3 January 1941

Telegram #25 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 3 January 1941.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

25, January 3, 10 p.m.

DEPARTMENT's 3977, DECEMBER 31, 1 p.m.

FOLLOWING FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. I have received your message of DECEMBER 31ST on the subject of the supply of milk and vitamin concentrates for children in unoccupied France and we have been greatly impressed by your arguments in favor of this proposal. The anxiety which we have always felt about this project is that it would lead to similar demands on behalf of our German occupied allies. We are indeed sure to be hard pressed by these unhappy people and it is therefore important that we should maintain the distinction which you draw so clearly between German occupied territo ries and those not in actual occupation. I feel sure that I can count upon your help to maintain this distinction for otherwise the whole fabric of our blockade would be fatally undermined and I need not stress to you what this
this would mean in terms of final victory.

Two. We are prepared to agree at once to the despatch of the first ship to Seville, Barcelona and Marseille as you propose subject to the following arrangements as regards safeguards which seem to us to meet the case.

(1) Relief goods to be confined to medical supplies in the strict sense (excluding cod and halibut liver oils) vitamin concentrates, dried or tinned milk and children's clothing.

(2) Distribution to be affected solely by the American Red Cross either direct from their own depots or under strict supervision to children's hospitals and clinics.

(3) Assurances to be secured from the Vichy Government that the press shall be allowed to publish periodical accounts of the relief work undertaken, such accounts to include reference to the cooperation of His Majesty's Government in allowing passage through the blockade.

(4) Further shipments to be stopped if there should be any evidence that these conditions are not being fulfilled.

Three. There is one point over which you can help us greatly. In any announcement of the scheme which is made in America we should like our part in the transaction to be presented in as favorable a light as possible. While it would be made clear that this step had been taken on
-3- #25, January 3, 10 p.m., from London.

on your initiative, we would like it stated that the relief goods are available only by good will of His Majesty's Government. The impression which we should like to see created is that of Anglo-American cooperation for humanitarian ends."

JOHNSON

EMB
11 January 1941

Telegram #117 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 11 January 1941.

Answered by Roosevelt in a telegram to Churchill dated 13 January 1941, filed herein. A telegram from Secretary Hull to the American Embassy at Vichy filed with this message.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY.

Department's 13, January 8, 5 p.m., and my 4232, December 8, 11 p.m.

Following and personal message for the President from Former Naval Person.

"You will doubtless have been informed by State Department of the delivery to Marshal Pétain of a personal message which I sent to the latter.

It seems from the report on this subject of your Charge d'Affairs in Vichy, that the Marshal may not have realized that the message was one from myself and that it involved considerably more than a suggestion of assistance in the event of the French Government deciding to cross to North Africa. The Marshal was no doubt too much embarrassed by the presence of II.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
-2-#117, January 11, 5 p.m. from London.

M. Flandin to give as much attention to it as he might otherwise have done.

Would you think it possible and desirable to instruct your Ambassador at Vichy to convey again the substance of the message to the Marshal if he gains the impression that the latter had not grasped its full import, and make it quite clear to him that the message came from myself? I do not want to press Marshal Pétain to cross to North Africa; I would not press him for any further answer; I only want to be sure that there has been no misunderstanding and that the Marshal would be fully aware of the nature and origin of the message."

JOHNSON

NPL
13 January 1941

Telegram #131 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 13 January 1941.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated January 13, 1941
Rec'd 7:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

134, January 13, 9 p.m.

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Hopkins and I spent the weekend together and he is coming along with me on a short tour of fleet bases, so we shall have plenty of time to cover all points at leisure. I am most grateful to you for sending so remarkable an envoy who enjoys so high a measure of your intimancy and confidence."

JOHNSON
21 January 1941

Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 21 January 1941.

Answered by Roosevelt in a message to Churchill dated 22 January 1941, filed herein.
January 21st, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister for you which reached me by telegram yesterday evening.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
Following is text of message from the Prime Minister to the President.

You probably know that Lord Halifax will arrive at Annapolis in our new battleship H.M.S. "KING GEORGE V." She cannot, of course, stay more than twenty-four hours. I do not know whether you would be interested to see her. We should be proud to show her to you or to any of your high naval authorities, if you could arrange this. She is due at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay at seven a.m. January 24th. If you will communicate to me any suggestions or wishes, we will do our best to meet them.
9 March 1941

Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 9 March 1941.
March 9th 1941.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a message for you from the Prime Minister which I have just received by telegram.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
DATED MARCH 9TH 1941.

"Our blessings from the whole British Empire
go out to you and the American nation for this
very present help in time of trouble."
10 March 1941

Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 10 March 1941.
Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a Personal and Most Secret message from the Prime Minister which has just been received at the Embassy. The second half of this message, which deals with a different subject, has been received in corrupt form, but will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

I have been instructed in forwarding this message to you to make it clear that in case the United States Government should contemplate giving His Majesty's Government diplomatic support in Angora, Moscow and Belgrade on the lines suggested by the Prime Minister, it is most important that the United States representatives in those capitals should say nothing about the British military move towards the Balkans.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the
United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

Kalijak
I must now tell you what we have resolved about Greece. Although it was no doubt tempting to push on from Benghazi to Tripoli, and we may still use considerable forces in this direction, we have felt it our duty to stand with the Greeks who have declared to us their resolve, even alone, to resist the German invader. Our Generals Wavell and Dill, who have accompanied Mr. Eden to Cairo, after heart-searching discussions with us, believe that we have a good fighting chance. We are therefore sending the greater part of the Army of the Nile to Greece, and are reinforcing to the utmost possible in the air. Smuts is sending South Africans to the Delta. Mr. President, you can judge these hazards for yourself. At this juncture the action of Yugoslavia is cardinal. No country ever had such a military chance. If they will fall on the Italian rear in Albania there is no measuring what might happen in a few weeks. The whole situation might be transformed, and the action of Turkey also decided in our favour. One has the feeling that Russia, though actuated mainly by fear, might at least give some reassurance to Turkey about not pressing her in the Caucasus or turning against there in the Black Sea. I need scarcely say that concerted influence of your Ambassadors in Turkey, Russia and above all in Yugoslavia, would be of enormous value at the moment, and indeed might possibly turn the scales.

In this connexion I must thank you for the magnificent work done by Donovan in his prolonged tour of the Balkans and the Middle East. He has carried
with him throughout an animating heart-warming flame.
C.H.

Just come—What do you think? Let us know in morning—Please return for my job.

FDR
My dear Mr. President:

With reference to the letter from the British Ambassador to you of March 10, enclosing a message from Mr. Churchill on the situation in the Near East and suggesting certain approaches by our diplomatic missions in Ankara, Moscow, and Belgrade to the governments of those respective countries, I have closely canvassed the Near Eastern situation during the recent fast-developing weeks and have come to the following conclusions as far as concerns the attitude of this Government in the premises.

As you know, we have sent several messages personally from you to the Chiefs of State of the Balkan countries and Turkey, and also from this Department to the Chiefs of Government in those same countries, making clear our attitude of aid to Britain and the application of

The President,

The White House.
of all the vast resources and production of this country to the assistance of Britain and those countries defending themselves against the attack of the forces of conquest. I am satisfied that we here, and our representatives in that area have done everything that could possibly be done to bolster up the resistance of the Balkan governments to penetration and occupation by the German forces. I, myself, and through my associates here, have been in constant touch with the representatives of the Balkan nations in this capital and have sought their advice and counsel as to any steps we might take to be helpful to them in this situation. I have been told by those representatives here, and I believe this to be true, that the only further step which can be of real help in these developments would be the promise on the part of the British Government to lend material military aid with air force and ground forces to the Yugoslav and the Turkish Governments in the event they find it necessary to resist the entrance or passage of German troops.

I have even taken the occasion of the visit of the British Ambassador on Monday afternoon to transmit to him this final suggestion.
As I said before, I feel that we have done everything this Government can possibly do in the present circumstances, but I shall not fail to continue to study the situation with a view to making any further recommendations as developments arise.

Faithfully yours,
March 11th, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein in its correct form the second half of the message from the Prime Minister which I sent you yesterday afternoon.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.
I have been working steadily about the bases on turning the mountains back into molehills, but even so, the molehills remain to be disposed of. I hope to send you a cable on Monday leaving very little that is not cleared away. Please lend a hand with the shovel if you can. Remember it is the inflexible policy of His Majesty's Government, with or without any reciprocal consideration, to make sure that the United States has full, effective military security both in war and in necessary peace-time preparations for war in these Islands and areas. Give us the best chance you can to bring the local people along, for after all these Islands are their only home, and I want them to be your friends as well as ours.

The sinkings are bad and the strain is increasing at sea. Ends.
12 March 1941

Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 12 March 1941.
12th March, 1941.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a message for you from the Prime Minister, which was received at the Embassy this evening.

I am,

dear Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

Halifax

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States.
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Admiral Darlan’s declaration and threat make me wonder whether it would not be best for you to intervene as a friend of both sides and try to bring about a working agreement. We do not wish to push things to extremes, and we naturally should be most reluctant in a thing like this to act against your judgment after you have weighed all the pros and cons. We fear very much prolongation of the war and its miseries which would result from breakdown of blockade of Germany and there are immense difficulties in preventing Germany from profiting directly or indirectly from anything imported into unoccupied France. Dealing with Darlan is dealing with Germany, for he will not be allowed to agree to anything they know about which does not suit their book. Also there is the danger of rationing spreading to occupied France, Belgium, Holland and Norway. Perhaps however you might be able to devise a scheme under which supervision would limit leakage and might also give you a number of agents in favourable positions in unoccupied France and in French Africa. It would be easier for you to talk to Vichy with whom you are in regular diplomatic relations, than for us to negotiate via Madrid or by making speeches on broadcast. Besides this, Darlan has old scores to pay out against us in the dire action we were forced to take against his ships.

Would you therefore consider coming forward on the basis of how shocked you were at the idea of fighting breaking out between France and Great Britain, which would only help the common foe. Then you might be able to procure Vichy assent to a scheme allowing a ration of wheat to go through, month by month to unoccupied France and something for French Africa as long as other things were satisfactory. These other things
might form the subject of a secret arrangement of which the Germans will not know, by which German infiltration into Morocco and French African ports would be limited to the bare armistice terms, and by which an increasing number of French warships would gradually be moving from Toulon to Casablanca or Dakar.

I have asked the Foreign Office to telegraph to Lord Halifax all sorts of things we think should be taken care of, so that he can tell you about them. But the two I have mentioned are worth more to us than the disadvantages of a certain amount of leakage of food to the enemy. It would have to be made clear that the relief accorded was limited to stated quantities of food at agreed intervals and did not extend to other goods. For instance, there is a French ship, the "Bangkok", with 3,000 tons of rubber on board which is certainly not all for teats of babies' bottles, and we have abundant cases of all kinds of valuable munition materials which are going straight through France to Germany or Italy, not entirely without some greasing. Moreover, it would be a great pity if any large number of ships which are all needed for our life and war effort were used up in food carrying. I do not want the people here who, apart from the heavy bombardment likely to be renewed soon, are having to tighten their belts and restrict their few remaining comforts, to feel that I am not doing my best against the enemy. Nevertheless if it were not unwelcome I would gladly invite you to act as intermediary and make the best plan you can to beat Hitler. We have supreme confidence in you, and would receive with profound respect what you thought best to do.

The bases question has, I think, been tidied up, and I hope to bring an agreed document before the Cabinet tomorrow, Thursday, afternoon. Will you let me know when you would like the announcement to be made? Does it matter if it comes on the morrow of passing of Lease-Lend Bill?
17 March 1941

Telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 17 March 1941.
Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a message for you from the Prime Minister. This was telegraphed to the Embassy this morning.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR PRESIDENT
DATED MARCH 17th 1941.

Pray accept my most sincere congratulations and grateful thanks on your magnificent speech. It is a trumpet call to free men all over the world, and will play a weighty part in drawing them together. I must also thank you for your most kind and complimentary reference to me.
2 April 1941

Two telegrams from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 2 April 1941.
Dear Mr. President,

I was on the point of asking whether I might have an opportunity of seeing you tomorrow or the next day for a short talk when I got the enclosed message from the Prime Minister.

You will see that it relates to the earlier message that he sent to you through your Embassy in London concerning the movement of the French battleship "Dunkerque".

If you can see me tomorrow or Friday, perhaps you would be good enough to have your Secretary let me know.

Yours truly,

Halifax

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

"Please at once tell the President that in any communication Admiral Leahy may be instructed to make to French Government it would be desirable to make no mention of "permission" being obtained from armistice commission or of escort to be provided for "Dunkerque" as this might give away our source.

It would be sufficient for him to say that information had been received showing that there was the intention to send "Dunkerque" to Toulon for repairs in near future."

2nd April, 1941
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Sc)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1282, April 2, 6 p.m.

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. We have entirely authentic secret information that Vichy Government have received 'permission' from Armistice Commission to transfer battleships 'DUNKERQUE', with escort protection of the whole 'STRASBURG' group, from Oran to Toulon for 'disarmament'. Transfer will begin on fourth April.

Two. It seems certain that object of transfer is to effect repairs, and we must of course assume it is being done on German orders.

Three. I do not need to point out to you the grave danger to which this exposes us. The menace from German surface raiders is already great enough. The addition of such a vessel to the raiding fleet would set us a hard problem indeed. If any value were to be attached to Admiral Darlan's word, it might be hoped that he would in the last resort order out of French metropolitan ports naval
-2- 1232, April 2, 1941, 6 p.m. from London

Naval units ready for sea. But if 'DORIANQUE' is docked and immobilized for repairs, that gives the Germans time to swoop and gain possession of her.

Four. I fear this is a sinister confirmation of our worst suspicions of Darlan.

Five. You have already, through your Ambassador in Vichy, indicated to the French Government that negotiations for the supply of grain to unoccupied France would be greatly facilitated if French warships in metropolitan ports were gradually transferred to North African Atlantic ports. Here we have Darlan not merely failing to comply with your wishes, but deliberately flying in the face of them.

Six. I earnestly hope that you may at once indicate to Marshal Petain that, if Darlan persists in this action, he will be cutting off relief from his country and finally forfeiting American sympathy. We ourselves in this situation could, of course, lend no assistance to the revictualling of France. There may be just a chance that Marshal Petain may deter him from this action, but if not, the matter for us is so vital that we may, even in spite of all the dangerous implications, have to make an effort to intercept and sink this vessel. I should like to hear from you that you would understand the necessity for such a step.

Seven.
-3- 12:22, April 2, 1941, 6 p.m. from London

Seven. It is, of course, of first importance that neither the French nor their masters should guess the source of the information or be made aware that we might take the drastic action mentioned in paragraph six."

WINANT

JRL
NPL
16 April 1941

Telegram #1515 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 16 April 1941.
DES
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated April 16, 1941.
Rec'd 9:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1515, April 16, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. I had intended to cable you more fully on your momentous message about the Atlantic. Admiralty received the news with the greatest relief and satisfaction and have prepared a technical paper. They wonder whether since Admiral Ghormley arrives here in about two days it would be better to discuss this with him before despatch. I do not know whether he is appraised or not. The matter is certainly of highest urgency and consequence. There are about 15 U-boats now operating on the 30th meridian and of course, United States flying boats working from Greenland would be a most useful immediate measure.

Two. Cannot tell what will happen in Greece and we have never underrated the enormous power of the German military
-2- 1515, April 16, 11 p.m. from London (SECTION ONE)

military machine on the mainland of Europe. We are not able to send ships to Cattaro to bring away Yugoslav refugees because of even more claimant commitments and because of the air and naval strength of the enemy in the Adriatic.

WINANT

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY
1515, April 16, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Three. I am personally not unduly anxious about the Libyan-Egyptian position. We estimate Germans have one colonial armoured division and perhaps the whole of one ordinary armoured division comprising say 600 to 650 tanks of which a good many have already been destroyed or have broken down. There are no German infantry in Cyrenaica except the few battalions comprised in the German-armoured divisions. Difficulties of supply of petrol, food, water, and ammunition must be severe and we know from prisoners of the strain under which these audacious formations are working. We are naturally trying to bring our own armoured forces which were largely refitting at the time of the attack into action and are reinforcing Egypt from all parts of the Middle East where we have nearly half a million men. Tobruk I regard
April 16, 11 p.m. (Section Two) from London.

regard as an invaluable bridgehead or sally port. We do not feel at all outmatched at present in the air and are growing stronger constantly. The whole power of the Mediterranean fleet which is being strongly reinforced will be used to cut the sea and coastal communications. There are of course Italian forces besides the Germans and we believe the Germans are now sending or trying to send a third armoured division from Sicily.

Four. The repulse of the German attacks on Tobruk on the 14th and 15th seems to me important as this small fierce fight in which the enemy lost prisoners, killed, and tanks, together with aircraft, out of all proportion to our losses, is the first time they have tasted defeat and they are working on very small margins.

WINANT

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1515, April 16, 11 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

Meanwhile our efforts to turn off the tap have met with a noteworthy success in the Mediterranean. Our destroyers from Malta in the early hours of this morning, 16th, caught a German-Italian convoy of five large ships loaded with ammunition and mechanical transport and escorted by three Italian destroyers. The whole convoy and all its escort were sunk. We lost one destroyer in the fight. We are keeping the strength of our forces secret for the present.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT
3 May 1941

Telegram #1753 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 3 May 1941.

Answers Roosevelt’s message to Churchill, dated 1 May 1941, filed herein.
WT
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. [87]

LONDON
Dated May 3, 1941
Rec'd 12:40 a.m., 4th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1753, May 3, midnight. (SECTION ONE)

Department's 1471, May 1, 9 p.m.

FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

One. Your friendly message assured me that no tem-

porary reverses, however heavy, can shake your resolution
to support us until we gain the final victory. I quite
see your difficulties about paragraph one so far as visits
are concerned but the consequences reflect themselves
upon paragraph two.

Two. The conditions in your first sentence of this
paragraph (paragraph two) make it almost certain that we
shall be forestalled. We ourselves are deeply impressed
by those conditions, but on the other hand how are we to
deal with German penetration by tourists and agents ready
for some fine day when a German armed expedition will
arrive finding all prepared beforehand. The terror
which Germany exercises on the Governments of Portugal
and
and Spain forces them to take no notice of infiltration in these islands lest worse befall them at home. You may be sure that they will try to synchronize any decisive move from Spain or Portugal with a stroke on the islands. We have taken no decision yet but I am sure you would not wish to prescribe our remaining passive, if we feel we have to act in advance of the conditions set forth in the first sentence of your paragraph two.

Three. Should we decide to move against these islands not only would we declare that they are occupied only for the purpose of British defense and not for permanent occupation and that we will restore the islands to Portuguese sovereignty at the close of the war if Portugal is restored as an independent nation, but we should be perfectly ready that the United States should stand guarantor for the execution of such an engagement. We are far from wishing to add to our territory, but only to preserve our life and perhaps yours.

WINANT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated May 3, 1941
Rec'd 4:15 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1753, May 3, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Your paragraph three. We must not be too sure that the consequences of the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would not be grave. It would seriously increase the hazards of the Atlantic and Pacific and could hardly fail to prolong the war with all the suffering and military dangers that this would entail. We shall fight on whatever happens, but please remember that the attitude of Spain, Vichy, Turkey, and Japan may be finally determined by the outcome of the struggle in this theater of war. I cannot take the view that the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a mere preliminary to the successful maintenance of a prolonged oceanic war. If all Europe, the greater part of Asia and Africa became, either by conquest or agreement under duress, a part of the Axis system, a war maintained by the British Isles, the United States, Canada, and Australia against this mighty agglomeration would be a hard, long, and bleak proposition
proposition. Therefore, if you cannot take more advanced positions now or very soon, the vast balances may be tilted heavily to our disadvantage. Mr. President, I am sure that you will not misunderstand me if I speak to you exactly what is in my mind. The one decisive counter-weight I can see to balance the growing pessimism in Turkey, the Near East, and in Spain, would be if the United States were immediately to range herself with us as a belligerent power. If this were possible I have little doubt that we could hold the situation in the Mediterranean until the weight of your munitions gained the day.

WINANT

CSB
WT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated May 3, 1941
Rec'd 2:50 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1753, May 3, midnight. (SECTION THREE)

Five. We are determined to fight to the last inch and ounce for Egypt, including its outposts of Tobruk and Crete. Very considerable risks are being run by us for that and personally I think we shall win in spite of the physical difficulties of reinforcing by tanks and air. But I adjure you, Mr. President, not to under-rate the gravity of the consequences which may follow from a middle eastern collapse; in this war every post is a winning post and how many more are we going to lose?

Six. With regard to Vichy we are more than willing that you should take the lead, and work out how to get the best from them by threats or favors. You alone can forestall the Germans in Morocco. If they are once installed it will not be necessary for them to go over-land; they will soon get air borne troops to Dakar.

Seven. I shall await with deep anxiety the new broadcast which you contemplate. It may be the supreme turning
-2- #1753, May 3, midnight, from London. Section three.

turning point.

Eight. Let me thank you for the splendid help in shipping and tankers which we owe to your action, and for all your generous and bold assistance to us and to the common cause. (END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

CSB
10 May 1941

Telegram #1855 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 10 May 1941.

Answered by Roosevelt in an undated telegram to Churchill. This telegram filed herein under date of 10 May 1941.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1655, May 10, 5 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"I expect you are now acquainted with the splendid offer which General Arnold made to us of one third of the rapidly expanding capacity for pilot training in the United States to be filled with pupils from here. We have made active preparations and the first 5504 young men are now ready to leave as training was to have begun early next month. A second batch of 550 will follow quickly on their heels. I now understand there are legal difficulties. I hope, Mr. President, that these are not serious as it would be very disappointing to us and would upset our arrangements if there were now to be delay. General Arnold's offer was an unexpected and very welcome addition to our training facilities. Such ready made capacity of aircraft, airfields and instructors all in balance we could not obtain to the same extent and in the same time by any other means. It will greatly accelerate our effort in the air."

WINANT

RDS

LONDON
Dated May 10, 1941
Rec'd 3:38 p.m.
14 May 1941

Telegram #1909 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 14 May 1941.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated May 14, 1941
Rec'd 9 a.m.

PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Thank you so much for your very kind message and I hope you will soon be quite well again. I have good hopes that in view of certain steps we have taken, the situation in Libya will be improved before long. It is, therefore, particularly important for you to go forward confidently with all your plans for supplying our Middle Eastern Armies by American ships to Suez. In Iraq too we are trying to regain control and anyhow we are making a large strong bridgehead at Basra where later on in the war American machines may be assembled and supplies unloaded. Syria is, however, a cause of great anxiety. There is no doubt that Darlan will sell the pass if he can, and German aircraft are already passing into Iraq. I have no means of action on that Caitiff Government. The more Leahy can do, the better. It
#1909, May 14, 1 p.m., from London.

It is the only hope. We are also sure Vichy is letting transport, etc., go to Tripoli overland from Tunis. The Azores and Cape Verde Islands are always liable to be jumped by the Germans at the same time as they break into Spain or seduce the Spanish Government. It will be very difficult for us to avoid being either too soon or too late. Finally, one of our armed merchant cruisers was torpedoed this morning between the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth meridians. I will send you a special report about these shortly."

WINANT

PEG
19 May 1941

Telegram #1992 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 19 May 1941.

Answered by Roosevelt in a message to Churchill dated 19 May 1941, filed herein.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated May 19, 1941
Rec'd 7:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1932, May 19, noon. (SECTION ONE)
PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT.

While at Chequers last night the following message came in. I understand it was sent through the British Consulate General at New York.

"Following for Prime Minister from Wendell Willkie:

I send you this because of my great concern about American public opinion which is hesitant and confused by present issues. I returned advocating destroyers for Britain after talk with you and Alexander. Donovan returned advocating convoys after talk with authorities in England. Forrestal now returns presumably after similar conversations saying that convoys not necessary and that bombers are sufficient. I am fearful that this policy places your friends outside administration in untenable positions. Obviously your policy must be flexible and constantly changing but might there not be some method through your representatives here to keep your friends
friends advised as to changes of needs?

My affectionate and respectful regards."

The Prime Minister wrote the following reply but wanted to be sure that it would not in any way embarrass you and so we agreed that I should send it on to you in case you had any suggestions to make before its dispatch from here. He said that he would appreciate very much a prompt answer."

Prime Minister to Mr. Wendell Willkie through Consul General New York:

WINANT

RR
JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON
Dated May 19, 1941
Rec'd 7:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1992, May 19, noon. (SECTION TWO)

One. There has been no change in our attitude. We want destroyers and long range bombers but far more we want effective convoy to farthest possible point. Feel sure Forrestal must have been misreported in saying anything contrary to this.

Two. Merely taking American munitions sunk is no measure of the danger. Loss of tonnage is enormous and any success we have in giving special protection to valuable convoys from United States is paid for by other losses in Atlantic off Freetown or in other waters or by diminution of our war effort in Mediterranean. I have never said that the British Empire cannot make its way out of this war without American belligerence, but no peace that is any use to you or which will liberate Europe can be obtained without American belligerence towards which convoy is a decisive step. Every day's delay adds to the length of the war and the difficulties to be encountered. West Africa, Spain, Vichy, Turkey, the Arab
Arab world all hang in the balance. Japan hangs in the balance. Wait three months and all this may be piled up against us in an adverse sense thus lengthening the war to periods no man can pretend to know about and increasing immensely the danger and burden to be borne by someone before Hitler's defeat. How easy now—how hard a year hence will be the task.

WINANT

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SO)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1992, May 19, noon. (SECTION THREE)

Three. At present rate in next twelve months we shall lose four and half million tons of shipping. The United States by a prodigy of generous constructive effort will build perhaps three and a half and we build the other million. Where have we got to then? Just making time and swimming level with the bank against the stream. Whereas cooperation of even a third of the American Navy would save at least one-half of the tonnage beforehand and give that mastery which alone can abridge the torment of mankind.

Four. Most grateful to you for your cable."

WINANT

HTM
23 May 1941

Telegram #2065 from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 23 May 1941.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note: Many thanks - Betty]
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
2065, May 23, noon.

PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

One. The Admiralty have asked me to send you the two attached papers "A" and "B". The first is technical and the second speaks for itself.

Two. Battle in Crete is severe because, having no airfields within effective range, we cannot bring any airforce into action either to aid defense or protect patrolling squadrons. Two of our cruisers and two destroyers sunk today. We are destroying many of highest class German troops and have sunk at least one convoy.

Three. Yesterday, twenty-first, BISMARCK, PRINCE EUGEN and eight merchant ships located in Bergen. Low clouds prevented air attack. Tonight they have sailed. We have reason to believe that a formidable Atlantic
-2- Triple Priority #2065, May 23, noon from London.

Atlantic raid is intended. Should we fail to catch them going out your Navy should surely be able to mark them down for us. KING GEORGE V, PRINCE OF WALES, HOOD, REPULSE and aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS with auxiliary vessels will be on their track. Give us the news and we will finish them off. W.S.C.

The two enclosures A and B referred to in numbered paragraph One are lengthy and have been sent through Navy channels in order to save time. Admiral Ghormley has requested the Navy Department to forward the texts immediately to you for the President.

WINANT

NK
Attached are papers "A" and "B" mentioned in telegram no. 2065 of May 23, noon from London sent to the President at 9:25 a.m.

May 23.
23 MAY 1942

SHEET 1 OF 4

THE VICE MINISTER IS SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT. REFER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S DISPATCH OF 12 MAY 1942, DISPATCH NUMBER 2069.

THE REMAINDER OF THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED ANNEX "A" TO THAT MESSAGE, AND ANNEX "B" TO ANNEX "A" TO THAT MESSAGE. PLEASE DELIVER THEM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ANNEX "A": IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE PATROLS WHICH ARE AT PRESENT BEING OPERATED BY THE UNITED STATES IN AREAS 1, 2, AND 3 HAVE BEEN OF GREAT VALUE, BUT THE SITUATION HAS NOT MATERIALLY CHANGED IN THESE DAYS. (A) SUBMARINES HAVE STARTED NOW TO OPERATE WEST OF 40 DEGREES WEST IN AREA 1. (B) ATTACKS BY HEAVY SURFACE UNITS ON OUR TRADE AT AN EARLY DATE ARE EXPECTED.

2. SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN AREA ONE. UP TO NOW WE HAVE ONLY BEEN ESCORTING OUR HALIFAX-UNITED KINGDOM CONVOYS TO 35 DEGREES WEST.

CONT'D

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
IT WILL NOW BE NECESSARY TO ESCORT THESE CONVOYS OVER THE ENTIRE ROUTE, AND THIS WILL NECESSARILY REDUCE GREATLY THE SCALE OF DEFENSE WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED TO EACH CONVOY. SURFACE RAIDER ATTACKS.

AGAINST THIS FORM OF ATTACK, OUR BATTLE FLEET WHICH IS SMALL CAN ONLY OFFER AN INADEQUATE SCALE OF PROTECTION. WE HAVE, UP TO NOW, MADE IT A POLICY TO FURNISH BATTLE SHIP PROTECTION FROM HALIFAX TO 40 DEGREES TO AS MANY CONVOYS AS POSSIBLE.

2. IF THE UNITED STATES FORCES OPERATING IN AREA ONE COULD COVER THE AREA THROUGH WHICH OUR VESSELS USUALLY PASS FOR THE PURPOSE OF, FIRSTLY, MAKING SUBMARINES AND SURFACE RAIDERS FEEL INSECURE; AND, SECONDLY, REPORTING ENEMY UNIT'S POSITIONS WHEN SIGHTED SO THAT OUR SURFACE FORCES MIGHT BRING THE ENEMY FORCES TO ACTION AND OUR MERCHANT VESSELS ROUTED OVER ANOTHER ROUTE, IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE AFOREMENTIONED THREATS. OF PARTICULAR VALUE WOULD BE AIR RECONNAISSANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE CONVOYS, AND IT MAY BE SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE CLOSER THE USS.
FORCES WORK TO A CONVOY, THE MORE IT WILL HELP TO PROTECT THE CONVOY.

4. THE UNITED STATES PATROLS WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST SECONDARY TO THAT IN VALUE IN AREAS "X" AND "Y" AS GIVEN IN THE ATTACHED NOTE.

5. AREA 2. THE TRACKS WHICH ARE BEING FOLLOWED BY U.S. FORCES IN AREA 2 ARE BEING RECEIVED, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY COVER THE AREA THOROUGHLY. THE BRITISH HAVE ASSIGNED A CRUISER TO CRUISE IN THE VICINITY OF THE U.S. FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACTING AS A "KILLING FORCE."

6. AREA 3. SUBMARINES HAVING NOW SPREAD THEMSELVES ON A LINE BETWEEN FREE TOWN AND NORTHEASTERN CORNER OF BRAZIL, THIS AREA HAS THUS RECENTLY BECOME VERY CRITICAL. THE U-BOATS HAVE TAKEN HEAVY TOLLS OF OUR SHIPPING, AND IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE ITALIAN AIR LINE FROM CAPE VERDE ISLANDS TO BRAZIL IS RENDERING THEM ASSISTANCE.

IN SECTIONS OF THIS AREA IN WHICH THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF SHIPPING, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ENEMY SURFACE RAIDERS MAY ALSO OPERATE,

CONTINUED.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
7. AREA "A" GIVEN ON ATTACHED NOTE IS THE AREA IN WHICH THE U.S. FORCES WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST ASSISTANCE IN
FULFILING THE ABOVE OBJECTIVE. IT IS INTENDED SOON TO STATION A CRUISER AS AN ATTACKING FORCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNITED STATES
FORCES IN THIS AREA.

AREA "X" 63 DEGREES NORTH, 35 DEGREES WEST; 57 N., 55 W.;
50 DEGREES NORTH, 47 DEGREES 30 MIN., WEST; 63 N., 38 W.

AREA "Y" 50 N., 39 W.; 36 N., 45 W.; 35 N., 50 W.; 45-30 N.,
50 W.; 30 N., 47-30 W.

AREA "Z" 15 N., 26 W.; EQUATOR, 26 W.; EQUATOR, 35 W.;
10 N., 50 W.

THIS IS THE END OF ANNEX "A"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>NAME OF VESSEL</th>
<th>LONGITUDE</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
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<tr>
<td>20 APR</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>CALCHAR</td>
<td>27-00 W.</td>
<td>10,305</td>
<td>UNDETERMINED</td>
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<td>30 APR</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>LASSIE</td>
<td>20-56 W.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 MAY</td>
<td>NORWEGIAN</td>
<td>TARANGER</td>
<td>25-20 W.</td>
<td>4,073</td>
<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>OAKDEN</td>
<td>27-51 W.</td>
<td>4,235</td>
<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>RAMILLIES</td>
<td>30-52 W.</td>
<td>4,953</td>
<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>BENGORE HEAD</td>
<td>32-40 W.</td>
<td>2,609</td>
<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>EDMONL</td>
<td>32-40 W.</td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>REGALIA</td>
<td>32-40 W.</td>
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<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>EMPIRE CLOUD</td>
<td>32-40 W.</td>
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<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>CITY OF WINCHESTER</td>
<td>26-14 W.</td>
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<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 MAY</td>
<td>DUTCH</td>
<td>HERCULES</td>
<td>34-28 W.</td>
<td>2,317</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>SOMERSET</td>
<td>26-13 W.</td>
<td>5,170</td>
<td>GRAIN</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>NARPOSS</td>
<td>41-00 W.</td>
<td>6,718</td>
<td>GRAIN</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>NORMAN MONARCH</td>
<td>41-00 W.</td>
<td>5,356</td>
<td>PAPER, 5 PLANES, 1000 MACHINE GUNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 MAY</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>DARLINGTON COURT</td>
<td>41-00 W.</td>
<td>5,470</td>
<td>TANKER</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**SHEET TWO-ANNEX "B"**

This is Annex "B" to dispatch transmitted through State Department between March 31 and May 20, following ships sunk west of 26 deg. W:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>NAME OF VESSEL</th>
<th>LONGITUDE</th>
<th>TONNAGE</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 MARCH</td>
<td>SWEDISH</td>
<td>CASTOR</td>
<td>32-00 WEST</td>
<td>8914 TON</td>
<td>TANKER FOR 98 TRUCKS, GENERAL, 4 PLANKS, 172 TONS AMMUNITION.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 APRIL</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>LEAFSTEAL</td>
<td>29-16 WEST</td>
<td>2316 TON</td>
<td>88 TONS T0N8 TNT, 98 TRUCKS, GENERAL, 4 PLANKS, 172 TONS AMMUNITION.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>BRITISH RELIANCE</td>
<td>28-09 WEST</td>
<td>7000 TON</td>
<td>TANKER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>ALDERPOOL</td>
<td>27-55 WEST</td>
<td>4313 TON</td>
<td>GRAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>BRITISH VISCONT</td>
<td>27-30 WEST</td>
<td>6989 TON</td>
<td>TANKER</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>GREEK</td>
<td>LEONIDA S. CAMERIST</td>
<td>27-30 WEST</td>
<td>4274 TON</td>
<td>GRAIN</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>WESTPOOL</td>
<td>27-30 W.</td>
<td>5724 TON</td>
<td>SCRAPIRON</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>THIRLBY</td>
<td>26-12 W.</td>
<td>4687 TON</td>
<td>WHEAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 APRIL</td>
<td>BELGIAN</td>
<td>INDIER</td>
<td>27-30 W.</td>
<td>5409 TON</td>
<td>STEEL</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 APRIL</td>
<td>NORWEGIAN</td>
<td>LINCOLN ELWORTH</td>
<td>27-06 W.</td>
<td>5580 TON</td>
<td>BALLAST</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 APRIL</td>
<td>DUTCH</td>
<td>SALLEIER</td>
<td>30-46 W.</td>
<td>6563 TON</td>
<td>OUTWARD BOUND</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 APRIL</td>
<td>BELGIAN</td>
<td>VILLE D'ILIEGE</td>
<td>29-30 W.</td>
<td>7463 TON</td>
<td>GENERAL, 2,662,600 POUNDS SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION, 20 AEROPLANE ENGINES, SEVENTY-FOUR TON TRUCKS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>NATIONALITY</td>
<td>NAME OF VESSEL</td>
<td>LONGITUDE</td>
<td>TONNAGE</td>
<td>CARGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 M</td>
<td>NORWEGIAN</td>
<td>JOHN P. PEDERSEN</td>
<td>41-00 W</td>
<td>6,120</td>
<td>ADMIT TANKER</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 M</td>
<td>DUTCH</td>
<td>ELUSA</td>
<td>38-00 W</td>
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<td>20 M</td>
<td>BRITISH</td>
<td>DAN FELIX</td>
<td>40-20 W</td>
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<td>TANKER IN BALLAST</td>
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<td>(BRITISH SHIP)</td>
<td>(LONG, TONNAGE &amp; CARGO ALSO UNKNOWN)</td>
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<td>41-10 W</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 M</td>
<td>BELGIAN</td>
<td>GUNG</td>
<td>37-30 W</td>
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THIS IS THE END OF ANNEX "FR".

DIST. STATE.......  
FILE.......  
CHO.......