ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL

JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1942

Microfilmed at The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT.

As a result of proposals put forward by the American and British Chiefs of Staff, and of their recommendations to President Roosevelt and to the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, it is announced that, with the concurrence of the Netherlands Government and of the Dominion Governments concerned, a system of unified Command will be established in the South West Pacific Area.

2. All the forces in this area, sea, land and air, will operate under one Supreme Commander. At the suggestion of the President, in which all concerned have agreed, General Sir A. Wavell has been appointed to this Command.

3. Major-General George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps of the U.S. Army, will be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. He is now in the Far East. Under the direction of General Wavell, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy, will assume Command of all naval forces in the area. General Sir Henry Pownall will be Chief of Staff to General Wavell.

4. General Wavell will assume his Command in the near future.
5. At the recent Tunis, His Excellency Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek has accepted the Supreme Commander over all troops and his forces of the United Nations which are now or may in the future be operating in the African theatre, including initially such forces as of India, China, and Thailand as may become available to troops of the United Nations. American and British representatives will operate in the joint headquarters at Tunis.
January 29, 1942.

For your information here is the latest on the Vichy situation:

1. On January 20th I sent the following statement of our policy to Petain through Leahy:

"Here are some thoughts which you could use if the occasion offered -- either with Marshal Petain or General Weygand.

1. It is most important for the French Government and the French people to realize that the President of the United States is about the best friend they have; that one of his greatest wishes is to see France reconstituted in the post-war period in accordance with its splendid position in history.

2. The word 'France' in the mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire.

3. The attack on the United States and the declaration of war must make the French Government and people realize that any act on their part either at home or in the colonies which would give aid and comfort to the Germans or Italians must, of necessity, help the Germans and hurt the United States. The United States could not, of course, take such a hostile act lying down. That is just common sense which the French should realize.

4. Now that the United States is in the war, it should be perfectly clear to the French Government and the French people that if Germany or Italy attacked unoccupied France or any of the French
Colonies, in any way, the President could not regard acquiescence to such an attack as anything else than playing the German game.

5. On the other hand, resistance by the French against Germany or Italian attack either in France itself or in any part of the Colonial Empire would be regarded by the President as a normal and natural reaction. Such resistance would have not only the moral support of the United States, but it would also have the physical support of the United States by every possible military and naval assistance we could bring to bear.

The above seems to me almost like a primer because it is wholly logical and wholly simple.

2. Today I have received a message from Leahy saying that he had delivered my message to the Marshal orally and told him that the President's message was confirmatory of what he, Leahy, had already said many times.

3. The Marshal (Darlan and Rochat being present) said in effect:

(a) That the French Government would resist any invasion by the Gaullists, the Germans, the British, or the Americans.

(b) That there is no longer any question of using the French Fleet in an unfriendly way.

(c) That there is no longer any question at the present time of Germany using bases in North Africa.

(d) That there is no pending question of the Germans making an invasion of Africa from any direction, including Spain.

4. When Leahy asked the old gentleman if he would accept military or naval aid from the United States if French Africa were invaded by Germany or Italy or both, the Marshal made the somewhat cryptic reply "If we ask for it".

5. At the same interview Darlan said he had heard that South Africa might make an attack on Madagascar.
and that this would make Vichy very angry. Darlan also hoped that the Saint Pierre-Miquelon affair would soon be settled.

6. It seems to be Leahy's present opinion that if Germany tries to move into French Africa, the Vichy Government cannot be expected to give any cooperation whatsoever to the United States.

7. Thus the situation seems to me no better and no worse than it was when you left here and the flying trapeze can, therefore, remain in statu quo.

ROOSEVELT
7. This seems to be our joint staff opinion here. What do you think?

8. Thank you ever so much for your wire. It is fun to be in the same decade with you.

9. Congratulations on yesterday's vote. We also had one vote in opposition.

Roosevelt
TO: AMBASSADY LONDON

FROM: Officer

THR 30, 1942

CABLES LONDON 31/135

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE
PRESIDENT.

1. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING WAVELL'S MESSAGE REGARDING
OUR MAN IN THE ABDA AREA. WE HAVE HAD AN INDICATION HERE THAT HE
FELT THAT HE WAS TOO OLD TO HANDLE THAT IMPORTANT COMMAND. IF A
CHANGE IS MADE IT SEEMS TO ME THERE ARE MANY COMPPELLING REASONS
FOR PROMOTING THE DUTCHMAN, WHO IS APPARENTLY A VERY GOOD NAVAL
OFFICER. IN THAT CASE I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE
COMMAND OF THE AIR.

2. AS A MATTER OF FACT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT AIR
FORCE IN THAT AREA. DO YOU THINK THIS COULD BE WORKED OUT? I
REALIZE THAT PEARSE HAS JUST BEEN NAMED BUT IT MAY BE THAT WAVELL
COULD GIVE HIM THE POST OF INTENDANT GENERAL NOW TEMPORARILY CHARGED
TO GENERAL BRETT IN ADDITION TO HIS, BRETT'S, REGULARLY ASSIGNED
ROLE AS DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER. WE WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE POST
OF DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER BEING TEMPORARILY LEFT VACANT IN ORDER
THAT GENERAL BRETT MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO COMMAND THE COMBINED ABDA
AIR FORCES. I FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UNITED STATES
HAVE ONE OF THE IMPORTANT COMMANDS IN THE ABDA AREA. WILL YOU
LET ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS.
The staff have been giving consideration to the matter of including the Australians, the Dutch and the New Zealanders in the joint staff conferences. While they have not given me a final answer, I think I can say that their general feeling, with which I concur, is that all political and governmental matters concerning New Zealand, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies should continue to be handled in London and that military matters be resolved here.

However, to have all of these countries represented each by three men on the joint staff considering ABDA problems would provide for an altogether unwieldy body. We are all strongly of the opinion that the present working organization is functioning very efficiently for the collaboration of British - U.S. affairs which will constitute the major portion of the matters to be handled. We think it should remain as at present but with this important supplementary arrangement to meet the special complications of the ABDA area;

That in cases in which the Dutch, the Australians and the New Zealanders are concerned the combined staff will invite their participation in discussion of such matters as involve their national interest and collaboration. It is essential, however, that in those cases where immediate action is required the individual advice of the officers concerned be given without waiting for formal word from their respective governments.
WE WILL UNDERTAKE HERE TO WORK OUT A CLOSE AND INTIMATE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE THREE MILITARY MISSIONS OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND MAKE SURE THAT THEIR ADVICE IS IN NO SENSE PERFUNCTORY BUT WILL BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING THE GENERAL POLICIES OF THE WAR IN THE ABDA AREA.

7. The same to our joint staff opinion here. What do you think?

8. Thank you very much for your view. It is fun to be in the same closet with you.

9. Congratulations on yesterday's vote. We also had our vote in opposition.

Rassbach

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date OCT 6 1971

-3-
TEXT FROM THE PRESIDENT.
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON (SERVICE AND PERSONAL)

1. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING WAVELL'S MESSAGE REGARDING OUR MAN IN THE ABDA AREA. WE HAVE HAD AN INDICATION HERE THAT HE FELT THAT HE WAS TOO OLD TO HANDLE THAT IMPORTANT COMMAND. IF A CHANGE IS MADE IT SEEMS TO ME THERE ARE MANY COMPELLING REASONS FOR PROMOTING THE DUTCHMAN, WHO IS APPARENTLY A VERY GOOD NAVAL OFFICER. IN THAT CASE I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE COMMAND OF THE AIR.

2. AS A MATTER OF FACT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT AIR FORCE IN THAT AREA. DO YOU THINK THIS COULD BE WORKED OUT? I REALIZE THAT PEARSE HAS JUST BEEN NAMED BUT IT MAY BE THAT WAVELL COULD GIVE HIM THE POST OF INTENDANT GENERAL NOW TEMPORARILY CHARGED TO GENERAL BRETT IN ADDITION TO HIS, BRETT'S, REGULARLY ASSIGNED ROLE AS DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER. WE WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE POST OF DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER BEING TEMPORARILY LEFT VACANT IN ORDER THAT GENERAL BRETT MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO COMMAND THE COMBINED ABDA AIR FORCES. I FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE ONE OF THE IMPORTANT COMMANDS IN THE ABDA AREA. WILL YOU LET ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS.

3. THE STAFF HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERATION TO THE MATTER OF INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIANS, THE DUTCH AND THE NEW ZEALANDERS IN THE JOINT STAFF CONFERENCES. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN ME A FINAL ANSWER, I THINK I CAN SAY THAT THEIR GENERAL FEELING, WITH WHICH I CONCUR, IS THAT ALL POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL MATTERS CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED IN LONDON AND THAT MILITARY MATTERS BE RESOLVED HERE.

4. HOWEVER, TO HAVE ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED EACH BY 8 MEN ON THE JOINT STAFF CONSIDERING ABDA PROBLEMS WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN ALTOGETHER UNWIELDY BODY. WE ARE ALL STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT THE

By Deputy Archivist of the U.

By

Date

(See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
PRESENT WORKING ORGANIZATION IS FUNCTIONING VERY EFFICIENTLY FOR THE
COLLABORATION OF BRITISH-U.S. AFFAIRS WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE THE MAJOR
PORTION OF THE MATTERS TO BE HANDLED. WE THINK IT SHOULD REMAIN AS AT
PRESENT BUT WITH THIS IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENT TO MEET THE
SPECIAL COMPLICATIONS OF THE ABDA AREA;

5. THAT IN CASES IN WHICH THE DUTCH, THE AUSTRALIANS AND THE NEW
ZEALANDERS ARE CONCERNED THE COMBINED STAFF WILL INVITE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION OF SUCH MATTERS AS INVOLVE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND COLLABORATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, THAT IN THOSE CASES WHERE IMMEDIATE ACTION IS REQUIRED THE INDIVIDUAL ADVICE OF THE OFFICERS CONCERNED BE GIVEN WITHOUT WAITING FOR FORMAL WORD FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

6. WE WILL UNDERTAKE HERE TO WORK OUT A CLOSE AND INTIMATE WORKING
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 3 MILITARY MISSIONS OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND
THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND MAKE SURE THAT THEIR ADVICE IS IN NO SENSE PERFUNCTORIAL BUT WILL BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING THE GENERAL POLICIES OF THE WAR IN THE ABDA AREA.

7. THIS SEEMS TO BE OUR JOINT STAFF OPINION HERE. WHAT DO YOU THINK?

8. THANK YOU EVER SO MUCH FOR YOUR WIRE. IT IS FUN TO BE IN THE SAME
DECADE WITH YOU.

9. CONGRATULATIONS ON YESTERDAY'S VOTE. WE ALSO HAD ONE VOTE IN OPPOSITION.

ROOSEVELT.

CAPT. MC-CREA (WHITE HOUSE).....COPY.

FILE: SEALED SECRET FILE.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JANUARY 31, 1942

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

DILL IS OUT OF TOWN BUT I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I
DEEPLY HOPE HE WILL STAY AND SIT ON THE JOINT STAFF IN
ADDITION TO WEE MEYS AND NAVY AND AIR. THERE IS NO REASON
WHY THE STAFF SHOULD NOT BE COMPOSED OF THE ABOVE FOUR
AND ALSO STARK, MARSHALL, ARNOLD AND KING.

THERE SEEMS TO BE ONLY ONE QUESTION AND THAT IS
JUST WHOM DILL WOULD REPRESENT. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO
HIS REPRESENTING THE JOINT STAFFS IN LONDON BUT I
PARTICULARLY HOPE THAT I CAN REGARD HIM AS THE REPRESENT-
ATIVE OF YOU IN YOUR CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE.
PERRAPS THIS LATTER STATUS COULD BE UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN
YOU AND ME.

ALL OF THIS IS WHOLLY AGREEABLE TO MY PEOPLE ON
THE JOINT STAFF AND ALSO TO HARRY.

ROOSEVELT
January 31, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

Dill is out of town but I want you to know that I deeply hope he will stay and sit on the Joint Staff in addition to Weemys and Navy and Air. There is no reason why the Staff should not be composed of the above four and also Stark, Marshall, Arnold and King.

There seems to be only one question and that is just whom Dill would represent. I have no objection to his representing the Joint Staffs in London but I particularly hope that I can regard him as the representative of you in your capacity as Minister of Defense. Perhaps this latter status could be put on an informal basis but one which would be understood between you and me.

All of this is wholly agreeable to my people on the Joint Staff and also to Harry.

ROOSEVELT
January 31, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

Dill is out of town but I want you to know that I deeply hope he will stay and sit on the Joint Staff in addition to Wessyss and Navy and Air. There is no reason why the Staff should not be composed of the above four and also Stark, Marshall, Arnold and King.

There seems to be only one question and that is just whom Dill would represent. I have no objection to his representing the Joint Staffs in London but I particularly hope that I can regard him as the representative of you in your capacity as Minister of Defense. Perhaps this latter status could be put on an informal basis but one which would be understood between you and me.

All of this is wholly agreeable to my people on the Joint Staff and also to Harry.

ROOSEVELT
I feel that Dill is making his way here extremely well and
I hate to see you change his status. If it were another type of
PERSONALITY I THINK THAT DIFFICULTIES MIGHT ARISE BUT IN DILL'S CASE I AM SURE THAT SITTING IN ON THE JOINT STAFF HE CAN ADD TREMENDOUSLY TO OUR COMMON ENTERPRISE HERE. I WILL UNDERTAKE TO MAKE THIS POSITION CLEAR AND AGREEABLE TO STARK, KING, MARSHALL AND ARNOLD. I AM SURE THEY WILL AGREE.

IF YOU WISH I SHALL BE VERY HAPPY TO DISCUSS IT WITH DILL AS WELL. I HAVE THE GREATEST REGARD FOR HIM AND WOULD PREFER TO SEE WYMASS REMAIN AND DILL HAVE THE STATUS WHICH WE AGREED UPON WHILE YOU WERE HERE. THE IMPORTANT DETAIL IN DILL'S CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT HIS PRESENCE CAN BE USEFUL. I AM SURE THAT IT CAN BE USEFUL TO THE STAFF BUT ALSO ESPECIALLY TO ME PERSONALLY.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: DEAN ACHESON

We have received a confidential wire from Mr. Winant who says that the War Cabinet yesterday tentatively decided to reject the Lend-Lease draft agreement and they are meeting tomorrow to prepare a counter proposal.

Mr. Winant and Secretary Hull both believe that a personal message from the President to Mr. Churchill is the only hope for getting the present draft accepted.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3:00 P.M. Feb. 4, 1942.

This is a proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister:

I have asked the State Department through Halifax and Winant to express to the British Government my strong hope that it promptly agree to the present draft of interim Lend-Lease agreement and I now ask your personal help in bringing this about.

I understand your need of maintaining unity at home in the great task of winning the war. I know you also understand how essential it is that we maintain unity of purpose between our two governments and peoples in this and equally important in the unfinished tasks that will follow it.

I am convinced that further delay in concluding this agreement will be harmful to your interests and ours. I am likewise convinced that the present draft is not only fair and equitable but it meets the apprehension which some of your colleagues have felt and which Halifax has brought to our attention.

No one knows better than I how busy you are. I should not add this matter to the long list of your worries if after giving it much personal attention I were not convinced that a failure to sign this agreement would do much mischief.

(Dictated by Dean Acheson, after talking with Secy. Hull and Mr. Hopkins)
February 9, 1942

Miss Tully:

This cable was sent over to the State Department Code Room Friday night at 9:45. It had been approved by the President.

LMB
TELEGRAM

February 6, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

ADMIRAL HART HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED BECAUSE OF ILL HEALTH. I BELIEVE THE THING TO DO IS TO LET THE DUTCHMAN GO IN AS ACTING COMMANDER AND CHIEF OF ALL NAVAL FORCES LEAVING ALL OTHER COMMANDS UNDER WAVELL AS AT PRESENT CONSTITUTED INCLUDING PEERSE. THIS WILL HANDLE THE MATTER SATISFACTORIALLY FOR THE PRESENT AND WILL PERMIT US TO MAKE CHANGES LATER IF THAT SEEMS DESIRABLE. THIS PROPOSAL IS IN HANDS OF CHIEFS OF STAFF HERE BUT I WANTED TO SEND YOU MY PERSONAL VIEW. CAN WE NOT SETTLE THIS WITH FINALITY BY SUNDAY.

HARRY GAVE ME YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SINKINGS IN WESTERN ATLANTIC. THIS MATTER IS BEING GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION BY STARK, KING AND ME. WE HAD A GOOD GO AT THE JAPS IN MARSHALL ISLANDS. WE ARE PUSHING ON WITH MAGNET. WARM REGARDS,

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By
Date 6/1/1971
February 6, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT.

ADMIRAL HART HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED BECAUSE OF ILL HEALTH. I BELIEVE THE THING TO DO IS TO LET THE DUTCHMAN GO IN AS ACTING COMMANDER AND CHIEF OF ALL NAVAL FORCES LEAVING ALL OTHER COMMANDS UNDER HAYE. AS AT PRESENT CONSTITUTED INCLUDING PEARSE. THIS WILL HANDLE THE MATTER SATISFACTORY FOR THE PRESENT AND WILL PERMIT US TO MAKE CHANGES LATER IF THAT SEEMS DESIRABLE. THIS PROPOSAL IS IN HANDS OF CHIEFS OF STAFF HERE BUT I WANTED TO SEND YOU MY PERSONAL VIEW. CAN WE NOT SETTLE THIS WITH FINALITY BY SUNDAY.

HARRY GAVE ME YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SINKINGS IN WESTERN ATLANTIC. THIS MATTER IS BEING GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION BY STARK, KING AND ME. WE HAD A GOOD GO AT THE JAPS IN MARSHALL ISLANDS. WE ARE PUSHING ON WITH MAGNET. WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT

This was sent prior to establishment of "RC" Serial file and is filed for information only. 842

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: [Signature]
Date: 06/06/1971
February 9, 1942.

From: The President.
To: The Prime Minister.

The combined Chiefs of Staff have been directed to inform Wavell that he is directed to designate Vice Admiral Helfrich as Acting Commander of Combined Naval Forces in ABDA Area. Suggest that we issue press release simultaneously from London and Washington at 2 p.m. G.C.T. Wednesday 11 February as follows:

Quotes "In view Admiral Hart's request to be relieved because of ill health Vice Admiral Helfrich has been designated as acting Commander Combined Naval Forces ABDA Area." Unquote

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.J. Stewart
Date: OCT 6, 1971
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I am sending through Halifax and Winant a reply to the proposal of an exchange of notes relating to Article VII of the proposed interim Lease-Lend Agreement. The notes as drafted do not express my understanding of the Article and its purpose. There is no suggestion in the Article (as some of your colleagues have expressed it) of bartering Empire sovereignty to meet a debt, and it is wholly understood that, before any commitment is made modifying the system, the Dominions must be consulted. Where I differ from the statement in the proposed note is in the exclusion of Empire preference or any other special preference arrangement, either ours or yours, from the scope of the discussions and the area within which agreement of all concerned is to be sought. I still believe that a simple acceptance of the draft would be by far the best

Enciphered by ______________________

Sent by operator ______________ M., __________, 19__________
best method of achieving the purposes of both our countries and of demonstrating the unity of those purposes and of the American and British people. The Article offers a road to the settlement of our mutual and world problems to which all can rally against the misery and slavery of Hitler's New Order. I hope that we can move forward boldly along that road. The Article makes it plain that all conclusions must be reached by agreement after discussion of all the objectives mentioned and with the participation of all countries concerned. This is the method of free peoples, and insures that no existing arrangements are or can be affected without the consent of those involved.

You will agree, I know, that the pressing matter now is to reach an agreement. If it will help you to this, we can record in notes the assurances which have already been given, although as I have said this seems to me to dilute the effect of agreement with an atmosphere of caution. The message sent through the State Department carries the texts which do this. I am counting upon your help to conclude this matter in the next few days.
Quote I have no objection to your proposal for announcing Air Marshal Peirse as Commander in Chief of the Air Forces in ABDA, although I would have preferred to wait a few days because of public reaction following the withdrawal of Admiral Hart from the Naval Command Unquote
February 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to our conversation on Sunday regarding the British reply to your message urging the acceptance of the interim Lease-Lend agreement and your instructions to me at that time, I have prepared for your consideration a message from you to the Prime Minister and a draft of memorandum to be presented to the British Government through Ambassador Winant. Attached to this memorandum is a modification of the British proposed exchange of notes redrafted to conform with the position which this Department has taken under your instructions. If these messages meet with your approval, we can send them off at once.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.

Enclosures.
The Government of the United States finds it impossible to accept the text of the notes proposed in the memorandum from Lord Halifax dated February 7, 1942, because paragraph four of the proposed note from the Government of the United States to the Government of the United Kingdom alters rather than elucidates the meaning of Article VII of the Interim Agreement. The natural and inescapable meaning of paragraph four is that in the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom preferential arrangements between the Dominions and the United Kingdom and—although the language is here obscure—the United States and, say, the Philippines would be reserved from consideration because falling entirely outside the ambit of the Article. Paragraph four then continues to suggest that should the United Kingdom and the Dominions consent thereto, the consideration of modification of the system of Imperial Preferences might be brought within the scope of the matters to be considered in the final settlement. The Government of the United States has never contemplated or expressed the foregoing interpretation.
interpretation of Article VII and cannot now agree to it.

My Government has on numerous occasions expressed orally that it is not the intention of Article VII to commit either Government to any unilateral action. The final settlement is to be reached by agreement. Agreement is to be sought upon a many-sided program of action along the lines of all the objectives stated in the Article. A plan is outlined, not a list of isolated points, and nothing falling within the scope of the plan is excluded or reserved from consideration and agreement. The participation of other Governments is specifically contemplated. Wherever a change in existing arrangements may be involved, the parties to those arrangements will naturally be consulted - as the Article even more broadly provides - and their agreement sought.

Article VII is not a settlement. It offers an avenue by which the settlement may be reached and commits the parties to that road. It may fail. It certainly will fail.
fail if either nation insists upon holding back some cherished item from the common effort. The imperative task, today, is to keep open the road to a settlement which can be the foundation of a lasting peace.

In the opinion of my Government the purposes which both Governments are seeking can best be served by simple agreement upon the draft without an exchange of notes which may appear to the peoples of our two countries and of other countries to indicate a halting and cautious rather than a broad and united approach toward the problems of the war and post-war period. If, however, His Majesty's Government believes that a formal exchange of notes recording understandings reached during the course of the negotiations is desirable, my Government is willing to enter into an exchange of notes with His Majesty's Government along the lines attached hereto.

In as much as the need for an Interim Agreement is pressing, a reply to this memorandum is requested at the earliest convenient moment.
Note from His Majesty's Government to Mr. Winant.

Your Excellency, I have the honour to refer to the conversations which have taken place between the representatives of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with Article VII of the Lease-Lend interim agreement signed this day.

2. During the course of these conversations the representatives of both governments have indicated that their governments fully appreciate the post-war problems which will confront the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and of other countries which may subsequently participate in agreed action for the attainment of the objectives stated in the said Article VII.

3. The representatives of both governments have referred to the dependence of the United Kingdom on international trade and to the severity of the problem...
of the problem of the balance of payments with
which the Government of the United Kingdom will
have to deal in the post-war period and they have
recognized the necessity for taking this problem
into account in formulating agreed action to attain
the ends of Article VII.

4. The representatives of the United Kingdom
Government have stated that before accepting any
commitments modifying the existing system of Imperial
Preference, the Government of the United Kingdom
would naturally require to consult the Governments
of the Dominions, and have further stated their
understanding that nothing in Article VII binds
either contracting Government to take action
unilaterally without regard to action by the
other as may be agreed to after discussion of all
the objectives stated in that Article.

5. The representatives of the Government of the
United Kingdom have referred to problems which will
confront
confront all Governments, including the United States Government, in pursuit of the objectives stated in Article VII, relating to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers as part of a system of world trade that the respective Governments by Article VII are striving to attain.

6. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom in signing the agreement referred to above, that each contracting Government in concerting measures necessary for the attainment in common accord of the objectives envisaged in Article VII, will take fully into account the problems and conditions set forth in the preceding paragraphs. I shall therefore be grateful if Your Excellency will furnish me with an assurance that
that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United States.

Mr. Winant's Reply.

Your Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of this day's date, in which you were so good as to recapitulate the various problems and conditions which should be taken into account in connection with Article VII of the Lease-Lend provisional agreement, which we have signed to-day.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States entirely shares the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards the desirability of taking fully into account all the problems and conditions to which allusion is made in Your Excellency's note.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 7th, 1942
TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 11, 1942

TO: EMBASSY
   LONDON

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR CHURCHILL FROM HOPKINS

APROPOS OF YOUR TELEPHONE CALL I TALKED TO THE PRESIDENT LAST NIGHT AND HE SEES NO DIFFICULTY WHATSOEVER IN CHINA SITTING IN ON YOUR PACIFIC COUNCIL IN LONDON.

HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date 11/17/2
TELEGRAM

February 11, 1942.

TO: AMBASSADOR
LONDON

NUMBER 102

AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT
YOUR NUMBER 25.

1. I AM GIVING CAREFUL ATTENTION TO CHINA AND SENT THE GENERALISSIMO
   ANOTHER PERSONAL WIRE LAST NIGHT ASSURING HIM THAT AN ADEQUATE AIR TRANSPORT
   SCHEME WOULD BE SET UP BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
   INCIDENTALLY, I HAVE TAKEN TWENTYFIVE GOOD COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTS AWAY
   FROM THE AIR LINES TO ADD THEM TO OUR AFRICAN FERRY SERVICE AT ONCE AND
   WILL TAKE MORE IF NECESSARY.

2. PRESSURE ON MCARTHUR IS GETTING MORE ACUTE.

3. THE NEW NAVAL COMMAND IN THE ABDA AREA IS ALL SET.

4. WE HAD A BAD BREAK LAST NIGHT IN THE LCSS OF THE NORMANDIE AND
   WILL NOT KNOW FOR A FEW DAYS WHETHER SHE IS A TOTAL LOSS OR NOT.

5. YOU CAN BE SURE THERE WILL BE NO GUARANTEES GIVEN ABOUT
   NON-OCCUPATION OF MADAGASCAR OR REUNION.

6. OUR STREAM OF BIG BOMBERS IS GETTING BLOCKED UP AT BANGALORE
   BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF LANDING FIELDS IN SUMATRA AND JAVA BUT
   WE HOPE TO BREAK THAT JAM SOON.

7. I DO HOPE Auchinleck CAN GIVE ROMMEL A PUSH SOON.

8. HARRY IS MUCH BETTER BUT I AM TRYING TO CONFINE HIM TO BARRACKS
   UNTIL HE LEARNS TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 6 1971

DECLASSIFIED

0602
TO: AMBASSADOR
LONDON

NUMBER 100:

CONFIDENTIAL and personal for the former naval person from the President.

YOUR NUMBER 25.

1. I am giving careful attention to China and sent the Generalissimo another personal wire last night assuring him that an adequate air transport scheme would be set up between India and China in the immediate future. Incidentally, I have taken twenty-five good commercial transports away from the air lines to add them to our African ferry service at once and will take more if necessary.

2. Pressure on MacArthur is getting more acute.

3. The new naval command in the Aden area is all set.

4. We had a bad break last night in the loss of the Normandie and will not know for a few days whether she is a total loss or not.

5. You can be sure there will be no guarantees given about non-occupation of Madagascar or Reunion.

6. Our stream of big bombers is getting blocked up at Bangalore because of the difficulties of landing fields in Sumatra and Java but we hope to break that jam soon.

7. I do hope Auchinleck can give Rommel a push soon.

8. Harry is much better but I am trying to confine him to barracks until he learns to take care of himself.
2-12-42

Miss Tully,

For the President's Files: Copies of secret messages No. 103, 104, and 105 and attached memos.

Respectfully,

L.H. Schuyler
Int. Adj.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made on the telephone a little while ago, I am sending you herewith the suggested message for you to send to Mr. Churchill.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
<th>NAVY DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRAFTER</td>
<td>OPNAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTENSION NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDRESSEES</td>
<td>ALUSNA LONDON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECEDENCE</td>
<td>PRIORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td>PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>FEB 11, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODE ROOM</td>
<td>PRIORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td>ROUTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td>DEFERRED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

112149 CR 1318

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

NO 103

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date 2/1/72

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
February 10, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In view of the information received from many sources and in view of the admission of Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan to Admiral Leahy on February 9 that food supplies and trucks had in fact been shipped from France in French vessels to Tunis for the use of the Axis forces in North Africa, I felt it necessary to send a personal message today to Marshal Pétain to be delivered immediately by Admiral Leahy.

My message to Pétain was in substance as follows:

"The American Government has information that the French Government has entered into some arrangement with the Axis Powers providing for the use of French ships for the transportation of supplies and possibly war material to Tunis for delivery to the enemy forces in Libya. There can be no possible justification under the terms of the Armistice for the shipment of war materials or other direct aid to the Axis Powers and without official assurances from the Vichy Government that no military aid will go forward to the Axis
in any theater of war and that French ships will not be used in the furtherance of their aggression, Admiral Leahy will be instructed to return immediately to the United States for consultation as to our future policy."

The step which I have taken appears to be responsive to the views of your Government as communicated yesterday by Halifax to Welles. The possibility contemplated in my message to Pétain is of course serious, but I am hopeful that my message may result, at least temporarily, in checking the sending of further supplies and in preventing greater and more serious forms of collaboration with the Axis on the part of the Vichy Government.
NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In view of the information received from many sources and in view of the admission of Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan to Admiral Leahy on February 9 that food supplies and trucks had in fact been shipped from France in French vessels to Tunis for the use of the Axis forces in North Africa, I felt it necessary to send a personal message today to Marshal Petain to be delivered immediately by Admiral Leahy.

My message to Petain was in substance as follows:

"The American Government has information that the French Government has entered into some arrangement with the Axis Powers providing for the use of French ships for the transportation of supplies and possibly war material to Tunisia for delivery to the enemy forces in Libya. There can be no possible justification under the terms of the Armistice for the shipment of war materials or other direct aid to the Axis Powers and without official assurances from the Vichy Government that no military aid will go forward to the Axis..."
in any theater of war and that French ships will not be used in the furtherance of their aggression, Admiral Leahy will be instructed to return immediately to the United States for consultation as to our future policy."

The step which I have taken appears to be responsive to the views of your Government as communicated yesterday by Halifax to Welles. The possibility contemplated in my message to Pétain is of course serious, but I am hopeful that my message may result, at least temporarily, in checking the sending of further supplies and in preventing greater and more serious forms of collaboration with the Axis on the part of the Vichy Government.
February 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference the Prime Minister's message of this morning stating that the British Air Ministry would like to announce Air Marshal Peirse as Air CINC, the problem with us is whether or not it is advisable to announce, at the moment of informing the U.S. public of the passage of Naval Command in ABDA from an American to the Dutch, that the Air Commander is to be a Britisher.

We think that from the United States point of view it would be desirable to delay the announcement regarding Peirse for the time being, unless the Prime Minister is under serious pressure for such a declaration, in view of the Singapore situation. However, the British public know that they have supreme command in ABDA, and a full general as Chief of Staff for Wavell.

We suggest the following reply from you to the Prime Minister:

"Reference your message regarding announcement of Air Marshal Peirse as Commander of Combined ABDA Air Force colon in view of effect on United States public of announcement to-day that naval command is passing from United States to Dutch I would prefer to delay publicity regarding Peirse for the time being stop If such delay is an embarrassment to you I will reconsider stop"

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Army Air Forces

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleets
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK:

Attached hereto is a suggested draft of a reply by the President to the Prime Minister, to be used in the event that the President rejects the one already signed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The gist of the attached draft was suggested by the Chief of Staff as an alternative.

Incl.

This was left by Captain McCrea with Harry Hopkins last night. Harry must have left it on President's desk. It has no significance as original was sent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
<th>NAVY DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRAFTER</td>
<td>ADDRESSEES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>OPNAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td>PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>FEB 12, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODEROOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

112237 CR 1329
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME  DATE  TIME  GCT

TEXT

NO 184

P1A ------

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 6 1971

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 11, 1942

TO: LONDON

AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER 27 REGARDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF AIR MARSHAL PEIRSE AS COMMANDER OF COMBINED ABDA AIR FORCE:

IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE EFFECT ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC OF ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY THAT NAVAL COMMAND IS PASSING FROM UNITED STATES TO DUTCH I WOULD PREFER TO DELAY PUBLICITY REGARDING PEIRSE FOR THE TIME BEING. IF SUCH DELAY IS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO YOU THEN WILL YOU GO AHEAD AND AUTHORIZE WAVELL TO MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS.

WHILE WE ARE SORRY TO HAVE HARRIS GO WE WILL WELCOME AVILL AND I WILL MAKE IT MY BUSINESS TO SEE HIM SOON.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: J.S. Stewart

Date: OCT. 6, 1971
TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 11, 1942

TO: LONDON

No. 104 AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER 27 REGARDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF AIR
MARSHAL PERSE AS COMMANDER OF COMBINED ABDA AIR FORCE;
IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE EFFECT ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC
OF ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY THAT NAVAL COMMAND IS PASSING FROM UNITED
STATES TO DUTCH I WOULD PREFER TO DELAY PUBLICITY REGARDING
PERSE FOR THE TIME BEING. IF SUCH DELAY IS AN EMBARRASSMENT
TO YOU THEN WILL YOU GO AHEAD AND AUTHORIZE WARELL TO MAKE THE
ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS.

WHILE WE ARE SORRY TO HAVE HARRIS GO WE WILL WELCOME AVILL
AND I WILL MAKE IT MY BUSINESS TO SEE HIM SOON.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 6 1971

Sent Vice Naval
Communications

OPNAV NO. 112237 9 Feb 1942
February 11, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reference to drafts of a cable from you to the Prime Minister and from the Department to Mr. Winant on the British proposals regarding the interim Lease-Lend agreement, Dean Acheson has had a discussion with Harry Hopkins, following your talk with Harry. Together they have redrafted the message from you to the Prime Minister to act as a substitute for all the papers which I sent to you yesterday. It seems to me an improvement and I think that it is well worth sending as a final effort to reach an agreement upon the present draft of the interim agreement. I am submitting it to you for your consideration. If you approve the message, do you wish to send it by naval radio or through the Department? The latter course would enable the Ambassador to be informed of our latest step.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.

Enclosure.
February 11, 1942

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

No. 105 In regard to the proposed exchange of notes relating to Article 7 of the interim Lend-Lease Agreement, referred to in your message No. 25, I want to make it perfectly clear to you that it is the furthest thing from my mind that we are attempting in any way to ask you to trade the principle of imperial preference as a consideration for Lend-Lease.

Furthermore, I understand something of the nice relationships your constitution requires of your home government in dealing with the Dominions. Obviously the Dominions must not only be consulted but I assume you must have their approval on any affirmative changes.
in existing arrangements which might be developed in the broad discussions which you and I both contemplate.

It seems to me the proposed note leaves a clear implication that Empire preference and, say, agreements between ourselves and the Philippines are excluded before we sit down at the table.

All I am urging is an understanding with you that we are going to have a bold, forthright, and comprehensive discussion looking forward to the construction of what you so aptly call "a free, fertile economic policy for the post-war world". It seems perfectly clear to me that nothing should now be excluded from those discussions. None of us knows how those discussions will turn out, although, as I told you when you were here last, I have great confidence that we can organize a different kind of world where men shall really be free economically as well as politically.

The idea of attaching notes to this interim agreement would seem to me to give an impression to our enemies that we were overly cautious. I believe the
peoples not only of our two countries but the peoples of all the world will be heartened to know that we are going to try together and with them for the organization of a democratic post-war world and I gladly accept your intimation that we might get going at once with our economic discussions.

What seems to be bothering the Cabinet is the thought that we want a commitment in advance that Empire preference will be abolished. We are asking for no such commitment, and I can say that Article 7 does not contain any such commitment. I realize that that would be a commitment which your government could not give now if it wanted to; and I am very sure that I could not, on my part, make any commitment relative to a vital revision of our tariff policy. I am equally sure that both of us are going to face in this realistic world adjustments looking forward to your "free and fertile economic policy for the post-war world", and that things which neither of us now dreams of will be subjects of the most serious consideration in the not too distant future. So nothing should be excluded from
the discussions.

Can we not, therefore, avoid the exchange of notes which, as I have said, seems to dilute our statement of purpose with cautious reservations, and sign the agreement on the assurances which I give in reference to the matter that seems to be the stumbling block.

I feel very strongly that this would demonstrate to the world the unity of the American and British people.

In regard to coming to a meeting of minds with you at an early date, I only need to say to you that there are very important considerations here which make an early understanding desirable.

In saying this, I want again to tell you that I am not unmindful of your problem. We have tried to approach the whole matter of Lend-Lease in a manner that will not lead us into the terrible pitfalls of the last war.
FROM: THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO: U. S. NAVAL ATTACHE LONDON

112235 NCR 1328 12 FEBRUARY 1942

TEXT: THE FOLLOWING IS CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON AND WILKIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

NO. 105. IN REGARD TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES RELATING TO ARTICLE 7 OF THE INTERIM LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT, REFERRED TO IN YOUR MESSAGE NO. 25, I WANT TO MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO YOU THAT IT IS THE FURTHEST THING FROM MY MIND THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING IN ANY WAY TO ASK YOU TO TRADE THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPERIAL PREFERENCE AS A CONSIDERATION FOR LEND-LEASE.

FURTHERMORE, I UNDERSTAND SOMETHING OF THE NICE RELATIONSHIPS YOUR CONSTITUTION REQUIRES OF YOUR HOME GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH THE DOMINIONS. OBVIOUSLY THE DOMINIONS MUST NOT ONLY BE CONSULTED BUT I ASSUME YOU MUST HAVE THEIR APPROVAL ON ANY AFFIRMATIVE CHANGES IN EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED IN THE BROAD DISCUSSIONS WHICH YOU AND I BOTH CONTEMPLATE.

IT SEEMS TO ME THE PROPOSED NOTE LEAVES A CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT EMPIRE PREFERENCE AND, SAY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE PHILIPPINES ARE EXCLUDED BEFORE WE SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE.

ALL I AM URGING IS AN UNDERSTANDING WITH YOU THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A BOLD, FORTHRIGHT, AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION LOOKING FORWARD TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT YOU SO APTLY CALL "A FREE, FERTILE ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE POST-WAR WORLD". IT SEEMS PERFECTLY CLEAR TO ME THAT NOTHING SHOULD NOW BE EXCLUDED FROM THOSE DISCUSSIONS. NONE OF US KNOWS HOW THOSE DISCUSSIONS WILL TURN OUT, ALTHOUGH, AS I TOLD YOU WHEN YOU WERE HERE LAST, I HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN ORGANIZE A DIFFERENT KIND OF WORLD WHERE MEN SHALL REALLY BE FREE ECONOMICALLY AS WELL AS POLITICALLY.

THE IDEA OF ATTACHING NOTES TO THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD SEEM TO ME TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION TO OUR ENEMIES THAT WE WERE OVERLY CAUTIOUS. I BELIEVE THE PEOPLES NOT ONLY OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES BUT THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE WORLD WILL BE HEARTENED TO KNOW THAT WE ARE GOING TO TRY TOGETHER AND WITH THEM FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A DEMOCRATIC POST-WAR WORLD AND I GLADLY ACCEPT YOUR INTIMATION THAT WE MIGHT GET GOING AT ONCE WITH OUR ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS.

WHAT SEEMS TO BE BOTHERING THE CABINET IS THE THOUGHT THAT WE WANT A COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE THAT EMPIRE PREFERENCE WILL BE ABOLISHED. WE ARE ASKING FOR NO SUCH COMMITMENT, AND I CAN SAY THAT ARTICLE 7 DOES NOT
CONTAIN ANY SUCH COMMITMENT. I REALIZE THAT THAT WOULD BE A COMMITMENT WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD NOT GIVE NOW IF IT WANTED TO; AND I AM VERY SURE THAT I COULD NOT, ON MY PART, MAKE ANY COMMITMENT RELATIVE TO A VITAL REVISION OF OUR TARIFF POLICY. I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT BOTH OF US ARE GOING TO FACE IN THIS REALISTIC WORLD ADJUSTMENTS LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR "FREE AND FERTILE ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE POST-WAR WORLD", AND THAT THINGS WHICH NEITHER OF US NOW DREAM OF WILL BE SUBJECTS OF THE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. SO NOTHING SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE DISCUSSIONS.

CAN WE NOT, THEREFORE, AVOID THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES WHICH, AS I HAVE SAID, SEEMS TO DILUTE OUR STATEMENT OF PURPOSE WITH CAUTIOUS RESERVATIONS, AND SIGN THE AGREEMENT ON THE ASSURANCES WHICH I HERE GIVE IN REFERENCE TO THE MATTER THAT SEEMS TO BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK.

I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THE UNITY OF THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH PEOPLE.

IN REGARD TO COMING TO A MEETING OF MINDS WITH YOU AT AN EARLY DATE, I ONLY NEED TO SAY TO YOU THAT THERE ARE VERY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS HERE WHICH MAKE AN EARLY UNDERSTANDING DESIRABLE.

IN SAYING THIS, I WANT AGAIN TO TELL YOU THAT I AM NOT UNMINDFUL OF YOUR PROBLEM. WE HAVE TRIED TO APPROACH THE WHOLE MATTER OF LEND-LEASE IN A MANNER THAT WILL NOT LEAD US INTO THE TERRIBLE PITFALLS OF THE LAST WAR.

ROOSEVELT.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: OPNAV
RELEASED BY: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
DATE: 11 FEB 42

TO: ALUSNA LONDON

DECODED BY: GLTUCKER

PARAPHRASED BY: GLTUCKER

MESSAGE

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

112235 NCR 1328

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

THE FOLLOWING IS PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON AND WINANT FROM THE PRESIDENT.

No. 105. In regard to the proposed exchange of notes relating to Article 7 of the interim lend-lease agreement, referred to in your message No. 25. I want to make it perfectly clear to you that it is the furthest thing from my mind that we are attempting in any way to ask you to trade the principle of imperial preference as a consideration for lend-lease.

Furthermore, I understand something of the nice relationships your constitution requires of your home government in dealing with the dominions. Obviously the dominions must not only be consulted but I assume you must have their approval on any affirmative changes in existing arrangements which might be developed in the broad discussions which you and I both contemplate.

It seems to me the proposed note leaves a clear implication that empire preference and, say, agreements between ourselves and the Philippines are excluded before we sit down at the table.

All I am urging is an understanding with you that we are going to have a bold, forthright, and comprehensive discussion looking forward to the construction of what you so aptly call "a free, fertile economic policy for the post-war world". It seems perfectly clear to me that nothing should now be excluded from those discussions. None of us knows how those discussions will turn out, although, as I told you when you were here last, I have great confidence that we can organize a different kind of world where men shall really be free economically as well as politically.

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Answered by 0M # 28

CONTI PAGE 2.

0623
The idea of attaching notes to this interim agreement would seem to me to give an impression to our enemies that we were overly cautious. I believe the peoples not only of our two countries but their peoples of all the world will be heartened to know that we are going to try together and with them for the organization of a democratic post-war world and I gladly accept your intimation that we might get going at once with our economic discussions.

What seems to be bothering the cabinet is the thought that we want a commitment in advance that empire preference will be abolished. We are asking for no such commitment, and I can say that article 7 does not contain any such commitment. I realize that that would be a commitment which your government could not give now if it wanted to; and I am very sure that I could not, on my part, make an commitment relative to a vital revision of our tariff policy. I am equally sure that both of us are going to face in this realistic world adjustments looking forward to your "free and fertile economic policy for the post-war world", and that things which neither of us now dreams of will be subjects of the most serious consideration in the not too distant future. So nothing should be excluded from the discussions.

Can we not, therefore, avoid the exchange of notes which, as I have said, seems to dilute our statement of purpose with cautious reservations, and sign the agreement on the assurances which I here give in reference to the matter that seems to be the stumbling block.

I feel very strongly that this would demonstrate to the world the unity of the American and British people.
IN REGARD TO COMING TO A MEETING OF MINDS WITH YOU AT AN EARLY DATE, I ONLY NEED TO SAY TO YOU THAT THERE ARE VERY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS WERE WHICH MAKE AN EARLY UNDERSTANDING DESIRABLE.

IN SAYING THIS, I WANT AGAIN TO TELL YOU THAT I AM NOT UNMINDFUL OF YOUR PROBLEM. WE HAVE TRIED TO APPROACH THE WHOLE MATTER OF LEND-LEASE IN A MANNER THAT WILL NOT LEAD US INTO THE TERRIBLE PITFALLS OF THE LAST WAR.

ROOSEVELT.

PRESIDENT UNITED STATES ......ORIG.
SEALED SECRET FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By  W.S. Stewart
Date  NOV 1 1971

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREGS.)
February 13, 1942

Dorothy:

This can be filed. It was left on the President's desk by Mr. Hopkins.

Lois
February 16, 1942

DOROTHY:

This can be filed. The green papers represent the draft of a cable which was not sent. I have no copy of the cable that finally was sent. It went from the State Department and you probably already have a copy of it.

LOIS
TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

AND PERSONAL

I REALIZE HOW THE FALL OF SINGAPORE HAS AFFECTED YOU AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT GIVES THE WELL-KNOWN BACK SEAT DRIVERS A FIELD DAY BUT NO MATTER HOW SERIOUS OUR SETBACKS HAVE BEEN, AND I DO NOT FOR A MOMENT UNDERRATE THEM, WE MUST CONSTANTLY LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEXT MOVES THAT NEED TO BE MADE TO HIT THE ENEMY.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE OF GOOD HEART IN THESE TRYING WEEKS BECAUSE I AM VERY SURE THAT YOU HAVE THE GREAT CONFIDENCE OF THE MASSES OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I THINK OF YOU OFTEN AND I KNOW YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ASK ME IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU THINK I CAN DO.

WHEN I SPEAK ON THE RADIO NEXT MONDAY EVENING I SHALL SAY A WORD ABOUT THOSE PEOPLE WHO TREAT THE EPISODE IN THE CHANNEL AS A DEFEAT. I AM MORE AND MORE CONVINCED THAT THE LOCATION OF ALL THE GERMAN SHIPS IN GERMANY MAKES OUR JOINT NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL PROBLEM MORE SIMPLE.

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS TO THE FAR EAST. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST AT ALL COSTS MAINTAIN OUR TWO FLANKS - THE RIGHT BASED ON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AND THE LEFT IN BURMA, INDIA AND CHINA.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ABLE BECAUSE OF OUR GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION TO REINFORCE THE RIGHT FLANK MUCH BETTER THAN YOU CAN AND I THINK THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT AND MAINTENANCE, USING AUSTRALIA AS THE MAIN BASE.

By W.F. Stewart
Date OCT 0628
WHILE THE DEFENSE OF JAVA LOOKS DIFFICULT, I BELIEVE WE BOTH
SHOULD FIGHT HARD FOR IT BUT WE MUST PLAN FOR THE MORE SOUTHERLY PERMANENT
BASE TO STRIKE BACK FROM. THIS WILL INCLUDE SOME OF THE ISLANDS FURTHER
NORTH, SUCH AS NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI.

BRITAIN IS BETTER PREPARED TO REINFORCE BURMA AND INDIA AND I
VISUALIZE THAT YOU WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT THEATER. WE WOULD
SUPPLEMENT YOU IN ANY WAY WE COULD, JUST AS YOU WOULD SUPPLEMENT OUR EFFORTS
ON THE RIGHT FLANK.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE OUR SUPPLIES, PRINCIPALLY
AIRCRAFT, THROUGH INTO CHINA BECAUSE I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE
AN EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATION FROM THERE. LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK
OF THIS.

BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE LOSS OF MOST OF THE ABDA AREA
ACTIVE OPERATIONS WILL MOVE FAIRLY RAPIDLY INTO THE BURMA AREA ON THE WEST
AND THE ANZAC AREA ON THE EAST. THIS WOULD CAUSE RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE
ABDA COMMANDS AND THE SHIFTING OF PERSONNEL.

I HAVE NOT HEARD HOW CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS GETTING ON BUT I AM UNDER
THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS VISIT WILL BE USEFUL.

DO LET ME HEAR FROM YOU.

ROOSEVELT

By Dep't
By W.S. Stewart
Date OCT 6 1943

DECLASSIFIED
No. 106

I realize how the fall of Singapore has affected you and the British people. It gives the well-known back seat drivers a field day but no matter how serious our setbacks have been, and I do not for a moment underestimate them, we must constantly look forward to the next moves that need to be made to hit the enemy.

I hope you will be of good heart in these trying weeks because I am very sure that you have the great confidence of the masses of the British people. I want you to know that I think of you often and I know you will not hesitate to ask me if there is anything you think I can do.

When I speak on the radio next Monday evening I shall say a word about those people who treat the episode in the Channel as a defeat. I am more and more convinced that the location of all the German ships in Germany makes our joint North Atlantic naval problem more simple.

I have been giving a good deal of thought during the last few days to the Far East. It seems to me that we must at all costs maintain our two flanks - the right based on Australia and New Zealand and the left in Burma, India and China.

It seems to me that the United States is able because of our geographical position to reinforce the right flank much better than you can and I think that the United States should take the primary responsibility for that immediate reinforcement and maintenance, using Australia as the main base.
- 2 -

WHILE THE DEFENSE OF JAVA LOOKS DIFFICULT, I BELIEVE WE BOTH
SHOULD FIGHT HARD FOR IT BUT WE MUST PLAN FOR THE MORE SOUTHERLY PERMANENT
BASE TO STRIKE BACK FROM. THIS WILL INCLUDE SOME OF THE ISLANDS FURTHER
NORTH, SUCH AS NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI.

BRITAIN IS BETTER PREPARED TO REINFORCE BURMA AND INDIA AND I
VISUALIZE THAT YOU WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT THEATER. WE WOULD
SUPPLEMENT YOU IN ANY WAY WE COULD, JUST AS YOU WOULD SUPPLEMENT OUR EFFORTS
ON THE RIGHT FLANK.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MOVE OUR SUPPLIES, PRINCIPALLY
AIRCRAFT, THROUGH INTO CHINA BECAUSE I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE
AN EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATION FROM THERE. LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK
OF THIS.

BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE LOSS OF MOST OF THE ABDA AREA
ACTIVE OPERATIONS WILL MOVE FAIRLY RAPIDLY INTO THE BURMA AREA ON THE WEST
AND THE ANZAC AREA ON THE EAST. THIS WOULD CAUSE RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE
ABDA COMMANDS AND THE SHIFTING OF PERSONNEL.

I HAVE NOT HEARD HOW CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS GETTING ON BUT I AM UNDER
THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS VISIT WILL BE USEFUL.

DO LET ME HEAR FROM YOU.

ROOSEVELT
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT  
AND PERSONAL  

I REALIZE HOW THE FALL OF SINGAPORE HAS AFFECTED YOU AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT GIVES THE WELL-KNOWN BACK SEAT DRIVERS A FIELD DAY BUT NO MATTER HOW SERIOUS OUR SETBACKS HAVE BEEN, AND I DO NOT FOR A MOMENT UNDERRATE THEM, WE MUST CONSTANTLY LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEXT MOVES THAT NEED TO BE MADE TO HIT THE ENEMY.

I HOPE YOU WILL BE OF GOOD HEART IN THESE TRYING WEEKS BECAUSE I AM VERY SURE THAT YOU HAVE THE GREAT CONFIDENCE OF THE MASSES OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I THINK OF YOU OFTEN AND I KNOW YOU WILL NOT HESITATE TO ASK ME IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU THINK I CAN DO.

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS TO THE FAR EAST. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST AT ALL COSTS MAINTAIN OUR TWO FLANKS - THE RIGHT BASED ON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AND THE LEFT IN BURMA, INDIA AND CHINA. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE ARE ABLE TO REINFORCE THE RIGHT FLANK MUCH BETTER THAN YOU CAN AND I HAVE BEEN THINKING THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT AND MAINTENANCE, WAGING A WAR AUSTRALIA AS THE MAIN Base.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By
Date OCT 6 1971  
0632
While the defense of Java looks difficult, I believe we should fight hard for it but we must plan for a base to strike back from eastern Australia, New Zealand and some of the islands further north, such as New Caledonia and Fiji. In the same token, you are better prepared to reinforce Burma and India and I visualize that you would take responsibility for that theater. We would supplement you in any way we could, just as you would supplement our efforts on the right flank.

The U.S. should continue to move our supplies, principally aircraft, through into China because I think it is important that we have an effective operation from there. Let me know what you think of this. We must also put our minds on the area, which with the fall of Singapore and in case Java should fall would place most of that area in the enemy's hands, so that our base would really be in the Anzac area.

It seems to me we must give consideration at once to the new geographical lines of command and the shifting of personnel.

I have not heard how Chiang Kai-shek is getting on but I am under the impression that his visit will be useful.

Do let me hear from you.
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

No. 107 I hope you can persuade Australian Government to allow proposed temporary diversion of their leading Australian Division to Burma. I think this is of utmost importance. Tell them I am speeding additional troops as well as planes to Australia and that my estimate of the situation there is highly optimistic and by no means dark. Harry is seeing Casey at once.

ROOSEVELT

Note: Original copy of this message delivered to Miss Tully 1750 2-20-42, due to the fact that it was added to in the President's handwriting.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Date] 6 1971
February 20, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

No. 107. I hope you can persuade Australian Government to allow proposed temporary diversion of their leading Australian Division to Burma. I think this is of utmost importance. Tell them I am speeding additional troops as well as planes to Australia and that my estimate of the situation there is highly optimistic and by no means dark. Harry is doing all right.

ROOSEVELT
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

YESTERDAY EVENING I SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CURTIN:

"PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR PRIME MINISTER CURTIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

I FULLY APPRECIATE HOW GRAVE ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN REACHING A DECISION IN THE PRESENT SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION RETURNING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.

I ASSUME YOU KNOW HOW OF OUR DETERMINATION TO SEND, IN ADDITION TO ALL TROOPS AND FORCES NOW EN ROUTE, ANOTHER FORCE OF OVER 27,000 MEN TO AUSTRALIA. THIS FORCE WILL BE FULLY EQUIPPED IN EVERY RESPECT.

WE MUST FIGHT TO THE LIMIT FOR OUR TWO FLANKS - ONE BASED ON AUSTRALIA AND THE OTHER ON BURMA, INDIA AND CHINA. BECAUSE OF OUR GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION WE AMERICANS CAN BETTER HANDLE THE REINFORCEMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE RIGHT FLANK.

I SAY THIS TO YOU SO THAT YOU MAY HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT WE ARE GOING TO REINFORCE YOUR POSITION WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED. MOREOVER, THE OPERATIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES NAVY HAVE BEGUN AND HAVE IN VIEW WILL IN A MEASURE CONSTITUTE A PROTECTION TO THE COAST OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 6 1971
ON THE OTHER HAND THE LEFT FLANK SIMPLY MUST BE HELD. IF BURMA GOES IT SEEMS TO ME OUR WHOLE POSITION, INCLUDING THAT OF AUSTRALIA, WILL BE IN EXTREME PERIL. YOUR AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IS THE ONLY FORCE THAT IS AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE REINFORCEMENT. IT COULD GET INTO THE FIGHT AT ONCE AND WOULD, I BELIEVE, HAVE THE STRENGTH TO SAVE WHAT NOW SEEMS TO BE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

WHILE I REALIZE THE JAPS ARE MOVING RAPIDLY I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT, IN VIEW OF YOUR GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION AND THE FORCES ON THEIR WAY TO YOU OR OPERATING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD, YOUR VITAL CENTERS ARE IN IMMEDIATE DANGER.

WHILE REALIZE THAT YOUR MEN HAVE BEEN FIGHTING ALL OVER THE WORLD, AND ARE STILL, AND WHILE I KNOW FULL WELL OF THE GREAT SACRIFICES WHICH AUSTRALIA HAS MADE, I NEVERTHLESS WANT TO ASK YOU IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR WHOLE WAR EFFORT IN THE FAR EAST IF YOU WILL RECONSIDER YOUR DECISION AND ORDER THE DIVISION NOW EN ROUTE TO AUSTRALIA TO MOVE WITH ALL SPEED TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH FORCES FIGHTING IN BURMA.

YOU MAY BE SURE WE WILL FIGHT BY YOUR SIDE WITH ALL OUR FORCE UNTIL VICTORY.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 6 1971
FEBRUARY 22, 1942.

FOR PRIME MINISTER CURTIN

THANK YOU FOR YOURS OF 20th.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT I CANNOT WHOLLY AGREE AS TO THE IMMEDIATE NEED OF THE FIRST RETURNING DIVISION IN AUSTRALIA. I THINK THAT AS OF TODAY THE PRINCIPAL THREAT AGAINST THE MAIN BASES OF AUSTRALIA AND BURMA, BOTH OF WHICH MUST BE HELD AT ALL COSTS, IS AGAINST THE BURMA OR LEFT FLANK, AND THAT WE CAN SAFELY HOLD THE AUSTRALIAN OR RIGHT FLANK. ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FULLY EQUIPPED REINFORCEMENTS ARE GETTING READY TO LEAVE FOR YOUR AREA.

IN VIEW OF ALL THIS AND DEPENDING OF COURSE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS I HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERTING THE SECOND RETURNING DIVISION TO SOME PLACE IN INDIA OR BURMA TO HELP HOLD THAT LINE SO THAT IT CAN BECOME A FIXED DEFENSE. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES YOU CAN DEPEND UPON OUR FULLEST SUPPORT.

ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Carton —
Thank you for your help.
I fully understand your position, in spite of the fact that I cannot wholly agree as to the immediate end of the first wave of war in Europe in Australia. I think that as far as holding the principal threat against the main bases of Australia and Germany
Earth of which must be held at all costs is against the Burma or left flank, and that we can safely hold the Australian or right flank. Additional American fully equipped reinforcements are getting ready to leave for your area.

In view of all this and depending of course on developments in the next few weeks I hope your
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

will consider the possibility of directing the immediate returning division to some place in India or Burma to help hold that line so that it can become a fixed defense under any circumstances you can depend upon one fall out of your

Pershing
No. 109

As telegram D.B.A. 22 which went to Wavell last night seems to cover all that is important in your message 0202A, I do not consider anything further to Wavell is necessary and hope you concur.

I have directed Combined Chiefs of Staff to examine once again the question of sending naval reinforcements to the ABDA area, but I am not too hopeful of this because of Japanese control of air. I think our present disposition and plans navalwise are better in the light of all circumstances.

Roosevelt

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date OCT 6 1971
FEBRUARY 22, 1942.

1. IN VIEW OF CURTIN'S FINAL ANSWER IN THE NEGATIVE TO OUR STRONG REQUEST I HAVE SENT HIM THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH IN THE HOPE WE CAN GET THE NEXT CONTINGENT TO HELP HOLD BURMA LINE.

   For Curtin

2. Quote thank you for yours of 20th. I fully understand your position in spite of the fact that I cannot wholly agree as to the immediate need of the first returning division in Australia. I think that as of today the principal threat against the main bases of Australia and Burma both of which must be held at all costs is against the Burma or left flank, and that we can safely hold the Australian or right flank. Additional American fully equipped reinforcements are getting ready to leave for your area. In view of all this and depending of course on developments in the next few weeks I hope you will consider the possibility of diverting the second returning division to some place in India or Burma to help hold that line so that it can become a fixed defense. Under any circumstances you can depend upon our fullest support Roosevelt unquote.

3. I am working on additional plans to make control of islands in ANZAC area more secure, and further to disrupt Japanese advances.

ADVANCES.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. W.B. Stewart

Date 6/1971

AIDAE

SACLANT 7/6

110
4. IN MONDAY NIGHTS SPEECH I AM LEAVING OUT PROPOSED REFERENCE TO GERMAN SHIPS RUNNING THE CHANNEL, BECAUSE OVER HERE THE FIRST BAD COMMENTS HAVE ABOUT DIED DOWN. ALL AGREE IT IS BEST NOT TO STIR UP THE CONTROVERSY AGAIN. I HOPE YOU CONCUR.

ROOSEVELT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

1. IN VIEW OF CURTIN'S FINAL ANSWER IN THE NEGATIVE TO OUR STRONG REQUEST I HAVE SENT HIM THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH IN THE HOPE WE CAN GET THE NEXT CONTINGENT TO HELP HOLD BURMA LINE.

2. "QUOTE. THANK YOU FOR YOURS OF 20th. I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT I CANNOT WHOLLY AGREE AS TO THE IMMEDIATE NEED OF THE FIRST RETURNING DIVISION IN AUSTRALIA. I THINK THAT AS OF TODAY THE PRINCIPAL THREAT AGAINST THE MAIN BASES OF AUSTRALIA AND BURMA BOTH OF WHICH MUST BE HELD AT ALL COSTS IS AGAINST THE BURMA OR LEFT FLANK, AND THAT WE CAN SAFELY HOLD THE AUSTRALIAN OR RIGHT FLANK. ADDITIONAL AMERICAN FULLY EQUIPPED REINFORCEMENTS ARE GETTING READY TO LEAVE FOR YOUR AREA. IN VIEW OF ALL THIS AND DEpending OF COURSE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS I HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERTING THE SECOND RETURNING DIVISION TO SOME PLACE IN INDIA OR BURMA TO HELP HOLD THAT LINE SO THAT IT CAN BECOME A FIXED DEFENSE. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES YOU CAN DEPEND UPON OUR FULLEST SUPPORT ROOSEVELT UNQUOTE.

3. I AM WORKING ON ADDITIONAL PLANS TO MAKE CONTROL OF ISLANDS IN ANZAC AREA MORE SECURE, AND FURTHER TO DISRUPT JAPANESE ADVANCES.
4. IN MONDAY NIGHT'S SPEECH I AM LEAVING OUT PROPOSED REFERENCE TO GERMAN SHIPS RUNNING THE CHANNEL, BECAUSE OVER HERE THE FIRST BAD COMMENTS HAVE ABOUT DIED DOWN. ALL AGREE IT IS BEST NOT TO STIR UP THE CONTROVERSY AGAIN. I HOPE YOU CONCUR.

ROOSEVELT
The White House
Washington

F. A. de Neve

1. In view of Curtin's final appeal to the President to send strong forces, I have sent him the following dispatch in the hope we can get the next contingent to help hold Burma Line.

2. Quote

3. I am writing one additional
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

I plan to make control of islands in Azia area more secure, and further to disrupt Japanese advances.

4. In Monday night's speech I am making a full proposed reference to German ships running the channel, because over here the first bad comments have about 101st.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

to stir up the controversy
of him. I hope you
Comeer.

Rusk
TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 23, 1942

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY
   LONDON

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM HOPKINS.

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM ADDRESSED B.A.D. 510 FEBRUARY 21 FOR THE
PRESIDENT, PARAGRAPH (ii):

THE FLIGHT OF HEAVY BOMBERS ACROSS AFRICA TO THE FAR EAST
HAS CONTINUED WITHOUT ABATEMENT. THE ONLY CHECK TO MOVEMENT
OCCURRED BETWEEN INDIA AND NEI AND EVIDENTLY WAS IN OBEDIENCE
TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM ABDACOM BUT EVEN SO OUR REPORTS INDICATE
THAT THREE FLEW FROM CEYLON TO JAVA FEBRUARY TWENTY.

HARRY HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 21/1/72.
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

February 25, 1942.

The following is purely a personal thought based on very little firsthand knowledge on my part but it is something which has been concerning me more and more greatly since you left and since the East Indian and Malayan situation have grown worse. Please treat it as something I would say to you if you and I were alone.

I have been for many years deeply interested in the problem of the relations between Europeans and Americans on the one side with the many varieties of races in eastern and southern Asia and the Indies on the other side, although I personally have never visited the Far East.

There is no question in my mind that the old relationship ceased to exist ten or twenty years ago and that no substitute has yet been worked out except the American policy of eventual freedom for the Philippines which was formulated as far back as 1902 and has been followed with reasonable consistency ever since.

In somewhat similar circumstances the older policy of master and servant has not been altered by the Dutch in their Islands nor by you in the Straits Settlements or Burma, and this rather recent surge under the generic name of "Asia for the Asiatics" has in a sense come rather suddenly on the Dutch and the British, for the very good reason that
you and the Dutch have not had time to work out a different plan for the future.

I recognize of course the obvious fact that India presents a much more complicated situation than the smaller Colonies or Islands, but there again the people of India feel that delay follows delay and therefore that there is no real desire in Britain to recognize a world change which has taken deep root in India as well as in other countries.

I feel that there is real danger in India now in that there is too much suspicion and dissatisfaction in too many places, and that resistance to Japan would therefore not be nearly as sincere and wholehearted as it should be. I wonder if there is sufficient spirit to fight among the Indian people.

I am thinking of the analogy of the United States after our Revolution ended. For several years we operated under a wholly unsatisfactory temporary arrangement known as "The Articles of Confederation". Thirteen States were going in thirteen different directions. A Constitutional Convention of very limited size worked out our present Constitution. The delegates to this Convention were chosen rather haphazardly. They represented, however, different walks of life and different areas. They were by no means all politicians. They met in one small room for several months. Their proceedings were in secret and they evolved a document which is still pretty good today.
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest consideration of calling in India a small group of not more than thirty or forty people, representing different groups, castes, occupations and geographies, asking them to bring in a temporary form of government to be recognized as a Dominion Government at once, and to be followed by a further small Convention in two or three years to recommend a more permanent structure of government. Meanwhile India would be operating with greater autonomy and as a Dominion. It should of course be pointed out that some such method should cause the people to forget hard-feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the dangers of Japanese domination and the advantages of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

I would have written you this were it not that I think time is of the essence and that the move should come from London rather than from India. I believe it all important that if any move is made by London, there should be no criticism that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion. Such a move is strictly in line with the world trends of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight you and I are making.

ROOSEVELT
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

The following is purely a personal thought passed on from little firsthand knowledge on my part, but it is something which has been concerning me more and more greatly since you left and since the East Indian and Malayan situations have grown worse. Please treat it as something I would say to you if you and I were alone.

I have been for many years deeply interested in the problem of the relations between Europeans and Americans on the one side with the many varieties of races in Eastern and Southern Asia, and the Indies on the other side, although I personally have never visited the Far East.

There is no question in my mind that the old relationship ceased to exist ten or twenty years ago and that no substitute has yet been worked out except the American policy of eventual freedom for the Philippines, which was formulated as far back as 1902 and has been followed with reasonable consistency ever since.

In somewhat similar circumstances the older policy of master and servant has not been altered by the Dutch in their Islands nor by you in the Straits Settlements or Burma and this rather recent surge under the generic name of "Asia for the Asiatics" has, in a sense, come rather suddenly on the Dutch and the British, for the very good reason that you and the Dutch have not had time to work out a different plan for the future.

I recognize, of course, the obvious fact that India presents a much more complicated situation than the smaller Colonies or Islands, but there again the people of India feel that delay follows delay and, therefore, that there is no real desire in Britain to recognize a world change which has taken deep root in India as well as in other countries.

I feel that there is real danger in India now in that there is too much suspicion and dissatisfaction in too many places and that resistance to Japan would, therefore, not be nearly as sincere and wholehearted as it should be. I wonder if there is sufficient spirit to fight among the Indian people.
I am thinking of the analogy of the United States after our Revolution ended. For several years we operated under a wholly unsatisfactory, temporary arrangement, known as the Articles of Confederation. The Thirteen States were going in thirteen different directions. A Constitutional Convention of very limited size worked out our present Constitution. The delegates to this Convention were chosen rather haphazardly. They represented, however, different walks in life and different areas. They were by no means all politicians. They met in one small room for several months. Their proceedings were in secret and they evolved a document which is still pretty good today.

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest consideration of calling in India a small group of not more than thirty or forty people, representing different groups, castes, occupations and geographies; asking them to bring in a temporary form of government to be recognized as a Dominion Government at once, and to be followed by a further small convention in two or three years, to recommend a more permanent structure of government. Meanwhile, India would be operating with greater autonomy and as a Dominion. It should, of course, be pointed out that some such method should cause the people to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination and the advantages of peaceful evolution against chaotic revolution.

I would have written you this were it not that I think time is of the essence and that the move should come from London rather than from India. I believe it all important that if any move is made by London, there should be no criticism that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion. Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight you and I are making.

ROOSEVELT