13 January 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 13 January 1941. Also telegram from Secretary Hull to the Secretary at the American Embassy at Vichy.

Answers Churchill's telegram #117 to Roosevelt, 11 January 1941, filed herein.
January 13, 1941.
6 p.m.

NO DISTRIBUTION
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

In response to the message to the President quoted in your telegram No. 117, January 11, 5 p.m., please convey the following personal reply:

QUOTE I have sent suitable instructions to the Ambassador at Vichy requesting that he make it clear to Marshal Petain that the offer came directly from you and involved more than a suggestion of assistance. In instructing the Ambassador to deliver this message to the Marshal at a suitable opportunity, I told Admiral Leahy that he should in no way give the impression of pressing for any response. ENDQUOTE

HULL

REGRATED
UNCLASSIFIED
The President has received a secret and personal message from Churchill who is apparently concerned lest the Marshal may not have fully realized that the message conveyed to him through the Chargé d'Affaires came directly from the Prime Minister and involved more than a suggestion of assistance in the event that the French Government should decide to cross to North Africa.

After consulting Matthews concerning his conversation with the French authorities on the subject (see telegram No. 1208, December 31, 7 p.m.) and when a suitable occasion may present itself, you should indicate to the Marshal that you are acquainted with the British offer. You should, however, make it clear that you are not bringing the subject up for the purpose of obtaining an expression of opinion from the Marshal but only for the purpose of making certain that he understands that it was the British Prime Minister himself who made the offer and that the Prime Minister has informed this Government that the offer involved considerably more than a suggestion of assistance. There is no intention whatsoever of pressing the Marshal for any response, but you may say to him that you are holding yourself available should the Marshal desire to pursue the matter further.
22 January 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 22 January 1941.

Answers telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 21 January 1941, filed herein.
January 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I have been asked to return the attached message from the British Prime Minister to the President.

It is my understanding that the President's reply has been sent - the pencil draft is returned herewith.

Respectfully,

D. J. CALLAGHAN

REGRADING
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 17, 1941.

With reference to your memorandum of January sixteenth regarding the former Naval Person's message to you of January eleventh, I enclose copies of the despatches which I sent to Vichy and London, in accordance with our conversation.
Delighted ship is coming to DC next week. I hope I can manage it. I will go there Friday afternoon and meet Halifax off the harbor. Destroyer will escort her as usual and act as escort. Would really appreciate it if two of our own vessels could go up bay on her. Many thanks.
7 March 1941

Proposed telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 7 March 1941. There is no record as to whether or not this message was sent.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

March 7, 1941.

I held up this proposed dispatch to Churchill because I wanted first to talk with Halifax. I explained to Halifax that it is of the utmost importance to us because of the congressional situation that the matter of the bases be settled quickly. He is telegraphing his Government to that effect.

I think we should do the same to our people. Winant is pushing it too.

In regard to points of difficulty, simple solutions can be found, as for example:

1. In regard to port dues, all United States Government ships go to our eight bases without having to pay port dues. All non-United States Government owned ships, whether they go to any of our eight bases or not, should pay the regular British Island dues.

2. In the case of navigational facilities, the United States Government should pay for and maintain all navigational facilities made necessary by our use of these eight bases. The British should pay for and maintain all others.

3. Because these eight bases are definitely military areas, British ships should be excluded from these areas except when authorised to enter them by the United States representative. This applies to local fishing boats, to whom revocable licenses might be given by the American representative, and actually would be given in normal times.
4. In regard to legal jurisdiction, the solution is clear. Where the offense is a normal police matter -- disturbance of the peace, assault, robbery or even a murder -- if the person is a native, the jurisdiction should lie in the Island court, whether the crime was committed on the reservation or off of it. Where such a crime or misdemeanor was committed by an American officer or enlisted man, off the reservation, the crime should be tried in an Island court; and where the crime was committed by an officer or enlisted man on the reservation, it should be tried by the Naval or Military authorities.

In regard to a narrow classification of crimes committed on the reservation, such as sabotage, espionage, etc., the jurisdiction would be in the American authorities for trial on the reservation or in an American court, the offense being against the Government of the United States.

5. In regard to duty to furniture for the use of Army, Navy or Marine Corps, to food, clothing, tobacco, etc., for their use on the reservation, they should enter free of Island duties. There should be a solemn undertaking on our part, however, that the resale of any article thus brought to the reservation, and later taken across the line for use anywhere off the reservation, would be severely punished and put an end to. As a matter of practical fact, in all of these Islands clothing, liquor, etc., can be bought more cheaply on the Island than it can be imported from the United States. The only real exception is that of cigarettes. The British Island duty on our cigarettes are very high. Cigarettes should, therefore, pay no duty going into our reservation for use there, but any person selling any of them outside the reservation should be severely punished.

F. D. R.
February 25, 1941

AMBASSADOR

LONDON (ENGLAND)

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I have been very much concerned at the delay in reaching an agreement in respect to the naval and air bases. At your request I was glad to reconsider the question of the place in which the negotiations were to take place and in view of the considerations advanced by you to send a delegation to London. This delegation has now been in London over a month and a satisfactory agreement has not yet been reached. Indeed the negotiations appear to be deadlocked on a number of points of considerable importance.

In connection with request for appropriations to construct these bases, our War and Navy Departments will be questioned by Congressional Committees within the next week. They will be asked detailed questions in regard to the status of these bases and the provisions of the leases. On the basis of the present situation,
satisfactory answers cannot be given to these questions and this inability to give satisfactory answers would probably lead to still more questions. Already adverse discussion has developed in Congress and in the press, in regard to the conditions under which we are acquiring these bases. It seems to me imperative, in all these circumstances, that a satisfactory agreement in respect to the bases be completed without further delay. Such an agreement would provide effective answers to questions which may otherwise prove to be embarrassing to the working out of many of the important immediate problems we have before us. I do hope that you will be able to urge your people to expedite the decisions our negotiators are now awaiting.
My dear Mr. President:

Reports from our representatives in London negotiating the base leases have indicated that delays have been encountered in receiving decisions from the British Government on pending questions. Upon the occasion of a call at the Department by the British Ambassador on Tuesday, February 25, I took the opportunity to call this matter to his attention. He asked that he be permitted to present a memorandum on the subject which he accordingly sent on February 26, a copy of which I am enclosing. I am today sending him in reply a memorandum, a copy of which I am also enclosing with this letter.

Appropriation requests are now before Committees of the Senate and House, and hearings are already called by the House Appropriation Committee on the Army appropriation for this purpose. The War and Navy Departments have been notified by the Congressional Committees that full information will be desired with regard to the terms and conditions of the leases and any other agreements which have

The President,

The White House.
have been made or are contemplated with regard to the establishment of these bases, and both the War and Navy Departments are apprehensive of criticism which might arise as the result of inability to give conclusive answers to these questions.

I am convinced that the British Government and this Government are not at all far apart on the questions now under discussion in London with regard to the terms of the leases and the accompanying agreements for the use and operation of the bases, and that the most important element in the whole situation at this time is to obtain a prompt settlement and agreement on the questions still pending. I have therefore drafted a suggested telegram which if it meets with your approval might be sent as a message from you to Mr. Churchill in an effort to have the matters at issue concluded as soon as possible.

The Navy and War Departments have been consulted with regard to the suggestion that you send a message to the British Prime Minister for this purpose and have both approved of such a step. I also feel that it would be advisable to make this effort to expedite the conclusion of these negotiations.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures.
MEMORANDUM

It was provided in the notes exchanged between Mr. Cordell Hull and Lord Lothian on September 2nd, 1940, that,

"His Majesty's Government in the leases to be agreed upon will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of territorial waters and air spaces adjacent or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases and appropriate provisions for their control.

"Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which those areas are situated shall be determined by common agreement."

In accordance with the foregoing provisions, discussions are now taking place in London with a view to deciding how the necessary "adjustment and reconciliation" between the jurisdiction of the United States authorities and that of the local British authorities can best be arranged.

No question of the transfer of sovereignty arises. This was made clear in the Attorney General's opinion of August 27th, and has been reaffirmed by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons. That being so, the question to be solved would seem to be how to arrange that the United States authorities in the various territories shall obtain adequate powers to defend, control and operate their bases with the minimum disturbance to the existing British administrative and jurisdictional arrangements.

There
There is, of course, no suggestion that the United States Government should be denied any powers which they consider necessary for the proper defence or use of the bases. At the same time, it is felt that it is most important that the fullest consideration should be given to the interests and feelings of the local inhabitants and that the existing administrative and jurisdictional arrangements should only be disturbed if this is really essential for the proper defence of the American bases. While the British authorities are naturally particularly concerned to protect the interests of the local inhabitants for whose welfare they are responsible, it is felt that it is equally to the advantage of the United States authorities to see that the leases are drawn up in such a manner as to reduce to the minimum the possible causes of friction between the various parties concerned. The leases are to run for a period of 99 years, and that being so it is clearly necessary that their long term effect upon the well being of the local inhabitants should be taken into account. It would seem, however, that the instructions sent to the United States Delegates in London make it difficult for the latter to pay due account to the interests of the different territories and their inhabitants, and compel them to put forward demands for concessions or facilities which would not seem to be essential for the defence or control of the bases.

Two examples may be given. In the matter of jurisdiction the British authorities are prepared to allow the United States authorities to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals as regards security offences committed anywhere in the territories concerned and over Americans
in regard to all offences committed within the leased areas. The American Delegates have, however, been instructed to claim United States jurisdiction over all persons, including British subjects, as regards security offences committed anywhere in the territories concerned, and as regards all offences committed in the leased areas. The exercise by the United States authorities of jurisdiction over all persons, whether Americans or not, in respect of all offences committed within the leased areas would not seem to be essential to the proper defence of the bases. This would not, for example, be prejudiced by an assault by one British subject on another taking place within the leased area.

As regards shipping, the British authorities have proposed that all vessels owned by the United States Government should be granted the same privileges and exemptions from harbour dues, etc. as vessels belonging to the Royal Navy. They have also proposed that the United States coastwise shipping laws should not apply to the leased areas, and that British merchant ships should therefore not be excluded from these areas and have asked that harbour facilities within the leased areas should be made available to British and other ships under certain conditions. In reply, the American Delegates have, it appears been instructed to press for the exemption of United States ships from all dues—which might place them in a more favourable position than ships in the Royal Navy—and have made no proposals to meet the British request in regard to the United States coastwise shipping laws and facilities for British ships in the leased areas.
The exemption of United States ships from all dues and the possible exclusion of British ships from the leased areas would again hardly seem to be essential to the defence or control of the bases.

There are other points on which similar difficulty seems to have arisen; but the broad argument that it is wished to urge is one in favour of the instructions to the United States Delegates being such as to enable them to treat the matters under discussion on a wide basis from the defence aspect and to take fully into account the interests of the various territories and their inhabitants.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
February 26th 1941.
MEMORANDUM

In its memorandum of February 26, the British Embassy raises the following questions with respect to the negotiations concerning the lease of naval and air bases:

(1) That the United States is demanding jurisdiction over all persons, including British subjects, as regards security offenses committed within the territories concerned, and as regards all offenses committed within the leased areas. It is stated that the exercise by our authorities of jurisdiction over all persons, whether American or not, in respect of offenses committed within the leased areas, would not seem to be essential to the proper defense of the bases.

In a telegram despatched to London on February 26, the American negotiators were authorized to say that the Government of the United States would not exercise jurisdiction
dition over British subjects, except as regards offenses committed within the leased area affecting the safety of the area or the security of the United States, that is to say, offenses of a military character, including treason, sabotage, espionage, or any other offense relating to the security and protection of the United States bases, equipment, or other property, or to the operations of the Government of the United States under the power of the lease. This jurisdiction was further limited to offenses committed within the leased areas where the offender is apprehended therein.

It is believed that this undertaking fully meets the views set out in the British memorandum.

(2) The memorandum also raises the question regarding harbor and light dues to be paid by American vessels using the bases. It is contended that American public vessels should not have greater exception than is now granted to similar ships of the Royal Navy.

As to this, it must be borne in mind (1) that

British
British public vessels of the types corresponding to
United States public vessels which it is proposed to charge
harbor dues, probably use ports in most of these outlying
possessions only on infrequent occasions, and (2) that
from the point of view of the British Government, it is
largely a matter of taking money out of one pocket and
putting it in the other. Consequently, the payment of
harbor and light dues would be a matter of little conse-
quence to the British, whereas American public vessels
would be using the bases constantly, not only in carrying
supplies, but in entering and departing for purposes of
maneuver, et cetera. To require these ships to pay dues
on an equal footing with ships of the Royal Navy would
mean that American public vessels might be paying large
sums of money into the local treasury for the use of a
leased base which under the agreement they would have
a perfect right to use without charge. Moreover, it
has been pointed out to the British that the United States
will construct and maintain lights, buoys, and other aids
to navigation, and that all these facilities will be
available to British ships—public and private—without
charge.
It is not clear from the British contentions whether some reasonable contribution by American public ships to the upkeep of local aids to navigation is contemplated or whether this is a matter of raising new revenue.

There will be no increased cost in the upkeep of existing navigation facilities due to the use of local waters by American public vessels. If new revenue is the point at issue, it is easy to understand how the expenses involved in the use of these bases would amount to considerable sums annually and to huge sums over a period of 99 years.

No exemption of vessels other than those of the United States Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Coast and Geodetic Survey is requested. As a matter of fact, there would be an increase of revenue of this type in each territory in which a base is located by reason of the fact that additional American vessels and perhaps foreign vessels will go to these territories with sup-

plies
plies and materials for use in the construction and operation of the bases. This additional revenue will undoubtedly be considerable and is an additional argument against the taxation of these four categories of public vessels. Moreover, the amounts spent by the United States in supplying increased aids to navigation and harbor improvements will be considerable. These are points which seem to have been overlooked by the British Government.

Furthermore, the British Government seems to have overlooked the statement in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and Lord Lothian wherein it is stated that:

"His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States for immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof" and that

"All the bases and facilities referred to . . . . . will be . . . . . free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property"
property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question.  

No one ever thought of charges on United States Government vessels for the privilege of entering and departing from these bases. The idea of payment of such charges is entirely negativized by the statement that the bases shall be "free from all rent and charges other than compensation to private property owners". Obviously, if there is a requirement for payment every time a ship enters or departs from one of these bases, the use of the bases is not free from charges.

(d) The British memorandum also states that the United States negotiators have made no proposals to meet the British request in regard to the United States coastwise shipping laws and facilities for British ships in the leased areas.

The American representatives in London have told the British negotiators that the United States coastwise laws would not extend to these bases but that under existing law all materials for the use of the army and navy, except
except under certain conditions, must be carried in American vessels. These excepted conditions are, among other things, lack or non-availability of American vessels, excessive costs, et cetera, under which conditions provisions of the law may be waived by the President.

Concerning the use of the base facilities by British ships, the American representatives in London have stated that such facilities will be available to British commercial vessels on the same terms and conditions upon which they are available to United States commercial vessels.

(4) It is also stated in the memorandum that the broad argument that it is wished to urge, is one in favor of the instructions to the United States delegates being such as to enable them to treat the matters under discussion on a wide basis from the defense aspect and to take fully into account interests of the territories and their inhabitants.

Throughout the course of the negotiations in London the attitude and spirit of the Government of the United States toward the discussion of the terms of the leases and the agreements
agreements under which the bases will be operated have been entirely within the framework of the broad purposes of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, as expressed in the basic exchange of notes. Every consideration has been given at all times to meet in as far as possible the desires of the local territories, but it must be said that many of the points which have caused delay in the discussions have referred to matters in which apparently it has been the desire of the local authorities to have provisions inserted which would circumscribe the rights considered by the United States Government as necessary and in accordance with the principles laid down in the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940.

The Naval Affairs Committees of the two Houses of Congress, and individual members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, have already raised the question as to whether the United States will be required to pay any kind of charges in connection with the use of these bases and have been told that the Government of the United States does not anticipate being subjected to
to any kind of charges. It would be unfortunate if
the British Government, by a continuation of the discus-
sion of such matters as customs, harbor, and light dues,
should cause these Committees to gain an unfavorable im-
pression at a time when the American Government is doing
its utmost in an effort to be of assistance in the world
situation.

Department of State,

Washington.
8 March 1941

Telegram #786 from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 8 March 1941.
March 8, 1941

American Ambassador
London
For Former Naval Person
Personal

Notwithstanding long delay the ultimate passage by the vote of 60 to 31 is highly satisfactory. Final concurrent action by the House followed by my signature should take place today or tomorrow. Confidentially I hope to send estimate for new orders and purchases under the Bill to the House on Wednesday.
It may take several weeks to pass the Appropriation Bill but in the meantime tentative orders can be placed. Best of luck.

Roosevelt
TELEGRAM SENT

March 8, 1941

ATP

This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-

fore being communicated
to anyone (5)

AMBASSADOR

LONDON

786

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Please transmit the following message to former

naval person:

QUOTE Personal. Notwithstanding some delay the

ultimate passage by vote of sixty to thirty-one is highly

satisfactory. Final concurrent action by the House followed

by my signature should take place Tuesday evening. Confiden-

tially I hope to send estimate for new orders and pur-

chases under the bill to the House on Wednesday. Best of

luck. Roosevelt. ENDQUOTE.

HULL

(ASB)

S: ASB

REGRADED

UNCLASSIFIED
29 March 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 29 March 1941.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO: NAVY DEPARTMENT  

29 March 1941

PRIORITY

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON LONDON I HAVE TODAY MADE ALLOTMENTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES FOOD AND FOR IMMEDIATE PURCHASE FIFTYFOUR HUNDRED AIRPLANES FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUNS THIRTYFOUR HUNDRED UNIVERSAL CARRIERS AND SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF OTHER MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY EQUIPMENT X I HAVE ALSO AUTHORIZED FIFTYFIVE HUNDRED OERLIKON GUNS AND AMMUNITION FOR THEM X SIXTY PATROL BOMBING MEDIUM PLANES AND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NAVY FIGHTING PLANES X THESE ACTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS SOON AS I HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO CONFER WITH YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR OPPOSITIONS IN OUR GOVERNMENT X YOU CAN BE SURE THESE MATTERS WILL BE PROSECUTED XXI VIGOROUSLY HERE SIGNED ROOSEVELT
2 April 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 2 April 1941.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CODE ROOM
STATE DEPARTMENT

The President would like to have you send the enclosed message.

M. A. LeHand
PRIVATE SECRETARY
April 2, 1941.

TO A FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I have this morning allotted funds for the building of 50 additional shipping ways and 800 additional ships. I have also made complete arrangements for repairs to merchant ships and for your larger friends.

ROOSEVELT

O.K.

F. D. R.
11 April 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 11 April 1941.
We propose immediately to take the following steps in relation to the security of the Western Hemisphere, which steps will favorably affect your shipping problem. It is important for domestic political reasons which you will readily understand that this action be taken by us unilaterally and not after diplomatic conversations between you and us. Therefore before taking this unilateral action I want to tell you about the proposal.

This Government proposes to extend the present so-called security zone and patrol areas which have been in effect since very early in the War to a line covering all North Atlantic waters west of about west longitude 25 degrees. We propose to utilize aircraft and naval vessels working from Greenland, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, the United States, Bermuda and West Indies, with possible later extension to Brazil if this can be arranged. We will want in great secrecy notification of movement of convoys so our patrol units can seek out any ships or planes of aggressor nations operating west of the new line of the security zone. We will immediately make public to you position aggressor ships or planes when located in our patrol area west of West longitude 25 degrees.
We propose to refuel our ships at sea where advisable. We suggest your longer shipping hauls move as much as possible west of new line up to latitude of the Northwest approaches.

We have declared Red Sea area no longer a combat zone. We propose sending all types of goods in unarmed American flag ships to Egypt or any other non-belligerent port via Red Sea or Persian Gulf. We think we can work out sending wheat and other goods in American ships to Greenland or Iceland through the next six months.

We hope to make available for direct haul to England a large amount of your present shipping which is now utilized for other purposes. We expect to make use of Danish ships very soon and Italian ships in about two months.

I believe advisable that when this new policy is adopted here no statement be issued on your end. It is not certain I would make specific announcement. I may decide to issue necessary naval operations orders and let time bring out the existence of the new patrol area.

ROOSEVELT.
1 May 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 1 May 1941.

For Churchill's reply, see telegram #1753 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 3 May 1941, filed herein.
DRAFT OF CABLE

May 1, 1941.

AMBASSADY, LONDON
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

1. In relation to paragraph 14 of yours of April 23 we received strong protests from Portuguese Government in regard to a proposed friendly visit to Azores or Cape Verd Islands at this time. In view of this we deferred proposed visit, but have not received recommendation from Ambassador in Spain that friendly visit plan be carried out, but that no fuel be taken on in the Islands. The new patrol now going into operation will extend to westerly side both island groups, but planes will not be flown over the islands themselves.

It is, of course, of utmost importance, in my judgment, that you send no expedition to either place unless Portugal is attacked or you get definite word
of an immediate German attack on the islands. Furthermore, I know you will not mind my saying that in the event of a British expeditionary force you make it very clear to American people that in case of Azores it is for purpose of British defense and not for permanent occupation. In other words, that Britain will restore islands to Portuguese sovereignty at close of war if Portugal is restored as an independent nation. The reason I suggest this is that, as you know, most of Azores are in Western Hemisphere under my longitudinal map reading.

2. Our patrol is already on way to take positions assigned, and I think liaison work between the two naval services is being established satisfactorily.

3. In regard to yours of April 29, my thought in regard to eastern Mediterranean is...
(a) You have done not only heroic, but very useful work in Greece and the territorial loss is more than compensated for by necessity for enormous German concentration and resulting enormous German losses in men and material.

(b) Having sent all men and equipment to Greece you could possibly spare, you have fought a wholly justified delaying action and will continue to do so in other parts of Eastern Mediterranean, including North Africa and the Near East. Furthermore, that if additional withdrawals become necessary, they will all be a part of the plan which at this stage of the war shortens British Lines, greatly extends the Axis lines, and compels the enemy to expend great quantities of men and equipment. I am satisfied that both here and in Britain public opinion is growing to realize that even if you have to withdraw further in the Eastern Mediterranean, you will not allow any great debacle or surrender, and that in the last analysis the Naval control of the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean will in time win the war.
(c) In regard to Turkey, I fear there is little we can do except to stiffen them morally and leave it to you to send such equipment to them as you can spare from American shipments going to the Red Sea.

(d) I think of the Syrian problem as almost identical with the French problem in North Africa. I do not think there is any chance of persuading Vichy to break with the Germans, if the latter violate Syria or North Africa. I wish you would let me have your views on the following policy, which I would be glad to introduce:

(1) Recognize that Vichy is in a German cage and still issues orders to Weygand, Syria and Indo-China.

(2) That because Vichy has already ordered French Colonies to resist British occupation, Vichy can and ought to issue orders to Colonies equally to resist German occupation.
(3) United States can as quid pro quo for such orders send two more children's food ships to Marseilles and offer to send oil and perhaps some ammunition and other munitions to Weygand on West Coast of Morocco, this being conditioned, of course, on agreement of Weygand to resist German occupation.

(4) At same time it is at least possible that if Weygand gets orders to resist Germans and agrees to do so, he would put up a strong rear-guard defense, moving slowly forward toward Casablanca.

(5) If Germany crosses Straits of Gibraltar with land forces, she can probably eventually occupy Tunis, Algiers and Morocco down to Casablanca, but it is of utmost importance to keep Germans out of the Moroccan ports as long as possible, including Port of Sisimos in Rio de Oro. We think it almost impossible for Germans to reach Dakar over land,
especially with what is left of French Army and Navy concentrated there.

(f) Personally, I am not downcast by mere spread of Germany for additional large territories. There is little of raw materials in all of them put together -- not enough to maintain nor compensate for huge occupation forces. The exception is oil in Mosul and Iraq and I assume production there could be practically destroyed by you in event of necessity.

5. Your talk Sunday night was splendid. Confidentially, I expect to go on air within next two weeks.

6. Keep up the good work.
1 May 1911

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 1 May 1911.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

Your 1753, May 3, midnight.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In my message of May 1 I did not intend to
minimize in any degree the gravity of the situation, par
particularly as regards the Mediterranean. I am well
aware of its great strategic importance and I share
your anxiety in regard to it.

I saw General Whiteley while he was here and heard
from him the magnificent effort of Wavell's army and
Cunningham's and Summerville's fleet. I have issued
instructions that supplies in so far as they are
available here are to be rushed to the Middle East at
the earliest possible moment. Thirty ships are now
being mobilized to go within the next three weeks to
the Middle East. I want to emphasize we intend to
continue the supplies and to get the ships to carry
them until there is a final decision in the Mediterranean.
I know of your determination to win on that front and
we shall do everything that we possibly to help you do it.

RECLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
My previous message merely meant to indicate that should the Mediterranean prove in the last analysis to be a possible battle ground that I do not feel that the fact alone means the defeat of our mutual interests. I say this because I believe the outcome of this struggle is going to be decided in the Atlantic and unless Hitler can win there he cannot win anywhere in the world in the end.

I cannot speak too highly of the admiration which the American people hold toward your generals, admirals, troops, airmen and sailors who fought in Greece and are now fighting in the Mediterranean and Africa. I think the feeling in America is that the efforts which your country made to stem the tide in Greece was a worthy effort and the delaying action which you fought there must have weakened your enemy.

I have now received through Ambassador Leahy a reiteration of Marshall Petain's assurances that he does not intend to agree to any collaboration by France that is beyond the requirements of the armistice agreement; that he has publicly stated that he will not consent to any offensive action against his former ally. While he states that Germany has no need of a passage for its troops through unoccupied France to
the Spanish frontier that he is endeavoring to limit the number of Germans in the African colonies, Leahy points out that it is accepted at Vichy that a refusal of the Marshall to agree to German demands would have little or no deterrent effects upon the Germans. Pétain had no comment to make upon the British Government's offer of assistance transmitted through Leahy and I gather that he feels that France can do nothing to prevent the arrival of German troops in Spanish Morocco which he, Pétain, considers imminent. Leahy believes that Pétain has the genuine support of all of the French people but that they do not share the same confidence in Darlan. He further believes that most of the people are openly or secretly supporting your cause. We are sending instructions to Leahy to urge Pétain to issue orders to all French authorities to resist Germany in any attempt to violate French territory or to use it as a base for military operations.

Our patrols are pushing farther out into the Atlantic. I have just added all of our units of the Coast Guard to the Navy for the purpose of implementing that patrol. Other steps to strengthen that patrol will be taken soon.

With this message goes my warm personal regards to you.
Undated telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill.

Answers Churchill's telegram #1855 to Roosevelt, dated 10 May 1941.
TELEGRAM

TO: VINANT
LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

ALL PLANS DISCUSSED WITH YOU BY ARNOLD FOR TRAINING PILOTS HAVE BEEN APPROVED HERE. THERE ARE NO LEGAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY AND THE TRAINING CAN BEGIN PROMPTLY. WE ARE RUSHING SIX ADDITIONAL SMALL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS FOR YOU. FIRST THREE SHOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THREE OR FOUR MONTHS.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
14 May 1941 (?)

Message from Roosevelt to Churchill, undated (filed under date of 14 May 1941).
PRIVATE

AMBASSADOR

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

If Hess is talking, or does so in the future, it would be very valuable to public opinion here if he can be persuaded to tell your people what Hitler has said about the United States, or what German's plans really are in relation to the United States or to other parts of the Western Hemisphere, including commerce, infiltration, military domination, encirclement of the United States, etc.

From this distance I can assure you that the Hess flight has captured the American imagination and the story should be kept alive for just as many days or even weeks as possible.

If he says anything about the Americas in the course of telling his story, it should be kept separate from other parts and featured by itself.

I have nothing specific from Vichy yet. I am not hopeful of any concrete orders to Dachau to resist but we may still pull some of the chestnuts out of the fire.

ROOSEVELT

REGRADED

UNCLASSIFIED
Memorandum For The President,

Rudolph Hess

Possibly this idea is cruelly amateurish; probably a number of people have already thought of it. Certainly there are a number of "ifs" involved -- the "ifs" of sanity, of good intentions, and of truth. But it might be worth trying.

The flight of Rudolph Hess has captured the American imagination as has nothing since the flight of the lamented Lindbergh. It may only be a seven-day wonder but the "man in the street" today regards it as a wonder.

No amount of conversation about economic penetration of South America or Nazi trade wars, or even the necessity for survival of the British navy seems to have convinced the American people, particularly the middle and far West, that this country is in danger from the Nazis.

But if Hess were to tell the world what Hitler has said about the United States, it would be a headline sensation. The people would begin to wake up. Recollection of the unpleasant Zinovieff letter indicates the possibilities. I am suggesting, of course, only that Hess make such a statement if it is true -- which it is.

If the idea is worthwhile, it should be done soon, while the American people are fascinated. It certainly should not be included with a great number of other things, such as Hitler's rapprochement with Russia, the economic conditions of Germany, etc. It should probably be done with American newspapermen present; otherwise the Nazis -- as they already are beginning to do -- will recreate the American suspicion of British propaganda.

I know you and I think Churchill can see the possibilities; I doubt if the professional career servant will.

But, if there is anything to the idea it should be done in the next day or so; otherwise it will not be believed.

James Rowe, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1941

Memorandum For Miss LeHand.

Dear Missy:

Rudolph Hess

Because you told me that someone else had the same idea I had and that Steve Early sent him up to the British Embassy, I thought you might not give the President my memorandum today.

I have been trained as a skeptic in all things — and I include Hess — but, assuming this idea is worthwhile, it will never get anywhere with the professional career men in the British Embassy or the State Department.

It is a "telephone" job between the President and Churchill, both of whom have imagination enough to see the advantage to both countries, and also because time is of the essence. Even tomorrow may be too late.

James Rowe, Jr.
19 May 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 19 May 1941.

Answers Churchill's telegram #1992 to the President, dated 19 May 1941, filed herein.
May 19, 1941.

FOR WINANT

AMBASSADY

LONDON

I wish you would explain very confidentially and entirely off the record to Former Naval Person that I am frankly placed in a most embarrassing situation in regard to Willkie's telegram and the suggested answer.

Quite aside from the Logan Act, and solely on the formation and maintenance of public opinion here, it would be very serious if it became known publicly that Mr. Willkie, who is giving splendid cooperation to all of us were communicating directly with the Prime Minister and receiving direct replies, especially in view of fact that communications go through the Consul General in New York.

Such communications are almost sure to leak out and the revulsion of feeling in the Congress and the Administration would be very bad. I can only suggest that the Prime Minister send a friendly reply thanking Willkie for his telegram, going into no details, agreeing that obviously the joint policy must be flexible and constantly changing, and suggesting that Mr. Willkie keep in touch in regard to details with the British Ambassador and me. We must not get our wires crossed.
I think the Prime Minister should maintain the friendliest of relations with Mr. Willkie but direct communication is a two-edged sword.

I think any reply should go either through you and this Department or through Halifax here and this Department.

Hull
For example, the statement attributed to Forrestal in the Press was never made by him.
27 May 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 27 May 1941.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26th

To former Naval Pensioner:

I hope you will like the speech tonight—it goes farther than I thought was possible from this platform and I take the liberty that it will secure general approval from the fairly large element which has been reinforced by detailed and sensible letters.

On the double fast.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

All of us are made very happy by the news of the
Trekking of the Bismarck and that she is
safely far to the south.

Rumors
CABLEGRAM

May 27, 1941.

AMERICAN
LONDON

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I hope you will like the speech tonight. It goes farther than I thought was possible even two weeks ago and I like to hope that it will receive general approval from the fairly large element which has been confused by details and unable hitherto to see the simple facts.

All of us are made very happy by the fine tracking down of the Bismarck and that she is literally gone for good.

ROOSEVELT
29 May 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 29 May 1941.

For Churchill's reply, see telegram #2233 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 31 May 1941.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
IN SPITE OF THE BEST EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION NOW HANDLING FLIGHT
DELIVERY OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT FROM THIS COUNTRY TO ENGLAND I AM ADVISED
THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF THESE PLANES ARE ACCUMULATING IN THIS
COUNTRY AND THAT THIS CONDITION IS APT TO GROW WORSE AS PRODUCTION
REACHES AN ACCELERATED RATE OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS PERIOD IN OUR
COMMON INTEREST AND IN ORDER TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION AS MUCH AS POS-
SIBLE I AM PREPARED TO DIRECT THE ARMY AND NAVY TO ASSUME FULL RESPO-
NIBILITY FOR THE TRANSFER OF AMERICAN BUILT AIRCRAFT FROM FACTORY TO
THE POINT OF ULTIMATE TAKE OFF AND TO SUPPLY MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING
FACILITIES ALONG THE WAY AND AT THE ULTIMATE STAGING FIELD PERIOD THIS
SHOULD RELEASE A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN PILOTS NOW DELIVERING PLANES PERIOD
MANY SUCH PILOTS CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE THE POOL OF
ATLANTIC FERRY PILOTS NOW ENGAGED IN THIS WORK PERIOD SINCE MILITARY
AND NAVAL PILOTS AND GROUND CREWS WOULD BE ENGAGED IN DELIVERY OF PLANES
I AM ADVISED THAT THE CLOSE COOPERATION NECESSARY TO CARRY THROUGH SUCC-
CESSFULLY THIS CONTINUOUS OPERATION CAN BEST BE OBTAINED IF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE ATLANTIC FLIGHT COULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THEIR SISTER SERVICE UNDER
THE AIR MINISTRY USING OF COURSE THE PRESENT CIVILIAN PILOTS AND SUCH
ADDITIONAL ONES AS MAY BECOME AVAILABLE PERIOD THIS PROCEDURE WOULD EN-
ABLE THE PLANES TO BE BROUGHT UNDER THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF THE
ROYAL AIR FORCE PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULING OF TAKE OFF AND
APPROACH TO THEIR DESIGNATED LANDING FIELDS IN ENGLAND PERIOD THE SUCCESS
OF THIS OPERATION WOULD DEPEND IN LARGE PART UPON THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE
WESTBOUND AIR TRANSPORTATION BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH
SIDES SUCH PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED AND GREATER ASSURANCES GIVEN OF THE
ABILITY TO HANDLE DELIVERY OF THE INCREASED QUANTITY OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT
ANTICIPATED DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS PERIOD I HOPE YOU WILL COMMENT
FRANKLY ON THIS PROPOSAL. 

For example the American
Army and Navy could deliver planes at Bedwood
Newfoundland ready and serviced for the B.A.T.
to take them over and fly them across
Later and depending on developments we might be able
to deliver them to your people in England.
17 June 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 17 June 1941.

Answers Churchill's telegram #2376 to the President, dated 11 June 1941, filed herein.
June 17, 1941.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

Army is studying possible ferry from Natal with idea that African landing places might be three in number -- Bathurst, Freetown and Liberia. I see no reason for any United States lease, but if the plan works out we would deliver the planes either in Natal or on African coast. Also, we would undertake the building of any necessary servicing facilities. I feel there should be three possible landing places because of proximity of Bathurst to Dakar. When your Air Marshal arrives our people will immediately confer with him. I find a feeling here that up to recently there has been a good deal of delay in delivery between Takarabi and lower Egypt, chiefly through difficulty in servicing the small hopping stones on the way across the Continent. Please let me know how you regard the working out of this problem.

I have a distinct feeling in my bones that things are looking up. After freezing the German and Italian assets on Saturday, I closed the German Consulates and Agencies yesterday, and the reaction here is, I should say, 90% favorable.
25 June 1941

Telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 25 June 1941.
June 26th

MISS TULLY:

THIS TELEGRAM WAS SENT LAST NIGHT BY MR. HOPKINS

L. BERNEY
TELEGRAM

JUNE 25, 1941

TO: AMBASSADOR
LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I AM ASKING CONGRESS IN A FEW DAYS FOR ADDITIONAL
FUNDS TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE OUR BUILDING OF MERCHANT
SHIPS SO THAT WE SHOULD BUILD A MINIMUM OF FIVE TO FIVE
AND HALF MILLION TONS IN 1942 AND SEVEN MILLION TONS IN
1943.

/s/ ROOSEVELT

REGRADED UNCATEGORIZED

HLH/1mb