CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
MARCH - APRIL 1942
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT NUMBER
THIRTY FOUR PARA WE ARE EARNESTLY CONSIDERING WHETHER A
DECLARATION OF DOMINION STATUS AFTER THE WAR CARRYING
WITH IT IF DESIRED THE RIGHT TO SECEDE SHOULD BE MADE
AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE PD WE MUST NOT ON ANY ACCOUNT
BREAK WITH THE MOSLEMS WHO REPRESENT A HUNDRED MILLION
PEOPLE AND THE MAIN ARMY ELEMENTS ON WHICH WE MUST RELY
FOR THE IMMEDIATE FIGHTING PD WE HAVE ALSO TO CONSIDER
OUR DUTY TOWARDS THIRTY TO FORTY MILLION UNTOUCHABLES
AND OUR TREATIES WITH THE PRINCES STATES OF INDIA CMA
PERHAPS EIGHTY MILLIONS PD NATURALLY WE DO NOT WANT TO
THROW INDIA INTO CHAOS ON THE EVE OF INVASION PARA TWO
PD MEANWHILE I SEND YOU IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELE-
GRAM TWO REPRESENTATIVE MESSAGES I HAVE RECEIVED AND A
SUMMARY OF A MEMORANDUM BY THE MILITARY SECRETARY CMA
INDIA OFFICE PARA THREE PD I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED
PRIME

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
CABLEGRAM

D 17
NFT

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

MARCH 4, 1942
10:47 A.M.

From LONDON

To POTUS

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NO. 4 MARCH 4

PARA FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES AND THE SUMMARY REFERRED TO IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER THIRTY FOUR CLN MESSAGE FROM MR JINNAH PAREN, PRESIDENT OF THE MOSLEM LEAGUE AND THE ACCEPTED HEAD OF THE MOST POWERFUL MOSLEM ORGANIZATION IN INDIA PAREN BEGINS CLN THE SAPRU CONFERENCE OF A FEW INDIVIDUALS WITH NO FOLLOWING AND ACTING AS EXPLORING AND PATROL AGENTS FOR THE CONGRESS HAVE PUT FORWARD PLAUSIBLE SUBTLE AND CONSEQUENTLY MORE TREACHEROUS PROPOSALS PD IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS STAMPED INTO THE TRAP LAID FOR THEM, MOSLEM INDIA WOULD BE SACRIFICED WITH MOST DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES CMA ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO THE WAR EFFORT PD THE SAPRU PROPOSALS VIRTUALLY TRANSFER ALL POWER IMMEDIATELY TO A HINDU ALL DASH INDIAN GOVERNMENT CMA THUS PRACTICALLY DECIDING AT ONCE FAR REACHING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN BREACH OF THE PLEDGES GIVEN TO THE MOSLEMS AND OTHER MINORITIES IN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS DECLARATION OF AUGUST EIGHTH NINETEEN FORTY CMA WHICH PROMISED NO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE CMA INTERIM OR FINAL COMMA WITHOUT MOSLEM AGREEMENT CMA AND THAT MOSLEMS WOULD NOT BE COERCED TO SUBMIT TO AN UNACCEPTABLE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT PD THE SAPRU PROPOSALS WOULD INTRODUCE MAJOR CHANGES ON THE BASIS OF INDIA BECOMING A

Action Copy

#35

PART ONE

MAY 5 1972

0862
SINGLE NATIONAL UNIT THEREBY TORPEDOING THE MOSLEM CLAIM FOR
PAKISTAN WHICH IS THEIR ARTICLE OF FAITH PD MOSLEMS ENTERTAIN
GRAVE APPREHENSIONS AND THE SITUATION IS TENSE PD THEY CALL
UPON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT OF ANY MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL MOVE BEING INTENDED TO DECLARE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF
THE PAKISTAN SCHEME CMA IF HIS MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT WISH TO
HAVE FREE AND EQUAL PARTNERSHIP OF MOSLEMS ENDS NOTE PD PAREN
THE PAKISTAN SCHEME CONTEMPLATES THE CREATION OF SEPARATE
MOSLEM STATES IN THE MOSLEM MAJORITY AREAS INDEPENDENT OF THE
REST OF INDIA CMA EXCEPT SO FAR AS THEY ACCEPT JOINT CONTROL
NEGOTIATING AS SEPARATE POLITICAL ENTITIES.

PRIME

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Couth. State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
PARA TWO MESSAGE FROM SIR FIROZKHAN NOOREN PAREN A
MOSLEM MEMBER OF THE VICEROYS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FROM THE PUNJAB AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MODERATE
MOSLEM POINT OF VIEW PAREN BEGINS PD SAPRU QUOTE
NON PARTY UNQUOTE CONFERENCE IS IN FACT AN ALL
HINDU PARTIES CONFERENCE PD ITS MEMBERS CMA ALTHOUGH
INSPIRED BY PATRIOTIC SENTIMENTS CMA ARE IN FACT
ACTING AS AGENTS OF THE CONGRESS PD THEIR AIM IS
THAT IF INDIA CANNOT BECOME A DOMINION DURING THE
WAR CMA GOVERNMENT SHOULD CMA UNDER THE EXISTING
CONSTITUTION CMA PASS INTO INDIAN HANDS PD THUS
HINDU RAJ WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED PD
MOSLEMS ARE EXTREMELY APPREHENSIVE THAT HIS MAJESTYS
GOVERNMENT ARE GRADUALLY YIELDING TO VOCIFEROUS
AGITATION AND GIVING WAY CONTRARY TO PLEDGES GIVEN
TO PRINCES CMA MOSLEMS AND OTHER MINORITIES PD
IMMEDIATE INDIANIZATION OF WHOLE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
WOULD DEPRIVE MINORITIES OF ASSISTANCE OF EUROPEAN
ELEMENTS ON WHOM MINORITIES DEPEND FOR ASSISTANCE
NO 15  PAGE #2  MARCH 4, 1942

IN CASES WHERE HINDU MAJORITY COMBINE AGAINST THEM
PD COUNCIL IS EVEN NOW OVERWEIGHTED AGAINST MOSLEMS
WHO HAVE THREE OUT OF EIGHT INDIAN MEMBERS PD IF HIS
MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT INDIANIZE WHOLE COUNCIL MOSLEMS
MUST HAVE FIFTY PERCENT SEATS OF WHOLE OF NON DASH
CONGRESS INDIA WILL CMA IN THE ABSENCE OF SAFEGUARDS
WHICH HAVE PROVED USELESS IN PROVINCES CMA FROM SHEER
DESPERATION CREATE SERIOUS SITUATION ADVERSELY AFFECT-
ING WAR EFFORT PD IN ANY DECLARATION CREATING INDIAN
DOMINION MOSLEM DEMANDS FOR PAKISTAN MUST BE SIMUL-
TANEOUSLY CONCEDED PD IF IT IS DECLARED THAT INDIA
WILL BE MADE A DOMINION AFTER THE WAR MOSLEMS EXPECT
SIMULTANEOUS DECLARATION THAT PAKISTAN WILL ALSO BE
GRANTED IF NO HINDU DASH MOSLEM AGREEMENT IS REACHED
PD OTHERWISE MOSLEM INDIA WILL BE UP IN ARMS AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER WILL AGAIN ArISE
PD CONGRESS BELIEVE THEY CAN FORCE HIS MAJESTYS GOVERN-
MENTS HAND AND THEY HAVE THEREFORE MADE ABSOLUTELY NO
MOVE TO WIN MOSLEM AGREEMENT PD ONLY REASON SO FAR
PREVENTING CONGRESS FROM CREATING DISTURBANCES

PRIME
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

MARCH 4, 1942

12:43 P.M.

LONDON

To POTUS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks

DATE MAY 5, 1972

NO. 15 PART FIVE MARCH 4

IN INDIA IS THAT MOSLEMS ARE AGAINST THEM PD IF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT BY HASTY OR ILL CONSIDERED DECISION PUSH MOSLEMS INTO OPEN OPPOSITION CONGRESS MAY UNITE WITH THEM AND CREATE EVEN GREATER DIFFICULTIES PD MOSLEMS FEAR THAT NEW ELEMENTS IN LONDON CABINET MAY ENFORCE RECONCILIATION ON IRRECONCILABLES FORGETTING THAT OTHER PARTIES CUP OF PATIENCE IS FULL ALREADY PD WAR EFFORT OF INDIAN PRINCES AND MOSLEMS SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED CMA AND IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT IN SPITE OF OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO RECRUITING SIXTYFIVE PERCENT OF NEW WITH RECRUITS ARE NON MOSLEMS PD ANY PEACE CONGRESS AGITATORS WILL ONLY BE MADE AT VERY HEAVY COST PD CONGRESS NOW FEEL THAT THEIR RELINQUISHMENT OF OFFICE IN PROVINCES WAS MISTAKE PD THEY DO NOT WISH TO GIVE FRANK UNDERTAKING THAT THEY WILL ASSIST IN WAR EFFORT IF RESTORED TO OFFICE PD THEY WISH TO USE SAPRA AND OTHERS TO SECURE FOR THEM OFFICES AND GOVERNMENTS WHICH THEY WILL NOT THEMSELVES ASK FOR BECAUSE

PART SIX

THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ACT STRAIGHTFORWARDLY AND WHOLEHEARTEDLY PD IF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH HINDU RAJ IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN DEFiance OF ALL FRIENDLY ELEMENTS THEY WILL BE
Playing with fire, I consider it my duty to draw His Majesty's government's attention to the great danger which will face India if they yield to browbeating by anti-British elements in India and against their former pledges. It will be a betrayal of trust which Great Britain claims she has always held on behalf of all the peoples of India and not on behalf of Congress. Only if I hope His Majesty's government will stand firmly by their duty to protect the interests of Indian peoples as a whole, irrespective of pressure from outside quarters which regard British commonwealth from different angles. PD ends PD.

Para three summary of memorandum by military adviser. PD quote probable effect of changes in India's constitution of Indian personnel of army quote CIN subpara one.

Part seven

Is assumed that both Congress and Muslim League are reasonably satisfied by proposed declaration of policy and that neither will attempt to stir up agitation among masses. PD nevertheless such a declaration will react on soldiers both in India and overseas. PD subpara two classes from which Indian Army is drawn cannot be geographically divided by provinces. PD although bulk...
PAGE 3 NO. 15 PART SEVEN MARCH 4
OF MOHAMMADANS COME FROM THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE AND
THE PUNJAB CMA RAJPUTANA CMA CENTRAL INDIA CMA UNITED PROVINCES
CMA BIHAR AND MADRAS AEL CONTRIBUTE PD LARGE NUMBERS OF MARTIAL
CLASS HINDUS. PAREN DOGRAS CMA JATS CMA ETC PAREN AS WELL AS
SIKHS CMA COME FROM PUNJAB PD GURKHAS FROM NEPAL CMA WHICH IS
FOREIGN TERRITORY CMA ARE A LARGE AND SEPARATE ELEMENT PD
PARTICULAR REACTIONS OF ANY ONE CLASS CANNOT BE GAUGED TILL
GENERAL RECEPTION OF DECLARATION IS KNOWN BUT IMMEDIATE GENERAL
EFFECT ON ARMY CAN BE FORECAST PD SUBPARA THREE INDIAN SOLDIERS
ARE VOLUNTEER MERCENARIES PD

PRIME
They fight for their pay and to support their families. They also do it in hope of rewards of gratuities, pensions and possibly grants of land. But above all, they are drawn from classes with long martial traditions. They take pride in their profession, in which a leading element is personal loyalty to their British officers and generals. Loyalty to the British Raj. Any indication of a fundamental change in the conditions or the authority under which they have accepted service cannot fail to have an unsettling effect. From experience in troubles if nineteen thirty-one and under Congress provincial rule since nineteen thirty-seven, many Indian soldiers believe Congress is inimical to martial classes. There is therefore every reason to suppose that the general reaction of the Indian soldier, whether Moslem...
OR HINDU CMA TO A PRONOUNCEMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WAS TO BE PLACED IN THE HANDS OF INDIANS DASH WHICH HE WOULD NATURALLY ASSUME TO BE THE HANDS OF THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY DASH WOULD BE ONE OF GREAT APPREHENSION AS TO HIS OWN FUTURE AND CMA MORE CMA THAT OF HIS FAMILY PD HE WILL NOT A T ONCE UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS AS THEY AFFECT HIMSELF CMA OF THE QUOTE CONTRACTING OUT UNQUOTE PROPOSAL CLN BUT WHEN HE DOES IT WILL HAVE AN EQUALLY DISTURBING EFFECT ACCORDING TO THE AREA FROM WHICH HE COMES PD SUBPARA FIVE MUCH O F THE FOREGOING DOES NOT APPLY TO GURKHAS WHOSE FAMILIES ARE IN NEPAL AND WHO RETURN THERE ON COMPLETING SERVICE PD BUT THEY ALSO ARE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS INSPIRED BY AS COMPLE TE LOYALTY TO THE BRITISH RAJ DURING THEIR SERVICE AS TO TH EIR MAHARAJAH PD THEIR PROFESSIONAL ALLEGIANCE IS TO THE BR ITISH CROWN NOT TO ANY INDIAN GOVERNMENT PD ANY IDEA CMA HO WEVER ILL FOUNDED CMA THAT THEIR ALLEGIANCE IS TO BE TRANSF ERRED WILL INEVITABLY UPSET THEIR
SOMETHING CHILDISH MENTALITY PD SUBPARA SIQ Letter PRONOUNCEMENT MADE WILL REACH THE INDIAN SOLDIER ACCOMPANIED AND FOLLOWED BY A HOST OF RUMORS AND EQQAGGRATIONS PD THESE WILL AUGMENT HIS NATURAL APPREHENSIONS AND CMA IN THE CASE OF THE SOLDIER OVERSEAS AT LEAST CMA IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE EFFECT ON HIS MORALE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT ADVERSE PD IN INDIA ITSELF IT SEEMS CERTAIN THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WILL LEAD TO GREATLY INCREASED POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND MANEUVERING TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION AT THE POSTWAR ELECTIONS PD THIS MUST REACT UPON THE SOLDIER PD IT MAY WELL RESULT IN A RELUCTANCE TO ENLIST OR CMA AT LEAST CMA IN A RELUCTANCE TO SERVE OVERSEAS PD SUBPARA SEVEN IT IS RECOGNISED THAT CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS IN DECLARATION ARE NOT TO BEGIN TO BE PUT INTO OPERATION UNTIL AFTER WAR CMA AND THAT PURPOSE OF DECLARATION IS TO INDUCE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION WHICH WILL ENSURE MAXIMUM WAR EFFORT BY INDIA PD IT IS NOT FOR ME TO SAY WHETHER THE SUPPORT OF
THOSE NOW HANGING BACK IS LIKELY TO BE FORTHCOMING CMA OR WOULD ADD SUBSTANTIALLY TO INDIA'S WAR EFFORT IF IT WERE CMA BUT I FEEL IT MY DUTY TO EQQPRESS THE CONVICTION THAT THE EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION SO FAR AS THE INDIAN ARMY IS CONCERNED WILL BE TO CREATE GRAVE APPREHENSIONS IN THE MINDS OF INDIAN SOLDIERS AND THEREBY PAREN A PAREN TO INDUCE HESITATION TO ENLIST AND RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE INDIA FOR SERVICE OVERSEAS AND PAREN B PAREN TO AFFECT ADVERSELY THE MORALE AND FIGHTING EFFICIENCY OF INDIAN TROOPS ALREADY OVERSEAS

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-73
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972

on Copy
Following is paraphrase of messages and the summary referred to in telegram Number 34:

"Message from Mr. Jinnah (President of the Moslem League and the accepted head of the most powerful Moslem organization in India.)

"The Sapru conference of a few individuals with no following and acting as exploring and patrol agents for the Congress have put forward plausible subtle and consequently more treacherous proposals. If the British Government is stampeded into the trap laid for them, Moslem India would be sacrificed with most disastrous consequences, especially in regard to the war effort. The Sapru proposals virtually transfer all power immediately to a Hindu All-Indian Government, thus practically deciding at once far-reaching constitutional issues in breach of the pledges given to the Moslems and other minorities in the British Governments declaration of August 8, 1940, which promised no constitutional change, interim or final, without Moslem agreement, and that Moslems would not be coerced to submit to an unacceptable system of government. The Sapru proposals would introduce major changes on the basis of India becoming a single national unit thereby torpedoing the Moslem claim for Pakistan which is their article of faith. Moslems entertain grave apprehensions and the situation is tense. They call upon the British Government in the event of any major constitutional move being intended to declare their acceptance of the Pakistan scheme, if his Majesty's Government wish to have free and equal partnership of Moslems."

(The Pakistan scheme contemplates the creation of separate Moslem states in the Moslem majority areas independent of the rest of India, except so far as they accept joint control negotiating as separate political entities.)

Message from Sir Firozkhan Noon (A Moslem member of the Viceroy's executive Council from the Punjab and a representative of the moderate Islam point of view):

"Sapru 'Non-party' conference is in fact an all-Hindu parties' conference. Its members, although inspired by patriotic sentiments, are in fact acting as agents of the Congress. Their aim is that if India cannot become a Dominion during the war, government should, under the existing constitution, pass into Indian hands. Thus
Hindu Raj would be immediately established. Moslems are extremely apprehensive that his Majesty's Government are gradually yielding to vociferous agitation and giving way contrary to pledges given to Princes, Moslems and other minorities. Immediate Indianization of whole Executive Council would deprive minorities of assistance of European elements on whom minorities depend for assistance in cases where Hindu majority combine against them. Council is even now overweighted against Moslems who have three out of eight Indian members. If his Majesty's Government Indianize whole Council, Moslems must have fifty percent seats of whole of non-Congress. India will, in the absence of safeguards which have proved useless in provinces, from sheer desperation create serious situation adversely affecting war effort. In any declaration creating Indian Dominion, Moslem demands for Pakistan must be simultaneously conceded. If it is declared that India will be made a Dominion after the war Moslems expect simultaneous declaration that Pakistan will also be granted if no Hindu—Moslem agreement is reached. Otherwise Moslem India will be up in arms and the problem of the northwest frontier will again arise. Congress believe they can force his Majesty's governments hand and they have therefore made absolutely no move to win Moslem agreement. Only reason so far preventing Congress from creating disturbances in India is that Moslems are against them. If his Majesty's Government by hasty or ill considered decision push Moslems into open, opposition Congress may unite with them and create even greater difficulties. Moslems fear that new elements in London Cabinet may enforce reconciliation on irreconcilables forgetting that other parties' cup of patience is full already. War effort of Indian Princes and Moslems should not be ignored, and it should be borne in mind that in spite of opposition of Congress to recruiting, sixty-five percent of new recruits are non-Moslems. Any peace with Congress agitators will only be made at very heavy cost. Congress now feel that their relinquishment of office in Provinces was mistake. They do not wish to give frank undertaking that they will assist in war effort if restored to office. They wish to use Sapra and others to secure for them offices and governments which they will not themselves ask for because they do not intend to act straightforwardly and wholeheartedly.

"If his Majesty's Government establish Hindu Raj in the central Government in defiance of all friendly elements they will be playing with fire. I consider it my duty to draw his Majesty's Government's attention to the great danger which will face India if they yield to browbeating by anti-British elements in India and against their former pledges. It will be a betrayal of trust which Great Britain claims she has always held on behalf of all the peoples of India and not on behalf of Congress only. I hope his Majesty's Government will
stand firmly by their duty to protect best interests of Indian peoples as a whole, irrespective of pressure from outside quarters which regard British Commonwealth from different angle."

Summary of Memorandum by military adviser:

"Probable effect of changes in India's constitution of Indian personnel of Army:

1. It is assumed that both Congress and Moslem League are reasonably satisfied by proposed declaration of policy and that neither will attempt to stir up agitation among masses. Nevertheless, such a declaration will react on soldiers both in India and overseas.

2. Two classes from which Indian army is drawn cannot be geographically divided by provinces. Although bulk of Mohamedans come from the northwest frontier province and the Punjab, Rajputana, Central India, United Provinces, Bihar and Madras contribute. Large numbers of martial class Hindus (Dogras, Jats, etc) as well as Sikhs, come from Punjab. Gurkhas from Nepal, which is foreign territory, are a large and separate element. Particular reactions of any one class cannot be gauged till general reception of declaration is known but immediate general effect on Army can be forecast.

3. Indian soldiers are voluntary mercenaries. They fight for their pay and to support their families, also in hope of rewards of gratuities, pensions and possibly grants of land, but above all, being drawn from classes with long martial traditions, they take pride in their profession, in which a leading element is personal loyalty to their British officers and generals, loyalty to the British Raj. Any indication of a fundamental change in the conditions or the authority under which they have accepted service, whether as affecting their material prospects or their creed as soldiers of the British crown, cannot fail to have at once an unsettling effect.

4. From experience in troubles in 1931, and under Congress provincial rule since 1937, many Indian soldiers believe Congress is inimical to martial classes. There is therefore every reason to suppose that the general reaction of the Indian soldier, whether Moslem or Hindu, to a pronouncement that the Government of India was to be placed in the hands of Indians—which he would naturally assume to be the hands of the majority community—would be one of great apprehension as to his own future and, more, that of his family. He will not at once understand the implications as they affect himself, of the "contracting out" proposal; but when he does it will have an equally disturbing effect according to the area from which he comes.
5. Much of the foregoing does not apply to Gurkhas whose families are in Nepal and who return there on completing service. But they also are professional soldiers inspired by complete loyalty to the British Raj during their service as to their Maharajah. Their professional allegiance is to the British crown, not to any Indian Government. Any idea, however ill founded, that their allegiance is to be transferred will inevitably upset their somewhat child- ish mentality.

6. Any pronouncement made will reach the Indian soldier accompanied and followed by a host of rumors and exaggerations. These will augment his natural apprehensions and, in the case of the soldier overseas at least, it is difficult to see how the effect on his morale can be anything but adverse. In India itself it seems certain that announcement will lead to greatly increased political activity and maneuvering to obtain adequate representation at the post-war elections. This must react upon the soldier. It may well result in a reluctance to enlist or, at least, in a reluctance to serve overseas.

7. It is recognized that constitutional proposals in declaration are not to begin to be put into operation until after war, and that purpose of declaration is to induce spirit of cooperation which will ensure maximum war effort by India. It is not for me to say whether the support of those now hanging back is likely to be forthcoming, or would add substantially to India's war effort if it were, but I feel it my duty to express the conviction that the effect of the declaration so far as the Indian Army is concerned will be to create grave apprehensions in the minds of Indian soldiers and thereby (a) to induce hesitation to enlist and reluctance to leave India for service overseas and (b) to affect adversely the morale and fighting efficiency of Indian troops already overseas.
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT NUMBER
THIRTY SIX PARA SINCE MY RETURN TO THIS COUNTRY,
I HAVE BEEN GIVING MUCH ATTENTION TO THE SHIPPING
SITUATION CMA WHICH IS LIKELY TO IMPOSE SEVERE
LIMITATIONS UPON OUR EFFORTS THROUGHOUT NINETEEN
FORTY TWO PD THERE ARE TWO MAIN ASPECTS PD FIRST
DASH MILITARY MOVEMENTS PD YOU KNOW WE ARE MOVING
VERY LARGE NUMBERS CMA INCLUDING AN AUSTRALIAN
CORPS OF THREE DIVISIONS AND THE SEVENTIETH BRITISH
DIVISION CMA FROM THE MIDDLE EAST ACROSS THE INDIAN
OCEAN PD TO MAKE GOOD THE DEPLETION OF THE MIDDLE
EAST AND TO SEND LARGE REINFORCEMENTS BOTH LAND
AND AIR TO INDIA AND CEYLON CMA WE SHOULD LIKE TO
SHIP FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TWO HUNDRED NINETY
FIVE THOUSAND MEN IN THE MONTHS FEBRUARY, MARCH,
APRIL, AND MAY PD A CONVOY OF FORTY FIVE THOUSAND
MEN SAILED IN FEBRUARY PD ANOTHER CONVOY OF FIFTY
THOUSAND, INCLUDING THE FIFTH DIVISION AND SEVEN
SQUADRONS OF AIRCRAFT, WILL SAIL IN MARCH PD TWO
FURTHER CONVOYS, TOTALLING EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND MEN, WILL SAIL IN APRIL AND MAY PD TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE ARE SCRAPING TOGETHER EVERY TON OF MANLIFT SHIPPING WE CAN LAY OUR HANDS ON AND ADOPTING EVERY EXPEDIENT TO HASTEN THE TURN ROUND AND INCREASE THE CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE SHIPPING PD EVEN SO CMA WE SHALL FALL SHORT OF OUR AIM BY ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND MEN PARA THIS IS THE SITUATION IN WHICH I TURN TO YOU FOR HELP PARA. I THINK WE MUST AGREE TO RECOGNIZE THAT GYMNAST IS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PD TAKING THIS FACTOR INTO ACCOUNT CAN YOU LEND US THE SHIPPING TO CONVOY TO THE INDIAN OCEAN DURING THE NEXT CRITICAL FOUR MONTHS A FURTHER TWO COMPLETE DIVISIONS PAREN SAY FORTY THOUSAND MEN PAREN CMA INCLUDING THE NECESSARY ACCOMPANYING MT GUNS AND EQUIPMENT PD THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE SHIPPING TO LOAD IN UK DURING APRIL AND THE FIRST HALF OF MAY PD THE COMBAT LOADING SHIPS NOW ALLOCATED TO MAGNET MIGHT PROVIDE FOR TEN THOUSAND OF THIS TOTAL AND THESE AND ANY OTHER SHIPS YOU ARE
ABLE TO FIND COULD BRING SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF MAGNET ON THEIR WAY TO THE UK THAT WE COULD DEFER THE BALANCE OF THAT MOVEMENT PARA FURTHER THE CARGO SHIPPING AT OUR DISPOSAL HAS NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN THE FLOW OF ESSENTIAL IMPORTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BUT ALSO TO KEEP UP SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA AND TO MEET INCREASING DEMANDS FOR THE SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE OF OUR TROOPS IN THE EAST PARA SHIPS ARE HAVING TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM IMPORTING SERVICE TO CARRY SUPPLIES TO THE EAST, NOT ONLY FROM THIS COUNTRY PARA BUT ALSO FROM USA AS MANY OF THE AMERICAN SHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN HELPING WITH THE LATTER TASK ARE BEING DIVERTED TO OTHER URGENT DUTIES PARA THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAR EASTERN WAR ARE HAVING A VERY SERIOUS EFFECT ON OUR IMPORTING CAPACITY PARA DURING THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF THIS YEAR WE EXPECT IMPORTS OF ONLY SEVEN AND A QUARTER MILLION TONS AND RECENTLY SINKINGS HAVE GREATLY INCREASED PARA THIS WILL MEAN A SERIOUS RUNNING DOWN OF STOCKS DURING THE FIRST PART OF THE YEAR PARA WHICH CANNOT BE CONTINUED AND WHICH MUST BE MADE GOOD BY A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE RATE OF IMPORTATION
IN THE LATER MONTHS PD WE HAVE MADE A CAREFUL
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPORTS WHICH WE MUST SECURE DURING NINETEEN FORTY TWO CMA IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN
OUR FULL EFFORT AND TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR STOCKS
SHALL NOT BE RUN DOWN BELOW THE DANGER LINE BY THE
END OF THE YEAR CMA AND ARE SATISFIED THAT IT IS
NOT REASONABLE TO AIM AT ANYTHING LESS THAN TWENTY
SIX MILLION TONS OF NON-TANKER IMPORTS PD THIS WILL
CERTAINLY NOT BE REALIZED WITHOUT VERY SUBSTANTIAL
ADDITIONS TO OUR SHIPPING RESOURCES SEMICLN IT
WOULD THEREFORE BE A VERY GREAT HELP TO US IN CON-
NECTION WITH ALL OUR PLANS IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW
TO WHAT EXTENT WE CAN EXPECT ASSISTANCE FOR OUR
IMPORTS AND FOR CARRIAGE OF OUR EQUIPMENT FROM US
TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM YOUR
SHIP BUILDING PROGRAMME MONTH BY MONTH AS VESSELS
COME INCREASINGLY INTO SERVICE

PRIME
COMPLETE SUMMARY OF DISPATCH

POINTS TO CONSIDER FOR REPLY

1. Will U.S. commit 2 divisions to Australia and New Zealand - to permit latter's divisions to remain Middle East. (Reply depends on what Col. Bourne informs Committee as to whether these are additional divisions to those already planned for.) This Request contained in Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 56.

2. F.H. "hopes" U.S. bombers in Northeast India to operate in force against Japanese bases in Siam and Indo-China. (See Paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 56)

3. What are present plans and disposition of U.S. Air Forces. (See Paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 56)

4. What action is now being taken toward operations from China and Aleutian Islands, and how far have these plans advanced. (See Paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 56)

5. Veiled request that Pacific Fleet keep Japanese Naval Forces busy in Pacific to prevent Japanese Fleet from entering Indian Ocean to defeat British Naval Forces based at Ceylon in which event over-sea invasion to India would be possible. (See Line 14 of Paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 56)

6. Suggests U.S. attack Japanese flank by "Commandos" in 1942 - thus diverting Japanese Forces from other areas and relieving the pressure on India and the British Indian Ocean Fleet, by drawing further upon Japanese resources which would otherwise be diverted South. (See Paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 56)

7. Recommendation as sound policy: for long range plan of U.S. to build up Commando Force on California Coast for serious attack on Japanese positions in 1943. (See Paragraph 9 of C.C.S. 56)
8. Will U.S. give increased naval protection to ANZAC AREA to (1) meet anxieties of Australia and New Zealand and (2) for purpose of insuring vital bases in Pacific? (See Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 56 - Note this is also related to Nos. 5 & 6 above)

9. INCREASE OF U.S. LAN-LIFT: Is U.S. able to double or triple tonnage of load-lift ships on 1943 estimates. (See line 15, Paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 56)

10. REQUEST FOR LOAN OF U.S. LAN-LIFT SHIPPING. (This request contained in C.P.J. 23 (D), and the background is contained in Paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 56. Proposed reply as contained in 56/1 covered the request for loan of U.S. LAN-LIFT Shipping)

CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

NOTE: The attached appendix contains a brief outline of the Prime Minister's strategic conception of particular areas and significance of his requests to those areas.
Action Copy

1

1003

March 16

To POTUS

From London

XXXO 16 MARCH FOURTH

NUMBER THIRTY SEVEN

LONDON FIFTH MARCH 39 TO PRESIDENT PARA

ONE WHEN I REFLECT HOW I HAVE LONGED AND PRAYED FOR THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE WAR I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO REALISE HOW GRAVELY OUR BRITISH AFFAIRS HAVE DETERIORATED BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE DECEMBER SEVEN.

WHEN I REFLECT HOW I HAVE LONGED AND PRAYED FOR THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE War I find it difficult to realise how gravely our British affairs have deteriorated by what has happened since December Seven.

WE HAVE SUFFERED THE GREATEST DISASTER IN OUR HISTORY AT SINGAPORE CHINA AND OTHER MISFORTUNES WILL COME THICK AND FAST UPON US STOP YOUR GREAT POWER WILL ONLY BECOME EFFECTIVE GRADUALLY BECAUSE OF THE VAST DISTANCES AND THE SHORTAGE OF SHIPS STOP ALL CAN BE RETRIEVED IN ONE NINE FOUR THREE OR ONE NINE FOUR FOUR PD BUT MEANWHILE THERE ARE VERY HARD FORFEITS TO PAY STOP THE WHOLE OF THE LEVANT DASH CASPIAN FRONT NOW DEPENDS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES STOP THE ATTACK WHICH THE GERMANS WILL DELIVER UPON RUSSIA IN THE SPRING WILL I FEAR BE MOST FORMIDABLE STOP THE DANGER TO MALTA GROWS CONSTANTLY AND LARGE REENFORCEMENTS ARE REACHING ROMEL IN TRIPOLI EN ROUTE FOR CYRENAICA STOP
PARA TWO SINCE WE LAST TALKED I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FORM A FULL PICTURE OF UNITED STATES PLANS BY SEA CMA AIR AND LAND AGAINST JAPAN STOP I AM HOPING THAT BY MAY YOUR NAVAL SUPERIORITY IN THE PACIFIC WILL BE RESTORED AND THAT THIS WILL BE A CONTINUING PRE DASH OCCUPATION TO THE ENEMY STOP WE EXPECT BY THE MIDDLE OF MARCH IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR R CLASS BATTLESHIPS TO HAVE TWO OF OUR LATEST AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WORKING WITH WARSPIEITE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THAT THESE WILL BE REINFORCED BY A THIRD CARRIER DURING APRIL AND BY VALIANT DURING MAY STOP THIS FORCE WILL HAVE AVAILABLE FOUR MODERN CRUISERS AND A NUMBER OF OLDER ONES AND ABOUT TWENTY DESTROYERS STOP BASED UPON CEYLON CMA, WHICH WE REGARD AS THE VITAL POINT NOW THAT SINGAPORE IS GONE CMA IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PREVENT OVERSEA INVASION OF INDIA UNLESS THE GREATER PART OF THE JAPANESE FLEET IS BROUGHT ACROSS FROM YOUR SIDE OF THE THEATRE CMA AND THIS AGAIN I HOPE THE ACTION AND GROWING STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY WILL PREVENT STOP WE HOPE THAT A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF DUTCH SUBMARINES WILL HAVE ESCAPED TO CEYLON AND THESE
TOGETHER WITH THE ONLY TWO SUBMARINES WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPARE FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO WATCH THE MALACCA STRAITS PD AS WE UNDERSTAND YOUR SUBMARINES FROM THE ABDA AREA WILL BE BASED ON FREEMANTLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PATROLLING THE SUNDA STRAITS AND OTHER EXITS THROUGH THE DUTCH ISLANDS CMA WE SHOULD NOT ONLY GET NOTICE OF BUT BE ABLE TO TAKE A TOLL OF ANY JAPANESE FORCES BREAKING OUT INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN PD THE NEXT FORTNIGHT WILL BE THE MOST CRITICAL FOR CEYLON CMA AND BY THE END OF MARCH WE OUGHT TO BE SOLIDLY ESTABLISHED THERE THOUGH BY NO MEANS ENTIRELY SECURE STOP PARA THREE WITH THE TIRPITZ AND SCHEER AT TRONDJHEIM OUR NORTHERN FORCE HAS NOT ONLY TO WATCH THE NORTHERN PASSAGES BUT ALSO TO GUARD THE RUSSIAN CONVOYS STOP THE TENSION IS HOWEVER TEMPORARILY EASED BY THE DISABLING OF SCHARNHORST CMA GNEISENAN AND EUGEN PD THE LATTER SEVERLY CMA WE BELIEVE CMA AND WE ARE TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY OF REFITTING RODNEY STOP RODNEY AND NELSON SHOULD BE READY FOR SERVICE IN MAY BUT ANSON WILL NOT BE IN FIGHTING TRIM UNTIL AUGUST STOP PARA FOUR I SHOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE FROM YOU A SHORT
STATEMENT OF THE DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS OF THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE STOP WE HAVE BOTH SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE IN JAVA AND I WAS MOST GRIEVED TO SEE THE UNTOWARD SINKING OF THE LANGLEY WITH HER INVALUABLE CONSIGNMENT STOP PARTICULARLY I SHALL BE GLAD TO KNOW TO WHAT POINT YOUR PLANS FOR OPERATING FROM CHINA OR THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS HAVE ADVANCED STOP WE ALSO HOPE THAT UNITED STATES BOMBERS BASED BASED IN NORTH EAST INDIA MAY OPERATE IN FORCE AGAINST ENEMY BASES IN SIAM AND INDO DASH CHINA STOP PARA FIVE YOU WILL REALIZE WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE ARMY WE HAD HOPED TO GATHER ON THE LEVANT DASH CASPIAN FRONT CMA AND HOW IT HAS NEARLY ALL BEEN DRAWN OFF TO INDIA AND AUSTRALIA CMA AND YOU WILL SEE AT ONCE WHAT OUR PLIGHT WILL BE SHOULD THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE OF THE CAUCASUS BE BEATEN DOWN STOP IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A GREAT HELP IF YOU COULD OFFER NEW ZEALAND THE SUPPORT OF AN AMERICAN DIVISION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THEIR RECALLING THEIR OWN NEW ZEALAND DIVISION CMA NOW STATIONED IN PALESTINE STOP THIS ALSO APPLIES TO THE LAST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST STOP ONE SYMPATHISES
WITH THE NATURAL ANXIETY OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WHEN THEIR BEST TROOPS ARE OUT OF THE COUNTRY CMA BUT SHIPPING WILL BE SAVED AND SAFETY GAINED BY THE AMERICAN REINFORCEMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND RATHER THAN BY A MOVE ACROSS THE OCEANS OF THESE DIVISIONS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST CMA I AM QUITE READY TO ACCEPT A CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN MAGNET TO FACILITATE YOUR ADDITIONAL HELP TO AUSTRALASIA CMA IT SEEMS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES MAIN NAVAL FORCES SHOULD GIVE INCREASING PROTECTION IN THE ANZAC AREA CMA BECAUSE THIS ALONE CAN MEET THE LEGITIMATE ANXITIES OF THE GOVERNMENTS THERE AND ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR VITAL BASES OF RE DASH ENTRY CMA PARA SIX EVERYTHING HOWEVER TURNS UPON SHIPPING CMA I HAVE SENT YOU A SEPARATE TELEGRAM CMA NUMBER THREE SIX CMA ABOUT THE IMPORT PROGRAME INTO GREAT BRITAIN IN THE CURRENT CALENDAR YEAR ONE NINE FOUR TWO CMA IT WILL CERTAINLY REQUIRE A CONSIDERABLE ALLOCATION OF THE NEW AMERICAN TONNAGE IN THE THIRD AND FOURTH QUARTERS OF THE YEAR CMA STOP THE IMMEDIATE AND DECISIVE CONCERN HOW-
EVER IS THE PROVISION OF TROOP DASH CARRYING TONNAGE STOP
I AM ADVISED THAT WE HAVE AT THE PRESENT TIME A TOTAL MAN
DASH LIFT OF TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND MEN CMA BUT OF
COURSE AT LEAST HALF OF THIS WILL BE RETURNING EMPTY OF
TROOPS FROM VERY LONG VOYAGES STOP YOU HAVE A COMPARABLE
MAN DASH LIFTING POWER OF NINE ZERO CMA ZERO ZERO ZERO MEN AND
AND WHAT HAS MOST ALARMED ME HAS BEEN THE STATEMENT
THAT EVEN BY THE SUMMER OF ONE NINE FOUR THREE THE
AMERICAN MAN DASH LIFT WILL ONLY BE INCREASED BY ANOTHER
NINE ZERO CMA ZERO ZERO ZERO STOP IF THIS CANNOT BE
REMEDIED THERE MAY WELL BE NO QUESTION OF RESTORING THE
SITUATION UNTIL ONE NINE FOUR FOUR CMA WITH ALL THE
MANY DANGERS THAT WOULD FOLLOW FROM SUCH A PROLONGATION
OF THE WAR STOP SURELY IT IS POSSIBLE BY GIVING ORDERS
NOW TO DOUBLE OR TREBLE THE AMERICAN MAN DASH LIFE BY
THE SUMMER OF ONE NINE FOUR THREE STOP WE CAN DO LITTLE
MORE BEYOND OUR TWO EIGHT ZERO CMA ZERO ZERO ZERO CMA
AND LOSSES HAVE BEEN VERY HEAVY LATELY IN THIS CLASS OF
VESSEL STOP I SHOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD RE-
LIEVE MY ANXIETIES ON THIS SCORE STOP I AM ENTIRELY WITH
YOU ABOUT THE NEED FOR GYMNAST BUT THE CHECK WHICH AUCHINLECK HAS RECEIVED AND THE SHIPPING STRINGENCY SEEM TO IMPOSE OBSTINATE AND LONG DELAYS STOP PARA SEVEN WE ARE SENDING FROM FOUR ZERO CMA ZERO ZERO ZERO TO FIVE ZERO CMA ZERO ZERO ZERO MEN IN EACH OF OUR MONTHLY CONVOYS TO THE EAST STOP THE NEEDS OF MAINTAINING THE ARMY AND OF BUILDING UP THE AIR AND ANTIDASH AIRCRAFT FORCES IN THE INDIAN THEATRE WILL AT PRESENT PREVENT US FROM SENDING MORE THAN THREE DIVISIONS FROM HERE IN THE MARCH CMA APRIL AND MAY CONVOYS CMA THESE ARRIVING TWO MONTHS LATER IN EACH CASE STOP IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ALL THESE TROOPS MAY BE NEEDED FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDIA CMA AND I CANNOT MAKE ANY PROVISION OTHER THAN THAT SUGGESTED IN PARA FIVE FOR THE TRANS DASH CASPIAN FRONT AND ALL THAT THAT MEANS STOP PARA EIGHT PERMIT ME TO REFER TO THE THEME I OPENED TO YOU WHEN WE WERE TOGETHER STOP JAPAN IS SPREADING ITSELF OVER A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF VULNERABLE POINTS OR TRYING TO LINK THEM TOGETHER BY AIR AND SEA PROTECTION STOP THE ENEMY ARE BECOMING EVER MORE WIDELY SPREAD AND WE KNOW THIS IS CAUSING ANXIETY IN TOKIO STOP NO THING CAN BE
XXX C MARCH FOURTH FROM LONDON PAGE EIGHT

DONE ON A LARGE SCALE EXCEPT BY LONG PREPARATION OF THE TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL APPARATUS STOP WHEN YOU TOLD ME ABOUT YOUR INTENTION TO FORM COMMANDO FORCES ON A LARGE SCALE ON THE CALIFORNIAN SHORE I FELT YOU HAD THE KEY STOP ONCE SEVERAL GOOD OUTFITS ARE PREPARED CMA ANY ONE OF WHICH CAN ATTACK A JAPANESE DASH HELD BASE OR ISLAND AND BEAT THE LIFE OUT OF THE GARRISON CMA ALL THEIR ISLANDS WILL BECOME HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE STOP EVEN THIS YEAR CMA ONE NINE FOUR TWO CMA SOME SEVERE EXAMPLES MIGHT BE MADE CAUSING GREAT PERTURBATION AND DRAWING FURTHER UPON JAPANESE RESOURCES TO STRENGTHEN OTHER POINTS STOP PARA NINE BUT SURELY IF PLANS WERE SET ON FOOT NOW FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE SHIPS CMA LANDING DASH CRAFT CMA AIR CRAFT CMA EXPEDITIONARY DIVISIONS CMA ETC PD CMA ALL ALONG THE CALIFORNIAN SHORE FOR A SERIOUS ATTACK UPON THE JAPANESE IN ONE NINE FOUR THREE THIS WOULD BE A SOLID POLICY FOR US TO FOLLOW STOP MOREOVER CMA THE STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES IS SUCH THAT THE WHOLE OF THIS WESTERN PARTY COULD BE DEVELOPED ON YOUR PACIFIC COAST WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PLANS AGAINST HITLER
XXXMARCH FOURTH FROM LONDON PAGE NINE

ACROSS THE ATLANTIC WE HAVE TALKED OF TOGETHER STOP
FOR A LONG TIME TO COME IT SEEMS YOUR DIFFICULTY WILL
BE TO BRING YOUR FORCES INTO ACTION AND THAT THE SHIP-
PING SHORTAGE WILL BE THE STRANGEHOLD STOP FROM THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

PRIME
CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.
MARCH 6 1942

MEMBASSY LONDON

To POTUS

NO XXXC 17 MARCH SIXTH

TO PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL

AND NO THREE EIGHT PARA I HAVE RECEIVED THE
FOLLOWING PROPOSAL FROM AUSTRALIA WHICH IS ENDORSED
BY NEW ZEALAND STOP ON ACCOUNT OF ITS URGENCY AND
IMPORTANCE I DID NOT WAIT FOR THE COMMENTS WHICH OUR
CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE MAKING UPON IT STOP THEY ARE
EXAMINING IT NOW STOP BEGINS TELEGRAM FROM AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT TO PRIME MINISTER NO ONE SIX SIX FOLLOWING
FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BEGINS STOP
REGARDING CABLE NUMBER ONE SIX NINE RELATIVE TO THE
EXTENSION OF THE ANZAC AREA AND THE MACHINERY FOR ITS
CONTROL CMA WE HAVE NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUS-
SING THIS WITH A SPECIAL DELEGATION OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT COMMA AND THEIR CHIEFS
OF STAFF STOP THE WHOLE MATTER HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AS
ONE OF URGENCY IN THE LIGHT OF THE RAPID DETERIORATION
IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION STOP AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS WITH THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT CMA THE FOLLOWING
CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN UNANIMOUSLY REACHED BY THE AUSTR-
ALIAN ADVISORY WAR COUNCIL CLN SUBPARA PAREN A PAREN
PRESENT MILITARY POSITION STOP PAREN ONE PAREN JAPANESE

R12 FORM-PAT. AMERICAN SAVES BOOK CO., INC., ROCHESTER, N.Y.
SUCCESSSES PLACE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN DANGER OF ATTACK STOP DARWIN CMA PORT MORESBY CMA NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI ARE IMMEDIATELY THREATENED STOP OTHER POINTS LIKELY TO BE ATTACKED ARE THE NORTH EAST AND NORTH WEST COASTS OF AUSTRALIA CMA THE NEW HEBRIDES AND TONGA TABU STOP THE JAPANESE HAVE DECISIVE AIR SUPERIORITY AND CONTROL IN THE SEAS IN THE AREAS IN WHICH THEY ARE OPERATING ESPECIALLY AS THERE SEEMS TO BE NO PRESENT PROSPECT OF SUCH A CONCENTRATION AS WOULD ENABLE THE MAIN JAPANESE WAVE TO BE DEFEATED STOP PAREN TWO PAREN THE LOSS OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD MEAN THE LOSS OF THE ONLY BASES FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION BY THE ALLIED NATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE FROM THE ANZAC AREA STOP THE DEFENSIVE ASPECT IS OF COURSE VITAL IF THESE BASES ARE TO BE HELD STOP PAREN THREE PAREN THE BASIS OF OUR PLANNING MUST BE NOT ONLY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND COMMA BUT TO USE THEM AS AREAS FROM WHICH OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL BE LAUNCHED PAREN FOUR PAREN THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE OF GREAT URGENCY ARE TO SECURE THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES CMA TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AND TO PREVENT THE SOUTHWARD
MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY STOP SUBPARA PAREN B PAREN
DEFINITION OF THE ANZAC AREA STOP WE ARE IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE PROPOSAL OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM THAT THE ANZAC AREA SHOULD INCLUDE THE MAINLAND
OF AUSTRALIA AND WE NOW RECOMMEND THAT IT SHALL EMBRACE
CLN PAREN ONE PAREN THE PRESENT ANZAC AREA STOP PAREN
TWO PAREN THE WHOLE OF AUSTRALIA AND ITS TERRITORIES
NEW ZEALAND AND THE ISLANDS WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF
THE PRESENT ANZAC AREA TO THE EXTENT NOT INCLUDED IN
PAREN ONE PAREN STOP PAREN THREE PAREN ANZAC AREA TO
THE WEST AND NORTH WEST OF AUSTRALIA INCLUDING TIMOR
CMA AMBON CMA THE WHOLE OF NEW GUINEA AND SUCH SEA
AREA WITHIN AN AGREED DISTANCE OF THE COAST WEST AREA
AS MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE DETERMINED STOP PAREN FOUR PAREN
THE SEA AREA TO THE SOUTH OF AUSTRALIA STOP THIS EXTEN-
SION WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE INCREASED NAVAL RESPONS-
IBILITY AND TO MEET THIS IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR ADDI-
TIONAL NAVAL FORCES TO BE PROVIDED TO COVER THIS ADDI-
TIONAL COMMITMENT SUB PARA PAREN C PAREN MACHINERY FOR
HIGHER DIRECTION OF POLICY AND OPERATIONS IN THE ANZAC
AREA THE UNITED KINGDOM CHIEFS OF STAFF STATED THAT IT
IS DESIRABLE QUOTE THAT THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE
ANZAC AREA SHOULD RECEIVE HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE
SAME AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER OF THE A B D A AREA AND
THAT THE MACHINERY FOR ENSURING THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS
REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONCERNED CMA
SHOULD BE THE SAME IN BOTH CASES STOP UNQUOTE STOP THE
ORIGINAL ABDA COMMAND HAS NOW BEEN DISPENSED WITH COMMA
BUT YOU WILL BE AWARE FROM CABLE NUMBER ONE ZERO TWO
THAT THE EXPERIENCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT DID
NOT INDICATE THAT THE ORGANIZATION CMA MACHINERY AND
PROCEDURE WERE SATISFACTORY FOR COPING WITH THE VITAL
PROBLEMS WITH WHICH WE ARE BEING BROUGHT FACE TO FACE
STOP FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF THIS VIEW WAS OBTAINED
DURING THE FINAL DAYS OF THE A B D A REGIME STOP OUR
VIEWS ON THE MACHINERY REQUIRED FOR THE HIGHER DIRECTION
OF THE ANZAC AREA ARE AS FOLLOWS CLN PAREN ONE PAREN
GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY STOP AN UNITED STATES DASH
UNITED KINGDOM DASH ANZAC COUNCIL COMPRISING THE ACCRED-
ITED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOLLOWING GOVERNMENTS COLON
THE USA CMA UNITED KINGDOM CMA AUSTRALIA CMA NEW ZEALAND
STOP THE CHAIRMAN TO BE THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA OR HIS
DEPUTY AND THE COUNCIL TO BE LOCATED IN WASHINGTON STOP
THE MEMBERSHIP MIGHT BE INCREASED AS DETERMINED BY THE

REDACTED-REDACTED-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N.Y.

0915
COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS AND EXPERIENCE STOP

SERVICE OFFICERS IN THE DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST AND COLLABORATION UNDER THE ABDA SCHEME PAREN THREE PAREN SUPREME COMMANDER STOP PARA THE COUNCIL OR THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WILL APPOINT A SUPREME COMMANDER PREFERABLY AN AMERICAN OFFICER SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL STRATEGICAL DIRECTION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON CMA AS SPECIALLY CONSTITUTED IN PAREN TWO PAREN STOP THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER WOULD BE COLON PAREN A PAREN TO EXERCISE GENERAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION OVER THE LAND CMA SBA AND AIR FORCES ALLOCATED TO THE AREA STOP PAREN B PAREN TO ALLOCATE WITHIN THE AREA THE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT THAT ARE AVAILABLE CMA SUBJECT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO RETAIN THEIR OWN TROOPS IN THEIR AREA SHOULD THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THEIR OPINION NECESSITATE IT STOP PARA THE SUPREME COMMANDER SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO HIS COMMANDERS STOP IT SHOULD BE NOT PART OF HIS DUTY TO CONTROL THE DETAILS OF ACTUAL OPERATIONS STOP THE CONTROL OF THESE SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE LOCAL COMMANDERS STOP PAREN FOUR PAREN COMMANDERS OF NAVAL CMA MILITARY AND AIR FORCES STOP
FOllowing is effective machinery for allocating the available forces stop paren C paren the machinery for coordination of allied effort within the area would be the minimum necessary for the effective coordination CMA and a wide measure of responsibility would be accorded to the local commanders stop paren one paren in regard to the supreme commander to be appointed by the council CMA the government would welcome the immediate appointment of General Brett United States Army CMA in view of his experience as deputy supreme commander of the ABDA area CMA the knowledge he has gathered of Australian and New Zealand requirements CMA and the government and service contacts he has made paren two paren the advisory war council representing all political parties in Australia regard the whole matter as one of over riding urgency paren three paren you will doubtless hear from the prime minister of New Zealand within a matter of hours stop both of us agree that it will be better for you to consider the proposal and we request you to recommend its adoption by the president stop end stop prime
CORRECTION ON XXXC NO. 17 MARCH 6TH TO POTUS

ON PAGE 4, LINE 7, UNDERLINED WORD SHOULD BE "ONE" MAKING IT READ "CABLE NUMBER ONE ZERO TWO". THIS IS CORRECTION FROM LONDON.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By H. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
No. 2112 MARCH 6th

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN PARA THE
PRIME MINISTER HAS SHOWN ME HIS CABLE TO YOU IN INDIA PD THERE
IS NO DOUBT HE AND THE WAR CABINET ARE EARNESTLY STRUGGLING TO
FIND A FORMULA THAT WILL BE OF VALUE AT THIS MOMENT AND INTEND
TO TAKE SOME AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PD THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTION IS
RECOGNIZED FOR ITS AFFECT ON OPINION AT HOME CMA IN AMERICA AND
ELSEWHERE QUITE APART FROM INDIAN PARA ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER
HAS NOT SPECIFICALLY SAID SO CMA I HAVE THE FEELING HE WOULD BE
INTERESTED IN YOUR REACTION PD I AM QUITE SURE THAT IN GILLS ABSENTCE I CAN CONVEY TO HIM WHATEVER YOU MAY HAVE IN MIND WITHOUT
EMBARRASSMENT CMA IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO CABLE HIM DIRECT

MCCLURE
March 6, 1942

From AMEBASSY LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

NO XXXC 18 MARCH SIXTH

NUMBER THREE NINE

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT

ROOSEVELT FOLLOWING HAS JUST REACHED ME STOP I SEND IT TO YOU SO THAT YOU MAY KNOW HOW THE SITUATION IS DEVELOPING AT THIS MOMENT STOP BEGINS FROM VICE ROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA STOP PARA ONE PD FOLLOWING IS BRIEF SUMMARY OF COMMANDER IN CHIEFS VIEWS CLN PRESENT PERCENTAGE OF COMPOSITION OF INDIAN ARMIES STOP HINDU FOUR ONE CMA MOSLEM THIRTY FIVE CMA SIKH TEN CMA GURKHA EIGHT AND HALF CMA OTHERS FIVE AND HALF STOP THE PUNJAB SUPPLIES FIFTY PERCENT OF WHOLE STOP PARA TWO SUB PARA A TAKEN BY ITSELF KNOWLEDGE FUTURE RIGHT TO SECede WOULD PROBABLY HAVE NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT IF PROPERLY PUT OUT CMA BUT DECLARATION OF LOCAL OPTION WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF GREAT UNSETTLEMENT WHICH WILL PROBABLY BECOME DANGEROUS AS COMMUNAL STRUGGLE OVER THESE PROPOSALS DEVELOPS STOP LOCAL OPTION WILL BE INTERPRETED AS ACCEPTANCE OF PAKISTAN AND EFFECT WILL BE PARTICULARLY BAD ON PUNJAB STOP MOSLEMS OF ALL RANKS FROM PROVINCES NOT LIKELY TO ACCEDE WILL ASK HOW NON DASH ACCESSION PROVINCES WILL BE GOVERNED CLN WILL THEY HAVE ARMY OF THEIR OWN CMA AND IF NOT HOW WILL THEY DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST
REST OF INDIA OR AGAINST OWEN MINORITIES E.G. SIKHS QUERY
IN RESULT THE MINDS OF ALL WILL DEFINITELY BE TAKEN OFF
TASK OF FIGHTING OUR ENEMIES CLN AS A SEQUEL RECRUITMENT
WILL BE GRAVELY IMPERILLED STOP SUB PARA B GENERAL TEND-
ENCY WOULD BE TO DISCOURAGE MARTIAL RACES CMA BUT BRING
FORWARD LARGE NUMBERS FROM NON DASH MARTIAL CLASSES WHO
WOULD BE WORTHLESS AGAINST EXTERNAL ENEMIES AND ONLY
DESIRE TO BE ARMED AGAINST INTERNAL ENEMIES STOP IN ANY
CASE IF AS SEEMS PROBABLY CMA WIDESPREAD COMMUNAL DIS-
URBANCES DEVELOP IN INDIA CMA TASK OF SUPPRESSING THEM
WITH INDIAN TROOPS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE STOP A POSSIBILITY
OF COMMUNAL WARFARE IN INDIAN ARMY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED
STOP SUB PARA C PROBABLE EFFECT ON STATES FORCES NOT
CLEAR STOP SUB PARA D SERVING GURKHAS UNLIKELY TO BE
AFFECTED STOP SUB PARA E EFFECT ON BRITISH OFFICER IS
LIKELY TO BE DISPIRITING WHILE HIS DIFFICULTIES ARE
INCREASED STOP NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS FOR INDIAN ARMY FROM
ENGLAND IS LIKELY TO DIMINISH STOP PARA THREE SUMMING
UP COMMAND IN CHIEF CONSIDERS THAT GENERALLY EFFECT
OF CONTEMPLATED ANNOUNCEMENT ON FIGHTING SERVICES WOULD
BE DISASTROUS STOP HE IS QUITE CERTAIN CONTEMPLATED ANN-
OUNCEMENT WILL TAKE SOLDIERS MIND SOONER OR LATER OFF
FIGHTING OUR ENEMIES AND START HIM LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER STOP FINALLY PRESENT TIME WHEN THINGS ARE GOING WRONG CMA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNHAPPY FOR SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT.

PRIME
From AMBASSADOR LONDON

To POTUS

Recipient: UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

Date: MAY 5 1942

RECOMMEND UNCLASSIFIED

TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL

NUMBER FORTY PARA IF WINANT IS WITH YOU NOW HE WILL NO DOUBT EXPLAIN THE FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW ABOUT RUSSIA STOP THE INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE WAR HAS LED ME TO FEEL THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER OUGHT NOT TO BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO DENY RUSSIA THE FRONTIERS SHE OCCUPIED WHEN GERMANY ATTACKED HER STOP THIS WAS THE BASIS ON WHICH RUSSIA ACCeded TO THE CHARTER CMA AND I EXPECT THAT SUCH A PROCESS OF LIQUIDATING HOSTILE ELEMENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES CMA ETC CMA WAS EMPLOYED BY THE RUSSIANS WHEN THEY TOOK THESE REGIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR STOP I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE US A FREE HAND TO SIGN THE TREATY WHICH STALIN DESIRES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE STOP EVERYTHING PORTENDS AN IMMENSE RENEWAL OF THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA IN THE SPRING AND THERE IS VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO TO HELP THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT IS HEAVILY ENGAGED WITH THE GERMAN ARMIES STOP PARA TWO WITH REGARD TO YOUR CONVERSATION WITH THE STAFFS ABOUT MY LONG TELEGRAM CMA I SHOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU CMA FOR YOURSELF ALONE CMA THAT I AM BY NO MEANS EXCLUDING AN EFFORT FROM HERE TO TAKE THE WEIGHT OF RUSSIA ONCE HITLER IS DEFINITELY COMMITTED TO THE ATTACK.
K STOP I DO NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE COMBINED STAFF AT ALL AT THE PRESENT TIME STOP I HOPE IT CAN REMAIN SECRET BETWEEN US STOP PARA THREE I AM KEEPING YOU INFORMED ABOUT INDIA SO THAT YOU MAY SEE THE DIFFICULTIES I HAVE TO FACE STOP THE WEIGHT OF THE WAR IS VERY HEAVY NOW AND I MUST EXPECT IT TO GET STEADILY WORSE FOR SOME TIME TO COME

PRIME

REGRADE D UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5, 1972

Action Copy
From AMBASSADOR LONDON

To POTUS WASHN

NO XXXC 20 MARCH SEVENTH

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND

NO FORTYONE PD IN PURSUANCE OF MY PLAN OF KEEPING
YOU INFORMED ABOUT OUR INDIAN POLICY AND IN CONTINUATION
OF MY TELEGRAM NO THIRTY NINE IN WHICH I GAVE YOU WAVELLS

VIEWS I NOW SEND YOU A TELEGRAM FROM THE VICEROY CMA
JUST RECEIVED CMA AS WELL AS ONE FROM THE GOVERNOR OF
THE PUNJAB STOP THESE ARE NOT CMA OF COURSE CMA THE
ONLY OPINIONS ON THESE MATTERS CMA BUT THEY ARE VERY
SERIOUS WHEN THE ENEMY IS BATTERING AT THE GATE AND
WHEN THE PUNJAB SUPPLIES FIFTY PER CENT OF ALL FIGHTING
TROOPS WHICH CAN TAKE PART IN DEFENCE OF INDIA STOP WE
ARE STILL PERSEVERING TO FIND SOME CONCILIATORY AND
INSPIRING PROCESS CMA BUT I HAVE TO BE CAREFUL THAT WE
DO NOT DISTURB BRITISH POLITICS AT A MOMENT WHEN THINGS
ARE INCREASINGLY AQUIVER STOP FOLLOWING ARE VICEROYS
COMMENTS WITH RELATION TO WAVELLS APPRECIATION STOP
BEGIN PARA THERE IS DANGER OF COMMUNAL POSITION IN
PUNJAB BEING MISUNDERSTOOD AT HOME AND FOLLOWING CONSIDER
ATIONS ARE THEREFORE PUT FORWARD WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO PROPOSAL FOR LOCAL OPTION TO REMAIN SEPARATE
FROM CENTRAL UNION STOP PUNJAB MOSLEMS IF THEY REMAIN UNITED COULD NO DOUBT ENSURE EXERCISE OF OPTION TO REMAIN SEPARATE IN CASE OF PUNJAB CM A BUT FOR FOLLOWING REASONS THEIR OWN COMMUNAL APPREHENSIONS MUST BE ALLAYED STOP SIKHS WOULD BE ALARME D AT PROSPECT OF PREDOMINANTLY MOSLEM AND SEPARATE PUNJAB AND WOULD BEGIN TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR TROUBLE STOP CERTAINTY OF SUCH TROUBLE ARISING WOULD CAUSE PUNJAB MOSLEMS TO LOOK TO THEIR OWN DEFENCES STOP IDEA OF A SEPARATED PUNJAB WOULD THEREFORE STILL KEEP BOTH SIDES EMBITTERED STOP NUMBER OF ARMS KNOWN TO BE HIDDEN IN PUNJAB GIVES CAUSE FOR ADDITIONAL ANXIETY STOP FURTHER INFLAMMATION OF COMMUNAL PASSIONS CAN ONLY BE PREVENTED BY GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL ENSURE MODERATION AND PEACE EITHER IN A SEPARATE OR FEDERATED PUNJAB STOP PARA LATEST ROUTINE REPORT FROM GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB REFERS TO SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN PUBLIC MORALE AS A RESULT OF BAD NEWS FROM FAR EAST CM A AND TO GROWING MUTUAL DISTRUST AND STRAIN IN RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSLEMS AND SIKHS STOP ENDS FOLLOWING IS TELEGRAM FROM GOVERNOR OF PUNJAB STOP BEGINS FOLLOWING ARE MY VIEWS ON EFFECT ON PUNJAB OF IMMEDIATE
DECLARATION THAT INDIA WILL AT FUTURE DATE BE GIVEN RIGHT TO SECEDE FROM EMPIRE STOP RESPONSIBLE SECTION OF MOSLEMS WHO ARE MAJORITY HOLD UNSHAKEABLE VIEW THAT UNTIL CONSTITUTION ACCEPTABLE TO MOSLEM INDIA IS DEVISED CMA BRITAIN MUST CONTINUE TO HOLD THE ROPES STOP THEY WILL CERTAINLY BE WORRIED THAT CONSTITUTION ON LINES CONTEMPLATED WOULD PLACE POWER IN HANDS OF HINDUS WHOM THEY ALREADY SUSPECT OF PRO DASH JAPANESE TENDENCIES STOP THEY WILL THEREFORE BE DIVERTED FROM WORKING FOR DEFENCE OF INDIA AS A WHOLE AND SEEK TO ALIGN THEMSELVES ELSEWHERE STOP UNPRECEDEDENT INTENSIFICATION OF BITTERNESS BETWEEN SIKHS AND MOSLEMS CMA BETWEEN WHOM RELATIONS ARE ALREADY DANGEROUSLY STRAINED CMA WILL RESULT STOP ALL COMMUNITIES WILL WISH TO KEEP THEIR OWN MEN AT HOME TO DEFEND THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND RECRUITMENT WILL AS A RESULT BE VERY SERIOUSLY AFFECTED STOP DISORDERS WILL BE INEVITABLE AND PRESENT GREATLY REDUCED SCALE OF SECURITY TROOPS LIKELY TO BE INSUFFICIENT STOP MOSLEM LEAGUE WILL PROBABLY GREATLY INCREASE STRENGTH IN PUNJAB AND WILL USE INFLUENCE RUTHLESSLY FOR PURPOSE OF DISRUPTION STOP PRIMIER OF PUNJAB WILL PROBABLY RESIGN WITH MOST
OR ALL OF HIS MINISTERS STOP THIS WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS EFFECT AS NO DASH ONE ELSE COULD HELP IN THE WAR AND HOLD THE PUNJAB TOGETHER AS PRESENT PREMIER HAS DONE STOP DECLARATION THAT PROVINCES WILL HAVE LOCAL OPTION OF ACCEDING TO CENTRAL INDIAN UNION WILL NOT COUNTERACT EFFECT OF DECLARATION THAT INDIA WILL HAVE RIGHT TO SECEDE FROM EMPIRE DEALT WITH ABOVE STOP PUNJAB IS NOT HOMOGENEOUS BUT COMPOSED OF COMMUNITIES ANTAGONISTIC TO EACH OTHER AND INTERNAL TROUBLE WOULD BE UNAVOIDABLE STOP PUNJAB WOULD PROBABLY NOT ACCEDE TO UNION STOP MOSLEM COMMUNITY WOULD TEND TO FORM BLOC WITH CO DASH RELIGIONIST NEIGHBOURS STOP

PRIME
From: LONDON
To: POTUS

NO. 21 MARCH 9
FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT PERSONAL
AND
NO FOUR TWO PARA AM MOST DEEPLY GRATEFUL
FOR YOUR PROMPT AND GENEROUS RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTIONS
STOP NEW POSITION IS BEING EXAMINED BY OUR STAFFS COMMA
AND I WILL CABLE YOU SHORTLY STOP

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 10, 1942

5:46 A.M.

No. 22 March Tenth

To President and personal no four three para we shall give Stark the warmest welcome and every facility from former Naval Person

Prime

Approved

Answers President's #114, 9 Mar 42

Action Copy

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5 1972
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 14, 1942

5:59 P. M.

LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 24, March 14th.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FORTY FOUR PARA WE HAVE DECIDED TO DO BONUS CMA AND AS IT IS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO WEaken OUR EASTERN FLEET WE SHALL HAVE TO USE THE WHOLE OF FORCE H NOW AT GIBRALTAR PD THIS WILL LEAVE THE WESTERN EXIT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN UNCOVERED CMA WHICH IS MOST UNDESIRABLE PD WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SEND SAY TWO BATTLESHIPS CMA AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER CMA SOME CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS CMA FROM THE ATLANTIC CMA TO TAKE THE PLACE OF FORCE H TEMPORARILY QUERY FORCE H WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE GIBRALTAR NOT LATER THAN MARCH THIRTY AND COULD HARDLY REACH GIBRALTAR AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF JUNE PD WE HAVE NOT PLANNED ANY OPERATION FOR FORCE H INSIDE THE MEDITERRANEAN BETWEEN APRIL ONE AND THE END OF JUNE PD IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT FRENCH RETALIATION CMA IF ANY CMA FOR BONUS WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF ATTACKING UNITED STATES SHIPS BY AIR PD MORAL EFFECT OF UNITED STATES SHIPS AT GIBRALTAR WOULD CMA IN ITSELF CMA BE HIGHLY BENEFICIAL ON BOTH SIDES OF THE STRAITS PD OPERATION BONUS CANNOT GO FORWARD UNLESS YOU ARE ABLE TO DO THIS PD ON THE OTHER HAND CMA THERE ARE THE GREATEST DANGERS IN LEAVING BONUS TO BECOME A JAPANESE BASE PD WE ARE NOT TELLING ANYONE ABOUT OUR PLANS AND ASSAULTING TROOPS MINGLE QUITE EASILY WITH OUR MARCH CONVOY TO THE EAST PD A SEPARATE TELEGRAM WILL EXPLAIN THE MEANING OF BONUS.

PRIME.
CABLEGRAM  

AC -4

Received at the War Department Message Center  
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.  

MARCH 15 1942  

627 A  M.

LONDON

To POTUS

NO. 25 MARCH FIFTEENTH

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND NUMBER FORTYFIVE PDFOR BONUS READ MADAGASCAR NOW IRONCLAD PD

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date  
MAY  5 1972
From AMBASSADOR LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942

March 17, 1942

11:58 A M.

No XXXC 26 seventeenth

Former Naval Person to President personal and number 46.

1. I have been earnestly considering your's of March 10. Although I sent a paraphrase of the operative parts of your proposals to Australia and New Zealand, I have not yet heard from them. It may be that Australia is relying on the discussions you will have with Dr. Evatt who should now be with you.

2. I have also had the proposals examined by our Chiefs of Staff. In principle we see great merits in the simplification resulting from the American control of the Pacific Sphere and the British control of the Indian Sphere, and indeed there is no other way. There are however certain issues, some fundamental, which I must place before you.

3. Nothing must prevent the United States and British Navies from working to a common strategy from Alaska to Capetown. The immense distances and practical facts require them to act in widely separated theaters, but they must operate with a single purpose, an exact timing, and upon closely coordinated plans.

4. We are building up and shall presently have a respectable force which will be based in the Central Indian Ocean. This force already consists of five (5) battleships, two (2) of our latest
aircraft carriers, four (4) modern cruisers and several older ones, and thirteen (13) destroyers; all under the command of Admiral Somervile who has done well in a great deal of fighting in the Mediterranean. The remnants of the Dutch Navy are reforming with our assistance and wish to work under our command. In one month the modern aircraft carrier illustrious, in two months the valiant and in six months, we hope, the Queen Elizabeth will reinforce our Eastern Fleet. On completion of the refits of Nelson, Rodney and King George Fifth, and should the situation permit, we should consider sending either Nelson or Rodney or possibly both to join the Eastern Fleet.

5. The British Eastern Fleet, composed as it is to a great extent of old ships with short range guns, could only deal with a certain number of the Japanese Fleet. Similarly, a general fleet engagement between the whole Japanese Fleet and the American Pacific Fleet would be a close run thing.

6. Therefore it seems to us that all our Naval Forces must be directed from a single standpoint, and their problems viewed as a whole. This can only be done by the machinery of the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee, acting directly under you and me in constant contact and agreement. All other arrangements for separate
Commands in the Pacific and India Spheres must be effectively subordinated to this supreme Command. I feel sure I am right in reading your proposals in this sense.

7. On this basis we welcome your proposal that an American should be appointed Commander in Chief of all Allies and of all three services in the Pacific Area, with local Commanders in Australia, New Zealand, etc.

8. We also agree that the American Chiefs of the Staff under your direction should decide day to day operational questions affecting the action of this American Commander in Chief in the Pacific Area.

9. We suggest however that Staff Officers from Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch and the Chinese should be available in Washington to serve the American Staffs on operational matters as may be necessary. These officers might also be the technical advisers of the members of the Pacific Council in Washington to which I refer in paragraph eleven (11) below. We have such an arrangement successfully working in London now.

10. So much for the executive conduct of the Pacific war. I now come to the advisory bodies which will have to be consulted on
larger issues. Owing to geography they must be duplicated and have the same composition on each side of the Atlantic ocean. There will in fact be two Pacific Councils. The one in Washington, lying as it will in close touch with the American Executive machinery in the Pacific Area, will naturally have more practical and more effective influence upon events than its reproduction in London. It is not possible to draw a line between strategic and political matters, as these are interwoven at the top.

11. As we see it, our Pacific council in London would discuss the whole state of the war against Japan and we would send our opinions from time to time to the similar body in the United States. The executive conduct of the Pacific war against Japan would remain the integral responsibility of the United States acting through the American Chiefs of the Staff and the American Commander in Chief, subject always to the coordination of Naval effort as stated in paragraph three (3) and to the decisions on grand strategy which are the function of the combined Chiefs of the Staff and the Heads of Governments similarly the executive conduct of operations in the Indian Theatre would remain the integral responsibility of the British War Cabinet acting through the Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet and the British Chiefs of the Staff, but the Pacific Council
in Washington would send us their opinions when they thought fit.

12. It follows from the above that the United Kingdom should have a representative on the Pacific Council in Washington and that you should have a representative on the Pacific Council in London. Equally we would keep your Representative informed of the course of affairs in the Indian Ocean, which also forms a large part of the Sphere of the London Pacific Council. The Dutch, for instance, are full of ideas for counter attacks on the Japanese captured places, which we will do our best to further before the summer is far advanced.

13. Turning back again to the highest war direction, the present arrangement centres upon the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee in Washington. The three British representatives in Washington act in accordance with the instructions of the British Chiefs of the Staff Committee in London. Do you wish that American representatives, say Admiral Stark and General Chaney, should sit in on Japanese matters from time to time with our three Chiefs of the Staff here.

14. I have now heard from New Zealand that they welcome your kindly offer to send an American Division at the dates mentioned into New Zealand. They have at no time asked for the
withdrawal of their Division from the Middle East, and they do not ask now. At the same time they do not wish to engage themselves never to ask for such return. If, for instance, they were heavily invaded their men abroad would feel deep distress about their homes and families and desire to go home and defend them. However, I do not think they are going to be heavily invaded, and anyhow the matter would be governed by shipping. Therefore let us take it as settled that you send a United States Division to New Zealand and the New Zealand Division remains in the Middle East, at any rate for many months to come. You will probably know from Dr Evatt as soon as I from Mr Curtin what the Australian position is. It would certainly be most unfortunate if the last Australian Division left the Middle East on the eve of the German offensive against the Caucasus.

15. On the supreme and general outlook in the Pacific, we are both agreed on the paramount importance of regaining the initiative against Japan and taking all the captured places their hostages to fortune, as they were formerly ours. We assume that any large scale methods of achieving this would be capable of being discussed by the combined Chiefs of the Staff Committee in Washington and would not be settled out of hand by the American
Chiefs of the Staff and their American Commander in Chief. We should naturally consult similarly on large scale methods in our area.

16. There are a few points of detail. In your telegram of March ten you say "India would not be occupied by American troops or planes," but in your earlier message to me, No. 113, in which you set out American air dispositions overseas for 1942, you allocated sixty heavy bombers and eighty pursuit aircraft for the China-India-Burma area. We hope this proposal holds good.

17. Furthermore in detail, we would rather have the American light bombers and fighters which you think sending to England by July sent to the Middle East, where American aircraft of these types are already operating. We are very short of these types in the Middle East and cannot increase what we are sending from here. By sending American types direct you would save the double lift and thus shipping. We have had to bleed the Middle East so much in order to help India, Ceylon and Burma that I am very anxious about our air position in that area.

18. We have agreed on a line dividing the Pacific and Indian spheres, but naturally this line would be elastic, dependent on the movements of the enemy or tasks we might appoint for our forces.
We must not have anything so rigid as to hamper planning or manoeuvre. The First Sea Lord is anxious that I should put the following point to you. (Begins) As the Naval responsibility for dealing with sea-borne raids of the North West and West Coasts of Australia will be British, we assume that under your proposals, in which there are only two areas in the East, the boundary between them will generally follow the line of the Dutch Islands, modified as necessary to give room for your submarine patrols to the south of these islands (Ends). Perhaps this could be taken care of in the final drawing of the line.

19. I have not attempted to discuss in this telegram your proposals for the joint control of the north and south Atlantic area. Pound is making some suggestions to King for a co-ordination of effort in the event of a break out of German ships.

20. To sum up, I feel that your proposals as I have ventured to elaborate and interpret them will achieve the double purpose, namely (a) integrity of executive and operational action, and (b) opportunity of reasonable consultation for those whose fortunes are involved ends message.
March 17, 1942

From London
To Potus

March seventeenth

Your No one two one (121). We are delighted MacArthur has arrived in Australia and that he has been appointed supreme commander with general acclamation.

You will by now have received my long reply to your No one one five (115) about the division of responsibility against Japan. I am cabling you tonight about Burma command. Former naval person.

Prime
From London

To The President of the United States

No. 28, March 17th.

Number forty eight (48).

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. Your numbers one one nine (119) and one two zero (120). If Tirpitz comes out only the fastest heavy ships are of any use. We must therefore keep two (2) King George Fifths and Renown in north working with our only remaining fast aircraft carrier on this station. Tirpitz has gone north to strike at our joint munition convoys to Russia and action may easily arise. Texas class could not play any part in such fighting. They could not therefore release corresponding force to go to Gibraltar.

2. In view of your help we could send to Gibraltar one eight (8) inch cruiser and four (4) destroyers (British) from the home fleet and makeshift with that while force Hypo is away.

3. We should greatly welcome your sending to home fleet one or two heavy cruisers, not less than four (4) destroyers, and above all please a fast carrier invaluable to join Victorious in catching Tirpitz.
Page two of No. 28 from London.

4. We assume any ships you will send will be under operational orders of C in C, home fleet.

5. Your points about sinkings and Atlantic convoys are being gone into separately, and a further signal will be made from Pound to King.

Prime.
Cablegram

From London

To The President of the United States

REGRADED UNECLASSIFIED by British

Secret

March 17, 1942.

8:57 P.M.

No. 29, March 17th.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

No. 49.

Your message of March 15 about Military Command in Burma and Southern China. We do not think that suggestion that General Stilwell should have a separate military command in Burma as well as in Southern China would work well. I cannot do better than send you the message just received by me from General Alexander.

"From Burma army number nine (9) March 15.

1. General Stilwell arrived here yesterday March 14 and stated that Generalissimo had issued orders stopping the movement of Fifth Army to Toungoo Area. This is serious in view on possible early advance of Japanese on this front and it is of urgent importance to transfer one BurDiv. to Prome Area as agreed with China. Seventeenth Div alone in present state will have difficulty in holding up enemy advance on oilfields. Stilwell has wired Generalissimo on this subject and meanwhile is giving orders for certain moves to proceed. Dennys (since killed) has also gone to
Page two of No. 29 from London.
Chungking to clarify situation.

2. Stilwell also states Generalissimo has placed him in Independent Command of Chinese troops in Burma which until March fourteen were under me. Have had no other notification. This arrangement appears very unsatisfactory as Stilwell has not necessary staff or local knowledge to take command and his other duties must inevitably interfere. We have built up supply organization for China who have no supply units and also complete liaison organization down to divisions which Stilwell cannot replace."

Would it not be better for Stilwell to be under general directions of Alexander in respect of troops moving actually in British territory where we are responsible for supply and will have constantly increasing forces? Alexander is one of our best Officers and cut his way out of the Rangoon Area with great determination.

Prime.
To POTUS

XXXC NO. 30 17th

From former Naval person to President number fifty personal and secret. Pound has just informed me that he has received a very nice message from King in which the latter says he will do all he can to keep the Japanese interested in the Pacific, whilst we are building up our strength in the Indian Ocean.

Two King also mentions that he was considering sending your two new battleships to the Pacific when my request to you to put a force at Gibraltar was received. We had no idea that your new ships were ready for service, and therefore only had in mind two of your Texas class.

Three. We greatly appreciate your willingness to send your new ships to us but, knowing how urgent it is that you build up your Pacific fleet, I think we should be wrong to accept your generous offer, thereby postponing this great reinforcement to your fleet. If you can send us the ships I mentioned in my number forty eight (48) we can manage and will be most grateful,

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-73
By R. H. Parks Date

SECRET

MAY 5 1942

0949
Cablegram

March 18

From London

To Potus

XXXC 31 March 18

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I am delighted to receive this splendid news. We
have not been able to form any impression here of
such events, except from the vague accounts in the
newspapers, in which one cannot see the wood for
the trees. It would be a great help if we could
be told more. Could not some channel be arranged.
Once more all my thanks and congratulations.

Prime
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

March 19, 1942

12:16 p.m.

From AMBASSADOR LONDON

To POTUS WASHINGTON

Copies furnished as noted:

NO XXXC 32 nineteenth

Former Naval Person to President personal and number fifty two.

We are deeply grateful for your sending a force in which is included one of your new battleships to join CINC Home Fleet.

This will enable us to send a force which will include the Renown to Gibraltar. We will get in touch with Ghormley where your ships should proceed.

When the time is approaching for your new battleships to go to the Pacific please give us sufficient warning to enable readjustments to be made in British dispositions

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy
March 20, 1942
7:45 A.M.

From: Embassy London
To: Potus
By: R. H. Parks

No. 34 March 20
Former Naval person to President personal and secret no five three (53).
Your no one two four (124). We cordially accept the arrangement you propose and instructions have been sent to Generals Wavel and Alexander accordingly.

Your one two five (125). The highest importance is attached by us to bombing U-Boat construction yards and bases and they will play a leading part in our spring bombing offensive. All is in readiness for this, including a vastly improved method of finding our way to the target, first tried at Essen a fortnight ago. We have been only held back by weather, which is the worst experiences for bombing purposes in fifteen years, just as last year was the best. It would be improvident to lose fifteen (15) or twenty (20) bombers, as we have sometimes done, returning to Fogbound Airfields in this Island, when better conditions are certainly approaching. No chance will be lost.

We are also studying the attack by long Range Aircraft upon U-Boats coming from Bordeaux to the Caribbean. It is a question of competing claims. Prime
Note: Par. 1 of 53 was given to Gen. Marshall and Par 2 was given to Admiral King.

No. 54 - Copies were given to Admiral King, Gen. Marshall and Gen. Arnold.
To The President of the United States

No. 35, March 20th, 1942.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

No. 54.

Prime Minister of New Zealand has today telegraphed that he is in entire accord with your proposals for unified control in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and Atlantic, and that the New Zealand Government are prepared to accept the scheme in principle and do their utmost to ensure its efficient operation. Fraser adds that there are some matters of detail on which his Government are not quite clear and which they may wish to take up later. In particular he expresses the hope that the close collaboration between Australia and New Zealand, which has recently been agreed between the Governments concerned, will not be weakened.

Fraser also says that New Zealand Government warmly welcomes the appointment of General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Pacific area.

Former Naval Person.

Prime.
March 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have asked the War Department to prepare any comment they wish on the part of the second paragraph which begins with the words "It would suit us better" and ends with "could be managed."

H.L.H.
No 36 March twenty first
To President from former naval person No 55

Have now had very careful consideration given to your most secret telegram No one one three (113) by my close military advisers.

Your generous offer to lend us American shipping and, in addition, to release the "Queen Mary", "Queen Elizabeth", and "Aquitania" for our use is most welcome and I gladly accept the conditions set out in your para five. Thanks to your help we should now be able to send one more infantry division and one armored division to the East making five in all in the next three months. We would have preferred to keep the monster liners, particularly "Queen Elizabeth," on the long and safer journeys, but the need is so pressing that we must, I think, accept the risks of the Atlantic for them. There is a small point in your para five (C). It would suit us better if you could send a further nine thousand American troops to Iceland (C), even at the expense of Northern Ireland. Perhaps you would consider whether this could be managed.

Personnel shipping. I am delighted to learn that your man lift is so much better than I had been advised. We
No 36 from London Page two
shall need it all.

Air. I am immensely impressed by your layout which
should dominate the future and by the bold strategic out-
look on which it is based. I am however, as you know, very
anxious about the Levant-Caspian front. Even with United
States contributions of air craft for the RAF we ourselves
can do little for that theatre. I therefore ventured to
ask in Par seventeen (17) of my number forty six (46)
whether you would consider sending to the middle east in-
stead of to the United Kingdom, all the light bombers and
as many as possible of the fighters listed in your para
eight G (one).

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 5 1972
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE WHITE HOUSE

No. 37 March 23rd
Former Naval person to President personal and No. fifty six (56).

1. Your No. one two seven apostrophe five (127'5). You have no doubt seen the correspondence between me and Curtin Curtin, which speaks for itself. I accepted his agreement and waited five (5) days before making the announcement.

2. The matter is complicated by Australien Party politics which proceed with much bitterness and jealousy regardless of national danger. The present Labour Government in Australia, with a majority of one, contains various personalities, particularly Evatt and Beasley, who have made their way in local politics by showing hostility to Great Britain. The failure of sea power to protect Australia from Japan brings this sentiment to a head. I am very glad you encouraged Casey to take up the appointment.

3. I shall be interested to know your personal impressions of Evatt and how you get on with him.

Prime.
From: LONDON
To: POTUS

No. 38 XXXC March 24th.

Former Naval person to President. No. 57. My No. 46.

1. I have now received telegram from Australian Government commenting on proposals contained in yours of March 10. The text is contained in my immediately following telegram. I have already sent you comments of His Majestys Government in my No. 46 and of the New Zealand Government in my No. 54.

PRIME
Copy furnished as noted:

No. 39, March 24th.

Former Naval Person to President. No. five eight (58).

Following is text referred to in my five seven (57). Begins.

We have been considering the President's proposals in the light of your cablegram and several cablegrams from Sir Earle Page and a communication received by me from the President stating that he is in general agreement with our proposals regarding organization and commanding of the Australian area except as to some details concerning relationship to the combined Chiefs of Staff and as to boundaries. Prime Minister in view of the various observations which have been expressed on the composition of the higher machinery its functions location and the procedure to be followed we consider it necessary to summarize our understanding of the position as follows together with any necessary comments.

(1) Division of World War Theatre. This is to be divided into the following three areas - (a) The Atlantic under joint British and American responsibility. (b) The Indian Middle East and Mediterranean areas under British responsibility. (c) The Pacific including China under United States operational responsibility.

The question of the relationship between operational
Page two of No. 39 from London.

responsibility in the Pacific Area to the inter governmental body is referred to later.

As already stated the President in his message to me considers some detailed adjustments are necessary in boundaries. The significance of the First Sea Lords point on paragraph one two of Dominions Office cablegram three one nine (319) relative to the boundary between the Indian and Pacific areas as it affects the North West and Western Coasts of Australia is not clear in view of advice from Page that the Pacific War Council agreed to our suggestion that the proposed line of division should not run to latitude five (5) degrees south to Onslow as proposed but on reaching Longitude one one zero (110) degrees East should run due south along that meridian.

Subject to the foregoing we agree in principle with the President's proposals for the division of the World Theatre into the three areas mentioned.

The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that on tactical and strategical grounds China should be within the middle area rather than the Pacific because the only lines of communication with China that are or are likely to be open are through the middle area and the bases for aircraft operations in China must be sited within the
Indian Command. Also attacks against the Japs in or from China must form part of combined operations on the part of the forces located in the middle area.

(2) Pacific War Council London. It is noted that you suggest that the President should have a representative on the Pacific Council in London and we fully agree with this proposal.

The functions of the Pacific Council in London are described in cablegram No. three one nine (319) as discussion of the whole state of the war against Japan and the communication of its opinions from time to time to the similar body in the United States. This appears satisfactory subject to the later observations on the Pacific Council in Washington.

(3) Pacific War Council Washington. The summary of the President's telegram refers to the setting up in Washington of an advisory body on operational matters consisting of members of Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands East Indies and China under the Chairmanship of an American. We have from the first made it clear that it is imperative that the Commonwealth Government should have a voice in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific Theatre particularly as the whole of our forces are being placed under the operational control of the Supreme Commander.
Page four of No. 39 from London.

On twenty first January (1-21st) we asked that the Pacific War Council be established at Washington comprising representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom, USA, Australia, China, Netherlands and New Zealand and proposed that this body should be a council of action for the higher direction of the war in the Pacific. In our proposals of 4th March we stated that the Council should be responsible for the higher policy of the war in the Anzac area and should deal with questions of policy and the provision of forces and supplies. It is observed in paragraph ten of Dominions office cablegram No. three one nine (319) that reference is made to quote the advisory bodies which will have to be consulted on larger issues unquote. We would not be content with an advisory body on operational matters in Washington.

(4) Machinery for strategical and operational control. The Chiefs of Staff committee is the technical advisory body to the Pacific War Council in London and liaison exists between it and the Australian service advisers in London.

We are in agreement with the President's proposal that the United States should assume operational responsibility for the Pacific Area. As suggested in our proposals of 4th March we desire to establish in Washington a Staff comprising a Naval and Army and an...
Air Force Officer who would act as the technical advisers to the
Australian Government Representative on the Pacific War Council
and who for the purpose of Anzac strategy should be associated with
the American Chiefs of Staff as the joint body for advice to the
Pacific War Council on the larger issue.

Agreement has already been reached on the appointment of the
Supreme Commander in the Anzac area. The directive suggested by us
is complete to the higher machinery and the appointment of the
Supreme Commander. The Australian Chiefs of Staff consider that
the Supreme Commander should be located in Australia because he must
be in close touch with the bulk of the forces under his orders espe-
cially with those in the forward area in order to judge the capacity
and effectiveness of these forces who are undertaking both offensive
and defensive operations.

Instead of the local command in Australia and in New Zealand
being under an Australian and New Zealander respectively as proposal
of 4th March should be adopted and an Army and an Air Commander
appointed for each of the following.

(a) Australia its territories and New Caledonia.
(b) New Zealand, Fiji, and all the Island for which New Zealand
is responsible.

General Brett of the United States Army has already been
From ______________

To ______________

Copies furnished as noted: Page six of No. 39 from London.

appointed to Command the Allied Air Forces in Australia. In regard to the grand strategy relating to operations in the three areas it is understood that advice on this would be the responsibility of the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and in London.

(5) It is understood that the joint committees on shipping and raw materials and on munitions will continue to function on their present basis. Curtin.

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
No 40 March twenty seventh

Former naval person to President personal and no 59 and your 120.

I asked the foreign office to send you a note on the details of your project which I hope may be considered. We do not mind your sending very limited quantities of supplies to French North Africa provided the American observers can penetrate the country freely especially if you could get compensating advantages in securing the control of strategic materials now going to Germany. We value your contacts with Vichy and it is well worth paying a certain price but please... (apparently an omission here)

Nothing must interfere with operation ironclad to which we are now committed and no assurances offered by the French about defending their empire like they did Indo-China should be accepted by the United States in such a way as to enable them to complain of a breach of faith.

Our operation has been carefully planned. It comprises two strong and well-trained brigades with
March twenty seventh page two
a third in case of a check together with tank land-
ing craft and two carriers as well as a battleship
and cruisers. All these are additional to our
Eastern fleet which is now growing in size and
balance. It would be a great help if we could
give the impression by dropping leaflets at the
moment of attack that the expedition was Anglo-
American. Please consider whether you can let us
do this or anything like it.

Prime

SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD

Attached hereto is a copy of a recent despatch received by the President from the Prime Minister. The President requests that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare a draft of reply.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

No. 60

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5, 1972
XXXC 41 March 29th.

 Former Naval Person to President personal and No. sixty.

 1. In order to cope with future U-Boat hatchings, we are emphasising bombing attacks on U-Boat nests, and last night went to Lubeck with two five zero bombers including forty three heavy. Results are said to be the best ever. This is in accordance with your wishes expressed in your No. one two five.

 2. As I mentioned in my No. fifty three replying to your No. one two five, Admiralty and Coastal Command, RAF have evolved a plan for a day and night patrol over the Debouches from the Bay of Biscay. Biscay ports are the shortest and best departure points for U-Boats operating in Carribean and American coasts. German present practice is to proceed submerged by day and make speed on the surface at night. We hope that night attacks and menace by aircraft will hamper their night passage and force increasing exposure by day. Essential therefore to menace both by day and night thus increasing length of voyage and diminishing operational spell on your side.

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. R. Parks Date

MAY 5 1979

0969
This advantage would be additional to any kiplings or maimings, some of which might be hoped for each month since there are never less than six U-Boats going or coming through the area to be patrolled.

3. In view of the very heavy sinkings still occurring on your side to which convoy when organized can only be partial remedy, Admiralty are pressing to allocate four and later on six bomber squadrons to this new Biscay patrol. On merits I am most anxious to meet their wish.

4. On the other hand the need to bomb Germany is great. Our new method of finding targets is yielding most remarkable results. However our bombing force has not expanded as we hoped. We have had a heavy disappointment in a structural defect with the wing tips of the Lancasters which requires laying up four squadrons of our latest and best for several months. Just at the time when the weather is improving, when Germans are drawing away flak from their cities for their offensive against Russia, when you are keen about our bombing U-Boat nests, when the oil targets are especially attractive, I find
Page 3. XXXC 41 from London 3/29

It very hard to take away these extra six squadrons from bomber command in which Harris is doing so well.

5. Arnold had arranged at your orders to send the first installment of United States Bomber Groups to England arriving in July. Can you not manage to expedite TMMS? Never was there so much good work to be done and so few to do it. We must not let our summer air attack on Germany decline into a second rate affair. Everything is ready for your people here and there are targets of all kinds, from easy to hard, to work up on in contact with the enemy. Even a hundred American heavy bombers working from this country before the end of May would lift our air offensive to the proper scale and enable me to spare the six squadrons now for the Biscay patrols.

PRIME
Para 1. Air attack on Malta is very heavy. There are now in Sicily about four hundred German and two hundred Italian fighters and bombers. Malta can only now muster twenty or thirty serviceable fighters. We keep feeding Malta with Spitfires in packets of sixteen loosed from Eagle carrier from about six hundred miles west of Malta.

This has worked a good many times quite well but Eagle is now laid up for a month by defects in her steering gear. There are no Spitfires in Egypt. Argus is too small and too slow and moreover she has to provide the fighter cover for the Carrier launching the Spitfires and for the escorting force. We would use Victorious but unfortunately her lifts are too small for Spitfires. Therefore there will be a whole month without any Spitfires reinforcements.

Para 2. It seems likely from extraordinary enemy concentration on Malta that they hope to exterminate our Air Defense in time to reinforce either Libya or their
Russian offensive. This would mean that Malta would be at the best powerless to interfere with reinforcements of armour to Rommel, and our chances of resuming offensive against him at an early date ruined.

Para 3. Would you be willing to allow your Carrier Wasp to do one of these trips provided details are satisfactorily agreed between the Naval Staffs. With her broad lifts, capacity and length, we estimate that Wasp could take fifty or more Spitfires. Unless it were necessary for her to fuel Wasp could proceed through the straits at night without calling at Gibraltar until on the return journey as the Spitfires would be embarked in the Clyde.

Para 4. Thus instead of not being able to give Malta any further Spitfires during April a powerful Spitfire force could be flown into Malta at a stroke and give us a chance of inflicting a very severe and possibly decisive check on enemy. Operation might take place during third week of April.

Prime.
April 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain McCrea called to say that the Chiefs of Staff sent to the President a memorandum from the P.M., dated March 24th, having to do with the delineation of the theatres of war. Have you seen it?

G.

This no longer holds.
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 1, 1942

8:32 P. M.

To The President of the United States
The White House.

No. 43, April 1st, 1942.

To President from Former Naval person personal and

No. sixty two.

Delighted by your letter of March eighteen just received. I am so grateful for all your thoughts about my affairs, and personal kindness. Our position here has always been quite solid but naturally with nothing but disaster to show for ones work people were restive in Parliament and the Press. I find it very difficult to get over Singapore but I hope we shall redeem it ere long.

Dickies show at St Nazaire, though small in scale, was very bracing. For your personal and Secret eye. I made him Vice Admiral, Lieutenant General and Air Marshal some few weeks ago, and have put him on the Chiefs of Staff Committee as Chief of Combined Operations. He is an equal member attending whenever either his own affairs or the General Conduct of the war are under consideration. He will be in the centre of what you mention on the second page of your letter, Paragraph three. I am looking forward to receiving your plan. We are working very hard here, not only at plans but at preparations.
Page two of No. 43 from London, 4/1.

Your last paragraph on page one. Speaking as one amateur to another, my feeling is that the wisest stroke for Japan would be to press on through Burma northwards into China and try to make a job of that. They may disturb India, but I doubt its serious invasion. We are sending forty to fifty thousand men each month to the East. As they round the Cape we can divert them to Suez, Basra, Bombay, Ceylon or Australia. I have told Curtin that if he is seriously invaded, by which I mean six or eight enemy divisions, we will come to his aid. But of course this could only be at the expense of the most urgent needs in the other Theatres. I hope you will continue to give Australia all possible reinforcement and thus enable me to defend Egypt, the Levant and India successfully. It will be a hard task.

We cannot send any more submarines from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and dispose only of two British and four Dutch. We are much stronger now at Ceylon and are fairly equipped with Garrisons, Hurricanes, some Torpedo planes and RDF, together with pretty stiff flak. Admiral Somervilles fleet is growing to respectable
proportions, and it may be an opportunity of fighting an action will occur. Meanwhile operation Ironclad is going ahead. This also concerns Dickie a good deal. Altogether I hope we shall be better off in the Indian Ocean in a little while, and that the Japanese will have missed their opportunity there.

It seems important to make the Japanese anxious for their numerous conquests and prevent them scraping together troops for further large excursions. I should be very glad to know how your plans for Californian Commandos are progressing. I see some hints that Donovan is working at them.

All now depends upon the vast Russo German struggle. It looks as if the heavy German offensive may not break until after the middle of May or even the beginning of June. We are doing all we can to help and also to take the weight off. We shall have to fight every convoy through to Murmansk. Stalin is pleased with our deliveries. They are due to go up fifty percent after June and it will be very difficult to do this in view of the new war and also of shipping. Only the weather is holding us back from
continuous heavy bombing attack on Germany. Our new methods are most successful. Essen, Cologne and above all Lubeck were all on the Coventry Scale. I am sure it is most important to keep this up all through the summer, blasting Hitler from behind while he is grappling with the Bear. Everything that you can send to weight our attack will be of the utmost value. At Malta also we are containing, with much hard fighting nearly six hundred German and Italian planes. I am wondering whether these will move to the South Russian front in the near future. There are many rumors of an air borne attack on Malta, possibly this month.

Having heard from Stalin that he was expecting the Germans would use gas on him, I have assured him that we shall treat any such outrage as if directed upon us, and will retaliate without limit. This we are in a good position to do. I propose at his desire to announce this towards the end of the present month and we are using the interval to work up our own precautions. Please let all the above be absolutely between ourselves.

Averell is a great help here. He had a remarkable
Page five of No. 43 from London, 4/1.

success with the House of Commons Committee three hundred strong in a most powerful, convincing speech. We shall be very glad to have Wibant back, everybody is inspired by him. I am personally extremely well, though I have felt the weight of the War rather more since I got back than before.

My wife and I both send our kindest regards to you and Mrs. Roosevelt. Perhaps when the weather gets better I may propose myself for a weekend with you and flip over. We have so much to settle that would go easily in talk.

Prime.
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

PRIORITY

April 2, 1942

11:49 A.M.

From London

To The President of The United States

The White House

No. XXXC 44 April 2nd, 1942

To President personal and secret no. 63. Your no. 129. Delighted Harry and Marshall are coming. Looking forward to their arrival and the sooner the better. Considering that everything turns on availability of naval forces and shipping we should greatly welcome King coming too. From former naval person.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

Action Copy

MAY 5 1972
From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

No. XXXC 45 April 4th

Former Naval Person to President No. 64.

Your 131. Fully agree.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5, 1942

URGENT SECRET
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 7, 1942
12:35 P.M.

From London

To The President of United States

No. 46 Seventh
Former Naval person to President personal and number 65.

According to our information 5 and possibly 6 Japanese Battleships, probably including 2 of 16 inch Guns, and certainly 5 Aircraft Carriers, are operating in the Indian Ocean. We cannot of course make head against this Force, especially if it is concentrated. You know the composition of our Fleet. The 4 Roger class Battleships were good enough, in combination with the others, to meet the 3 Kongos, which was all we believed were over on our side. They cannot of course cope with modernized Japanese Ships. Even after the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy's Aircraft in their abortive attack on Colombo, we cannot feel sure that our 2 Carriers would beat the 4 Japanese Carriers concentrated South of Ceylon. The situation is therefore one of grave anxiety.

It is not yet certain whether the enemy is making a mere demonstration in the Indian Ocean or whether these movements are the prelude to an invasion in force of Ceylon. In existing circumstances our Naval Forces are not strong enough to oppose this.

As you must now be decidedly superior to the enemy Forces in the Pacific, the situation would seem to offer an immediate opportunity to the United States Pacific Fleet which might be of such a nature as to compel Japanese Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean to return to the Pacific, thus relinquishing or leaving unsupported any invasion enterprise which they have in mind or to which they are committed. I cannot too urgently impress the importance of this upon you.

Looking forward to receiving Harry.
April 8, 1942.

PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS PERSONAL AND

THE SITUATION SET FORTH IN YOUR HOSTS NUMBER 65 IS BEING MET BY
EXPEDITING MOVEMENTS ALREADY IN HAND WHICH SHOULD TEND TO GIVE SOME
RELIEF FROM CURRENT PRESSURE IN CRITICAL AREA OF ENEMY NAVAL CONCENTRA-
TION

ROOSEVELT

4-8-42

original given to him fully

V. L. he can

INCLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1972
MR Hopkins

PRESIDENT TO PRIME-MINISTER PERSONAL AND
YOUR HOST

THE SITUATION SET FORTH IN NUMBER 65 IS BEING MET BY EXPEDITING MOVEMENTS
ALREADY IN HAND WHICH SHOULD TEND TO GIVE SOME RELIEF FROM CURRENT PRESSURE IN
CRITICAL
EXISTING AREA OF ENEMY NAVAL CONCENTRATION

April 8, 1942.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1, 1972

0984
To President of the United States
The White House

No 47 April 7, 1942

Former naval person to President No 66 8th.

Since I sent you my number 65 of 7th I have received the following from Deputy Cinc at Colombo. Begins: Captain of Gandara and survivors of Gandara and Dardamus (2 merchant ships sunk in Bay of Bengal) report ships were sunk by 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser, modern type. Previously reported as 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. Position 16 degrees North 32 degrees 20 minutes east at 0220 Z on the 6th. Further particulars to confirm identity are being sought.

Position therefore seems somewhat easier. Will keep you informed of every change. Both Dorsetshire and Cornwall, 10,000 ton 3 inch cruisers were sunk same day south of Ceylon by from 40 to 60 dive bombers each armed with 1 large bomb. There are 1100 survivors.

Hoping to see Harry and Marshall today.

Prime
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Modicum party started on second stage of journey at 5:00 A.M. today after a delay of forty-eight hours due to engine trouble and weather conditions. Should reach ultimate destination early tomorrow morning.

J.R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
MEV

PLAIN

London

Dated April 8, 1942

Rec'd 9:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1690, eighth.

Mr. Hopkins, General Marshall and party arrived in London this afternoon. They are holding a joint press conference at seven-fifteen London time tonight.

MATTHEWS

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
1712, April 9, noon.

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
MR. HOPKINS.

"Marshall and I saw the Prime Minister yesterday morning for two hours at Downing Street. Marshall laid out fully the purpose of our visit. The Prime Minister's response was good and I would say indicates that the proposal will be explored here sympathetically and I believe successfully. We dined last night with Churchill, Attlee, General Brooke and Eden. Some further progress was made. Marshall meeting chiefs of staff all day today. Churchill has just sent for me to discuss India and I will wire or telephone you immediately after I have talked with him. All well. Harry."

MATTHEWS

RDS
No. XXXC 48, April 11, 1942

To President Personal and
The President of The United States
The White House

I have tonight received long letter from Congress President stating that Congress is unable to accept proposals. Rejection on widest grounds and not solely on defense issue although it indicates that while Congress would agree that Commander-in-Chief should have freedom to control conduct of the war and connected activities as Commander-in-Chief and war member proposed formula left functions of defense member unduly restricted. Main ground of rejection is however that in the view of Congress there should be immediately a National Government and that without Constitutional changes there should be "definite assurances in conventions which would indicate that new government would function as a Free Government and members of which would act as members of a cabinet in a Constitutional Government". Letter also states that picture of proposed immediate arrangements is not essentially different from old ones "the whole object which we have in view that is
No. XXXC 48, April 11, 1942

Page 2

to create a new psychological approach to the people to make them feel that their own national freedom had come, that they were defending their new won freedom, would be completely frustrated when they saw this old picture again which is such that Congress cannot fit into it."

There is clearly no hope of agreement and I shall start home on Sunday.

He is broadcasting at 2030 I. S. T today Saturday. I feel absolutely satisfied we have done our utmost and have sent Cripps the following telegram:

You have done everything in human power and your tenacity, perseverance and resourcefulness have proved how great was the British desire to reach a settlement. You must not feel unduly discouraged or disappointed by the results. The effect throughout Britain and in The United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defense is a great advantage.

I am very glad you are coming home at once, where a
most cordial welcome awaits you. Even though your hopes have not been fulfilled, you have rendered a very important service to the common cause and the foundations have been laid for the future progress of the peoples of India. From former Naval Person no. 67.

Prime
THIS DESPATCH IS UNNUMBERED.
IT IS PLACED IN THIS FILE
AT THE REQUEST OF THE
PRESIDENT.
To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 49 April 11, 1942

From Mr. Harry Hopkins to the President most immediate and . Had very satisfactory discussion last night between former Naval person, Pound, Brooke, Portal, Marshall and myself. Feel sure that our main business here is going to turn out satisfactorily. Former Naval person asking Marshall and me to meet with Cabinet Monday with Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff Tuesday night at which time I believe the matter will be decided definitely and after which former Naval person will undoubtedly get in direct touch with you. We are meeting Leathers this noon to discuss shipping and all its implications. Further military conferences tonight. Everybody here greatly disappointed at turn of events in India, but all believe that a fair offer was made and that no stone was left unturned to reach agreement. Quite apparent that further negotiations by Cripps would be futile.
Page 2 No. 49 from London

Will you have someone telephone Diana and tell her that Marshall has got me under control.
All here send you their warm regards. Am not allowed to discuss weather, but my heavy under-
wear itches like the devil.

PRIME
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 12, 1942

10:17 A.M.

From LONDON

To PCTUS

No. 50. April 12th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret No. 68.

I have read with earnest attention your masterly document about future of the war and the great operations proposed. I am in entire agreement in principle with all you propose, and so are the Chiefs of Staff. We must of course meet day to day emergencies in the east and far east while preparing for the main stroke. All the details are being rapidly examined and preparations where action is clear have already begun. The whole matter will be discussed on evening of Tuesday, the 14th, by Defense Committee, to which Harry and Marshall are coming, and I have no doubt that I shall be able to send you our complete agreement.

I may say that I thought the proposals made for an interim operation in certain contingencies this year met the difficulties and uncertainties in an absolutely sound manner. If, as our experts believe, we

Declassified
Page 2 No. 50 from London, April 12, 1942

can carry this whole plan through successfully. it
will be one of the grand events in all the history
of war.

About 3 AM this morning, the 12th, when contrary
to your instructions Harry and I were still talking,
the text of your message to me about India came through
from London. I could not decide such a matter with­
out convening the Cabinet, which was not physically
possible till Monday. Meanwhile Cripps had already
left and all the explanations have been published by
both sides. In these circumstances, Harry undertook
to telephone to you explaining the position, but owing
to atmospherics he could not get through. He is going
to telephone you this afternoon and also cable you a
report.

You know the weight which I attach to everything
you say to me, but I did not feel I could take respon­
sibility for the defence of India if everything has
again to be thrown into the melting-pot at this critical
Page 3 No. 50 from London, April 12, 1942

Juncture. That I am sure would be the view of Cabinet and of Parliament. As your telegram was addressed to former Naval Person I am keeping it as purely private, and I do not propose to bring it before the Cabinet officially unless you tell me you wish this done. Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle.

Prime

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1823, April 14, 1 p.m.

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
HOPKINS.

Have you any news from Stalin and is there anything you want to say to me if and in case reports are true that Laval is back in power?

MATTHEWS

London
Dated April 14, 1942
Rec'd 7:18 a.m.

KLP

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

E. J. Stewart Date MAR 2 1972
Telegram from Mr Harry Hopkins to the President.

Shipping losses in Western North Atlantic during period January 12th to April 12th of United Nations tonnage are 1,200,000 gross tons. Of this more than half are tankers. During the past week we have lost in the same area 150,000 tons, of which 106,000 tons were tankers. It seems to me that the ships we are losing are in the main far more important than the cargoes. We are going to need all of these ships desperately in the next few months.

British are agreeable to reducing stocks to make sure that ships are not sunk, and it seems to me that we should be able to do the same thing. In other words, unless the cargoes are absolutely essential the ships should not be permitted to sail until our new scheme comes into operation next month. I doubt very much that anything short of convoy is going to do this job, and risking further ships without reasonably sure protection is the wrong policy. I should feel somewhat differently about this if every cargo was absolutely essential to the war effort during the next few weeks, but if the British can give up cargoes temporarily I am sure we can.

I believe the bad effect on the crew, not only of ships in this area but other areas as well, cannot be over estimated. It is going to be very difficult to keep these men at work if the sinkings continue, particularly when they have no escort or other ships in company. Statement by Knox that submarine menace will be in hand by May 1st impresses me as being a
very unwise statement at this time. I cannot impress upon you too strongly the concern which all here have in regard to this matter. This is only natural because this island is so dependent on imports and they realize full well the significance of these sinkings to the future of the war.

I need not dwell on the importance of every possible ship to us during the coming months. I had planned to postpone a discussion of this until I could see you, but the matter seems to me to be of such urgency that I decided to take it by cable.

Prime
No. 2398, April 14th, 1942,

British Chiefs of Staff have just submitted comments on our proposal. From Marshall to McNarney urgent. In substance, there is complete agreement as to 1943 and as to speed up of preparations of boats, assembly of US troops and planes, initiating air offensive this summer and increase in frequency and size of raids. "If Russia is being defeated we may be compelled to make supreme effort to draw off German forces from the Eastern Front. This situation may arise at any time after June. It therefore follows that the sooner American air forces, and particularly American bombers, arrive in this country the greater will be our chance of successful action. The subsequent arrival of American land forces would enable us to reinforce the expeditionary forces on the Continent, if we succeed in establishing a bridgehead."

Following the general presentation is the following as part two of the paper: Measures which must be taken concurrently with our preparation to go on the Continent.

We wish to point out that the action against Germany as outlined in the previous paragraphs may be entirely vitiated unless we take the necessary steps to hold Japan in the meantime.

The extent and rapidity of the Japanese advance has placed us in a perilous position in India, the Indian Ocean and Ceylon. But despite the enormous British interests involved, we should not on the long view feel so concerned at the Japanese advance, were it not for the results it might have on our ability to defeat Germany. We cannot afford that Japan should obtain control of the waters in the Western part of the Indian Ocean as it would have the following results:

NOTE: THE ANSWER TO THIS MESSAGE IS NO. 133 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.
(A) We should be unable to sustain our forces in the Middle East. Germany would then be able to get access to the oil of Iraq and Iran and to the raw materials of the East, and so be greatly fortified for a very long struggle. (B) We should lose our oil supplies from Abadan. This would be a major disaster since the oil which we and Australia obtain from the Persian and Iraq Oil Fields cannot be replaced from elsewhere owing to shortage of tankers. (C) The Southern supply route to Russia would be cut. This route is likely to be of increasing importance as enemy attacks on the Northern route increase. We have plenty of evidence that the Germans have every intention of bringing a heavy scale of surface, U-boat and air attack against the Northern route this summer. (D) Turkey would unquestionably fall an easy prey to the Axis enabling enemy naval forces to enter the Black Sea and so turn the Russian position in the Caucasus. This might lead directly and quickly to the downfall of our Russian ally.

We do not possess enough naval forces, even leaving the barest minimum for our vital commitments in home waters to meet the Japanese forces already operating in the Indian Ocean; not to mention those which may be added to them. We are also very short of aircraft in this theatre.

Accordingly we most urgently require American naval assistance unless the action by the United States Pacific Fleet can be such as to ensure that the Japanese cannot operate strong forces in the Indian Ocean; the only alternative is the USA to send us capital ships and aircraft carrier reinforcements, together with their complement of cruisers and destroyers, so that our Eastern Fleet may be may be reinforced to such an extent that the Japanese will not dare challenge it in these waters.

Similarly we urgently require American Air Forces, particularly air striking forces, in the Indian theatre, in order that we may ensure the control of sea communications in the waters around Ceylon and on the East coast of India. These are required both to secure our naval base at Ceylon and to prevent the enemy acquiring positions in Southern India from which they could threaten this base. Aircraft
rather than personnel are our primary immediate requirement."

Have Eisenhower and Arnold consider this immediately. Also place it in the hands of Admiral King. Try and get to me as quickly as possible your appreciation and a proposed reply for me.

Part One of the paper will be cabled later today including the annex.

McClure

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO COPY: AG
FILE: SGS
CG AAF
ADM. KING

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 7263/4
By RICHA Date MAY 1 1972

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

1003
From Embassy London England
To: Milid G-2
No. 2400, April 14, 1942.

The following is part 1 and annex of "Chiefs of Staff Committee Comments on General Marshall's Memorandum" mentioned in my number 2398. From Marshall to McNarney urgent.

A 1. We have read with great interest and are in general agreement with your outline plan for operations in Western Europe. It fits in with the way we had been thinking and the opportunity afforded by your visit for examination of the plan by your and our staffs, in close and frank consultation has, we think, been invaluable. We should like this close consultation to continue in London.

We agree with the Paramount importance of keeping Russia in the field, and that Western Europe is the most suitable theatre for a major offensive against Germany by the combined forces of the United States of America and Great Britain. There is, therefore, identity of outlook between us both on the short and long term view.

As regards the long term view, we entirely agree that plans should be prepared for major operations on the continent by American and British forces in 1943 on the lines proposed in your paper. It is important that no time should be lost in concerting the necessary plans, and your paper provides a most valuable basis for their preparation. We also agree that, subject to the necessary measures being taken to hold Japan (see paragraphs 13th to 15th below), everything should be concentrated on the main object, the defeat of Germany.

NOTE: THE ANSWER TO THIS MESSAGE IS NO. 133 FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. HOPKINS FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMV BY TAG PER 7203/14
By DATE MAY 1 1972

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 12
As regards the short term view, we feel that we may have an opportunity, indeed that we may be compelled (for the reasons given in paragraph 5) to take some action on the continent this year (1942). Since the weather breaks before the end of September, any such operation must take place sufficiently early to ensure the capture of a port on the continent by the 3rd week in September at latest. In other words, the operation must be launched in August at latest. We recognize that substantial American land forces cannot reach the United Kingdom in time to take part in operations on the continent until September, and therefore that the bulk of any land forces which are engaged in any operation before that date will have to be British. Nevertheless, any American forces, particularly air forces, which can arrive in time to cooperate would be of the greatest value, and might make the difference between success and failure. The reasons are as follows:

Our action in 1942 will be governed by the situation in Russia. this may develop in any of the 3 following ways:
(A) Russia is being defeated; (B) Russia is holding Germany; (C) Russia is winning. These alternatives are discussed seriatim in the paragraphs that follow.

6. If Russia is being defeated, we may be compelled to make a supreme effort to draw off German Forces from the Eastern Front. This situation might arise any time after June. It therefore follows that the sooner American Air Forces, and particularly heavy bombers, arrive in this country the greater will be our chance of successful action. The subsequent arrival of American land forces would enable us to reinforce the expeditionary force on the continent, if we had succeeded in establishing a Bridgehead. But even if the Russians were to collapse before the American forces had crossed over, they would be invaluable to strengthen the defenses of this country against the invasion which we believe
If Russia is holding Germany, it is difficult to see in advance precisely what we should do. On the one hand, successful action by us on the continent might turn the scale in favour of Russia and expedite ultimate victory. On the other hand, there might be much to be said for delaying such action until 1943. In the first place, the German Army and people would by then be much weaker as a result of enduring another winter; 2ndly the danger of a premature and possibly abortive uprising by the Patriot Armies would be avoided. Since, however, we must be prepared to make action in 1942, the early arrival of American forces is just as necessary as in the previous case.

If Russia is winning, much the same arguments apply as in the last case, with this qualification that if at any time it became clear that Germany was on the point of collapse, we should not hesitate to get on the continent at once. American participation in such an enterprise, whenever it might occur, would clearly be of the greatest value.

Thus, in all 3 cases, American Forces would be of the greatest value, although at this stage it is not possible to foresee the precise circumstance or the precise manner in which they would be employed.

If you agree with our General conception, we should be glad of early information as to the character and extent of the contribution which you could make available before September, and the earliest dates by which the various air and land contingents could arrive. The most important requirements for this country are transport aircraft and crews and parachute battalions, while equally important is an additional supply of American fighters for the Middle East to enable us to assemble

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY by TAG PER 720314
By RG Date MAY 1 1972

COPY No. 12
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
the necessary reserve of British fighters in the United Kingdom.

We cordially agree with your view that considerable training in combined operations is necessary before any forces are launched upon operations on the continent. This can best be done in this country.

As an annex to this Paper, we have set out the steps which we have in hand to prepare ourselves for the various contingencies which may arise in the near future.

Annex: Summary of action already being taken or contemplated.

In the first place, we have put in hand the restoration of our South Coast Ports which had fallen into disuse, and without which no operations on any considerable scale can be launched.

As a further step, in addition to night air attacks which we are delivering at the heart of Germany, we intend to carry out heavy day light raids on the coasts of France and Inland on the continent with views forcing the Germans to give battle and so subject their fighter forces to severe wastage. By doing this, we hope to give positive assistance to the Russians on the Eastern Front by drawing off German reserve Aircrews to the West.

We also intend to intensify both the scope and frequency of our seaborne and airborne raids on the enemy's coast line.

We have in addition studied very carefully all operation for seizing a Bridgehead on the coast of France.

Enclosure

ACTION: OPD
INFO COPIES: FILE, SGS, CG AAF
CM-IN-3772 (4/14/42) PM 10:42

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARNY BY TAG PER 720314
By RHEB Date MAY 1 1972

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1850, April 15, 12 noon

And personal for the President from Hopkins.

At long meeting last night of Defense Council, Chiefs of Staff, former naval person, Marshall and I, British Government agreed to our main proposal. I imagine former naval person will cable you today.

Your message Number 133 getting our immediate attention.

MATTHEWS

KLP
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 15, 1942

5:52PM M.

From London

To POTUS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78.
By R. H. Parks Date May 5 1942

From Former Naval Person to The President personal
and secret number 69.

I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian
ocean mentioned in my number 65, arising from the fact
that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a
third of their battle fleet and half their carriers,
which force we are unable to match for several months.
The consequences of this may easily be: (A) The loss
of Ceylon. (B) Invasion of Eastern India with incal-
culable internal consequences to our whole war plan and
including the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with
the Chinese through Burma. But this is only the be-
ginning. Until we are able to fight a fleet action
there is no reason why the Japanese should not become
the dominating factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This
would result in the collapse of our whole position in
the Middle East, not only because of the interruption
to our convoys to the Middle East and India, but also
because of the interruptions to the oil supplies from
Page two XXXC 52, April 15, from London

Abadan, without which we cannot maintain our position either at sea or on land in the Indian Ocean Area. Supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf would also be cut. With so much of the weight of Japan thrown upon us we have more than we can bear.

We had hoped that by the end of April the American Pacific Fleet would be strong enough to reoccupy Pearl Harbor and offer some menace to the Japanese which they would have to consider seriously. At present there seems to be no adequate restraint upon Japanese movements to the West. We are not sure whether owing to the great distances even the reoccupation of Pearl Harbor in force by the United States Battle Fleet would necessarily exercise compulsive pressure upon the Japanese High Naval Command. We are deeply conscious of the difficulties of your problem in the Pacific Area.

If you do not feel able to take speedy action which will force Japan to concentrate in the Pacific, the only way out of the immense perils which confront us would
Page three XXXC 52, April 15, from London

seem to be to build up as quickly as possible an ample force of modern capital ships and carriers in the Indian Ocean. By substituting one of the 4 R repeat Roger Class now at Kilindini for Malaya in Ironclad it will be possible to send her back to Gibraltar and for renown to reach Admiral Somerville before the end of May. If you would consider sending North Carolina and Ranger from Task Force 22 to join Somerville temporarily, he would be provided with a force of three long range capital ships and 4 carriers as well as the 4 Rogers. In 8 or 9 weeks barring accidents we shall be better off. Illustrious should have joined Somerville by the middle of May and Valiant in June. Nelson and Rodney will be on the way from England. Thus we shall grow continually stronger and regain the power to fight an action in the Indian Ocean against any detachment Japan may dare to make from the Pacific.

Alternatively if you preferred to place North Carolina alongside Washington in Scapa WE could send Duke
Page four XXXC 52, April 15, from London

of York to join Somerville in the Indian Ocean and Ranger could go direct to meet her. The first method improves our position a fortnight earlier, when days may count.

We are most grateful to you for sending Washington and her consorts to help us and for the invaluable work Wasp is now doing.

It is also most important to have some American heavy bombers in India. There are at present about 14, and 50 more are authorized. But none of these was able to attack the Japanese Naval Forces last week. We have taken everything from Libya which is possible without ruining all prospects of a renewed offensive. We are sending every suitable aircraft to the East which can be efficiently serviced out there, but without your aid this will not be sufficient. Might I press you, Mr. President, to procure the necessary decisions query.

I am sending you a separate message about our memorable meeting with your envoys last night. We have
Page five XXXC 52, April 15, from London

established the most intimate contacts with the United States Army and Air Force but as Harry will tell you we are not nearly so closely linked up on the Naval side. Yet all depends on this being successfully handled in unison. I am therefore sending the First Sea Lord back with General Marshall and Harry in order that he may discuss with you and Admiral King the whole position and make long term plans. I hope however that if you agree with either of the suggestions for Naval movements made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this message you will be able to have the necessary orders given without waiting for his arrival. We cannot afford to lose any time.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 15, 1942

11:04 PM M.

To POTUS

XXXC 53, April 15, 1942

Correction POTUS 52. In para 4 change to read "We could send Duke of York to join Somerville in the Indian Ocean and Ranger could go direct to Capetown to meet Her.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
April 16, 1942

4:30 A.M.

London

To

The President of the United States
The White House

No. XXXC 54 April 16th

Amendment to telegram from Former Naval Person to President No. 69. Paragraph 2, sentence 3, first 5 words should read "we are not sure however".

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
NO. XXXC 55 APRIL 17TH.

TO PRESIDENT __________ AND PERSONAL NO. SEVENTY PARA ONE.

YOUR ENVOYS WILL TAKE BACK WITH THEM A FULL NOTE OF OUR
MEMORABLE MEETING LAST TUESDAY AND A DETAILED
COMMENTARY ON YOUR PROPOSALS BY OUR CHIEFS OF STAFF.

I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT YOU WOULD WISH TO HAVE AT
ONCE A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE
REACHED. PARA TWO.

WE WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREE WITH YOUR CONCEPTION OF
CONCENTRATION AGAINST THE MAIN ENEMY, AND WE
CORDIALLY ACCEPT YOUR PLAN WITH ONE BROAD QUALIFICATION.

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM MY SIXTY NINE OF THE FIFTEENTH
APRIL, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD PREVENT A
JUNCTION OF THE JAPANESE AND THE GERMANS. CONSEQUENTLY,
A PROPORTION OF OUR COMBINED RESOURCES MUST, FOR THE
MOMENT, BE SET ASIDE TO HALT THE JAPANESE ADVANCE.

THIS POINT WAS FULLY DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING, AND
MARSHALL FELT CONFIDENT THAT WE COULD PROVIDE
WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN AND OTHER
THEATRES, AND YET GO RIGHT AHEAD WITH YOUR MAIN PROJECT.

PARA THREE. THE CAMPAIGN OF NINETEEN FORTY THREE IS
STRAIGHTFORWARD, AND WE ARE STARTING JOINT PLANS AND
NO. XXXC 55 APRIL 17TH

PREPARATIONS AT ONCE. WE MAY, HOWEVER, FEEL COMPelled TO ACT THIS YEAR. YOUR PLAN VISUALISED THIS, BUT PUT MID-SEPTEMBER AS THE EARLIER DATE. THINGS MAY EASILY COME TO A HEAD BEFORE THEN STOP MARSHALL EXPLAINED THAT YOU HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO PRESS FOR AN ENTERPRISE THAT WAS Fraught WITH SUCH GRAVE RISKS AND DIRE CONSEQUENCES UNTIL YOU COULD MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL AIR CONTRIBUTion; BUT HE LEFT US IN NO DOUBT THAT IF IT WERE FOUND NECESSARY TO ACT EARLIER, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, WOULD EARNESTLY WISH TO THROW IN EVERY AVAILABLE SCRAP OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES. WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH PLANS AND PREPARATIONS ON THAT BASIS.

BROADLY SPEAKING, OUR AGREED PROGRAMME IS A CRESCENDO OF ACTIVITY ON THE CONTINENT, STARTING WITH AN EVER INCREASING AIR OFFENSIVE BOTH BY NIGHT AND DAY, AND MORE FREQUENT AND LARGER SCALE RAIDS, IN WHICH UNITED STATES TROOPS WILL TAKE PART. PARA FOUR. I AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO ONE TWENTY NINE OF SECOND APRIL THAT YOU SHOULD ASK STALIN TO SEND TWO SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO SEE YOU AT ONCE.
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

(SHEET THREE) M.

From: LONDON
To: POTUS.

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5-1972

Copies furnished as noted: NO. XXXC 55 APRIL 17TH.

ABOUT YOUR PLANS. IT WILL IN ANY CASE BE IMPOSSIBLE
TO CONCEAL THE VAST PREPARATIONS THAT WILL BE NECESSARY,
BUT WITH THE WHOLE COAST OF EUROPE, FROM THE NORTH CAPE
TO BAYONNE OPEN TO US, WE SHOULD CONTRIVE TO DECEIVE
THE ENEMY AS TO THE WEIGHT, TIMING, METHOD AND THE
DIRECTION OF OUR ATTACKS. IT IS INDEED FOR CONSIDERATION
WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO MAKE A PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT OUR TWO NATIONS ARE RESOLVED TO
MARCH FORWARD INTO EUROPE TOGETHER IN A NOBLE BROTHER-
HOOD OF ARMS ON A GREAT CRUSADE FOR THE LIBERATION OF
THE TORTURED PEOPLES. I WILL CABLE YOU FURTHER ON
THIS LAST POINT. FORGER NAVAL PERSON.

PRIME.

ACTION COPY

REPRINTED FROM AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., WHEELS FALLS, N.Y.
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 18, 1942

PRIORITY

From LONDON

To POTUS WASHN

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 56, April 18th, 1942

Please make following correction in Prime
Ministers Telegram to President No. 70 of 17th
April. Begins. Last sentence of paragraph 2
should read "This point was fully discussed at the
meeting and Marshall felt confident that we could
together provide what was necessary for the Indian
Ocean and other theatres and yet go right ahead
with your main project".

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRY HOPKINS PERSONAL AND

AFRICAN MESSAGE RECEIVED TALKED TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON WHO THINKS MARSHALL AND I SHOULD RETURN LONDON. DO YOU THINK SITUATION REQUIRES OUR REMAINING IN ENGLAND UNTIL THIS MATTER CLEARED UP?

Refers to Note to Hopkins 17 April 42

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. 21 April 1972

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
From London

To The President of the United States

No. 57 April 18th

Former naval person to President personal and

number 71. Your number 134 and also message

number 133 through Harry.

I hope you will send North Carolina over to
join Washington at Scapa. This will enable us to
send Renown immediately and Duke of York as soon as
possible afterwards to join our Eastern Fleet in the
Indian Ocean. This force should prove a strong
deterrent to Japanese attacks upon our convoy route
to Egypt and India. There is no question of our
seeking battle against superior forces, but we do not
want to be sought out and found at a disadvantage.
Admiralty information concurs with yours that there
are indications that Japanese carriers have gone
eastwards to replenish with aircraft after their severe
losses at Colombo and Trimcomalee. All the more is
there reason to use this lull to get into a sounder
position.

As regards air reinforcements for Burma India and
Ceylon Portal has drafted the note in my immediately
following telegram after full discussion with Marshall
and his officer. On this basis therefore welcome use you propose for Ranger and hope movement may go forward full speed as you kindly suggest.

I also have had a long painful message from the Generalissimo but I do not know what can be done beyond the measures now set on foot including especially the replenishment of A V G Alexander has done very well but his force is now little more than ten thousand effectives and if the Japanese continue to land new divisions it is only a question of time before they enter China from the South.

Prime
From London

To The President of the United States

No. 58 April 18th

Former naval person to President personal and number 72 following is note by Portal to which I refer in paragraph 2 of my immediately preceding telegram:

The air force suggestions referred to in the President's telegram to the Prime Minister number 134 have been discussed by me with Marshall after careful joint examination by our respective staff officers. I agree that the quickest and soundest means of building up an air striking force is to bring US bombardment squadrons now in India up to full strength. It is welcome news to hear of 30 American Fortresses and Liberator and 16 B 25 aircraft already in or nearing India. To provide this force with a full reserve for immediate purposes I have agreed to transfer 34 heavy and medium bomber aircraft from British allocations. I have asked that these should be returned to us as early as possible as we ourselves are shortly forming 2 Liberator squadrons in India and another 3 either in Middle East or India as soon as possible afterwards. Nearly all the Liberator aircraft we are getting will be required for this purpose.
I should be only too willing to release Kittyhawk aircraft for Fanger for despatch in Fanger were it not that this would mean taking grave risks in Middle East and possibly compromising the coming offensive. Egypt is now more than ever dependent on this type because of large despatches of Hurricane fighters to India. I hope this will not prevent the use of Fanger as the President suggests. In case sufficient American aircraft for A V G are not available perhaps it would be possible to use any vacant space to hasten shipment of Kittyhawk destined for Middle East but at present waiting for ships.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972
From London,

To Potus,

No. XXXC 59, April 19th, 1942,

Correction our number 58 Prime Minister number 72. Change last sentence para 1 to read 30 American Fortress repeat Fortress and Liberator.

Prime.
From London

To President of the United States

No 61 April 20th, 1942.

From former naval person to the President number 73 the Ambassador and the heads of our missions in Washington tell me that it may be necessary to create some combined bodies for dealing with supplies in addition to those we set up at Christmas. One example is food while our long range programs of war production are also not yet covered by the existing machinery.

But if to the existing raw materials and shipping combined boards we add 2 or 3 additional bodies, it appears that some means of pulling together all the inter allied groups (other than the Chiefs of Staff) in order to get overall direction may be needed. I find that Harry Hopkins and our representatives are agreed about the need for a central focus of this kind.

We must in any case make some fresh appointments in connection with our various supply organizations in Washington. If, on your hearing Harry Hopkins report of his talks with us, you agree about the desirability of setting up a single controlling body over the combined boards, I would at once appoint a representative with the

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By R. H. Parks
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From __________

To __________

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2 Number 61 from London April 20th

Appropriate status to work with your nominee.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
May 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

This thing is being worked on and when I get back we will be able to send a wire on this. I hope it will not be sent before I get back.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
From London

To President of the United States

No 62 April 20th, 1942.

Former naval person to President personal and 

No 74 will you kindly consider whether you should not now make an offer to Pétain and or Darlan of British and American support if they will carry the French Fleet to Africa? Should you favour such a policy I will cable you exactly what we could put in on invitation to Morocco unopposed, and at what dates. It seems to me they ought to be offered blessings as well as cursings

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1942
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

April 24, 1942

From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 62. April 24th

To President from Former Naval Person. and Personal. Number 75. XXXC.

In your Number 131 of April 3rd you said that you felt that it would be unwise to do anything which would give the impression that Ironclad was a joint Anglo American enterprise. In the situation which then existed I agreed with you: But now that Laval has come into power at Vichy and you have withdrawn Leahy, are not things different?

In these changed circumstances, would you be prepared to reconsider your previous decision, and allow us to drop leaflets both at Ironclad and in France which would give the impression that American was associated with the expedition, and that, conjointly with Great Britain, she guaranteed the return of Ironclad to France after the War?

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-74

By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. XXXC 64 April 24, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and secret number 76.

In my immediately following telegram is a note drafted by me on 22nd for Defense Committee and accepted by them. It should explain to you how we are planning to act. I beg that this may be for you and Admiral King alone.

I am deeply anxious about Malta under the unceasing bombardment of 450 1st line German aircraft. If the island fortress is to hold out till the June convoy, which is the earliest possible, it must have a continued flow of Spitfires. The last flying off from Wasp was most successful, although unhappily the enemy attack broke up many after they had landed. We are using Eagle to send in 15 or so at a time. I shall be grateful if you will allow Wasp to do a 2nd trip. We will of course escort with Renown as before. I do not think enemy have the slightest idea Wasp has been in and out of the Mediterranean. Without this aid I fear Malta will be pounded to bits. Meanwhile its defense is weighing out the enemy's air force and effectively aiding Russia.

Para 3 will follow later.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET
To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Paragroph 3 of message number 26. We cordially accept the proposals which Admiral King has made to the First Sea Lord about the dispositions of American heavy ships in the Atlantic.

PRIME

REGRADED UNECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Former Naval person to President personal and
number 77.

1. No satisfactory solution of the Malta problem
is available in May. The island must therefore hold out
till the June dark period. This should be possible if
rigorous severity of rationing is imposed from now and
the supply of Spitfires by Vasp and Eagle is maintained.

2. We must not be deterred from Ironclad, for which
such long preparations have been made, by the changes
in the French government. However, it would be wise
to have both Renown and Duke of York handy either at
Gibraltar or in home waters till we see the reactions
upon Vichy France.

3. The month gained by Malta holding out till the
Middle of June and the dropping of the idea of a convoy
from the west (A) eases the strain upon the Commander in
Chief, Home Fleet by narrowing the gap between Rodney
and Nelson being ready for action and any departure of
Duke of York: (B) enables the May convoy to Russia to
be run thus relieving a most dangerous congestion and
avoiding failing Stalin at the most critical juncture.

4. All the above is very convenient in the west but
is gained at the expense of the Command of the Indian
Ocean. However, we were not going to get that anyhow
until late in June. It is suggested therefore that the
assembly of the Eastern Fleet should be fixed for 30th
June, by which date, barring accidents, Duke of York,
Renown, Warspite, Valiant, and 3 armored aircraft
carriers and the 4 Rogers should all be present. Here
would be a fleet which, if not strong enough to fight
the Japanese Navy, would at any rate be capable of
dealing with a very heavy detachment. We may have to
pay forfeits in the Indian Ocean in consequence of enemy
action, but we are running these risks now and would have
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By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 5 1972
to anyhow for 5 weeks to come. We shall have to go on running the risks for another 4.

5. What should Admiral Somerville do in the meanwhile? First he is to cover Irenclad for which he is not ill equipped with the 3 carriers, Warspite and the 4 Rogers. This is all provided for in his orders and he is already on the way via Colombo.

6. After Irenclad is over, it is hoped about the 16th May. he should work his way North to fuel at Aden in the early days of June. By this time we shall know what has happened to General Auchinleck's offensive. If he has got Mafhuga or Benhaji, the chances of a Malta convoy getting through from the East will be greatly improved. We shall also know how much of the German Air Force has been drawn away from the Mediterranean to the South Russian front. The actual moves that have taken place or are in progress. We can also judge the situation in the Indian Ocean as it then appears, observing that we cannot fight a fleet action anyhow except against a minor detachment. The decision can then be taken whether or not to escort the convoy in strength from the East through the Mediterranean or sail southwards again to meet the Duke of York and Renown and pick up Valiant for the eastern fleet assembly on June 30th.

7. Should the decision be to make a dart into the Mediterranean and see the convoy through in style. Admiral Somerville should proceed with all 3 aircraft carriers and Warspite with auxiliaries through the canal where the convoy should be assembled. This convoy must be worthy of the effort and risk required to put it through. At least 7 supply ships can now be loaded at Alexandria. If all goes well, there will still be time for Admiral Somerville to come back through the canal and make the general fleet rendezvous on the 30th June at Colombo or wherever is convenient.
From LONDON

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

April 24, 1942

Urgent

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 67 April 24, 1942

Former Naval person to President no. 78.

With regard to what you say in your telegram number 139 about Molotov's journeyings, I have had a message from Stalin saying he is sending here to discuss certain divergences in draft texts of our agreement, which he wants settled as soon as possible. He may even be already on his way. You will understand that I cannot now suggest to him a change in the order of his visits. If and when, therefore, Molotov bears down upon us, I propose to agree to a discussion of our drafts and would hope to clear main difficulties out of the way. But I will suggest to him that he should then go on to Washington and see you before anything is finally signed.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

April 25, 1942

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. XXXC 66 April 25, 1942

From former Naval person to President no. 79.
Your 140. Thank you so much.

PRIME

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R.H. Parks Date MAY 5 19...
Number 70, April 23, 1942

From Former Naval Person to President personal and no. 89.

Your no. 141.

Eden has been dealing with this for me in consultation with first Sea Lord and Leathers. Following is the position. Voyage of each of these convoys now entails major fleet operation. With the best will in the world cycle of convoys cannot be more than 3 in 2 months. One convoy (P.Q. 15), limited to 25 merchant ships, has just sailed. In view of what you tell me we are ready to consider, in the light of the experience gained in this convoy, whether the number of merchant ships in future convoys can be increased to as many as 35. Convoy should reach North Russian ports in about 10 days time. Meanwhile we are arranging for 35 merchant ships to be loaded for the next convoy (P.Q. 16), due to leave Iceland (C) on the 17th May. But 35 is the absolute maximum number which it is safe to risk without further experience of the scale of enemy attack.
It is not clear from your telegram whether you have seen the contents of Leathers letter to Harriman of 25th April which were telegraphed to Hopkins the same day. This explains that even if size of the convoy is limited to 25 merchant ships each there will be 75 ships carrying supplies to Russia every 2 months, of which 24 are sufficient to lift protocol supplies from the United Kingdom, leaving 51, including tankers, available to carry supplies from the USA in each 2-monthly period. We estimate that, apart from food, the protocol calls for about 150,000 short tons per month from the USA. Deducting 10,000 tons from this for deliveries via the Persian Gulf, and proceeding on the assumption that each ship will carry on the average 6,000 short tons, not more than 24 ships per month (I E 48 in the 2 months) would be required to lift your quotas, leaving a margin of 2 or 3 for tankers and food supplies.

But the assumption that each ship can carry on the average 6,000 short tons presupposes that the cargo is
stowed in such a way as to ensure that the highest priority goods are loaded into a much smaller number of ships than is now employed. Hitherto ships have been carrying about half this tonnage. This is a waste we can neither of us afford. The only possible course to adopt in order to work off the present accumulation at Iceland (C) is therefore to bring to the United Kingdom most of the 16 ships now waiting there, and also some of the 50 American and Russian ships which are on their way across the Atlantic. These would be discharged and restowed. In our view this is the only possible course if the most important cargo is to reach Russia in the largest possible volume at an early date.

I hope this may meet your views. We are at out utmost strain for convoys escorts.

PRIME
From Former Naval Person to President personal and no. 31.

We have given further thought to ironclad, and we feel that, in order to reduce to a minimum the risk of wavelike reaction by Vichy, it is essential that you should come in fully behind us immediately the operation has taken place.

What we would ask is that in addition: (1) To authorising leaflets as proposed in my telegram no. 52, you should (2) if possible send a token United States detachment to join the occupying forces as soon as possible: (3) In any event inform the Vichy government immediately the operation has taken place that the operation has your approval and support, and (4) immediately make public that such a communication has been made Vichy.

If I might make a suggestion, your communication to Vichy (which might be made to the French Ambassador in Washington on the morning of zero day) might be on
the following lines: -The United States Government wish to inform the French Government that the occupation by British forces of Ironclad, which has been undertaken to forestall occupation by the enemy, has the full approval and support of the United States Government. In order to make this claim, the United States Government will take an early opportunity to send United States forces to participate in the occupation. The United States and British Governments jointly undertake to restore Ironclad to France after the war. The United States Government also wish to make it plain that any warlike act permitted by Vichy against Great Britain in consequence of the occupation would be regarded by the United States Government as an attack upon the United Nations as a whole, from which the United States Government would draw the necessary consequences and take the appropriate action.
From American Embassy London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 73, April 29, 1942.

From former Naval Person to President Personal and secret No. 82.

Most grateful for your telegram about Ironclad, for which all goes forward. Also for allowing Wasp to have another good sting.

I am highly interested in escape of General Giraud and his arrival at Vichy. This man might play a decisive part in bring about things of which you had hopes. Please tell me anything you know.

We have made 2 desperate attacks on Tirpitz at Trondheim. Results of 1st, no damage, but 2nd is more hopeful. Will let you know when photographs are developed late tonight. We are keeping the air fighting up at full intensity. German retaliation strikes at towns near the coast which have no flak. Numbers are moderate and pilots sometimes make 2nd journeys. Monday night we got 3 out of 20 on Norwich, and last night 5 out of 20 on York, all shot down by night fighters.

RECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-7

By R. H. Parks Date
I have had a telegram from Curtin saying that General MacArthur has asked him to request me "To divert to Australia the 2nd British Infantry Division which will be rounding the Cape during the latter part of April and the beginning of May, and also the Armoured Division which is to round the Cape 1 month later. The Diversion, he says, would be of a temporary nature, and these Forces would remain in Australia only until such time as the 9th Australian Imperial Force Division and the remainder of the 6th Division are returned." I should not be able to send these Forces to Australia unless it is definitely invaded by 8 or 10 Japanese Divisions. They are all urgently needed in India. I fear this is a prelude to the recall of the Australian 9th Division.

General MacArthur also asks for a British Aircraft Carrier, pointing out that it is wasteful to operate an unbalanced Naval Force. He further requests an additional allocation of shipping on
the Australian - American Run, stating that the present amount of 250,000 tons is quite inadequate to complete requisite defence strength apart from offensive action.

I should be glad to know whether these requirements have been approved by you or the Washington Pacific Defence Council, and whether General MacArthur has any authority from the United States for taking such a line. We are quite unable to meet these new demands which are none the less a cause of concern when put forward on General MacArthurs authority.

Prime

No. 73, April 29, 1942.  

Page 3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:  

Subject: Dispatch from the Prime Minister.

Admiral King has handed to me the Prime Minister's recent dispatch to you, with certain passages marked for my comment or suggested answers, which are to serve as a basis for your reply to Mr. Churchill. In this connection I am at a loss to explain the reference to General Giraud. This French General, who was a prisoner of the Germans, is reported to have escaped, but so far as we know has gone to Berne and not to Vichy as stated by the Prime Minister.

With respect to other marked portions of the message I suggest a reply as follows:

"It seems probable to me that the request made upon you by Mr. Curtin for two divisions and for additional marine assistance was made upon his own responsibility although probably based upon conversations with General MacArthur. The directive under which General MacArthur holds his command provides that the United States Chiefs of Staff will constitute the executive agency through which orders are to be passed to him, and we had assumed that any request of his for reinforcement would be directed here. However, the command set-up in Australia is complex and understandings in certain details are reached only as they arise, and it is therefore possible that both Mr. Curtin and General MacArthur felt it proper to make request for British assistance directly upon the British Government.

"We have previously replied to a message from General MacArthur informing him that additional airplane carriers are not now available for assignment to the Southwest Pacific. Only today we received another request for a number of ships desired for coastwise and local transportation in Australia, but we had no knowledge of any special need for additional trans-Pacific shipping, nor for the two British Divisions now at sea. I agree with you these should go to India and I hope Mr. Curtin's request is not a mere preliminary to an insistence upon the return home of the 9th Australian Division. As you know, in accepting, some time ago, your suggestion that we send an additional division to the Australians, we did so in the hope that they would then feel able to leave one of their own in the Middle East.

I have had no official information concerning Giraud's alleged escape. My only information has come from the press."
"We will instruct General MacArthur, immediately, that his future requests for reinforcements, except for routine supply which should follow accustomed channels, will be processed to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Where your forces are concerned, we will then communicate with the British Chiefs of Staff. With this arrangement definitely prescribed and understood, you will know that any request reaching you from Mr. Curtin is made upon his own responsibility."

A message to General MacArthur, agreeable to the above, is going out immediately.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff.

If you think it advisable I will offer the hope to Mr. Curtin that he will not ask the return of any of his troops from the Near East.

This despatch is in reference to your No. 82.

[Signature]