THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 1, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made of me on Friday, I am enclosing herewith a suggested message for you to send to Mr. Churchill in response to his message to you of February 27.

I am returning to you herewith Mr. Churchill's message, as you requested.

Believe me.

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.
NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.

No. 112 FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

The views outlined in your telegram on the adherences to the United Nations declaration very closely coincide with mine.

I believe we should without question accept the adherence of the French National Committee in London, whenever submitted, but that we should consult as to the action to be taken on requests for further adherences from governments with which we are still in official communication.

We might then determine at what moment we should bring the Soviet Government, and other governments of the United Nations which may be directly concerned, into these consultations.

As for "free groups" representing the populations of occupied countries, and other organizations, I have no intention of taking any action without full consultation.

Enciphered by 

Sent by operator M., 19

1/12
with you.

Welles had already commenced the discussion of this general problem with Halifax prior to the receipt of your message, and he will continue these conversations along the lines above indicated.  

Burch

Acting
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Attached are 3 copies of revised draft of message from the President to the Prime Minister.

Will you please give one copy to Mr. Hopkins and keep one for your file. Please, also, when the message is finally sent, send me a copy for distribution to the Chiefs of Staff.

W. B. S.

Incl.
Draft of message.
TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

No. 113 1. We have been in constant conference since receipt of your message of March 4th to insure that nothing is left unexplored which can in any way improve our present prospects. We recognize fully the magnitude of the problems confronting you in the Indian Ocean and are equally concerned over those which confront us in the Pacific, particularly since the United States assumes a heavy responsibility regarding measures for the defense of Australia, New Zealand, and the guarding of their sea approaches. You, on the other hand, will recognize the difficulties under which we labor in deploying and maintaining, in unprepared and distant positions, the considerable forces which will be required to meet this critical situation. I know that you will also appreciate that success in holding this region depends largely upon the adequacy of shipping, and the availability of munitions and aircraft for arming Dominion forces. The magnitude of the effort which may be put forth by the U.S. in the Southwest Pacific has a direct relation to the magnitude of the air offensive which the U.S. will be able to undertake from United Kingdom Bases.

2. The U.S. is now operating a large part of the Pacific Fleet in the Anzac region, for the defense of Australia and New Zealand, for preserving a base area for a future decisive offensive against Japan, and for containing Japanese naval and air forces in the Pacific. Provided their bases in the west of Australia can be kept secure, U.S. submarines will continue to operate in the ABDA Area against Japanese supply lines and against naval forces that exit to the Indian Ocean.

3. While Japan is indeed extending herself over a large area, it must be admitted that the deployment has been skilfully executed and continues to be effective. The energy of the Japanese attack is still very powerful. It is only through a greater energy, skill, and determination, that Japan can be halted before
she attains a dominating position from which it would prove most difficult to eject her. The U.S. agrees that the Pacific situation is now very grave, and, if it is to be stabilized, requires an immediate, concerted, and vigorous effort by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. To establish the many defended bases now planned and to transport to them their garrisons, together with enough amphibious troops for even minor offensives, requires the movement there of some of our amphibious forces, and the use of all our combat loaded transports which are not urgently needed at home for elementary training of additional amphibious formations. The loan to the British of transports for further troop movements to India requires the use of combat transports for carrying U.S. garrisons to positions in the Pacific, and thus, seriously reduces present possibilities of offensive action in other regions.

4. We concur in your estimate of the importance of the Indian and Middle East Areas and agree that reinforcements are required. We also agree that the Australian and New Zealand divisions now in that region should remain. The 41st Division is leaving the United States by the 10th of this month, reaching Australia about April 10th. As a replacement for Australian and New Zealand divisions allotted to the Middle East and India, the United States is prepared to dispatch two additional divisions: one to Australia and one to New Zealand. A convoy of one-half a division could leave about April 15th and the remainder of this division about May 15th. Another U.S. division can also leave for the Southwest Pacific about May 15th. It should be understood that our willingness to dispatch these two divisions, over and above the 41st, which is already set up to go, is based on the necessity for economizing in shipping and the continuing security of the Middle East, India and Ceylon. It is, therefore, dependent upon the retention of a similar number of Australian and New Zealand divisions in those theaters. The above movements in
the Southwest Pacific can be accomplished provided that some twenty-five cargo ships are withdrawn for one voyage from those engaged in transport of Lend-Lease material to the Red Sea and to China, and scheduled to sail in April and May.

5. The U.S. can furnish shipping to move 2 divisions (40,000 men) with their equipment from the U.K. to the Middle East and India. The first convoy consisting of all the U.S. shipping and the Aquitanic can depart for U.K. about April 26 and the remainder about May 6. The supplying of these ships is contingent upon acceptance of the following during the period they are so used:

a. Gymnast cannot be undertaken.

b. Movements of U.S. troops to the British Isles will be limited to those which these ships can take from the U.S.

c. Direct movements to Iceland (C) cannot be made.

d. Eleven cargo ships must be withdrawn from sailings for Burma and Red Sea during April and May. These ships are engaged in transportation of Lend-Lease material to China and the Middle East.

e. American contribution to an air offensive against Germany in 1942 would be somewhat curtailed and any American contribution to land operations on the continent of Europe in 1942 will be materially reduced.

It is considered essential that the U.S. ships used for the movement of the two British Divisions be returned to U.S. upon completion of the movement.

6. In addition to considerable U.S. air, antiaircraft and auxiliary troops, there is now in Australia one division, intended for defense of New Caledonia, which contributes directly to Australian security. As stated above, the 41st Division is scheduled to sail to Australia on March 18th. With the arrival
of this division, U.S. ground and air forces in Australia and New Caledonia will total some 90,000 men.

Samoa has been garrisoned and a U.S. pursuit squadron has been sent to Suva. With the line from Samoa to Australia held, New Zealand in its retired position south thereof, is not thought to be in danger of serious attack.

PERSONNEL SHIPPING

7. The present shipbuilding program seems to be about the maximum that can be attained, and any increases would not be available until after June, 1944. Included in the program are thirty C-4 ships, each having a lift of 3,675 men, and twenty P-2 ships, each having a lift of 5,750 men. Thus, under construction we now have troopships that will carry 225,250 men. It is understood that the British do not plan to increase their total of troop-carrying ships.

Shipping now available, under the U.S. flag, will lift a total of about 130,000 men. Increases from conversions during 1942 are estimated at at least 35,000 men. By June, 1943, new construction will give an additional 40,000, by December, 1943, an additional 100,000, and by June, 1944, an additional 95000. Thus, neglecting losses, the total troop carrying capacity of U.S. vessels by June, 1944 will be 400,000 men.

AIR

8. The deployment of the American Air Forces, which, at this stage, must be regarded as wholly tentative, including Army and shore based Naval Aviation, will be in accordance with the following strategic concept: offense against Germany using maximum forces; defense of the general area Alaska, Hawaii, Australia, using necessary forces in support of the United States Navy in that area and in maintaining essential sea communications in all U.S. areas; defense of North and South America using essential forces. Tentative distribution by the end of 1942 of first line strength is as follows:
a. **Alaska**, Army one group (thirty-five) heavy bombers heavy bombers and one group (eighty) pursuit, Navy 48 VPB.

b. **Hawaii and North Pacific Islands**, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers three groups plus two squadrons (290) pursuit, one squadron (13) light bombers, Navy 126 VPB 48 VSO 90 VP, 90 VSB.

c. **Southwest Pacific and Australia**, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers, two groups medium bombers (114), one group light bombers (57), five groups and one squadron (425), pursuit, Navy 90 VPB, 24 VSO, 81 VSB, 81 VF.

d. **Caribbean area**, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers one group (57) medium bombers one group (57) light bombers four groups (320) pursuit, Navy (103) VPB 60 VSO.

e. **China-Indo-Burma area**, Army one group plus two squadrons heavy bombers (60) one group pursuit (80) exclusive of AVG.

f. **Outposts on Lines of Communications**, Army one squadron heavy bombers (8) two squadrons medium bombers (26) seven squadrons pursuit (175), Navy 48 VPB 12 VSO.

g. **Army Air Forces available for offensive against Germany**:

   (1) **July 1942**, three groups heavy bombers (105) one group medium bombers (57) three groups light bombers (171) five groups pursuits (400).

   (2) **October 1942**, eleven groups heavy bombers (385) three groups medium bombers (171) five groups light bombers (285) seven groups pursuits (560).

   (3) **January 1943**, fifteen groups heavy bombers (525) seven groups medium bombers (399) seven groups light bombers (399) thirteen groups pursuits (1040).

*Pursuit to be used as fighter escort for daylight bombing and for offensive sweeps.*
9. This does not include airplanes in depot reserve and those essential for operational training. As much as possible of this force is essential in the United Kingdom if a concerted offensive against German Military strength and resources is to be made in 1942. The above dispositions include forces previously set up for GYMNAST and MAGNET.

10. In confiding thus fully and personally to you the details of our military arrangements I do not mean that they should be withheld from your close military advisors. I request, however, that further circulation be drastically reduced.

11. I am sending you a personal suggestion on Sunday in regard to simplification of area responsibilities.

12. This may be a critical period but remember always it is not as bad as some you have as well survived before.
To Former Naval Person:

7 March 1942

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pursuit, one squadron (13) light bombers, Navy 126 VPB
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c. Southwest Pacific and Australia, Army two groups (70)
heavy bombers, two groups medium bombers (114), one group light
bombers (57), five groups and one squadron (425), pursuit,
Navy 90 VPB, 24 VSO, 81 VSE, 81 VF.

d. Caribbean area, Army two groups (70) heavy bombers
one group (57) medium bombers one group (57) light bombers
four groups (320) pursuit, Navy (108) VPB 60 VSO.

e. China-India-Burma area, Army one group plus two
squadrons heavy bombers (60) one group pursuit (80) exclusive
of AVG.

f. Outposts on lines of communications, Army one squadron
heavy bombers (8) two squadrons medium bombers (26) seven
squadrons pursuit (175), Navy 48 VPB 12 VSO.

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Germany:

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bombers (235) seven groups pursuit# (560).

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10. In confiding thus fully and personally to you the details of our military arrangements I do not mean that they should be withheld from your close military advisors. I request, however, that further circulation be drastically reduced.

11. I am sending you a personal suggestion on Sunday in regard to simplification of area responsibilities.

12. This may be a critical period but remember always it is not as bad as some you have so well survived before.

ROOSEVELT
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON
LONDON

March 9, 1942.

I have decided, if it is agreeable to you, to send to you in London, as my representative on naval matters, the present Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, as the successor to Admiral Ghormley who has been serving as Special Naval Observer in London. Stark has, as you know, broad knowledge of our Naval Forces: afloat and ashore, and I think he will definitely contribute to the work of the Combined Staff in London.

I am putting Admiral King into Stark's place here as Chief of Naval Operations, but King will also retain the position of Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and will remain in Washington.

FDR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 29 1971

Answered by Pierre
Minister's # 43, 10 Mar 42.
TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

I TELEGRAPHED YOU SATURDAY NIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMBINED STAFFS AS YOU DOUBTLESS RECOGNIZED FROM THE CONTEXT. I WANT TO SEND YOU THIS PURELY PERSONAL VIEW SO THAT YOU MAY KNOW HOW MY THOUGHTS ARE DEVELOPING RELATIVE TO ORGANIZATION.

I AM CONCERNED BY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESENT OPERATIONAL COMMAND SETUP TO WHICH IS ADDED EQUAL COMPLEXITY IN THE POLITICAL SETUP.

WHEN ALL IS CONSIDERED THE OVERWHELMING CONTRIBUTION OF ALL THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RUSSIA, AND TO LESSER EXTENT CHINA, COMES AND WILL INCREASINGLY COME FROM THE RESOURCES OF BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. EVER SINCE OUR JANUARY MEETINGS THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS OF THAT PERIOD HAVE LARGELY BECOME OBSOLETE IN RELATION TO THE WHOLE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

I WISH THEREFORE THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL SIMPLIFICATION.

(1) THE WHOLE OF THE OPERATION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PACIFIC AREA WILL REST ON THE UNITED STATES. THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR OPERATING DECISIONS FOR THE AREA AS A WHOLE WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THERE WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS WITH MEMBERS FROM AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND CHINA WITH AN AMERICAN PRESIDING. CANADA COULD BE ADDED. THE PACIFIC COUNCIL NOW SITTING IN LONDON MIGHT WELL BE MOVED HERE; AT ANY RATE THE OPERATIONAL FACT OF ITS FUNCTIONS INCLUDING SUPPLY SHOULD OPERATE FROM HERE.
YOU MAY THINK IT BEST TO HAVE A PACIFIC COUNCIL IN LONDON
CONSIDERING POLITICAL QUESTIONS.

THE SUPREME COMMAND IN THIS AREA WILL BE AMERICAN.
LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND ON THE CONTINENT OF AUSTRALIA WILL BE
IN CHARGE OF AN AUSTRALIAN. LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND IN NEW
ZEALAND WILL BE UNDER A NEW ZEALANDER. LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND
IN CHINA WILL BE UNDER THE GENERALISSIMO. LOCAL OPERATING COMMAND
IN DUTCH INDIES WOULD BE GIVEN TO A DUTCHMAN IF LATER ON AN
OFFENSIVE CAN REGAIN THAT AREA FROM THE JAPANESE.

UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT DECISIONS FOR IMMEDIATE
OPERATING STRATEGY WOULD BE DETERMINED IN WASHINGTON AND BY
AMERICAN SUPREME COMMANDER FOR WHOLE PACIFIC AREA UNDER SUPERVISION
OF UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE METHODS OF REGAINING THE
OFFENSIVE WOULD BE SIMILARLY DECIDED. THIS WOULD INCLUDE FOR
EXAMPLE OFFENSIVES IN NORTHWESTERLY DIRECTION FROM THE MAIN BASES
AND ATTACKS ON JAPAN PROPER FROM CHINESE OR ALEUTIAN OR SIBERIAN
BASES. THERE WOULD BE DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITY ON OUR PART THUS
RELIEVING BRITISH FROM ANY TASKS IN THIS AREA OTHER THAN SUPPLE-
MENTING OUR EFFORTS WITH MATERIAL WHERE POSSIBLE.

(2) THE MIDDLE AREA EXTENDING FROM SINGAPORE TO AND INCLUDING
INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, PERSIAN GULF, RED SEA, LIBYA AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN WOULD FALL DIRECTLY UNDER BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY.
ALL OPERATIONAL MATTERS IN THIS AREA WOULD BE DECIDED BY YOU. BUT
ALWAYS WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT AS MUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD BE GIVEN
TO INDIA OR NEAR EAST BY AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AS COULD BE
WORKED OUT WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE
TO IT ALL POSSIBLE MUNITIONS AND VESSEL ASSIGNMENTS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PRESUPPOSES THE TEMPORARY SHELVING OF GYMNAS.

(3) THE THIRD AREA WOULD INCLUDE THE PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH ATLANTIC AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE DEFINITE PLANS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW FRONT ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. THIS WOULD BE THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. DETAILS OF COMMAND TO BE WORKED OUT AS REQUIRED. I AM BECOMING MORE AND MORE INTERESTED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS NEW FRONT THIS SUMMER, CERTAINLY FOR AIR AND RAIDS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SHIPPING AND SUPPLIES IT IS INFINITELY EASIER FOR US TO PARTICIPATE IN BECAUSE OF A MAXIMUM DISTANCE OF ABOUT THREE THOUSAND MILES. AND EVEN THOUGH LOSSES WILL DOUBTLESS BE GREAT, SUCH LOSSES WILL BE COMPENSATED BY AT LEAST EQUAL GERMAN LOSSES AND BY COMPELLING GERMANS TO DIVERT LARGE FORCES OF ALL KINDS FROM RUSSIAN FRONTS.

FURTHERMORE UNDER THIS PLAN ICELAND AND MAGNET BECOME OF LESS IMPORTANCE BECAUSE OF OFFENSIVE CONDUCTED AGAINST ENEMY ON EUROPEAN SOIL ITSELF.

(4) IT IS INTENDED OF COURSE TO CARRY THROUGH ALL POSSIBLE AID TO RUSSIA.

(5) IN REGARD TO THE SECOND PROPOSED AREA UNDER BRITISH CONTROL THE AREA ITSELF INCLUDING INDIA WOULD NOT BE OCCUPIED BY AMERICAN TROOPS OR PLANES BUT WE SHOULD WANT TO USE THE INDIAN PORTION AS AN AIR HIGHWAY FOR OUR PLANES EN ROUTE TO CHINA.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date OCT 1 1971
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF ACTUAL OPERATIONS IN THE THREE AREAS WOULD REMAIN AS THEY ARE TODAY THE SUBJECT OF STUDY AND DECISIONS BY THE COMBINED STAFFS BOTH HERE AND IN LONDON AND THE JOINT COMMITTEES ON SHIPPING, ON RAW MATERIALS AND ON MUNITIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS THEY DO NOW--ALL SUBJECT TO OUR JOINT APPROVAL.

I WISH YOU WOULD THINK THIS OVER. IT APPEALS TO ME BECAUSE OF THE SIMPLIFICATION IT OFFERS UNDER EXISTING OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES. INCIDENTALLY I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE AUSTRALIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS, DUTCH AND CHINESE WOULD RATHER WELCOME IT.

BEST OF LUCK.

ROOSEVELT
I have given much thought to the problem of India and I am grateful that you have kept me in touch with it.

As you can well realize, I have felt much diffidence in making any suggestions, and it is a subject which, of course, all of you good people know far more about than I do.

I have tried to approach the problem from the point of view of history and with a hope that the injection of a new thought to be used in India might be of assistance to you.

That is why I go back to the inception of the Government of the United States. During the Revolution, from 1775 to 1783, the British Colonies set themselves up as Thirteen States, each one under a different form of government, although each one assumed individual sovereignty.
While the war lasted there was great confusion between these separate sovereignties, and the only two connecting links were the Continental Congress (a body of ill-defined powers and large inefficiencies) and second the Continental Army which was rather badly maintained by the Thirteen States. In 1783, at the end of the war, it was clear that the new responsibilities of the thirteen sovereignties could not be welded into a Federal Union because the experiment was still in the making and any effort to arrive at a final framework would have come to naught.

Therefore, the thirteen sovereignties joined in the Articles of Confederation, an obvious stop-gap government, to remain in effect only until such time as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union. The thirteen sovereignties, from 1783 to 1789, proved, through lack of a Federal power, that they would soon fly apart into separate nations. In 1787 a Constitutional Convention was held with only twenty-five or thirty active participants,
representing all of the States. They met, not as a Parliament, but as a small group of sincere patriots, with the sole objective of establishing a Federal Government. The discussion was recorded but the meetings were not held before an audience. The present Constitution of the United States resulted and soon received the assent of two-thirds of the States.

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies -- this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government. It would, of course, represent existing governments of the British Provinces and would also represent the Council of Princes.

But my principal thought is that it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent government for the whole country. -- this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years or at least until a year after the end of the war. I suppose that this governing group,
speaking for the new Dominion, would have certain executive and administrative powers over public services, such as finances, railways, telegraphs and other things which we call public services.

Perhaps the analogy of some such method to the travails and problems of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.
For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making.

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DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
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That is why I go back to the inception of the Government of the United States. During the Revolution, from 1775 to 1783, the British Colonies set themselves up as Thirteen States, each one under a different form of government, although each one assumed individual sovereignty. While the war lasted there was great confusion between these separate sovereignties, and the only two connecting links were the Continental Congress (a body of ill-defined powers and large inefficiencies) and second the Continental Army which was rather badly maintained by the Thirteen States. In 1783, at the end of the war, it was clear that the new responsibilities of the thirteen sovereignties could not be welded into a Federal Union because the experiment was still in the making and any effort to
arrive at a final framework would come to naught.

Therefore, the thirteen sovereignties joined in the Articles of Confederation, an obvious stop-gap government, to remain in effect only until such time as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union. The thirteen sovereignties, from 1783 to 1789, proved, through lack of a Federal power, that they would soon fly apart into separate nations. In 1787 a Constitutional Convention was held with only twenty-five or thirty active participants, representing all of the States. They met, not as a Parliament, but as a small group of sincere patriots, with the sole objective of establishing a Federal Government. The discussion was recorded but the meetings were not held before an audience. The present Constitution of the United States resulted and soon received the assent of two-thirds of the States.

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies — this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government. It would, of course, represent existing governments of the British Provinces and would also represent the Council of Princes.

But my principal thought is that it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent government for the whole country. — this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years of at least until a year after the end of the war. I suppose that this central temporary governing group, speaking
for the new Dominion, would have certain executive and administrative
powers over public services, such as finances, railways, telegraphs
and other things which we call public services.

Perhaps the analogy of some such method to the travails and
problems of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant
in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard
feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress
the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of
peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of
the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who
are fighting Nazism.

I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London
and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.

For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I do
want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business,
except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight
that you and I are making.

Roosevelt

March 10, 1942
Released J.L. McCrea
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No. 117 CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAS APPROACHED ME ABOUT THE SAME MATTER ABOUT WHICH HE APPARENTLY CABLED YOU, NAMELY THE MILITARY COMMAND IN BURMA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONSIDER A COMMAND UNDER STILWELL FOR THE WHOLE OPERATION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT STILWELL COMMAND ON THE NORTHERN END WITH THE SOUTHERN PART UNDER BRITISH COMMAND.

I AM PLEASED THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK WANTS TO USE STILWELL BECAUSE I THINK IT MEANS WE WILL GET MORE EFFECTIVE MILITARY COMMAND IN THE CHINESE SECTOR AND IT WILL MEAN A CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL OF US AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK WHICH I CONSIDER TO BE OF VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS.

ROOSEVELT

3-16-42 Original copy which was added to in the President's handwriting delivered to Miss Tully this date.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAS APPROACHED ME ABOUT THE SAME MATTER
ABOUT WHICH HE APPARENTLY CABLED YOU, NAMELY THE MILITARY COMMAND
IN BURMA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONSIDER A COMMAND UNDER STILWELL FOR THE
WHOLE OPERATION AND HAVE SUGGESTED THAT STILWELL COMMAND ON THE
NORTHERN END WITH BOUNDARIES APPROXIMATELY

I AM PLEASED THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK WANTS TO USE STILWELL
BECAUSE I THINK IT MEANS WE WILL GET MORE EFFECTIVE MILITARY
COMMAND IN THE CHINESE SECTOR AND IT WILL MEAN A CLOSER WORKING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL OF US AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK WHICH I
CONSIDER TO BE OF VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS.
TELEGRAM

MARCH 16, 1942

TO: LONDON

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM HOPKINS

YOUR WIRE TO ME RELATIVE TO TANKER SINKINGS WILL BE ANSWERED WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS.

PRESIDENT ANXIOUS TO HEAR FROM YOU RELATIVE TO HIS CABLES NUMBER 115 AND NUMBER 117.

HARRY HOPKINS
FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL AND SECRET X PREFER TO MEET REQUEST CONTAINED IN YOUR DESPATCH NUMBER FORTYFOUR REGARDING IRONCLAD AS TO TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF FORCE HYPO BY SENDING DETACHMENT TO JOIN HOME FLEET EQUIVALENT IN STRENGTH TO FORCE DETACHED THEREFROM TO REPLACE FORCE HYPO PARA OUR SHIPS NOW BEING MADE READY WITH VIEW TO EARLY DEPARTURE
TELEGRAM

March 16, 1942.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No. 120. Apropos my No. 119 this afternoon I feel that it would be more advisable if we reinforce your Home Fleet temporarily and you detach such ships as are necessary either to replace your H Force or to do the whole escorting job itself. We would send a force of two battleships, two cruisers, an aircraft carrier and a squadron of destroyers to take up their position at such bases like Scapa as are agreed upon between the Admiralty and the Navy. The difficulties of our operating in Gibraltar are very considerable and I should much prefer to reinforce your Home Fleet in a manner that would enable you to release the appropriate number of ships.

Harry has shown me your cable to him relative to the tanker sinkings, which are very disturbing.

In Admiral King's despatch number 2335 of February second to the Admiralty we hoped that ten United States destroyers would thus be made available for work on the Atlantic seaboard. This has not worked out completely because it has been necessary to reinforce east bound British midocean escorts and because of the weakness of the Canadian western local escorts it has been necessary for United States units to remain with them ten degrees of longitude to the westward of the agreed limit.
The trawlers which you mention have only recently arrived or are approaching. Those here are undergoing essential voyage repairs but some will be operating within the week.

I hope that you can have a talk with Admiral Pound to see if we can't get the complete revision of the trans-Atlantic escort working so that the ten destroyers can get on to the patrol along our Atlantic seaboard. I hope this would be temporary because I have always held destroyers should not be used coast patrol as they are all purpose ships.

It seems to me that there are two things that would enable us more effectively to deal with the submarine here during the next few weeks. The first would be to open the cycle of trans-Atlantic convoys to eight days from now until July first. By that time our mounting production of small escort vessels and planes will come fully into play. I realize this means that your imports would be decreased during the next quarter but I am sure with our merchant shipbuilding program going as well as it is that we can make up for that in the second half of the year. I know you will bear in mind in connection with this that the prospective relief of one of your heavy forces will take several destroyers from the Atlantic. I am sure none can be spared from the Pacific. I think it would be unwise to consider a proposal to provide fewer destroyers with each convoy. This would, it seems to me, only invite attack.

The second measure that would help us in the immediate situation would be an instruction from you that British controlled shipping
conform to routes prescribed by the Navy in the western Atlantic. Some of your ships, as well as ours, that have been torpedoed have had on their running lights. It is very important that the routes conform to our distribution of escorting vessels.

I feel sure we are going to get on top of this but it requires some help from you during the next few weeks. Will you let me know how this strikes you.

I shall be sorry to see Casey go but I think you are giving him a more important assignment. I am sure you have made an excellent choice.

ROOSEVELT

3/9/45

Original copy (added to by the President) returned to Miss Tully this date, via Mrs. Brady.
TELEGRAM

MARCH 16, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No 120 APROPOS MY No 119 THIS AFTERNOON I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE
MORE ADVISABLE IF WE REINFORCE YOUR HOME FLEET TEMPORARILY AND
YOU DETACH SUCH SHIPS AS ARE NECESSARY EITHER TO REPLACE YOUR H
FORCE OR TO DO THE WHOLE ESCORTING JOB ITSELF. WE WOULD SEND
A FORCE OF TWO BATTLESHIPS, TWO CRUISERS, AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND
A SQUADRON OF DESTROYERS TO TAKE UP THEIR POSITION AT SUCH BASES
AS ARE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE ADMIRALTY AND THE NAVY. THE
DIFFICULTIES OF OUR OPERATING IN GIBRALTER ARE VERY CONSIDERABLE
AND I SHOULD MUCH PREFER TO REINFORCE YOUR HOME FLEET IN A MANNER
THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO RELEASE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF SHIPS.
HARRY HAS SHOWN ME YOUR CABLE TO HIM RELATIVE TO THE TANKER
SINKINGS, WHICH ARE VERY DISTURBING.

IN ADMIRAL KING'S DESPATCH NUMBER 2335 OF FEBRUARY SECOND
TO THE ADMIRALTY WE HOPE THAT TEN UNITED STATES DESTROYERS WOULD
BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR WORK ON THE ATLANTIC SEABOARD. THIS HAS
NOT WORKED OUT COMPLETELY BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO
REINFORCE EAST BOUND BRITISH MIDOCEAN ESCORTS AND BECAUSE OF THE
WEAKNESS OF THE CANADIAN WESTERN LOCAL ESCORTS IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY
FOR UNITED STATES UNITS TO REMAIN WITH THEM TEN DEGREES OF
LONGITUDE TO THE WESTWARD OF THE AGREED LIMIT.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.R. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
THE TRAVELERS WHICH YOU MENTION HAVE ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED
OR ARE APPROACHING. THOSE HERE ARE UNDERGOING ESSENTIAL VOYAGE
REPAIRS BUT SOME WILL BE OPERATING WITHIN THE WEEK.

I HOPE THAT YOU CAN HAVE A TALK WITH ADMIRAL POUND TO SEE IF
WE CAN'T GET THE COMPLETE REVISION OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC ESCORT
WORKING SO THAT THE TEN DESTROYERS CAN GET ON TO THE PATROL ALONG
OUR ATLANTIC SEABOARD.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE TWO THINGS THAT WOULD ENABLE
US MORE EFFECTIVELY TO DEAL WITH THE SUBMARINE HERE DURING THE
NEXT FEW WEEKS. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO OPEN THE CYCLE OF TRANS-
ATLANTIC CONVOYS TO EIGHT DAYS FROM NOW UNTIL JULY FIRST. BY THAT
TIME OUR MOUNTING PRODUCTION OF SMALL ESCORT VESSELS AND PLANES
WILL COME FULLY INTO PLAY. I REALIZE THIS MEANS THAT YOUR IMPORTS
WOULD BE DECREASED DURING THE NEXT QUARTER BUT I AM SURE WITH OUR
MERCHANT SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM GOING AS WELL AS IT IS THAT WE CAN
MAKE UP FOR THAT IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR. I KNOW YOU WILL
BEAR IN MIND IN CONNECTION WITH THIS THAT THE PROSPECTIVE RELIEF
OF ONE OF YOUR HEAVY FORCES WILL TAKE SEVERAL DESTROYERS FROM THE
ATLANTIC. I AM SURE NONE CAN BE SPARED FROM THE PACIFIC. I
THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO CONSIDER A PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE FEWER
DESTROYERS WITH EACH CONVOY. THIS WOULD, IT SEEMS TO ME, ONLY
INVITE ATTACK.

THE SECOND MEASURE THAT WOULD HELP US IN THE IMMEDIATE
SITUATION WOULD BE AN INSTRUCTION FROM YOU THAT BRITISH CONTROLLED

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Date]
SHIPPING CONFORM TO ROUTES PRESCRIBED BY THE NAVY IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC. SOME OF YOUR SHIPS, AS WELL AS OURS, THAT HAVE BEEN TORPEDOED HAVE HAD ON THEIR RUNNING LIGHTS. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE ROUTES CONFORM TO OUR DISTRIBUTION OF ESCORTING VESSELS.

I FEEL SURE WE ARE GOING TO GET ON TOP OF THIS BUT IT REQUIRES SOME HELP FROM YOU DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. WILL YOU LET ME KNOW HOW THIS STRIKES YOU.

I SHALL BE SORRY TO SEE CASEY GO BUT I THINK YOU ARE GIVING HIM A MORE IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT. I AM SURE YOU HAVE MADE AN EXCELLENT CHOICE.

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By  
Date  

0816
From President Roosevelt to the Former Naval Person colon General

MacArthur and a small staff arrived in Australia by air today stop Since
the Prime Minister of Australia as well as New Zealand had proposed a
United States supreme commander in that region, suggesting Brett, I
had instructed Brett immediately on MacArthur's arrival to propose the
latter officer to Mr. Curtin as Supreme Commander in Australia stop Brett
in Cabling MacArthur's arrival reports that Mr. Curtin enthusiastically
accepts MacArthur stop They urge immediate joint press release to avoid
leak stop This I think highly important if Axis propaganda attacking
MacArthur's departure from Philippines is to be forestalled stop

Therefore I authorized a press release at ten thirty A.M. Washington
time announcing MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander in that
region stop This action will in no way interfere with procedure of
determining strategic areas and spheres of responsibility through established

channels

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date

12/11/42
MARCH 17, 1942

PERSONAL AND FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT NO. 122

YOU PROBABLY HAVE HEARD OF THE GOOD GO WE HAD AT THEM OUT IN NEW GUINEA THE OTHER DAY.

A SUBSTANTIAL TASK FORCE WAS IN THE SALAMOA-LAE AREA APPARENTLY WAITING TO PROTECT A GOOD-SIZED TROOP CONVOY. OUR TASK FORCE STEAM ED INTO THE GULF OF PAPUA ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE PENINSULA TO A POINT SOME ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE MILES DISTANT FROM SALAMOA. 105 OF OUR PLANES TOOK OFF FROM A CARRIER AND CAUGHT THE ENEMY COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE INFlicting THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE:

TWO HEAVY CRUISERS SUNK; ONE LIGHT CRUISER BELIEVED SUNK; ONE DESTROYER PROBABLY SUNK; TWO DESTROYERS BADLY DAMAGED AND POSSIBLY SUNK; FIVE TRANSPORTS OR STORE SHIPS SUNK OR BADLY DAMAGED BY FIRE; TWO PATROL CRAFT BURNED, POSSIBLY SUNK; ONE MINELAYER LEFT BURNING, PROBABLY SUNK; ONE SEAPLANE TENDER SERIOUSLY DAMAGED.

IT WAS GOOD COORDINATION WITH OUR SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT WHO FOLLOWED OUR NAVAL PLANES THE NEXT DAY. THESE PLANES, AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN BOMBERS, ATTACKED THE CONVOY AS WELL AS MAKING FURTHER ATTACK IN THE SALAMOA-LAE AREA.

ALL IN ALL IT WAS A GOOD DAY'S WORK BECAUSE WE GOT AWAY WITH THE LOSS OF ONLY ONE PLANE AND OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE JAPS STILL DON'T KNOW HOW THEY WERE HIT. IT WAS BY ALL MEANS THE BEST DAY'S WORK WE HAVE HAD.
March 13, 1942.

Dear Winston:

I am sure you know that I have been thinking a lot about your troubles during the past month. We might as well admit the difficult military side of the problems; and you have the additional burdens which your delightful unwritten Constitution puts your form of government into in war times just as much as in peace time. Seriously, the American written Constitution, with its four year term, saves the unfortunate person at the top a vast number of headaches.

Next in order is that delightful god, which we worship in common, called "The Freedom of the Press". Neither one of us is much plagued by the news stories which, on the whole, are not so bad. But literally we are both menaced by the so-called interpretative comment by a handful or two of gentlemen who cannot get politics out of their heads in the worst crisis, who have little background and less knowledge, and who undertake to lead public opinion on that basis.

My own press — the worst of it — the McCormack-Patterson people, the Hearst papers and the Scripps-Howard chain — are persistently magnifying relatively unimportant domestic matters and subtly suggesting that the American role is to defend Hawaii, our east and west coasts, do the turtle act, and wait until somebody attacks our home shores. Curiously enough these survivors of isolationism are not attacking me personally except to reiterate that I am dreadfully over-burdened, or that I am my own strategist, operating without benefit of military or naval advice. It is the same old story. You are familiar with it.

Here is a thought from this amateur strategist. There is no use giving a single further thought to Singapore or the Dutch Indies. They are gone. Australia must be held and, as I telegraphed you, we are willing to undertake that. India must be held and you must do that; but, frankly, I do not worry so much about that problem as many others do. The Japanese may land on the seacoast west of Burma. They may bombaard Calcutta. But I do not visualize that they can
get enough troops to make more than a few dents on the borders -- and I think you can hold Ceylon. I hope you can get more submarines out there -- more valuable than an inferior surface fleet.

I hope you will definitely reinforce the Near East more greatly than at present. You must hold Egypt, the Canal, Syria, Iran and the route to the Caucasus.

Finally, I expect to send you in a few days a more definite plan for a joint attack in Europe itself.

By the time you get this you will have been advised of my talk with Litvinov, and I expect a reply from Stalin shortly. I know you will not mind my being brutally frank when I tell you that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so.

My Navy has been definitely slack in preparing for this submarine war off our coast. As I need not tell you, most Naval officers have declined in the past to think in terms of any vessel of less than two thousand tons. You learned the lesson two years ago. We still have to learn it. By May first I expect to get a pretty good coastal patrol working from Newfoundland to Florida and through the West Indies. I have begged, borrowed and stolen every vessel of every description over eighty feet long -- and I have made this a separate command with the responsibility in Admiral Andrews.

I know you will keep up your optimism and your grand driving force, but I know you will not mind if I tell you that you ought to take a leaf out of my notebook. Once a month I go to Hyde Park for four days, crawl into a hole and pull the hole in after me. I am called on the telephone only if something of really great importance occurs. I wish you would try it, and I wish you would lay a few bricks or paint another picture.

Give my warm regards to Mrs. Churchill. I wish much that my wife and I could see her.

As ever yours,

The Honorable
Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of England,
London,
England.

P.S. Winant is here. I think he is really a most understanding person.
FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL AND

NO. 123 YOUR NUMBER FORTY EIGHT X WE WILL SEND DEPARTING ABOUT MARCH TWENTY THIRD DETACHMENT

UNDER COMMAND OF WILCOX COMPRISING ONE NEW BATTLESHIP TWO HEAVY CRUISERS ONE CARRIER

FIVE OR SIX DESTROYERS TO REPORT FOR TEMPORARY DUTY TO GHORMLEY TO BE UNDER OPERATIONAL ORDERS OF CINC HOME FLEET PARA WE WILL KEEP READY ON THIS SIDE SIMILAR

DETACHMENT IN POSITION SUITED TO HEAD OFF ENEMY WHEN HE COMES INTO OPEN ATLANTIC

PARA WE FEEL THAT YOU CAN NOW INCLUDE BATTLESHIP IN YOUR REPLACEMENT FOR FORCE HYPO AND OTHERWISE MAKE IT MORE NEARLY ADEQUATE

[Signature]

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: 

Date: OCT 12, 1971
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the attached message from the Prime Minister it is recommended that a reply somewhat as follows be dispatched:

No. 124 "For the former Naval person. Reference your message concerning command in Burma I have urgently requested the Generalissimo to continue reinforcing the Burma front and to permit Stilwell to make cooperative arrangements relative command according to the principles laid down in his original directive approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Recent messages from Stilwell indicate that he and Alexander can continue to work effectively together but that the urgent need is for additional Chinese troops. The Generalissimo has placed Stilwell in command of the 5th and 6th Chinese Armies but unfortunately will not permit completion of their transfer to Burma pending clarification of the command situation. Stilwell has not only urgently requested the Generalissimo to recede from this position but has actually ordered additional units southward in the hope that the Generalissimo will approve. Despite command complications Stilwell provides a means of assuring complete cooperation whereas a Chinese commander might make the situation impossible for General Alexander. Stilwell is not only an immensely capable and resourceful individual but is thoroughly acquainted with the Chinese people, speaks their language fluently, and is distinctly not a self-seeker. His latest telegram states: 'Have arranged with General Alexander for cooperation and matter of command need not affect conduct of operations. Have asked the Generalissimo to start another three divisions toward Burma.' Under the circumstances I suggest we should
leave the command status at that for the present. I feel that Generals Alexander and Stilwell will co-operate admirably. Strange that these two who were originally intended to meet at Super-Gymnast should in fact meet at Maymyo.

Prewetch

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.
Memorandum for the President:

Those of us who are directly concerned with combating the Atlantic submarine menace are not at all sure that the British are applying sufficient effort to bombing German submarine bases and building (repair) yards. We are aware that intelligence reports indicate that some of these bases are well protected against bombing, but we are nevertheless convinced that raids in adequate force, pressed well home, can seriously hamper building and repair work. The close proximity of many of these bases to the United Kingdom should facilitate offensive operations against them.

It seems that the R.A.F. is not fully cooperative in complying with the views of the Admiralty in this (and other) matters relative to the selection of military objectives - and that in such cases it requires a directive from "higher authority" to attain the necessary action.

I have therefore to propose for your consideration a message to Mr. Churchill reading somewhat as follows:

No. 125

"Your interest in steps to be taken to combat the Atlantic submarine menace as indicated by your recent message to Mr. Hopkins on this subject impels me to request your particular consideration of heavy attacks on submarine bases and building and repair yards thus checking submarine activities at their source and where submarines perforce congregate."

Roosevelt

E. King
and Urgent

Dear Miss Tully:

Please have this message from the President to Mr. Churchill which the President has already approved numbered and sent off in the customary way in which these messages from the President are transmitted to London.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure.

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON.

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

We have been keeping Halifax informed of the progress of our attempts to obtain from Vichy definite commitments to supplement the assurances already given that it will not afford military aid either direct or indirect to the Axis and that its colonial territories in North Africa and the Western Hemisphere will not be available as bases for the Germans. The terms of the French replies have been communicated to you.

Under these circumstances, I am considering whether as part of the United Nations' effort we cannot fulfill a useful role by resuming the program of limited economic assistance to North Africa and by sending further Red Cross aid to children in France to help keep the French people in line. The success of recent bombing operations such as at Renault factories and the realization which that must have brought to the French people that they are still in the war are a way of thwarting the collaborationists. It seems to me that it would be useful to

DECLASSIFIED

Enciphered by [redacted] By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. [redacted]
Sent by operator [redacted] Date [redacted] 14 1972 [redacted]
supplement this by another method. At a time when the United Nations are preparing to meet the enemy by force before it can occupy various areas it seems to me important that we should take advantage of the possibility that we can hold the Axis off from other areas by using such psychological and economic weapons as are available.

Should France go over it would mean, of course, that the Iberian Peninsula as well is lost to us. We are obtaining for our common cause vital military and strategic information by the presence of our observers in North Africa and from our missions in France itself. In order that this remaining bridgehead to Europe may be held as long as it serves our purpose it is necessary that our position there be reinforced from time to time through limited economic aid, thereby not abandoning the field entirely to the Germans.

I am therefore proposing to resume this economic effort at such a moment as may appear expedient and wanted to let you know beforehand of this step, which I am convinced may prove of immense importance to the aims of the United Nations.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By V. J. Stewart Date FEB 14 1972
AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I AM GREATLY DISTURBED AT THE PUBLICITY COMING OUT OF THE CASEY BUSINESS. IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE GETTING ATTENTION ALL OUT OF PROPORTION TO ITS IMPORTANCE.

I AM PARTICULARLY DISTURBED AT WHAT I LEARN FROM THE PAPERS: THAT CURTIN, ON THE ONE HAND, MAY BE GOING TO PUBLISH A DETAILED WHITE PAPER AND THAT YOU, ON THE OTHER, FEEL THAT YOU MAY HAVE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER PUBLICLY IN PARLIAMENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ALL OF THIS PLAYS RIGHT INTO THE HANDS OF OUR ENEMIES AND IF THERE IS ANY WAY THAT ALL FURTHER PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF IT COULD CEASE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALL AROUND.

I HAVE HAD A LONG TALK WITH EVATT ABOUT THIS AND HE IS SENDING TO CURTIN THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT I AM CABLEING TO YOU.

THE CASEY APPOINTMENT, I REALIZE, IS BUT AN INCIDENT. THE MORE IMPORTANT MATTER IS THE BASIC RELATIONSHIP OF GREAT BRITAIN TO AUSTRALIA. I SENSE A GROWING FEELING IN THIS COUNTRY OF IMPATIENCE AT WHAT APPEARS PUBLICLY TO BE A RATHER STRAINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.

I AM SIMPLY WONDERING HOW SOMETHING MIGHT BE DONE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO CHANGE ALL THAT TO AN ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD WILL WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITY OF OUR MILITARY EFFORTS
DIRECTED AGAINST THE ENEMY. I CONFESSION AT THE MOMENT THAT I HAVE NOTHING TO PROPOSE ALTHOUGH I AM GOING TO DIRECT MY MIND TOWARDS IT AND IF I THINK OF ANYTHING I WILL LET YOU KNOW.

I SAY THIS TO YOU BECAUSE I FEEL MYSELF GREATLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TURN OF EVENTS. I TOLD CASEY QUITE FRANKLY THAT I HOPED HE WOULD TAKE THE JOB IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE HE WOULD BE A PERSON IN THE AREA WHO WOULD KNOW BOTH THE AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN ANGLES AS WELL AS THE BRITISH, AND I STILL THINK THE DECISION FOR CASEY TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST IS A WISE ONE.

[Signature]
TELEGRAM

March 26, 1942.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No. 128

EVATT HAS TOLD ME THE SUBSTANCE OF A CABLE FROM CURTIN RELATIVE TO THE THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, IN WHICH CURTIN EXPRESSES HIS GREAT ANXIETY AT LEAVING THE THIRD DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE ADVISED THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER IN THE ABSENCE OF EVATT, WHO HAS GONE TO NEW YORK, THAT WE WOULD WITHDRAW ALL CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO SENDING AN ADDITIONAL AMERICAN DIVISION TO AUSTRALIA AND THAT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES THE ADDITIONAL AMERICAN DIVISION WILL GO AS SLOW AS POSSIBLE. I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT MY ORIGINAL ADVICE AS TO LEAVING THE FINAL AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST EXPRESSED MY OPINION AND THAT I HAD NOT CHANGED IT.

I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER THE AUSTRALIAN DIVISION SHOULD BE SENT HOME OR NOT MUST BE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER CURTIN AND NOT BY ME.

ROOSEVELT

The original copy of this despatch was altered in the President's handwriting and was therefore returned to Miss Tully for historical files.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date 10-12-1971
TO:  FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM:  THE PRESIDENT
NO. 128

EVATT HAS TOLD ME THE SUBSTANCE OF A CABLE FROM CURTIN
RELATIVE TO THE THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, IN WHICH CURTIN
EXPRESSES HIS GREAT ANXIETY AT LEAVING THE THIRD DIVISION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE ADVISED THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER IN THE ABSENCE OF
EVATT, WHO HAS GONE TO NEW YORK, THAT WE WOULD WITHDRAW ALL
CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO SENDING AN ADDITIONAL DIVISION TO AUSTRALIA
AND THAT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES ONE ADDITIONAL DIVISION WILL GO
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT MY ORIGINAL
ADVICE AS TO LEAVING THE FINAL AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST EXPRESSED MY OPINION AND THAT I HAD NOT CHANGED IT.

I ADVISED HIM FURTHER THAT THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER
DIVISION SHOULD BE SENT OR NOT MUST BE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER
CURTIN AND NOT BY ME.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By  W.P. Stewart
Date  Oct 2 1971
TELEGRAM

APRIL 1, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 129

AS I HAVE COMPLETED SURVEY OF THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE PROBLEMS
OF THE MILITARY SITUATIONS FACING THE UNITED NATIONS, I HAVE COME TO CERTAIN
CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE SO VITAL THAT I WANT YOU TO KNOW THE WHOLE PICTURE AND
TO ASK YOUR APPROVAL. THE WHOLE OF IT IS SO DEPENDENT ON COMPLETE COOPERATION
BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES THAT HARRY AND MARSHALL WILL LEAVE
FOR LONDON IN A FEW DAYS TO PRESENT FIRST OF ALL TO YOU THE SALIENT POINTS.
IT IS A PLAN TO WHICH I HOPE RUSSIA WILL GREET WITH ENTHUSIASM AND, ON WORD
FROM YOU WHEN YOU HAVE SEEN HARRY AND MARSHALL, I PROPOSE TO ASK STALIN TO
SEND TWO SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO SEE ME AT ONCE.

I THINK IT WILL WORK OUT IN FULL ACCORD WITH TRENDS OF PUBLIC OPINION
HERE AND IN BRITAIN. AND, FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO LABEL IT THE
PLAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ROOSEVELT

4-2-42

Original in long hand
given to him fully by me

J.L. McCus

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. G. Stewart
Date Oct 12, 1981

129
April 1, 1942

The White House
Washington

Mr. N. R. F. G. -

I have completed an inquiry of the immediate and long-range problems of the military and the United Nations situations facing us. I have come to certain conclusions which are so vital that I want you to know the whole picture and to ask your approval. The whole of it is so dependent on complete cooperation by the U.K. and U.S. That Harry and Marshall will leave for London in a few days to present first at
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To you
call the valiant saints,
it is a plum to which I have
Prussia will greet with warmth,
and our word from you when
you have seen Harry Marshall
I propose to ask the
they and 2 special representatives
to see me at once. If I think
it will work out in full
accord with trend of public
opinion here and in Britain.
And finally, I would like
not able to label it
The plan of the United
Nations

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
April 2, 1942.

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL AND

PROPOSAL IN YOUR NUMBER SIXTY ONE OF MARCH THIRTYFIRST DOES NOT MENTION AVAILABILITY OF
FURIOUS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE UNITED STATES APRIL THIRD FOR THE CLYDE VIA
BERMUDA AND WHOSE PLANS SHOW ELEVATORS LARGE ENOUGH FOR SPITFIRES PARA ADMIRAL KING
WILL ADVISE ADMIRAL POUND THROUGH GHORMLEY THAT WASP IS AT DISPOSAL AS YOU REQUEST
IF OUR ESTIMATE AS TO FURIOUS SHOULD BE INCORRECT

Pursuelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.G. Stewart
Date: OCT 12, 1971
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 131

RELATIVE TO YOUR NUMBER 59 AND THE OPERATION TO WHICH YOU ARE COMMITTED I FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO IDENTIFY THE EXPEDITION IN THE MANNER INDICATED BY YOU. MY REASON FOR THIS IS THAT WE ARE THE ONLY NATION THAT CAN INTERVENE DIPLOMATICALLY WITH ANY HOPE OF SUCCESS WITH WHICH IT SEEMS TO ME EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE ABLE TO DO THIS WITHOUT THE COMPLICATIONS WHICH MIGHT ARISE BY THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS OR OTHER INFORMAL METHODS IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OPERATION. I DO HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH THIS.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.P. Stewart
Date 05/12/1971
TRIPLE PRIORITY.

* Please deliver immediately the following message from the President to the former naval person:

"I most earnestly hope that you may find it possible to postpone Grippa's departure from India until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations.

I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the United States believes that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary. The feeling on the contrary is almost universally held that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical military and naval defense control to the competent British authorities. American public opinion cannot understand why,
if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war.

I feel I must place this issue before you very frankly and I know you will understand my reasons for so doing. If the present negotiations are allowed to collapse because of the issues presented to the American people and India should subsequently be successfully invaded by Japan with attendant serious military or naval defeats for our side, the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion can hardly be over-estimated.

Consequently, would it not be possible for you to have Cripps postpone his departure on the ground that you personally have sent him instructions to make a final effort to find a common ground of understanding. I learned that an agreement seemed very near last Thursday night. If he could be authorized by you to state that he was empowered by you personally to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that minor concessions would be made by both sides, it

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
seems to me that an agreement might yet be found.

I still feel, as I expressed to you in an earlier message, that if the component groups in India could now be given the opportunity to set up a nationalist government similar in essence to our own form of government under the Articles of Confederation with the understanding that upon the termination of a period of trial and error they would then be enabled to determine upon their own form of constitution and, as you have already promised them, to determine their future relationship with the British Empire, a solution could probably be found. If you made such an effort and Cripps were then still unable to find an agreement, you would at least on that issue have public opinion in the United States satisfied that a real offer and a fair offer had been made by the British Government to the peoples of India and that the responsibility for such failure must clearly be placed upon the Indian people and not upon the British Government. UUNQUOTE
April 14, 1942.

PRIORITY

From: POTUS
To: Hopkins for Former Naval Person.

#133 I have read and approved message McNarney to Marshall re planes for India and want to emphasize the following:

One: I consider it very unwise to curtail planes now on way to Stillwell. A very despondent message has come from the Generalissimo and I believe considerations of high policy call for air help to Burma theatre at once as Chinese position must be sustained.

Two: I believe plan A of our Staff is by far the better.

Three: It is my belief Japanese land attack on Ceylon will not be made for several weeks.

Four: I hope United Nations shipping will be kept out of Bay of Bengal.

Five: I hope British warships will for the time being stay under umbrella of land based planes while in vicinity of Southern India and Ceylon.

Six: The quickest and easiest increase in air strength in Indian theatre is to let us send all possible planes now here earmarked for British account in order to bring Brereton up to strength. This large movement can start in 48 hours after we hear from you.

ROOSEVELT.

RELEASED 2325 - 14 APRIL 1942

JOHN L. MCCREA
Captain, USN.
Naval Aide to President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.L. Strodt
Date OCT 1 1971
April 14, 1942.

From: McNarney
To: Marshall

The following data and recommendations are submitted in accordance with your No. 2398, April 14. Urgent for General Marshall from McNarney with Admiral King and Generals Arnold and Eisenhower concurring. We concur with the estimate of the British Chiefs of Staff as to the importance of the India-Middle East area, and as to the probable results on the Russian position that would follow the loss of the Middle East. We likewise concur in the character of the assistance required by the British in order to make the Bay of Bengal and Indian area reasonably secure.

At this moment no (repeat no) planes allocated to the U.S. Army Air Force are available for transfer to India or the Middle East. Units now engaged in such critical tasks as the combatting of the submarine menace on our East Coast are pitifully small and are all badly under strength. Admiral King states that the tasks assigned the U.S. Naval Forces are so numerous and of such importance that no diversions can be made at this time.

The only source from which land type airplanes of American manufacture can be secured immediately is from those already allocated to the British. The following information is given on the types and numbers available. Considerable numbers of these are now held on various fields in the U.S., due to congestion of the British ferry route, particularly at Montreal, and cannot be cleared through that route to any destination. These include bombardment types only and exclude all airplanes known to be non-operational for lack of guns, turrets, etc.: 35 B-25; 25 LB-30; 8 B-17s. These numbers are exclusive of greater quantities which are non-operational because of lack of guns or other equipment now in England; for example, 23 Lockheeds at Fort Wayne and 67 B-26s at Omaha.

With respect to pursuit types there are likewise available considerable quantities which are crated and ready for shipment and can be diverted to the Indian region by the first available shipping.

Proposed plans for employment of these airplanes in India is given as follows: Plan A. The 10th Air Force, now in India, comprises one pursuit group and one composite bombardment group of one heavy bombardment squadron and two medium bombardment squadrons. To this force should be added one heavy reconnaissance squadron of LB-30s. The plan would provide for bringing the 10th Air Force to full operational strength immediately by ferrying appropriate numbers of the
operationally fit bombers, above listed, to India and by transferring pursuit planes by use of the U.S. aircraft carrier Ranger. This ship to be loaded with crated fighters which will be set up en route, and flown off at Monrovia. From that point the planes would be flown to General Brereton, commanding the 10th Air Force.

Plan B. To provide ferrying crews only for the bombers above listed and turn them over to the British upon arrival in India. This plan is suggested by the statement in the British appreciation, "aircraft rather than personnel are our primary immediate requirement." However, we doubt that the British air personnel already in India is sufficiently strong in qualified pilots and combat crews to operate this equipment efficiently. If this plan were adopted the pursuit planes could still be moved to India by the method already described.

Admiral King definitely states that the Ranger cannot (repeat not) be made available for combat use in the Indian Ocean. This statement involves also any other major fleet unit. The only way the Navy can assist is by the use of Ranger for ferrying across the Atlantic as above described.

We desire to remind you that the 10th Air Force has been assigned to General Stilwell with an original purpose of supporting his operations. Since this diversion of the 10th Air Force to another mission will adversely affect the Chinese situation and Stilwell's operations, we deem it especially important that no attempt be made to divert any of the airplanes required to keep the AVG at full operational strength and that former assurances to the Generalissimo and Stilwell in this regard be adhered to. This applies also to other types of planes already allocated the Chinese under firm agreements.

At this point your No. 2401 containing instructions for Stilwell and Brereton arrived. The orders will be immediately sent as directed but for your information the shipping schedule is such that planes now afloat can scarcely bring the AVG to full operational strength before May 15. We estimate that Plan A as outlined will bring the 10th Air Force to operational strength at an earlier date than can be accomplished by depending upon AVG planes over and above the operational strength of that group. This message has been read and approved by the President.

(IN CONNECTION WITH THIS DESPATCH SEE MESSAGE NO. 133 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON)
Hopkins for Former Naval Personnel

I have read and approved Mr. Nirenberg to Marshall as Plans for Russia and want to emphasize the following:

One: I consider it very unwise to center all plans now on any to Stillwell. A very important message has come from the Generalissimo and I believe these considerations of high policy call for air help to Russian Theatre as Chinese Front has not been.

Two: I believe plans A of air and stuff is in too far the further
Three. It is my belief Japanese attempt on Ceylon will not be made for several weeks.

Four. I hope United Nations shipping will be kept out of Port of Bengal.

Five. I hope British warships will for the time being stay under control of Allied forces, while in vicinity of Southern Indian and Ceylon.

Six. The quickest and most effective means in our strength in Western Theatre is to let us send all possible forces now here concentrated for British account.
In order to bring Breton up to strength, this large movement can start on 48 hours after we hear from you.

Roosevelt
For Mr. Hopkins to be conveyed to

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

former naval person for your

despatch of April 14th para

It is of course impossible to send

to the Indian Ocean what would

help a great deal. That is 16 carriers. As

we have already made available

the only one we can possibly spare is the Wasp

diva. It is our view that the

Indian Ocean situation demands

to be taken care of and it is

in order to apply your reserve

carriers to that situation para.

Further, that the offensive air

action is only attainable in time

by transferring bombers from

British account to ours to be

maintained by us and flown to

India and there operated by us

para. Forgoing premises would

develop a set of whereby British

naval forces need not be operated.
April 14, 1942.

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
LONDON

Litvinov came in to ask for information of Moscow what the subject was I wished to discuss and I told him the facts and pointed out that all of this was clearly implied in my message to Stalin. I hope to have an answer shortly.

It seems true Laval is back though we have not heard officially from Leahy.

ROOSEVELT
April 14, 1942.

PRIORITY

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

LITVINOV CAME IN TO ASK FOR INFORMATION OF MOSCOW

WHAT THE SUBJECT WAS I WISHED TO DISCUSS AND I TOLD HIM THE

FACTS AND POINTED OUT THAT ALL OF THIS WAS CLEARLY IMPLIED

IN MY MESSAGE TO STALIN. I HOPE TO HAVE AN ANSWER SHORTLY.

IT SEEMS TRUE LAVAL IS BACK THOUGH WE HAVE NOT

HEARD OFFICIALLY FROM LEAHY.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1735, April 14, 1942.

J. C. McCrea

JOHN L. MCCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
April 15, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Your suggestion being studied but consensus of opinion is that odor still too strong for family of nations.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1910, April 15, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 134.

YOUR SECRET NO. 69. WE HAVE BEEN AND ARE CONTINUING STUDIES OF IMMEDIATE NEEDS. I HOPE YOU WILL READ OUR AIR FORCE SUGGESTIONS SENT TO MARSHALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. THIS WOULD BE MUCH THE QUICKEST WAY OF GETTING PLANES TO INDIA THOUGH THEY WOULD BE LAND BASED PLANES AND FOR THE TIME BEING WOULD COMPEL YOU TO KEEP YOUR FLEET UNDER THEIR COVERAGE. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS PLAN WOULD DO THE MOST TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDIG AT CEYLON, MADRAS OR CALCUTTA. IN OTHER WORDS THEY WOULD DEFINITELY IMPROVE THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIA AREA. THESE PLANS, HOWEVER, INVOLVE USE OF RANGER AS A FERRY BOAT AND PREVENT HER USE AS CARRIER WITH HER OWN PLANES. THE RANGER IS OF COURSE BEST SUIT ED FOR FERRYING AS WE ARE NOT PROUD OF HER COMPARTMENTATION AND HER STRUCTURAL STRENGTH.

MEASURES NOW IN HAND BY PACIFIC FLEET HAVE NOT BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU IN DETAIL BECAUSE OF SECRECY REQUIREMENTS BUT WE HOPE YOU WILL FIND THEM EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY CAN BE MADE KNOWN TO YOU SHORTLY.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PRESENT LACK OF NAVAL BUTTER TO COVER THE BREAD BUT I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT BECAUSE OF OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICES THERE IS A GRAVE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A MAIN FLEET CONCENTRATION SHOULD BE MADE IN CEYLON AREA WITH MIXED FORCES.

April 16, 1942.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.G. Stewart
Date OCT 1, 1971
PARTLY BECAUSE OF THIS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF MY FEELING THAT FOR
THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDING ANYWHERE
IN INDIA OR CEYLON THAT WE ARE INCLINED TO GIVE GREATER CONSIDERATION TO
TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF YOUR HOME FLEET UNITS RATHER THAN MIXING UNITS
IN INDIAN OCEAN.

IT IS MY PERSONAL THOUGHT THAT YOUR FLEET IN INDIAN OCEAN CAN
WELL BE SAFEGUARDED DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS WITHOUT FIGHTING MAJOR ENGAGEMENT,
IN THE MEANTIME BUILDING UP LAND BASED PLANE UNITS TO STOP JAPANESE
TRANSports. I HOPE YOU WILL LET ME KNOW YOUR THOUGHT IN REGARD TO THE
AIR FORCE MEASURES INDICATED ABOVE. WE COULD PUT THEM INTO EFFECT AT ONCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1600, April 16, 1942.

JOHN L. McCrea,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
Capt. McCrea:

The President wants this despatch sent.

This copy is to go in the President's own file.

I have copy.

To be returned to Miss Tully.
YOUR SECRET #69. WE HAVE BEEN AND ARE CONTINUING STUDIES OF IMMEDIATE NEEDS. I HOPE YOU WILL READ OUR AIR FORCE SUGGESTIONS SENT TO MARSHALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. THIS WOULD BE MUCH THE QUICKEST WAY OF GETTING PLANES TO INDIA THOUGH THEY WOULD BE LAND BASED PLANES AND FOR THE TIME BEING WOULD COMPEL YOU TO KEEP YOUR FLEET UNDER THEIR COVERAGE. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS PLAN WOULD DO THE MOST TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDING AT CEYLON, MADRAS OR CALCUTTA. IN OTHER WORDS THEY WOULD DEFINITELY IMPROVE THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIA AREA. THESE PLANS, HOWEVER, INVOLVE USE OF RANGER AS A FERRY BOAT AND PREVENT HER USE AS CARRIER WITH HER OWN PLANES.

MEASURES NOW IN HAND BY PACIFIC FLEET HAVE NOT BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU IN DETAIL BECAUSE OF SECRECY REQUIREMENTS BUT WE HOPE YOU WILL FIND THEM EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY CAN BE MADE KNOWN TO YOU SHORTLY.

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PRESENT LACK OF NAVAL BUTTER TO COVER THE BREAD BUT I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT BECAUSE OF OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SERVICES THERE IS A GRAVE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER A MAIN FLEET CONCENTRATION SHOULD BE MADE IN CEYLON AREA WITH MIXED FORCES.

PARTLY BECAUSE OF THIS AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF MY FEELING THAT FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO PREVENT JAPANESE LANDING ANYWHERE IN INDIA OR CEYLON WE ARE INCLINED
TO GIVE GREATER CONSIDERATION TO TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF YOUR HOME FLEET UNITS RATHER THAN MIXING UNITS IN INDIAN OCEAN.

IT IS MY PERSONAL THOUGHT THAT YOUR FLEET IN INDIAN OCEAN CAN WELL BE SAFEGUARDED DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS WITHOUT FIGHTING MAJOR ENGAGEMENT, IN THE MEANTIME BUILDING UP LAND BASED PLANE UNITS TO STOP JAPANESE TRANSPORTS. I HOPE YOU WILL LET ME KNOW YOUR THOUGHT IN REGARD TO THE AIR FORCE MEASURES INDICATED ABOVE. WE COULD PUT THEM INTO EFFECT AT ONCE.

THE RANGER IS OF COURSE BEST SUITED FOR FERRying AS WE ARE NOT PROUD OF HER COMPARTMENTATION AND HER STRUCTURAL STRENGTH.
FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL AND SECRET.

YOUR SECRET NUMBER SIXTY-NINE HAS BEEN DULY CONSIDERED AND IT IS NOTED THAT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN MENTION OF AIR FORCE MEASURES SENT TO MARSHALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION NEARLY FORTYEIGHT HOURS AGO PARA YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SAID AIR FORCE MEASURES WILL IMPROVE THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION IN INDIAN OCEAN THEATER PARA MEASURES NOW IN HAND BY PACIFIC FLEET HAVE NOT BEEN CONVEYED TO YOU IN DETAIL BECAUSE OF SECURCY REQUIREMENTS BUT WE EXPECT YOU WILL FIND THEM EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY CAN BE MADE KNOWN PARA YOUR PROPOSALS FOR DISPOSITION OF UNITED STATES SHIPS ARE RECEIVING EVERY CONSIDERATION AND WILL BE REPLIED TO IN DUE COURSE PARA IN ANY EVENT IN ORDER TO AVOID MIXING OF UNITS WHATEVER DECISION MAY BE REACHED WILL PROBABLY BE PREMISED ON TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT OF HOME FLEET UNITS RATHER THAN MIXING UNITS IN INDIAN OCEAN PARA LET ME URGE YOU TO ACCEPT AIR FORCE MEASURES INDICATED SO THAT THEY MAY BE PUT INTO EFFECT AT ONCE.

This was King's draft. I sent substitute by me.
April 16, 1942.

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 135

REFERENCE HOPKINS DESPATCH OF 14 APRIL CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OF AGENCIES CONCERNED HAVE REACHED DECISION TO LAY UP TANKERS OPERATING ON

ATLANTIC COAST FOR A PERIOD DEPENDING UPON AVAILABILITY OF MORE EFFECTIVE

PROTECTION. OPPORTUNITY WILL BE TAKEN TO ARM SHIPS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

ACTION ON DRY CARGO SHIPS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

SECRETARY KNOX DID NOT MAKE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. IT HAS

BEEN RETRACTED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1900, April 16, 1942.

JOHN I. MCCREA,

Captain, U.S. Navy,

Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At a conference held this morning in the Office of Secretary Ickes, the attached post cablegram was agreed upon as a consensus of opinion of those present.

The following were present:

Secretary Ickes
Mr. Davies
Mr. Leon Henderson
Administrator, War Shipping Administration and three of his representatives
Mr. Joseph B. Eastman
General Pyron, U.S.A.
Six or eight representatives of the oil industry

At the conclusion of the meeting I went to see Admiral King where the enclosed draft was prepared in the form submitted herewith for your signature.

E. S. Land

Enclosure
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
MEMORANDUM

Date ______________________

From: Chief of Staff.  
To: Admiral King

PROPOSED DRAFT OF DESPATCH IN REPLY TO SECRET CABLE-GRAM NUMBER 51 OF APRIL 14 SIGNED PRIME.

CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF AGENCIES CONCERNED HAVE REACHED DECISION TO LAY UP TANKERS OPERATING ON ATLANTIC COAST FOR A PERIOD DEPENDING UPON AVAILABILITY OF MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION X OPPORTUNITY WILL BE TAKEN TO ARM SHIPS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE PARA ACTION ON DRY CARGO SHIPS UNDER CONSIDERATION PARA SECRETARY KNOX DID NOT MAKE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO HIM X IT HAS BEEN RETRACTED

__________________________
Russell Willson
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON: PRIORITY

MACKENZIE KING HAS BEEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR TWO DAYS AND HE WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOMETHING TO SHOW FOR HIS WASHINGTON VISIT AND PROPOSED A CONFERENCE IN OTTAWA EARLY IN MAY TO DISCUSS THE GREATLY EXPANDED AIR TRAINING PROGRAM AND THE RENEWAL OF YOUR EMPIRE AIR TRAINING PLAN ON AN OVERALL BASIS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. I SEE NO HARM, AND A GOOD DEAL OF PROBABLE GOOD IN SUCH A CONFERENCE.

I TALKED WITH YOUR EMBASSY ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE RELEASE TO SYNCHRONIZE WITH KING'S DEPARTURE AND THEY SAW NO REASON TO BOTHER YOU WITH IT BEFOREHAND.

I HOPE YOU WILL LET SOMEONE COME FROM ENGLAND FOR IT, IN ADDITION TO YOUR TOP PEOPLE OVER HERE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1705, April 17, 1942.

J. L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
TO: HOPKINS - LONDON

REPORTED THIS MORNING PETAIN RESIGNED. DARLAN IN HIS PLACE BUT LAVAL PROBABLY IN CONTROL. IN VIEW OF THIS WELLES AND I FEEL NORTH AFRICA STAND SOME CHANCE FAILING TO ACCEPT LAVAL'S ORDERS.

THEREFORE HOPE YOU AND MARSHALL WILL TALK THIS NEW SITUATION OVER WITH FORMER NAVAL PERSON WHO DOUBTLESS HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. I AM NOT PROPOSING REVIVAL OF GYMNAST BUT ONLY ASK THAT YOU DISCUSS WHOLE SUBJECT.

THERE IS SOME REASON HERE TO BELIEVE ORANGE BATTLESHIPS WITHDRAWING TO EASTWARD OUT OF BAY OF BENGAL. RANGER BEING LOADED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 10:45, April 17, 1942.

JOHN L. Mcclaren
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
April 18, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON.

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

I DO NOT THINK RETURN LONDON ADVISABLE AS MATTER MAY
NOT DEVELOP FOR DAYS AND MAYBE WEEKS.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 0915, April 18, 1942.

J L. McCrea,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON, NO. 137

IN REPLY TO YOUR NUMBERS 71 and 72 ALL PLANS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR MOVEMENT OF AGREED UPON AIRPLANES TO INDIA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. BAD WEATHER HELD UP ASSEMBLY OF PURSUIT AIRPLANES FOR SHIPMENT ON RANGER BUT THIS MOVEMENT IS COMPLETED AND RANGER SHOULD LEAVE ON TUESDAY APRIL TWENTYFIRST. YOUR APPROVAL OF THE UTILIZATION OF LIBERATORS PAREN B DASH TWENTYFOUR PAREN MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO INSTALL ASV EQUIPMENT ON THESE AIRPLANES PRIOR TO MOVEMENT TO INDIA. THIS WILL PROVE A GREAT HELP IN RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER THE BAY OF BENGAL OR THE INDIAN OCEAN. SEVEN FLYING FORTRESSES SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES WITHIN FORTYEIGHT HOURS. TWENTYFOUR ADDITIONAL LIBERATORS PAREN B DASH TWENTYFOUR PAREN SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES SHORTLY AFTER MAY TENTH. THIS DELAY ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SATISFACTORY NOSE ARMAMENT PERIOD THE TWENTYONE B DASH TWENTYFIVES WHICH WE TOOK OVER FROM YOU SHOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES DURING THE COMING WEEK PERIOD THIS DELAY CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT NOT ON YOUR AIRPLANES SUCH AS AUTOMATIC PILOTS BEING INSTALLED PRIOR TO THIS MOVEMENT PARAGRAPH AIRCRAFT CARRIER RANGER WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER FERRYING ADDITIONAL AIRPLANES TO INDIA VIA AFRICA ON ITS RETURN FROM WEST AFRICA.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON, NO. 137, (CONTINUED)

TO WHAT EXTENT AND WITH WHAT EQUIPMENT IT WILL BE LOADED WILL BE DETERMINED AFTER PRESENT MOVEMENT STARTS. AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT, PILOTS AND THE TIME OF TURN AROUND WILL ALL DETERMINE LOAD AND DESTINATION OF SECOND TRIP, IF IT IS MADE PARAGRAPH AVG FOR THE TIME BEING HAS A TOTAL OF TWO FOUR SEVEN AIRPLANES ALREADY AT KARACHI OR EAST OF KARACHI OR ENROUTE BY AIR OR BY SEA PARAGRAPH I ASSURE YOU THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF AVG IN CHINA AND YOUR FORCES IN INDIA

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1808 April 21, 1942.

JOHN L. MCCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

BOTH THESE WIRES ARE O.K.
AND I THINK THEY SHOULD BE SENT
AT ONCE.

H.L.H.

[Signature]
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING: (Navy Department)

Subject: Draft of Message for President.

Here is a draft of a message for the President to the former Naval person.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl:
Draft of Message to President.

Date: FEB 14 1972
Signature: [Signature]

[Handwritten note: OK with corrections in pencil]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Airplanes to India.

It is suggested that the following telegram be sent to the former naval person in reply to his No. 137 dated April 18th.

ALL PLANS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR MOVEMENT OF AGREED UPON AIRPLANES TO INDIA AT THE Earliest Possible Moment Period Bad Weather Held Up Assembly of Pursuit Airplanes for Shipment on Ranger but this Movement Is completed and Ranger should Leave on Tuesday April Twenty First Period your Approval of the Utilization of Liberators Parent B Dash Twenty Four Parnen Makes it Possible for Us to Install ASV Equipment on These Airplanes Prior to Movement to India Period this Will prove a Great Help in Reconnaissance Missions over the Bay of Bengal or the Indian Ocean Period Seven Flying Fortresses Should Leave the United States Within Forty Eight Hours Period Twenty Four Additional Liberators Parent B Dash Twenty Four Parnen Should Leave the United States Shortly After May Tenth Period This Delay Essential to Provide them with Satisfactory Nose Armament Period the Twenty One B Dash Twenty Fives Which we Took Over From you Should Leave the United States During the Coming Week Period this Delay Caused by Additional Equipment Not on Your Airplanes such as Automatic Pilots Being Installed Prior to this Movement Para Aircraft Carrier Ranger Will Be Available for Furling Via Africa Additional Airplanes to India On Its Return From West Africa Period to What Extent and With What Equipment It Will Be Loaded Will be Determined After Present Movement Starts Period Availability of
AIRCRAFT COMMA PILOTS AND THE TIME OF TURN AROUND WILL ALL DETERMINE LOAD AND DESTINATION OF SECOND TRIP COMMA IF IT IS MADE PARA AVG FOR THE TIME BEING HAS A TOTAL OF TWO FOUR SEVEN AIRPLANES ALREADY AT KARACHI OR EAST OF KARACHI OR EN ROUTE BY AIR OR BY SEA PARA I ASSURE YOU THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF AVG IN CHINA AND YOUR FORCES IN INDIA

[Signature]

Herbert H. Arnold
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: FEB 14 1972
Signature: [Blank]
APRIL 21, 1942

TO: LONDON

NO. 138

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

REPLYING TO YOUR NUMBER 74, BELIEVE WISER TO LET SITUATION JELL A LITTLE BEFORE MAKING THE APPROACH YOU SUGGEST. THIS BUSINESS MUST BE WATCHED WITH THE GREATEST CARE. I WILL CABLE YOU AGAIN ABOUT IT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1007 April 21, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a draft which is a rather evasive answer but it may be all you want to say to the Prime Minister at the moment.

H.L.H.
TO: LONDON
NO. 139

AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

REPLYING TO YOUR NUMBER 70, I AM DELIGHTED WITH THE AGREEMENT
WHICH WAS REACHED BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR MILITARY ADVISERS AND
MARSHALL AND HOPKINS. THEY HAVE REPORTED TO ME OF THE UNANIMITY
OF OPINION RELATIVE TO THE PROPOSAL WHICH THEY CARRIED WITH THEM
AND I APPRECIATE EVER SO MUCH YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE CONFIRMING THIS.

I BELIEVE THAT THIS MOVE WILL BE VERY DISHEARTENING TO HITLER
AND MAY WELL BE THE WEDGE BY WHICH HIS DOWNFALL WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.
I AM VERY HEARTENED AT THE PROSPECT AND YOU CAN BE SURE THAT OUR
ARMY WILL APPROACH THE MATTER WITH GREAT ENTHUSIASM AND VIGOR.

I WOULD LIKE TO THINK A BIT THE QUESTION OF A PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENT. I WILL LET YOU KNOW MY FEELING ABOUT THIS SOON.

I BELIEVE THAT ANY JUNCTION BETWEEN JAPANESE AND GERMANS IS
GOING TO TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF DOING BUT REALIZE THAT THE REMOTE
PROSPECT OF THIS IS SOMETHING THAT MUST BE WATCHED.

IN THE MEANTIME AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN IN THE PRESS WE HAVE
HAD A GOOD CRACK AT JAPAN BY AIR AND I AM HOPEING THAT WE CAN MAKE
IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO KEEP TOO MANY OF THEIR BIG SHIPS IN
THE INDIAN OCEAN. I WILL HAVE A TALK WITH POUND ABOUT THIS IN A
DAY OR TWO.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Oct 1 1971
I have a cordial message from Stalin telling me that he is sending Molotov and a general to visit me. I am suggesting that they come here first before going to England. Will you let me know if you have any other views about this? I am quite pleased about the Stalin message.

While our mutual difficulties are many I am frank to say that I feel better about the war than at any time in the past two years.

I want to thank you for your cordial reception of Marshall and Hopkins.

Roosevelt

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1025 April 22, 1942.

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON

PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND

I REFER TO YOUR SECRET NUMBER SEVENTYSIX ADDRESSED TO ME AND AM PLEASED TO SAY THAT WASP IS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE SECOND TRIP WITH SPITFIRES FOR MALTA X IT IS GOOD TO KNOW THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH ENEMY HEAVY SHIPS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ARE SATISFACTORY X YOUR SECRET NUMBER SEVENTYSEVEN TO ME GIVES US CLEAR IDEA OF PLANNED MOVEMENTS IN INDIAN OCEAN AND WITH RESPECT TO CONVOY FROM EASTWARD INTO MALTA X TIME IS DEFINITELY RUNNING IN OUR FAVOR JUST NOW X BEST OF LUCK

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1900, April 24, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, USNR,
White House Watch Officer.
April 24, 1942.

PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND NUMBER 140

I REFER TO YOUR SECRET NUMBER SEVENTYSIX ADDRESSED TO ME AND AM PLEASED TO SAY THAT WASP IS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE SECOND TRIP WITH SPITFIRES FOR MALTA X. IT IS GOOD TO KNOW THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH ENEMY HEAVY SHIPS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ARE SATISFACTORY X YOUR SECRET NUMBER SEVENTYSEVEN TO ME GIVES US CLEAR IDEA OF PLANNED MOVEMENTS IN INDIAN OCEAN AND WITH RESPECT TO CONVOY FROM EASTWARD INTO MALTA. Time is definitely running in our favor just now. Best of luck.

[Signature]

Miss Fidely's file

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: J. Frank Steward
Date: OCT 12, 1971

0873
TO THE FORER NAVAL PERSON:        April 26, 1942.

No. 141. I HAVE BEEN YOUR CABLE TO HARRY THIS MORNING RELATIVE TO THE
SHIPMENTS TO RUSSIA. I AM GREATLY DISTURBED BY THIS BECAUSE I FEAR NOT
ONLY THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN RUSSIA BUT EVEN MORE THE FACT THAT
OUR SUPPLIES WILL NOT REACH THEM PROMPTLY. WE HAVE MADE SUCH A TREMENDOUS
EFFORT TO GET OUR SUPPLIES GOING THAT TO HAVE THEM BLOCKED EXCEPT FOR
MOST COMPELLING REASONS SEEMS TO ME A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

I REALIZE IN TALKS I HAVE HAD WITH POUND AND AGAIN WITH LITTLE
THIS MORNING AND MY OWN NAVAL ADVISERS THAT THE MATTER IS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT AND I DO NOT WANT FOR A MOMENT TO UNDERRATE THOSE DIFFICULTIES.
ON THE OTHER HAND WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER FOR US TO MAKE ALL OUR PLANS
IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ON THE BASIS OF EXPERIENCE? IT MAY BE
THAT THE NEXT CONVOY WILL MOVE THROUGH EASIER THAN WE EXPECT AND THAT
THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WE NOW FORESEE MAY NOT BE INSURMOUNTABLE AND
THE LOSSES WHICH WE MAY HAVE TO UNDERGO MAY WELL BE WORTH THE RISK.

I DO HOPE PARTICULARLY THAT YOU CAN REVIEW AGAIN THE SIZE
OF THE IMMEDIATE CONVOYS SO THAT THE STUFF NOT BACKED UP IN ICELAND
CAN GET THROUGH AND I HOPE THAT IN ANY CONVERSATIONS THAT HUDN MAY
HAVE WITH THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR THEY BE CONFINED TO TELLING HIM THE
DIFFICULTIES AND URGING THEIR COOPERATION IN BRINGING THE CONVOYS IN
RATHER THAN ANY FIRM STATEMENT ABOUT THE LIMIT TO THE NUMBER OF SHIPS
THAT CAN BE CONVOYED.

I CAN AND WILL MAKE SOME IMMEDIATE ADJUSTMENTS AT THIS END
BUT I VERY MUCH PREFER THAT WE DO NOT SEEK AT THIS TIME ANY NEW UNDER-
STANDING WITH RUSSIA ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF OUR SUPPLIES IN VIEW OF THE
IMPELLING ASSAULT ON THEIR ARMIES. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ANY WORD REACHING
STALIN AT THIS TIME THAT OUR SUPPLIES WERE STOPPING FOR ANY REASON
WOULD HAVE A MOST UNFORTUNATE EFFECT.

Roosevelt

April 28, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

NO: 142

IN REGARD TO IRONCLAD I AM SAYING IN MY SPEECH TONIGHT AS FOLLOWS:

PLAIN ENGLISH QUOTE RECENTLY WE HAVE RECEIVED NEWS OF A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN WHAT WE USED TO KNOW AS THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE -- A NAME DEAR TO THE HEARTS OF ALL LOVERS OF LIBERTY -- A NAME AND AN INSTITUTION WHICH WE HOPE WILL SOON BE RESTORED TO FULL DIGNITY. PARAGRAPH THROUGHOUT THE NAZI OCCUPATION OF FRANCE, WE HAVE HOPED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A FRENCH GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD STRIVE TO REGAIN INDEPENDENCE, TO REESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLES OF 'LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND FRATERNITY', AND TO RESTORE THE HISTORIC CULTURE OF FRANCE. OUR POLICY HAS BEEN CONSISTENT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOW CONCERNED LEST THOSE WHO HAVE RECENTLY COME TO POWER MAY SEEK TO FORCE THE BRAVE FRENCH PEOPLE TO SUBMISSION TO NAZI DESPOTISM. PARAGRAPH THE UNITED NATIONS WILL TAKE MEASURES, IF NECESSARY, TO PREVENT THE USE OF FRENCH TERRITORY IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD FOR MILITARY PURPOSES BY THE AXIS POWERS. THE GOOD PEOPLE OF FRANCE WILL READILY UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH ACTION IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO PREVENT ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMIES OR NAVIES OR AIR FORCES OF GERMANY, ITALY AND JAPAN. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FIGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS FUNDAMENTALLY THEIR FIGHT, THAT OUR VICTORY MEANS THE RESTORATION OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT FRANCE -- AND THE SAVING OF FRANCE FROM THE SLAVERY WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSED UPON HER BY HER EXTERNAL ENEMIES AND HER INTERNAL TRAITORS.
PARAGRAPH WE KNOW HOW THE FRENCH PEOPLE REALLY FEEL. WE KNOW THAT A DEEP-SEATED DETERMINATION TO OBSTRUCT EVERY STEP IN THE AXIS PLAN EXTENDS FROM OCCUPIED FRANCE THROUGH VICHY FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF THEIR COLONIES IN EVERY OCEAN AND ON EVERY CONTINENT.

OUR PLANES ARE HELPING IN THE DEFENSE OF FRENCH COLONIES TODAY, AND SOON AMERICAN FLYING FORTRESSES WILL BE FIGHTING FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE DARKENED CONTINENT OF EUROPE. UNQUOTE

RESUME CODE

I FULLY APPROVE YOUR THIRD AND FOURTH SUGGESTIONS AND WILL GET THIS TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE MORNING OF ZERO DAY AND WILL ADD THAT IF FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IT IS DESIRABLE THAT AMERICAN TROOPS OR SHIPS USE IRONCLAD IN THE COMMON CAUSE OF THE CIVILIZED PEOPLES, WE SHALL NOT HESITATE TO DO SO AT ANY TIME.

ROOSEVELT
TO: LONDON
NO. 143

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

KING IS COMMUNICATING WITH POUND TODAY RELATIVE TO THE
URGENT NECESSITY OF GETTING OFF ONE MORE CONVOY IN MAY IN ORDER
TO BREAK THE LOG JAM OF SHIPS ALREADY LOADED OR BEING LOADED FOR
RUSSIA.

I AM VERY ANXIOUS THAT SHIPS NOT BE UNLOADED AND RELOADED
IN ENGLAND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT WOULD LEAVE IMPOSSIBLE AND VERY
DISINGUISHING IMPRESSION IN RUSSIA.

OUR PROBLEM IS TO MOVE 107 SHIPS NOW LOADED OR BEING LOADED
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO JUNE FIRST.
I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL KING IS MAKING BECAUSE I
THINK ON BALANCE THAT THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WE CAN USE
OUR ESCORTS FOR.

WE SHOULD WATCH OUR LOADING FROM HERE OUT SO THAT THE AGREED UPON
NUMBER LEAVING ICELAND AFTER JUNE FIRST WOULD FALL WITHIN THE
POSSIBILITIES OF OUR CONVOY SYSTEM. I KNOW THAT THIS IS A
DIFFICULT ENTERPRISE BUT I THINK IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT I HOPE
YOU WILL EXAMINE KING'S PROPOSAL WITH POUND CAREFULLY.

Roosevelt

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date OCT 22 1971
FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND # 144

April 30, 1942.

I have had no official information concerning Giraud's alleged escape. My only information has come from the press.

It seems probable to me that the request made upon you by Mr. Curtin for two divisions and for additional marine assistance was made upon his own responsibility although probably based upon conversations with General MacArthur. The directive under which General MacArthur holds his command provides that the United States Chiefs of Staff will constitute the executive agency through which orders are to be passed to him, and we had assumed that any request of his for reinforcement would be directed here. However, the command set-up in Australia is complex and understandings in certain details are reached only as they arise, and it is therefore possible that both Mr. Curtin and General MacArthur felt it proper to make request for British assistance directly upon the British Government.

We have previously replied to a message from General MacArthur informing him that additional airplane carriers are not now available for assignment to the Southwest Pacific. Only today we received another request for a number of ships desired for coastwise and local transportation in Australia, but we had no knowledge of any special need for additional trans-Pacific shipping, nor for the two British divisions now at sea. I agree with you these should go to India and I hope Mr. Curtin's request is

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By [Signature]

Date OCT 1, 1971
not a mere preliminary to an insistence upon the return home of the 9th Australian Division. As you know, in accepting, some time ago, your suggestion that we send an additional division to the Australians, we did so in the hope that they would then feel able to leave one of their own in the Middle East.

We will instruct General MacArthur, immediately, that his future requests for reinforcements, except for routine supply which should follow accustomed channels, will be processed to the United States Chiefs of Staff. Where your forces are concerned, we will then communicate with the British Chiefs of Staff. With this arrangement definitely prescribed and understood, you will know that any request reaching you from Mr. Curtin is made upon his own responsibility. If you think it advisable I will express the hope to Mr. Curtin that he will not ask the return of any of his troops from the Near East.

This despatch is in reference to your No. 32.

1925-4-30-42
ROOSEVELT

 Released

Cpl. WM
Aide

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date 08-12-71