce the private demand for goods and services. In this respect they act as an offsetting factor to governmental expenditures, which, speaking generally, constitute a demand for goods and services. The net effect on demand and thereby on employment of a full cycle of taxation and governmental expenditure depends not only on their relative amounts, but also on the nature of the expenditure and the types and sources of the taxes.

The effects of taxes on private expenditure relate both to the expenditure of consumers and to the expenditure of business on goods and services.

The effects of taxes in reducing consumer demand include the reduction both of the ability of consumers to buy and of their willingness to buy; the former is ordinarily by far the more important. Taxes reduce the ability to buy by taking away income that would otherwise be spent on consumer goods and services or by increasing prices and thereby reducing the amounts that can be bought with the income. The effect of all of tax collections in reducing consumer demand depends on whether the dollar would be spent if it were not taken in taxes. Persons with small incomes spend all or nearly all of their incomes while persons with larger incomes spend a progressively smaller fraction of additional dollars. Accordingly, taxes which fall primarily on small incomes have a larger relative effect in reducing consumer demand than do taxes on large incomes. Progressive taxes reduce consumer demand less than do proportional or regressive taxes.

Taxes also have an effect on willingness of consumers to buy. High excise taxes on specific commodities may reduce consumption of such commodities, but the effect may be to shift consumption to other commodities. A high rate tax on consumer spending in general would probably decrease willingness to spend at least for the time being, especially if the tax were expected to be temporary.

Taxes also operate to reduce business expenditures. The higher the taxes, the smaller the proportion of profits remaining for business purposes. Moreover, the volume of funds available for business in the hands of outside investors is affected by taxes. Where taxes on income from investments are very high the prospective return remaining to the investor after taxes may be too small to induce him to plow back his savings in unliquid assets. The prospective rate of return which an investor has learned to expect may not be presented by any available investment opportunity, and he may postpone investment on this account. Moreover, if there are risks to the investment, some prospect of reward after taxes is necessary to induce the taking of risks. The amount of such necessary reward depends in part on the extent to which risks can be reduced, for example, by allowing offsets of losses against income over a period of years.

In considering the effects of taxes on willingness to invest, the types of investment opportunities that present themselves are an important factor. Investment opportunities are not automatic. Someone must see the prospect of profit. This prospect is often related to anticipated consumer demand. The investor must see a new or an undersupplied market or a market that he can divert from other suppliers at lower prices. Taxes falling on consumer demand decrease the prospective return of an investment.
The extent to which taxes reduce business and investment demand is much less determinable than the effect on consumer demand. In some circumstances, taxes may reduce investment demand by as much as or conceivably even by more than the amount of the taxes collected. On the other hand, some taxes, especially progressive income taxes, frequently are paid from income that otherwise would give rise neither to consumer demand nor business demand but would either be held idle or would be applied in ways that create relatively little or no demand. In this case the tax does not reduce either consumer demand or business demand.

Taxes have other effects on employment, although in most cases of less significance than those already mentioned. Taxes may have the effect of increasing people's desire to work to make up for the lost income. On the other hand, high marginal rates of tax may reduce the willingness to work. Taxes may also affect employment through their effects on monopoly and competition, on the peacefulness of labor relations and in other more indirect ways.

Finally, the economic impact of the tax system is affected by public belief in its soundness and fairness.

In reaching any given revenue goal there are opportunities to choose between taxes that impinge chiefly on business and consumer expenditures and those that strike more heavily at idle savings. When economic conditions are tending toward inflation, it is proper to rely more extensively on the former kinds of taxes. Per contra, when economic conditions are dull and serious unemployment threatens, taxes which tend to curtail consumer and business expenditures should be lightened. Adjustments to changing economic conditions may involve the kind as well as the amount of taxes.

If the problem of the postwar period should be to maintain full employment, those tax policies should be followed which maximize private expenditures on goods and services. To what extent such tax policies may be incompatible with other objectives, for example, a balanced budget, and debt retirement, cannot be forecast with assurance.

Since the economy has shown a strong tendency to fluctuate, the maintenance of full employment would involve changing the impact of taxes in periods of high demand and low demand. Such a "contra-cyclical" tax policy may call for a rapid change in the volume of tax collections, and especially those that reduce consumer demand. Some contra-cyclical action may be built into the system. Taxes on net income, for example, show a relatively high degree of fluctuation. An additional contra-cyclical action may be found desirable and achieved through provisions for prompt reduction in tax rates when employment seems likely to fall and increase in rates as it rises.

The above discussion will indicate the area in which tax policy can play a part in achieving and maintaining full employment. The precise effects of taxes on employment are not fully understood, but enough is known to make it clear that taxes have great effects on employment and accordingly that an intelligently directed tax policy can and should be an important part of Federal full-employment policy.

Passing from the field of tax policy, the Treasury Department can also contribute to the achievement and maintenance of full employment by its influence on the rate of interest and by the adoption of appropriate policies in the management of the public debt.

A low rate of interest contributes to full employment in a number of ways:

(1) A low interest rate increases the volume of long-term real investment, such as housing, industrial and public utility construction, in which the rate of return on capital is an important element of total cost. In these sectors of the economy -- which we among those most sensitive to the business cycle -- a fall of 1 percent, or even 1/2 of 1 percent, in the long-term rate of interest can open up whole new vistas of projects which were impracticable at the previous rate.
(2) Interest income is characteristically received by persons with a high propensity to save. A low level of interest rates, therefore, reduces the proportion of the national income which is likely to be saved and, consequently, increases the demand for consumers' goods and services. Thus, in turn, increases the demand for capital goods.

(3) Low rates of interest on high-grade securities make it more worth while for capital to take risks in order to secure a differentially higher return. Low interest rates on perfectly safe investments consequently encourage the flow of capital into venturesome enterprise.

(4) A low rate of interest on the public debt decreases the amount of taxes which must be levied for debt service, with a consequent stimulating effect on business.

The Treasury Department can also contribute to the maintenance and achievement of full employment and price stability by directing its borrowing and refunding operations primarily to individuals and savings institutions during times of full employment, and primarily to commercial banks during times when employment opportunities are tending to decline. In this way, the funds raised by the Treasury through borrowing and refunding operations during times of full employment would draw already created purchasing power off the market; while the funds raised during the periods of decreasing employment opportunities would be from newly created purchasing power.

The Treasury Department can also contribute to the achievement and maintenance of full employment by increasing the overall liquidity of the economy by shortening the maturity structure of the public debt. Such an increase in liquidity gives a greater flexibility to the whole economy in adjusting itself to any set of changed conditions; and, by satisfying the demand for liquidity on the part of individuals and corporations, makes them ready to commit a portion of their funds to new physical investment.

Turning to the role of the Treasury Department in international financial affairs, it is clear that the maintenance of full employment and high standards of living in this country depend in considerable measure upon the existence of an international economic environment conducive to a high level of world trade.

The level of our foreign trade and foreign investment will play an important part in securing full employment in this country after the war. If we are to be assured of a high level of exports, we must eliminate the barriers to the free flow of international trade and investment which characterized the 1930's and which threaten to be even more restrictive of trade in the postwar period unless something is done about it.

It is for this reason that the Treasury Department earnestly hopes for the speedy enactment of the Bretton Woods Agreements for the establishment of an International Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The purpose of the International Monetary Fund is to facilitate the growth of world trade by removing exchange barriers to trade and by stabilizing the values of the world's currencies in terms of one another. The Fund would contribute to the reestablishment of order in international economic relations by providing a set of standards or "rules of the game" to replace the chaotic conditions which characterized much of the 1930's. The purpose of the International Bank is to encourage the flow of productive international investment largely by means of guaranteeing loans made through the usual private investment channels. Loans made through the bank would be for the reconstruction of the war-torn areas of Europe and Asia, and for the development of those countries which are greatly in need of capital to increase their ability to produce. In this way, these countries will become better customers for the products of American labor.
3. "In the present planning of your agency's post-war activities, what assumptions, if any, have you made with regard to the post-war level of the gross national product, the national income, and employment?"

In planning its fiscal operations, the Treasury is continually faced with the necessity of forecasting business conditions for some time ahead. For example, revenue estimates are made periodically by the Treasury for the Budget of the United States Government. In addition, the Treasury must plan its borrowing operations, not only to achieve proper coordination with expected Federal receipts and expenditures, but also to relate borrowing requirements to sources of funds available in the rest of the economy. Many of the estimates involve forecasts of economic conditions extending over a period of from eighteen months to two years. The latest revenue estimates covered the full fiscal year 1945, and in some cases involved projection of economic series as far as December 1946.

At the present time, of course, uncertainty as to the length and scope of the Japanese war and the speed of re-conversion presents major difficulties in forecasting. With the war over in Germany, business activity may be expected to decline somewhat from the recent unprecedentedly high levels. In the calendar year 1944, income payments to individuals aggregated $157 billion; national income, $101 billion; and gross national product, $149 billion.

The decline in these series is expected to be rather gradual. Estimates of outlays in munitions production are being revised almost continuously in accordance with alterations in military programs. The latest available information indicates that deliveries of munitions are expected to decline in dollar value by something like 20 percent in the third quarter of this year as compared with the level before July, by the first quarter of next year the decline is expected to reach 35 percent. Translating these figures into the impact on economic activity and allowing for expanded civilian output as re-conversion proceeds, it looks as though gross national product probably will not drop below $100 to $150 billion (in 1944 prices) annually as long as the Pacific continues to be a major battlefield.

The work we have done for the period following the end of the Japanese war is much more general in character. Some estimates have been prepared on the probable level of gross national product which would be required for full employment, but no attempt has been made to guess how fully this objective will be realized. It is convenient to consider the post-war situation separately for (1) the immediate post-war period, when demobilization and re-conversion will be predominant factors, and (2) more normal years thereafter. To illustrate these two different situations, we have tentatively assumed 1947 to be a year of re-conversion and 1950 to be a more normal post-war year. Our preliminary estimates indicate that, in terms of 1944 prices, gross national product will probably have to aggregate approximately $176 billion in 1947 if full employment is to be achieved, and perhaps $185 billion in 1950. Under these conditions, employment, including the armed forces, would amount to perhaps slightly under 50 millions in 1947 (as compared with 63 millions in 1944) and between 59 and 60 millions in 1950. This allows for somewhat less than a normal 5-year increase in employment from 1947 to 1950 as more persons employed temporarily during the war return to home or school. These employment figures leave out about 2 to 4-1/2 million persons as an allowance for normal frictional unemployment.

The estimates just referred to are preliminary and, of course, are subject to revision as further work is done. They have been mentioned here to give you some idea of the magnitudes involved, although they are not actually being used "in the present planning of your agency's post-war activities", as specifically requested in your question.

4. "What specific improvements in S. 360 might be considered by the Banking and Currency Committee?"

The Treasury does not have, at this time, any suggestions
July 14, 1945

TO THE SECRETARY:

In response to your oral request, I am sending you herewith the weekly report relating to payments to veterans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VETERANS PAYMENTS UNDER D. L. BILL OF RIGHTS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Week ended July 6, 1945</td>
<td>Number of residents</td>
<td>Cumulative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefits</td>
<td>30,840</td>
<td>$618,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>158,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students' subsistence allowances</td>
<td>6,944</td>
<td>635,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition and fees for students</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>105,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42,099</td>
<td>$1,517,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[a/\] $20 a week; four weeks' allowance for each month of active service, not to exceed 52 weeks.

\[b/\] Difference between monthly earnings and $100.

\[c/\] $50 a month without dependents; $75 with dependents.

\[d/\] Limited to $500 per annum.

[Signature]
July 14, 1945

Mr. Klotz
Secretary Morgenthau

I would like to subscribe to the Eiplinger Letter and Maley-Eaton.

July 14, 1945

Mr. Gaston
Secretary Morgenthau

I would like to have individual letters written thanking each member of the crew of the Coast Guard plane. Would you prepare these for me, please?
July 14, 1945

Mr. Blough
Secretary Morgenthau

Is this something I want to put in my annual report?

Att.

Mr. William Sherwood's report on the expenditure outlook for administering income and profits tax - dated June 7

United States Senate

Honorble Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to express my own gratitude to you for your appointment of Joe P. Hale to succeed Harold Polk at Nashville, Tennessee. I am quite sure that you will have no cause to regret it.

In 1933 Judge Thad A. Ox of Johnson City, Tennessee, who is the dean of the legal profession in that section of our state and our personal friend, came to Washington and brought Joe with him. He described Joe to Senator McKellar and to me as being a diamond in the rough.

He was appointed field deputy at Johnson City and instead of doing just as little as possible in order to get by he immediately set out to study tax problems and later when the chief deputy at Nashville died he was the logical successor on account of his knowledge and familiarity with income taxes. I believe I can say without fear of contradiction that he is one of the best posted men on the subject in our state.

I am very devoted to him and to his good wife and it is a source of great satisfaction to me that he has received this recognition.

Again thanking you and with kind personal regards and best wishes for your future success and happiness, I am

Very truly yours,

D. W. McKellar,
Secretary to Senator McKellar
July 14, 1945

Mr. Ted Gamble  
Secretary Morgenthau

I want to write a letter to each State War Bond  
Chairman thanking them and saying good-bye.

Mr. Haas  
Secretary Morgenthau

I would like to be sure to mention in my annual  
report, the decentralization of the Penal Division of the  
Office of the Chief Counsel for Internal Revenue.
GROUP
Present: Mr. Gaston
Mr. Bertelt
Mr. O'Connell
Mr. White
Mr. East
Mr. Smagh
Mr. Smough
Mr. C. C. Bell
Mr. Fehle
Mr. Luxford
Mr. Veltus
Mr. Coe
Mr. Fussell
Mrs. Klots

July 10, 1945
9:30 a.m.

H.N.JR: The first order of business is this: I am prepared to sign this letter to Senator Wagner.

MR. WHITE: Well, it is not clear to me from what I heard, Mr. Secretary, that you had seen this letter at all. I understand now that what you have seen is a long memorandum; and what Luxford had suggested doing, and which I think most of us thought was a good idea, was to accompany that long memorandum with a short letter. This is the letter that went over yesterday.

Now, that has not been approved in its present form, though it has been approved in a form much like it. Herbert had a somewhat different draft, and I think maybe others had a somewhat different draft.

Now, the thought is, you can either sign this letter without any accompanying memorandum.

H.N.JR: I have a thirteen-page letter.

MR. WHITE: That is a technical memorandum.

MR. FRANK: That can go up later, Mr. Secretary, the technical memorandum. This is more of a personal thing, indicating how you feel generally about the bill. It doesn't go into the technical side at all.

MR. WHITE: Or you can accompany it by a memorandum saying it is accompanied by a memorandum. There are three ways. You can either send it the long way as a letter—that was the original intention, and I understand that that is the way it was submitted to you.

H.N.JR: It came to me Saturday.

MR. WHITE: Well, that form in the long letter was some time ago.

H.N.JR: Well, I get it Saturday.

MR. WHITE: During the last two weeks Luxford had the thought—and I thought it was a very good idea—to accompany that long memorandum as a memorandum with a two or three-page letter from you—that two or three-page letter be circulated among the various people—and I thought they all approved of the idea, though there were some modifications of the specific wording, and there were other suggestions. So either the short letter can go with the long memorandum, or the short letter can go without any memorandum, or the long memorandum can go as a letter. My own preference is for the short letter to go—

H.N.JR: Do you mind if I stand on my head? (Laughter) This is what I thought: In the first place, let's just talk about the long memorandum which I am prepared to sign. And I have another alternative. That is this: I haven't read this yet, but I am anxious to get this thing up to Wagner before noon. Then I could send the long one, and then have Fussell do a summary of it for the press and let it be released at once.
MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, I don't like that long letter because there is not one line in it that says you approve that bill. You have gone all through thirteen pages, and you still don't say you support the bill.

M.W.JR.: Is this your handwriting?

MR. LUXFORD: It is a cooperative thing. I have done some work on it, yes.

MR. WHITE: No, no, Mr. Secretary, a letter like that was prepared about two weeks ago, and everybody approved of that suggestion.

M.W.JR.: The thing was put on my desk Saturday. Now, why it was held up, I don't know. Anyway, let me read it. (Reads letter addressed to Senator Wagner, dated July 10, 1943; attachment A)

I think it is a wonderful letter.

MR. WHITE: I would have preferred Herbert's modification and re-write two weeks ago, but today I think the situation has changed, and I think some of the flamboyant or other expressions which had no appropriate place two weeks ago when you wrote your draft are definitely in order.

MR. GASTON: I get you, Harry, and I am inclined to agree with you.

MR. WHITE: As Secretary of the Treasury some of this shouldn't be in here, and I think your draft was more appropriate, but I think this is better now.

MR. GASTON: I agree.

MR. WHITE: John, Luxford, and I made some changes to bring it up to date.

MR. HAAK: The reason the other was so long is he asked four specific questions, and we attempted to answer them.

H.W.JR.: Should I say I am enclosing something else?

MR. WHITE: I think this is probably better because the other is an economic analysis of the pros and cons.

MR. HLOUGH: I have been for this sort of letter from the beginning, but Dan felt that we had to answer the questions. Now I don't think that necessity is present.

MR. WHITE: Another thing, I think if this letter were to go it would get quite a play in the papers, whereas, if it is encumbered with a longer analysis, much of which is not new, and full of qualifications, I think it would diminish from the interest and effectiveness of this letter.

MR. GASTON: And that original letter was not supple at all because it has the Secretary going into theoretical economic considerations.

MR. LUXFORD: In the whole letter you don't say you are for the bill.

(Mr. Feltus entered the conference.)

H.W.JR.: Feltus, read this quickly. I am thinking of sending it up to Wagner this morning for immediate release.

MR. WHITE: In the last sentence I think you might want to say, "...believe, as I know you do, Senator Wagner," and so forth.

MR. FUSELL: Harry, wouldn't that interfere with your Bretton Woods thing in putting that out right now?

MR. LUXFORD: I don't think so.

MR. WHITE: I don't see why. What is in your mind?

MR. FUSELL: Some of your Republicans are for Bretton Woods.
MR. WHITE: We have always maintained that you have
got to have prosperity at home. If you don't, Bretton
Woods nor any other part of the forest is going to get
you out of the woods.

MR. HAAS: You never traded anything for Bretton Woods.

H.M.JR.: Well, I am willing to sign it. The question
is the mechanics of getting it out.

MR. WHITE: Is it going to be a press release this
morning?

MR. O'CORR: You shouldn't release it until Wagner
has had it.

H.M.JR.: It should be released from Wagner's office.

MR. LUXFORD: You can get his permission.

MR. FELTUS: He wouldn't object to your releasing
it, would he?

MR. LUXFORD: Tell him you are sending him a good,
strong letter for his bill. You can just ask Wagner's
permission to give it out here, or have him give it out
there.

H.M.JR.: What is it called, the Wagner Bill?

MR. LUXFORD: The Wagner-Murray-Kilgore Bill. That
distinguishes it from the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, which
is social security.

H.M.JR.: You get the gist of it, Feltus, don't you?

MR. FELTUS: Yes.

H.M.JR.: What do you think?

MR. FELTUS: I think it is splendid. I think I would
send copies to the other two sponsors at the same time.

---

MR. LUXFORD: And Petman.

H.M.JR.: John, you are not on the Hill today. Will
you draft those letters for me?

MR. PELLE: Yes.

MR. FELTUS: I would send a copy of this with a
covering note.

MR. PELLE: Right, I will do that.

H.M.JR.: Do you want to say, "You and I agree that
our returning soldiers"?

MR. WHITE: Something of that sort. I don't think
that it ought to read as it does now, that it is a new
idea with you.

MR. PELLE: Say, "as you and I know."

H.M.JR.: Fix it up so that I can get it out. It is
just the last page that has to be done over.

MR. PELLE: Can we say, "as you and I agree"?

MR. WHITE: As I say, I think the quicker we get it
out, the better.

MR. LUXFORD: When do you officially leave?

H.M.JR.: Mr. Vimon's thing is going up at noon today.
I am going on the assumption that he will be sworn in at
once. If that is true, he will come in tomorrow.

MR. FELTUS: What I was thinking of was, if this
was your last official act it would get a lot more press
if it were timed to mean that and spoken of as that.

MR. WHITE: I should think it might be well to be
his last act. I can't think of anything else that might
get as continuing an effect in the future as that letter.

MR. LUXFORD: In your press release say it is the final act of Secretary Morgenthau.

MR. FELTUS: I would start my letter with that sentence.

H.W.JR: It may not be.

MR. WHITE: Would that conflict with the report as a final act?

(Secretary holds a telephone conversation with Senator Wagner.)

MRS. KLOTZ: If you type that out, it loses everything. I think you ought to preserve that record.

MR. WHITE: He has one foot in the bear trap, but the other one is pawing the ground. (Laughter)

H.W.JR: Hold me back, I want to hit him. (Laughter)

As soon as this is ready, Ed, I think you might take it up, if you don't mind.

MR. FUSSELL: I think we had better cut our stencils here and run off a bunch of mimeographs to take up to him so he can give them out up there.

MR. LUXFORD: It will be helpful, too, if you stay up there and pass them around.

H.W.JR: How long will it take?

MR. FUSSELL: It will take about three-quarters of an hour.

H.W.JR: Do they need so many copies?

MR. FELTUS: We need fifty copies for the Senate press gallery, and fifty copies for the Press Club.

MR. LUXFORD: Can't you release it from here after it has been released up there?

H.W.JR: It would only add to the confusion. It goes to the press gallery and the wires are up there.

MR. FUSSELL: We can keep a few copies down here to give out in answer to requests.

MR. LUXFORD: George Little might see the AP on this.

MR. GASTON: If you correct the copy, you can get the stencils going. Have you started cutting stencils?

MR. FUSSELL: No.

MR. GASTON: If John can correct the carbons--

MR. FELTUS: It is in my office, Ed.

(Mr. Fussell leaves the conference temporarily.)

H.W.JR: Does anybody have any appointments? I have nothing to do.

MRS. KLOTZ: That isn't so. You have lots to do.

MR. LUXFORD: Does anybody know any good stories?

(Mrs. Klotz: I can tell some good ones.)
MR. O'CONNELL: I just wanted to be sure there is nothing we are supposed to do about this Export-Import Bank legislation. I understood you spoke to Vinson about it on Friday.

(Secretary signs letter to Senator Wagner dated July 18, 1945.)

MR. WHITE: I think John might also draft a couple of notes from you. I think one ought to go to Hiram Green and Murray, and about half a dozen other people we can think of. It should be a different note in each case, though. It is a little personal.

MR. FEHLEN: Those can be signed during the day.

H.W.JR: What happened on that was this: White gave me a memorandum. I showed it to Vinson, and Vinson said that Spence had already called him about it. He sort of gave me the impression that he had the matter in hand.

MR. O'CONNELL: The House passed it at first with the bad provision in it.

H.W.JR: He said, "Well, I will call up Harry White later on." He said he would call Harry. Did he call you?

MR. WHITE: No, he didn’t.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, Tuesday it is going to be on the Senate side.

MR. O'CONNELL: Whatever is done by anybody has to be done today.

H.W.JR: Vinson knows all about it.

MR. WHITE: And he knows that something has to be done Monday.

H.W.JR: And he knows that I know who has done this thing. I explained to him about the Advisory Committee on Bretton Woods. So, he is fully cognizant of it. I turned it over to him and he assumed the responsibility.
H.M.JR: And the people he talked to were significant — George, Connelly, Barkley.

MR. O'CONNELL: That probably makes a certain amount of sense because they have now put the Charter over for a full week and George had an interest in getting that over for a week in order to get the Tax Bill out.

H.M.JR: He talked to George, Connelly, and Barkley, and when I called him up the Senate pro tem knew nothing about it. He talked to those three boys for an hour and a half. Certainly Luxford was awful down in the mouth.

MR. LUXFORD: Wagner didn't know it.

MR. WHITE: Let's get Luxford down on the record now with no equivocation. Mr. Luxford, is it your opinion that Senator McEllrath assured the passage of the Bretton Woods Bill this week instead of possible postponement until the fall.

MR. LUXFORD: I yield to Secretary Morgenthau.

(Laughter.)

MR. WHITE: I just want to call your attention, Secretary Morgenthau, that when the crucial question is put he waffles. (Laughter.) Did I hear your answer?

MR. LUXFORD: I yield to the man who knows.

(Laughter.)

H.M.JR: You had better begin learning to call me squire. (Laughter.) That will relax me. The squire of the Hudson Valley. Well, I am glad you put him on the spot. All I can tell you, Mr. White, Assistant Secretary White, is that certainly Mr. Luxford had the jitters all over the place — so much that I had to follow him up what a mop. (Laughter.) I don't know what he was getting at.

MR. LUXFORD: Wagner did not know when he called me.

MR. PEHL: I wouldn't say any more. (Laughter.)

H.M.JR: Now, you being settled and worried about the Export-Import Bank, do you have any other worries? Mr. Gaston, do you have any worries?

MR. GASTON: No, I don't think I have any.

H.M.JR: John?

MR. PEHL: No.

H.M.JR: Blough?

MR. BLOUGH: I am seeing Randolph Paul at ten-thirty to talk over this problem about what, if anything, to put in this report of tax recommendations. I am not sure anything ought to go in.

H.M.JR: Well, I am waiting for my annual report. Who is responsible in the Treasury for that? George, are you responsible? Do you get it out?

MR. HAAS: I work through the Under Secretary on it. We might be called sort of an editor of it.

H.M.JR: When is the thing going to begin to come my way?

MR. HAAS: You see we just started a few days ago on it. I wrote a memorandum for Bell's signature to the various people and put a deadline of Wednesday on it. That was a very short deadline. I know we will make our deadline that we are actually writing on, but I don't know about the others.

H.M.JR: Herbert, would you kind of ride herd on these fellows?

MR. GASTON: Yes. I think George has a hand in it, but I will work with George on it.

H.M.JR: Charlie, you too. They need a couple of fellows with experience. Particularly Roy Blough. He looks so healthy.
Mr. BLOOH: I don't even know what ought to go into it. (Laughter.)

H.M.JR: Well, I will be waiting. Ed, do you have anything?

Mr. BARTLETT: Only to report that the tax refund program is moving along satisfactorily. We have about a third of the refunds out of the way now. We have paid about a million eight hundred and sixty-five thousand this last week, which is a little better than our schedule.

H.M.JR: All right.

Eddie Pussell?

Mr. FUSSELL: No, sir, I haven't anything.

H.M.JR: Feltus?

Mr. FELTUS: No, sir.

H.M.JR: Luford?

Mr. LUFORD: No, sir. I haven't anything.

H.M.JR: When are you going up on the Hill?

Mr. LUFORD: In about ten minutes.

H.M.JR: Sue?

Mr. COS: I told Harry that Sunday one of the reporters who had been ringing Charlie Shaeffer, rang up to check on the story of an order from the President to you on monetization of silver. Apparently that story has broken out in Salt Lake City.

H.M.JR: That is a good place to have it break. Somebody called me from Milwaukee, Sunday. Is there a paper called The Sentinel?

Mr. WHITE: Yes.
H.H.Jr: First it is going to be "rocking chair squire."

Mrs. Klotz: For about ten minutes at a time.

H.H.Jr: Well, I have nothing.
July 16, 1945

Dear Bob:

I could not leave the Treasury with a sense of having completed my work without informing you of my strong support for S. 360, the so-called "full employment" bill.

I think too much time and effort have been wasted on ideological word battles over the subject of full employment. Too little time and effort have been directed to the much more difficult -- and less spectacular -- task of making a fair and impartial study of what industry, agriculture, labor and government can do to give this country the best possible assurances of a sound and balanced economic structure after the war.

The fact that you and your Committee plan to come to grips with the practical side of this problem is to me highly encouraging. It offers assurance of that kind of a down-to-earth examination of the facts which is characteristic of the American democratic process at its best. Under this process many of us are inclined to lose and tense at the start over the irreconcilable attitude of our political adversaries. But under the searching spotlight of public discussion and the give and take of Congressional hearings, we often find ourselves in agreement on objectives and practical men in Congress find a way of bridging our differences over methods. It is my earnest hope -- my expectation -- that this will occur in the course of your hearings on S. 360.

The bill impresses me as being an appropriate basis from which to commence an analysis of the problem of a prosperous post war America -- call it full employment if you like or high employment as some seem to prefer. It is particularly appropriate because it directs our initial attention to premises and operating principles. It rightly leaves for subsequent determination the formulation of actual programs for implementing the policies established in S. 360.

I am, therefore, more interested at this time in the approach of S. 360 to the problem of full employment than I am in the detail of its actual provisions. I am strongly of the opinion that government does have a definite responsibility, together with industry, agriculture and labor, for seeing to it that a sound and prosperous economy in this country is maintained -- an economy that will be able to absorb profitably the honest toil of the American worker and offer full encouragement to American productive genius. The precise terms in which this responsibility is defined in S. 360 is therefore less important in my judgment, than the fact that the responsibility is clearly defined and accepted.

I am confident that there will emerge from the careful discussions of your Committee an effective procedure for discharging the responsibility thus defined.

Finally, it is my belief that S. 360 should be acted upon by your Committee and the Congress with all the speed that is possible and consistent with a careful consideration of its provisions. Prompt emendation of S. 360 will give this country -- industry, agriculture, labor and government -- a definite policy with which to approach the epoch making problems of reconversion. Delay, on the other hand, offers the spectacle of this country facing this rapidly approaching crisis with indecision, confusion and stop-gap emergency measures.
As you and I agree, our returning soldiers and those on the home front who have contributed so generously to victory deserve -- yes, are entitled -- to know now where their government stands on the issue of full employment and prosperity after the war.

Sincerely,

/signed/ H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Honorable Robert F. Wagner,
United States Senate.
July 16, 1945
9:55 A.M.

W.: Yes.
HMJr.: And I suppose they will confirm him right away.
W.: I suppose so.
HMJr.: Now, would you like to release that from up there?
W.: Yeah.
HMJr.: This morning?
W.: Yes.
HMJr.: You would.
W.: Yes, I would. Or you can release it.
HMJr.: No, I'd much rather have you release.
W.: All right, I'll release it.
HMJr.: All right, it will be up there within a half-hour.
W.: Fine.
HMJr.: I'll have it up there and in releasing it you can say
    that this is my last official act.
W.: Yeah.
HMJr.: What?
W.: Oh, hell.
HMJr.: Well, anyway you want, but I'd like to get it out
    before noon, see?
W.: Well, I'll do that. I'll get it out right away.
HMJr.: Before Viscut's name goes up there.
W.: Yeah, all right.
HMJr.: See?
W.: I'll be glad to do that.
HMJr.: I'll have one of the boys that you know bring it up.
W.: How is Mrs. Morgenthau?
She is holding her own. That is the best I can say. All of this business has naturally upset her.

W: Oh, I can understand that.

HM Jr: The sooner we can move the better, but it will be another couple of weeks.

W: Move from here you mean?

HM Jr: Yes, move her to the country.

W: Oh, I see.

HM Jr: I mean I can't move her yet, she isn't well enough.

W: Is that so?

HM Jr: But the minute she is well enough, we'll move.

W: She looks like a husky girl, too.

HM Jr: I know. Well, she is but you know how those things are.

W: Yeah.

HM Jr: Well, Bob, this isn't goodbye, I'll be seeing you.

W: Yeah, don't say goodbye because I'm sad enough.

HM Jr: Righto, and good luck on this Bretton Woods trip.

W: Oh, goosh.

HM Jr: We're leaning on you.

W: Yeah, o.k. (laughs)

HM Jr: All right, Bob.

W: I'll do the best I can, Henry.

HM Jr: You always have.

W: Well, good luck to you, Henry.

HM Jr: You are a friend.

W: Yeah, well...

HM Jr: All right, Bob.

Con. Jere Cooper: Henry.

HM Jr: Hello, Jere.

C: Jere Cooper. How are you?

HM Jr: Oh, I'm fine.

C: Well, that's good. I just wanted to call and tell you how sorry I am to see about your leaving, Henry.

HM Jr: Well, I guess us Roosevelt fellows - it is time we got on our way.

C: Well, I know how these things are, but I'm awfully sorry about it and wanted to tell you how much I appreciate your friendship and I've enjoyed working with you and anytime I can ever be of any little service why you let me know. It would have to be little if I could be big enough to do it.

HM Jr: Well, that is mighty nice of you, Jere. It has been one of the pleasant things down here working with you.

C: Well, that is very kind and I appreciate it. I just wanted to tell you that I'm sorry about your going, but I have enjoyed working with you and appreciate your friendship.

HM Jr: Well, we'll be seeing each other. Maybe we'll see more of each other in the future.

C: Well, I hope so, Henry.

HM Jr: I hope so, Jere.

C: All right, thank you.

HM Jr: Thank you.

C: Bye.
Mrs. Roosevelt wanted me to tell you if you were up at our apartment at 10 minutes past four, she would be glad to have you ride down to the station with her.

Mr. John Oliver: Yeah, she is going to get a five o'clock train.

HMJr: Yeah, but she wants to go early in order to get a train.

C: Let's see - four-ten, o.k. All right, I'll have my car there with me, and drive her down.

HMJr: All right.

C: 4:10. Shall I come upstairs.

HMJr: I think you could announce yourself.

C: Sure.

HMJr: Go up and get her.

C: Yeah, o.k.

HMJr: Right.

C: Right.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1945

Dear Henry:

I am sending you herewith copy of my cable to the President and copy of his reply.

I assume that the reply was in code and that you will treat it accordingly.

Very sincerely,

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosures
14 July 1943

SECRET

FROM: CAPTAIN VARDAN
TO: THE MAP ROOM

FOR JUDGE ROSENMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have received your despatch of the 14th (NR-OUT-118) in reference to Secretary Morgenthau. I concur only in the exchange of the first two cables and you may order their release from the White House. Do not (rpt not) release third cable.
July 12, 1945

THE PRESIDENT:

As per your instructions I have spoken with Henry Morgenthau and he has been perfectly splendid in the whole matter.

I suggest that the following exchange of cables, which he has approved, be released at the White House as soon as you approve.

(1) "My dear Mr. President: When I wrote to you on July 5th, submitting my resignation as Secretary of the Treasury, I agreed, at your request, to remain in office until your return from Europe.

I have been giving further thought to this matter, and now take the liberty of suggesting that you may wish to reconsider this arrangement. Since you have now made your decision as to my successor, it seems to me that the delay we contemplated is no longer necessary but, on the contrary, may prove a handicap to Judge Vinson for whom I have the highest admiration. It is my earnest desire to be of every assistance to him in taking over the great responsibilities of this office.

Such matters as the continuation of war financing, the tax enforcement drive, revenue legislation, and many other Treasury problems call for prompt decisions. My successor should be given the opportunity to make these decisions, since it will become his duty to carry them out.

These considerations are given added weight by the possibility of a recess of the Senate, which would delay Judge Vinson's confirmation.

Accordingly, I urge that you appoint my successor at your earliest convenience, and make my resignation effective upon his appointment and qualification. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

(2) "Dear Henry: I have given careful consideration to your cable of July 13th urging that I send to the Senate immediately the nomination of Judge Vinson as Secretary of the Treasury.

I am inclined to agree with you that for the reasons you mention it would be preferable to take this action now instead of waiting for my return from Europe.

I appreciate very much the fine spirit and keen sense of public responsibility in which you have approached this matter.

With personal regards,"  Harry S. Truman

----------

The foregoing two cables are to be exchanged without any strings or conditions of any kind. Henry wants me to make that perfectly clear to you.

However, without having made any promises or representations of any kind, on my own initiative and with the idea that you would want to do something substantial after 13 years of fine service in the Treasury, I am suggesting the following cable to Henry which is not to be made public.

You will note that the publicity involved in the following cable would come at the time when the Bretton Woods legislation is signed and that it would apply to the governorship of the fund and the bank.

To do this would be analogous to the Stettinius case and I personally believe would be mutually helpful. However I want to make it clear that one is not conditioned on the other in any way.

If you do not approve, then, of course the foregoing two cables are to be released anyway. The suggested cable follows:

"Dear Henry: While I fully appreciate the reasons which prompted you to resign as Secretary of the Treasury, nevertheless
I want you to take on a further important assignment for me.

The Bretton Woods legislation will soon be enacted. Your contribution to the formulation of these proposals and the negotiation of the Agreements has been outstanding. I now want you to assume the task of making them work.

With that in mind, I plan, with your consent, to name you as the American Governor of the Fund and Bank on their establishment. I further hope that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will designate you as its President.

In the meantime, much work must be done preparatory to the actual establishment of the Fund and Bank by the end of this year. I am counting on you to participate in these discussions, and to give us the benefit of your close familiarity with these problems.

When I sign the Bretton Woods legislation, I should like to announce to the public that I intend designating you as the American Governor of the Fund and the Bank." Harry S. Truman

Rosenman
TO Secretary Morgenthau
FROM E. B. Fussell

Mr. De Voe of the Washington office of Collier's is interested in possible serial rights for the German book. I have told him his interest will be brought to your attention, but have suggested that he send you a note to this effect.

(In this connection please note the correspondence previously turned over to you from Mr. Snevily, who manages both the Bell Syndicate and North American Newspaper Alliance. He has also been told that his interest in anything you may write will be given attention.)

(Lt. Dave Levy, whose brother is with Putnam, says that firm also would be interested in a book. I've asked Dave to give me a memo to this effect, for transmittal to you.)
July 16, 1945

Dear Sam:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 16, enclosing a copy of your cable to the President and a copy of his reply.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
July 16, 1945

Dear Bob:

I could not leave the Treasury with a sense of having completed my work without informing you of my strong support for S. 380, the so-called "full employment" bill.

I think too much time and effort have been wasted on ideological word battles over the subject of full employment. Too little time and effort have been directed to the much more difficult -- and less spectacular -- task of making a fair and impartial study of what industry, agriculture, labor and government can do to give this country the best possible assurances of a sound and balanced economic structure after the war.

The fact that you and your Committee plan to come to grips with the practical side of this problem is to me highly encouraging. It offers assurance of that kind of a down-to-earth examination of the facts which is characteristic of the American democratic process at its best. Under this process many of us are inclined to flunk and fumble at the start over the irreconcilable attitude of our political adversaries. But under the searching spotlight of public discussion and the give and take of Congressional hearings, we often find ourselves in agreement on objectives and practical men in Congress find a way of bridging our differences over methods. It is my earnest hope -- my expectation -- that this will occur in the course of your hearings on S. 380.
The bill impresses me as being an appropriate basis from which to commence an analysis of the problem of a prosperous post-war America -- call it full employment if you like or high employment as some seem to prefer. It is particularly appropriate because it directs our initial attention to premises and operating principles. It rightly leaves for subsequent determination the formulation of actual programs for implementing the policies established in S. 380.

I am, therefore, more interested at this time in the approach of S. 380 to the problem of full employment than I am in the detail of its actual provisions. I am strongly of the opinion that government does have a definite responsibility, together with industry, agriculture and labor, for seeing to it that a sound and prosperous economy in this country is maintained -- an economy that will be able to absorb profitably the honest toil of the American worker and offer full encouragement to American productive genius. The precise terms in which this responsibility is defined in S. 380 is therefore less important in my judgment than the fact that the responsibility is clearly defined and accepted.

I am confident that there will emerge from the careful discussions of your Committee an effective procedure for discharging the responsibility thus defined.

Finally, it is my belief that S. 380 should be acted upon by your Committee and the Congress with all the speed that is possible and consistent with a careful consideration of its provisions. Prompt enactment of S. 380 will give this country -- industry, agriculture, labor and government -- a definite policy with which to approach the epoch making problems of reconversion. Delay, on the other hand, offers the spectacle of this country facing this rapidly approaching crisis with indecision, confusion and stop-gap emergency measures.
As you and I agree, our returning soldiers and those on the home front who have contributed so generously to victory deserve -- yes, are entitled -- to know now where their government stands on the issue of full employment and prosperity after the war.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Honorable Robert F. Wagner,
United States Senate.
SPECIAL
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE July 16, 1945

TO Mrs. Klets
FROM Secretary Morgenthaler

I spoke to Judge Roseman at his home at 8:20 this morning. Before I could say anything, he said, "The answer came in from Truman to send Viscom's name up Monday." I said, "That's good." Roseman said, "No, it isn't." I said, "Yes, it is."

I said, "What I really am calling you up for is this, I sent over my letter signed to Latta Saturday but I have nothing from the President, therefore, I would like for you to send me a true copy of the cable you sent the President and a true copy of the answer that you received from him." Roseman promised me that he would send them over this morning.

Mrs. Klets, if they do not come by 2:30 today, I will call him up.
By dear Mr. Green:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 350, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Hon. William Green, President,
American Federation of Labor,
American Federation of Labor Building,
Washington, D. C.

JUL 16 1945

Dear Mr. Patton:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 350, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. James G. Patton, President,
National Farmers' Union,
430 Kuney Building,
Washington, D. C.

JUL 16 1945
JUL 16 1945

Dear Mr. Murray:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 380, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Philip Murray,
President of the C.I.O.,
718 Jackson Place, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

JUL 16 1945

My dear Mr. Patman:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 380, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Honorable Wright Patman,
House of Representatives.
JUL 16 1945

Dear Mr. O'Neal:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 380, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Edward A. O'Neal, President,
American Farm Bureau Federation,
58 East Washington Street,
Chicago, Illinois.

JWP:an 7-16-45

JUL 16 1945

Dear Mr. Whitney:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 380, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. A. F. Whitney, President,
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Bldg.,
Cleveland, Ohio.

JWP:an 7-16-45
JUL 16 1945

My dear Senator:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 380, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Honorable James E. Murray,
United States Senate.

JUL 16 1945

Dear Henry:

I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have today sent to Senator Wagner, supporting S. 380, the so-called "full employment bill".

Sincerely,

Honorable Henry A. Wallace,
Secretary of Commerce,
Washington, D.C.

JWP:aa 7-16-45  

JWP:aa 7-16-45
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

TO Secretary Morgenthau
FROM E. B. Fussell

DATE July 16, 1945

I have told the newspaper men that Tuesday, July 24, will be agreeable to you for the party they propose. They will give us details later.

Hello.

Mr. Leslie: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

HMJr: Morgenthau speaking.

B: Good morning, sir.

HMJr: How are you?

B: Just fine, thank you. I've been wanting to see and talk with you.

HMJr: Well, I'm here, and in a couple of days I'll be up at my apartment. Any time you are free I'd be delighted to see you.

B: Thank you. Where do you live, Mr. Secretary?

HMJr: 2029 Connecticut Avenue.

B: Oh, yes, thank you. I'd like to talk with you sometime.

HMJr: Well, it would be a pleasure for me.

B: Thank you.

HMJr: Biffle, what is your guess as to when the Bretton Woods legislation will pass the Senate?

B: We hope to finish it tomorrow.

HMJr: Tomorrow.

B: Yes, sir.

HMJr: There was some gossip - you are not going to let this tax bill come in?

B: No, not at all. We - Senator George wanted to bring it in there, but we thought it might be a medium for a delay.

HMJr: I see.

B: So we are going to hold it back and bring up - continue the Bretton Woods until it is disposed of.

HMJr: And then the chances are - I understand the House is meeting on Tuesday - no, Thursday...
B: Thursday, that's right.
HHJr: And they will...
B: We want to be able to send it over for them to consider on our amendments, if any at all.
HHJr: On Thursday?
B: On Thursday.
HHJr: Well, that's - that's what I wanted to understand, but I heard this gossip about the tax bill.
B: Yes, well, we don't want that to come in and we've been able to persuade Senator George not to attempt to bring it in.
HHJr: But you will be through Wednesday?
B: Wednesday...we hope to finish it tomorrow afternoon.
HHJr: I'm just...enough of a human being, it would be kind of nice if it would pass while I was still here.
B: Well, that was my thought too.
HHJr: Ahum.
B: Very definitely so.
HHJr: As I say I don't know what arrangements are being made, but I've worked so hard on this - I'm just human.
B: I would like ever so much to see it finished before you leave.
HHJr: Yeah.
B: And I'll keep in touch with you on it.
HHJr: Thank you.
B: You are welcome.
HHJr: Bye.

HHJr: Hello.
Senator
McKellar: All right.
HHJr: Senator Henry Morgenthau.
M: All right, Mr. Secretary.
HHJr: First, may I thank you for that very, very nice letter you wrote me.
M: Well, all right.
HHJr: I appreciate that. Now I understand that they are going to go right through with the Bretton Woods legislation. Hello?
M: Yes.
HHJr: I mean they are not going to interrupt it with any tax bill.
M: I understand not.
HHJr: Is that correct?
M: That's what I hear.
HHJr: Because I think if they go through it looks as though I might still be Secretary of the Treasury when they pass it.
M: Yeah.
HHJr: Is that right?
M: Yes, that's right.
HHJr: It kind of looks that way because they will - I understand it will go over Thursday to the House and they'll consider.
M: Well, I don't know how long it will take the House. I think not long.
HHJr: Well, Sam Rayburn said it would take a day.
M: Well, he knows about it.
HHJr: Well, I'm just human enough that I'd still like to be around when it becomes a law.
M: Yes.
M: You know.
M: Yes, I can understand that.
M: Oh, I think so.
M: Wonderful.
M: Yes.
M: Thank you.
M: All right, Mr. Secretary, thank you.

Senator Tom Stewart: Hello.


M: Hello, Mr. Secretary, how are you, sir?

S: I'm fine.

HMJr: Sorry you are quitting us, sir.

S: Well, ... that happened when Mr. Roosevelt died.

HMJr: Yes, I knew you had been wanting to quit.

S: Yeah.

HMJr: I had understood that. Mr. Morgenthau, I called you about the appointment of Joe Hale down at Nashville. Senator McKellar told me he thought that had been worked out all right.

S: That's right.

HMJr: And he suggested that I give you a ring about it. It will be safe for us to send Hale a wire, won't it?

S: I signed it Friday.

HMJr: We can telegraph him that it is all O.K., then?

S: It is okayed and finished.

HMJr: Well, that's fine. Thank you, sir, and I certainly appreciate that.

S: I said that with your recommendation and Senator McKellar's was the sole reason that it went through.

HMJr: Well, thank you very much, indeed, sir, we appreciate it very much, and I hope you have good luck and are happy in your retirement.

S: Thank you so much.
Mr. Joe O'Connell: Hello, Mr. Secretary.

WHJr: Yeah.

O: The Senate just confirmed Judge Vinson.

WHJr: I see.

O: About two minutes ago.

WHJr: I see.

O: Just had a call.

WHJr: They just confirmed it.

O: Just this minute.

WHJr: O.K.

O: All right, Mr. Secretary.
JUL 17 1945

Dear Admiral Næsche:

Again it is my pleasant privilege to express to you my sincere thanks and that of my associates for the very generous assistance given the War Finance Division.

The contributions made by the personnel of the Coast Guard and by the facilities placed at our disposal were of inestimable value in reaching the high quotas established for the Seventh War Loan campaign.

I am grateful to you for your having made possible this contribution to our effort.

Sincerely,
(Signed) H. Morgenstau, Jr.

Vice Admiral Russell H. Næsche
Commandant, United States Coast Guard
1200 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

JUL 17 1945

Dear General Vandegrift:

Again it is my pleasant privilege to express to you my sincere thanks and that of my associates for the very generous assistance given the War Finance Division.

The contributions made by the personnel of the Marine Corps and by the facilities placed at our disposal were of inestimable value in reaching the high quotas established for the Seventh War Loan campaign.

I am grateful to you for your having made possible this contribution to our effort.

Sincerely,
(Signed) H. Morgenstau, Jr.

Lt. General Alexander A. Vandegrift
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Arlington Annex
Washington 25, D.C.
July 17, 1945

Dear Mr. Simson:

I take this opportunity to send to you and to those who have worked with you my sincerest thanks for your able and devoted service in the greatest of all War Loans, The Mighty Seventh.

It has been a great pleasure to have been so closely associated with you in our War Finance program. We have faced many hard tasks together and can be happy in the fact that we have come through them all successfully. The Seventh War Loan was the most difficult of all, in the face of a rapidly changing military and economic situation. It is a tremendous tribute to the American people that the outcome of this loan has been a more striking success than any of its predecessors.

We all know that we could not have succeeded without the aid of the thousands of individual volunteer workers of our State War Finance Committees. I hope you will extend to those who work under your leadership my boundless gratitude for their hard work and fine accomplishments.

As I did in January, I salute them, the members of your full-time staff, and you for another great and inspiring success. And in leaving the Treasury I shall look forward to the long continuation of the friendly relations which we have established in this great national effort.

Sincerely,

Mr. Walter W. Simson
War Finance Chairman
510 New Post Office Building
Phoenix, Arizona

This is a letter to all State Chairman.
# STATE WAR FINANCE COMMITTEES

The address at the right is the address of the state headquarters. Chairman and other executive officers listed may be addressed at same office unless otherwise noted.

Correspondence for state headquarters should be addressed to the state chairman unless name of one of other officers is underlined, in which case address to him.

Addresses of principal sub-offices and offices in charge follow state headquarters listing.

### ALABAMA
- **Chairman**: Ed Leigh McMillen [Underlined]
- **Vice Chairman**: Frank F. Sanford
- **Executive Manager**: Fred B. Clement
- **Address**: 2002 Comer Building, Birmingham 3
- **Phone**: 4-6511

### ALASKA
- **Chairman**: Gov. Ernest N. Gruening
- **Executive Manager**: P. O. Box 110
- **Address**: Juneau

### ARIZONA
- **Chairman**: Walter E. Bimson
- **Executive Director**: Joseph L. Reesah
- **Executive Manager**: Geo R. Frazier
- **Address**: 215 New Post Office Bldg Phoenix
- **Phone**: 4-2921

### ARKANSAS
- **Chairman**: W. H. Campbell
- **Vice Chairman**: W. Robert Crow
- **Executive Manager**: C. K. Wilkerson
- **Address**: 111 East Capitol Avenue Little Rock
- **Phone**: 4-7543

### CALIFORNIA (Northern)
- **Chairman**: Wm. W. Crocker
- **Vice Chairman**: Merrill E. Ookey
- **Executive Manager**: William V. Regan, Jr.
- **Address**: 733 Marketod Building San Francisco 9
- **Phone**: Garfield 8236

### CALIFORNIA (Southern)
- **Chairman**: Robert M. Wilton
- **Executive Vice Chairman**: N. Dean Willies
- **Address**: 621 South Spring Street Los Angeles 14
- **Phone**: Tucker 3232

### COLORADO
- **Chairman**: Phillip E. Alexander
- **Vice Chairman**: Ralph Nicholas
- **Address**: 555 Equitable Building 17th & Stout Streets Denver 2
- **Phone**: Keystone 4151

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*Send copy to W. H. Campbell, c/o National Bank of Eastern Arkansas, Forrest City (over)*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
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<th>Executive Manager</th>
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<td>IOWA</td>
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Branch Offices:

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(over)
MICHIGAN
Chairman
Frank H. Lassley
Deputy Manager
Robert C. Douglas
Executive Manager
(see below)

BRANCH OFFICES
Deputy Manager
L. B. Hadley
Deputy Manager
Thomas E. Paierol
Executive Manager
Walter J. Wade

MINNESOTA
Chairman
O. J. Arnold
Exec. Vice Chairman
Charles B. Liseo
Executive Manager
Leif Gilstad

BRANCH OFFICES
Duluth
Hennepin County

MISSISSIPPI
Chairman
Box 1 Brown
Vice Chairman
Frank R. Hamby, Jr.
Executive Manager
Leigh Watkins, Jr.

MISSOURI
Chairman
Walter W. Head
Vice Chairman
Dan L. Bee
Executive Manager
Earl H. Shackelford

600 Union Guardian Bldg.
Detroit 26
Phone Randolph 8208

Union National Building
Marquette

1406 Howe Foundation Bldg.
Flint 3

360 Michigan Trust Bldg.
Grand Rapids

570 Northwestern Bank Bldg.
Minneapolis 2
Phone Bridgeport 8763

305 Lonsdale Building
Duluth

Hennepin County

ANDERSON (CONT'D)
BRANCH OFFICES
Deputy Manager
Earl T. Scott

MONTANA
Chairman
A. T. Hibbard
Vice Chairman
R. B. Richardson
Executive Director
Fred J. Martin

BRANCH OFFICE
Exec. Vice Chairman
Wm. H. Bartley

NEBRASKA
Chairman
W. Dale Clark
Vice Chairman
A. A. Lowman
Executive Manager
Leon J. Markham

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Chairman
Forest F. Lorello
Vice Chairman
A. A. Lowman
Executive Manager
Leon J. Markham

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Chairman
Eliott D. O'Meara
Vice Chairman
Norwin G. Noon
Vice Chairman
Henry J. Pelton
Executive Manager
R. A. Seidlin

NEW JERSEY
Chairman
Franklin D'Olier
Vice Chairman
Herbert L. Corbin
Executive Manager
John E. Manning
(Phone Mitchell 2-2020)

BRANCH OFFICES
Deputy Manager
Russell S. Britton

504 Title & Trust Bldg.
Kanawha City 6
Phone Victory 7745

28 Union Bank Building
Helena
Phone 1958

302 Federal Building
Great Falls
Phone 8677

636 World-Herald Bldg.
Omaha 2
Phone Jackson 2637

31 East 4th Street
Reno
Phone 2-2990

702 Ellis Street
Manchester
Phone 9080

972 Broad Street
Newark
Phone Market 3-6170

2307 Boardwalk
Atlantic City
Phone 5-1930

709 Market Street
Cincinnati

98 East State Street
Trenton 8
Phone 3-7060

- Send copy to Mr. D'Olier, c/o Prudential Insurance Co.,
Newark, N.J., New Jersey -
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<th>State</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice Chairman</th>
<th>Executive Manager</th>
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<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>Gale W. Carson</td>
<td>Roy A. Nielsen</td>
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<td>George W. Slocum</td>
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<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>Frederick W. Gehl</td>
<td>Mrs. Courtlandt D. Barnes</td>
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<td>Candler Cobb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Hon. Martín Trujillo, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Roderick Pirne, Louis G. Carr</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Christie Demet, Executive Manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Henry S. Johnson</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Walter M. Burke, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>A. J. Powell, G. A. Christoperseh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>G. Cecil Woods, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Ralph A. Davidson, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>R. M. Rutledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Nathan Adams, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>R. L. Thornton, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Dr. V. Taylor, Executive Manager</td>
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<td>Deputy Manager</td>
<td>C. H. Smith</td>
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**Texas (Cont'd)**

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<tr>
<td>Regional Manager</td>
<td>W. E. Walker, 1602 Republic Bank Bldg., Dallas, Phone 6-6101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Manager</td>
<td>R. E. Sherman, 208 N. Stanton Street, El Paso, Phone Main 552</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Manager</td>
<td>Clarence R. Hendricks, 703 First Natl. Bank Bldg., Fort Worth, Phone 7-3355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Manager</td>
<td>George H. Allen, 7th Natl. Bank Bldg., Ground Floor, Houston, Phone 6-9598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Manager</td>
<td>Homer N. Darsey, 514 First Natl. Bank Bldg., Houston, Phone 6-9598</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Manager</td>
<td>Creston H. Funk, 2020 Alamo Natl. Building, San Antonio, Phone 6-6271</td>
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**Utah**

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<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Charles L. Smith, 3rd Floor, Union Pacific Building Annex, 19 W. South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Phone 5-7661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec. Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Clarence Hambroger, D. Howe Hoppst, 3rd Floor, Union Pacific Building Annex, 19 W. South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Phone 5-7661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>D. Arnold Skelly, 3rd Floor, Union Pacific Building Annex, 19 W. South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Phone 5-7661</td>
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**Virginia**

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<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Francis F. Gaines, 214 N. Fifth Street, Richmond, Phone 7-777</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>C. Fradis Govea, 214 N. Fifth Street, Richmond, Phone 7-777</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>James S. Brasher, 214 N. Fifth Street, Richmond, Phone 7-777</td>
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*Send copy to Mr. Smith at First National Bank, 79 South Main Street, Salt Lake City*
Virginia (Connecticut)
Office of the Governor
1000 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

REGULATORY OFFICE

Regional Manager
(Eastern Division)
Vector M. London

Regional Manager
(Western Division)
B. C. Homaw

WASHINGTON
Chairman
Hansel F. Griffiths

Vice Chairman
Paul Bass

Vice Chairman
E. E. Lewis

WASHINGTON
Chairman
A. C. Spur

Vice Chairman
Lee C. Paul, Sr.

Executive Manager
W. C. Hendler

WISCONSIN
Chairman
Walter Kasten

Vice Chairman
William H. Brand

Executive Manager
Harold V. Dickens

VERMONT
Chairman
Fred W. Marble

Vice Chairman
A. G. Crane

Executive Manager
A. H. Wildes

408 Va. Electric & Power
Company Building
Norfolk 2
13 Church Avenue, S.W.
Roanoke 11
Phone 1-0416

900 Federal Office Bldg.
Seattle 4
Phone Sears 3100
Exts. 237, 729, 437

North 120 Wall Street
Spokane 6
Phone Main 1397

626 Broadway
Takoma 2
Phone Main 6271

608 Security Building
Charleston 1
Phone 3767

Room 620, 735 N. Water St.
Milwaukee 2
Phone Broadway 2632

203 Federal Building
Cheyenne
Phone 7339

Send copy to Mr. Olin, c/o Puget Sound National Bank, Tacoma
My dear Jim:

I know you will be happy to learn that the assistance accorded the War Finance Division by the Navy Department during the Seventh War Loan campaign was of such help to us its effect cannot be over-estimated. As you know, our quotas were unusually high and the circumstances under which they were not met made the task more formidable than any we had previously faced. That our efforts were successful is due in no small measure to the Navy's help.

While I would certainly not detract in any way from the important contribution made by the many individuals in the Navy who contributed of their time and effort, I am tempted to mention specifically the exhibition of Navy planes in Eastern cities and of U-Boat 602. Many of our chairman tell us these two promotions alone were responsible for their meeting their high goals.

The Special Activities Section of the Office of Public Information deserves special commendation. Lieutenants H. L. Shubert, R. E. Hoffswill, A. B. Scott, and A. F. Rhoads of that office worked untiringly, I am told, in coordinating the numerous demands that were made upon them.

Please accept my sincere thanks and that of my associates for the generous help accorded to us.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable James V. Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall;

The "Here's Your Infantry" combat troop demonstrations which appeared in 746 communities in behalf of the Seventh War Loan were a tremendous factor in the results achieved nationally in the drive. We have received reports from coast to coast testifying to the high quality of the production, the fine conduct of personnel and the outstanding results in U. S. Bond sales directly attributable to the operation. In every case the extraordinary public reception accorded the demonstrations was remarked upon.

I greatly appreciate your cooperation in the war financing program in making Army personnel and facilities available for the Seventh War Loan tour, and trust that it will be possible to produce "Here's Your Infantry" on a modified scale for use in the next drive.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff of the Army
Room 3-B-422
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

[Signature]

July 11, 1945
Dear Mrs. Hubbard:

In appreciation of your very generous contribution of the collection of letters and documents containing a complete set of autographs of the signers of the Declaration of Independence to the Seventh War Loan as an award, it gives me great pleasure to send you the attached citation from the Treasury Department. I am told that this is the most valuable collection of manuscripts ever to be offered the Book and Author War Bond Committee. It would indeed be difficult to find a collection more appropriate to the patriotic purposes of the War Finance Campaign.

As you have undoubtedly already heard, Harvard University, in order to qualify for this gift of yours in memory of your late husband, John Hubbard, to the Houghton Library, purchased an additional half million dollars in government bonds. Perhaps the most attractive aspect of this occasion was the enthusiasm with which the people of Cambridge, Massachusetts responded to your generous loan. The participation of 206 clubs and organizations, representing a wide cross section of the population of Cambridge, in a bond selling campaign in honor of your gift is vivid testimony to the public esteem for these historic documents.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Mrs. Helen Rhinehart Hubbard 34 East 59th Street New York, New York

Jul 19 1945

[Engraved seal of the Treasury Department]

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing with reference to your letter of June 28, 1945, in which you requested the views of the Treasury Department on a proposed bill to consolidate and revise the laws relating to the Coast Guard.

The main purposes of the bill are to codify in logical arrangement all laws relating to the Coast Guard, to make such changes in the law as are necessary to provide for the performance of the functions of the Coast Guard contemplated in its post-war plans and to provide for appropriate organizational changes for carrying out these functions. It is noted that the bill is part of a legislative program the early enactment of which is deemed essential to permit proper planning for the execution of the post-war functions of the Coast Guard once that the bill in companion legislation to the bill to establish the permanent military strength of the Coast Guard which you previously transmitted.

The proposed legislation has my approval and the Treasury Department will be glad to cooperate in securing its enactment.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Honorable James Forrestal Secretary of the Navy Washington, D. C.

Jul 1 & 8 1945

[Engraved seal of the Treasury Department]
By dear Harry:

Again I find it my privilege to express to you my sincere gratitude and that of my associates for the liberal cooperation accorded the War Finance Division by the War Department during the recent Seventh War Loan campaign. The amazing accomplishment in the drive was due in no small measure to the splendid assistance the Army gave to us.

Such outstanding spectacles as the Airborne Attack demonstrations, the "Here's Your Infantry" shows, and the airwaves, to say nothing of the contribution made by the many members of the Army personnel and the exhibits of Army equipment, gave an impetus to our effort which could not otherwise have been experienced.

The complete tabulation of Bond sales which could be credited to each feature has not yet been possible, but preliminary reports indicate they will reach totals of which you and we may well feel proud.

It is my hope you will derive great satisfaction from the knowledge that these activities were so helpful to us and, too, from the fact that they have made the public at large more fully aware of the remarkable job being done by the Army.

Sincerely,

Lt. Henry

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Tom:

I take this opportunity to send to you, and to those members of your Committee who have worked closely with you, my sincere thanks for your able and enthusiastic help during the Seventh War Loan drive.

As Chairman of the Committee of War Bond Drives of the American Bankers Association, you have mobilized effectively the selling efforts of the nation's 10,000 banks. This effort has been a very important factor in the successful carrying out of our whole war financing program.

It has been a great pleasure to have been so closely associated with you in this, as in other Treasury work. We have been associated in a number of hard tasks and can be happy in the knowledge that we have come through them so successfully.

In leaving the Treasury, I shall look forward to a long continuation of the friendly relations that we have established in the several jobs we have performed together.

Sincerely,

Lt. Henry

Mr. Tom L. Smith
President
Monteith's National Bank
St. Louis, Missouri

July 7, 1945
July 18, 1945

Mrs. Klots
Secretary Morgenthau

Please remind me to write a longhand letter today to
Bob for his birthday.

Mrs. Klots
Secretary Morgenthau

Please send Joan a copy of the nice editorial in the
Washington Post. I am not sure whether I sent the boys, Martha
and my Father each a copy, but if I haven't I wish you would.
July 18, 1945

Mrs. Spangler
Secretary Morgenthau

Yesterday they sent down 73 bushels of beans for the Atlantic and Pacific. Would you call up Johnson up there and find out what they brought and let me know? Thank you.

July 18, 1945

Mr. Russell
Secretary Morgenthau

A reminder that you were going to give me a letter to Senator Pepper on account of the death of his father.
Mrs. Klots
Secretary Morgenthau

Please call up General Greenbaum's secretary and ask the General if he will add Alan Barth to the Thursday night list. Thank you.

July 18, 1943

To:    Mr. Fitzgerald
From:  Secretary Morgenthau

Call up Matt Connolly and if he is not there call one of his assistants, and see if you can get me a sort of a season pass for myself and one guest to the Executive Gallery of the Senate and the House. Do it this morning, please.

July 18, 1943
July 18, 1945

Ted Oehle
Secretary Morgenthaus

Will you please let me know about who Fred Oehle is going to have on hand for the dinner that I want to give them in New York?

Mr. Fassell
Secretary Morgenthaus

My letter to Robert Wagner - will you please contact the labor section over in War Bonds and ask them if they won't see that the labor press gets copies of that letter. I wish you would do that the first thing this morning. The man to contact over at War Bonds is Lawrence Houghtaling. Please tell him I would like for him to do this himself.
Response requested.

TO: Secretary Morgenthau

FROM: Mr. Fussell

DATE: July 10, 1945

1. The pressroom boys asked me to tell you that subject to your approval their plans call for the dinner the evening of July 24, to be at the Carlton at 7 p.m., informal, and with all proceedings strictly off the record.

2. Life Magazine would like to send a photographer to the dinner to make a few candid camera shots. The pressroom gang would like to have this done, if it meets with your approval.

Hope talked to Fussell.

TO: Mrs. Ketsa

FROM: Secretary Morgenthau

DATE: July 10, 1945

Please send Joan a copy of the nice editorial in the Washington Post. I am not sure whether I sent the boys, Martha and my Father each a copy, but if I haven't I wish you would.

Done.
TO Mrs. Eaton or Mrs. McCullough
FROM Secretary Morgenthau

I think I sent back to Frank Coe's office a personal letter from Mr. Hoeven to be translated. I would like to have it back this morning so I can answer it.

Ted Gamble also has from Ambassador Gaffney a cable from Paris. The cable is about our exhibit and I think it is addressed to me. I would like to answer that also.

Also, somewhere there is a letter from Forbes Watson which I ought to answer. Please take care of these things. About this
The Honorable,
The Secretary of the Treasury,

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is in further reference to your letter dated 16 May 1945 relative to the shipment of gold to China.

This will confirm arrangements made through this office for two additional water shipments, details of which have been furnished by telephone to Mr. Lipsman's office.

Lot No. 1 consisting of 16 kgs. serially numbered CNO 1118 through CNO 1219, with a total weight of 8,336 pounds, displacing 36 cubic feet, with a total value of $6,065,329.91. Each kgs. should be marked HUNT-6-CVD-CVD 153.

Lot No. 2 consisting of 16 kgs. serially numbered CNO 1220 through CNO 1235, with a total weight of 8,336 pounds, displacing 36 cubic feet, with a total value of $3,930,330.88. Each kgs. should be marked HUNT-6-CVD-CVD 153.

It is understood that each lot will be held at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York on call from the New York Port of Embarkation. It is requested that Mr. Peter Lang, Federal Reserve Bank, New York, contact Lt. Col. Merrill Wiggins, TC, New York Port of Embarkation, Telephone, Windsor 9-5G00, as to the exact time and place of delivery for each lot. It is then understood that the Treasury Department will make all necessary arrangements to transport the gold to the New York Port of Embarkation to arrive at the time and place requested by Col. Wiggins with insurance effected by the final consignee.

The Commanding General, India-Burma Theater will be advised by War Department radio the number of the vessel on which the kgs. were loaded with request that arrangements be made for the acceptance and delivery of the kgs. to Mr. P. F. Ling, Manager, Bank of China, Calcutta, India.

Sincerely yours,

R. F. NERVEN
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Fiscal Director
July 10, 1946

My dear Mr. Minister:

I am happy to have your report that our representatives were able to supply to the Inter-Allied Savings Exhibition an exhibit which you regarded as suitable and effective.

Permit me to express my pleasure at having had the opportunity to work with you.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morganstern, Ch.

The Honorable Rene Pleven Minister of Finance Paris, France

MINISTÈRE DES FINANCES

LE MINISTRE

Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État
de la Trésorerie américaine

Mon cher Secrétaire d'État,

Vous avez bien voulu charger Messieurs ADAMS SHELTON et WATSON de prêter leur concours à l'organisation de l'Exposition interalliée de l'Epargne qui vient de s'ouvrir à Paris.

Grâce à l'appui technique et à la compétence déployée de ces deux éminents spécialistes, la section américaine de l'Exposition connaît, par sa présentation originale et suggestive, un succès qui se confirme chaque jour davantage.

Cette participation à notre Exposition met parfaitement en valeur les résultats magnifiques obtenus aux Etats-Unis dans le placement des Emprunts de guerre et vous permet ainsi de révéler au public français l'effort qui précède du peuple américain, qui a contribué par son Epargne à forger les armes qui nous ont conduit à la Victoire.

Je tiens à vous exprimer mes remerciements pour ce nouveau témoignage d'amitié auquel je suis personnellement très sensible.

Cet accompli de ma part est bien sincère....
Translation

Ministry of Finance

Office of the Minister

The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You have been kind enough to have Messrs. Adams, Sheldon and Watson assist in the preparations for the Inter-allied Savings Exposition which has just opened in Paris.

As a result of the technical skill and ability of these distinguished specialists, the American exhibit at this Exposition is attracting more and more attention each day because of its originality.

Your participation in our Exposition highlights the splendid results obtained in the United States through the sale of war bonds and enables us to reveal to the French people the unprecedented efforts of the American people, who, through their savings, made possible the weapons that brought us victory.

Please accept my personal gratitude for this gesture of friendship.

Sincerely,

/s/ E. Eleven
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1945

My dear Henry:

Thank you for your thoughtfulness in writing to me about the Navy's participation in the Seventh War Loan campaign and particularly about the helpfulness of Special Activities Section of the Office of Public Information.

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal

Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
The Secretary of the Treasury
July 20, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

At 9:20 this morning I spoke to Speaker Rayburn. He was very friendly. I asked him when they were going to take up Bretton Woods and he said they would do it the first thing at 12:00 o'clock today. I asked him if he thought they would have any trouble with Congresswoman Jessie Sumner. He said he didn't think so, but that if she gave him any trouble he would wait until she left the room.
31 June 1946

My dear Senator:

I want to express my deep appreciation for the outstanding leadership you have contributed in connection with the Bretton Woods Agreement.

From the opening day of the Bretton Woods Conference to the closing day of the Senate debate on the bill, you have stood unflinchingly for genuine international cooperation in the interest of world peace and prosperity. The fact that you had the courage and conviction to support openly the Bretton Woods Agreement during the early period, when ridicule of these proposals was thought popular and sophisticated by important segments of the press and business, will always be remembered by me.

It must be a great satisfaction for you to recall that where you once stood almost alone among Republican leaders as an open supporter for Bretton Woods, today you are able to say that all of these leaders save a very small minority have accepted the wisdom of your judgment.

Sincerely,

(Signed) M. Morganthau, Jr.

Honorable Charles W. Tobey,
United States Senate.

July 21, 1945

Dear Walter:

I want to congratulate you on the passage of the Tax Adjustment Act and on the admirable way in which you guided it through the Senate, avoiding amendments which would have delayed passage and impaired the legislation. The Act will be encouraging and helpful to the businessmen of the country in the critical period of reconstruction to peacetime work.

The cooperative way in which this bill was formulated has pleased me very much and I appreciate your important personal contributions to the development of the measure. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue has done a fine job and I am sure will continue to do a fine job as it turns to the more important problems of postwar taxation. I want to thank you for your helpfulness to the members of the Treasury staff, both in their recent work with the Committee and in the past. They have often spoken of your unfailing courtesy.

It has given me a great deal of pleasure over the years to work with you on tax and other financial matters. Under your able chairmanship the Senate Finance Committee has played a leading part in financing the war on a sound basis. Please accept my warm congratulations on your many years of distinguished public service and my hearty good wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Henry

Honorable Walter F. George
Chairman, Senate Finance Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

July 21, 1945

Filed 7/21/45

Regarded Unclassified
Dear Mr. Johnson:

I want to thank you for the kindly references to me in your editorial of July 6 dealing with my resignation.

I am aware that many conscientious public servants would be encouraged to put forth still greater efforts if they could be assured that they would receive such generous appreciation.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Harold N. Johnson
Editor, Watertown Times
Watertown, New York

Re: Bnnc
Re: mnh
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Stanley:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. C. W. Stanley
Editor, The Advertiser
Montgomery, Alabama

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Chapman:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. H. Powell Chapman
Editor, The Times
Roanoke, Virginia
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Hall:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. W. W. Hall
Editor, The Post
Charleston, South Carolina

RF:hgb
HEH/mah

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Owen:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. E. L. Owen
Editor, The Post-Standard
Syracuse, New York

RF:hgb
HEH/mah
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Noland:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthaler, Jr.

Mr. Stephen C. Noland
Editor, The News
Indianapolis, Indiana

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Burkholder:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthaler, Jr.

Mr. Ralph Burkholder
Editor, The Citizen
Columbus, Ohio
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Pulcher:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington, I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Gordon Pulcher
Editor, The American
Austin, Texas

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Jaffe:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington, I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. L. I. Jaffe
Editor, The Virginian Pilot
Norfolk, Virginia
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Salisbury:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Gerald H. Salisbury
Editor, The Knickerbocker News
Albany, New York

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Clark:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Frank W. Clark
Managing Editor
The Herald-Journal
Syracuse, New York
My dear Mr. Owens:

I am belatedly acknowledging that I read the editorial in The Sun of July 7 on "The Spreadingest! Secretary of Them All" and was pleased by it.

My gratitude should also be recorded not only for other instances of editorial praise on the back by The Sun, but especially for the good reporting on national affairs that has helped to hold the standard of the press a little higher.

I send you and your staff my greetings and good wishes as I leave the work here.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Hamilton Owens
Editor-In-Chief, The Sun
Baltimore, Maryland

My dear Mr. Daniels:

I want to thank you for your pleasant note of comment on my leaving office after twelve years.

It recalls associations running back a long way to the times when as a very young man I felt a special interest in your public career.

I am cheered greatly as I leave by knowledge that you regard praise of my efforts as just and merited.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

The Honorable Josephus Daniels
Editor, The News and Observer
Raleigh, North Carolina

HE5/mah
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Freeman:

I have read yours among other editorials on my leaving office and was greatly pleased by it.

It is with a great deal of relief, although of course with some regret, that I lay down the burdens of this post, which you can realize have not been light at any time in these twelve years.

That man of wisdom and historical knowledge who have been watching have words of commendation sends me on my way with lighter heart.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Douglas S. Freeman
Editor, The News Leader
Richmond, Virginia

July 20, 1945

Dear Mr. Lewis:

As I prepare to free myself of duties here I have been reading some editorials on my resignation. I liked very much the tone and content of yours in the Dispatch of July 6 and thought I ought to tell you so.

It is encouraging to people who work in government if they can feel that their records will be surveyed candidly and impartially and with the same sense of responsibility that the conscientious public officer has to bring to his tasks.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Herbert Lewis
Editor, St. Paul Dispatch
St. Paul, Minnesota

ERF: FP: hgb
ERF: mah

ERF: rnc
ERF: mah
July 20, 1945

Dear Mr. Field:

I liked very much the tone of The Sun’s editorial of July 7th on the subject of my resignation from the Cabinet and thought I should tell you so.

It was understanding and intelligent and expressed correctly what I have been trying to do. I want no greater recognition than credit for being on the right track and trying.

I wish you continued and greater success with your good newspaper.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Marshall Field  
Editor, The Chicago Sun  
Chicago, Illinois

July 20, 1945

Dear Mr. Paschall:

I appreciate greatly the friendly references, in your editorial of July 6, to what we have been doing here in the Treasury during my tenure of office. All who have been associated with me will, I am sure, be encouraged to put forth greater efforts by such understanding commendation.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. John Paschall, Editor  
Atlanta Journal  
Atlanta, Georgia
July 20, 1945

Dear Mr. Pulliam:

I want you to know that I read your friendly and understanding editorial of July 6 and was greatly pleased. The fact also that you have been a staunch, a faithful and a powerful helper in War Finance from the start has not escaped my memory and will not.

This final tribute is a good memorial of our satisfying association in a good work.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. E. C. Pulliam, Editor
Indianapolis Star
Indianapolis, Indiana

July 21, 1945

My dear Mr. Reid:

For the kind words in your editorial of July 7 about my resignation I offer you my thanks. As for the rest I won't quarrel with you for the moment.

I thank the Herald-Tribune for much kindness and consideration in my twelve years here. I don't remember having had reasons to complain of ill treatment, though here and there our opinions didn't just check.

You have been running a fair, an enterprising and a high-minded newspaper. I think it well deserved from the Roosevelt Administration the label of "the loyal opposition."

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Ogden Reid
Editor, The Herald-Tribune
New York, New York
July 24, 1945

Dear Eugene:

I have been too busy with a number of things to write you earlier in thanks for your editorial of July 6, commenting on my resignation.

It was immensely pleasing and reassuring to me, especially as because of the standing and character you have given to the Post, which cause its appraisals of men and events in Washington to be regarded with the greatest respect. I think a great many people are like me in giving more weight to what the Post thinks on national affairs than they give to publications of much wider circulation and supposed influence.

There's a reason for this and the reason reflects the highest credit on you.

You and your men have given help to us here in the Treasury frequently. I like to feel it was because you thought we deserved it.

You started on your present assignment about the time I started on mine. You are still going strong and well, I hope, continue for many years to come.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Mr. Eugene Meyer
The Washington Post
Washington, D.C.

KHP:sja
KH:P:ah

July 21, 1945

My dear Mr. Noyes:

I noticed your editorial of July 6 on the subject of my resignation and was pleased by it.

As I leave office permit me to wish you and the others of the Evening Star family all good fortune. I am indebted to all of them for much enjoyment and enlightenment in my years here.

Sincerely,

[Signature] H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Theodore K. Noyes
Editor, The Evening Star
Washington, D.C.
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Blagden:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the editors, and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

[Signature] H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Ralph M. Blagden
Managing Editor
The Star-Times
St. Louis, Missouri

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Mansfield:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the editors, and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

[Signature] H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. W. D. Mansfield
Editor
Mansfield News
Mansfield, Pennsylvania

EBF:cmw
July 21, 1945

Dear Dean:

I read the story about my moving and was pleased by the obvious evidences of your attention. Certainly there was nothing in the story to which I should object.

Also, let me express my gratitude for the editorial that appeared in the Washington News of July 6. Will you tell the author that I approve it?

Sincerely,

(Signed) Tommy

Mr. George B. Parker
Editor-in-Chief
Scripps-Howard Newspapers
1013 13th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Martin:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. Sanford Martin
Editor
The Journal and Sentinel
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Ferguson:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

Mr. J. D. Ferguson
Editor
Journal
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

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July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Matthews:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Jones:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington, I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

[Signature] H. Morganthau, Jr.

Mr. Vincent S. Jones
Executive Editor
Observer-Dispatch
Utica, New York

MR: clw

July 2, 1945

Dear Mr. Patterson:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington, I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

[Signature] H. Morganthau, Jr.

Mr. Maclean Patterson
Managing Editor
Evening Sun
Baltimore, Maryland

MR: clw
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Dabney:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also consciously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,

(Signed) H. Marganethou, Jr.

Mr. Virginius Dabney
Editor
Times-Dispatch
Richmond, Virginia
July 21, 1945

Dear Mr. Hurwitz:

I am writing to thank you for your kind references to me in the editorial on my resignation.

In my twelve years in office in Washington I have had no more effective help than that rendered by the newspapers. I feel an obligation not merely to the press as an institution, but personally to the reporters, the writers and the editors who are also conscientiously and actively serving in the business of government.

In leaving office I wish for you prosperity and progress as guardians of our liberties.

Sincerely,


Mr. Abraham Hurwitz
Editor, Journal
Jacksonville, Florida

RE:rgd
FARM CREDIT DIARY
April 27–Nov. 16, 1933
April 27, 1933

10:30 - Congressman Pou of North Carolina called on me. He says he has been in the House for 32 years and that Mr. Hoover, out of recognition for his services, located the R. A. C. C. Bank at Columbus, Mo. He pled with me to keep the bank there, out of recognition for his services. He said, "I am a rubber stamp on the Hill and I am proud of it."

10:45 - W. H. Settle, President of the Indiana Farm Bureau called. He is a director of Farmers National. He told me that he thought the salaries in Farmers National, particularly Mr. Minnor's, should be reduced. I told him I thought that was up to the Board of Directors. I also informed him about the recent visit of Farmers National officials and that they made a preliminary reduction of 20% in their budget. Mr. Settle said he thought that was fine and it was the first he had heard about it.

11:00 - Former Governor Carlton of Tampa, Florida, called. He impressed me very much. He said any time I wanted any information about Florida he would be glad to give it to me. He hoped that in appraising the land for mortgages that we would give credit for the orange groves in addition to the land which, he tells me, is not done now.

11:40 - Ed. O'Neal of the American Farm Bureau Federation called, and wants me to place his son who is being graduated from the Columbus Law School this spring. I introduced O'Neal to Ollphant and assured him that if his son stood well at college that we could give him a job as a law clerk.

12:15 - Ollphant and I called on Congressman Woodrum, Chairman of the Sub-committee on Appropriations of the House. He said very confidentially that the Committee had approved our appropriation as submitted although there had been some questions about the $10,000 salaries. We then went to the Appropriation room and Congressman Buchanan, the Chairman, came out and shook hands with us and told us that everything was all right.

1:30 - Was a luncheon guest of Senator Arthur Capper, who wanted me to meet Mr. Roy Roberts of the Kansas City Star, who is the managing editor. Senator Capper also had Senators Patterson and Clark of Missouri and Senator McGill of Kansas. Mr. Roberts told me that he looked forward with real favor on the farm mortgage end of the farm relief bill, but was quite worried about the farm relief end of it. I told Bennett Clark about the negro who had been fired from the Crop Loan office at St. Louis on March 18th, and the next day had been put to work by the N.A.C.C. He told me he would investigate this at once and let me know.

2:30 - Frank Peck brought in Mr. Harry Beale who is the Manager of the R.A.C.C. Bank at Columbus, Ohio. Mr. Beale was introduced to me by E. E. Babcock who has known him for 15 years and recommends him very highly. I urged Mr. Beale to come with us on trial as assistant to Mr. Peck as I pointed out to him that the future of the cooperatives in this country would be settled in our office during the next six months. Mr. Beale is going to come with us starting next Monday and work five days, returning every Friday night to Columbus. I called up Hovey of the R.F.C. and asked him to lend Mr. Beale to us for an indefinite period. He cheerfully granted this request.

3:30 - Was visited by John Brandt of the Land O'Lakes Creameries. Mr. Brandt tells me that in the last ten days, the price of butter, skim-milk powder and turkeys have all gone up and that the farmers are generally feeling much better. He says he feels that there is an excellent chance that the farm relief bill will go to Roosevelt what the Farm Board did to Hoover. Brandt is disgusted with the farm leaders' attitude towards the relief bill as he feels that they are just a lot of "me-too's".

The next visitor was James Stone, ex-chairman of the Farm Board who came in to say good-bye. Outwardly, he seemed very friendly.
Evening - Elmer and I made a formal call on the Canadian Legation who had a reception in honor of Prime Minister Bennett. Bennett said he would like to talk to me about the wheat situation. On leaving, I told the Canadian Minister, Mr. Herridge, that I would be delighted to discuss wheat at any time but felt that it was up to the Secretary of Agriculture. Mr. Herridge said, "The Prime Minister likes you very much and wants to talk to you."

At 9:30 we went to a reception at the White House in honor of the Canadian Prime Minister. Sidney Thompson gave a recital.

April 22, 1933

Senator Smith called on me this morning and brought along a Mr. Traxler for whom he is very anxious to get a position. Traxler was campaign manager for Roosevelt in South Carolina. He also has been a promoter of real estate in Florida and Texas. Senator Smith seems extremely low and constantly refers to the fact that he was treated better under Hoover than he is under Roosevelt. He said, "Mark you, Worgantha, if they do not change their method of distributing patronage the President will soon have a revolution on his hands." Smith objects to having to get every appointment obeyed by Farley.

Senator Lonergan of Connecticut called on me. The Connecticut Life Insurance Company informed him that they believe it is to their disadvantage to have the home mortgage bill appraise city homes at 80% and have the farm mortgage bill do their appraising on a 60% basis. I explained to him that the city homes were appraised on today's basis while the farm would be appraised on a normal or fair basis which practically puts the city and the farm on the same basis of appraisal. Lonergan and the Life Insurance people have told Wallace on the idea that the farm appraisal should be raised. I finally told Senator Lonergan that Wallace should stick to his farm relief, and I would attend to Farm Credit, and that was what Roosevelt brought me down for. I spent over half an hour with Lonergan and when he left I think I convinced him that the position I was taking was a fair one and really in the interests of the insurance companies.

10:30 - Mr. Goss, member of the Executive Committee of the Grange, brought in Mr. Shumway and Mr. Adams of the North Pacific Grain Coop. It seems that they have about 35,000,000 bushels of wheat on hand. The 1933 wheat crop to be made looks as if it would be only 50% of normal. The banks in Portland who have loans on this wheat have issued orders that they must sell the same within the next 30 days. They informed me that already their sales have driven the price down 7 or 8¢ in this area. This procedure seems very stupid to me. I called up Mr. Harrison, Assistant to Governor Meyer of the Federal Reserve and asked him to see this group this afternoon and see if between the Federal Reserve and the Farm Board we cannot do something to help this group.

10:45 - Mr. Hearst, President of the Iowa Farm Bureau, called on me. I took this opportunity to ask him what he knew about Lt. Gov. Kressel. He tells me that Kressel has been a livestock auctioneer of questionable reputation.

11:30 - Congressman Burnham of California called in regard to selling the Land Banks to make loans in Imperial Valley. He tells me that Mr. Ellis, President of the Land Bank at Berkley, California, has always been unfriendly to the Imperial Valley.

12:00 - Pictures taken at the Department of Agriculture.

2:30 - Mr. Roper, Secretary of the National Democratic Committee, called and left a letter with me from Jim Farley asking that we advise him of every appointment we make. I turned him over to Forbes Morgan and asked him to comply with Jim Farley's request. I asked Mr. Roper if any other Department had a man to look after appointments and he said the only one who had was Secretary Hyde. He said Mr. Wallace told him to keep in touch with his secretary, Mr. Hall, and Mr. Roper refused to because Hall is a Republican appointed by Secretary Hyde. As near as I can make out, with the exception of Secretary Farm, no other department is equipped to handle political appointments the way we are. Secretary Ickes raised the question why we should have to deal with Farley who is simply another member of the Cabinet.
April 29, 1933

Mr. Arthur Sulzberger and Bob visited me in the morning. I came to the office very much excited as the previous evening the Senate had passed the Smith Farm Relief Bill unexpectedly. I felt sure that commodities would rise sharply and wanted to use this opportunity to sell the balance of the grain stabilization wheat. Just as I expected, wheat opened Saturday morning 2-1/2 points above Friday's close. Within 90 minutes I sold the balance of the wheat that we owned.

I thought that this was a good opportunity to give out the story of how much the Farm Board operation in stabilization wheat cost.

Elinor, my father, Bob, Arthur Sulzberger, and I had lunch together. In the afternoon we went out to Fort Myer horse show, and in the evening I went to the Grillroom Dinner and sat between McAdoo and my father. They introduced my father and myself to saying that my father had been sent as Ambassador to Turkey and how his son was talking turkey to the farmers. McAdoo used this opportunity to talk patronage to me which, of course, I did not relish.

April 30, 1933

Elinor and my father, Bob and I drove out for a picnic lunch. We called on the Klots's at their apartment in the afternoon, and had the Grant Straus for supper.

May 1, 1933

Due to a misunderstanding Wallace's secretary had not communicated with me and, therefore, Mr. Wallace waited 15 minutes for me. We walked down together. Wallace suggested that we have a meeting with the President and the leading Democrats who are interested in agriculture. When I asked him what Democrats, he seemed vague. It finally boiled itself down that he wants to meet with him and the President and see if he can agree on a policy of running his Farm Relief Administration. I asked him if he had ever explained to the President just how he proposed to do it, and he said he never had the opportunity to. I told him that I would be glad to meet with him if he would make the appointment. He suggested that we have a preliminary meeting at which we would try to come to some agreement before seeing the President.

10:00 - Myers, Beator and I called on Senator McNary and Wolcott who are the two Republican members from the Senate who will sit in on the Farm Relief Bill Joint Conference. McNary seems very intelligent and grasped the various points very rapidly. Wolcott doesn't seem to know much about the bill and seems to be unfriendly to the Federal Land Bank System.

12:00 - I went to the White House doctor to have my eye looked after - nothing much the matter with it.

May 2, 1933

Last night I attended a dinner at the White House given in honor of the two Argentine Ambassadors. Very uninteresting dinner.
Went to the White House at 11 a.m. The two Argentina Ambassadors, Senator Putnam, Raymond Moley, Herbert Feis, Jim Warburg, Jr., Wallace and Tugwell were there. The President outlined his discussion with MacDonald, and said that they had agreed to try to do something with wheat and silver; that the silver producing countries would get together and see if they could not stimulate the use of silver and raise the price, as over 500,000,000 people in this world were on the silver basis. They felt that if these silver producing countries could confer with India that good might come of it. He told them that he was sending my father abroad, but it was very hazy in his mind as to what conference my father was attending.

After the Argentine Ambassadors left, a half dozen of the men gathered around the President and I heard him say that he was against having any more gold exported, and that he felt we should let the dollar seek its own level but hoped that the price of the dollar would rise a little bit more. Tugwell seemed quite aggressive and, as usual, rubbed me the wrong way. Wallace sat there with his head hanging down and his mouth open, and if you looked at him with his face so relaxed, his expression was one of complete dejection.

1:00 p.m. Luncheon with the President. Had a very direct talk with him about our progress with Russia. I told him that Raymond Moley said that what I was doing was one of the most courageous things that anybody had done so far in Washington. I told the President that if the proposition turned out well I would be a hero, and if it turned out badly, I would have to leave Washington. He turned to me and in a very positive manner said, "Well, of course, you know that I stand back of you in these negotiations; and if you have to stand back of you in these negotiations I will leave with you." He then turned to leave Washington, I will leave with you. He then turned to leave Washington and said, "You know Mr. Morgenthau is negotiating a proposition and if it does not turn out well he may have to leave Washington and I told him if he does there will be two of us who will leave."

I told the President that I would like to introduce additional legislation to perfect the Farm Security Administration, and that we would like to transfer the $30,000,000 fund that the RFC allocated to the Secretary of Agriculture for Crop Loans. I told him that if we had the unexpended balance in this fund, plus whatever collections would come back, that we could set up local credit corporations this summer and be ready to take care of direct loans for the next season, and that we hoped in this way to make it unnecessary for Congress to again appropriate a large amount of money for seed loans. He told me to go ahead and have this legislation introduced and that I could say that it had the approval of the White House.

Bob and I went over to meet Mr. Calloway of Georgia at Wallace's office. Wallace was ten minutes late and came in from a Cabinet meeting looking simply exhausted. Calloway wanted to talk about taking 10 million acres of cotton out of production and paying the farmer $10 an acre to plow under his cotton. Calloway said if we did not do this we were facing a 125 million bale crop, and he prophesied that cotton would go to 4.

I then called on Marvin Jones and had a hearing with five members of the Committee on Agriculture who will confer with a similar committee of the Senate on the Farm Mortgage Bill. They gave us exceptionally fine treatment, and I believe that they will accept all of our suggestions that we asked them to make in the Bill.

Stayed home for supper.

Attended a conference at the office of the Secretary of Agriculture with the two Argentina Ambassadors. Rex Tugwell did 90% of the talking for our side. He was very aggressive and positive, and I felt irritated at the Argentina Ambassadors. Ezekiel put his car in and Wallace sat there and hardly opened his mouth. He constantly referred to Tugwell, and I really felt sorry for Wallace. When we got through discussing wheat I felt that they had gotten nowhere. They then said they would take up the question of the embargo on Argentine cattle on account of the hoof and mouth disease. Tugwell then said, "Those who were only interested in wheat will be excused," - to which I replied, "Thank you for sending me home. I will go at once."
Giannini called on me of the Bank of America. He is one of the most forceful and dynamic personalities that I have met in a long time. He told me that R.A.C.C. has been run by his enemies and that he wants to put us on our Board in California some member of his bank to look after his interests. He almost took my breath away. I told him that we were not putting any representatives of any banks on our Board, that we were trying to serve the farmers and not special interests. I said, "You will have to trust me that I am going to run this outfit fairly and squarely." Giannini said, "I was satisfied with you until I read that you had Eugene Meyer for dinner and then I had my doubts about you as Meyer is allied with the group on the Pacific Coast who are our enemies." I told Mr. Giannini that before changing the setup on the Pacific Coast with new people that I would give him an opportunity to let me know if the people I put in charge were on the level.

Tonight I attended a conference at the White House and I am putting in my diary a memorandum prepared by Gaston of what took place at this meeting:


Later arrivals: Secretary Perkins, Attorney General Cummings, Assistant Secretaries of State Fels and Moynihan, President's Secretaries Bowne, McIntyre and Early.

The President, after some jocular conversation, asked Wallace to state the purpose of the meeting.

Wallace - Important question of policy in administration of farm relief bill should be decided by those present, leaders of "the party". Rise in commodity prices on eve of passage of bill made problem in some ways more difficult. Higher prices mean temporary relief but likely to encourage big crops. Disastrous fall in prices later. Surpluses will exist despite rise in prices. There is difference of opinion about leasing program. Indicated he thought farmers should be induced to make a start in cutting down production by "taking out" substantial area from cotton and wheat by leasing. Later outlined method of county quotas of funds to be raised by processing tax, distributed on basis of production. Method of apportioning within county perhaps on basis of tax value of lands.

Roper - Contributed at length thoughts about cotton leasing. Seemed to favor idea. Discussion between Roper and Wallace about possible effectiveness of Smith option plan. Wallace at length suggested meeting should hear from Peck.

The President - "What do you think about this, George?"

Peck - "Well, of course, I disagree." The first effort should be to raise prices, with control of acreage to be left in abeyance. Prices could be raised by processors' tax and agreements with trade. Cutting acreage now would be very unpopular, especially as to wheat, although he believed something should be done about cotton acreage. Went into involved discussion of administrative control should be set up. Suggested "strong men" such as Alex Legge, Lowden, and others to be commodity directors. Thought early efforts should be big end of effort. Men should be selected without regard to party politics. Republicans should be chosen in middle west, since that section is really Republican.

Douglas expressed interest in necessary Treasury advances and danger of their not being fully recovered by processing tax.

Wallace talked about commodity conferences at which the Department would merely present "forcibly" facts as it viewed them, leaving decisions to conferences.
Morgenthau, after more than an hour of seemingly fruitless discussion by the above-named, asked the President's leave to make a suggestion, which was that the Secretary of Agriculture be permitted to continue his outline of plans.

The President asked Wallace to continue.

Wallace produced prints of organization chart, showing some 300 or more employees. Wallace continued that Peak was the man "we have in mind" for administrator in general charge. Since he and Peak were not in complete agreement as to policy it was important to get instructions from "party leaders" in this meeting.

Farley, asked by the President for his opinion, thought organization shown on diagram looked "too complicated." Didn't see why there should be such a big organization. Wallace replied it would necessarily be more complicated than shown on chart.

Wallace and Tugwell endeavored to divert discussion back to leasing. Tugwell suggested H. L. Wilson express his view. Wilson supported Wallace-Tugwell view some leasing should be attempted this year as an example and training, even though growing crops be destroyed.

McIntyre - President should be on air with appeal to farmers to cut down acreage. Said people in government had no idea great hold President had on affections of farmers. They'd do must he asked.

The President asked Henry Morgenthau's opinion.

Morgenthau - Strongly opposed McIntyre suggestion. Thought it would be a terrible mistake for the President to take on any such responsibility.

Wallace continued on leasing theme. Production must be cut unless country wanted to continue Republican policy of financing shipments by foreign loans.

Peek suggested dumping could be practised.

Feis defended record of State Department. Easier to talk about dumping than to get away with it. Countries that depend on agricultural exports must make them.

The President invited Morgenthau to express his opinion. "Do you see any difficulties?"

Morgenthau - "Nothing else but." Repeated he had no opinion to express but when the President insisted on obtaining his views said whole evening's discussion had been on basis as if bill were about to be introduced. Bill was actually about to become law. Department of Agriculture should have a plan. It was Department's business to form a plan and administer the bill. He had other matters on his hands. He could not undertake to decide policy.

The President - "The bill is going to be passed and I am going to sign it." Thing now was to decide what to do with it. Morgenthau should have opinion as well as he. To Morgenthau's statement he would not ask meeting such as this to decide policies as to farm loans, President said he might call such a conference on some matter of farm credit policy.

Rebock - Thought powers under bill should be used in cautious way. Would "ease into the thing".

Myers - Believed it would be difficult to get farmers to plow under growing crops for rental representing their costs. Their habit to regard crops well along in growth in light of yield value. Like asking cabinetmaker to break up two out of six chairs because there were too many.

Gaston said any radio appeal by President ought not to be merely to farmers, but should be general appeal to public for cooperation. Making special appeal to farmers to cut acreage on patriotic grounds would be in effect repudiation of the relief bill.

Hows, Roger and others contributed additional remarks and the conference broke up about 11:30.
The general impression created was that Peck's selection as Relief Administrator had been forced on Wallace and he desired to get President and advisors either to approve his ideas and veto Peck's, or to take responsibility for the latter. The meeting didn't arrive at any decision.

I was terribly excited throughout the whole meeting as I felt that Wallace was trying to drag the President in to share the responsibility with him on the Farm Relief Administration. If I had been in Wallace's shoes I would have wanted to hang my head with shame because I did not know how to do my job. We all left the meeting very blue but since then have cheered up considerably.

May 4, 1933

The first thing after I had arrived at the office, Wallace telephoned me to thank me for what I had done to help him. Of course, he took my breath away but for once I was not stupid enough to let on that I did not know what he was thanking me for.

4:00 - Attended my first hearing on Public Buildings. Colonel Grant, the Secretary of this Commission, tried to think of every reason why we should not get the space we needed. I felt he was rather slow-minded and thick-headed. Finally they agreed to give us the space we needed in the old Southern Railway Building and, in fact, gave us about 10,000 more feet than we needed. McReynolds who accompanied me was very helpful. The Department of Agriculture had four people there, and they said they must have room by Monday to set up their farm relief organization, and they were insistent that the Department of Crop Loans be put out of the Department of Agriculture Administration Building. The Committee did not seem very much worried about it and told them that they would have to wait until they moved out the U.S. Customs from our building, and then there would be room for crop loans.

Went home and had lunch with Elinor and Irving and Siassi Lehman. Rested in order to get myself in shape to speak at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Read a speech prepared by Herbert Gaston and answered numerous questions. I felt partly satisfied the way I handled myself but not entirely satisfied.

Was visited in the afternoon by Governor Blood of Utah and two Congressmen whose only interest in calling on me was to ask for jobs.

In the evening I attended a dinner at the Argentina Embassy. On arrival, Rex Tugwell rushed up to me and said, "You can't appreciate how much you did for us at the White House. You certainly were a real friend in need." He really said it as though he meant it.

May 5, 1933

Called on the Controller General who asked me to come alone. He seemed quite disturbed about our set-up and felt that we would not be able to pay some of our Division Heads without getting some changes in the law. I am going back at 4:00 p.m. with Myers, Oliphant and McReynolds to try to come to an understanding with him.

Judge Sam Rosenman had lunch with us and told me that he spent fifteen minutes with Ray Moley. Sam said, "To think that Ray Moley used to hang outside of my office six months ago with the hope that I would pass on some of his papers to Governor Roosevelt. This morning he acted as if he was running the Government and that Roosevelt was carrying out Moley's suggestions." Sam seems very much down on Moley and thinks that Tugwell is all right. I tried to disillusion him on Tugwell.

This evening I went to the White House at 7:30 for supper. Miss Leland asked me to come as the Rosenman's were going to be there. I had fifteen minutes with the President before supper. He mixed cocktails and various people came in. I asked him what the purpose was of the meeting on Wednesday night, and I told him that on Thursday morning Wallace called me up to thank me for what I had done. The President roared and said, "I don't see why Wallace thanked you inasmuch as you kicked..."
him twice. ..." The President said he thought the purpose of the meeting was to acquaint the members of the Administration with the difficulties facing the carrying out of the farm relief program. Mr. and Mrs. Breezenridge Long, Mrs. James Roosevelt, Jr., and her sister were there also.

Went to New York on the midnight.

May 6, 1933

Saturday morning I went to the office for a couple of hours, and then took the twelve o'clock train to the farm.

May 7, 1933

Returned to New York tonight, Sunday. Earle Baille called on me at 9:30, and we decided to sell those stocks on Monday which had gone up largely due to talk on inflation. We felt that the other stocks that I own would continue to do well on their merits independent of what the British pound did. He and I listened to the President's radio talk, and I have never been so thrilled by any radio talk as I was with the one he gave. Returned to Washington on the midnight.

May 8, 1933

Learned through McReynolds that Colonel Grant of the Public Building Commission was trying to hold me up in getting space. I was very much excited about it. Called up Sen. Connally, Chairman of this Committee. He knew nothing about it so I decided that the best thing was to have it out before the Committee, and I asked Sen. Connally to give me a chance to appear. Colonel Grant has had the reputation of being a martinet and very ruthless.

An amusing episode during the day was when Senator Connally called me up from Rep. Buchanan's office - each have a candidate for the position of Agent at the Houston Land Bank. Sen. Connally said, "I will not stand on my rights and I am perfectly willing that Congressman Buchanan's man should have second place as long as mine has first." Congressman Buchanan got on the wire and said, "Would it be agreeable to you if we flipped a coin as to which man should have first place?" I said okay, but Sen. Connally would not agree. I referred the matter to Jim Farley's office and O'Mahoney, due to Mr. Farley's absence, called up Sen. Connally and told him that they would have to get together. Sen. Connally again called me and said that they had agreed that his man was to have first place and that he would not stand in the way of Buchanan's man having second place. Inasmuch as Mr. Buchanan is chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and Sen. Connally chairman of the Building Committee, I was in a tough spot - but it all worked out for the best.

May 9, 1933

Sen. Smith called on me and told me in great confidence that Frank Lever of South Carolina is getting a petition signed to urge me to appoint Lever in charge of the Southeastern part of the United States. I told Senator Smith not to worry as I could not use Frank Lever as he reeked of liquor. Senator Smith said that he had noticed it, too.

I then went up to the Building Commission and told them that I could not understand how their Commission acted as they had passed a resolution last Thursday arranging for space to house my organization in 1300 E Street. Colonel Grant took it upon himself to do otherwise. I told the Committee that I was right up against a stone wall and I had to find room for the Federal Land Banks as they would be taking on 200 or 300 men within two weeks, and we had no place to put them. After arguing about it for about half an hour they finally decided that they would move out the Bureau of Customs into a temporary building known as "O" Building. This is just what Colonel Grant didn't want. Sen. Connally ordered Colonel Grant to
move the Bureau of Customs out within ten days and move the
Land Bank organization in. After the meeting was over, a num-
ber of the people from the Department of Agriculture con-
gratulated me on my success, and they say that this is the
first time since Colonel Grant has been in charge that he
has had to take a licking and they all said it was about high
time as he has been very ruthless about administering pub-
lic buildings.

Had lunch with the President. He greeted me in German. I
asked him what about Schacht, and he swung his arms around
and said, "Why, he is terrible. I am in an awful jam with Europe,"
and jokingly remarked, "I may have to call up the Army and
Navy as Great Britain and France respectively disown MacDonald
and Harriot. They are a bunch of 'bastards,'" he said - re-
ferring to European statesmen.

I told the President we were making good progress on our
negotiations with Russia, and ought to hear between May 15th
and 20th; also told him we had an inquiry from Yugoslavia
for 50,000 bales of cotton and that I thought if we could
announce our Russian deal along with the Yugoslavian deal that
it might take the curse a little bit off the whole proposition,
to which he agreed. Told him that we might run into diffi-
culty - that Antorg was confused as to the deal I was trying
to put over and the one that Floreshiem of Chicago has tried
to put over. Floreshiem evidently had contacted the Antorg
a couple of months ago, saying that he represented Mr. Woodin.
The President told me very emphatically that he had taken up
at a Cabinet Meeting the question of Floreshiem negotiating
with Antorg and they had decided that he should not represent
the government as the President had heard indirectly that
Floreshiem expected to make a 100 commission out of the deal.
The President further said, "Noah, if I could only, myself,
talk to some one man representing the Russians, I could
straighten out this whole question. If you get the opportunity,
Henry, you could say that you believe but have no authority
to say so, that the President would like to send some person
to Moscow as Trade Commissioner in order to break the ice be-
tween our two countries and in that way gradually get the
people of the United States used to doing business with the
Russians." I told the President that I doubted if I would
have the opportunity to talk to anybody representing the
Russians as I was dealing through Greenbaum and from
Greenbaum to Rosen, and from Rosen to Antorg.

I showed the President a chart on how the commodities were
rising; also another chart with a lot of business statistics,
and he said, "No." This seemed most surprising to me.
I told him how the people in Wall Street were worried about investigations beginning May 23rd and he said, "It
is news to me. I didn't know it." He said, however, that
I would be surprised to know how many people, Senators,
Congressmen and members of his administration have come to
see him and say, "Don't you think that it would be wise to
have Congress soft-pedal Pecora's investigations?" The Presi-
dent said, "It is none of my damn business who or what Congres-
s investigate.

I told the President how I thought that his radio speech
was even better than his bank radio speech when one consid-
ered that the circumstances surrounding his speech were
not as unusual. I felt the reception it received was even
better and he agreed. It is surprising how keenly interested
he was in what I had to say about his radio speech because,
after all, today is Tuesday, and there must have been thou-
sands of people who telegraphed him about it, but just the
same he loved to hear the nice things which I had to say about
his speech. He said, "As soon as I get the authority from
Congress to regulate gold, I can use it when and if necessary."

I took the opportunity to show him a two-page memorandum from
Dr. Warren in which he was very much interested. He then
gave me a penciled memorandum about a telephone conversat-
on he had had from Governor Olsen of Minnesota, in which Olsen
told the President that unless something was done soon, he
was afraid that in the State of Minnesota they might have a
repetition of what happened in the State of Iowa; namely, a
demonstration by the farmers against the courts. The Presi-
dent said to me, "What would you think of my giving out a
short statement when I sign the farm relief bill asking the
holders of mortgages to put off all foreclosures until we
had a chance to put into effect the new farm mortgage relie-
ity I told him I thought it was an excellent idea, and the Presi-
dent then said, "Ask Gaston to write a 200-word statement for
me."
McIntyre announced that Mr. Woodin was waiting outside, and
the President said, "Let him wait" - to which McIntyre
replied, "Should I tell Mr. Woodin to come in in five min-
utes?" and the President said, "No, I will ring for him when
I am ready." He let Mr. Woodin wait ten minutes until we
got through.

May 10, 1938

Spoke at the New York Advertising Club. Spent an hour writing
my speech at my apartment before I went there and found when
I got up to deliver it, I seemed to know it pretty well by
heart. I think the talk went very well.

Had supper with my three sisters and their two husbands at my
father's house. We spoke to my father by radio over the
telephone.

Returned to Washington that night.

May 11, 1938

Wasn't good for anything until after lunch because I had one
of my very sick headaches. In the evening went to Mr. and
Mrs. Fred Delano's for dinner. Very nice, but dumb.

Mr. Goos telephoned me from Seattle, Washington, that he
would take the position to head up the Division of Production
Loans, but did not wish us to announce it until June 7th
as he was going to have a State Grange Convention at that
time. He said he would be with us on the 1st of June.

May 12, 1938

Had a staff meeting. Told them that I would have to run
Crop Loans myself until Goos came. I feel that if I do run
it for two or three weeks I will really learn what it is all
about and undoubtedly it will be helpful.

Had a call from Senator Murphy of Iowa who asked me point
blank if I was going to appoint Lt. Gov. Kraschel. I told
him that I was not going to appoint him as several farmers
from Iowa told me that it would be a very unpopular appoint-
ment as they did not consider Mr. Kraschel a first rate man.
Senator Murphy seemed very much disappointed, and said that
he would have to get him the position of some Collectorship.
He then asked me if I would take his State Chairman, who
is 72 years old and knows nothing about our work. I told him
that I could not. I said, "Sen. Murphy, you have to give
me first rate men. I am willing to come back to you three
or four times, if necessary, in order to get a good man,
but you know perfectly well that if I fall down on my admin-
istration because I selected poor men, none of you politi-
cians are going to come to my rescue, and you will all say
that Morgenthau should have known better, and should not
have accepted these people." He agreed with me, and went
out of the room half way satisfied. I made up my mind that
I am not going to kid the politicians, and I am going to tell
them politics, but finally, that I cannot accept their candi-
dates. I believe, in the long run, they will respect me
HINTS FOR IT.

May 15, 1938

Senator Smith called on me about 9:30 very much excited about
our statement that we were going to sell at auction the
19,000 bales of cotton held abroad. He said he had telephone
calls from all over as to whether that meant that we were
going to sell any more cotton. I told him that we would set
out a statement explaining it, and he said it would be entire-
ly satisfactory. He went out of his way to take a crack at
Wallace.
10:30 - I met with about 30 representatives of various Life Insurance Companies. Their attitude was, on the whole, cooperative, although one man from Iowa told me that he would only exchange his mortgages for our new certificates provided we accepted his mortgages at face value. With commodity prices so high, I question whether the insurance companies are going to rush in and offer us a lot of their mortgages as they now seem quite hopeful that they may be able to work out of their situation without giving any reduction in the principal of the mortgages.

11:00 - Lunched with the President. I said to him, "You know I am really the only 100% Jew in your administration, and as a personal favor I would greatly appreciate it if you would let me check anybody whom you are thinking of appointing as Ambassador to Germany." The President said he would be glad to, although he said, "You are only a 75% Jew." I asked him what he meant by that and he replied, "You are not orthodox." He said that William Phillips, Under Secretary of State, had suggested Adolph Miller of the Federal Reserve Board. I told him that I doubted whether he would be forceful enough to be the man. He then said, "What do you think of Glenn Frank, President of the University of Wisconsin?" I said, "As far as I know, he is all right. Now, I have a suggestion to make." I then gave him the name of Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick. The President seemed to like the suggestion very much. He said, "That is all right as long as you do not suggest Dr. Holmes or Dr. Wise." I said that I would not. He said, "If you could keep this absolutely under your hat until noon on Tuesday, I will read you a statement which I am giving to go out. He then read a most remarkable statement on appealing to the 65 nations of the world to disarm completely. He is giving this statement, knowing that Hitler was supposed to address the Reichstag on Wednesday and hopes to influence him in this manner.

I asked the President how he got along with Dr. Schacht, and he said only fair. I said, "What is the likelihood of war with Germany?" and he said, "A very strong possibility." I said, "Will the U.S. have to go in and defend its treaty rights?" and he said, "We won't have to send any men abroad any way."
country of foreign bonds. The President called up Rev. Samuel Rayburn and discussed it with him at length over the telephone, and asked him to do something about it. Louis Howe said, "How if you really want to make Hiram Johnson happy, call him up and tell him what you told Cong. Rayburn." The President did this. It was very interesting to watch Louis Howe work, and see how the President took his suggestions.

I told the President that I was delighted that he had instructed Secretary Wallace not to use the processing tax on commodities for the time being. The President said, "Of course, we cannot do it now as it would be contrary to what I have been talking about with the foreign representatives, as if we put a processing tax on commodities in this country, it would mean that we would have to increase the tariff on similar commodities to raise them to the price of our domestic market." I told the President that I hoped that now that he had postponed the use of the process tax that he never would use it. He said, "How are you going to pay for the leasing of the land?" I said, "Any method other than the process tax would be less expensive in the long run." He gave me a kind of funny look as much as to say, "I do not agree with you and I am not over pleased with your remark," but I stuck to my guns as I always do with him.

As I left, he said the two Elmores had a very nice ride together this morning. He also said whenever I take a commodity ride and a day off the way I did Sunday, I always have a let down the following day.

Saturday afternoon, late, Wallace called me up very much excited because the Journal of Commerce of New York had had him on the phone about our selling the last of the cotton stabilization cotton. He said he thought that possibly we were wrong and couldn't Oliphant get in touch with his people at once. I told him that we would the first thing Monday morning that everybody had gone home. Monday, first thing, I called in Oliphant who had not explained to me that in selling this cotton located abroad I would have to cover and buy an equal amount of cotton in the U.S. Oliphant had not thought the thing through to conclusion. He says that the case of A.C.C.A. cotton is different as the title is

still with them, and that they can sell their cotton to Russia, and would not have to turn it over to the U.S. I.A. I took Oliphant aside and let him know that I was displeased, and I finally told him that I look to him and only to him to keep me straight on this kind of transaction. He took it all right, and I am sure that in the future he will be more careful.

May 16, 1933

First thing in the morning I had my picture taken by three news reeles.

Senator Thomas of Oklahoma called to inquire about our set-up in his State.

I had a very amusing incident with Senators Connally and Shepherd of Texas. Senator Connally said, "Vorgentau, I went to the mat for you today," and I said, "What happened?" He said, "When we started to move the Bureau of Customs out of your building, they told us that the Secretary of the Treasury had instructed them not to move." Connally said he had it out with the Secretary of the Treasury, and told him that they would have to move. Evidently the Secretary of the Treasury only learned of this decision which is at least ten days old. Connally seemed very much pleased with himself and then turned to me and said, "Now how about giving this man a job?" It seems perfectly ridiculous that a whole Bureau should be moved and flight about 20,000 square feet in order that Senator Connally should get a couple of jobs from me - but that is the way that things are done in Washington. I feel that by strictly attending to my own business and personally following the moving, I am getting results for my department and have been able to put it over people like the Secretary of the Treasury, who evidently are not following things as closely.
Called on the Comptroller General who has prepared an excellent set of inventory blanks that we will send to all the Branch Offices of the R.A.C.C., and I believe the Crop Loan offices. The idea is that these offices will take an inventory on May 27th as of the close of business on May 26th. My idea is to close all of these offices to the public on May 27th in order that they can comply with this inventory by the following Monday, May 29th.

I broadcast for five minutes pointing out that applications should be sent directly to the twelve Regional Land Banks rather than to Washington.

Lunched with Dante Pierce, who is anxious to find out if I really had anything against Lt. Gov. Kraschel. I learned from Pierce that Kraschel has antagonized the Farm Bureau in Iowa through trying to get their appropriation discontinued. He has also antagonized the Farmer Union crowd. It seems that Kraschel ran against U.S. Senator Murphy in the primary, and Kraschel was defeated, and in the last minute of the campaign they got Kraschel to run for Lt. Gov. He evidently did more than any other individual to carry the State Ticket this last election. Therefore, Senator Murphy feels under tremendous obligation to him. Dante Pierce tells me that he has known Kraschel since he was a small boy, and feels he is absolutely on the level. However, after listening to Dante Pierce, I realize that it would be very stupid of me to appoint Kraschel as I would be getting into the midst of a farm organization fight in Iowa. Dante Pierce just hates Wallace and loves George Peek.

Sam Curtis Bailey, a Harvard classmate of the President. He is assistant manager of the R.A.C.C. office at Portland. He made a very good impression on me. He has had a lot of experience with cattle loans, and I think later on I will be able to make use of him.

Had a long talk with John Boettiger of the Chicago Tribune. He told me that over the week-end he had been doing a lot of worrying as he was afraid that he and I were going to have a real fight. I told him that I also had been worrying, and the last thing in the world I wanted to do was to have a row with him. I explained to him that I felt I could not give all the information that he wanted about Farmers National to Congressman Bean, but I appreciated the fact that McCormack, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, was bringing all kinds of pressure on Boettiger to get the inside story about Farmers National. I told Boettiger the last thing in the world that I wanted to do was to cover up anything crooked in Farmers National, if they were crooked. I told him that I would make him the following proposition: "I am perfectly willing to let you see all of our files on F.N. and give you Mr. Wells to assist you, provided you give me your word of honor that you will divulge nothing in these files unless you find something irregular, and then discuss it with me first." Boettiger agreed to this proposition, and I felt that he could be trusted.

I was largely influenced to coming to this decision as a result of a conversation that I had with Ernest Lindley of the N.T. Tribune, who is a great friend of Boettiger. Lindley said to me, "Be sure, Henry, that by withholding information on Farmers National you are not putting yourself in a precarious position in case they subsequently should find out that there was something crooked about F.N., and then you would be blamed for concealing this."

Sam Warburton and Hoffman of Crop Loans, and Mrs. Fuller. Mrs. Fuller said, "I have a fine suggestion to make to lay off the people we do not need in the Washington office. She said, "You know these people have all had one notice and don't have notice from the sill we have reinstated at least 80 of them." She said, "Let us give them notice on the 27th of May that they would be through on the 31st." Then I argued with her that I would like to have these people laid off before the 27th, she let out of the bag by saying, "Why if we do that all of the pressure will be on the Secretary of Agriculture." So I told her to give these people notice on the 24th that they were through on the 27th, and they could say in this notice that I had been consulted. Mrs. Fuller must have thought I was awfully stupid and then said we could put a last one over on her. She has applied to me for a position and, as a result of this episode, I certainly would not want her in my organization.
Went to dinner at Mrs. Wallace's, the wife of the former Ambassador. Sat next to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson. I was quite thrilled as I never had a real chance to talk to her before. She has a very high-pitched, rather unpleasant speaking voice. She is very pleasant to talk to. I said to her, "The President has certainly brought back a lot of the Woodrow Wilson people." She said, "Yes, he has. It is very nice and I do not want to criticize him, but there are a lot of other people that Mr. Wilson had whom he could bring back who are very worthy." She said Wilson used to say that it was so difficult to get good people to join in the depression service as so few could afford to take the positions. Mrs. Wilson is very much interested in our looking for a house, and suggested that we take one back of hers. She said, "We would love to have you as neighbors."

May 17, 1939

Walked down with Babcock. He tells me that he is not going with Sears Department Store, and that after July he is going to devote himself to the U.S.F. and the A.A. I told him that I hoped he would give the A.A. more time after July 1st and he said he would.

I told him about my arrangement with Boettiger of the Chicago Tribune, inasmuch as Babcock is handling the Farm Board's negotiations with Farmers National. I told Babcock that I wanted Farmers National to pay up the $400,000 or $500,000 that comes due the latter part of May as I felt that it was important on account of all of the people who were watching to see what I was going to do in connection with Farmers National. He said he would see that this was taken care of.

Jesse Jones telephoned me and said the President wanted me to accompany him to see the Secretary of State in regard to selling China one million bales of cotton. We met at the Secretary's office who called in the Chief of the Far East Division and one other man. The expert pointed out that the National Government of China owed various private citizens of the U.S. amounts totaling $150,000, and that their custom

... taxes had tripled in recent years, but they used all of this money for current expenses instead of paying off some of their obligations; that Japan was about our largest customer for cotton and might take offense at our Government financing such a large transaction to China. The Secretary pointed out that our Government was approving sales of arms and ammunition by private firms to Japan. He also said that several months ago it was necessary to send our fleet to the Far East in order to keep Japan from taking possession of some of our islands. I asked for an opportunity to talk with Hull and Jones alone. I told them that I would strongly urge that this transaction be put through at this time as I felt that even if we never got a penny for our cotton that this transaction would put cotton up at least $2.50 to $3.00 a bale; that our carry-over plus our prospective crop looked like 25,500,000 bales. If we exported 1,000,000 it would increase the value of cotton on hand by about $100,000,000. I told them that I hoped that this would go through and stop the Secretary of Agriculture's plan to have the southern cotton growers put under a proportion of their cotton. Hull and Jones agreed with me.

At 4:30 we saw the President. I took Oliphant along in order to introduce him as I never had an opportunity to have him meet the President since he had been with me. We saw the President for three or four minutes before Dr. Secretary, Finance Minister of the National Government of China and the Chinese Minister to this country arrived. Jones briefly sketched the proposition, and then I repeated to the President my reasons for urging to have this done. For the first time that I made a suggestion which was a criticism of the plans of the Dept. of Ag., the President agreed with me without showing any irritation. Hereafter, he seemed irritated when I criticised the Department plans in regard to farm relief. The Chinese are certainly very intelligent but talked awful English. Just before the meeting broke up, the President turned to Jones and said, "Do not make the Chinese pay too quickly for this transaction and do not make the interest rates too high." He certainly gave the impression that he wanted the Chinese treated liberally. Just before leaving I showed him my chart showing that this week, for the first time, the price of gold has levelled out and that the price of commodities has continued
to rise notwithstanding. The President asked for an explanation of this and I said, "I do not know. It is just an important factor, and I wanted to bring it to your attention." He turned to Jones and said, "Henry shows me a series of charts every Monday, and they are most interesting."

Had lunch with 30 or 40 people in the Board Room - mostly directors of Babcock's G.L.F. Very pleasant affair.

Senator Byrnes called on me very much worried and quite excited. He had been in in the morning and told the Forbes Morgan had said that the reason we were not giving Ex-Congressman Frank Lever a job was because somebody said he drank to excess. It was very stupid of Forbes Morgan to say this. Senator Byrnes wanted to know who had made this statement. I could not tell him that Senator Smith had said so, so I said I did. I said that Lever had been here for three days and every morning his breath smelled strongly of liquor. Byrnes said, "I cannot understand it. I have known that man for a lifetime and he swears to me that he has not touched a drop in five years." In the afternoon he said that he had an explanation of this. He produced a bottle of Cod Liver Oil and Malt Extract. He said that Lever takes this vile stuff every morning and this must be the reason why his breath smells so. Byrnes says that his secretary notices whenever he has a drink, and that very often he stops around in the afternoon to visit the Vice President who, according to Byrnes, drinks every afternoon, and joins the V.P. in this custom. Byrnes says that "my secretary always notices when I have had a drink." I have asked her about Lever and she says that Lever does not drink. He said that Warburton says that he does not drink. The whole thing seems awfully trivial if it were not for the fact that Byrnes takes it so seriously, and the only thing that I could do was to say that I believed him. He said, "If you give Lever a job and you ever find that he takes a drink during office hours, you can fire him on the spot."

My next caller was Marvin Jones who had gone to see the President at my suggestion as he wants to be appointed Judge in the Customs Court in New York City. He said the President was most kind, and really gave Jones the impression that he would hate to lose him, and asked Jones to think it over. I told Jones that if he left here, it would be a tremendous loss

to me, and I hoped he would certainly not leave and would think it over very carefully. Jones said it was his life ambition to be a Judge and this looked like his opportunity.

Dined at the White House. They had those of the correspondents who had formerly been in Albany and who were now here in Washington. Mrs. Roosevelt called across the table to me, "Did you listen to Hitler on the radio?" I said that I did. She said, "Could you understand a word he was talking about?" I said, "I could not." She said, "Oh, I am so glad because neither could Franklin nor I."

May 22, 1938

This morning at 9 o'clock I was at the office of Joe Robinson to meet there with Myers, Senator Smith, Senator Byrnes of S.C., Marvin Jones, Cong., Joe Byrnes and Speaker Kelby. For an hour we discussed the proposed bill prepared by Myers setting up the Farm Credit Administration. Senator Smith objected to the whole plan. He is strongly in favor of continuing Crop Loans. Senator Robinson objected to that part of the bill which made changes in the local farm loan systems. He felt that this was very controversial and if we wanted to get this bill through this year we better leave out that part of Myers' proposal which had to do with changes in the Federal Land Bank System.

At 11:30 had my first Farm Credit Administration staff meeting. It lasted about an hour. The following people were present: Mr. Myers, Mr. Gilplant, Mr. Gaston, Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Warburton, Mr. McReynolds, Mr. Bowman, Mr. Forbes Morgan, Mr. Estor, Mr. Carson, Mr. Peck, Mrs. Klots. I believe that the meeting was very useful and I propose to have a similar meeting every day.

Lunched with the President. On coming into his room I was greeted by Louis Howe. I said to Louis, "I want you to help me on something that I am going to ask the President." I then told the President that this was the first time that I was coming to him to ask his help as we were up against a stone
wall trying to get space for the F.C.A. It seems that Colonel Grant had been around and left a memorandum with McIntyre who had given it to the President, and the President in turn had turned it over to Lew Douglas. The President said, "I referred this matter to Lew Douglas." He said, "Get in touch with him." I said, "Yes, he is so terribly hard to reach as he is so busy. Can't Louis Howe do this as he has been so helpful in getting things done for me?"

The President said, "All right, call Louis Howe." which Louis Howe did. Douglas did not know what he was talking about as he had not received the memorandum. The President said, "Tell Douglas there is no hurry about this," and Louis Howe repeated to Douglas, "This is not urgent."

I then explained, quite at length, the urgency of our getting space, and I am interested to see what is going to happen.

The President was a little irritable today with both McIntyre and Louis, and asked them both in turn for Heaven's sakes to let him eat his lunch in peace. He said, "I want 30 minutes to myself and do not want to talk business."

The President said to me, "What did you think of my message to the U.S. nations?" And I said, "I hate to say nice things to your face but I really believe that your message changed the whole situation in Europe." He said, "I think I have averted a war. I sent word through the German Ambassador to Hitler that I was going to send a message and that if his message was of the same character as Van Papen that I would not blame France if she went to war." He said, "I think that sending that message to Hitler had a good effect." I said, "Do you think the announcement in today's papers about England, France, Germany and Italy getting together?"

He said, "Nobody seems to know much about it, neither the German nor French Ambassadors who were here this morning, but it looks as though it was all right, as though the four countries were agreeing to what I asked the U.S. countries to agree to."

I told him that Irving Lehman was so pleased with the letter that he had received from him about my father being a delegate to London and he said, "I am only sending six delegates; two Senators," I think he said, "two Congressmen, Secretary Hull and Mr. Cox." He said, "I have to limit it to six. Your father will be a member of the Advisory Commission."

He then asked me what I had done about his former classmate, Curtis Bailey. I told him that I liked him very much and surely could use him a little later on. He said, "Now, I want to ask you to take care of two other people - Guernsey Cross and Mayor Sarge of Poughkeepsie." I simply roared and said, "Good heavens, why are you punishing me? I thought I had done a good job so far." He laughed and said, "I have got to take care of them somehow," and he then let the matter drop. I asked him what he was going to do with Tom Lynch, and he said he wasn't going to give him another appointment later on.

While this conversation was going on, Miss Leilung came in with a new dress she bought and put on the jacket and hung the skirt from her waist, and asked the President how he liked it. She said, "Dorothy Roseman had one like this in black, and I asked her to get one for me in blue." We both admired it. Then Missy went around straightening out some pictures on the wall and left us, and then returned in about twenty minutes. I asked him about John F. Sinclair. He said, "I like him and I think he is able." I told him that I thought of appointing him as one of my Deputies and he said, "I think he is all right." He autographed four of the Inaugural Programs for me and a picture of the farm bill being signed for myself and one for Marvin Jones. He said, "We had a grand time on the river, and I want you and Elmer to go with us some time." I told him about my idea in getting a boat to live on for June and he said, "no, not anchor too close to Washington during the summer on account of the sewerage." He said, "I believe there is a U.S. Fish Hatchet at the federal six miles below Mr. Vernon."

I showed him my business chart, and he said he was very much interested in seeing that building was picking up. I drew his special attention to the fact that the price of gold and basic commodities had separated, and he replied, "Yes, but the difference between them for the time being seems to be constant." He said, "I would like to see all other loans increased," and I told him that I understood that the Federal Reserve Board tomorrow would announce the index for the week, and that it would show a slight increase. When he came to the steel activity chart, he said, "That is going up too fast."

Regraded Unclassified
He said, "I see that Samuel Untermyer has been made counsel for some Jewish American Committee," and he also said, "Too bad, he is not the right man for the job." I expect to pass this word along to Irving Lehman by telephone.

May 23, 1958

Took John Boettiger of the Chicago Tribune to lunch. I consider this conference very important as I have been very much worried what the ethical thing was in regard to giving out information about Farmers National and the Grain Stabilization Corporation; also I did not wish to suppress any information and, lastly, knowing that Colonel McCormack wanted this information I did not want to make an enemy of him and his press. The whole thing was a most delicate negotiation, and I believe I have come out of it extremely well. I explained to Boettiger that his investigation through our records disclosed no dishonesty on the part of the Grain Coops; that it did reveal the fact that the Farm Board in February, 1956, certainly showed bad judgment in extending the $4,000,000 loan of Farmers National for another year just before I took office and contrary to the advice of the Farm Board staff.

I told Boettiger that we were in the midst of a reorganization of Farmers National, that if he published the fact that Farmers National had been run in an unbusinesslike and careless manner, it would jeopardize our $16,000,000 loan. I told him that I was very hopeful that we would be able to reorganize Farmers National on a business basis. Boettiger said that he had been in touch with Senator McNary and that the Senate Committee on Agriculture would shortly publish the results of their investigation of last fall. Boettiger asked me how I would react to a request from Senator McNary that they continue this investigation and bring it up to date. I told him that I would tell Senator McNary that I would be delighted to have him make such an investigation. Boettiger said anybody could ask for anything more. Boettiger then asked if I would be willing to have him write Colonel McCormack that Boettiger had an opportunity to go through our records and had found nothing dishonest. I told him by all means to write such a letter.

May 25, 1958

as I told Boettiger that it ought to strengthen his position with Colonel McCormack.

I think that Boettiger has been fair, and that he feels that I have been more than fair with him. It is my guess that he has been getting a lot of his information from Ed. Marishan, who used to be the publicity man for the Farm Board and who now represents the grain trade in Washington.

Last night I took Marvin Jones, Congressman Joe Byrne, the leader of the House to supper. We then went over to Joe Robinson's room. Senator Jimmy Byrnes, Senator Hill and Mahood were there, and Cong. Doxey of Mississippi, and Speaker Rayburn. They asked to have the bill read page by page, and much to my surprise after about two hours of discussion they agreed to 90% of the bill. Unfortunately, the appropriation end of the bill was not read so it means a delay in having it introduced. They asked me if this was an administration bill, and I said that I had the authority to say it was.

May 25, 1958

Last night Senator Byrnes of S.C., Marvin Jones, O'Brien of the Hill Drafting Commission of the House, Myers, Ollivant and I called on the Director of the Budget to explain to him our farm bill which we had delayed in introducing at his request. I reminded him that a month ago we had told him that we were going to do this if he did not give us $120,000,000, necessary to start a new organization on a permanent basis, and that undoubtedly Congress next January would come back and ask for another $200,000,000 or $300,000,000 for Crop Loans. Senator Byrnes led the argument very forcibly and very well, and finally Douglas said, "I am satisfied. You can go ahead with the bill." I asked him if he would tell the President this, and he said he would. I consider this a big victory as Douglas had put me in a most uncomfortable position, as I told the Democratic Leaders in the Senate and in the House that I had the approval of the
President as to the general principles of this bill, and if Douglas had killed it, it would have greatly hurt my prestige.

As I left the office, Miss Johnston, Douglas' secretary, told me that Douglas had disapproved my request for executive positions under the new set-up on May 27th of the P.C.A. This just gives me one more worry.

On arrival home, Jesse Jones called me. He wanted me to get together with him and Secretary Wallace right away. We finally arranged to meet at his office Thursday morning at 9 o'clock.

Kline and I dined at Frances Perkins' home. Harry Hopkins, Mr. and Mrs. Jewett House were there. Frances Perkins did 75% of the talking. Harry Hopkins, 25%, leaving very little for anybody else. Frances Perkins is certainly very positive in her statements and did much of the talking herself that I, for one, did not have a good time.

May 26, 1933

Went to Jesse Jones' office this morning. Senator Smith of S.C., Henry Wallace and his counsel, Jerome Frank, were there. Wallace said he thought they should sell some of the Crop Loan or Cooperative Cotton. I told him that we have been unable to get a decision out of him in regard to their Crop Loan cotton, and it would take months to deliver it to him. Frank agreed with me. He said last night they consulted the Solicitor General, and he said it would be illegal for them to sell the Cooperative Cotton. I told him that Oliphant held otherwise. I urged that they buy 1,000,000 bales of cotton for China in the open market. Wallace said, "I have lots of reasons for wanting to see some of the U.S.A. cotton sold, but I won't go into it unless you want me to." I then said, "If you hold that it is illegal to sell the Cooperative Cotton, why argue about it?" Finally, Wallace said, "Well, if you do sell the cotton to China I do not want it announced for at least 30 days so that the price of cotton will stay down and I can go out and conclude my arrangements to lease the land from the cotton growers because if the price of cotton goes up now, it will make it much more difficult for me to lease the land." I said, "Henry, I wonder if you really what you are doing. You would be withholding information from the farmers and if in a month or two they learn that you knew all the time that this Chinese deal had been concluded the farmers would feel that you had misled them. Quick as a flash he said to me, "I do not care what they think as long as we can lease their land." And I answered, "If you do not care, I do, and I am certainly not going to let the President be put into any such position." He then said, "All right, Mr. Jones, make any kind of a deal that you want, but when you get ready to release the publicity, let me know."

I stayed after Wallace left and said to Jesse Jones, "My advice to you is to release the publicity just as soon as the contract with China is signed, and if you want to use my name, you can do so. It is up to you." He said, "When I get ready to release it I want to say that I had consulted both Wallace and you."

Just before leaving I strongly urged Jesse Jones to sign the contract with China, buy the cotton in the open market, and in this way head off any plans that Wallace might have to lease acreage. Just before leaving, Senator Smith called up Jones and said that Wallace had convinced him while riding over in a taxi that if they bought any cotton it should be the Cooperative Cotton - again showing that Wallace is not straightforward, not intellectually honest, and will not put his cards on the table in face to face conferences. For the first time, I have come to the conclusion that he is not trustworthy and, therefore, a very dangerous person.

May 28, 1933

Appeared before the Sub-committee of the Senate on Banking and Currency on our Credit Reorganization Bill. Stayed about one hour. Subsequently heard from Dr. Meyers that they reported it out favorably. Senator Byrnes of S.C. presided.
12:30 - Jimmy Roosevelt and Mr. Sargeant called on me. Jimmy Roosevelt said, "I am not going to pull a Curtis Dall. Father knows all about this and approves." He said, "I am on a salary with this firm of insurance brokers and my only interest in the matter is if I get them additional business perhaps they will increase my salary by $1,000." It seems to me that he is rather splitting hairs, and I cannot see an awful lot of difference between what he is asking and Curtis Dall's request, except that one is the President's son and the other is a son-in-law, and they are both in the same business and evidently competing against each other. In fact, Jimmy told me that Curtis had no business going into the insurance business, that he was in it first. Jimmy and I had lunch with the President.

I told the President about the troubles that I was having with Lew Douglas. I said that no personal difference between us had arisen, but simply that I felt that as long as I kept within my appropriation and the number of jobs specified, that the responsibility was mine as to whom I appointed and what I paid them. The President said, "What do you want me to do - have your appointments come directly to the White House?" I said, "No, it is perfectly agreeable to have them clear through Douglas as long as he is told by you to let me have the people I need." The President wrote a long-hand note to Douglas and said he would take care of it. I hope he did.

The President said he would like to see the dollar go to 4.25. He also told Bernard Baruch in my presence that he would like to see the price of commodities be based on a 75¢ dollar. He asked me what I thought and I said, "Fine." The President said, "I do not want to see the stock market go up too fast."

The President said, "The first opportunity you have, I wish that you would get over to Arthur Sulzberger that Arthur Knock is making some very important guesses as to news out of Washington and that he is only right 80% of the time." The President said, "I will give you an example. Several weeks ago at a newspaper conference I spoke about new kinds of taxes. The boys asked me what kind and I said I was thinking about 80 different kinds of taxes. The next morning the Times printed the story in a flat statement that I was considering using the sales tax. More recently, in the case of my message to the 56 nations, this is what happened. I wrote the message Sunday evening on the Sequoia and showed it to two people, Hull and Phillips. Monday afternoon, the story leaked through one of two sources and neither of these sources was Moley. Phillips had telephoned to New York and asked Frank Pope's opinion of the message. Pope being the lawyer for Morgan. The President said, "What would be more stupid?" He said, "Monday afternoon it was around Washington that I was going to send an important message to Europe, and Arthur Knock that evening wrote an article saying that I was doing something which would guarantee security to France. Tuesday morning at five o'clock, my cables to the 56 nations left. These were in Europe by 11 o'clock. Tuesday morning at eight o'clock the French Ambassador, M. Andre de Laboulaye, picked up the New York Times, read Arthur Knock’s story, and sent a dispatch to the French Foreign Office, quoting Knock's story as being as Knock was close to the Administration. The President of the French Republic had not yet received Roosevelt's message or else he had not communicated it to the French Foreign Office. The French Foreign Office gave out a statement which appeared on the streets of Paris in the afternoon of Tuesday congratulating Roosevelt and themselves that Roosevelt was going to guarantee the security of France. A few hours later the French President, having received Roosevelt's message, transmitted the same to the French Foreign Office who gave it out to the press, and Wednesday morning all of the French papers ran editorials how disappointed they were in Roosevelt's message - the French being the only country to do this. Roosevelt blames all of this on Knock's story."

The President said the trouble with Knock is that during the last six months of the Hoover Administration, Knock was amongst the two or three newspaper men that Hoover treated as intimates. As a matter of fact, he was so close to Hoover that Hoover used him to telephone Roosevelt while he was Governor at Albany and also had him telephone to Louis Howe in a case of another matter to be the intermediary between Roosevelt and Hoover. Now, Roosevelt treats all of the newspaper men alike and he thinks that Knock's nose is out of joint.
I will try to get this story over to Sulzberger, but it will be a very difficult and delicate mission.

I told Roosevelt that my father had asked me hoping that his status in London would be announced. Roosevelt said, "I do not know why it has not been announced. It should have been." Then he went on to send me a personal letter, "Tell your father if he wants to send me a personal letter he should do it through Warren Robbins who will bear witness to its genuineness."

The President said to me, "Do you get your news plane all right?" I said, "Yes, I do get my news plane all right," and he said, "I would very much like to see it."

June 6, 1933

Lunched with the President. Douglas sent word that he could not come as he was held up in a committee meeting. Therefore, Miss Lehigh joined us but when she heard that Douglas was coming any way, she left.

Showed the President my statistical chart. He said, "I hope the stock market will not go up too fast," and also that the President could not continue to improve until the 15th of September, when he thinks we will have turned the corner.

Had a lengthy discussion with the President and Douglas about salaries. The President, to my surprise, said most of the salaries have not been increased. He hardly took part in the conversation. The President said that the two of them had agreed on Sunday that 10 per cent of the F.D.R. at $10,000 each should not have 10 per cent of the F.D.R. at $10,000 each.

As a matter of fact, on returning from the White House, I found a note from the President which read as follows:

"Mr. F.D.R.,

I am not thinking over the 5 men at $10,000 each.

I think it politically unwise and out of line with other administrations."

The President said that with all these new agencies coming along that if he established the precedent of 10 executives at $10,000 each, he would have difficulty with the other people not to give them the same. We argued for almost three-quarters of an hour. I did my best, but finally agreed on myself and 3 deputies at $10,000, and the rest at $9,000. The final argument centered around the General Counsel. Douglas spoke up and said, if you give Henry's counsel $10,000 you will have to do the same for Frank at the U.S.C.G. He said there has been a lot of criticism against Frank. It seemed to me entirely out of Douglas' territory to pass on the counsel for the U.S.C.G. I left fairly well satisfied as I could see the President's point of view.

4:15 p.m. - Myers and I went up to the office of the Secretary of the Senate and met with the Sub-committee on Banking and Currency of which Senator Jimmy Byrnes is Chairman. Senator Steiner of Oregon and Carey of Wyoming put up a big fight that we should continue the R.A.C.C. I kept repeating over and over again that I would not close one of the R.A.C.C. banks until I had something better to take its place.

We had to wait for Jimmy Byrnes to come back from the White House. He had been there on a conference on cotton acreage control. Byrnes told me, "Senator Bankhead is very keen for this program. I have gone along with him on cotton and he in return has withdrawn his objection to your Credit Bill."

As a matter of fact, said Byrnes, Bankhead is going to let me cast his vote. This shows you how legislation can be killed or put across.

June 9, 1933

Friday afternoon about five o'clock Congressman Bushman called me up and said that Congress was going to adjourn Saturday night and that Douglas had phoned him the figures to include in the deficiency appropriation bill and that
ours was not included. Oliphant, Myer's, and I tore over to the office of the Director of the Budget and saw his assistant, Mr. Roosevelt. I left Oliphant behind to get the necessary papers out of that office and see them on the way to the White House. About 8 o'clock that night the White House sent them up to the Capitol. I was very much worried because we needed $42,000,000, and I thought Douglas might prove to be difficult to handle, but he was not. As a matter of fact, I never talked to him. Myer's and I then left for the Capitol and met Senator Jimmy Byrnes to see what was going to happen to our bill. Looking around for a room to use we finally got located in the office of the Vice President. The V.P. told us we could use the room and we stayed there until 10 o'clock doing our lobbying. About every half hour the V.P. would come in and take a drink. He always would bring some Senator with him. We left a little after ten when we found that there was no chance to bring our bill up. Byrnes assured us that our bill would be made unfinished business and would be on the calendar for the next morning.

Ten o'clock next morning Myer's and I again took possession of the office of the V.P., and stayed there and had our lunch there and spent the whole day. In the afternoon, the Senate and the House held their conference committee meeting on our bill, and it was fun to watch Byrnes handle them. They struck out an amendment for $500,000 to be loaned in North Dakota and adjacent states to light grasshoppers. I drew Byrnes' attention to the bill amendment which carried the 3 Commissioners' salaries at $10,000 each. I told him that I had an agreement with F.R. and Douglas that we should pay those men $9000. Byrnes said, "I am not going to pay any over rate salaries and you can tell the President I said so." All afternoon, Arthur Mullen tried to reach me and I talked to him once. He was very anxious to have the bill changed so that the 7th Director of the Land Banks could be appointed by me in 30 days instead of having to wait one year. His object was to have me vote the President of the Land Bank at Omaha, Mr. Ragan. Mullen was not successful in his lobbying. Had supper with the Myer's and returned to the Senate and sat in the V.P.'s room. About ten o'clock there was a lull and Jimmy Byrnes moved that our bill be passed. In fifteen seconds it was done.

It took my breath away it happened so quickly. Myer's and I shook hands and congratulated each other. If we had not stayed on the job, I doubt if the bill would ever have gone through.

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Sunday morning at 7:30 I left by airplane for the farm. Landed at New Haven, in two hours in a Navy Plane. Captain McGinnis was my pilot. Elmer had her class reunion. Gorgeous day, place looked beautiful, and I hated to leave it.

On flying back when we went over Bear Mountain I suddenly noticed that my left foot was very cold. I thought that was funny and I looked to see where the air was coming in. I then found that the gasoline tank had sprung a leak and was squirting all over me. I attracted the pilot's attention. Of course, he could not hear me but could see that I was saying the word "gasoline". He repeated the word, slowed the plane down and we headed for the Floyd Bennett Field where the New York Naval Reserve is located. I could not help but think what would happen if the plane caught on fire. I really was quite calm and kept wondering if I would have the nerve to go overboard and if I could remember to count five slowly before I released the parachute. The 20 minutes he took from the time we discovered the gasoline leak until we had arrived at the Floyd Bennett Field passed fairly slowly. I was quite pleasantly surprised when I did not get rattled. On arrival at Floyd Bennett Field we were able to get a Naval Reserve Plane and continued our trip to Washington, arriving at the field at 8:30 just as the sun went below the horizon.

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Mr. Crowley, representing the Governor of Wisconsin, arrived upon my invitation, also had the President of the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, F. H. Lawlor, and the Commissioner's Agent, Mr. Jerry P. Riordan. There are 500 banks in Wisconsin, 150 of which are closed and the other 250 under restriction. They have $40,000,000 in farm mortgages. My idea is that it would be just as easy to do business on a wholesale state-wide basis as it would be to middle along doing a few at a time. I arranged for a meeting at Boy, Woodin's office at 3 o'clock.
Those present, at my request, were Mr. Dean G. Acheson, Under Secretary of the Treasury, W. J. Cummings, Executive Assistant to the Secretary, J. P. O'Connor, Comptroller of the Currency, Governor Black of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Jesse Jones and my gang. I was told that it was the first time that everybody had ever gotten together who had anything to do on the part of the Federal Government with the opening of closed banks. The meeting went very well. I asked Mr. Woolin whether he wanted to buy our bonds if the deal went through, and as I jokingly put it to him, "I am going to blackmail you into doing it because if you do not buy them, we will have to sell our bonds and may ruin your bond market." He said, "We will buy them."

I had to leave the meeting to go to the White House. On my return at 4:30 they were still in conference and had decided to go along with the plan. They all were very enthusiastic and they felt that this was a chance to open the banks and that the Treasury officials meant that they would insist that the State Banks would come into the National System. I do not know whether this is wise but then I know so little about it that I am willing to take the opinion of the Treasury officials. Woolin designated Cummings to work out the details. If it goes through it will certainly be a feather in my cap.

While at the White House, I saw the President, Louis Howe being present. I first told him about my plan to open up the banks in Wisconsin through our buying the farm mortgages which they held and I asked him if he would not like to announce this himself. He said he would. I think that this put him in a good humor although he looked very tired and his face was drawn with fatigue. I have never seen him look more exhausted. Then told him very apologetically how I had tried to get Senator Byrnes to change the bill amendment which specified that I should pay my three Commissioners $10,000, but he had been unsuccessful. Whereupon, much to my surprise, the President put his hand to his mouth as though he was laughing up his sleeve, and let out peals of laughter. Louis Howe put his hand to his nose and snorted loudly. This lasted for several minutes. The President and Louis let me think that I had put one over on them and they seemed to enjoy it hugely. I said, "Franklin, inasmuch as you are in such a good humor over this incident, would you not like to sign my request for my salaries which has been on your desk for ten days?" He said, "I have lost it and can't find it." I was very insistent and finally he said, "All right, get Missy to look through my basket for you." I went into Missy's room and I said, "The President wants you to look through his basket for him." She said, "Why must I come now. I am drinking a milk shake," and rather disagreeably said, "Why can't it wait? My milk shake will spoil." To which I replied, "Missy, I will buy you ten milk shakes if you come in," and she came with a pout on her mouth. The President said, "Missy, if you can find Henry's paper, he will give you anything that you ask him for." Missy said, "He has already offered me ten milk shakes." A search then started which lasted for about 15 minutes, my egging the President and Missy on. They went through every drawer and every basket and could not find the papers. Just then Steve Early came in and I said, "We are looking for my papers and they can't be found." He said, "I think I saw them on McIntyre's desk." I said, "Wouldn't you get them for me?" He didn't want to and after asking him three times, he went out in a slight huff and came back immediately with my papers and Wallace's. They evidently had been on McIntyre's desk, who, for reasons only known to himself, had been holding them out. I then dictated to the President what he should write, and he wrote exactly word for word as I dictated to him.

"Approved for Governor and 3 Deputies, one General Counsel and 4 Commissioners $10,000 - this in accordance with bill about to be passed."

(signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.

I was with the President about 40 minutes. I came out thoroughly elated as I consider it a great personal victory for me over Douglas who I think has acted very meanly and pounded foolish in regard to this whole salary business.
When I came out of the President's office I found Wallace and his whole gang who had had a 4 o'clock appointment and had been waiting half an hour. I said to Wallace, "I would like to see you about this spray residue business. I really think you, personally, should get in on it." He said, "I know what you want, Henry, and I think our people are about ready to concede that we should not put our regulations into effect this year." I am to see him finally about it at 11 a.m., Tuesday. If I can get Wallace to change his ruling on this, it certainly will make every fruit grower in the U.S. very happy. I most likely have to keep in the background as unquestionably, Wallace will not want it to be known that I influenced him in coming to this decision.

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(Governor Morgenthau left Washington, Saturday, June 17th. He left New York on the 19th for Chester, Nova Scotia. He expects to return to Washington on July 3.)

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Vacation
June 27, 1933

Elinor, Henry, Cecil Allen, John Fox and I left the Hackmatack Inn at Chester, N.B., at about 2:15 in a five-year-old Ford Touring Car for Digby, 125 miles away. I had received a telegram from Captain Vernon, Naval Aide to the President, that they would have a destroyer call for me on Wednesday at Neymouth. We arrived at the Hotel Pines, Digby, at about 7 o'clock after having had to stop for one hour to have the Ford overhauled. The drive through Annapolis Valley is very beautiful.

The family returned that night to Chester, and I went on to Neymouth which is a very small town on the Sissaboue River. I stayed at a small commercial hotel where I had the best room and breakfast including a bowl of wild strawberries for $1.25.

Late that evening I received word that on account of the fog, the destroyer would not be able to come over until Thursday.

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June 28, 1933

Today, Wednesday, I decided it would be foolish to wait around at Neymouth so on learning that a train left at ten o'clock for Digby, I boarded it. Mr. Whitney, representing the Canadian National Telegraph Company, introduced himself to me as he had been sent down to Neymouth to meet the President. We subsequently learned that the President had intended coming over himself, but on account of the fog he was delayed so long that he was unable to make it. I left Digby at three o'clock on the C.P.R. Boat, and was met at St. John by Byrnes, the manager of the C.P.R. Boat, and was met at St. John by Byrnes, who drove me to St. John where we spent the night at the Algonquin Hotel. En route, Mr. Byrnes gave me a lot of valuable information about his operations, particularly in Aroostook County, Maine.
June 22, 1938

It was my good luck that a boat left at ten o'clock for Campobello Island. On the boat I met Mrs. Herridge, wife of the Canadian Minister to the U.S., and Sir Thomas Tait, who was her travelling companion. I had telegraphed to Eleanor Roosevelt that I was coming and was disappointed when nobody met me, but subsequently I learned that the telegram had not been delivered. On arrival at F.D.R.'s house, I found there Miss Leaun and her brother, Louis Howe, Johnny Roosevelt, Marion Dickerman, Nancy Cook and Mrs. James Roosevelt, Jr., and some of her Friends. As we were sitting down to lunch at 1:30, they announced that the President would be here in twenty minutes. Mrs. Roosevelt very calmly said, "We will have our lunch." The President did not arrive until four o'clock. I accompanied Mrs. Roosevelt in a small launch, and we sailed out in the harbor to meet the President as he sailed in. It was a thrilling experience.

At Welches Pool, which is the little harbor of Campobello, the President was met by a Reception Committee and then was taken to the Yacht Club where he made a short address. We all then went up to the Roosevelt home where we had tea. The President seemed rather distracted and not at his ease. About six o'clock Mrs. Roosevelt left with Johnny and took along Ambassador Norman Davis who had arrived with the President and took them to the train, not returning until about 9:30 that evening, when she and Marion Dickerman had supper together by themselves.

Either that day or the next, Louis Howe took me aside and said that there was tremendous pressure on the President to agree to have the Government go into a stabilization of currency operation. I gathered from Louis that Norman Davis had been advocating it strongly. Louis said the trouble with this idea is that there are no limits to how much money they might need and he said, "I am against it." He said, "We will be discussing it on the trip back and I wanted to know how you felt about it." Not knowing an awful lot about it, I sort of felt my way but told him in principle I agreed with Howe.

June 30, 1938

Thursday evening - Eleanor Roosevelt said to her husband, "It seems to me that it is a mistake to have Moley go over to London, and that it is belittling to Hull and must weaken Hull's position." F.D.R. tried to explain to her that this was not so, but he was not very convincing about it. Eleanor Roosevelt followed me to my room and talked to me about 15 minutes. I told her that I had agreed to what she said about Moley. She then made a most startling statement. She said, "I made that statement about Moley for two reasons - one, I wanted to get it over to Franklin and two, I wanted Missy to hear it as I know she will repeat it to Moley." I said, "I thought Missy didn't like Moley." She said, "She pretends not to but Moley takes her and Grace Tully out to tea and makes a big fuss over them." Eleanor also said, "Now that Missy cannot go out with the newspaper woman she is very glad to have Moley take her out." Eleanor said, "You know I see and know what is going on around Franklin, but he seems to be entirely oblivious to all of it."

Friday noon - They had all the officers over from the cruiser, and the two destroyers, and had a very nice picnic for them at the beach. Eleanor Roosevelt was roasting frankfurters over open fire and being very natural and an excellent hostess.

Friday evening - The young people all went out for supper. We were only half a dozen of us there. Both evening before supper F.D.R. would mix cocktails for everybody and was very jolly. Friday evening on account of the cocktail party we were half hour late for dinner, and Eleanor Roosevelt scolded him at supper as though he was a small boy. F.D.R. answered her and said, "You can't scold me this way. It is not my fault and I didn't know what time supper was." I think what really annoyed her was the fact that Franklin, Jr., was given a cocktail to drink.
Sometime during the evening, McIntyre came in and discussed the tentative draft which Hull sent over to Roosevelt for his approval. At that time F.D.R. did not show me the draft although there was reference to it in the newspapers the next day. McIntyre asked how he wanted the proposed statement answered. Roosevelt said, "Send word to Hull to say nothing, do nothing and agree to nothing."

Friday night Franklin, Eleanor Roosevelt, Marion and Nancy, and I sat around and talked for a couple of hours. Louis Howe, lying on a couch half asleep, did not take any part in the discussion. I brought down my charts and the whole discussion was about foreign exchange, gold and world exports. I had just finished reading Garrett's article in the Saturday Evening Post, and I discussed this with the President. I believe I handled myself quite well, and the President is not as well posted on foreign exchange as one would suppose, but he certainly gave me the impression that evening that he wanted to develop prosperity in this country first, and also that he wanted to raise the price of commodities and business generally to the 24th and 25th level.

During these two or three days, F.D.R. seemed very much preoccupied and I suppose that he was trying to come to a decision as to instructions that he would send to London.

July 1, 1933

They sent me up in a Canadian Patrol Boat to try to buy some rum and gin for F.D.R. at the Canadian Liquor Store. It took me one hour to get there only to find that it was Dominion Day, and that the bank and liquor store were closed.

Eleanor, Marion and Nancy left Saturday morning at seven o'clock to drive back to N.Y.
July 3, 1933

This morning, Monday, about 9 o'clock we anchored in the Chesapeake Bay three miles off shore from Annapolis. They sent me ashore in a whale boat, and I got completely drenched when a wave broke over the bow. On the whole trip, F.D.R. was perfectly natural, was in a grand humor all the time, and I seldom have seen him tell so many sea stories and seem to enjoy himself so thoroughly.

(End of Vacation)

July 10, 1933

Monday - Lunched with the President. Missy came in and we arranged to go to Olney's Inn on Wednesday night. I asked F.D.R. to suggest any one he wanted, and Missy suggested Admiral Grayson and Mrs. Grayson because it seems that something had happened to Admiral Grayson's daughter, and they felt sorry for the Admiral.

When I came in to have lunch and for fully half an hour, Hearst's lawyer from San Francisco was there talking to F.D.R. He told him that it was McAdoo who got to Hearst during the Chicago Convention, but it was he who had done so at the request of Jim Farley. The man himself increased as a very high class person. Roosevelt said after he left that this man is really the one who has the most influence with Hearst. He told F.D.R. that Hearst's son, William Randolph, Jr., was coming to Washington to run the Washington papers and that he would be contacting Roosevelt. Roosevelt said, "What about Hearst's son, George?" and this man said, "Say he is a bad egg. I ought to know. I tried hard enough to work on him but he is hopeless." This man then said, "I want to talk to you about newspaper in which I am selfishly interested as I buy all the paper for Hearst who is the largest buyer of newspaper in the U.S. I think it would be a mistake to put the price of newspaper up too high although Hearst has always stood for a fair price."

I got Roosevelt to sign the Presidential Commissions for Goss, Brennan and Peck. He asked me how they were doing and I told him that I was well pleased with all of them. He said, "That is fine." I showed him my charts, particularly the one new one which shows that England has also been pushing the price of its commodities up the last two months about the same time that we have been doing this. Roosevelt was not aware of this fact.
I spoke to the President about Prof. Viner of Chicago, and he said I should bring him around for tea Tuesday, and have him see Warren and Prof. Rogers of Yale. "I have brought both of these men down to study the money question under Secretary Roper," he said.

I told Roosevelt that I wanted an airplane to take a trip out west, and he wrote a memo to the Secretary of War asking him to give me a plane.

Just before I left Jesse Jones came in and told the President that he only had $600,000,000 left and that he needed $100,000,000 of this for the banks in Michigan. He said, "I will not have enough money for Henry." He finally agreed to let me have $100,000,000 with the understanding that Mr. Black of the Federal Reserve and Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and I should get together as soon as possible to decide how I should market my bonds. I suggested that they all have dinner with me Tuesday night. I drove Jesse Jones back to his office.

At 2:30 I had my press conference and gave out the story of what we were going to do in Illinois. He had worked out this program in the morning, before giving out the publicity, I called Governor Horner and he okayed it. I told him that I might come out there within a couple of weeks and he said, "Be sure and come to the Mansion." He said, "I am bacheloring it and I have twelve empty rooms." I thanked him and told him I would let him know later on.

At three o'clock, I met with Mr. Love, Banking Superintendent of Mississippi, Senator Pat Harrison, Mr. Clark, Caracas, and men from New Orleans. I found Clark very difficult to deal with as he is not only slow but stubborn. Before we got through, I lost my temper with him. I asked them to meet with Boss and Myers, and see if they could work something out. Olliphant is afraid that if we go into Mississippi where the banks have been opened on a shoe string that we may be inadvertently instrumental in closing a lot of the banks when we ask them to write down farm mortgages.

July 30, 1938

Today, Sunday, Elinor and I went to Hyde Park to have lunch with the Roosevelts. The Mallisons and Selma Barhart and Putnam and a French woman, who were over for a World Conference, were over for lunch. Had two talks with F.D.R. after lunch. Told him about my trip. He said, "I understand Governor Horner has had a tough time and is too easy going. I told him that Horner had realized that he had been soft the first three months, but had changed. F.D.R. said, "what is fine, I am delighted to hear it." I gave F.D.R. two suggestions. One, that in each state there should be an Executive Council headed by the Governor corresponding to the President's Council in Washington. I also suggested that he bring all of the Governors to Washington and spend three days with them, with the President's Council at his side, and make decisions as he went along. He thought very well of both of these suggestions and said that he would talk it over with Lees. F.D.R. told me as a deep secret that it was absolutely necessary for him to get Moley out of Washington before Hull returned as Hull would kick up such a terrible fuss. F.D.R. said that after Moley was in London two days he started dealing direct with some of the countries which naturally made Hull furious. He said, "I am thinking of sending Moley to Hawaii to make a study of conditions there, and in this way get him out of the path of Hull." F.D.R. said Moley has done a number of stupid things.

F.D.R. was most complimentary about my work and told me that he heard from all sides that we were doing a good job.

The President said, "I have appointed a Committee of Dean Acheson, Jesse Jones, Governor Black, the Comptroller of the Currency, and you to pass on Government borrowings outside of the Treasury borrowings. (I subsequently learned that the reason for this was because Peck borrowed $30,000,000 from the New York banks to pay us for the 1,000,000 bales of A.C.C.A. cotton) F.D.R. said, "I have asked Acheson to look into the Home Loan situation as I know it is bad, but Acheson is too bashful and does not want to do it." He said, "If you would sort of look into it," I said, "Franklin, there is no use my looking into it unless you have Jim Farley sitting..."
in this room and the three of us talk over the whole situation. It is all a matter of patronage. Am I right? The President nodded his head and said, "Yes, you are."

I found the President not looking well. His complexion was rather gray. F.D.R. also said, "Your father did a very good job in London and showed wonderful patience."

August 1, 1933

Tuesday - at 8:30 p.m. I met with the directors of A.C.C.A. I looked over their statement and found that it showed an estimated earning for this coming year of 18 million dollars. However, their list of salaries showed an increase. After talking it over with my crowd in one corner, I went back and made the following statement to them. "It seems to me that inasmuch as the President and the F.C.C.A., through Congress, has made it possible to keep you people out of bankruptcy, your people should show your appreciation by offering to pay 4% on the $10,000,000 loaned and take at 6% in stock in the Central Cooperative. Furthermore, I wish to state that I am against any salary above $50,000 (Creemore was down for $60,000)." I said, "Gentlemen, you understand what I am asking," and they all laughed and said, "Yes, we understand English." Creemore then said that they would meet Wednesday morning and let Peck know what decision they had come to. If they did not comply with my request, I have the right to call $10,000,000 of their loan at once, and I am sure they know it.

August 2, 1933

This morning I had breakfast with Senator McAdoo, and for over five minutes he told me that he had to be bothered with patronage, and then went into a long harangue on how Miss Perkins had appointed somebody, how Harry Hopkins had appointed somebody without consulting him, and how he was appointing people. He said that we were only appointing Republicans. I think he is lying and I am going to try and prove it. I told him that we were having an investigation made by the engineers of the Department of Agriculture as to the underground water, and pending that report we could not come to any decision in regard to loans on land with underground water conditions. I told him I would come to California the latter part of August or early in September. He said he would advise his people that he met with me and that I was coming to California shortly.

Roosevelt had sent me a note about a complaint that McAdoo had made against our Berkeley Bank. I told him that McAdoo had asked me to authorize him to approve all of our appointments in California. I told the President the first time McAdoo telegraphed me this I avoided answering the question, and when he telegraphed again I had Gaston answer that I had left town. The President chuckled and said, "I thought you were up to some trick like that when McAdoo showed me your telegram." He said, "That is fine. That is just the way to handle him." He said that McAdoo had asked him for some appointments and he was turning them down, but very politely. I told the President I would try to do likewise.

August 14, 1933

Wallace, Peek, Hays and I called on the President at his request. At F.D.R.'s request, I was invited. The question was whether the rule of the Chicago Grain Exchange which expired today should be continued. This rule set a minimum price for all grain for the last fortnight. Wallace stated the case, and then the President argued that possibly we could discontinue all trading in grain futures. Peek was strongly in favor that the minimum price should be continued. Wallace, much to my surprise, agreed with Peek although only one hour previous in my office he told me that he was in favor of discontinuing a minimum price. I told him in front of the President that I could not understand how he changed his mind within an hour. I argued with the President against setting another minimum price, and urged that they set the price vary by 3¢ a day. I told him that I thought that the continuation...
of a minimum price was a sign of great weakness and that if we set the minimum price on wheat, why not cotton, lard and all the other basic agricultural products.

I pointed out to him that there was a large short interest in the dollar in Europe, and that it seemed to me important that the question was the price of the dollar as it affected all commodities rather than just single out wheat. The President said, "Next week maybe we will set a minimum price on oil and coal." I argued with him that these commodities were produced 365 days a year, and, as Fann pointed out, could be controlled at the source, while this was not true of wheat. I could see that the President had made up his mind that he did wish to continue the minimum price, but I continued to present my side of the case as well as I knew how. Fann chimed in and was very helpful. Finally, the President said, maybe we could do something within a couple of weeks about the price of the dollar." I said, "That will be entirely different." In summing up, Wallace said, "Now, Mr. President, we will let the Chicago Board of Trade know that it is agreeable to us that they continue the minimum price unless the premium for cash grain as compared to the minimum price of futures should continue so widely that there would be no object in continuing the minimum price." The President did not argue well, and you could see that he was willing to use any argument in order to make his point. Wallace, on the other hand, wanted to agree with the President. This gave me the impression of sincerely believing in what he was advocating. I came away from the meeting with a very bad taste in my mouth.

August 16, 1933

Lunched with the President for half an hour. Harold Ickes and Moffett, formerly with Standard Oil, talked to the President about the oil code. It seems that there is not at all satisfied with the code drawn up by N.R.A. The President told them that they should prepare a code and have it over by five o'clock. He said, "I will try to memorise it and will present it as though it was my own in order that there should not seem to be a difference of opinion between N.R.A. and the Interior Department." Moffett told the President that they ought to have a minimum price of $.6 for gasoline and $.12 for crude oil. He said if the demand for fuel oil and bunker oil should increase, the price on gas and coal could come down.

I told my story to the President about God thinking he was President Roosevelt, and he chuckled for over two minutes. He just loved the story and when Miss Lehman came in he made me tell it all over again to her.

I told him how we were handling St. Louis from a political angle, and that I had gone over the whole situation with O'Mahoney and House, and that they were entirely satisfied. The President said, "It is absolutely all right. Yours are financial institutions and you must have men who qualify." I told him that I was going to California and asked him how I ought to handle Madsen. He said, Madsen has been recommending poor people and after I turn down the second or third man that he wanted, I go ahead and appoint whom I want." He asked me where my business indexes were, and I told him that I did not think he wanted them any more as he got a report once a week from Dr. Sachs of N.R.A. He seemed kind of disappointed that I had not brought them along. He said, "I am not as worried about business conditions as most people are." He said everything is going along fine with the exception of the price of wheat and corn. He said, "It is too bad that it looks as though these prices would be low during the harvesting period and then would rebound after the farmer had sold the bulk of his crop." He said it was all right about removing the minimum price on wheat because we had nothing to do with it and the exchange made the decision themselves. I felt that from the manner in which he said this that this was a concession to my opinion.

I drew his attention to the fact that sterling was down to 4.41-5/4. I said, "What about it?" He said that he would like to buy in the open market gold for the Treasury at 290 an ounce. He said, "I think that this would do the trick, but I do not know how it can be done." I said, "Those ideas is that" and he said, "Mine." He was most friendly with me.
I showed him Speaker Rainey’s letter complaining about my putting Wood Netherland in as General Agent, and after I explained the situation to him he said, “That is all right. Prepare a nice letter for me to sign in answer to Speaker Rainey.” I asked him whether I could have Steve Early call up Edgar Hoover of the Justice Department and have him put the Secret Service on to an investigation of the source back of the New York milk strike. The President gave me his okay.

I found him in excellent shape, fit as a fiddle and telling that he was thoroughly enjoying his job. He told me that this morning he had had an hour with Taylor, President of the U.S. Steel, and Charlie Schwab whom he said, by the way, “I know intimately from the war days.” He said, “I scared then the way they never have been frightened before and I told Schwab he better not pay any more million dollar bonuses to their President, Mr. Grace.”

I was particularly pleased with this interview because I got complete a proval from the President of my method of selecting and appointing officials for the new regional F.C. set-up. I told the President that Senator Trammell of Florida was bringing all kinds of pressure to bear on us to continue to make seed and crop loans this fall in Florida. I told the President that I had assured Congress that we would discontinue seed and crop loans and I felt that now was the time to do it. He said, “Senator Trammell has been trying to see me and I have refused to see him.” He said, “You can tell Senator Trammell that I, the President, say that you should stop making seed and crop loans.”

I told the President that I saw Bogdonov and that he wanted to buy $75,000,000 of raw materials. The President said, “I saw Jesse Jones this morning who spoke to me about a proposal of selling the Russians $80,000,000 worth of machinery. Is this the same deal?” I said, “No.” He said, “Well, you can tell Jesse Jones that over the next few months I would set a limit of $250,000,000 on what we sell Russia,” and he said as an offhand suggestion he would sell them half machinery and half raw materials, and ask for a 15-20% down-payment.

Lunched with the President and Frances Perkins. The President had seen a committee of farm leaders composed of Ed O’Neill, Huff, Ewing of the National Livestock and three or four others. They left a statement with him, a copy of which they subsequently gave me. The President pointed out that before the 4th of July we had consulted with this group, and that since then Wallace and I had appointed a considerable number of farm leaders and thought it would be good business to continue to consult the farm leaders who had not received appointments, and in this way try and keep them from becoming jealous. (I think that this is a very good point that the President made.)

Frances Perkins then cornered the conversation and said, “I have to say this in front of Henry, but I hope he will keep it a secret.” I assured her that I would. She then went into a tirade against General Johnson. She pointed out that he had an inferiority complex and that he appointed only third rate people; that she found it very difficult to work with him because she would ask him to do something and then find later that he had gone ahead and done it in a different way. She said she found it necessary to send her own agent over to his shop to follow through certain telegraphed instructions that she wanted to have gotten out. She said that Johnson was going ahead and is setting up his permanent organization, although he assured them that he had not. She said that he needed a dozen first rate deputies to work his codes. The President said, “Did you keep Johnson’s secretary, Miss Robinson, from flying with him to review the New York parade?” Miss Perkins said, “That is a good feeling. Before you can say ‘Jack Robinson’, they were both in the air on their way to N.Y.”

The President listened sympathetically to Miss Perkins’ criticisms. She said to the President, “You know that you signed an executive order taking out the labor provisions from the oil code.” The President said, “I am sure you are wrong.” Miss Perkins said, “Oh, no. You signed it and the labor provisions are out and that is just the kind of thing that Johnson is doing all the time.” She said, “You get the feeling that the whole N.R.A. is being run with some deep plot and conspiracy.” The President said, “Well, Richberg is doing
well," and Miss Perkins said, "Oh, no. He is not. In fact, you never hear or see Richberg over there." Miss Perkins said that if Johnson had handled the Ford matter better, she felt confident that Ford would have come into the N.R.A. She said that the thing Ford objected to was having to give out facts and figures as to his profits because he did not want his competitors to know, but he would have come along on everything else. Miss Perkins left, and then I had 16 or 20 minutes with the President.

I spoke to him about appraising land on the basis of future value of crops as per his note to Senator Murphy of Iowa. The President said, "I fixed the minimum price of cotton. Can't you adjust your appraisal on that basis?" I told him that it would be difficult to know what land would be worth 20 years from now and that we were doing everything possible to be liberal in our appraisals, but that when he got back I wanted to sit down with him and Wallace and Goss and discuss the whole proposition. I showed him how we were increasing each week the number of our loans closed, and he seemed interested and pleased. I told him that if our bonds were guaranteed as to principal and interest and we no longer had to worry about the investing public, we could greatly liberalize our appraisals.

Russia - I asked the President whether in view of all the publicity whether he wished me to go ahead and make any loans to Russia. He did exactly what he did two weeks before. He threw it back in my lap and said, "What do you recommend?" I said, "I think we ought to decide what would be most helpful for the U.S. to sell to Russia rather than try and finance them in buying what they need the most." He said, "What would you think of bringing this whole Russian question into our front parlor instead of back in the kitchen?" I said, "That is fine if you want to do it, but that is up to you." He said, "Well, I have got a plan in mind," and I said, "What is it?" He replied, "Well, it will take me at least ten minutes to explain and we haven't the time now." He said, "However, send for Skvortzov and tell him that we have the whole Russian question under consideration and that the delay in no way is prejudicial." He had a lot of fun laughing over his mispronouncing of the name Skvortzov, and he insisted on inserting the letter "m", and we both had a good laugh over it.

I told him that I was taking up Tuesday with the Secretary of the Treasury the question of their buying and selling our securities and making them part of the open market operations. This did not particularly interest him.

I gave him the letter showing that we impounded another two million dollars, making a total of four million dollars impounded out of the appropriation of forty-four million that Congress provided with which to buy cotton and wheat for the Red Cross. This seemed to please him very much. I used this as an opportunity to suggest that they buy one million bales of cotton and one hundred million bales of wheat for the unemployed this winter. He replied rather sharply that the machinery had been set up to do this. (I question this as they have only provided seventy-five million dollars, and that will not go very far.)

I asked him if we were going on this cruise with him on the weekend of October 24th, and he said that they had something to do that Saturday so it might only be for Sunday. He told me that he is going to Chicago Monday to address the Legion Convention which will certainly be a surprise to everybody as so far nobody knows it. He is going to spend half a day at the World's Fair and then return via Detroit, and he is going to invite Henry Ford to ride with him from Chicago to Detroit.

He asked me two or three times where my business charts were. He was particularly interested in the one that shows that for the first time in four or five years our imports exceeded our exports. He said, "This is fine. This is fine. I hope it continues that way and only more so." I said to him, "What did Dr. Warren tell you?" He said, "Well, he wants me to come out with an announcement. The Attorney General has advised me that I cannot buy gold." He said, "I would love to be able to do that. If I can't do that, I may have to change the number of grains of gold in the dollar." I said, "Well, my people think you can buy gold." He said, "If you could, please let me know because I certainly would love to be able to do it."
During the course of the conversation he said, "I never see Henry Wallace but that I ask him how his pig birth control campaign is coming along."

I didn't have time to bring up the fact that he had announced that I was to finance the cotton farmer in advancing him to the extent of $0.9 a lb. on his cotton.

I said to the President, "Frances Perkins tells me that you are going to have a coordinator for credit agencies." He said, "That is right." I said, "Well, I hope it is not going to be Lew Douglas." He said, "I can assure you that it is not." I said, "We have gotten along very well with the committee headed by Chaseon and I think it would be unfortunate to bring in an extra person." I subsequently learned from Henry Wallace that the President has a definite person in mind - a New York banker.

Walked down with Henry Wallace today. He said two things of interest - one, that if we had not had the bulge in prices last July he felt that the farmer would have been feeling pretty good today. Second thing he said was that we must keep prices down for the next three months in order to complete our program of acreage reduction. He said, "If prices should go up, it will make it impossible for us to complete our program." He also said that for the long-term program we must get into land utilization and permanently take out of production marginal land.

September 27, 1938

Lunched with Bullitt, special assistant Secretary of State. He informed me that he is handling the Russian matter for the State Department and I, therefore, talked very frankly to him. I hope my doing so was all right. Bullitt tells me that negotiations with Russia are far more important than just lending them some money with which they can buy goods. He says they are absolutely broke and that they cannot meet their payments this year, although their total payments which they owe the world do not exceed four hundred fifty million dollars; there is a 50% chance that Japan will attack Russia in the Russian Maritime Provinces; that it means everything to Russia to negotiate this loan with the U.S.A., as their only source of credit at present is Germany, and on account of Hitler's stand towards the Russians they are naturally anxious to break off relations with Germany. Furthermore, if they could negotiate a loan from us the Japanese would naturally draw the inference that we would loan Russia money with which to buy airplanes and other war materials. In negotiating previous loans with Germany, Russia practically pledged them their eyes teeth. He pointed out the fact, which I already know, that there are Russian credits in Germany to the extent of five or six million dollars which American bankers might be able to get transferred to this country as an offset to what Germany owes us, and through American bankers do business with Russia direct without the R.F.C. loaning them a nickel. He says that there are a great number of things that the State Department wants to see put into the contract such as that the Russian Soviet Government will guarantee that the Third International will not engage in propaganda in this country; that American ships are given protection in Russian ports. He pointed out that the Hoover Administration had put in the Legations adjoining Russia some of our very strongest men and they have been collecting for years material in case we should recognize Russia. He pointed out that Japan was a serious menace to the U.S., and would have to be watched very closely; that the staff of the State Department were anti-Russian and anti-recognition but that he personally had been for the recognition of Russia for a long time.

He almost swept me off my feet when he said, "Do you know whether the President gave out this morning his statement in regard to Russia?" I did not let on that I did not know what he was talking about, but during the course of the conversation I gathered what the President had in mind was something that he talked to me about some weeks ago - that he would address a letter directly to the President of the Soviet Republic, and invite him to send representatives over here to discuss recognition in Washington. Bullitt pointed out that if Russia accepted they would have to conclude trade agreements with us because if they were unsuccessful in the eyes of the world all doors would be closed to them for credit. I pointed out to people in my own official family that I wanted to go very cautiously in regard to Russia because I would wake up some morning to find that the President had recognized Russia or taken steps towards this.
It seems that the State Dept. was very much disturbed by Jesse Jones' statement in New York last week that he was ready to loan fifty to seventy-five million dollars to Russia, and Bullitt claims that he has seen a copy of a telegram that the Russians sent home in which they stated that they had refused Jesse Jones' offer. Bullitt furthermore intimated that it was the White House which gave out this statement that I was in charge of Russian matters in order to offset Jesse Jones' statement and to let the world know that I was in charge and not J.J. Forbes Morgan also told me last night that he understood that it was the W.I. that had the statement given out that I was in charge of Russia in order to sit on the lid.

Interview with Louis Howe. Saw Louis Howe and talked to him about Russia and he seemed perfectly satisfied. I then spoke to him about having the new coordinator of Federal Credits, Henry Bruere, assistant to Woodin rather than being placed under Lew Douglas. At first Louis did not warm up to my idea of placing Bruere under Douglas, but he finally convinced him sufficiently that I said, "You should see the President yourself. You do not need anybody else to talk for you, and you can tell him that I think Bruere should be under nobody but be directly responsible to the President." As I left he said, "Henry, when you have been in the Government service as long as I have you will recognize that coordinators come and coordinators go, and that furthermore sometimes it is good business to place so much work on a man that he cannot handle any of it."

October 1, 1938

Called on the President at Hyde Park and showed him a long-hand memo by Herman Olliphant suggesting various ways that the President might, through an Executive Order, have a free gold market in this country. He read the whole memo very carefully. When he got through he said, "I have a method of my own to break the law which I think is much simpler." He said, "I think we can form a separate corporation under the R.F.C. and let this corporation buy the gold and put it up as mortgage against money loaned to it by the Treasury."

While we were discussing this, Henry Wallace called up and spoke to him about advancing of money to the cotton growers up to 10c a lb. The President suggested losing them the money at 8%. I could not tell from watching his face whether he approved of what Wallace was saying but he looked over at me and had a sly twinkle in his eye as much as to say, "Well, I am putting something over on you, Henry," and I am afraid he is because it seems that Wallace has run into a jam over the legal details with the R.F.C. He then puts Oscar Johnston on the phone who talked to the President and then to me, and Johnston wanted a decision right away. I spoke to him again at two o'clock from the farm, and told him that I did not want to come to a decision without talking to Olliphant first and suggested that all of us get together Monday morning. He thought this was a good idea. I told him that if there was no other possible way of losing this money we would do it.

I spoke to the President about Russia and Bullitt. I told him that Bullitt had had me for lunch and had pumped me about Russia. The President said rather excitedly, "Bullitt has absolutely no right to do that. He should work through the Secretary of State and not go over his head the way Moely used to." The President said, "The Secretary of State has brought me three different suggestions for a message to Russia and possibly Bullitt assisted in drafting these." I told the President what I said to Skrynsky and he said I had handled it absolutely right. I found the President in extremely good humor and looking very well.

The same evening Elinor and I went to Nancy Cook's for a picnic where the President, Mrs. Roosevelt and all the newspaper boys were. I spoke to the President for a minute and asked him if I went ahead with this cotton deal had I not better speak to the Secretary of the Treasury about it as it would involve so much money, and in a joking, sarcastic manner, he said, "Yes, I suppose it would be just as good to advise the Secretary of the Treasury."
When I saw Miss Leland before seeing the President, she said, "I gave the President your message about Henry Bruere and Douglas, and he told me that Bruere is not going to be under Douglas." On seeing the President I said to him, "I hope you are not going to put Bruere under Douglas." He said, "No, I am not. He is far too big to be under Douglas. He is going to be directly under me." He further said, "I suppose I will make him a special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury." I said to him, "Well, I am glad to see you have Henry Bruere because I think it will take a lot off your shoulders, but I suppose what you are doing is to parallel Woodin," and he nodded his head, meaning yes. I questioned him quite closely as to whether or not he really meant that he was not going to put Bruere under Douglas and I think he was telling me what he really had in his mind.

Jesse Jones called in person to see me at the Savoy Plaza, and told me that at the beginning of the week he had been of the opinion that this cotton deal should be financed through the R.A.C.C., but recently it has been brought to his attention that by putting this kind of business through the R.A.C.C. it would ruin its credit and also possibly the market of Intermediate Credit Debentures. He, therefore, decided that it was a mistake. (I wonder who sold him this idea.) Most likely Oliphant did through Stanley Reed. He said, "I told Woodin who told the President at one o'clock today that he, Jones, believed that a separate corporation should be set up which would in a way guarantee the private banks against loss on this cotton deal, and that this whole deal should be put through private banks."

He said, "Is it all right if I come to Washington Tuesday because I am very anxious to get the New York banks to take preferred stock of the R.F.C. They are so strong that nobody could question their taking stock and it would offset our having to loan $50,000,000 to the Commerical and Continental Bank of Chicago?"

I then told him that the President wanted me to work with him on gold. After a little while he told me that the Attorney General has just advised him that they could buy gold through a corporation like the suggested cotton corporation, and that is one of the reasons why I believe that Jones has swung away from the idea of having the R.A.C.C. do it and is now in favor of having a cotton corporation created which at the same time could handle the gold matter.

I sounded Jones out to see how he felt about Bruere's coming down and you could see that he does not like it at all. He said, "If the President had made either you or me chairman of this committee we could get results as we know what it is all about." Jesse said, "I told the President that bringing Bruere would only slow matters up." As Jones left, I said, "Well, Jesse, we always get along well together," and he said, "Yes, if people always deal their cards face up and never are devious in their ways, they can always get along.

I had difficulty in keeping a straight face because there are two things that Jones fails to do - one, is to deal cards face up and the other is not to be devious.

October 5, 1933

Jesse Jones, Henry Wallace and I called on the President. Jesse Jones arranged the meeting. The President said, I have a memo from McIntyre saying that none of you wish to handle this cotton deal. I understand that you wish to form another corporation, and it seems to me that we have enough agencies in existence." (Henry Bruere was present.) The President was quite positive and a little bit excited in his statements. I came back at him rather hard and told him why I thought that we should not be asked to do this. He again said that he did not want any new agencies created. Jesse Jones then asked him whether he would not read a statement which they had prepared to give out. When he was half way through this statement he stopped and said, "Why wouldn't this corporation be the one that the Secretary of the Treasury said we must have if we are going to buy and sell gold and silver? Let us call this a Commodity Corporation rather than a Cotton Corporation." After some more general discussion, we got up to go and somebody said, "Well, then it is settled," and he said, "No, I want the Attorney General to pass on this first."
I told them that Oliphant and Reed had been working on the question of how the government could buy gold and that we were ready to report. I had a minute with him alone and I said, "Did you see in the Whirligig that Moley is going to make a vicious attack on me?" The President said two or three times rather emphatically, "I don't believe it is so."

October 16, 1933

At 10:30 tonight the President telephoned me at my home and said, "We have got to do something about the price of wheat." He said, "Can't you buy 25 million bushels for Harry Hopkins and see if you can't put the price up?" The President was worried and angry at the interpretation the people were giving to the sale of new government issues.

I called up Harry Hopkins' home and Mrs. Hopkins answered and she told me he was down at the Department of Agriculture. I got both Wallace and Hopkins there, and they said they would come up to see me. It is rather interesting that the President called me first and Wallace second on this matter. I sent for Frank Peck.

After they arrived it took Hopkins only a couple of minutes to say that he could use 20 million bushels and I said, "Fine." Wallace wanted to know how we were going to do it, and I told him I would lend the money to the Farmers National, and they would buy it for us.

October 17, 1933

Early this morning I got in touch with Milnor and told him to be prepared to act. I got the President on the wire at 8:45 and he said, "Are you ready to go?" and I said, "Yes." He said, "Tell now," and I did. He said, "That is simply fine," and said, "I want you to hold everything until I have spoken to Will Woodin."

I got the President again about ten o'clock and he said, "Woodin is delighted." He said, "Last Saturday I finally succeeded in selling Will Woodin on the importance of keeping up the price of commodities." At 10:30 the staff and I sat down with phones and, on the advice of Milnor, I put in an order to buy 1 million bushels at the opening. We got this million between 72$ and 74$. I guess it was mighty good that we bought this because we subsequently learned that if we had not the market most likely would have broken to the low limit which for that day was 64-7/8s.

Harry Hopkins sat with me for the first half hour. He was very much interested and wanted to see how the thing was done. We put in a stop order of 1 million bushels at 74-1/8s and the market broke through that and hit the low of 68$. I was a pretty sick boy when this happened. It seemed to me as though I was trying to hold up not only the commodity markets of the world but also the stock market as everything was sagging.

About eleven o'clock I gave orders to buy up all the cash wheat that was offered at that day. This seemed to do the trick. We got 105 cars and the price began to go up a little bit. Milnor began to urge me to give out a statement that I was buying wheat. Gaston argued very hard against my doing so. I finally said to Gaston, "On my own responsibility I have decided to give out a statement. Please call up the Wall Street Journal first and have them put it on the ticker, and then give it to the AP, UP and the International News." Well, the publicity proved to be the right thing. Wheat began to climb and the stock market followed, and finally wheat went up to the ceiling which for the day was 74-7/8 and the stock market also rallied and followed wheat.

We accomplished what the President wanted, and I felt that this was one of the big moments of my life. I let the President know around noon how things were going, and I told him that the firm of Hopkins and Morgenthau were in the wheat business. I said I would be glad to have him in and give him one quarter interest. He said, "Make it one-third." He said, "Squeeze the life out of the shorts and put the price up just as fast as you can." He said this with fight in his tone of voice.
October 13, 1933

The market opened around 75c and held through most of the day. We continued to buy all the cash wheat that was offered and got (x) number of cars and about 8 minutes before the market closing, I decided to buy one million bushels, and I succeeded in getting the price up 2c. As the wheat exchange closed at 21c, and stocks were off about 3 points, I hoped to be able to influence the stock market, but I was not very successful. The President called me on his own initiative about 2:40 and wanted to know what had happened and I told him and he was delighted. He said, "Will Woodin wants to know why you cannot sell some wheat and in that way keep from accumulating too much." I said, "Mr. President, I think Mr. Woodin is wrong and that I might be severely criticized if I sold any wheat and I do not think I should do it." He said, "You are right. Don't do it."

About eleven o'clock Dean Acheson called me up on the telephone. He said, "I am very anxious to talk to you about buying and selling gold." I said, "What is the trouble?" He said, "How can we go into a gold buying proposition now when we are just completing the sale of new government securities? We will be accused of bad feeling with the public." I said, "Well, didn't you cross that bridge and didn't you think it out a couple of weeks ago?" and he said, "Now, Henry, you know we don't think anything out more than one day in advance." He asked, "Could we not put this off for a while?" and I said, "I don't think so. It seems to me that it is one of the two or three most important things to be accomplished in this town." He said, "Well, it is a question of clearing up the legal status now and I am going to try and see Homer Cummings before things close, but after three I have to see the British." I said, "Have you got our legal memo?" and he said, "Yes, yes. The President gave it to me last night and told me I have to go ahead and buy gold." He said, "That is what is worrying me," so I said, "I will drop anything that I am doing any time you want to see me to discuss this matter." He said, "Fine. You will hear from me after I have seen Homer Cummings."

Had lunch with the President on the 9th. He outlined to me very carefully what I should do with Skvirskey, and inasmuch as I am dictating this ten days later, I will simply subsequently tell what happened and not as we acted, but just the way the President told me at lunch on the 9th that he wanted it.

Tuesday night at 7:30 Bullitt called me up and told me that the President had finally told him to go ahead with the draft of the letter to Kalinin, which had been drafted by the President himself. After great difficulty, I located Mr. Skvirskey in New York through his secretary and asked him to be at my office Wednesday morning at 10:30. He arrived and I told him, Mr. Skvirskey, several weeks ago I told you that for the time being all negotiations were off pending consideration by the White House. You asked me if this was a friendly move and I said yes. I will now give it to you. In about five minutes Bullitt from the State Department will come here with a piece of paper unsigned and will give it to you. His face lit up with a big smile. Bullitt made his entry on the stage as arranged by the President himself, sat down, and said to Skvirskey, "I have a piece of paper in my hand unsigned. This document can be made into a invitation for your country to send representatives over here to discuss relationship between our two countries. We wish you to telegraph the contents of this piece of paper by your most confidential code, and learn if it is acceptable to your people. If it is acceptable, will you have your people send a draft of an answer to us and we will let you know in turn if this proposed draft will be acceptable to the President. If both drafts are acceptable, the President will sign this piece of paper, and both letters can be released simultaneously from Moscow and Washington. If they are not acceptable, will you give me your word of honor that there will never be any publicity in regard to this proposed change of letters and that the whole matter will be kept a secret." Mr. Skvirskey assured Bullitt that that would be the case. He then said, "Does this mean recognition?" and Bullitt replied with an answer by saying, "What more can you expect than to have your representative sit down with the President of the United States?"
October 19, 1938

This morning, Thursday, I went to the White House, and the President told me that the night before they had received final word from Russia that his letter was acceptable, and he had accepted their draft of the letter to him, and that he would release both of them the following day, Friday, October 20th, at the four o'clock press conference. He seemed very much pleased about it.

I am dictating this four or five days later, but it must have been at this conference that he started me going to find out whether or not he could buy or sell gold. As a matter of fact, it was at this conference that he explained to me in great detail how he could buy silver and I must have told him that we found a new way for him to buy gold. It was either this morning or earlier in the week that I had given him Herman Oliphant's memorandum on how he could buy gold, and to the best of my recollection, it was at this conference that he told me that the Treasury people told him that it could not be done. I was quite positive that it could be done.

About 11:30 Dean Acheson telephoned me, and I went over to see him with Oliphant, and we talked for about an hour. Acheson said what this Treasury needs is a healthy secretary. Acheson said, "I have no control over my subordinates and my position is impossible." Acheson argued with Oliphant at great length maintaining that Oliphant's method of buying gold was illegal. I must have said to Acheson, "Why don't we get together with the President and the Attorney General, and have these meetings?"

I called up the President and asked him when he would see us. He said at 20 minutes to two. He said that was a good time because Homer Cummings was having lunch with him. "Come on over," he said. Oliphant, Stanley Reed, and Acheson and I called on the President at this time, and we had a lengthy discussion which got nowhere. While we were talking, they announced Henry Brueg and the President said, "Let him come in and sit in on this," which he did. After they had been talking for some time, the President turned to me and said, "What do you suggest, Henry?" and I said I would look into a room all the lawyers who have ideas on this subject and tell them that they must come to a decision this afternoon. He said, "That is fine. Let us go over to the Attorney General's office and do it," and they did. I asked Oliphant to let me know, but he did not.

Friday morning about eight o'clock I called up Stanley Reed and asked him what had happened, and he told me that they had come to an agreement that the R.F.C. could do it, and they were going to have a board meeting at eleven o'clock and pass a resolution. I went to the White House at 9 o'clock, and with Warren met the President.

I told the President what had happened, and asked him whether he would not like me to follow the thing through for him that day, especially because Acheson was fighting it continuously. He said, "Fine, do that." Before leaving the President's room, I told him how Acheson was doing everything to stop it, and he said, "I will send for him and talk to him before he goes to the meeting of the R.F.C., and he did.

I took Warren and Oliphant with me to the Board meeting, and it really was embarrassing because they were so obsequious. Dean Acheson arrived a little late, but scarlet and looking like a thunder cloud. He said, "Gentlemen, I have just come from the President. You know that I am opposed to our buying gold. The President has ordered me to do it. I will carry out his orders." They read him the resolution and he said, "I will vote for it." The Board did not have the slightest idea what they were voting for from the questions that they asked Warren later on. They were all scared to death not to do what the President wished because they realized that I was there watching them for the President. Then the Board and Acheson said, "Of course, we have to get the Attorney General to rule on this," and Acheson wanted to stall, and I said, "No, let us go over and see the Attorney General now and try to get him to give us a ruling now."

I called up Homer Cummings and he said, "Sure, come on over now." Acheson, Oliphant and I went over and we stayed there until 1:45 rewriting and perfecting the resolution of the R.F.C. - this resolution making it possible for the R.F.C. to buy gold. Cummings called up the President about 10 to 2, and told him that we were through, and as this was Cabinet day, he said to be over at 3:30 and he would go over it with us. So we all piled
over there and he saw us about 2:45. The President and Acheson almost came to blows because Acheson wanted to insist that the President write him a personal letter as a protest against Acheson's personal risk. This made the President very angry. We all piled out at four o'clock, and about 100 newspaper men and women on the way who were waiting to see the President, and have him announce his Russian story.

October 22, 1933

This morning, Sunday, at 11 o'clock Oliphant, Warren and I went to the White House to work with the President on his radio speech for that night. In addition to ourselves there were Wallace, Harry Hopkins, Ray Moley, Prof. Rogers, Michaelson, Louis Howe and Henry Brue. We discussed the pros and cons for buying gold until about five minutes to one. While the discussion was on, I slipped out and asked Eleanor Roosevelt whether I could see her husband for a few minutes. She arranged it and I did see him in his bedroom. I told him that while I considered the question of a monetary policy of the greatest importance that his program for opening banks and getting the banks ready to come under the deposit guarantee on January 1st was not functioning and that he ought to look into it himself. The President seemed to think that these two programs were functioning.

I took Warren, Oliphant and Rogers home for lunch. During lunch hour, Moley and Henry Brue worked on the speech in the Executive Office of the White House. We all came back after lunch and sat around for about a half hour doing more arguing. Then the President said, "If you will excuse me, I will begin to dictate," and as far as I could tell the only end of buying gold, and he said, "sure, come back at tea-time." I did, and I got in just in time to hear him read his final draft of his radio speech. Very few changes were made. Everyone left, and I had half hour chat with him. I then went back to the White House for supper alone, Eleanor being sick, and had dinner. On the way he asked me this question, "What would you do if you were President?" I said, "I would not do it either."

I had lunch with him and again showed him how the markets were going, and again he was delighted. I told him at lunch that Hullitt was crowding me to organize American business into a semi-government corporation that could deal exclusively with Russia. I told him that my instinct told me that this was not the right thing to do. He said, "You are absolutely
right. I want to keep these Russian negotiations on a high plane, and it will be time enough to talk about business after we have come to every other decision.

The President is beginning to have a cold, and he said he was going to see the doctor to have a treatment. Again he stopped in the Cabinet room on his way back from the treatment, and most of the time was just jollying and joking with us. I do not know when I have seen him in such high spirits. As a matter of fact, everybody around the White House was most jovial. After three o'clock, we packed up our papers and trooped home, having had a most exciting and thrilling day.

October 24, 1938

Tuesday morning I was at the White House with Warren at 9:30 and again met Acheson there and found that they had not worked out a plan as to whether they should buy gold through the C.C.C. or in exchange for R.F.C. debentures. Again I made the suggestion to the President that he postpone it 24 hours, but to give out a statement that he definitely would begin to buy gold on Wednesday morning. This was done.

We then again went back to the Cabinet room, but because the President's cold was worse, he stayed in bed all day. I visited him at 11:30, 1:45, and 4 showing him the market sheet each time, and at various times stayed and chatted with him. At my 11:30 trip, William Phillips was with him, and at the four o'clock, Farley. I thought I was through for the night when at 6:30 Governor Herring called me and said, "I do not know what is going to happen tonight. There are so many pickets out on the road, and I am afraid you are the only man who could get word to the President, and I wish you would tell him that Milo Reno wrote the White House on September 27th, and is sore that he never got an answer."

I called up Eleanor Roosevelt and said, "I would like to come down and see the President about Iowa." She said, "Come right along. I got there about ten minutes to seven. I never left until 8:15 although I got up three or four times to leave. He had his supper while I sat there. He and I each had two cocktails apiece. This is what I needed very badly.

I told him that Governor Herring said that he was trying to keep the Governor of North Dakota and South Dakota and Minnesota from calling a governors' conference as he thought the result would be unfriendly to the President. I advised the President to tell Herring to go ahead and hold the governors' conference as I felt it was about time that some of these governors took some of the responsibilities and did not always look to Washington. The President agreed with me.

After considerable delay, he got Herring and while I could only hear one end of the conversation, evidently Herring was much less excited in talking to the President than he had been when he talked to me.

After I got back about ten o'clock, McIntyre called me and evidently Steve Early was standing next to him. McIntyre said, "What did you tell Jesse Jones about who should represent the R.F.C. Wednesday morning at the Treasury? I told him that Steve Early had told Jones that he wanted a committee to represent the R.F.C. McIntyre said, "Well, Harvey Crouch called me up and seems pleased that he is not going to be present." I called up McIntyre 15 minutes later at room 736, the Mayflower, which seems to be McIntyre's private hangout, and asked him what had happened. He said he could not reach Jesse Jones because he was up at the British Embassy for dinner.

October 25, 1938

On arrival at my office this morning at ten to nine, Jones called me and said, "What is this all about my taking a committee to the White House? So I told him just what had happened, and he said, "What do you advise me to do?" I said, "I would take the whole R.F.C. Committee for the first time to the Treasury." He said, "All right. Will you ask the
President when you see him at 9:15 whether those are his final orders and let me know?" and I said that I would.

At 9:05 Cameron, Manager of the Foreign Department of the Federal Reserve in New York, called me up and told me that the gold price, based on London, after deducting expenses, was 31.92, and in Paris, 31.90. Paris being higher, we would use the Paris price as a basis.

We had hardly gotten in the President's bedroom when who should walk in but Jesse Jones. You could have knocked me over with a feather. I subsequently learned from the President that Jesse had called up at nine o'clock, and said he wanted to see the President, and he said, "Come on over," and that is how he got there.

We talked a few minutes and the President said, "Let's make it 31.96," and I said, "No. Let's make it 31.96 or 32.00 above the French price." He said, "All right, we will make it 31.96," and I have the satisfaction of knowing that I set the price and that the President accepted it.

I then said, "You will remember that you said you would write a chit to Dean Acheson telling him what the price would be." He took pencil and paper and wrote out a note addressed to the Chairman of the S.P.C. and the Secretary of the Treasury and said, as nearly as I can remember it, "I suggest that you buy gold today at 31.96."

Jesse Jones and I then walked over to Acheson's office, and found a big crowd of newspaper men outside of Acheson's office. I handed the slip to Acheson and he said, "Mr. Woodin wants to run this himself." He got Woodin on the phone and had a meaningless conversation with him for five minutes. Woodin evidently argued that inasmuch as the price in London had gone up so much that we do nothing.

(The Treasury crowd certainly died here.)

Jesse Jones then said, "What should we do?" Acheson said, "Well, that is up to you, Jones, to make a statement." Then Acheson dictated a statement which Jones took down in longhand. It was about eight minutes to ten, and I said, "We have to give out a statement before ten o'clock." They called in a stenographer and Jones dictated what he had written down to the stenographer. I then again said, "We will have to give this statement out now."

Jones and Acheson should have been ready with a formal statement, but as usual they had procrastinated until the last minute. The press was then invited in, and Jones read his statement from his longhand notes in an uncertain manner, and as soon as he came to the price most of the reporters dashed out of the room only leaving a handful. One of the reporters came up to Acheson and said, "Can we now take your pictures?" and Acheson said in a very, very disagreeable voice, "I thought I told you once and for all - no."

Acheson asked where I would be, and I said that I would not be at the Cabinet room today but over at my office, and he said, "Why don't you move into Mr. Woodin's office?" I looked right in the eye and said, "Dean, you may or may not believe it, but I live each day for myself and let the future take care of itself. I am neither a schemer nor a plotter." I got up to go, and Jesse Jones rose to his feet as though I was his superior and said, "What other orders have you, boss?" and I was terribly embarrassed and said, "Don't do that to me, Jesse."

When I was with the President at 11:40, we got talking about Henry Wallace for the first time, and I said to him, "Franklin, when Wallace gives those long economic talks, do you understand what he is talking about?" and he shook his head and said, "Absolutely not." I said, "Ellnor said the other day that if somebody reads the statement to an intelligent group and they cannot understand it, the chances are that the person who is reading it does not understand it himself." Franklin said, "That is very true." He said, "But I told you what happened the other day at Cabinet." He said that Wallace read a two-page statement, each sentence ending in a question mark. When he got through, the President said, "That is very nice, Henry. Now suppose you write the answer to all your own questions," and he said that everybody in the Cabinet room roared with laughter.

The President said that Henry Wallace seems to have the kind of mind that is always questioning everything. I said, "That is not a very helpful kind of mind to have in these times." The President said, "No. We need the kind of mind that gets
action." He then turned to me and said, "What do you suppose Henry Wallace was over here for this morning?" and I said, "I do not know." He said, "Well, he was over here in regard to Russian recognition." I asked, "What is Henry Wallace interested in this for?" and he said, "Religiously." He added, "Anyway, Henry Wallace is very much worried about our recognizing Russia on account of the religious effect it will have in this country."

This is the first time that I have ever discussed Henry Wallace with the President, and I was surprised that he was ready to discuss him so freely.

The President said Litvinoff arrives on November 4th.

Saw Colonel Cooper today.

October 28, 1933

Called on the President at 9:20 with Warren, and found Jesse Jones ahead of us. The English gold was up 17c, and he asked me what I thought. I suggested making it 31.6c or up 24c, and he said, "No, I had a brainstorm this morning, and I think it should be 31.6c," so of course we made it that.

Jesse and I then walked over to Acheson's office, and Acheson was calmer this morning and had his statements all mimeographed with just a blank space for the amount we were going to pay for the dollar. We filled these in ourselves, and then sent them down to his press room. In other words, this morning it was done in an orderly manner as against confusion yesterday.

I asked Acheson how much gold we had bought yesterday, and he said, "None because I sent the Executive Order over yesterday noon to the White House and the President has not signed it yet." I came back and called up McIntyre and gave him this information and said, "This is a friendly tip. McIntyre said he had been trying to get the President to sign it, and thanked me for the information.

I called on the President about 11:45 and told him about my conversation with Gov. Floyd Olsen and how I had asked Gov. Olsen whether he thought Mr. Manuel, the president of an independent bank in Minneapolis, would be willing to come down here for a year to help me. Olsen said, "The bank is Manuel's hobby." He said, "It would be just as though Manuel, you and I had a mistress. Would we be willing to give them up?" He said Manuel feels about the bank the way you and I feel about our mistresses. The President just howled and then told me a questionable story. The President said, "I am worrying about silver." He said that we ought to do something about it. I then showed him that silver had gone up 5c in the last five days or about the same rate as wheat. As long as silver begins to rise at the same rate as other commodities, why worry? He said, "We have entered into a gentleman's agreement to buy a certain proportion of the world's supply of silver each year. I have not the faintest idea what we have done about it." He said we ought to see Senator Key Pittman and have a talk with him. I said, "Leave it to me and I will take care of it for you," and he said, "That is fine." So now, I have silver in my lap.

McIntyre then came in and went over his appointments with him for this afternoon. The President had told me earlier that he had received a telegram from Gov. Herring of Iowa, asking that I be sent out to the governors' conference. I said, "Mr. President, I want to say this in front of McIntyre. I am not the man to go to Iowa because the criticism is against the U.S.D.A. and the A.A.A. I have never criticized them publicly or privately and I cannot go out there and look after your interests and not criticize them." McIntyre spoke up and said, "Henry should not go. We cannot send Wallace because they are too down on him and I suppose we will have to send George Peck." So I said, "Whatever you do, don't send me."

I then asked the President whether he would not see Frank Gannett. He said he would. The President said to come back and see him again at three o'clock.

I said to the President, "Before you ask me, I want to tell you that I do not think that I am the right person to work with Wallace on your hog program." He said, "Why not?"
I said, "Because I am an Orthodox Jew." He said, "No, you are not." I said, "Why yes, I am. I joined the church last night," and he just howled. He said, "Well, I certainly want you to talk to Henry Wallace and Hopkins about it and keep an open mind. I promised him that I would.

October 27, 1933

Saw the President with Warren and Jesse Jones. Instead of taking the leadership in the conversation I held back to see what the others would say. The President kept looking at me out of the corner of his eye, expecting me to say something. When they did not reach any conclusion the President turned to me and said, "What do you think, Henry?" I said, "I think we ought to put gold up today 20c, another 20c Saturday, but then get ready to buy gold abroad." The President said, "Now about making an announcement that we expect to buy gold shortly." I said, "Before you do that you have to get the machinery in order to handle it, and it is up to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to do this for you and do it sympathetically." I asked if Warren could not represent me over at Acheson's office and let me stay behind. The President said, "Sure."

I then told him that it was foolish for us to continue to put up the price of gold unless we were prepared to go into foreign exchange operations; that we have somebody in London and Paris observing for us and that it seemed to me what we were trying to do now would be just as though I had been limited to buying what futures and had not been permitted to buy any cash grain; and, furthermore, if I had attempted to do all of this without any technical experience assistance.

I was just nicely started when Senator Cooper was announced, and the President said, "If you will wait 30 seconds, Henry, we will continue the conversation." Thirty seconds were about half an hour, during which period I had a long talk with Louis Howe and Miss Leland. Missy had just returned from New York where she said everybody was dumbfounded to read in the New York papers an announcement that the Treasury was reported to have said that they knew nothing about this gold operation. I told them that we had to have somebody in the Treasury immediately who would carry out the President's wishes. Missy agreed with me 100%, and all that Louis said was, "Are you going to find such a man?" He said, "We looked for six weeks for an Under Secretary and finally took Dean Acheson on Ray Moley's and Douglas' recommendation." He said, "We checked Acheson's record in and out for three days and could not find anything against him." Then Louis said, "Of course, since then we have found out more about Douglas," and I do not know what he meant by that remark.

I then went back to see the President again and asked Missy to go along with me. I started to say to him that we had to have a new Secretary of the Treasury, and he shut me off immediately. I then said, "Well, then, we have to have a new Under Secretary." The President said, "I do not know which is worse - to keep Acheson or to fire him." Just then Steve Early came in and I said, "Ask Steve which way is best from the standpoint of the reaction of the public." Steve said, "Fire him." Missy feels just as strongly about this whole business as I do. Steve told him that last night he got hold of the reporter who wrote the story that the Attorney General was doubtful as to the legality of the government's buying gold. He said the reporter told him that Dean Acheson had called him up on the telephone and told him so, but said that he must not disclose his source of information. The reporter then hung the story on to the Attorney General. When the President heard this, his face turned black with anger. He said, "I guess this boil has about come to a head, and you know me, Henry; I am slow to get mad, but when I do, I get good and mad." He said, "I will take the question of Dean Acheson's staying or not staying up with the Cabinet this afternoon." During this whole conversation, I was terribly excited and tense.

I walked back to the office and felt a little better. I returned about 11:30 at the President's request to show him how the markets were going. Grain was up fractionally and stocks were down fractionally. He said, "I guess you better give the grain market a little push. Have it close up a couple of points from yesterday's close." I said, "aye, aye, sir." He received me in the bathroom shaving, but was in a grand humor and joked with me a lot about coming into his bathroom. As a matter of fact, I think that this
is the first time he has let me sit with him while he was shaving and took his bath since he has been in Washington. I told the President I reached the height of my ambition. I was a member of the bathroom cabinet.

While this was going on, in walked Missy with a statement from the Secretary of State. The three of us all sat down and had a good giggle. She looked at the President's feet and saw that he was barefooted and said, "You ought to be ashamed of yourself that you do not wear slippers." The Secretary of State wanted to know whether he should give out a statement or whether the President wished to do so at his press conference. The President sent word to him that he should give it out, and then come over and see him.

The President said he had received another letter from Speaker Rainey complaining about our appraisals. He said, "Get hold of some good Democrat and send him out there and try to take Rainey out on the road with him and find out whether or not you are really making fair appraisals." He said, "Remember, after all, he is the Speaker of the House." I told him that I was trying to have our appraisers 50% Democrats and if the President said, "Now, remember, Henry, I do not want too much politics in your organization." He told me to come back at 3:45 before his press conference and give him a picture on the financial markets.

Bullitt had lunch with me and we discussed the Russian situation. Bullitt said he did not believe the President had the right information about Litvinoff coming over on the 4th of November because they had not heard a word about it. Bullitt said I Mrs. Phillips was trying to maneuver things so that she, Phillips, would be in charge when Litvinoff came over. I told Bullitt that I doubted if this was so as the President told me that there would be four present at the conference — the President, Hull, Bullitt and myself.

I saw the President five minutes before his press conference. I said, "See what has happened since I saw you at noon when you told me to buy wheat. I did it by buying only 58,000 bushels," so the President said, "I'll tell you what I did. It was the combination of the three of us. I was shaving, Henry was on the bathtub, and Missy was sitting on the toilet." I said, "That is what I call efficiency and the New Deal."

As I left, McIntyre whispered in my ear, "What is the latest news in regard to Dean Acheson?" I said, "I do not know. I have not seen the President since 11:45." So he said, "All right. I guess it will not do any harm to go ahead and write the letter for the President's signature." (Do not know what this means but I suppose the President has it in mind to ask for Acheson's resignation.) Then McIntyre said, "Who should we get to fill his place?" I said, "I have not the slightest idea," and McIntyre said, "Well, we certainly do not want Lew Douglas." So I said, "No," and McIntyre said, "Lew Douglas needs to be deflated. This whole thing has gone to his head."

Missy said to the President, "Is it all right for McIntyre to tell Gus Ginnerick to button his vest before the newspaper conference?" And the President said, "Sure, let us tell him anything he wants to." (Evidently for some reason or other they are down on poor Gus.) The President's entourage certainly has its ups and downs. Evidently, Missy is going after Gus for reasons known best to her.

October 28, 1928

(Dated November 1, 1928)

Saturday morning at about 21 minutes to one, I called up the President and told him that wheat was off about 38. He said, "Yes, and have wheat close at about the same price as it closed on Friday." I said, "Mr. President, this may take two or three million bushels," and he said, "Well, I would like to have you do it on account of the reaction that it will have throughout the country over the weekend." I started in and evidently the crowd in the wheat pit was laying for me because I made very little headway. At about six minutes before closing, I told Milmor to give them the gun and to buy everything that they offered in order to try and reach our objective. When the smoke cleared away we had bought four million four hundred thousand bushels, and we got May wheat which we were buying practically up to the close of the night before. I felt literally dizzy while the thing was going on. I went home and went to bed for two hours after lunch.
At five o'clock, Warren, Rogers and I had tea with the President and after tea he talked to us very seriously for an hour. He talked about the whole agricultural situation, and the necessity of bringing up the price level. We discussed the possibility of England and France shutting down their embargo on our purchases, and whether or not South African gold would continue to go to London if we were bidding $2. an ounce above London. The consensus of opinion was that South African gold would come to New York.

Then we discussed what the program should be, and the President suggested that we buy seven million dollars a week of newly mined gold in London. I said to the group, ‘Well, when we have bought all this gold and raised the price of gold, what next?’ The consensus of opinion was that the next step would be to stabilize the dollar through fixing the number of grains in a dollar on a new basis, but before doing this you would have to raise the price of commodities. The President said, furthermore, his objective was to have before January 1st cotton at 10c., corn at 50c. and wheat at 90c. He also said that his objective for the coming week would be to set the U.S. price of gold at 33.02; that on Monday he would put the price at 31.98; Tuesday, 32.26; Wednesday, 32.69; Thursday, 32.66; Friday, 32.96, and Saturday, 33.02. Tuesday he would buy in London one and a half million dollars worth of gold; Wednesday, one million dollars; Thursday, eight hundred thousand; Friday, one million four; and Saturday, one million three - or a total of six billion dollars. When we left the President, Rogers turned to me and said, ‘Were you satisfied with the meeting?’ and I said I was not.

I don’t want to forget to relate that Friday morning I saw the President at about 11:45. I said to him, ‘Mr. President, have you invited the Federal Reserve people to come here Sunday?’ I asked him the same thing at our 9:30 meeting Saturday morning and he made a note of it. I asked Miss Leland to remind him. At 11:45 on Friday he said, ‘Why, yes, everybody is taken care of,’ and he went over the list with me. I went out and spoke to McIntyre, and I said, ‘Have the people been invited for the three o’clock meeting on Sunday?’ He said, ‘What meeting are you talking about?’ I said the meeting of the people to meet with the President to discuss how we are going to buy gold abroad. He said, ‘I
MEMORANDUM

October 27, 1933.

To: Mr. Morgenthau

From: Mr. Wells

CASH WEAT PURCHASED

October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>bushels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slight correction may be necessary on mail confirmation.

Estimated bushels: 52,000.

1. I suggest buying 75 mil. a week of newly mined gold each week.

2. Let us get them stabilized at a definite number of grains in 1.

3. Before Jan 1st cotton at 10%, hog — corn @ 50x, wheat @ 9x.

4. Justin subject to point before the previous night at 61, other advice to 35.00.
3/8 to 3/19/38, Monday
3/9 to 3/16, Tuesday
3/21 to 3/28, Wednesday
3/29 to 3/30, Thursday
3/31 to 3/1, Friday
3/2 to 3/3, Saturday

Travled in London £16
Was £600,000
Taxes £1,000,000
Lob £1,300,000
£6,000,000
do not know what you are talking about, Henry," I said, "You better get busy because these people will all be leaving their offices and you won't be able to reach them."

When I got back to my office, it was twelve o'clock and I called up Kanne and I said, "Please remind McIntyre to remind the President to invite the Federal Reserve group to come here. Let me know when it has been done." He said, "All right." At 12:12 he called me up to say it had been taken care of. What would have happened if I had not reminded the President at nine and at twelve, and then checked up two times more, I do not know. But this story just gives an example of how you have to work with the President and the people who are around him.

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October 29, 1938

Sunday - At 3 o'clock I attended what was certainly a very important meeting. Those present were: Jesse Jones, Warren, Rogers; from the Federal Reserve Bank, Kent, Crane, Harrison, Gov. Easley, Acheson, Brueu and I. The President opened the meeting by reading a silly verse that Woodin had sent down. I believe he said by messenger, about Jesse Jones having a cold and being very hard-boiled and having given his cold to Mr. Woodin. Mr. Woodin went to great trouble to have the verse illustrated by some very well known illustrators. This was Mr. Woodin's sole contribution to this most important meeting, and I could not help but think that if he had spent his time on something more useful than a silly verse we might not be in as bad a jam as we were. The President then read us a take-off on Woodin's verses which he had dictated in bed that morning, and it was very clever also, by Jesse Jones. Jones did not know how to take it and looked rather foolish. He has not got much sense of humor.

As a contrast against this reading of silly verses, the President then made a most stirring speech, full of seriousness and mixed with anger. He said, "Gentlemen, I have called you together to inform you that the question of our buying gold is an administration policy. We are all in the same boat. If anybody does not like the boat, he can get out of it."

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He looked around the room and said, "I do not mean anybody particularly, but everybody in this room in general."

From the time the meeting opened and closed, Acheson only said one word but looked very miserable and very sick through the whole thing.

The President then went on and talked about half an hour about his program of raising agricultural prices, and how both from a political and economic viewpoint that it was most important to do this. He said, "Gentlemen, if we continued a week or two longer without my having made this move on gold, we would have had an agrarian revolution in this country. He said wheat was headed toward 50 or 60 when he had me step in and begin to buy for the account of Harry Hopkins. He explained what he was doing in regard to cotton and his so-called hog-corn program and tobacco in the Southeast.

The people in the room were impressed. You could not help but feel that you were at the crossing of the roads as far as the financial policy of the government was concerned.

The discussion then got down to how they could do this, Governor Harrison doing most of the talking. The meeting lasted almost three hours. Harrison was anxious that some one should talk to the French and English before this policy should be announced. The President did not want to do it. He said, "Every time we have taken the English into our confidence they have given us a trimming." He finally agreed that Harrison should be permitted to talk to them.

The President then wrote out in longhand a statement which should be handed out to the press. Before the meeting broke up, Harrison said to the President, "I am willing to assume full responsibility of buying and selling all gold abroad only if the responsibility is mine. Anytime you do not like how I am doing it, tell me so and I will quit." The President told Harrison that he wanted him to keep in touch with Jesse and me.

I left this meeting feeling that we had gotten somewhere and that the matter was now in the hands of the Federal Reserve of New York which ought to know, if anybody knows, how to carry on this very technical international operation; namely,
buying and selling gold in the world's markets.

During the discussion the question came up as to what should be done in regard to Mr. Kent's operations. As I understand it, any merchant or bank who wishes to sell a bill of goods abroad has to get the okay of Kent. Kent's function is to see that this is a legitimate business transaction and not one to get capital out of this country. F.D.R. told Kent that he had no objection to his easing up on these regulations as long as they were not violated. Kent said he saw no objection to letting a N.Y. bank transfer funds for deposit in London in order that the New York bank could earn some interest on this money, and the President said, "Okay." What really will happen will be that Kent will ease up sufficiently on his regulations so that they will not be in conflict with the government's policy to put the price of the dollar down and the price of gold up. The President told Harrison that he could have a fund of one hundred million dollars to play with, and they both agreed that that ought to be enough unless we had a war in Europe.

October 30, 1933

Went to the White House as per schedule at 9:15, and Jesse Jones, as usual, was ahead of me ten or fifteen minutes, and I found him having coffee at the President's bedside. I teased him about it, and told him that the next morning I wanted scrambled eggs. Jesse did not like the teasing very much.

During the day I sold some December wheat futures, 190,000 bushels at above 90c, and bought about 160,000 bushels of cash grain, so that at the end of the day we owned 30,000 bushels less. Jesse Jones was sorry that I bought the cash grain, but I only did it at the urgent request of Minor.

Had lunch with the President and showed him the memo prepared by Oliphant, explaining how we could get the gold transferred from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury. The President read it very carefully and he said, "I think this is all right, but we will have to give it careful consideration." He said, "If we do it, let's do it at three o'clock some morning so that the people wake up they will find it has been done." I told him that I had been looking into silver, and could not find any obligation on the part of the U.S. Government as a result of the conference at London calling upon us to buy silver, that it was necessary for all of the governments who are a party to this treaty to ratify the same before it becomes effective, and that so far none of the countries had ratified it.

Called Miss Leibland and asked if they had heard from George Harrison, Governor of the Federal Reserve of New York. She told me to wait a minute and then put me on to the President. He said that Harrison had been talking to the French and they were literally jumping out of their skin. He explained to them that this was a firm policy of the government and that he simply wanted to let them know. Harrison said he left the French feeling a little bit better. He then called up Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, (the President referred to him as "old pink whiskers") and he said, "This is the most terrible thing that has happened - France and Holland will be driven off the gold basis and the whole world will be put into bankruptcy." At this point in the conversation it struck me awfully funny, and I just howled with laughter, and so did the President. He said Harrison quieted Governor Norman down and left him feeling as happy as possible under the circumstances. He next spoke to Sir George Leith-Ross, who is here for the British Debt Commission, and the President said everyone of his hairs were standing on end with horror at what we were doing, but he also quieted down when the thing was explained to him by Harrison.

I asked the President if we were ready to operate tomorrow morning, and he said, "No. The counsel for the Federal Reserve said it was illegal for them to take R.F.C. debentures that possibly some member bank could take them but they had not yet worked it out." I asked him if it would not be possible for him to see Harrison and some of the others and get it straightened out as I considered it most important that they begin to buy tomorrow morning. He said, "It is impossible as I am busy every minute up to six o'clock which is my deadline, as I take my exercise and swim at that time." He said, "I will tell you what to do. You and Jesse Jones try to get this thing straightened out and let me know. Tell them that they have to make up their mind by six tonight." I told him that I would go to it and that I would not call him unless I needed him desperately. He said, "Fine."
I finally located Harrison, and he came over here and explained to me that he really was not ready yet to buy gold and would much prefer to wait another day. He convinced me that he was right, and I got the President on the wire and told him that I recommended that we postpone buying gold for another day. He said, "Governor Black is sitting at my side, and he is nodding his head in the affirmative." F.D.R. then said, "Tell Harrison, however, that I expect that within another 24 hours we will see the whites of the eyes of the enemy and I expect him to shoot."

October 31, 1933

As per schedule, went to the President and there was Jesse Jones having his coffee. Then I went over to Dean Acheson's office and found Harrison there. I had decided that I did not want to sit in at a conference between Harrison and Jones but, much to my surprise, Acheson urged me to stay because he whispered to me that there might be differences I might be able to help smooth over, so I stayed.

A letter to the Federal Reserve in New York had been prepared for Jesse Jones to send, and the Secretary of the Treasury approved, giving the Federal Reserve the necessary orders with which to begin to buy gold. The big argument centered on the fact that Jones wanted to be able to tell each day what to do, Harrison maintaining that he could not and would not do business on that basis. The President told him that he was to be solely responsible and that would be the only way that he would do it. After 3/4 of an hour it finally wound up by Harrison making his point.

At about 1:45 I went over to the Executive Offices of the White House to show the President the latest figures on the market. Jones was sitting there, and I could see that he was reading the letter which we worked on during the early part of the morning. The friendly, courteous thing for him to have done would have been to ask me to go in with him to see the President. Instead of that, he did the typical Jones act, which was to wait until he was told to come in to see the President, and as he went through the door he said to me, "Henry, maybe you would like to see a copy of this letter." There is no sense in getting offended or paying any attention to Jesse's rudeness. If the circumstances had been reversed, he would simply have walked in with me without having been asked.

After Jones was with the President for three minutes, the President sent for me and asked me to accompany him into the washroom and let me talk to him while he was in there. I was glad that Jones saw me go into the washroom with the President because if he did not already realize how close I was to the President, he must have realized it after that.

Again, in the typical Jones' manner, before the Council Meeting started, Jones showed Acheson and me the letter with the pencil corrections made by the President. Jones does not bother me a bit because I really feel that his method of doing business with the President in the long run will only get him in Dutch.

After the Council Meeting I got up to go, and the President beckoned to me and said, "I want to see you Monday, Henry." He said, "What are the financial market figures for today?" I rushed to the telephone on his own desk and got them and then left for my own office.

November 1, 1933

Wednesday morning - Again at the President's bedside with Jesse Jones. The President asked Jesse and me whether we had heard anything from Harrison and neither of us had. I played a little trick on Jesse. I turned to him and said, "Jesse, it seems to me that it is up to you to get the quantity of gold purchased each day, knowing darn well that he did not have them. He turned to me and said, "Well, you know, Henry, both of us have been trying to get these figures," and I said, "Yes, Jesse, but it seems to me that inasmuch as it is your money you ought to know each day how much gold you bought."
Before leaving I told the President that I had some swell figures on Russia, and asked him when we were going to have a dress rehearsal. He said, "Are you going to go home next Tuesday to vote or are you going to vote by mail?" I said, "I am going to vote by mail." He said, "Have you got your blanket?" and I replied that I had not. Then he said, "Well, then you are too late." I said, "I have sent my check for $200 to John E. Mack," and he said, "Why, yes, that reminds me, I will have to do the same." But I am sure that he will again forget about it. I said, "When do you think we ought to have a dress rehearsal about Russia?" and he said, "Let us have it next Monday." I said, "Fine."

I then went over to Acheson's office with Jesse Jones and, unfortunately, was present at what almost became a real row between the two men. Acheson insisting that he must know the details about each bank that buys preferred stock, and Jesse Jones insisting that Acheson must rely on the S.P.C. and should simply sign on the dotted line. Acheson said, "I would like to see some one over from the Treasury who could watch things for me." Jesse said this would simply slow matters up. Jesse said, "Why don't you come to our meetings yourself and then you will know what is going on?" Acheson said, "I have not got the time." Then Jesse banked down and said, "All right. Send somebody over." Jesse showed ill-temper throughout the whole of this conversation and I must say for Acheson that he conducted himself well and seemingly came out on top of the argument.

I have talked each morning at about ten o'clock to Secretary Woodin at his home trying to keep him from making me buy the new government issues for F.C.A. Woodin has been very anxious to support the market, and has supported it with millions of dollars in order to have them continue to convert the 4th Liberties into the new issue. He has been using, I believe, twenty-five million dollars of Postal Savings funds, and Heaven knows how much of Sinking Fund money, and six million four of my money. My money was used at the issue price and some of his money at above the issue price. I have told him each morning that he could not keep this price up, and that if the President's gold policy was successful, governments would and should go down. So far, I have been successful in getting them to use their own funds rather than mine.

This seems to be the only thing that Woodin is interested in as he never discusses the gold matter with me, and I doubt if he knows what it is all about. He is always very cheerful and friendly over the telephone, and wants you to know very decidedly that he is getting better.

While I was there he asked Acheson to immediately send him down a copy of the Committee on Liquor Taxation. This report is to go to the President today.

It seems incredible that while we are in the "ast of one of the greatest financial crises in the world that we should have a Secretary of the Treasury who is less than useless because he meddles into the affairs of the government just enough to make it very difficult for his Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and I should think particularly difficult for the President as it throws the whole burden on the President, especially because Acheson is completely out of sympathy with the President, and I question his loyalty.

I called up the President and told him that between 1:45 and 2:15 we lifted the price of May wheat approximately 96 by buying 250,000 bushels of wheat. I told him that we were about ready to go ahead on silver, but instead of taking it up with Acheson first I suggested that we get the Attorney General to rule on it first and then tell Acheson about it afterwards. The President said, 'You Devil - you are just as bad as I am.' I said, 'Well, who taught me?' and he just roared. Then he said, 'That will be simply grand. Go ahead and get the information and let me know.' I spoke to Carusi, special assistant to the Attorney General, and he is going to assign somebody to do this in strict confidence.

November 2, 1933

Last night at the house I had Senator Key Pittman, Rogers and Oliphant. Spent the whole evening discussing silver. Told Pittman that the President had asked me to follow this matter for him, and the Attorney General would give us a ruling shortly as to the legality. I impressed on him the importance of secrecy. However, there must have been a leak earlier in the day as metal stocks went up from 4 to 6 points. It could
not have come from this office as I only spoke to the President about it."

About nine o'clock Harry Hopkins called me up. He just returned from a five-day trip out West and was very much excited. He had a letter from Lorenz Holzer saying that Mr. Jaffrey, the new head for the R.C.C. at St. Paul, was a crook and that none of the people could understand why Jones had appointed him. He then also could not understand why Jones had hired Mr. Hopkins, who was the former head of the R.C.C. in the same district, as he also is supposed to be mixed up in some crooked deals. Hopkins is having lunch with the President and is going to tell him all about it.

Hopkins also told me what they thought out West of our two Land Bank Presidents, Fields at Wichita, and Hogan at Omaha. I told him that that was an old story to me.

Hopkins also said, "For Heaven's sake, don't sell any more wheat. I have an idea how we could use lots of it through feeding it to the cattle in the starvation area." I said, "More power to you."

I called on the President as usual and Jesse Jones was ahead of me. The President was delighted that the price of gold in London had gone up to $33 shilling 3 pence. I advised him that the Federal Reserve this morning had bid in London 11d above the Paris parity, but had not bought any gold because the premium went to 11d. About 400,000 pounds of gold had been dealt in in London. In Paris, we bought $900,000 in gold at an average rate of 6.0699.

Went over to see Dogan and asked him how much money they had spent in supporting the new issue, and he told me twenty-eight million dollars; that he had spoken to Secretary Woodin last night, and he decided that for the time being they would not buy any more.

Saturday - Went to the White House and met Jones there. I said to the President that we did not buy any gold last night. He said, "That is right. Harrison called up and spoke to Jesse." I could not make out whether he also spoke to the President. Then Harrison urged that inasmuch as Saturday was only half a day that they should not buy any gold. Both the President and Jones said that they thought they made a mistake by agreeing with Harrison. I believe it was on Friday that we raised the price 11d, and the President said, "It is a lucky number because it is three times seven." If anybody ever knew how we really set the gold price through a combination of lucky numbers, etc., I think that they would be frightened. Saturday we increased the price 11d. I stayed after Jones left and had a good half hour talk in which most of the time Louis Howe was present.

I showed the President a letter of Sen. Smith drawing his attention to the fact that he owed us $300 back interest and amortization. The President said, "I want to ask you what you think I should do in connection with agriculture as I am expecting to see the five governors at 10:30." I said, "I am going to talk to you, if I may, very frankly, and straight from the shoulder. I think that you should not do a thing, but this idea of fixing the prices of commodities on a parity basis is ridiculous. Let us give your gold purchasing plan a fair trial before we get into any deeper on this artificial price-fixing scheme. Furthermore, I am going to say something in this room that I have never said before, and I only wish Senator Wallace was here. It seems to me that Wallace and Peck are 100% apart." The President shook his head and said, "Why, no, you are wrong," and I said, "I am sorry, Mr. President, but I still think I am right." Furthermore, I said, "Wallace ought to make up his own mind and take full responsibility and not dump all of these difficult problems in your lap." I said, "Not only Wallace, but a lot of other people in this town in who are appointive officers should do everything possible to protect the elected officers like yourself." I said that every time Wallace has something difficult he comes and runs to the President with his problem, and it seems to me that it is about time that he took some responsibility himself. I said, "I have never
criticized Wallace on the outside and always supported him." The President said, "That is right. I know you have and Wallace tells me that he likes you very much.

I then walked back to the office and I got the idea that if we could do something to raise the price of corn over the weekend that it would help the President a lot.

I had told the President that I was getting a check through Seligman and Lehmans on from 150 to 300 businessmen, and I thought the reports would be available. I used that as an argument for him to sit by and not conceed to the demands of the governors. The President said, "Milo Seeto has sent me word that if I do not concede to his wishes he will call a strike, and I do not like to have anybody hold a pistol to my head and demand that I do something.

When I got back to the office I called up Harry Hopkins and said, "I would like to buy a couple of million bushels of corn today for you as I want to help raise the price." He said, "Don't. We have to talk to Wallace about this," and I said, "No, we do not." He asked, "Can I feed this to cattle?" and I said, "Sure." So he said, "All right. Go ahead."

Later in the day I told him I could buy 100,000 bushels of oats that were 2% damaged from being in a fire for 25c a bushel, which is about 4% under the regular market, and he said, "All right." I then purchased this oats. I tried desperately to get the President to okay this purchase, but we could not reach him as the British Ambassador was with him. I decided to use my own judgment and went ahead. I spoke to Engel in Chicago and he said that he had a bid for 25,000 bushels of corn from England about 2% under the market, but he said, "Buy 500,000 bushels for Harry Hopkins." I said, "Buy 500,000 bushels for Farmers National first?" He said, "No, go ahead"

I then bought our 500,000 bushels, and it and do this." We then bought our 500,000 bushels, and it raised the price less than 1c. At 10 minutes to 12 we announced that Farmers National had sold 25,000 bushels to England.

I checked this publicity with both McIntyre and Early, and they said it was fine. I cannot remember whether I talked to the President about it or not. I think I did. In fact, I am quite sure I did and told him he should use it in talking to the governors.

At ten to one the corn market began to sag so I gave him orders for 500,000 more bushels. They bought only 400,000 but in the last few minutes put corn up 2c, so that it closed at 47c.

I tried to get the President before I left the office but they said he was busy. I got him about two pm, and they said he was ready to talk to me. I told him what we did and he was simply delighted. He was very jolly over the telephone, and said that the Mormons had just called on him to come to their church on Sunday, and jokingly he said, "Me?"

Then he suggested that Elinor and I represent him.

November 6, 1933

I am writing this on November 14th and I am going to try to go back to Monday, November 6th. This past week has certainly been a most eventful one, the outstanding events being my participation in the negotiations with Russia.

Wednesday I attended a lunch at the White House for the Russians, and in the morning I went to Secretary Hull's office at eleven o'clock. I made a few notes, fortunately, while the conference was on of my impressions, and they are as follows:

Hull gave the impression that the religious issue is the most important one, and that it was very much uppermost in his mind. He talked about nothing else for the whole first hour. Hull said if we just started diplomatic relations between Russia and the U.S.A. without first coming to an agreement on the religious issue, the Roosevelt Administration would be overthrown at the next election.
Those present at the conference were Hull, Phillips, Bullitt, Judge Moore and Keeley. Judge Moore kept asking for a formal statement in regard to the religious issue which would not detract from the dignity of the U.S.S.R. Litvinoff kept answering that he could not give any statement formal, or otherwise, as it would be binding on his country and, therefore, he did not wish to make any statement.

Hull now says they are only talking about protecting American nationals in Russia, and not about the religious issue as it affected Russian citizens, and that the U.S.A. was desirous of securing permission for her nationals for religious worship while in Russia. Litvinoff says, "But the facts are that they are now permitted to do so, and no American nationals have ever complained against religious restrictions while in Russia." Litvinoff said very emphatically, "We cannot set up a privileged class."

Litvinoff suggests that claims and counter-claims be handled through diplomatic channels after recognition. Hull says we have a congressional election every two years. We will have to face criticism if we do not handle the question of debts to face criticism if we do not handle the question of debts. It is time we made some progress.

Hull's attitude throughout was very hesitating and apologetic. Litvinoff is decisive and firm. Litvinoff disclaimed all responsibility of the Third International. He said the Third International has no governmental standing. He said, "We are not asking for anything. We have no request to make of any of your organizations in the U.S., so why ask us about some of your organizations?" The conference broke up for lunch at the White House.

We came back to the State Department at four o'clock and continued the conference. During the afternoon, Hull was very decisive. I guess as a result of a talk with the President, Litvinoff said, "Why should the Soviet Government pay the debts of the Singer Sewing Machine to private people for installment payments due the Singer Sewing?" Litvinoff said, "I cannot see why our government should pay debts of this character." He admitted that the Russian government took over many plans of companies, but paid for them by giving them special concessions.

Hull gave Litvinoff a carefully prepared document in regard to religious freedom of our nationals in Russia. Hull said, "We would like to exchange such documents making it unilateral. "We cannot make any such request," says Litvinoff, "as we are not interested in the religion of our national. During the conversation, he remarked that they took special precaution against emissaries from the Vatican.

November 15, 1938

Went to the White House as per schedule, and the President said that he wanted to talk to me about F.D.R. and suggested to Jones that he leave. F.D.R. then said, "I had a very interesting and confidential conversation with Mr. Woodin." He said Mr. Woodin wants to go away for several months and he added, "I have suggested to him that he take a leave of absence without pay." He said, "I am going to write him a letter in answer to one which he has written to me suggesting that we get somebody to become Acting Secretary who knows government and knows finance." He then said, "I have decided that that person is H.M., Jr." I was so dumbfounded when he made this statement that I broke out in a perspiration and sort of mumbled for a few seconds.

The President then continued and said, "You made good for me in Albany, and you are one of the two or three people who has made an outstanding success here in Washington, so let's you and I go on to bigger things." He said, "We will have lots of fun doing it together."

I told him how much I appreciated the opportunity, and after I came to, I went over and shook his hand and thanked him and told him that, of course I had given him everything just as I always had, and I felt that the job was a particularly difficult one from a personnel standpoint. He said that Will Woodin had only made one request of him. He said, "He brought down with his Steve Gibbons as his personal assistant, and he would like you to keep him." The President said, "Tom Hughes, another Assistant Secretary, is n.g., and you better get rid of him." He said, "I do not know much about Chip Roberta. I think he is honest, but you better watch him." He said that Roberts wants to take hold of the new bureau for central purchasing, but he absolutely is not the man for this job.
He then told me that he was going to ask Acheson for his resignation. F.D.R. seemed particularly annoyed with Acheson because within the last couple of days he had tried to avoid signing the gold agreement for fear of personal liability to himself. The President said that he is yellow. He then continued and said, "Woodin wants to stay for the Cabinet Dinner Thursday night because he has never been to a Cabinet Dinner, and then he expects to go to Arizona." I said, "Do you think he will come back?" and F.D.R. said, "I really do not know," but he said that Woodin had dropped a hint that he would like to have an Ambassadorship. F.D.R. said, "I am sure Woodin will never come back to Washington on account of the climate." I said, "Why don't you announce this at your Wednesday press conference and that would give me a chance to sit with Woodin a couple of days?" He said, "That is a good idea and I will do it."

At lunch with the President, Anna Ball being there also, I could not say anything as I had asked him in the morning if he had consulted or talked to anybody about my appointment. He said, "Absolutely nobody." I said, "When did you make up your mind?" and he said, "Saturday." He asked Anna and Missy to go out of the room, and then he read me Woodin's letter to him and his letter to Woodin. Both of them were excellent. F.D.R. read me his letter asking Acheson for his resignation. He said, "Do you think this is too harsh?" I said, "Mr. President, if I thought it was too harsh or unfair I would tell you so." I said, "Furthermore, I would not want the job if I thought that you are doing Acheson an injustice by asking for his resignation." I believe he expects to give these letters out Wednesday morning.

Missy came in and said, "We can't get a cottage for Henry and Ellnor, and Henry says he only wants to come down if he can be helpful." The President did not let on that we had discussed the thing in the morning, and that I was to come down for three or four days beginning with November 23rd. So he said to Missy, "I have to talk to some one about gold, and I would rather talk to Henry than any one else."

Wallace called me and asked me to take Peek into my organization because he wanted to get rid of him. I told him that I would not do it because I could not be so unfair as to wish Peek off on the F.C.A. I told him that I would go with him to the President but, under no circumstances, would I permit Peek to be transferred to this organization.

The Korensky files were under the custody of the State Department. They left them in the old Soviet Embassy, and now they are having a great deal of trouble about them. If they do not move these files today they will belong to the Bolsheviks instead of us.

Don't know the date of the following but it was after HM Jr. became Under Secretary, and before the President went to Warm Springs:

Saw the President. Very brief interview. Told him that I have been thinking over about U.S. and England each putting up twenty-five million dollars to try and stabilize the pound between 3.25 and 3.29. Told him that I talked it over with Warren and Rogers, and that we thought it was all right, provided we could get out on 24 hours notice. The President said, "All right."

I told the President that I would try to carry out as many of these financial matters as possible without bothering him; that if I went too far or too fast that he could check me. He said, "I get to Warm Springs Thursday night at 8:00, and you could reach me there." I said, "I will not bother you unless I have to." He said, "Maybe my curiosity will be so great that I will call you." I asked him what he said to Dr. Sprague, and he said that Sprague complained he had been unable to see the President while Warren and Rogers seemed to have the entry. The President said that he said to Sprague, "I take it perfectly for granted that you have been seeing Acheson and how should I know that you have not?" He said, "If you wanted to see me, why didn't you let me know?"
He said, "I think the best way to handle Sprague is to let Will Woodin handle him today." F.D.R. said, "I had a good talk with Jack Morgan who is more disturbed about the speech that Rex Tugwell made in which he said something about capital being inhuman." The President said, "I think that my talk with Jack Morgan was helpful."

Oliphant and I then went to the Treasury, and I got him started to see if the Treasury could put up twenty-five million dollars as a stabilization fund.

I then went down to see Eugene Black and asked him to explain to me the Federal Reserve open market operations. He said that they had over 660 million dollars reserves on hand, and that the thought behind this was that if they loaded up their member banks with an excess of capital they would be forced to loan it out. He admitted that this policy had not worked and consequently they only purchased two million dollars this week, and there is a question if they would buy any the next week.

I told him that I wanted to work with the Federal Reserve, and really be partners. He said that was fine. I suggested that we have a meeting of his executive committee with myself immediately. His face beamed all over. He seemed to be tickled to death with the idea. He said, "Let's call up George Harrison and arrange it at once." He then spoke to George Harrison, and he will be here on Monday at eleven o'clock to meet with me. I told George Harrison that I was perfectly willing to enter into an agreement with England for ten days, each putting up twenty-five million dollars, but I wanted to be able to get out on 24 hours' notice in case wheat should drop to 60c and cotton to 8c. He said, "I am quite sure that England would not be willing to do this as it might result simply in England losing twenty-five million dollars of gold." I said why not let the English know that for the next two days we will simply try to keep the pound between 5.25 and 5.30, and let us see what happens, especially if they try to help us? He said he would think it over and call me back.

Conference on collection of claims of government lending agencies from cotton benefit payments to be distributed by Department of Agriculture

Present as the committee of the executive council:
Morgenthau, Chairman, Jones and Wallace.

Present in consulting and advisory capacity:
For the Farm Credit Administration -- Myers, Gaston, Oliphant, Wells, Hovey, Upper, McKenleys, Brennan, Hewitt.
For the Department of Agriculture -- Brand, Johnston, Peak, Palme, Seldman, Porter.

Governor Morgenthau presided as chairman of the committee. On request, Johnston reviewed negotiations for reaching method of disbursing payments so as to fulfill legal obligations to lien-holders. Referred to delay in reaching understanding and necessity for prompt action. Morgenthau called attention to fact F.C.A. was not responsible for delay, but had made constant efforts to reach understanding. Johnston admitted F.C.A. was not to blame for any delays. Said he had been away when request was made for attorney general as to whether government claims must be offset. Didn't regard this as vital anyway. Morgenthau asked whether he could see copy of opinion. Brand said he had asked that one be sent over. Morgenthau knew of opinion only by hearsay. Opinion was not produced during the meeting.

Morgenthau proposed tentatively plan of having checks made jointly to farmer and F.C.A. as creditor. Asked for expression of this, Palme as comptroller of A.A.A. explained great difficulty of attempting to deal with lists of debtors to be furnished by F.C.A. He thought only feasible way of making joint checks was to take list of creditors from farmer's application and performance report. Admitted that this might not give accurate results, depending on honesty of farmer in making report. Man who failed to report debts would benefit. Upon question whether all agreed to this plan Gaston suggested as alternative that all checks be made solely to farmer beneficiary but that printed notice be enclosed directing beneficiary to come to agreement with all creditors on use of proceeds. Brand and others of D. of A. thought this good idea. Wallace, who came in late, said whole plan would fall unless farmers got their checks promptly and it would be endangered by too severe a collection policy.
Members of the committee withdrew to end of room to discuss proposals. President Morgenstern said they had decided best plan was to send out checks promptly made out to beneficiaries and F.C.A. would deal with each case individually. Johnston agreed A.A.A. would give notice of localities where checks were being distributed to allow opportunity for collection.

Oliphant said, of course, this could not apply to any but Crop and Seed Loan and R.F.C. debts as other creditors than government were affected in case of Land Banks, Joint Stocks and Intermediate Credit. In these cases checks would have to be made jointly as in case of private creditors. There was apparent agreement to this by Wallace, Johnston and Paine, and meeting was breaking up when Brand said he didn’t think matter was settled yet. He contended for general policy of making checks solely to beneficiaries. Meeting broke up into half a dozen groups discussing this and other matters.

Paine said making joint checks meant long delay. Johnston thought it could be done very quickly. Paine said, "You’re the man to take charge of it, then."

Wallace had previously assigned Porter to work with Gaston in working out publicity to be released following council session. Porter agreed he would write story and submit it for Gaston’s approval.

Debate between individuals continued for 1½ to 20 minutes. If any change was made in understanding as stated above, the writer of this memo did not learn of it.