CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1942
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BRITISH CLASSIFIED

A NOTE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE (as amended and concurred in by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces), 10/7/41

AIR DEFENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN Directive by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 10/8/41

ARMY STRENGTHS Directive by the Minister of Defence, 10/9/41

PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL ISHAY FOR C.O.S. COMMITTEE AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE, undated

E.G. Hollis to Prime Minister, 1/23/42

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AUSTRALIAN CLASSIFIED

Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1/23/42
A NOTE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

1. Renown awaits the Commander who first, in this war, restores the lvery to its prime importance upon the battlefield from which it has been taken by heavily armoured tanks. For this purpose three rules are necessary:—

(a) Every field gun or mobile A.A. gun should carry a plentiful supply of solid armour-piercing tracer shot; thus, every mobile gun will become an anti-tank gun, and every battery possess its own anti-tank protection.

(b) When guns are attacked by tanks they must welcome the occasion. The guns should be fought to the muzzle. Until the approaching tanks are within close range, batteries should engage them at a rapid rate of fire with H.E. During this phase the tracks of the tanks are the most vulnerable target. At close quarters solid A.P. shot should be fired; this should be continued so long as any of the detachments survive. The last shot should be fired at not more than ten yards range. It may be that some gun crews could affect to be out of action or withhold their fire, so as to have the superb opportunity of firing A.P. at the closest range.
(c) It may often happen as a result of the above tactics, especially when artillery is working with tanks, that guns may be over-run and lost. Provided they have been fought to the muzzle, this should not at all be considered a disaster but, on the contrary, the highest honour to the battery concerned. The destruction of tanks more than repays the loss of field guns or mobile A.A. guns. The Germans have no use for our captured guns as they have a plethora of their own types which they prefer. Our supplies are sufficient to make good the deficiencies.

The principle must be established by the Royal Artillery that it is not good enough for tanks to attack a group of British batteries properly posted, and that these batteries will always await their attack in order to destroy a good proportion of tanks. Our guns must no more retreat on the approach of tanks than Wellington’s squares at Waterloo on the approach of hostile cavalry.

2. The Germans made a practice from the beginning of their invasion of France, and have developed it consistently since, of taking what they call “flak” artillery with their most advanced parties and interspersing all their armoured and supply columns with it. We should do the same. The principle should be that all formations, whether in column or deployed, should be provided with a quota of A.A. guns for their protection. This principle is applicable to columns of all kinds, which should be freely supplied with machine guns as well as with Bofors as the supply of these weapons becomes more plentiful.

3. 250 Bofors are now being sent to General Auchinleck for him to use in the best possible way with all his columns, and at all the assembly points of his troops or refuelling stations required in the course of offensive operations.

Nevermore must the army rely solely on aircraft for its protection against attack from the air. Above all, the idea of keeping standing patrols of aircraft over moving columns should be abandoned. It is unsound to “distribute” aircraft in this way, and no air superiority will stand any large application of such a mischievous practice.

4. Upon the Military Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East announcing that a battle is in prospect, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief will give him all possible aid irrespective of other targets, however attractive. Victory in the battle makes amends for all, and creates new favourable situations of a decisive character. The Army Commander-in-Chief will specify to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief the targets and tasks which he requires to be performed, both in the preparatory attack on the rearward installations of the enemy and for air action during the progress of the battle. It will be for the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief to use his maximum force for these objects in the manner most effective. This applies not only to any squadrons assigned to army co-operation permanently, but also to the whole air force available in the theatre.
5. Bombers may, if required, be used as transport or supply machines to far-ranging or outlying columns of troops, the sole object being the success of the military operation. As the interests of the two Commanders-in-Chief are identical it is not thought that any difficulty should arise. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief would naturally lay aside all routine programmes and concentrate on bombing the rearward services of the enemy in the preparatory period. This he would do not only by night, but by day attacks with fighter protection. In this process he will bring about a trial of strength with the enemy fighters, and has the best chance of obtaining local command of the air. What is true of the preparatory period applies with even greater force during the battle. All assembly or refuelling points or marching columns of the enemy should be attacked by bombers during daylight with strong fighter protection, thus bringing about air conflicts not only of the highest importance in themselves but directly contributing to the general result.

October 7, 1941.

W. S. C.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

Chiefs of Staff Committee.

AIR DEFENCE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Directive by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

WE cannot state how severe the air raids will be this winter or what the danger of invasion will be in the spring. These two vultures will hang above us to the end of the war. We must be careful that our precautions against them do not unduly weaken our Mobile Field Army and other forms of our offensive effort.

2. It would seem reasonable to fix the total of A.D.G.B. personnel at its present figure of 280,000 plus any additional recruitment of women that they can attract. This will give them at least 30,000 more than what we got through the air raids with last year. The proposed addition of 50,000 to a total of 330,000 cannot be supplied. Many more high and low-ceiling guns are coming to hand now. Some of these might be mounted in additional batteries, but unless A.D.G.B. can contrive by praiseworthy thought and ingenuity to man them within the limits of the personnel mentioned they will have to be kept in Care and Maintenance.
3. Having regard to the parity now existing between the British and German Air Forces and the Russian factor, it is unlikely that the enemy would make heavy and continuous air attacks on Great Britain in combination with or as a prelude to Invasion. He would need to save up for that. We should feel a major air onslaught on this island as it developed. We should discern the assembly in the river mouths of Invasion craft and shipping. There would thus be a short but effective period of time in which to adjust ourselves to the particular form of attack.

4. A.D.G.B. must therefore become as flexible as possible and keep static defence at a minimum. For this purpose as large a proportion as possible of A.D.G.B. should be in a mobile form. General Pile should prepare schemes for giving the utmost reinforcement of mobile flak to General Brooke’s Army. Sometimes they must take their guns from the site. In other cases a duplicate set of mobile guns may be made available. Thus we can shift the weight from one leg to the other as the need requires.

5. A similar kind of shuttle service is required for Coastal Defence. No more men (other than normal wastage) can be provided for the Coast batteries. A detailed study must be made of the coast to economise man-power in the batteries according to the strategic danger. This can be done either by reducing the personnel per gun in certain sectors, and thus reducing the degree of readiness, or by reducing the number of guns for which crews are provided. The demand for 9,000 additional Coast Defence gunners cannot be met. These must be used in the mobile and offensive spheres. However, should Invasion threaten, A.D.G.B. must not only liberate to the utmost its mobile forces, but must also be ready to provide additional gunners to bring the Coast batteries up to the highest level.

6. Above all, we cannot go on adding gun to gun and battery to battery as the factories turn them out and so get an ever-larger proportion of our limited trained man-power anchored to static and passive defence.

7. General Pile should be assisted in every way to prepare schemes for increasing the mobile flak of the Army and reinforcing the Coast batteries while at the same time without any addition (apart from women) to his numbers, 260,000, maintaining the indispensable minimum which served us so well last year.

8. The Chiefs of the Staff Committee is requested to advise and consider what proposals should be made to give effect to the foregoing principles.

(Initialled)      W. S. C.

*Great George Street, S.W. 1,*  
*October 8, 1941.*
PRIME MINISTER TO GENERAL ISMAY FOR C.O.S.
COMMITTEE AND DEFENCE COMMITTEE.
I have availed myself of a few days quiet and seclusion to review the salients of war as they appear after my discussions here.

1. The United States has been attacked and become at war with the three Axis Powers, and desires to engage her trained troops as soon and as effectively as possible on fighting fronts. Owing to the shipping stringency this will not be possible on any very large scale during 1942. Meanwhile the United States' Army is being raised from a strength of a little over thirty Divisions and five Armoured Divisions to a total strength of about sixty Divisions and ten Armoured Divisions. About 3½ million men are at present held or about to be called up for the Army and Air Force (over a million). Reserves of manpower are practically unlimited, but it would be a mis-direction of war effort to call larger numbers to the armed forces in the present phase.

2. It does not seem likely that more than between a quarter and a third of the above American forces can be transported to actual fighting fronts during the year 1942. In
1943, however, the great increases in shipping tonnage resulting from former and recent shipping programmes should enable much larger bodies to be moved across the oceans, and the Summer of 1942 may be marked by large offensive operations which should be carefully studied meanwhile.

3. The United States Air Force, already powerful and rapidly increasing, can be brought into heavy action during 1942. Already it is proposed that strong bomber forces, based on the British Isles, should attack Germany and the invasion ports. American Fighter Squadrons can participate in the defence of Great Britain and the domination of such parts of the French shore as are in Fighter reach. Additional United States' Fighter and Bomber forces are much needed in Egypt and Libya, and it may be that the attack of the Roumanian oilfields from Persia by the heaviest American bombers is a project which should be entertained. Meanwhile, also, continuous streams of American bombers are proceeding both westward and eastward to the Pacific theatre of war, which will, of course, be the main scene of United States' air action in 1942.

4. The Declaration by the President to Congress of the enormous increases in United States' output of munitions and
shipping to proceed during 1942, and reach full flow in
1943, makes it more than ever necessary for Hitler to bring the
war to a decision in 1942 before the power of the United States
can be fully brought to bear. Hitler's need to invade the
British Isles has always been great. The difficulties of the
operation are also very great. Our preparations to resist
have continually improved during the past year, and will be
still further augmented by the time the Spring invasion season
is reached.

Improvements in British preparations comprise:

(a) a far better trained and equipped Army;
(b) stronger and more elaborate beach defences,
   including substantially increased coast
   batteries;
(c) the marshalling by the Spring of between
   three and four thousand medium and heavy
   tanks in Great Britain, forming the equiva-
   lent of seven or eight Armoured Divisions;
(d) by the need imposed upon the invader, arising
   from the above, of bringing a very large
   invading Army across the sea, with consequent
   aggravated difficulty of finding the shipping
and of assembling it in the ports and river mouths, and of the greater target presented to British naval and air action.

(e) by the increase in the actual and relative power of the British Fighter Command which can now, instead of fighting at odds, bring superior numbers to bear upon the enemy Air Force over British soil, and can moreover dominate the French coastal regions nearest to the British Isles, viz., from Dunkirk to Dieppe, during the daytime, thus permitting daylight bombing of the nearest and most dangerous regions of hostile embarkation.

5. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, we must continue to regard the invasion of the British Isles in 1942 as the only supreme means of escape and victory open to Hitler. He has had the time to prepare, in very great numbers, tank transporting vehicles capable of landing on any beach. He has no doubt developed air-borne attack by parachutes, and still more by gliders, to an extent which cannot be easily measured. The President, expressing views shared by the leading
American strategists, has declared Great Britain an essential fortress of the United Nations. It is indeed the only place where the war can be lost in the critical campaign of 1942 about to open. It would be most imprudent to allow the successful defence of the British Isles to be hazarded. We have, of course, to continue to send about 40,000 men a month, with proportionate munitions and air forces, to the Armies of the Middle East. We have to send, as soon as shipping can be found, several additional Divisions to the Far East, or to replace Divisions withdrawn from the Middle East for the Far East. We also hold certain Divisions ready for particular overseas enterprises. The naval position in the Eastern Mediterranean also requires a very marked increase in British air power along the North African and Levantine shores. We must, therefore, face a continued outward flow of strength from the British Isles, and apart from equipment and armour there is no way in which our home defence army can be sensibly replaced by us. Indeed, the despatch of further Divisions abroad cannot be replaced by us.

6. The sending of four United States' Divisions (one armoured) into Northern Ireland is therefore a most necessary war measure, which nothing should be allowed to prevent.
The replacing of the British troops in Iceland liberates an additional British Division. It is suggested, however, that the United States' authorities should be asked to consider:

(a) the training in Iceland of as many troops as possible to work in mountains and under snow conditions, as only the possession of such trained mountain and ski troops in considerable numbers can enable liberating operations in Scandinavia to be prepared for the future; and

(b) that the American troops once settled down in the North of Ireland should pass in rotation, first by Brigades and then by Divisions, for tours of duty on the beaches of England and Scotland. This would be of interest to the American troops as well as adding to their experience and the defence of the island.

(c) It is further suggested that, in the absence of other more urgent calls, American Divisions beyond those already under orders may be sent into the United Kingdom.

7. The Operation "SUPER-GYMNAST" might become ripe, or might be forced upon us in the near future by inconsiderable
political or military events. It would be a misfortune if it were to interrupt the movement called "MAGNET". Provided the situation in North Africa, France or Spain, undergoes no sudden deterioration, a month or six weeks' delay might be accepted. Moreover, the military fact which would set French North Africa in a ferment and bring matters to a head would be the arrival of General Auchinleck's vanguard at the frontiers of Tunis. We cannot tell yet if this will be possible, yet certainly the resistance of the enemy in Cyrenaica; the possibilities of General Von Kommel withdrawing; being able to escape with a portion of his troops; the reinforcements which have probably reached Tripoli, and others which must be expected during the delay, and above all, the difficulties of supply for our advancing troops - all will retard, or even prevent the full completion of ACROBAT. We are therefore in a position to study SUPER-GYMNAST more thoroughly, and to proceed with MAGNET with the utmost speed.

8. For reasons which are known, the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean is greatly in excess of the British, and it is only the poor morale of the Italian Fleet that enables us to dispute the command of the sea, having regard
especially to the very numerous well posted air-bases which the enemy has in Tripoli, in Sicily, in Italy, in Greece and in Crete. The concentration of German aircraft in large numbers at these air bases and the number of U-boats they maintain in the Mediterranean, may conceivably portend an overseas expedition to the African shore, or alternatively an attack upon Malta, that cruel thorn in their sides. It is, therefore, most important that the maximum air-power - bomber, fighter and torpedo-carrying types - we can gather be installed along that portion of the North African coast which is under our control. Substantial British reinforcements are already on the way. The employment of American squadrons, based primarily on Egypt and extending westwards, would be invaluable. It would be for our advantage to develop air war in the Mediterranean on the largest scale on both sides, with constant bombing of enemy airfields and sea-traffic. The German front-line Air Force is already less strong numerically than the British. A considerable portion of it must now be left opposite Russia. But the bulk of the facing British Air Force has to be tied up at home at the present time a much smaller concentration of German bombers and
fighters, and yet not able to be moved because of the good interior communications possessed by the enemy and his power of rapid transference. In addition, there is the Italian Air Force to consider. What comparative value should be placed upon them is a matter of opinion.

II. The object we should set before ourselves is the wearing down by continuous engagement of the German Air power. This is being done on the Russian front. On the British front it can only be done to a limited extent, unless the enemy resumes his bombing or daylight offensive. But in the Mediterranean the enemy shows an inclination to develop a front, and we should meet him there with the superior strength which the arrival of American Air Forces can alone give. It is of the utmost importance to make the German Air Force fight continuously on every possible occasion, and at every point of attack. We can afford the drain far better than they can. Indeed, like General Grant in his last campaign, we can almost afford to lose two for one, having regard to the immense supplies now coming forward in the future. Every German aircraft or pilot put out of action in 1942 is worth two of them in 1943. It is only by the strain of constant air-battle that we shall be able to force his consumption of air-power to levels which are
beyond the capacity of his air-plants and air-schools. In this way the initiative may be regained by us, as the enemy will be fully occupied, as we have been hitherto, in meeting day to day needs of keeping his line alive.

12. Coming further east we must recognize the very great deliverance to us afforded by the successful Russian resistance along the Don and in the Crimea, carrying with it the continued Russian command of the Black Sea. Three months ago we were forced to expect a German advance through the Caucasus to the Caspian and the Baku oilfields. That danger is almost certainly staved off for perhaps four or five months till the winter is over and, of course, continued successful Russian resistance in the south gives complete protection to us. This fact alone has enabled us to divert the 18th Division, the 17th Indian Infantry Division and to plan the withdrawal of two out of the three Australian Divisions in Palestine, together with considerable air reinforcements and much material, from the Levant-Caspian front to the new emergencies in Malaya and the Far East. It must be emphasised that we could not possibly have provided for the Libyan operations, the maintenance of the Levant-Caspian front and the Malayan needs simultaneously. Even without the war with Japan we could
only have maintained a very doubtful defence of Palestine, Iraq and Persia.

13. The danger may, however, recur in the late Spring. The oil stringency which is already serious in Germany and the German conquered countries, makes the seizure of the Baku and Persian Oilfields objects of vital consequence to Germany, second only to the need of successfully invading the British Isles. No-one can forecast the future course of the Russo-German struggle. Evidently the Germans will suffer increasingly heavy losses during the winter. They may even sustain disasters so great that the Russian counter-strokes will reach the former frontier with consequences to the Nazi regime, both military and internal, which cannot be measured. On the other hand, the enormous power of the German Army may be able to reassert itself as soon as weather conditions improve. In this case they might well be content to adopt a defensive attitude along the northern and central sectors of the Russo-German front, and thrust an offensive spearhead south-east through the Caucasus to the oilfields which lie beyond.

14. They may also persuade or compel Turkey to grant them passage through Anatolia to attack Syria, Palestine and Egypt. It would, however, seem unlikely, first that Turkey, in view of the Russian strength in the north and of
the British activities in Egypt and Libya, and also of the world situation, now that the United States is a full belligerent. Secondly, in the event of a Turkish refusal it seems unlikely that Germany would, after her Russian losses, wish to bring into the field against her the 50 Turkish divisions by which the inhospitable and difficult regions of Anatolia would certainly be stubbornly defended. Moreover, if the south-eastward spear-thrust through the Caucasus were successful, the Anatolian line of advance would not be indispensable to the acquisition of the oilfields. The resistance of Turkey as a friendly neutral should be stimulated in every way, and especially by sending whatever supplies are possible in aircraft, anti-aircraft, tanks and anti-tank equipment. Great Britain has already made promises to aid the Turks with considerable air and land forces if they are attacked and resist. Our ability to fulfil these promises has, however, been prejudiced by the diversions necessary for making head against Japan. On the whole, however, it would seem reasonable to assume that the main danger to be faced in the spring of 1942 in this theatre will be a break-down in Russian defence of the Caucasus and Baku, and the German advance thence to the oilfields of Persia, and to Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf.
15. We thus see ourselves drawn away towards the West by CRUSADER, ACROBAT and perhaps GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST, while at the same time we are drawn farther to the East by the increasing scale of the Japanese war. How are we to meet the danger outlined in the two preceding paragraphs? It will not be possible for Great Britain to replace the 18th British, 17th Indian, and two Australian Divisions moved or already assigned to the Far East, especially if GYMNAST or SUPER-GYMNAST should develop. The monthly drafts for North Africa, for the Levant-Caspian front and for the Malayan theatre, which have already averaged for many months 35,000 a month, will probably rise to 50,000 if existing units are to be maintained and if the necessary British contingents of the five new Divisions being raised in India are to be supplied. This will strain to the utmost both the escorts and the shipping necessary to move these monthly convoys in and out of the danger zones in the British Isles, and three or four months' round voyage via the Cape of Good Hope to Suez, Basra or Malaya. It is doubtful whether more than one, or at the outside two, new Divisional formations can be transferred from Great Britain to the various eastern theatres in six or even eight months. It would not be wise to call upon India for further reinforcements for the Levant-Caspian theatre, as all her resources will be needed
to nourish the war against Japan in the Malayan theatre, to
defend Burma (and it may be India) and keep open the Burma
Road to China. After the move to the Far East of the
Divisions mentioned above has been completed we shall,
therefore, have in the Levant-Caspian region only the 5th
Indian Division in Cyprus, the 50th British Division at
Baghdad, one Australian and one Armoured Division (as yet
only partly formed) in Palestine, the 8th, 9th and 10th
Indian Divisions in Persia and Iraq - total 7 Divisions.
We shall have in Egypt and North Africa three British
Armoured, the 70th British, the New Zealand Division, 2
South African Divisions, an Indian Division and various
British Brigade Groups and Polish and French contingents
the equivalent of, say, three Divisions - total 11 Divisions.
It seems likely that this force will be fully occupied in
maintaining the North African shore, especially if the fight-
ing front should extend westwards into Tunis.

16. It is a question to be profoundly considered
whether the United States would not be wise to contemplate
the development of an American Army, based on the Persian
Gulf ports, to operate to the northward with the British
and Empire forces set out above. The monster liners sailing
from United States' east coast ports could perhaps find
their fullest employment in carrying American troops through
the great ocean spaces via the Cape to the Persian Gulf. If an American Army of six or eight Divisions could be developed north of the Persian Gulf, it would, added to the seven we have and proportionate air forces, with any reinforcements we can send, be a powerful factor in the war against Germany. Whether this Army of, say, 15 Divisions, or any part of it, should stand purely on the defensive or should move forward to the Caucasus and even to the Russian southern front north of the Black Sea, would be dependent upon events on the Russo-German front, on where that front would be standing in the third quarter of 1942 and on the development of the communications by road and rail from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. It must be observed that any large force moved and maintained from the Persian Gulf in the Caspian basin will, of course, choke the southern warm-water supply lines by which it is proposed to carry munitions into Russia. If nothing can be done and the Russian southern front is beaten in, a frightful gap will be open which at present there is nothing in sight to fill, and the loss of the oilfields of the Caspian and Persia, and of all the regions between the present Russian front and the frontiers of India cannot be excluded from our thoughts. It is suggested that the Joint Staffs should study and
report on the possibilities which are open, the precise object being the development of at least fifteen Divisions in the Levant-Caspian theatre.
17. It is generally agreed that the defeat of Germany entailing a collapse will leave Japan exposed to overwhelming force, whereas the defeat of Japan would not by any means bring the world war to an end. Moreover, the vast distances in the Pacific and the advantageous forward key-points already seized or likely to be seized by the Japanese will make the serious invasion of the homelands of Japan a very lengthy business. Not less lengthy will be the piece-meal recovery, by armies based mainly on Australia and India, of the islands, airfields and naval bases in the south-west Pacific area now confided to General Wavell. It seems, indeed, more probable that a decision can be reached sooner against Germany than against Japan. In any case, we cannot expect to develop adequate naval, air and military superiority in the aforesaid area for a considerable time having regard to the calls made upon them and the limitation of shipping.

18. While, therefore, it is right to assign primacy to the war against Germany it would be wrong to speak of our standing on the defensive against Japan; on the contrary, the only way in which we can live through the intervening period in the Far East before Germany is defeated is by
regaining the initiative albeit on a minor scale. Certain measures stand out clearly and are indeed imposed upon by events:

(a) The Philippines must be held as long as possible if only to detain Japanese forces there.

(b) The supply lines to China via Burma must be kept open and fought for with the utmost energy.

(c) The Singapore fortress and its approaches must be defended to the utmost limit.

(d) The Dutch Possessions in JAVA and SUMATRA must be disputed on a constantly increasing scale.

None of the above defensive operations will be successfully accomplished apart from the development of a counter-stroke offensive on a minor, but nonetheless, considerable scale. In a theatre of a thousand islands, many capable of being converted into make-shift air and naval bases, insoluble problems are set to purely passive defence. The Japanese having obtained temporary command of the sea, and air predominance over considerable areas, it is within their power to take almost any point they wish apart from the fortress of Singapore. They can go round with a circus-force and clean up any local garrisons we or the Dutch have been able so far to hold. They will seek to
secure their hold by a well-conceived network of air bases and they no doubt hope to secure, in a certain number of months, the possession of the fortress of Singapore. Once in possession of this as well as Manila, with their air bases established at focal points, they will have built up a system of air and naval defence capable of prolonged resistance. They may succeed in doing this, in which case the end of 1943 or 1944 may well see them still ensconced in the possessions they have so easily won. On the other hand, the wider they are spread the greater the weight of the war upon them. Their air-power cannot be replenished or maintained at strength comparable to that of United States and Great Britain. The naval superiority of the United States, to which Great Britain will contribute to the best of her ability, ought to be regained by the summer of 1942.
20. It is not proposed here to discuss the steps by which the American-British naval superiority will be attained. Thereafter, or at least as soon as possible, raids should be organized upon islands or seaports which the Japanese have seized. The President has, I understand, ordered the formation of a force akin, on the West Coast of America, to the Commandos. Such a force, apart from its individual qualities, will be exceptionally valuable by gaining key-points and lodgments in amphibious operations. It would require to be supported by a number of small brigade Groups whose mobility and equipment would be exactly fitted to the particular task foreseen, each task being a study in itself. It is not necessary, unless required on strategic grounds, to stay in the captured or re-captured islands. It will be sufficient to destroy or make prisoners of the garrison, demolish any useful installations, and depart. The exact composition of the forces for each undertaking and enterprise is a matter for separate study. According to our experiences it would seem essential that there should be adequate cover by sea-borne aircraft and detachments of tanks and tank landing craft. The enemy cannot possibly be prepared and must be highly vulnerable at many points. After even a few successful enterprises of
this character, all of which are extremely valuable experiences to the troops and Commanders for instructional purposes, he will be forced to hold places weakly, and will be forced to concentrate on a certain number of strong points. It may then be possible for us to secure very easily suitable islands, provided we do not try to hold too many, in which air and re-fuelling bases of a temporary or permanent character can be improvised. The establishment of a reign of terror among the enemy's detached garrisons would seem to be an extremely valuable preliminary to the larger operations for re-conquest and the building up of strong bases as stepping stones from Australia northward.

(unfinished)
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

Defence Committee (Operations).

ARMY STRENGTHS.

Directive by the Minister of Defence.

WE have now in the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) 26 standard motorised infantry divisions and the Polish division, total 27, well equipped with guns and transport, with an average strength of about 15,500 men, with 10 Corps organisations and Corps troops (61,000). There are 8 county divisions for work on the beaches, averaging about 10,000, without artillery other than coast artillery and with little transport. We have 5 armoured divisions and 4 Army Tank brigades; the whole comprising 14 armoured brigades (with 5 divisional elements); 4 Brigade Groups with artillery and transport; 7 infantry brigades and 12 un-brigaded battalions: furthermore, 8 aerodrome defence battalions and the 100,000 men in the Home Defence and Young Soldiers' battalions.

2. It is proposed to transform this organisation into 27 standardised divisions (hereinafter to be called Field Divisions), plus the Polish Division (which will have an armoured element), total 28; and to increase the armoured forces to 7 armoured divisions with 8 Army Tank brigades, the whole comprising 22 armoured brigades (with 7 divisional elements). The 4 Brigade Groups are to remain. Instead of the 8 county divisions and other units mentioned above,
there will be 13 brigades, plus the equivalent of 2 Ally brigades, and 8 "Detached Battalions"; the foregoing constituting the Home Field Army, which can thus be reckoned the equivalent of 45 divisions. In addition, there will still be the 8 aerodrome battalions and the Home Defence and Young Soldiers' battalions.

3. The object of these changes is to increase the war-power of the army, particularly in armoured troops; and to provide additional field, anti-tank and flak artillery, including that required for 5 additional Indian divisions, to be formed during 1942. For this last purpose also it will be necessary to provide up to 17 British battalions for the Indian Army.

4. No reduction in the force mentioned in para. 2 is compatible with our war needs. To maintain it during the next nine months, i.e., to July 1, 1942; and also to maintain the drafts for the army of the Middle East for India and for our garrisons in Iceland, Gibraltar, Malta and Hong-Kong, &c., with a normal wastage of 50,000 a quarter there must be provided an intake to the army of 278,000 men. Measures are being taken to provide this. The army also requires at least 142,000 more women above the 63,000 already recruited.

5. In my directive on A.D.G.B. I have proposed that the personnel should be fixed at 280,000 men and that the suggested increase of 50,000 be disallowed: also that the suggested increase of 9,000 in the Coast batteries should be disallowed. The savings thus provided will be applied towards strengthening the Field Army. Finally A.D.G.B. will continually endeavour to develop for the service of the Home Field Army the largest amount of mobile flak possible, and also a transferable force available to strengthen the coastal batteries should the Emergency Period of Invasion be instituted. As it is unlikely that the enemy could afford prolonged and widespread bombing of our towns in the advent of Invasion, a shuttle arrangement of this kind should be possible, enabling us to meet according to events either a sustained air attack or Invasion. The Anti-Aircraft force is formed into 12 Divisions.

6. The Army of the Nile now consists of the 50th and 70th (formerly 6th) British Divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions with the Cavalry Armoured Division (forming) and two Army Tank Brigades; the three Australian Divisions; one New Zealand; two South African, one Polish and Foreign equivalent, and the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, total 16 Divisions. It is intended to reinforce the Middle East with two British Divisions, the 18th and 2nd, from the United Kingdom as convenient.

7. Apart from the 2 divisions mentioned above, India has in action in Persia and Iraq the 6th, 8th and 10th Indian divisions, and General Wavell proposes to send the 17th by the end of the year. During 1942, 4 extra Indian divisions and one Indian armoured division will also take the field; total 9.

8. For the defence of India, there will remain the equivalent of 3 British divisions and 5 Indian divisions, over and above those which will operate outside India.
9. There remain our garrisons abroad, to wit:—

Iceland (C)—the equivalent of 1 division.
Gibraltar and Malta—that of 2.
Singapore—that of 3.
Aden, Hong Kong and other minor garrisons—that of 1.

Total division-equivalent of garrisons, 7.

10. If we estimate our Army in divisions or their equivalent, the general layout for 1942 is as follows:—

United Kingdom ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 45
Anti-Aircraft divisions ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 12
Army of the Nile ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 16
Army of India in Iraq and Persia ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 9
Army of India at home ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 8
Fortress Garrisons ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 7
Native African Divisions ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 2

Grand total ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 99

11. It is our duty to develop, equip and maintain all these units during 1942.

W. S. C.

10 Downing Street, S.W. 1,
October 9, 1941.
June 3, 1842
1:15 a.m.

My Dear Mr. President,

It seems to me that this can't be held anymore. I suggest the enclosed printed statement will be issued around 2 p.m., which will go.

The United States money running paper their run, but let the British money paper have it also for Sunday morning.

I cannot fit in the Australian Times of the world will keep full again.

Please let me know if under.

Yours ever,

[Signature]
AT: THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR. HOPKINS.

Shall I send this direct, or will you handle it yourself?

5. 1. 42
AT: THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR. PRESIDENT

Please will you very kindly consider giving a few rationed carrots to the Dons to help stave off trouble at Gibraltar? Every day we have the use of the harbour is a gain, especially in view of some other ideas we have discussed. I am told it only needs a word to Wallace.

5. 1. 42
Dear Mr. President,

We have been greeted on arrival by this cutting from the local paper. This shows that all the trouble you took about preserving secrecy has been in vain. Tommy is plainly identifiable.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

[Handwritten note]

“Hard work is the thing that will win this war — we must keep at it night and day!”
Prime Minister

Reference the attached Minute about New Caledonia (Flag "A"), this question arose from a review by the combined U.S. - British Staffs of the defence of island bases between Hawaii and Australia.

The United States pressed strongly for forces to be established in New Caledonia. As Australia were unable to do this, they undertook to send American forces.

New Caledonia lies on the important air route to Australia and the ABDA Area. Aircraft can reach Australia direct from Fiji without landing at New Caledonia, but it would be awkward if it fell into the hands of the Japanese. Moreover, the island has a principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only limited quantities.

DECLASSIFIED JCS MEMO, 1-17-73 BY DATE AUG 28 1973
I do not know if Casey made any representations to the Americans, but certainly our people did not press for the despatch of troops to the island.

I understand from General Gerow (the U.S. D.M.O.) that the Americans wish to send reinforcements of 20,000 men to the Far East in any case, from which the detachment of initially, one brigade for New Caledonia would be made.

Three or four personnel ships will be required for the New Caledonia force (these of course would be no use for taking supplies to Russia); I gather that they intend to send the M.T. on later.

I am afraid in the time available I have been unable to obtain very precise details from the American Staff, since they themselves have not yet worked out the Far East convoy programme in detail.

I attach at Flag "B" the combined U.S. - British report on the defence of Pacific island bases; the passages referring to New Caledonia are sidelined. As stated above, the proposals for New Caledonia were initiated by the Americans.

12th January, 1942.
BRIGADIER HOLLIS.

The Prime Minister is still not contented about New Caledonia and does not think it should have such a high priority. How did it come into the business? Was it simply Casey, or did our people press it? Could it be pulled out now and stood over in favour of Russia? How many ships are involved, observing that decisions are not final until London advices on shipping are received?

Let Prime Minister have a report before his return at midnight.

J.M. Mackenzie
12.1.42.
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFENSE OF ISLAND BASES

BETWEEN HAWAII AND AUSTRALIA

Agreed to by Joint Planning Committee, January 10, 1942:

W. P. SCOBLY
Colonel, U.S. Army

Joint Secretaries

L. R. McDOWELL
Commander, U.S. Navy

R. D. COLERIDGE
Commander, R.N.
Joint Planning Committee

Report for the Chiefs of Staff Committee

Subject: Defense of Island Bases between Hawaii and Australia.

1. There is under development and approaching completion an air route suitable for the use of both long and medium range aircraft and extending from Hawaii to Australia. Airdromes are located at Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia. In addition to their use as staging points along the air route, all of these islands are valuable outposts of the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands or of New Zealand and Australia. They will serve also as operating bases for naval and air forces.

2. In addition to its military importance, New Caledonia is an important Japanese objective since it is the principal readily accessible source of supply for nickel of which the Japanese have at present only a limited supply. At present the total output of nickel is shipped to the United States. In emergency this source of supply could be denied to the Japanese for some time by the destruction of the blast furnaces, power supply and limited loading facilities.

3. It is planned also to establish at Bora Bora, in the Society Islands, which are under Free French jurisdiction, a base for refuelling naval vessels and other shipping en route to and from the South West Pacific.

4. The defense of all the island positions along the route depends ultimately upon their support by naval and air forces. The final strength of forces recommended herein is based on the length of time which in present circumstances may elapse before naval and air support can be made effective. The strength of the forces required will have to be kept under constant review.
In the present situation, the Japanese appear to be able to attack New Caledonia or Fiji at an early date with a force of at least one infantry division supported by strong naval and air forces.

5. The present garrisons of the island bases are inadequate to hold out unsupported against the attacks of which the Japanese are capable. The degree of resistance to the Japanese of the French and native troops in New Caledonia is unknown.

6. The United States is able to provide forces for the defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa and Bora Bora.

7. New Zealand is sending most of the personnel needed for the defense of Viti Levu. The United States already is providing one pursuit squadron and very considerable quantities of the equipment required for the Fijis. The remainder is being supplied from British sources. Most of the equipment needed will be supplied in the near future.

8. Although we consider that New Caledonia should be an Australian responsibility, we are informed that, owing to the scarcity of troops for home defense in the absence of four divisions overseas, Australia is unable to increase the small garrison of one company now in New Caledonia within the next six months. Australia is laying minefields in the approaches to Noumea and Tontouta. We consider that it is important to provide more adequate defenses in the island as early as possible. The only way to do this would be for the United States to send the necessary forces. These would, however, initially be at the expense of the ABDA area. An opinion should also be obtained from Australia as to the priority for arming the 3700 Free French on the island. A list has been received of their requirements.
Recommendations.

9. (a) That the United States arrange for the local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American Samoa, and Bora Bora. This is now being accomplished.

(b) That the Dominion of New Zealand be responsible for the local defense of the Fiji Islands.

(c) That the United States assist in providing equipment and air defenses for the Fiji Islands.

(d) That the defense of New Caledonia should in principle be accepted as an Australian responsibility, but that the United States should as a temporary measure furnish forces as early as possible for the defense of the island, even if this has to be at the expense initially of the ABDA area. The question of arming the Free French troops should be taken up between the United States and British Staffs as soon as an opinion has been obtained from Australia as to the priority.

(e) Arrangements should be made immediately by the British with the Free French for the demolition, if necessary, of the furnaces and power plant of the nickel mines and the loading facilities for chrome and nickel ore in New Caledonia.

(f) That Australia and New Zealand afford all practicable logistic support to United States forces which may be assigned to assist in the defense of the Fijis and New Caledonia.

(g) The attached table shows forces present in the islands, or en route and those we recommend should be sent in the future as shipping and naval escorts become available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON TO BE COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL ESCORT AND SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Includes Col. b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. New Caledonia</td>
<td>One Co. A.I.F.</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approximately 3,000 Free French Forces (inadequately equipped)</td>
<td>1 Inf. Division (½ regiments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 6&quot; Fixed Defense Guns (Free French)</td>
<td>24 Heavy A.A. guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48 Light A.A. guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24 .50 Calibre A.A. M.G's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 A.A. Searchlights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 155 m.m. C.A. guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Eng. Regt. (Gen. Serv.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Pursuit sq. (25 aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Medium Bomb. Sq. (13 aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Warning Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approximate Total Strength 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See Notes (a) and (b) in Col. (d).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>DEFENSES NOW THERE OR EN ROUTE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED DESIRABLE GARRISON COMPLETED AS FORCES, NAVAL SHIPPING BECOME AVAILABLE (Col. b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. FIJI</td>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>Naval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Minesweeper</td>
<td>1 Minesweeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Motor patrol boats</td>
<td>8 Motor Patrol Boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 New Zealand Inf. Bns.</td>
<td>8 Inf. Bns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Regular Fiji Bn. (1/3 European)</td>
<td>16 Heavy A.A. guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Territorial Fiji Bn. (1/3 European)</td>
<td>28 Light A.A. guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 Field Guns</td>
<td>12 .50 Cal. A.A. M.G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 6&quot; C.A. guns at Momi</td>
<td>12 A.A. Searchlights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 6&quot; C.A. guns at Suva</td>
<td>2 C.A. 155 m.m. guns for 155 m.m. guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 4.7&quot; C.A. guns at Suva</td>
<td>4 6&quot; C.A. guns at Momi and Suva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 60 Pounders</td>
<td>2 60 Pounders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 6&quot; Howitzers</td>
<td>2 6&quot; Howitzers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Bofors</td>
<td>28 Field Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 3&quot; A.A. guns</td>
<td>1 Co. Tanks (L) (13 Tanks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 A.A. Searchlights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Reconnaissance Bombers*</td>
<td>1 Pursuit (I) Squad. (25 Men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Miscellaneous Aircraft</td>
<td>1 Medium Bombardment Squadron (80 Men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Singapore Flying Boats</td>
<td>1 Flying Boat Squad. (8 and Fly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700 Men, Air Corps</td>
<td>4 Sets RADAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Airplanes, Fighters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Sets RADAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LONDON.--PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL RETURNED TO ENGLAND BY FLYING BOAT TODAY.
CHURCHILL SAID HE HAD FLOWN 3,287 MILES IN 18 HOURS.
(THIS IS THE LAND-MILE DISTANCE FROM BERMUDA TO PLYMOUTH. IN NAUTICAL MILES THE DISTANCE IS 2,860.)

ADD CHURCHILL, LONDON

CHURCHILL ARRIVED AT PADDINGTON STATION, LONDON, IN MID-AFTERNOON ABOARD A SPECIAL TRAIN AND WAS GREETED BY MRS. CHURCHILL, MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, SERVICE OFFICIALS AND A CHEERING THRONG OF ABOUT 800. MRS. CHURCHILL LEFT THE ENGLAND-SCOTLAND FOOTBALL MATCH AT WEMBLEY STADIUM TO MEET HER HUSBAND AT THE STATION.
Grace:

Miss Berney says the Prime Minister gave the President this morning a memo entitled ASSIGNMENTS. They want that title changed to read MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS DRAFT.

Also -- third line from the bottom of page instead of the word WITH, change to BY.
HRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated January 17, 1942
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
265, January 17, 10 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

"Your message of January 16 relating to Wavell's 00048 of January 14: I entirely agree. Action was most urgent.

We got here with a good hop from Bermuda with a thirty mile wind. Will cable you again shortly."

WINANT

CSB

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

CHIEF OF STAFF and
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

I enclose copy of telegram handed me Saturday by Mr. Casey. I think the Chiefs of Staff, American and British, should give this consideration at their next meeting.

F.D.R.

Only 1 carbon copy sent, for both to look at.
1-29-41

Mr. Brady
Ad. Stack has
noted. Thanks

Is this just
file?

Confidential
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK:

Will you put this with the other message from the Prime Minister?

F.D.R.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 27th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I find that a mistake was made in
the decyphering of the long message from the
Prime Minister which I handed you this
afternoon. In paragraph 4 of Mr. Curtin's
message which was quoted in full, the word
"not" was omitted towards the end of the first
sentence. This sentence should therefore read
as follows:-

"In the event of differing views
on the Council the Australian representative
in London might be in agreement with the
United States representative on the combined
Chiefs of Staff in Washington, but Australian
approval of the point might not reach the
President who is the final arbiter."

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D. C.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 27th, 1942

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a message for you from the Prime Minister which was received at the Embassy this morning.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States.
Message for the President from
the Prime Minister dated January 27th.

I send you the following memorandum
which has been prepared for me in the Dominions
Office. Begins.

Before I got back to England I put to
the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand
proposals which I discussed with you for joint
[words.undecypherable] supreme commander of ABDA
area. As regards the means for coordinating in
London the views of Australia and New Zealand the
Dutch and ourselves, I proposed that a Far East
Council on ministerial plane should be set up
permanently with myself as Chairman and with
representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the
Netherlands. Its duties would be to focus and
formulate the views of these four Governments to
yourself whose views would also be reported to the
Council.

Mr. Curtin replied on January 21st that
the Australian War Council representing all the
principal parties in Australia were unanimous in
disagreeing with the proposed Council on the ground
that it would be purely advisory and out of keeping
with Australian primary interests in Pacific sphere.
The Australian Government desired that a Pacific
Council should be established in Washington comprising
representatives/
representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Australia, China and the Netherlands and New Zealand. They urged that this body should be a Council of action for the higher direction of the war in the Pacific and that it should be assisted by the Joint Staff already established, on which the members proposed that the Pacific Council would also have representatives of their services if they so desired.

I explained to Mr. Curtin on January 22nd that he had misapprehended the character of the proposed Council. It would not be purely advisory and Australia would have an equal voice on it with the United Kingdom. I asked him whether he intended to bring his proposal before you or wished me to transmit it to you.

Mr. Curtin has now telegraphed:

"At point which will be decisive we do not consider there is real, as distinct from nominal, equal voice."

He also adds

"It is desired, as this machinery was evolved between the President and yourself, that in the first instance our views be submitted by you to the President for his consideration."

By way of further comment Mr. Curtin has stated as follows:

"(1)"
"(1) Instructions to Commander-in-Chief South West Pacific Area are issued by the President who will be advised by the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. Australia and New Zealand and the Netherlands East Indies are not represented on this body. It is a more logical and expeditious arrangement to have Pacific Council in Washington alongside the President and combined Staff than in London."

"(2) With a Pacific Council in Washington relying for its advice on Allied Joint Staff there is less possibility of conflicting advice arising from technical advisers than if it is in London consulting another set of officers on the United Kingdom Dominions Joint Staffs. If the views of the members are irreconcilable and cannot be 'focussed', a satisfactory solution is more likely at Washington, the seat of final authority, than in London."

"(3) The United Kingdom Government have stated that the combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee will 'receive opinion of the Council'. As the Council is a political body on Governmental plane, this procedure indicates that the functions of the Council are of an advisory and not executive nature."

"(4) In the event of differing views on the Council the Australian representative in London might be in agreement with the United States representative on the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, but Australian approval of the point might/
might reach the President who is the final arbiter. With the Council at Washington, points of difference could be discussed with the combined staffs and the President or his representative on the Council would obtain first-hand knowledge of the Australian member’s viewpoint.

"(5) As the President is final authority, and as the President and the Prime Minister are to discuss points that are in dispute or matters of great urgency, this also indicates that the proposed Council will be advisory as it will certainly not possess any final executive authority in London. Furthermore the views of the London Council are to be represented to the Joint Staff in Washington by the Prime Minister who is also to report to them any differences of opinion between the four members of the Council and in the last resort to reach a settlement with the President. The Council in Washington would facilitate a conclusion if the Prime Minister and the President are unable to agree.

"(6) In short we strongly urge a Pacific Council at Washington, its jurisdiction not to be limited to ABDA Area and its personnel to be representative of the United Kingdom, Australia, China and New Zealand."

As regards New Zealand Mr. Fraser took a similar view. I thereupon sent him a fuller explanation of the proposals. He has since telegraphed again pressing for "a Far Eastern Council on lines suggested to be established in Washington with representation on
Governmental plane of United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, China and Netherlands". In comment Mr. Fraser says "We think it not only desirable but necessary that there should be one coordinating authority - land, sea and air - for the whole war against Japan on which we should wish to be represented. While we do not decline cooperation in the proposal you have outlined with such amendments as may be possible to meet our views and will if necessary do our best to make it a success, we would not willingly accept any solution of this admittedly most difficult problem that does not afford us direct and continuous access to the power which under the arrangement so far reported is solely responsible for the conduct of naval operations in that portion of the world which includes [word undecypherable] Dominion".

Ends.

I should be glad to know whether in your opinion these observations by the Australian and New Zealand Governments affect the view which we took together in Washington that coordination of views of these two Governments with those Governments of Great Britain and Netherlands should be effected in London.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral Stark:

Will you put this with the other message from the Prime Minister?

F.D.R.

4 Secret from Halifax to the Pres. 1/27/42 re corrected paragraph 4 of Mr. Curtin's message which was from the Prime Minister.
PD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

473, February 1, 4 a.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Thank you so much about Dill. He will represent both C. of S. Committee in London and me as Minister of Defence."

WINANT

KLP

London
Dated February 1, 1942
Rec'd 11:30 p.m. January 31st
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC).

Secretary of State
Washington

474, February 1, 5 a.m., (SECTION ONE).

AND PERSONAL TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. Thank you for your telegram just received. I send you herewith Wavell's message to me of 29th. Please remember it was not written for your eye, but we have got to a point where none of that matters.

Two. I entirely agree about the balance being maintained, especially as I guessed who you are leaving the supreme command vacancy for. Nothing must stand in the way of the big layout, namely, supreme commander, Wavell; deputy, unknown; naval, the Dutchman; air, Brett, or whoever you choose. I have cabled Wavell on these lines, as it would be well to have his view before us before final decision.

Three. I will reply to your paragraphs 3-7 inclusive after I have put them before the Cabinet on Monday. You may be sure there will be no disagreements.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks     Date MAY 5 1972
-2- #474, February 1, 5 a.m., (SECTION ONE) from London.

Disagreements between you and me.

Four. Your paragraphs 8 and 9. Thank you so much for all your kindness. I cannot tell you how sorry I was to leave the White House. I enjoyed every minute of it, which is more than all of those whose portraits adorn the walls can say.

WINANT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (NC)

London
Dated February 1, 1942
Rec'd 2:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

474, February 1, 5 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

Extract from telegram from General Wavell for Prime Minister.

Will you please give me your advice on following matter as you will doubtless know from your talks in Washington, general feeling of President and also of Dutch Government. It is position Admiral Hart.

One. I sent you private telegram number 0028 (also that 408) twelfth January giving you my first impressions of him. He is charming personality and knows his job but always takes pessimistic view of situation and refers frequently to his advanced age. He has said openly both to Dutch and myself that he considered himself old for this job. He told me other day that if I wished to have Dutch Admiral Helfrich instead of himself he would not mind.

Two. When I was in Batavia three days ago Governor General asked to see me and told me his Government had no confidence in Hart and considered Helfrich should have been appointed because of his local knowledge of these difficult waters.

KLP                      WINANT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (II)

London

Dated February 1, 1942

Rec'd 3 a.m.

Secretary of State, Washington,

474, February 1, 5 a.m., (SECTION THREE).

He told me that his Prime Minister - Governor von Hook had already expressed this opinion to high authorities in Washington. He asked me whether he should instruct von Hook to pursue matter further. I said no and that if matter came up again in Washington von Hook should ask for official reference to be made to me.

Three. As Hart had asked me previously whether I knew of any representations in Washington I informed him privately of gist of what Governor General had said.

Four. Matter now stands thus.

(a) Am sure Hart only too willing to go if it can be done in some way that will save his face. He in fact practically said so to me today. He will not stand strain and should be replaced by younger and more energetic men.

(b) From little I know of Kelfrich he is capable and has plenty of initiative and, of course, local knowledge.

VIRANT

HLP

0721
PD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated February 1, 1942
Rec'd 3:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

474, February 1, 5 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

He may do all right with present small forces but can have no experience of handling large fleets. I am not sure that (Americans ?) would be happy under his command. He is inclined to express himself caustically about them. Dutch navy will not increase whereas there will we hope be much larger American and British naval forces in these waters before long. I do not think Dutch would raise any objections to appointment younger and more energetic American Admiral provided (underlined) they were at same time informed of intention to send considerable American reinforcements. This would be much best solution though Helfrich would be disappointed. He is jealous of position on my (staff ?) of Terpoorten who is younger and junior in rank. Dutch navy considers itself of much greater importance than army.

(C) Important that Palliser should remain as deputy, he is doing excellently.

(END OF MESSAGE).

WINANT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)
FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT

"PART ONE
One. I send you appended Wavell's reply in his own words.

Two. Please consider whether it would not be better to leave Hart where he is until the Unknown is available, observing that Hart is ashore and Helfrich will be afloat. The layout would then be announced all at once, namely:

Supreme Wavell.
Deputy-Supreme The Unknown.
Intendant-General Brett.
Air Peirse.

Army Ter Poorten, observing the Dutch claim to have the equivalent of six divisions on the ground.

Three. If you think this does not balance, Helfrich could stay at sea and you could substitute a younger American Admiral ashore at Abdacom H.Q.

for Hart.

ALC

WINANT

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Evidently Brett and Wavell have got on very close terms.

PART TWO.

Five. About the Pacific Council. I have not heard from Australia or New Zealand, to whom I sent text of your proposals. We still think it will be necessary to have Far East Council in London and that Australians will eventually agree. The Dutch beg that it may be here because it is to be on the ministerial level and it would be impossible for them to lose touch with Holland by transporting themselves to Washington. This is in accordance with your view. The Far East Council would, of course, make recommendations to you on military as well as political matters. The purely military would go from our Chiefs of Staff Committee in London.
London to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. The political aspects would be dealt with either through the Foreign Office and State Department, or, when necessary, between you and me.

WINANT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

Six. There is no reason why the above arrangements should not fit in with what you have offered Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch. In fact, I think it an admirable solution. The combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington would receive the military recommendations, on which the Far East Council would have been consulted beforehand, from our Chiefs of Staff Committee as arranged. But when the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington were dealing with something affecting the Abda or the Anzac area, or even larger matters, it would be natural for them to invite representatives of military missions of Australia, New Zealand and Holland to attend the discussion. The representatives of these missions would, of course, act under instructions from their Governments but they would be available to state their arguments in their own way and supply additional
additional information to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. I have a feeling this will gratify all parties and not clog in any way the major American and British machinery which, as you say, is already working well.

WINANT

ALC
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Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Seven. But what about China? She has not hitherto been concerned with Abda and Anzac. Nevertheless, two Chinese armies are coming down into Burma and on the Burma Road. I suggest China is primarily your concern and that you will weave her in with the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington while keeping us constantly informed and will bring everything to final solution there.

Eight. Pending receipt of replies from Australia and New Zealand I should like to know how this strikes you. Again it looks to me a pretty good and practical layout."

Wavell's reply herewith appended.

"One. I have discussed whole question with Brett and Peirse and have also informed Hart you have gist of correspondence since he has received message from Washington indicating that I had made some
-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR) from London.

Some representation to London and asked me rather reproachfully what I had done. He was charming about it but I think feels hurt.

WINANT

ALC
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

PART TWO.

Both Brett and myself feel very strongly that Peirse should remain in his present position for time being with Brereton as his Deputy and that Brereton should remain in his present position. Peirse has experience in handling bomber forces in war which no one else possesses. On other hand, he has little administrative experience while Brett has thorough grasp of whole problem of building up American Forces. It would be disastrous to make change now. As time goes on and United States Air Forces increase and American Commanders again experience, it may be advisable for Peirse to drop out and Brett or Brereton take over command of whole Air Forces.

WINANT

ALC
495 - London

Previous delivery of this telegram was not complete.

WDM
AF  
London  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)  
Dated February 3, 1942  
Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)
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ALC  
WINANT  
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks  
MAY 5 1972
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
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London to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. The political aspects would be dealt with either through the Foreign Office and State Department, or, when necessary, between you and me.

WINANT

AIC
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (NC)

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Received noon

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

Six. There is no reason why the above arrangements should not fit in with what you have offered Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch. In fact, I think it an admirable solution. The combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington would receive the military recommendations, on which the Far East Council would have been consulted beforehand, from our Chiefs of Staff Committee as arranged. But when the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington were dealing with something affecting the Abda or the Anzac area, or even larger matters, it would be natural for them to invite representatives of military missions of Australia, New Zealand and Holland to attend the discussion. The representatives of these missions would, of course, act under instructions from their Governments but they would be available to state their arguments in their own way and supply additional
additional information to the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. I have a feeling this will gratify all parties and not clog in any way the major American and British machinery which, as you say, is already working well.

WINANT

ALC
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Seven. But what about China? She has not hitherto been concerned with Abda and Anzac. Nevertheless, two Chinese armies are coming down into Burma and on the Burma Road. I suggest China is primarily your concern and that you will weave her in with the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington while keeping us constantly informed and will bring everything to final solution there.

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London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

PART TWO.

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WINANT

ALC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

Three. I am not certain whether Brett's position is fully understood in America. As my Deputy he advises me on all questions operational and administrative, concerning American forces and in my absence acts for me and takes any necessary decisions on all matters and Amda area. As Intendant General his main function is to control building up of American air and other forces and passage of reinforcements through Australia. He also exercises general supervision on all administrative questions but all detail is done for him by his Deputies.

He thus has for all practical purposes control of American forces in Amda area and is not an administrative officer. Brett thinks this is not understood by Army and Air authorities in United States of America.

Four. If it is desire of United States of America to separate posts of Deputy and Intendant

General
February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX) from London.

General and to bring in MacArthur as Deputy I shall, of course, be quite agreeable. I shall still have Brett available to advise me on all matters connected with United States Air Force.

WIN.INT

ILC
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated February 3, 1942
Rec'd 3:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

Five. As regards Naval Command I have already given my opinion. Helfrich will do job well and if Americans are prepared to accept him I am willing. He certainly knows his job. Whereas Hart has wanted some shoving, Helfrich is inclined to be impulsive and may want holding back. Palliser should in any case remain as Deputy.

Six. I must warn you that I feel Australians will demand higher representation and that they may be looking for place here for Blamey. Have had no reply to my 00467, 28th January addressed Melbourne, repeated War Office for Chiefs of Staff. When their corps arrives they will have larger force ground troops than anyone. I pointed this fact out to Governor General when he raised question of Helfrich with me. He said Dutch regarded Ter Poorten's position on my Hd. Qrs. as even more important than Helfrich's.

Seven.
-2- #495, February 3, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN) from London.

Seven. Now that we are finding our feet here and beginning to function as Hd. Qrs. and team, less changes made at present the better."

End Wavell's reply.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WIN.NT

LLC
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 7 1942

From: LONDON

To: POTUS

COPY FURNISHED AS NOTED:

#25

FEBRUARY 7 XXX

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND SECRET

NO TWO FIVE PARA ONE YOUR LATEST RECEIVED TODAY PRO-

POSING QUOTE TO LET THE DUTCHMAN GO IN AS ACTING CINC

OF ALL NAVAL FORCES LEAVING ALL OTHER COMMANDS UNDER

WAVELL AS AT PRESENT INCLUDING PEIRSE UNQUOTE IS ABSO-

LUTELY AGREED BY ME AND WILL I AM SURE PLEASE WAVELL

PD WHEN CERTAIN OTHER CHANGES ARE RIPE HE CAN REVIEW

THE WHOLE SITUATION PARA TWO PD BOTH AUSTRALIA AND NEW

ZEALAND HAVE NOW AGREED TO OUR PLAN ABOUT THE PACIFIC

COUNCIL BEING ON A MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN LONDON CONSTITU-

TED AND FUNCTIONING AS PROPOSED COUPLED WITH THE

ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF THE

DOMINIONS AND DUTCH ON THE COMBINED COS COMMITTEE IN

WASHINGTON ON OCCASIONS WHEN THEY ARE INTERESTED PD

THIS IS A GREAT STEP FORWARD AND I AGREE WITH YOU THAT

THE NEW MACHINERY CMA PONDEROUS AND COMPLICATED THOUGH

IT WAS BOUND TO BE CMA IS FUNCTIONING SMOOTHLY AND WEL

PD I EVEN THINK WE MAY PLUME OUR SELVES A LITTLE

Answered by Brs. #10. 1942

103# from 405

REGRADES UNCLASSIFIED by British

Govt., Post Depart., 3-29-31

By R. H. Turner Date MAY 3

Action Copy

074
HAVING BROUGHT IT ALL INTO ACTION SO SOON PARA
THREE PD I PRESUME YOU WILL TAKE CHINA UNDER YOUR
WING AT WASHINGTON KEEPING US INFORMED OMA WHILE
WE MAINTAIN OUR NORMAL CONTACTS PD I SENT A STRONG
TELEGRAM TO WAVELL ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE YOU PERSONALLY
ATTACH TO CHINA AND ABOUT BRINGING CHINESE TROOPS
DOWN INTO BURMA PD THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CHINESE
ARMIES HAVE NOW COME A LONG WAY SOUTH PD THERE
IS PLENTY OF RICE IN BURMA AND THIS PART OF THE
FIELD LOOKS BETTER PD I AM DOING ALL I CAN TO REINFORCE
BURMA FROM INDIA WITH BRITISH TROOPS AND REFILLING
INTESA FROM HOME PD AS YOU KNOW CHIANG IS VISITING
THE VICEROY PD PARA FOUR PD ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH
NATION INCREASINGLY CENTERS ITS HOPES ON THE
UNITED STATES OMA THE VICHY ATTITUDE DESCRIBED BY
YOU AND MANIFESTING ITSELF IN MANY WAYS IS ROTTEN
PD THEY HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN HELPING ROMMEL WITH
SUPPLIES PD I SEE THAT VICHY DOES NOT LIKE THE
MIGUELON ST PIERRE COMMUNIQUE AND THAT DARLAN
THREATENS TO RETALIATE BY PUSHING AMERICAN
OBSERVERS OUT OF MOROCCO PD IT SEEMS TO ME VITAL THAT DONOVAN'S ACTIVITIES OF WHICH YOU TOLD ME SHOULD HAVE FULL PLAY AND THAT AMERICAN OBSERVERS SHOULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE WITHDRAWN PD OTHERWISE WHAT BECOMES OF GYMNASIUM AND ITS VARIANTS QUERY YOU HOLD THE MASTER KEY IN MARTINIQUE WHERE THERE ARE REPUTED TO BE TWENTY FRENCH SHIPS PD FORTY FIVE HUNDRED SEAMEN MANY OF WHOM WOULD JOIN FREE FRENCH PD FIFTY MILLIONS OF GOLD FROM THE EMIL BERTAIN PD AND ONE HUNDRED AMERICAN FIGHTERS PLANES WHICH PD CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS REPORTS PD ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KEPT IN GOOD CONDITION PD PARA FIVE PD I HOPE NOTHING WILL BE DONE TO GIVE GUARANTEES FOR THE NON OCCUPATION OF MADAGASCAR AND REUNION PD THE JAPANESE MIGHT WELL TURN UP AT THE FORMER ONE OF THESE FINE DAYS PD AND VICHY WILL OFFER NO MORE RESISTANCE TO THEM THERE THAN IN FRENCH INDO CHINA PD A JAPANESE AIR PD SUBMARINE AND OR CRUISER BASE AT THE DIEGO SUAREZ WOULD PARALYSE OUR WHOLE CONVOY ROUTE.
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

PART FOUR

FEbruary 7, 1942

From LONDON

To POTUS

BOTH TO THE MIDDLE AND TO THE FAR EAST PD WE HAVE THEREFORE FOR SOME TIME HAD PLANS TO ESTABLISH OURSELVES AT DIEGO SUAREZ BY AN EXPEDITION EITHER FROM THE NILE OR FROM SOUTH AFRICA PD AT PRESENT ACTION IS INDEFINITELY POSTPONED AS OUR HANDS ARE TOO FULL CMA BUT I DO NOT WANT THEM TIED PD OF COURSE WE WILL LET YOU KNOW BEFORE ANY ACTION IS RESOLVED PD PARA SIX PD I AM DELIGHTED MAGNET IS GOING FORWARD PD AS IT DEVELOPS I HOPE TO SEND FOUR MATURED BRITISH DIVISIONS ROUND THE CAPE FOR EMPLOYMENT WHERE MOST NEEDED CMA BUT THE SHIPPING IS THE STRANGLEHOLD PD PARA SEVEN PD SEVENTY PERCENT OF OUR FORCES WHICH FOUGHT IN MALAYA GOT BACK TO THE ISLAND PD ELEVEN CONVOYS OF STORES AND REINFORCEMENTS INCLUDING THE WHOLE EIGHTEENTH DIVISION AND OTHER STRONG GOOD A A AND A T UNITS ARE NOW DEPLOYED MAKING THE EQUIVALENT OF FOUR DIVISIONS CMA A FORCE VERY WELL PROPORTIONED TO THE AREA THEY HAVE TO DEFEND PD I LOOK FORWARD TO SEVERE BATTLES ON THIS FRONT CMA WHERE THE
PART FIVE

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 7, 1942

From LONDON

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

JAPANESE HAVE TO CROSS A BROAD MOAT BEFORE ATTACKING A STRONG FORTIFIED AND STILL MOBILE FORCE PD UNHAPPILY THE ONE HUNDRED HURRICANES WHICH HAVE ARRIVED CANNOT WORK FROM THE FOUR BOMBARDED AIR FIELDS EXCEPT IN SMALL DETACHMENTS PD THUS WE ARE CONDEMNED TO HEAVY AIR INFERIORITY PD TOBRUK WAS HELD FOR SIX MONTHS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS CMA SO I HAVE GOOD CONFIDENCE PD EVERY DAY THAT SINGAPORE HOLDS OUT GIVES AVELL TIME TO GET A STRONG GRIP ON SUMATRA AND JAVA PD PARA EIGHT PD THE LIBYAN SETBACK HAS BEEN BOTH A SHOCK AND A DISAPPOINTMENT CMA BUT I DO NOT THINK AUCHINLECK HAS YET SHOT HIS BOLT PD PARA NINE PD YOUR TELEGRAM ABOUT LEASE DASH LEND PD I FOUND CABINET AT ITS SECOND MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT EVEN MORE RESOLVED AGAINST TRADING THE PRINCIPLE OF IMPERIAL PREFERENCE AS CONSIDERATION FOR LEASE LEND PD I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN OPPOSED OR LUKERWARM TO IMPERIAL PREFERENCE CMA BUT THE ISSUE DID NOT TURN ON THE FISCAL ASPECT PD THIS MIGHT WELL FORM PART OF

REGRARED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 1972

Action Copy
Cablegram AC-4

PART SIX

From_ LONDON

To POTUS

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 7 1942

437P M.

AC-4

A tariff or economic discussion CMA the latter of which we are ready to begin at once pd the great majority of the cabinet felt that if we bartered the principle of imperial preference for the sake of lease lend we should have accepted an intervention in the domestic affairs of the british empire CMA and that this would lead to dangerous debates in parliament as well as to a further outbreak of the german propaganda of the kind you refer to me on the second night of my visit about the united states breaking up the british empire and reducing us to the level of territory of the union pd we should only play into the enemies hands if we gave the slightest colour to all this nonsense pd on the other hand we are all for sweeping away trade barriers and it is quite likely that we shall be willing to go further than congress in this direction pd our whole aim is to work with you in constructing a free CMA fertile CMA economic policy for the post war world pd

DEGRADED UNCATEGORIZED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
I HOPE MOST EARNESTLY THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR ALL THESE DIFFICULTIES AND TRY TO HELP FORWARD THE SUGGESTIONS BEING MADE BY US THROUGH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND STATE DEPARTMENT PD PARA TEN PD I TRUST HARRY IS IMPROVING PD PLEASE GIVE HIM MY REGARDS PD YOU WOULD I AM SURE LIKE AN AMERICAN FILM I SAW LAST NIGHT QUOTE THE REMARKABLE ANDREW UNQUOTE PD IT STIRS ONES DANDER PD PARA ELEVEN PD LASTLY CMA WOULD YOU KINDLY NUMBER YOUR TELEGRAMS TO ME FOR SAKE OF REFERENCE PD I SUGGEST THAT YOU BEGIN AT ONE HUNDRED AND I AT TWENTYFIVE CMA WHICH I AM NUMBERING THIS

PRIME

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dep't. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5, 1972
NUMBER 4 FEBRUARY 8, 1942
PERSONAL AND SECRET NUMBER TWO SIX I SENT TO WAVELL YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT HART AND DUTCH ADMIRAL ACTING PROTEM PENDING A FURTHER GENERAL CHANGE PD I NOW SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING FROM WAVELL CLN QUOTE PRESUME I SHALL GET OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES PROPOSED PD PRESIDENTS MESSAGE NOT QUITE CLEAR PD HELFRICH IS NOT AT PRESENT ACTING C IN C OF ALL NAVAL FORCES BUT COMMANDS DUTCH FORCE ONLY PD UNQUOTE SHALL I TELL HIM YOU WISH HELFRICH TO BE ACTING C IN C ALL NAVAL FORCES CMA NOT ONLY DUTCH CMA OR WILL YOU DO SO FROM WASHINGTON QUESTION /

PRIME

THIS MESG DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT 7:20 P.M. BY HIS ORDERS, COPY TO GENERAL MARSHALL, GENERAL ARNOLD, ADMIRAL STARK, AND ADMIRAL KING. ADMIRAL STARK AND ADMIRAL KING ARE TO CONFER WITH GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL ARNOLD, AND PREPARE AN ANSWER TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

COPY TO: ADMIRAL STARK

Action Copy
February 9, 1942.

From: The Combined Chiefs of Staff.
To: General Wavell.

In view Hart's request to be relieved, the designation of Vice Admiral Helfrich as Acting Commander of Combined Naval Forces in ABDA Area directed. Press release will be issued simultaneously in London and Washington at 2 p.m. GCT Wednesday February 11.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/495-1 3/28/72
By APR 4 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Churchill has started a series of telegrams beginning at 25. Will you arrange that all the President's wires that go to Churchill, whether through the State Department or otherwise, get consecutive numbers beginning with 100, which was put on the one attached.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
From  LONDON
To  POTUS

XXXC FIVE 11th

NUMBER TWENTYSEVEN PARA ONE PD NOW THAT HELFRICH HAS BEEN
MADE ACTING NAVAL CINC ABDA AREA AIR MINISTRY WOULD LIKE TO
ANNOUNCE PEIRSE AS AIR CINC PD IT IS OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD THAT
THIS APPOINTMENT WILL BE REVIEWED WHEN THE LARGER CHANGES YOU
HAVE IN MIND COME TO PASS AND GENERALLY ALL WILL BE DONE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TELEGRAMS WE HAVE EXCHANGED PD PARA TWO
PD FOR YOUR INFORMATION I MENTION WE NEED HARRIS CMA NOW ONE OF
OUR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMBINED STAFFS COMMITTEE FOR THE
BOMBER COMMAND OVER HERE CMA AND WE ARE REPLACING HIM BY AIR
MARSHALL EVILL WHO IS ADMIRABLY SUITED TO REPRESENT US PD PARA
THREE PD WE HAVE ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND MEN IN SINGAPORE
ISLAND CMA OF WHICH NEARLY SIXTY THOUSAND ARE BRITISH OR AUSTRALIAN
CMA FORTY THOUSAND BEING BRITISH PD I AM VERY GLAD WAVELL IS THERE
TODAY PD THE BATTLE MUST BE FOUGHT TO THE BITTER END PD REGARDLESS
OF CONSEQUENCES TO THE CITY OR ITS INHABITANTS PD EVERY GOOD WISH

PRIME
NUMBER 829 FEBRUARY 12TH:

THIS IS MESSAGE NUMBER TWENTY-EIGHT PARA ONE REFERENCE YOUR ONE ZERO FIVE PD I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ALL YOU SAY CMA WHICH ENTIRELY MEETS MY DIFFICULTIES PD WE SHALL AGREE THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICE FORTHWITH SUBJECT TO CLEARING MATTER FINALLY WITH DOMINIONS TO DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE NEED OF FORMAL INTERCHANGE OF LETTERS PD OF COURSE WHEN I AM ASKED I SHALL STATE MY VIEW OF THE PUBLIC DOCUMENT FROM MY OWN STANDPOINT IN TERMS WHICH WILL LIE WITHIN YOUR ASSURANCES PD I DO NOT INTEND TO QUOTE YOU PD PARA TWO RE YOUR ONE ZERO THREE PD I AM VERY GLAD YOU HAVE DONE THIS PD PARA THREE PD I AM TELLING CHIANG THAT WE SHOULD LIKE HIM TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE LONDON PACIFIC COUNCIL CMA OF COURSE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO HIS CONTRACTS WITH WASHINGTON PD I HAVE HAD A TELEGRAM FROM DILL SUGGESTING OUR SENDING PUBLIC MESSAGES TO CHIANG CMA WHICH SEEM TO HAVE A NOTE OF APPEAL IN THEM PD I THINK IT BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL WE GET THROUGH OUR IMMEDIATE MISFORTUNES BEFORE SENDING SUCH MESSAGES PD I DO NOT GATHER THAT YOU HAVE YET BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THIS PD PARA FOUR PD SCHARNHORST AND GNEISENAU ARE BEATING THEIR WAY UP CHANNEL AND HAVE RUN THE BATTERIES AT DOVER PD WE ARE OUT AFTER THEM WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE PD PARA FIVE PD A FIERCE
#6 FROM LONDON

BATTLE IS RAGING AT SINGAPORE AND ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO FIGHT IT OUT PD PARA SIX PD I AM HOLDING UP ANNOUNCEMENT AIR MARSHALL PEIRSE CMA AND EQUALLY HARRIS PD FORMER NAVAL PERSON

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: LONDON

To: POTUS

NO 7, FEBRUARY 16

TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND SECRET PARA ONE PD

WAVELL WIRE THAT HE WOULD LIKE AN AMERICAN ADMIRAL
TO BE APPOINTED AS DEPUTY TO HELFRICH BUT THAT HE
WANTS TO KEEP PALLISER PAREN BRITISH PAREN AS CHIEF
ASSISTANT PD HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT PALLISER SHOULD
NOT BE REPLACED AT THE PRESENT CRISIS PD PARA TWO PD
YOU WILL HAVE SEEN WAVELLS TELEGRAMS ABOUT NEW SITUATION
CREATED BY FALL OF SINGAPORE AND JAPANESE STRONG
LANDINGS IN SUMATRA PD WE ARE CONSIDERING NEW POSITION
TONIGHT ON THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE AND TOMORROW ON THE
PACIFIC COUNCIL CMA AND WILL SEND YOU OUR RECOMMENDATIONS PD UNLESS THERE IS GOOD PROSPECT OF EFFECTIVE
RESISTANCE IN SUMATRA AND JAVA CMA THE ISSUE ARISES
WHETHER ALL REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE DIVERED TO
RANGOON AND AUSTRALIA PD THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SEEM
INCLINED TO PRESS FOR THE RETURN OF THEIR TWO DIVISIONS
TO AUSTRALIA PD I COULD NOT RESIST THEM FOR LONG CMA
AND PROBABLY THEIR THIRD DIVISION PD (CMA?) NOW IN
PALESTINE CMA WILL FOLLOW PD IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE
MOST VITAL POINT AT THE MOMENT IS RANGOON CMA ALONE
ASSURING CONTRACT WITH CHINA PD AS YOU SEE CMA
WAVERLL HAS VERY RIGHLY ALREADY DIVERTED OUR ARMoured
BRIGADE CMA WHICH SHOULD REACH THERE ON THE TWENTIETH
INSTANT PD THE CHIEFS OF THE STAFF WILL SEND YOU THE
RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW THROUGH THE MILITARY
CHANNEL PD PARA THREE PD A BATTLE IS IMPENDING IN
LIBYA IN WHICH ROMMEL WILL PROBAOLY TAKE THE OFFENSIVE
PD WE HOPE TO GIVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF OURSELVES PD
PRELIMINARY AIR FIGHTING YESTERDAY WAS VERY GOOD PD
PARA FOUR PD THE NAVAL POSITION IN HOME WATERS AND
THE ATLANTIC HAS BEEN DEFINITELY EASED BY THE RETREAT
OF THE GERMAN NAVAL FORCES FROM BREST PD FROM THERE
THEY THREATENED ALL OUR EAST DASH BOUND CONVOYS CMA
ENFORCING TWO BATTLE DASH SHIPS ESCORT PD THEIR
SQUADRONs COULD ALSO MOVE EITHER ON TO THE ATLANTIC
TRADE ROUTES OR INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN WE WOULD FAR
RATHER HAVE IT WHERE IT IS THAN WHERE IT WAS PD OUR
BOMBER EFFORT INSTEAD OF BEING DISPERSED CAN NOW BE
CONCENTRATED ON GERMANY PD LASTLY CMA AS YOU MAY
HAVE LEARNT FROM MOST SECRET SOURCES CMA PRINZ
EUGEN WAS DAMAGED AND BOTH SCHARNHORST AND
NO 7 FEBRUARY 16 PAGE 3

GNEISENAU WERE MINED CMA THE FORMER TWICE PD THIS WILL KEEP THEM OUT OF MISCHIEF FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS CMA DURING WHICH BOTH OUR NAVIES WILL RECEIVE IMPORTANT ACCESSIONS OF STRENGTH PD NATURALLY WE WERE VERY SORRY WE DID NOT SINK THEM CMA AND AN INQUIRY IS BEING HELD AS TO WHY WE DID NOT KNOW AT DAYLIGHT THEY WERE OUT PD NUMBER TWENTY NINE SIGNED FORMER NAVAL PERSON

X PRIME
From LONDON, 

To THE PRESIDENT. 

LONDON NO. 8. FEBRUARY 19TH. 

PERSONAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT 


DECLASSIFIED 
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72 

By Date 2/11/72
CRANBORNE IS TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES PD I WAS TOLD CONFIDENTIALLY THAT A CHANGE IS CONTEMPLATED IN THE WAR OFFICE PD IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT BEAVEROOK WILL BE ASSIGNED TO DO SPECIAL MISSIONS PD THE LATTER HAS SO MARRIED THE PRIME MINISTER SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT I WILL NOT BE SORRY TO SEE HIM OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE TIME BEING PD BRINGING CRIPPS INTO THE GOVERNMENT WILL SATISFY PRO RUSSIAN SYMPATHIES PD THE CHANGES WOULD STRENGTHEN LABOR SUPPORT AND ALSO PERMIT GREATER TEAMWORK WITHIN THE WAR CABINET PD BEVIN AND BEAVERROSOK WERE ALWAYS AT SWORDS POINTS PD PARA THE REALIGNMENT SHOULD BE MORE FRIENDLY RATHER THAN LESS FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND SHOULD GIVE GREATER SUPPORT TO OUR GENERAL PEACE AIDS PD PARA ALTHOUGH AMERY CONTINUES AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA I AM TOLD THAT THERE WILL BE AN EFFORT TO RECONSIDER INDIAN POLICY PD PARA THE PRIME MINISTER WAS DELIGHTED WITH YOUR MESSAGE PD PD I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM VISITING OUR TROOPS WITH GENERAL CHANEY PD THEY WERE WELL AND IN GOOD SPIRITS PD PARA I AM USING YOUR SPECIAL WIRE TO TRANSMIT THIS INFORMATION.

WINANT.

ACTION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By

Date 2/11/72

0761
FEBRUARY 19, 1942

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR MR. HOPKINS.

THE DUTCH WANT ME TO SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING FOR OUR FRIEND.

REFERENCE TELEGRAM COS(4) 60 WHICH WE SENT YESTERDAY TO COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR PROPOSED DRAFT TELEGRAM TO GENERAL WAVELL, WHICH CAME TO US AS JSM NO. 47 WITH NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER.

(2) DUTCH GOVERNMENT ARE VERY ANXIOUS THAT PARAGRAPH 1 OF INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL WAVELL SHOULD FOLLOW AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WORDING OF RESOLUTION OF PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL. THE REASON IS THAT YOUR DRAFT MIGHT GIVE IMPRESSION OF LACK OF DETERMINATION TO FIGHT IT OUT IN JAVA.

(3) SUGGEST ORIGINAL WORDING SHOULD STAND WITH ADDITION OF FOLLOWING:

"YOU HAVE DISCRETION AS TO PRECISE WAY IN WHICH THIS INSTRUCTION IS IMPLEMENTED."

(4) REFERENCE: PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR DRAFT, PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL HAD VERY MUCH HOPED THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEND NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS TO ABDA AREA. NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT ARE THEREFORE EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTED THAT NO SUCH REINFORCEMENTS APPEAR TO BE CONTEMPLATED. THEY EARNESTLY REQUEST ME TO ASK YOU TO RECONSIDER THIS MATTER.
COPY

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ARDACOM

FROM: Combined Chiefs of Staff

Dated: 1oth February, 1942

D.E.A. 18

Reference your personal 01288/16 and C.C.O.S. 7 and 8.

1. JAVA should be defended with the utmost resolution by all forces at present in the Island. Every day gained is of importance.

2. You have discretion to augment defence of Java with available naval forces and with U.S. aircraft now at your disposal assembling in Australia.

3. Land reinforcements now on the way from the West should not repeat now proceed to Java, but should augment defense of points in your area vital to the continuance of struggle against Japan, namely, Burma and Australia.

4. Consent of Australian Government is being sought to despatch of 7th Australian Division to Burma to assist in defence of that country until relieved by other forces from the West.

5. 6th and 9th Australian Divisions will be moved to Australia from Middle East as rapidly as possible.

6. Combined U.S. naval and air operations are now under way on Japanese flank in area immediately east of New Guinea.

T.O.O. 22090/18

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION
From: LONDON
To: POTUS

NUMBER 30, FEBRUARY 20TH:

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT NUMBER THIRTY PERSO
NAL AND SECRET PARA ONE I AM MOST DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FO
R YOUR WARM HEARTED TELEGRAM NUMBER ONE HUNDRED SIX PD THE
PRESSURE HERE HAS NEVER BEEN DANGEROUS AND I HAVE USED IT T
O EFFECT WHOLESOME CHANGES AND ACCESSIONS PD YOU MAY TAKE I
T EVERYTHING IS NOW SOLID PD PARA TWO I AM GRIEVED ABOUT MA
X CMA BUT HE REALLY DOES NEED TWO OR THREE MONTHS IN SUNSHI
NE FOR HIS ASTHMA AND I KNOW YOU WILL REALIZE WHAT FRIENDS
WE ARE AND HOW HELPFUL HIS DRIVING POWER WILL BE WHEN HE M
AS RECOVERED HIS HEALTH PARA THREE I DO NOT LIKE THESE DAYS
OF PERSONAL STRESS AND I HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO KEEP M
Y EYE ON THE BALL PD WE ARE HOWEVER IN THE FULLEST ACCORD I
N ALL MAIN THINGS CMA AND I WILL TELEPRINT YOU MORE AT LARG
E OVER THE WEEKEND PD DEMOCRACY HAS TO PROVE THAT IT CAN PR
OVIDE A GRANITE FOUNDATION FOR WAR AGAINST TYRANNY PD I AM
LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR RUBBING IT IN ABOUT THE EASEMENT IN
THE ATLANTIC BY THE GERMAN FLIGHT FROM BREST CMA BUT OF CO
URSE WE CANNOT DWELL TOO MUCH UPON THE DAMAGE THEY SUSTAINE
D PD EVERY GOOD WISH AND VERY MANY THANKS SIGNED WINSTON CH
URCHILL

ACTION COPY PRIME
NO. XXXXC 10 FEBRUARY 20TH
TO PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON NUMBER THIRTY

ONE MOST IMMEDIATE PD PARA THE ONLY TROOPS WHO CAN REACH RANGOON IN TIME TO STOP THE ENEMY AND ENABLE OTHER REINFORCEMENTS TO ARRIVE ARE THE LEADING AUSTRALIAN DIVISION PD THESE CAN BEGIN TO ARRIVE THERE BY TWENTYSIXTH OR TWENTYSEVENTH PD WE HAVE ASKED AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THIS DIVERSION FOR THE NEEDS OF BATTLE AND PROMISED TO RELIEVE THEM AT EARLIEST PD ALL OTHER AUSTRALIAN TROOPS GOING HOME AT EARLIEST PD AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE REFUSED POINT BLANK PD I HAVE APPEALED TO THEM AGAIN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING OPEN BURMA ROAD AND MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH CHIANG PD PARA TWO IN VIEW OF YOUR OFFER OF AMERICAN TROOPS TO HELP DEFEND AUSTRALIA AND POSSIBLE NAVAL MovEMENTS I FEEL YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO PRESS FOR THIS MOVEMENT OF ALLIED FORCES PD PLEASE THEREFORE SEND ME A MESSAGE WHICH I CAN ADD TO THE VERY STRONG CABLE I HAVE JUST SENT OFF PD OUR CHIEFS OF STAFFS HERE ARE MOST INSISTENT AND I HAVE NO DOUBT OUR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON FEEL THE SAME WAY PD THERE IS NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD NOT ALSO TALK TO CASEY
TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 20, 1942

TO: AMBASSADOR, LONDON
FOR: CHURCHILL
FROM: HOPKINS

HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE WITH PRESIDENT.
SECTION ONE HAS BEEN REDRAFTED AND HAS BEEN SENT TO WAVELL
BY COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.
"JAVA SHOULD BE DEFENDED WITH THE UTMOST RESOLUTION BY ALL
FORCES AT PRESENT IN THE ISLAND. EVERY DAY GAINED IS OF
IMPORTANCE. THERE SHOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS OR AIR
FORCES OF ANY NATIONALITY AND NO SURRENDER. AMENDMENTS TO THESE
INSTRUCTIONS CAUSED BY EMERGENCY CHANGES IN SITUATION SHOULD BE
REFERRED TO WASHINGTON AND IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE WILL BE
DECIDED BY YOU ON THE SPOT."

PRESIDENT WILL CABLE YOU DIRECT LATER TODAY RELATIVE TO
NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
MOST IMMEDIATE

To: ABDA Com
Reptd: Chiefs of Staff, London
From: Combined Chiefs of Staff
No: D.B.A. 20

21 February 1942

1. Your own headquarters will be withdrawn in such a manner, at such time and to such a place within or without the ABDA Area as you may decide, but its timely withdrawal is important. Dutch should be allowed to decide which of their representatives with your Headquarters should leave or stay and also destination of any personnel withdrawn.

2. Amplification of instructions contained in paragraph 1 of D.B.A. 19 will follow. In meantime Dutch shipping should be held and used accordingly.

3. When you withdraw report to whom you have transferred Command of JAVA.

4. Future ABDA Area now being considered by Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. Acknowledge.

6. Our D.B.A. 18 was not used.


DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/495-1 3/28/72
By JF PB Date APR 4 1972
MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Chiefs of Staff, London 21 February 1942
From: Joint Staff Mission, Washington
No: J.S.M. 58

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. PRESIDENT agrees to following message which was originally proposed as paragraph 1 of D.B.A. 20. To save time request you despatch most immediate to ABDACOM as D.B.A. 22 repeating here if Prime Minister concurs.

2. "Reference paragraph 2 of D.B.A. 20. All men of fighting units for whom there are arms must continue to fight without thought of evacuation, but air forces which can more usefully operate in battle from bases outside Java and all air personnel for whom there are no aircraft and such troops as cannot contribute to defence of Java should be withdrawn. With respect to personnel who cannot contribute to defence, general policy should be to withdraw U.S. and Australian personnel to Australia."

T.O.O. 1655Q/21

DECASSIFIED
By Authority of
927/495-1 3/28/72
By APR 4/1972
MOST IMMEDIATE

22 February 1942

To: ABDA Com.

Reptd: Chiefs of Staff, London

From: Combined Chiefs of Staff

No: D.B.A. 22

Reference paragraph 2 of D.B.A. 20. All men of fighting units for whom there are arms must continue to fight without thought of evacuation, but air forces which can more usefully operate in battle from bases outside Java and all air personnel for whom there are no aircraft and such troops particularly technicians as cannot contribute to defence of Java, should be withdrawn. With respect to personnel who cannot contribute to defence, general policy should be to withdraw U.S. and Australian personnel to Australia.

T.O.O. 0059Q/22

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/49S-1 3128/12
By RAB Date APR 4 1972
An agreement between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on the principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war was signed yesterday (Monday) by the Acting Secretary of State and the British Ambassador.

The agreement is made under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941. By this Act of the Congress and the great appropriations by which it has been supported this nation is able to provide arms, equipment, and supplies to any country whose defense is vital to our own defense.

On December 7, 1941, we were attacked. We are now one of the twenty-six United Nations devoting all of their united strength to the winning of this war and to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The vast resources which Providence has given us enable us to insure that our comrades in arms shall not lack arms. Congress has granted the authority and the means. United and equipped by the overwhelming productive power of their resources and ours, we shall fight together to the final victory.

Recent developments in the war have shown, if proof was required, the wisdom and necessity of the policy of lend-lease supplies to the United Nations. That policy continues, and is expanding to meet the expanding needs of the fighting fronts. The agreement signed yesterday reaffirms our purpose to supply aid to Great Britain. The British Government will supply this country with such reciprocal aid as it is in a position to give.

As to the terms of settlement between the two countries, the agreement states that it is too early in this struggle to foresee or define the precise and detailed terms. Instead the agreement lays down certain of the principles which are to prevail. These principles are broadly conceived, for the scale of aid is so vast that narrow conceptions of the terms of settlement would be as disastrous to our economy and to the welfare of our people as to the welfare of the British people. Articles which at the end of the war can be returned to us, and which we wish to have back, will be returned. Full account will be taken of all reciprocal aid.

The fundamental framework of the final settlement which shall be sought on the economic side is given in Article VII. It shall be a settlement by agreement open to participation by all other nations of like mind. Its purpose shall be not to burden but to improve worldwide economic relations. Its aim will be to provide appropriate national and international measures to expand...
production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which, the agreement states, are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples, to eliminate all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers, and, generally, to attain the economic objectives of the Atlantic Charter.

To that end Article VII provides for the early commencement of conversations, within the framework which it outlines, with a view to establishing now the foundations upon which we may create after the war a system of enlarged production, exchange, and consumption of goods for the satisfaction of human needs in our country, in the British Commonwealth, and in all other countries which are willing to join in this great effort.
Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Authorized and Provided for by the Act of March 11, 1941.

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Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfil or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.
ARTICLE II

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

ARTICLE IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

ARTICLE VII

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation.
by all other countries of like mind, directed to the
expansion, by appropriate international and domestic
measures, of production, employment, and the exchange
and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations
of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimina-
tion of all forms of discriminatory treatment in interna-
tional commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other
trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all
the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration
made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United
States of America and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom.

At an early convenient date, conversations shall be
begun between the two Governments with a view to determining,
in the light of governing economic conditions, the best
means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their
own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of
other like-minded Governments.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's
date. It shall continue in force until a date to be
agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this
23rd day of February, 1942.
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 24, 1942
10:41 A.M.

From AMBASSADOR LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

NO XXXC 11 FEBRUARY 24TH
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON NUMBER THIRTY TWO PARA WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS
ON YOUR HEARTENING DECLARATION

PRIME

REGRADES UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 27, 1942

7:56 P.M.

From USG AMEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

NO XXXC 12 FEBRUARY 27TH

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMAL NAVAL
PERSON NUMBER THIRTY THREE PCRA UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION PD I BELIEVE THAT A NUMBER OF FOREIGN
INDIVIDUALS CMA ORGANIZATIONS CMA OR GROUPS HAVE
RECENTLY TOLD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CMA AND IN
SOME CASES THEY HAVE TOLD US AS WELL CMA OF THEIR WISH TO
ACCEDE TO THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION AS QUOTE
APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES UNQUOTE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON
JANUARY SIXTH, YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT THIS STATEMENT WAS
DEvised FOR THE FREE FRENCH PD APPLICATIONS HAVE BEEN
RECEIVED CMA AMONG OTHERS CMA FROM OTTO STRASSERS
FREE GERMAN MOVEMENT CMA THE BASQUE AND CATALAN EMIGRE
MOVEMENTS CMA KING ZOG AND THE LATVIAN MINISTER
MINISTER AT WASHINGTON PD HALIFAX HAS TOLD THE STATE
DEPARTMENT THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF STATEMENTS OF ACCESSION
BY THESE GROUPS WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO US AND I UNDER­
STAND THAT THERE IS NOT IN FACT ANY QUESTION OF SUCH
ACCESSIONS BEING ACCEPTED PD WE MAY CMA HOWEVER CMA
SHORTLY HAVE TO CONSIDER APPROACHES FROM MORE WELCOME
REgraded UNCLASSIFIED BY British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 7-89-72
By R. E. Parka Date 5/3 1972

Action Copy
CANDIDATES SUCH AS PERSIA AND ETHIOPIA AND POSSIBLY IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA AS WELL AS THE FREE FRENCH PD
MY FEELING IS THAT IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE COUNTRY DESIRING TO JOIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE BUT THAT WE
SHOULD WELCOME ADHERENCE OF THESE PARTICULAR COUNTRIES PD I AM MOST ANXIOUS THAT YOU AND WE SHOULD KEEP IN
STEP AND THAT NO ACCESSION SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT PREVIOUS CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO OF US PD AS I
UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE DEALING PERSONALLY WITH THIS QUESTION CMA I PUT MY VIEWS DIRECTLY TO YOU PD EACH
PARTICULAR CASE WHICH ARISES CAN OF COURSE BE DISCUSSED THROUGH THE USUAL CHANNELS

PRIME