ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL
MAY - JULY 1942

Microfilmed at The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York
May 2, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONEL AND PERSONAL NO. 145.

I REFER TO YOUR PERSONAL AND SECRET DESPATCH NO. EIGHTY-FIVE AND FEEL THAT, FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF DESPATCHES BETWEEN ADMIRAL POUND AND ADMIRAL KING, IT IS NOW ESSENTIAL FOR US TO ACQUIESCENCE IN YOUR VIEWS REGARDING RUSSIAN CONVOYS BUT CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP CONVOYS AT STRENGTH OF THIRTY-FIVE SHIPS.

WE PROPOSE TO PRESS RUSSIANS TO REDUCE REQUIREMENTS TO ABSOLUTE ESSENTIALS ON GROUNDS THAT PREPARATIONS FOR BOLERO WILL REQUIRE ALL POSSIBLE MUNITIONS AND SHIPPING.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1550, May 2, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain
Aide

DEClassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.R. STUART
Date OCT 12 1971
I refer to your personal and secret dispatch number eighty-five and feel that following exchange of despatches between Admiral Pound and Admiral King, it is now essential for us to acquiesce in your views regarding Russian convoys but continue to hope that you will be able to keep convoys at strength of 35 ships. Para we propose to press Russians to reduce requirements to absolute essentials on grounds that preparations for Belero will require all possible munitions.
TO: LONDON

NO. 146

PERSONAL AND FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

REPLY TO YOUR 87.

IT NOW APPEARS THAT DELIVERY OF CARRIER FIGHTERS WILL FAIL
TO MEET OUR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN 1942 SO THAT THE LOANING OF
THE MARTLETS TO YOU WOULD MERELY MEAN THAT OUR OWN CARRIERS WERE
tO THE SAME DEGREE NOT EQUIPPED. I AM PUTTING EVERY PRESSURE ON
DELIVERY OF CARRIER FIGHTERS AND HOPE OUR PRODUCTION RATE CAN BE
INCREASED.

PLANS ARE BEING PUSHED TO TRAIN, EQUIP AND MOVE AIR TRANSPORT
UNITS TO THE U.K. AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE PRESENT SCHEDULE
AND THE PROBABILITY IS: FOR JUNE TWO GROUPS OF 52 PLANES EACH;
FOR JULY TWO ADDITIONAL GROUPS, MAKING A TOTAL OF 208 TRANSPORT
PLANES. THIS IS AN ADVANCE OF ONE MONTH ON THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE.
IT IS PLANNED TO AUGMENT THIS AIR TRANSPORT FORCE BY FOUR ADDITIONAL
GROUPS BY NOVEMBER, 1942, PROVIDING A GRAND TOTAL OF 416 PLANES.
TRANSPORT GROUPS ON REACHING ENGLAND WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
ASSIST THE BRITISH FORCES BOTH IN OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AIRBORNE TROOPS IN OPERATIONS IS FULLY
APPRECIATED AND WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE THE
RATE AT WHICH AIR TRANSPORT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE IN ENGLAND.

DECLASSIFIED
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.J. Stewart
Date Oct 2 1971
I WELCOME THE INVITATION FOR OUR PARACHUTISTS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS TO TRAIN IN THE U.K. ALONGSIDE YOURS; A BATTALION OF PARACHUTISTS WILL BE SENT IN JUNE. THE REMAINDER OF THE 1st ARMORED DIVISION AND THE FIRST SERIAL OF GENERAL SPAATZ'S 8th AIR FORCE WILL COMPLETE THE JUNE SHIPMENT. I AM PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO START OUR AIR UNITS OPERATING WITH YOURS ON THE OFFENSIVE AND TO GET SOME OF OUR GROUND TROOPS TRAINED IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS THIS SUMMER.
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: PRESIDENT
NO. 147

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE
ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED HERE. IT IS MY
CLEAR CONVINCION THAT EXCEPT FOR A REASONABLE NUMBER IN THE
BRITISH ISLES ALL RESERVE PLANES SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM A RE-
SERVE STATUS WHICH IS IN FACT AN INACTIVE STATUS IN ORDER TO
STRENGTHEN MAXIMUM AND CONTINUOUS AIR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR GREAT DESIRE TO MAKE
THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMBINED WAR EFFORT IN
EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR GROWING CAPACITY.
I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEM-
SELVES IN ESSENTIAL COOPERATION WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND
SEA FORCES WHENEVER AND WHEREEVER THE COMMON CAUSE CAN BE ADVANCED.
TODAY IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS THE U. S. IS
GOING TO HAVE INCREASING TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COM-
BAT PLANES IN SIGHT FOR THEM TO USE. WE ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS
THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT BE MANNED AND
FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS. EXISTING SCHEDULES OF AIRCRAFT ALLOCA-
TIONS DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.

NOT ONLY ARE PRESENT CONDITIONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE
EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE LEND-LEASE ARRANGEMENTS OF LAST YEAR
BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ARRIVED AT IN THE SO-CALLED

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
ARNOLD-PORTAL AGREEMENT OF THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOW AND AS OF FIVE MONTHS AGO.

MY THOUGHT IS THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND MINE, WOULD DETERMINE THE STRENGTH OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE RESPECTIVE THEATERS OF WAR. I THINK THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLANES POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN COMBAT AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY BE HELD IN RESERVE AND IN OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS, AND THAT AMERICAN PILOTS AND CREWS BE ASSIGNED TO MAN AMERICAN-MADE PLANES FAR MORE GREATLY THAN AT PRESENT ON THE COMBAT FRONTS.

I PROPOSE THAT ARNOLD AND TOWERS GO TO LONDON AT ONCE WITH EVILL TO MEET WITH PORTAL AND THE APPROPRIATE AIR OFFICER OF THE ADMIRALTY TO DISCUSS THE VERY IMPORTANT DETAILS IMPLIED IN THE BROAD POLICY EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT PORTAL RETURN HERE WITH ARNOLD EVILL AND TOWERS FOR THE FINAL DISCUSSION.

ROOSEVELT

RELEASED 2300 MAY 19

G. M. ELSEY
WATCH OFFICER
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: PRESIDENT
NO. 147

MAY 19, 1942

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED HERE.

IT IS OUR CONSIDERED CONVICTION THAT PLANES MAINTAIN A RESERVE STATUS IN FACT AN INACTIVE STATUS IN REGARD TO THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM AND CONTINUOUS AIR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR GREAT DESIRE TO MAKE THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMBINED WAR EFFORT IN EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR GROWING CAPACITY.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT THEMSELVES IN ESSENTIAL COOPERATION WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND SEA FORCES WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE COMMON CAUSE CAN BE ADVANCED.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE GOING TO HAVE INCREASING TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES IN SIGHT FOR THEM, WE ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT BE MANNED AND Fought BY OUR OWN CREWS.

EXISTING SCHEDULES OF AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.

Not only are present conditions different from those existing at the time of the lend-lease arrangements of last year but they are different from those arrived at in the so-called
ARNOLD-PORTAL AGREEMENT OF THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOW AND AS OF FIVE MONTHS AGO.

MY THOUGHT IS THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND MINE, WOULD DETERMINE THE STRENGTH OF AIRCRAFT TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE RESPECTIVE THEATERS OF WAR. I THINK IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PLANES POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN COMBAT AND THE MINIMUM NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY BE HELD IN RESERVE AND IN OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNITS.

I PROPOSE THAT ARNOLD AND TOWERS GO TO LONDON AT ONCE WITH EVILL TO MEET WITH PORTAL AND THE APPROPRIATE AIR OFFICER OF THE ADMIRALTY TO DISCUSS THE VERY IMPORTANT DETAILS IMPLIED IN THE BROAD POLICY EXPRESSED IN THIS MESSAGE. I WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT PORTAL RETURN HERE WITH ARNOLD EVILL AND TOWERS FOR THE FINAL DISCUSSION.

ROOSEVELT
Memorandum for Captain McCrea:

At 2210, Mr. Hopkins summoned me to the President's Study, where the President gave me the attached papers and directed me to make a smooth copy of the message to Mr. Churchill, and to send a smooth copy of the message to Mr. Curtin to the Australian Legation via the State Department.

I returned to the President at 2240 with the re-typed message to Mr. Churchill. This he signed after reading it with Mr. Hopkins, and I have filed it in the President-Prime Minister file. A carbon copy was delivered to a Code room messenger and has been sent as #147. The President directed that the other papers on this subject be given to you, saying"Captain McCrea will
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

know what to do with them." They are attached below.

I typed a smooth copy of the message to Prime Minister Curtin and gave it to Mr. Moreland, the State Department Watch Officer, who called for it in person at 2300. As per the President's instructions transmitted by me, Mr. Moreland turned this over to a representative of the Australian Legation (Mr Hayden, the Second Secretary of the Legation, who called for the message at the State Department at 2350). The original and a copy as given to the State Department are attached.

Very respectfully,

G. M. Elsey
Chart Room Watch Officer
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: PRESIDENT

1. I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE
   ALLOCATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURED HERE.

2. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED CONVICTION THAT ALL PLANES
   MAINTAINED IN A RESERVE STATUS ARE IN FACT IN AN INACTIVE STATUS
   IN REGARD TO THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE OF MAXIMUM AND CONTINUOUS AIR
   IMPACT ON THE ENEMY.

3. I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND OUR GREAT DESIRE TO MAKE
   THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMBINED WAR EFFORT IN
   EVERY APPROPRIATE THEATER TO THE LIMIT OF OUR GROWING CAPACITY.

4. I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE AIR FORCES CAN ADAPT
   THEMSELVES IN ESSENTIAL COOPERATION WITH OUR RESPECTIVE GROUND AND
   SEA FORCES WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE COMMON CAUSE CAN BE ADVANCED.

5. IT IS EVIDENT THAT UNDER CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS WE ARE GOING
   TO HAVE INCREASING TRAINED AIR PERSONNEL IN EXCESS OF COMBAT PLANES
   IN SIGHT FOR THEM. WE ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS THAT EVERY APPROPRIATE
   AMERICAN-MADE AIRCRAFT BE MANNED AND FOUGHT BY OUR OWN CREWS.
   EXISTING SCHEDULES OF AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION DO NOT PERMIT US TO DO THIS.

6. NOT ONLY ARE PRESENT CONDITIONS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE
   EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE LEND-LEASE ARRANGEMENTS OF LAST YEAR
   BUT THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ARRIVED AT IN THE SO-CALLED

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.E. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
ARNOLD-PORTAL AGREEMENT OF THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR ENTRY INTO THE WAR. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS DIFFERENCE OF SITUATION IS THE CURRENT POSITION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOW AND AS OF FIVE MONTHS AGO.

7. My thought is that the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with your approval and mine, would determine the strength of aircraft to be maintained in the respective theaters of war. I repeat our firm belief that the maximum number of planes possible should be maintained in combat and the minimum number consistent with security be held in reserve and in operational training units.

8. I propose that Arnold and Towers go to London at once with Evill to meet with Portal and the appropriate air officer of the Admiralty to discuss the very important details implied in the broad policy expressed in this message. I would also suggest that Portal return here with Arnold Evill and Towers for the final discussion.

ROOSEVELT
Dear Harry:

Herewith:

(1) marked-up copy of draft despatch to the Prime Minister re aircraft

(2) draft of reply to Mr. Curtin with paragraph added as indicated by the President today

Remain cheerful!

King
1. I have been giving a great deal of thought to the allocation of combat aircraft manufactured here.

2. It is our considered conviction that all planes maintained in a reserve status are in fact in an inactive status in regard to the paramount objective of maximum and continuous air impact on the enemy.

3. I am sure you will understand our great desire to make the most effective contribution to our combined war effort in every appropriate theater to the limit of our growing capacity.

4. I am confident that our respective air forces can adapt themselves in essential cooperation with our respective ground and sea forces whenever and wherever the common cause can be advanced.

5. It is evident that under current arrangements we are going to have increasing trained air personnel in excess of combat planes in sight for them. We are therefore anxious that every appropriate American-made aircraft be manned and fought by our own crews. Existing schedules of aircraft allocation do not permit us to do this.

6. Not only are present conditions different from those existing at the time of the lend-lease arrangements of last year but they are different from those arrived at in the so-called Arnold Portal agreement of the days immediately following our entry into the war. One example of this difference of situation is the current position of Australia and New Zealand now and as of five months ago.

7. My thought is that the combined Chiefs of Staff, with your approval and mine, would determine the number and type of aircraft to be maintained in the respective theaters of war. I repeat our firm belief that the maximum number of planes possible should be maintained in combat and the minimum number held in reserve and in operational training units.

8. I suggest that Arnold and Towers go to London at once to meet with Portal and the appropriate air officer of the Admiralty to discuss the very important details implied in the broad policy expressed in this message. I would also suggest that Portal return here with Arnold, Full and Towers for the final discussion.

Checked with Towers Present

Do with Marshall Arnold via phone

K.C. King
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3. I am sure you will understand our great desire to make the most effective contribution to our combined war effort in every appropriate theater to the limit of our growing capacity.

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8. I suggest that Arnold and Towers go to London at once to meet with Portal and the appropriate air officer of the Admiralty to discuss the very important details implied in the broad policy expressed in this message.
I have been giving a great deal of thought to the allocation of combat aircraft manufactured in the United States.

It is evident that under present arrangements we are going to have trained air personnel in excess of combat planes available to them. Furthermore we have means of transporting these aircraft and personnel to combat theaters. As you know, we want to get into this war in every appropriate theater to the limit of our manpower.

In so far as the air is concerned, therefore, we are anxious that every appropriate American-made combat aircraft be fought by existing schedules of allocations do not our own crews to a far greater extent than is now possible under existing allocations. I am sure you will understand not only the necessity for this but our great anxiety to make the most effective contribution to our joint war effort.

I am sure that our respective air forces can adapt themselves to cooperate from a tactical point of view with our respective ground and sea forces wherever that may be necessary. The only theater which at the moment I exclude from American personnel is the Russian theater, which, for reasons particularly of language, would make direct operation difficult. Even in this theater I can visualize certain types of air force, particularly the big bombers, operating.

I realize fully that what I am saying to you means that your own air force will not increase as rapidly as has been.

It is our firm conviction that the number of planes maintained in a reserve status is unimportant in the long run, but that the condition of our men and equipment that we must have at the time a war breaks out is of great importance.
I have been giving a great deal of thought to the allocation of combat aircraft manufactured in the United States.

It is evident that under present arrangements we are going to have trained air personnel in excess of combat planes available to them. Furthermore we have means of transporting these aircraft and personnel to combat theaters. As you know, we want to get into this war in every appropriate theater to the limit of our manpower.

In so far as the air is concerned, therefore, we are anxious that every appropriate American-made combat aircraft be fought by our own crews to a far greater extent than is now possible under existing allocations. I am sure you will understand not only the necessity for this but our great anxiety to make the most effective contribution to our joint war effort.

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I realize fully that what I am saying to you means that your own air force will not increase as rapidly as has been
PLANNED BUT ON THE OTHER HAND IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE WILL
BE FEWER COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN ANY THEATER OF THE WAR. IT MERELY
MEANS THAT MORE OF THEM WILL BE FUGHT BY OUR OWN PERSONNEL.

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, CERTAIN LIMITATIONS TO THIS PROPOSAL,
such as your requirements for our production of Martin light
bombers and particularly for planes to your air force in the
middle east, pending such time as a decision is reached as to
whether our own air force will join with you in that theater.
In any combat theater where it seems unwise for our own personnel
to operate, then, of course, American-built airplanes will be
sent as determined by the strategic necessities.

My thought is that the combined chiefs of staff, with
your approval and mine, would determine the number and type of
aircraft to be maintained in the respective theaters of war. I
believe that the maximum number of planes possible should be
maintained in combat and the minimum number held in reserve and
in operational training units.

I suggest that Arnold and Towers go to London at once
to meet with Portal and the appropriate air officer of the
admiralty to discuss the very important details implied in this
message but the broad policy which is expressed in this message
should not be referred to them.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS: - (The White House)

Subject: Principles which should cover the reallocation of combat planes produced in the U.S.

Herewith copies of suggested general principles covering the reallocation of combat planes produced in the United States. Your attention is invited to the fact that they are being revised in the General Staff, and that both of the attached are first drafts subject to criticism, revision, and correction.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Drafts of 2 memos re above subj.
Subject: Principles which should cover the reallocation of combat planes produced in the United States.

1. The strength and disposition of combat units of the Allied Air Forces to meet the strategic requirements will be as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The United States will build up and maintain Air Forces of the size necessary to meet our war and post-war requirements.

3. In general combat planes produced in the United States will be flown by personnel of our own armed forces. Certain exceptions are listed hereafter.

4. Types, non-standard for the United States Army or Navy being produced for other Allied Nations will be continued in production and the supply of these types will be maintained as long as necessary to maintain the combined allied aerial strength.

5. Reallocations made will insure that the Air Forces in the various theatres will not be reduced below the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirements.

6. In general, United States produced airplanes will not be supplied to other Nations as long as United States pilots or combat crews are on the ground awaiting planes.

7. The maximum possible number of planes will be maintained in combat against our enemies. Those in transit, held in reserve or used in operational training units, will be held to a minimum.

8. In theatres where facilities and arrangements have been made for maintaining and repairing our planes or where our planes are now used by combat units, the United States will continue to supply planes or may replace and/or supplement units of our allies whichever means appears to be most effective in maintaining the maximum aerial striking force.
PRINCIPLES TO COVER THE REALLOCATION OF AMERICAN COMBAT AIRPLANES.

1. The strategic disposition of units in combat of the allied Air Force will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. 
   a. The entire allied air effort is necessary to defeat the Axis.
   b. The American component of the allied air effort shall consist of American Forces manned, equipped and operated by Americans.

3. The strength of the American and British components of the Allied Air Forces will be, in general, proportionate to the resources of the two nations.
   a. Each nation will determine the strength of its own component based on its own resources.
   b. Where American facilities to train or to equip combat units exceed American requirements, excess facilities may be made available to the Allies.

4. All details as to operations or reserve and supply will be designed to provide Air Forces of the size required for the eventual defeat of the Axis. Interim combat requirements will be permitted to delay in the development of the eventual Air Force only to the extent necessary to stave off defeat.

5. In order to build an American Air Force it is necessary, in general, that all combat airplanes manufactured in the United States be flown by personnel from the American Armed Forces except when types non-standard for the United States Army or Navy are produced for other allied nations, such production will be continued, provided.
   a. That such non-standard airplanes are not required to equip trained U. S. combat crews which are on the ground awaiting planes.
   b. That such manufacturing capacity is not required for the production of standard American types.

6. The maximum number of planes will be maintained in combat.

7. The minimum number of combat aircraft will be held in reserve and in operational training units.

8. The United States agrees to undertake the repair and technical supply of all American aircraft operated in active theaters.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- OCT 12 1943
Signature- [Redacted]
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Aircraft situation in the United Nations.

1. The Army Air Forces cannot be equipped, trained and maintained during the remainder of 1942, nor can air forces be provided for both the initiation of an offensive in Europe and a strategic defensive in the Pacific, under the aircraft allocations provided by the Arnold-Portal Agreement. An immediate reallocation is necessary.

2. The situation under which the Arnold-Portal agreement was reached has greatly altered. The strategic situation and the United States commitments in the Pacific Theatre have not only changed materially, but until very recently the War Department did not have detailed information on British production, allocations and reserves. Furthermore, we were unaware of the British basis of calculation on reserves and attrition, which we now learn exceed our basis for calculating such requirements by an average of approximately 100 per cent.

3. The conception of the United States as the Arsenal of the Democracies had two purposes:

a. The initial provision of essential materials of war for the nations opposing the Axis.

b. The creation of a war potential which, if the United States entered the war, could and would be retained for the creation of necessary American armed forces. The United States is now at war. It requires the aircraft production that it has created.

4. In order to correct the situation outlined above, it is recommended that the present schedule of deliveries from United States production for all types of combat airplanes to Great Britain, be amended as follows:

**Army Types**

June 1942 - 50% of each type, except Martin 187 (light bombers), be reallocated to the United States.

July 1942 - 75% of each type, except Martin 187 (light bombers), be reallocated to the United States.
August 1942 - thereafter 100% of each type, be reallocated to the United States; provided further:
That the entire United States production of Martin 187 (light bombers), remain allocated to Great Britain, and
That the eleven American equipped pursuit squadrons in the Middle East on April 1, 1942 be furnished 20% monthly attrition replacements on initial equipment.

That the United States fulfill its present aircraft commitments to Russia (protocol to June 30, 1942; deliveries to be completed about August 15); that thereafter the allotments to Russia will be determined by the rate of attrition being suffered in the British-American air offensive over the European Continent, provided that a monthly average minimum of 50 United States pursuit, 50 light and 12 medium bombers will be guaranteed by the United States. It will also be understood that the British allocation to Russia will be maintained in general accordance with the foregoing policy, and that the United States will make no objection to the allocation by Russia of United States planes to Great Britain on a trade basis, to effect a better standardization of types or to facilitate transfers.

That both Great Britain and the United States be responsible for the equipment and replacements for their own combat units, except in the Pacific theatre where the United States agrees to maintain and repair existing British Commonwealth units now equipped with American aircraft, and except in the Middle East as provided above.

That the allocation of aircraft to other nations be kept to the absolute minimum in order to concentrate adequate forces in the decisive theatres.

Navy Types
(The following is included with the concurrence of Admiral King.)

June through December 31, 1942 - 33 % of all flying boats be reallocated to the United States.
June through December 31, 1942 - 100% of all torpedo bombers be reallocated to the United States.

5. This recommended reallocation will:

Permit by January 1, 1943, the British program to be met to the extent of 81% of total aircraft requirements, and the United States program by 54% (The Target programs of both nations up to January 1, 1943 are approximately the same).

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER SEC

ARMY BY TAG PER 726314
By PHIL Date MAY 1 1972
Permit the building of essential United States Air Forces and would still permit a thirty-four per cent expansion for the Royal Air Force by January 1, 1943.

Permit increased efficiency and simplicity, since each Nation will utilize its own aircraft.

Permit the great combat crew resources and training capabilities of the United States to be fully employed.

Enable American Air Forces to meet their combat and training requirements.

Result in the early provision of the required combined offensive air forces in the vital theater.

Enable Great Britain to maintain present United States equipped units in the Middle East with 150% reserve, and provide attrition replacements.

Enable a larger number of combat units to be employed offensively. The American policy of maintaining more moderate reserves will result in submitting the bulk of American aircraft to combat units.

I recommend that this subject be discussed with you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff – on Monday, May 18th, if practicable.

Concur:
E. F. King
Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER SEC
ARMY BY TAG PER 720314
By RD May 1 1972
May 26, 1942.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON (AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON)
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 148

I BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE MOUNTBATTEN COME FOR A SHORT VISIT IF HE CAN BE SPARED.

I AM HAVING YOUR MASSAU FRIENDS TO LUNCH NEXT MONDAY.
LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING LYTTELTON. ALL WELL HERE.

TAKE CARE OF YOURSELF.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1920, EWT, May 26, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Aide.

(Original copy, which had been added to in the President's handwriting, delivered to Miss Tully this date 5-27-42 - F. J. T.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON  (AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON)
FROM: PRESIDENT
NO. 148

I BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE MOUNTBATTEN COME FOR A SHORT VISIT IF HE CAN BE SPARED.
I AM HAVING YOUR NASSAU FRIENDS TO LUNCH NEXT MONDAY.
LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING LYTTELTON. All will there.

Take care of yourself. Runcies

Released at 1920 EWT, May 26, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Aide.
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 149

WE ARE EXPECTING THE VISITOR TONIGHT BUT WILL NOT DISCUSS POLYEO UNTIL THURSDAY. CAN YOU LET ME HAVE QUICKLY A SHORT SUMMARY OF WHAT YOU AND HE SAID TO EACH OTHER ABOUT POLYEO. IT WOULD HELP ME TO KNOW.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1425, EWT, May 27, 1942.

Chester Hammond
Major, J.A.G.D.
White House Map Room

(DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date 10-12-71)

(Original copy, in the Presidents handwriting, delivered to Miss Tully this date, 5-27-42, by Ensign Coffee. -amo)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To: Naval Person
We are expecting the 

First few tonight the 

will not distirce 

Raders until Thursday.
Can you let me have 

quickly a short summary 

of what you and the 

said to each other about 

Raders. It would 

help me to know 

Roosevelt
May 27, 1942.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

No. 150.

I AM INCLINED TO FAVOR THE IDEA OF INVITING
GENERAL SMUTS TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO SEE ME AND STAY FOR
A FEW DAYS, MORE IN A PERSONAL THAN IN A FORMAL CAPACITY.
I HAVE KNOWN HIM EVER SINCE 1918 AND CORRESPOND WITH HIM
OCCASIONALLY. ALSO I THINK IT MAY BE OF HELP TO HIM IN HIS
HOME PROBLEMS TO GET A PICTURE OF THE GENERAL SITUATION FROM
A FELLOW DUTCHMAN LIKE ME. I WOULD NOT SET ANY ESPECIAL DATE
BUT MERELY SUGGEST SOME TIME THIS SUMMER. PLEASE LET ME KNOW
WHAT YOU THINK.

I ALSO HAVE AN IDEA THAT IF I WERE TO INVITE OUR
FRIEND JOHN CURTIN TO COME HERE FOR A VERY SHORT VISIT, BUT AT
A DIFFERENT TIME FROM SMUTS' VISIT, IT MIGHT DO MUCH GOOD IN A
WHOLLY DIFFERENT WAY. FROM ALL I HEAR HE IS A THOROUGHLY
HONEST AND SINCERE PERSON BUT HAS HAD LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO
APPRECIATE THE WORLD SITUATION OUTSIDE OF HIS OWN SPHERE.
THERE ARE ALSO MATTERS REGARDING COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL
PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC IN WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO TRY
MY HAND AT INDOCTRINATION. (See #/51)

I WISH YOU WOULD LET ME HAVE YOUR PERSONAL THOUGHT
ON THIS MATTER ALSO.

Roosevelt

Released at 2200, May 27, '42

Envelope Carson Watch Officer
May 28, 1942.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

NO. 151

PRIORITY

ADD TO SECOND PARAGRAPH OF MY NUMBER 150 QUOTE I WOULD

SUGGEST TO CURTIN THAT HE SHOULD NOT COME HERE UNTIL EVATT HAS

RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA UNQUOTE

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1140, EWT, May 28, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.C. Stewart
Date DEC 12 1971
1. I am thrilled at the thought of the books and shall always cherish them.

2. I have sent the invitations to Smuts and Curtin, the latter not expected until after he has seen Evatt.

3. Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success because we have got on a personal footing of candor and as good friendship as can be acquired through an interpreter. His departure will be delayed two or three days more.

4. He has made very clear his real anxiety as to the next four or five months, and I think this is sincere and not put forward to force our hand. I have a very strong feeling that the Russian position is precarious and may grow steadily worse during the coming weeks.

5. Therefore, I am more than ever anxious that Bolero proceed to definite action beginning in 1942. We all realize that because of weather conditions the operation cannot be delayed until the end of the year.

6. After talking with our Staff, I believe German Air Forces cannot be defeated or indeed brought to battle to an extent which will bring them off the Russian front until we have made a landing. I have great confidence in the ability of our joint airforces to gain complete control of the channel and enough of the land for appropriate bridge heads to be covered. This will result in either:
(a) Pulling German Air Forces away from the Russian front, with effort to destroy it on our part, or
(b) If German Air Force fails to come out, the ground troop operation can be increased with objective of establishing permanent positions.

7. United Staffs are now working on proposal to increase shipping for use in Bolero by cutting out a large portion of materials for Russia, other than munitions which can be used in battle this year. This ought not to diminish supplies of munitions like planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, which Russians could use in combat this Summer. I think we can cut further on Murmansk-Archangel convoys and send more ready to use munitions via Basra. This should make your Home Fleet task easier, particularly destroyers.

8. I will telegraph you when Molotov leaves, and I am especially anxious that he carry back some real results of his mission and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin. I am inclined to think that at present all the Russians are a bit down in the mouth.

But the important thing is that we may be and probably are faced with real trouble on the Russian front and must make our plans to meet it.

Roosevelt

5/31/42
Released at 9/15

V. H. McCrea
Captain

1078
TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON

1. I am thrilled at the thought of the books and shall always cherish them.

2. I have sent the invitations to Smuts and Curtin, the latter not expected until after he has seen Evatt.

3. Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success because we have got on a personal footing of candor and as good friendship as can be acquired through an interpreter. His departure will be delayed two or three days more.

4. He has made very clear his real anxiety as to the next four or five months, and I think this is sincere and not put forward to force our hand.

5. Therefore, I am more than ever anxious that Bolero proceed to definite action beginning in August and continuing as long as the weather holds.

[Signature]
4. I have a very strong feeling that the Russian position is precarious and may grow steadily worse during the coming weeks.

5. We all realize that because of weather conditions the operation cannot be delayed until the end of the year.

6. The defeat or indeed best to let it to an extent which will bring them off the Russian front until we have made a landing. I have great confidence in the ability of our joint airforces.
complete
to gain control of the channel and enough of the land for appropriate bridgeheads to be
covered. This will result in either
6. After talking with [Staff], I believe German Air Forces cannot be eliminated without preliminary or temporary efforts by ground forces in order to force German planes into the air. If this phase can be started early in August, it will result in either:

(a) Pulling German Air Forces away from Russian front, with effort to destroy it on our part, or
(b) If German Air Force fails to come out, the ground troop operation can be increased with objective of establishing permanent positions.

7. United Staffs are now working on proposal to increase shipping for use in Bolero by cutting out a large portion of materials for Russia which could not be manufactured until 1943. This ought not to diminish supplies of munitions like planes, tanks, guns, ammunition, which Russians could use in combat this Summer. I think we can cut further on Murmansk-Archangel convoys and send more ready to use munitions via Basra. 

This should enhance your Home Fleet, particularly destroyers.
8. I will telegraph you when Molotov leaves, and I am especially anxious that he carry back some real results of his Mission and that he will give a favorable account to Stalin. I am inclined to think that at present all the Russians are a bit down in the mouth.

But the important thing is that we may and probably are faced with real trouble on the Russian front and must make our plans to meet it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1942

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON, FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

NO. 153 PRIORITY
REFER MY NUMBER 152 DISTINGUISHED VISITOR
DEPARTED WASHINGTON NOON FOUR JUNE REGARDS

ROOSEVELT

Released at 7:45, EWT, June 5, 1942, directed to do so by Captain J.L. McCrea, Naval Aide, over phone.

Joseph D. Coffee, Dr.
Ensign, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date: OCT 12, 1971
June 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Nelson and Lyttelton are anxious to get a Combined Production and Resources Board going similar to our other combined boards. I think it has a good deal of merit.

The exact powers of the Board could be agreed upon over the weekend.

I will have a memorandum for you today relative to the exact powers proposed by Lyttelton and Nelson, but it seems to me this wire might go at once because you will want to get the Prime Minister's formal approval. I am sure it is all right with him.

H.L.H.
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

JUNE 6, 1942

LYTTELTON AND DON NELSON, WHO HAS CHARGE OF OUR PRODUCTION, ARE ANXIOUS TO CREATE A COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD SIMILAR TO OUR OTHER COMBINED BOARDS. IT SEEMS TO ME IT HAS A GREAT DEAL OF MERIT AND I AM ANXIOUS TO GET IT STARTED WHILE LYTTELTON IS HERE PROVIDED YOU APPROVE.

IF YOU WILL CABLE ME I WILL RELEASE A JOINT STATEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS MONDAY OR TUESDAY.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
D. L. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
TELEGRAM

SECRET

JUNE 6, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
NO. 155

I DELIVERED TO MOLOTOV OUR JOINT PROTOCOL OF SUPPLIES FROM JULY 1, 1942 TO JUNE 30, 1943. I AMENDED THE GENERAL STATEMENT SOMewhat BUT IN NO IMPORTANT DEGREE. A COPY OF THE PROTOCOL AND OF THE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE APPROPRIATE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES HERE.

I WAS GREATLY PLEASED WITH THE VISIT. HE WARMED UP FAR MORE THAN I EXPECTED AND I AM SURE THAT HE HAS A FAR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION HERE THAN WHEN HE ARRIVED.

I CONFESS THAT I VIEW WITH GREAT CONCERN THE RUSSIAN FRONT AND AM GOING TO WIRE YOU IN A DAY OR TWO A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL WHICH I HAVE IN MIND.

THE BUSINESS IN THE PACIFIC IS GOING WELL AND I AM SURE WE ARE IMPACTING SOME VERY SEVERE LOSSES ON THE JAP FLEET. THE OUTCOME, HOWEVER, IS STILL INDECISIVE BUT WE SHOULD KNOW MORE BEFORE THE DAY IS OVER. I AM SURE OUR AIRCRAFT ARE GIVING VERY GOOD ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES. I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]
TELEGRAM

JUNE 10, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
NO. 156

GRAND. THE QUICKER THE BETTER INCLUDING THE RECEIVERS
WIFE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1630, EWT, June 10, 1942.

R. R. DODDERIDGE
First Lieutenant, Cavalry
Watch Officer, White House Map Room
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Former Naval Person
Grand. The quicker the
tetter including the

Frederick
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Proposed Draft of Message to Prime Minister.

Herewith is proposed draft of message to the Prime Minister relative to reallocation of airplanes between United States and Great Britain.

Recommend that it be forwarded without delay so as to reach the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Proposed Draft of Message to Prime Minister.
Slesser-Arnold Agreement.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date- OCT 12 1971
Signature-
PROPOSED DRAFT OF MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER.

To: Former Naval Person.  
From: President.  
No. 157  

June 12, 1942.

1. I am in full accord with the agreement that has been reached between Slessor and Arnold. This agreement is in consonance with the several basic principles that I have proposed relating to the reallocation of United States aircraft. The basic agreement provides in general that American aircraft will be manned by American crews. The pertinent exceptions to this general principle lie primarily with the light bombardment type for use by Great Britain in the United Kingdom and pursuit aircraft in such numbers as are required to maintain your proposed strength in American equipped British units in the Middle East.

2. I feel that we cannot further cut the United States fighter force required for use with our bombardment. This being the case, I cannot meet United States commitments to Russia and still continue the allotments of Airacobras to you.

3. Furthermore, American units, totaling approximately 19 heavy bombardment groups, 12 medium bombardment groups, 6 light bombardment groups, and 18 pursuit groups will be distributed throughout the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and India. The details of the plan upon which this deployment is based and in which I am in full accord are as outlined in the agreement submitted by Slessor. The U.S. combat units so employed will be subject to redistribution if and when necessary as agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(Retain correspondence in connection with this despatch will be found in file "President-PM Rough Drafts.")

Released at 1815, EWT, June 12, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy Aide

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. Stewart  
Date OCT 12 1971
June 13, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I FIND I MUST BE IN HYDE PARK NINETEENTH TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST.

IF YOU LAND ANY TIME BEFORE NOON OF SUNDAY THE TWENTY-FIRST COME TO HYDE PARK AND WE CAN LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON THAT NIGHT GETTING TO WHITE HOUSE MONDAY MORNING.

THE SET OF ROCKS HAS JUST COME AND I AM THRILLED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1735, June 13.

Ensign G. M. Elsey, U.S.N.R.
White House Chart Room Watch Officer
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fenner Havne Purcell

I find I must be in
Hyde Park some time with Twentith
and Twenty first Symphony
If you land before noon
of The Sunday The Twenty
first came to Hyde Park
and we can have for
Washington That night

The set of books has just come
and I am thrilled

Purcell
As the outcome of meeting with General Arnold Wednesday afternoon we arrived at the following understandings subject to your confirmation.

1. **Long Range Patrol Bombers for Coastal Command.**

   (a) As you know, the Navy have refused to produce any Catalina squadrons for Coastal Command. General Arnold cannot agree to producing any long range bombers other than those which he has already undertaken, i.e. an additional 28 Liberators in June, 6 in July and 4 a month after. Total of 54 up to the end of 1942.

   (b) Our assets in Fortresses and Liberators of all marks including May allocations and all aircraft now at modification centres in the United States amount to 140 Liberator, 59 Fortress, total 199. Of these 25 are in B.O.A.C. and A.T.A. leaving a total of 174 available for operational use.

   (c) The 2 Liberator squadrons in India will absorb 56 U.E. and attrition on 2 squadrons at 20% from mid June to end of September 24. The Indian commitment is therefore 60 leaving 114 for Coastal Command.

   (d) In order to build up the complete 9 squadrons in Coastal Command by the end of 1942 we require U.E. 108, attrition 23, O.T.U. including attrition 29. 10% depot stock 12. Total 172.

   (e) This leaves a balance of 58 and General Arnold has offered us 54.

   (f) This admittedly cuts as pretty well to the bone. There is however the factor that you have agreed to roll up the Indian squadrons (subject to the provision in para. 8 below) when the United States heavy bomber group is operational. General Arnold suggests that we should then decide whether the Liberators thrown up from India should be brought home and converted to Coastal Command requirements or handed over to U. S. heavy groups in Middle
East and a corresponding number credited to us from production in U.S.

(g) The position will be further eased by return of Fortress and Liberators loaned. (See 6 below).

(h) This deals with 1942. There remains the question of the 3 additional squadrons involving a U.E. with training backing of 44 in the first 3 months of 1945. This point has not been resolved. I suggest that it should be possible to meet this requirement out of flying boat allocations in 1943 and would be grateful for early confirmation that this would suit operational requirements. I think it not impossible that King might be induced to undertake this commitment for 1945 and think U.S. Navy should be pressed to do something towards meeting essential needs on British side of Atlantic. But very undesirable that this agreement should be compromised or unduly delayed for that purpose if it can possibly be avoided.

2. Medium Bombers. B-26. General Arnold undertakes that the first B-25 group will leave this country about 15 July and the second will be operational in the Middle East before 1st January.

3. Light Bombers. This is the most difficult point.

(a) You will understand that the figures in paragraph 5 of my MARCUS 132 6/6 were only those for 1943 and that the allotment of light bombers up to April 1943 is that shown on the piece of paper General Arnold gave you the night before his departure. This shows a total of 5556 to British and 2940 to United States in that period. That would fully meet our requirements were it not for the time factor.

(b) A fact of which I was not previously aware and which was not shown in U.M.A.F. 8 is that General Arnold has a commitment to Russia for 100 light bombers a month for the next 10 months reducing the total available to
U.S.A.A.F. to form their light bomber force and provide for training etc. to only 194 over the period in question.

(c) Ventura. General Arnold suggests that we should receive an additional 100 B-34 Ventura in exchange for 100 Vengeances during 1942 17 September 63 October 20 November but does not feel able to go any farther than that.

(d) Vengeance. On this basis in place of 725 Vengeance by end of 1942 offered in para. 5 MARCUS 132 6/6 we take 628 by that date at the following rate 60 June, 60 July, 60 August, 61 Sept, 100 Oct., 167 Nov., 117 Dec. Allocations of Vengeances up to April 1943 will thus be reduced from 1190 to 1090.


Our assets in squadrons, reserve, repair, en route, etc. at 30th April were 547. In addition the May allocation of 103 brings total to 650. General Arnold is prepared to give us enough aircraft to complete the following:

- Unit Equipment for 14 Squadrons: 252
- 150% Reserve: 378
- Attrition at 20% on 14 Squadrons: 50 a month.

This will amount to an equivalent of about 60 a month over the next 9 months but he is prepared to increase allotments in the immediate future at expense of allotments later in order to build up 150% reserve.

Latest expectations under R.M. 80D are nil July 154 July. General Arnold will agree to the full allocation for July dropping to 50 a month thereafter except in January when the allocation will be 61. This will involve delay of one month in arrival of the second pursuit group originally scheduled
for September.

5. Airacobra.

There is a clear conflict on this. United States have committed themselves to 100 pursuit a month to Russia through October, which were not shown in UMAP/8. We want to retain the Airacobras for the same purpose. If we lose then, the result can only be a corresponding weakening of combined strength in those theaters in which we depend on the Hurricane. On the other hand, United States considers that a further modification of their pursuit force for BOLERO would give them insufficient pursuit aircraft to escort their own bombers, which is a further principle laid down by the President. This point remains to be resolved on a higher level.

6. It is agreed that allocations to us up to and including May remain intact, including return of loans.

7. 1943 allocations. General Arnold will agree to including in the Agreement the following words - "British squadrons using American aircraft operational under our proposals on 1st April 1943 shall be allocated the aircraft necessary to meet the attrition after that date". This meets your point in 28(a) of your memorandum and covers re-equipment of Hudson squadrons at attrition rates in 1943 by G.H. Venturas.

8. General Arnold has agreed to inclusion of paragraphs to cover the questions of spares and balancing items for aircraft programmes in U.K. and British Empire.

9. Role of U.S. heavy bombers in India. General Arnold undertakes that "in the event of a threat to India the United States heavy bomber group will be used to defeat that threat."

10. Transport aircraft, Paragraphs in the sense of 30 and 31 of your
memorandum will be included in the agreement. General Fitzgerald has been told to meet the requirements of Tedder as far as he possibly can and in case of emergency to endeavour to meet them in full. The allocations of transport aircraft for 1943 will be reviewed later in the year.

11. Time Factor. General Arnold has outlined his proposals to General Somervell who sees no difficulty in them. General Arnold agrees that we should include a clause in the agreement as follows:

"The movement of personnel and equipment will be provided for in suitable priority to ensure arrival in appropriate theatres by the dates specified."

12. As soon as agreement is settled the whole detail will be submitted to General Somervell and the Combined Military Transportation Board.

13. Insurance Factor. General Arnold agrees to paragraph 32(a) of your memorandum.

14. Command of U.S. forces in British theatres. Paragraph 4(c) of U.N.A.F. 3 (Revised) will be included in the agreement.

15. The training allocations will stand until the full repercussions of the agreement have been analysed when they will be adjusted accordingly. We will explore the possibility of securing some Ansons for navigation training in U.S. from Canada.

16. Dominions. General Arnold has stated his position as follows to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and a paragraph will be included in the agreement to this effect:
(a) It is the duty of the United States Chiefs of Staff to decide the strategic requirements of the Dominions within United States spheres of responsibility.

(b) This will then be referred to Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. (Note, at this stage the British Chiefs of Staff will have an opportunity of satisfying themselves that the interests of the Dominions are being adequately safeguarded).

(c) When strategic requirements are approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff the United States will make the necessary allocations of aircraft which will be manned by Dominion personnel as far as the Dominions are able to do so and the balance by United States air forces.

17. Allocations of communication aircraft etc. for remainder of 1942 will not be covered by this agreement and are still open to discussion.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I do hope you can bring

Portal along.

F. D. R.
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 159

I DO HOPE YOU CAN BRING PORTAL ALONG.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 2130, June 16, 1942

Ensign J.D. Coffee, Jr.
White House Map Room Watch Officer

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
July 2, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON (SECRET AND PERSONAL) NO. 160

GOOD FOR YOU

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1350, EWT, July 2, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
TELEGRAM

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

JULY 7, 1942

NO 161

HAVE JUST HAD WORD FROM STALIN THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION

TO TRANSFER OF FORTY A-20's FROM BASRA TO EGYPT. INSTRUCTIONS

HAVE GONE FORWARD TO TRANSFER PLANES AT ONCE.

ROOSEVELT

Releas€d 1830, WTT, July 7, 1942.

W.C. MOTT

Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By  W.G. Stewart

Date  Oct. 2, 1971
TELEGRAM

TO: FOREIGN NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 162

JULY 8, 1942

I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR ME TO MAKE A FURTHER EFFORT
WITH REGARD TO THE FRENCH WARSHIPS AT ALEXANDRIA. THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES
HAVE RAISED THE TECHNICAL POINT THAT THESE SHIPS MUST BE REMOVED TO A
FRENCH PORT AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THEY CANNOT AGREE TO THE AMERICAN
PROPOSAL THAT THEY BE ESCORTED THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL TO A NEUTRAL PORT;
I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT I INFORM LAVAL AND ADMIRAL GODFROY THAT IF
THEY WILL AGREE THAT THE SHIPS BE WITHDRAWN BY WAY OF THE SUEZ CANAL,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT WILL GRANT SAFE PASSAGE TO MARTINIQUE WHERE THEY WILL NOT
BE USED BY THE UNITED STATES OR BRITISH GOVERNMENTS BUT WHERE THEY WILL
BE IMPRISONED ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE FRENCH WARSHIPS NOW AT PORT
DE FRANCE FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR WITH THE ASSURANCE THAT AT THE
TERMINATION OF THE WAR THEY WILL BE RESTORED TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

I BELIEVE THAT IF THIS OFFER IS MADE AND IS THEN REJECTED BY
LAVAL, NOT ONLY WOULD THE FRENCH CREWS UPON THESE SHIPS BE LESS DISPOSED
TO RESIST ANY FORCIBLE ACTION WHICH YOU MIGHT IN AN EMERGENCY FIND IT
NECESSARY TO TAKE, BUT ALSO THAT THE FRENCH PEOPLE IN OCCUPIED AND
UNOCCUPIED FRANCE WOULD REACT STRONGLY AGAINST LAVAL FOR HIS REFUSAL
TO AGREE TO AN OFFER WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE EVENTUAL RETURN OF THESE
SHIPS TO FRANCE.

TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE CONTENTION BY VICHY THAT THIS WOULD BE IN
VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WE WOULD SAY THAT IN AS MUCH
AS THESE SHIPS HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING OCCUPIED A SPECIAL POSITION AND
AND NOW IN A PRECARIOUS SITUATION, THEY ARE NOT WITHIN THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND HENCE THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT COULD NOT BE SAID TO BE VIOLATIVE OF THAT AGREEMENT.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW URGENTLY IF YOU SEE ANY OBJECTION TO THIS PROCEDURE.

ROOSEVELT

Taken by Ensign Coffee to Captain McCrea, who released it from his Navy Department Office at 1518, EWT, July 8, 1942.

Background material on above dispatch, with notation that the Under Secretary of State has been informed as he requested, filed in "President-Prime Minister Rough Draft" file.
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Mrs. Brady brought the attached papers in at 1610, and requested that when the Prime Minister's reply to the President's message was received, the Under Secretary of State be informed in accordance with paragraph 2 of his letter.

--000--

At 1700, July 9, Major Hammond tried to inform the Under Secretary of State concerning the contents of the Prime Minister's despatch No. 111 to the President, which was received at 1615, July 9; but was unsuccessful due to the illness of the Under Secretary, who could receive no calls.

Mr. Dunn, Room 203, State Department, is taking care of the matter, and will inform the Under Secretary.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our conversation of last night I am sending you herewith a suggested message for you to send to Mr. Churchill which both Secretary Hull and I believe would be very helpful and which I think is along the lines you desire.

If this is sent by Naval Radio and you receive the reply from Mr. Churchill through Naval Radio, will you let me know? I assume your message to Admiral Godefoy will be handled directly by the Navy. The message to Laval would, of course, have to go through our Chargé d'Affaires in Vichy.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.
July 8, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON.

FOR THE FORMAL NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I believe it would be advantageous for me to make a further effort with regard to the French warships at Alexandria. The French authorities have raised the technical point that these ships must be removed to a French port and that consequently they cannot agree to the American proposal that they be escorted through the Suez Canal to a neutral port. I suggest, therefore, to inform Laval and Admiral Godefoy that if they will agree that the ships be withdrawn by way of the Suez Canal, the Government of the United States by agreement with the British Government will insure their safe passage to Martinique where they will not be used by the United States or British Governments but where they will be immobilized on the same basis as the French warships now at Fort de France for the duration of the war with the assurance that at the termination of the war they will be restored to the French people.

I believe that if this offer is made and is then
rejected by Laval, not only would the French crews upon these ships be less disposed to resist any forceful action which you might in an emergency find it necessary to take, but also that the French people in occupied and unoccupied France would react strongly against Laval for his refusal to agree to an offer which would guarantee eventual return of these ships to France.

To meet any possible contention by Vichy that this would be in violation of the Armistice Agreement, we would say that in as much as these ships have from the beginning occupied a special position and are now in a precarious situation, they are not within the operative provisions of the Agreement and hence the proposed arrangement could not be said to be violative of that Agreement.

Please let me know urgently if you see any objection to this procedure.

U:SW:IJ
AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I believe it would be advantageous for me to make a further effort with regard to the French warships at Alexandria. The French authorities have raised the technical point that these ships must be removed to a French port and that consequently they cannot agree to the American proposal that they be escorted through the Suez Canal to a neutral port. I propose, therefore, to inform Laval and Admiral Godefroy that if they will agree that the ships be withdrawn by way of the Suez Canal, the Government of the United States by agreement with the British Government will ensure their safe passage to Martinique where they will not be used by the United States or British Governments but where they will be immobilized on the same basis as the French warships now at Fort de France for the duration of the war with the assurance that at the termination of the war they will be restored to the French people.

I believe that if this offer is made and is then

Enciphered by __________________________

Sent by operator __________ M., __________ 19________
rejected by Laval, not only would the French crews upon these ships be less disposed to resist any forceful action which you might in an emergency find it necessary to take, but also that the French people in occupied and unoccupied France would react strongly agains Laval for his refusal to agree to an offer which would guarantee eventual return of these ships to France.

To meet any possible contention by Vichy that this would be in violation of the Armistice Agreement, we would say that in as much as these ships have from the beginning occupied a special position and are now in a precarious situation, they are not within the operative provisions of the Agreement and hence the proposed arrangement could not be said to be violative of that Agreement.

Please let me know urgently if you see any objection to this procedure.

U:5W:1J

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19...
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE F ORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 163

Reference your Number 106 of July 8th it is recommended that our code

words be clarified as follows:

(1) That the term quote Bolero unquote be used to designate the
preparation for and movement of United States Forces into the European
Theater, preparations for their reception therein and the production,
assembly, transport, reception, and storage of equipment and supplies
necessary for support of the United States Forces in operation against
the European Continent.

(2) That the term quote Sledge Hammer unquote be used to designate
an offensive operation of the British and American troops against the
European Continent in nineteen forty-two to be carried out in case of
German internal collapse or imminent Russian military collapse which
necessitates an emergency attack in order to divert German forces from
the Russian front.

(3) That the term quote Roundup unquote, or any other name which
you may desire, be used to designate an offensive operation against
German dominated Europe to be carried out by combined American and
British forces in nineteen forty-three or later.

Roosevelt

Released at 1750, July 8, 1942. (EWT)

JOHN L. MCGREGA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. E. Stewart
Date Oct 2, 1971

(Background correspondence on this dispatch filed in
"President-Prime Minister Rough Draft" folder.)
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Subject: Code Names for European Operations.

Attached hereto is a proposed message to be sent from the President to the Prime Minister on the above subject.

The interpretation of code names indicated by the Prime Minister in his radio of July 6 is substantially the same as ours.

The term "One Third Bolero" has no official standing as a code name and if used at all by the President it was probably used in a descriptive sense.

With reference to the code name "Roundup," I can see no particular objection to its use. It was a name used by the British prior to the conception of Bolero to designate offensive operations against the European Continent in 1943 or later. However, if the name itself is objectionable to the Prime Minister, it could readily be changed to anything he considers more appropriate.

Deputy Chief of Staff.

Incl.

Mr. President

Think this is OK.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Proposed Message to be Sent
from the President to the Prime Minister

Reference your Number 106 of July 6 it is recommended
that our code words be clarified as follows:

(1) That the term "Bolero" be used to designate
the preparation for and movement of United States Forces
into the European Theater, preparations for their reception
therein and the production, assembly, transport, reception,
and storage of equipment and supplies necessary for support
of the United States Forces in operation against the European
Continent.

(2) That the term "Sledge Hammer" be used to designate
an offensive operation of the British and American troops
against the European Continent in 1942 to be carried out in
case of German internal collapse or imminent Russian military
collapse which necessitates an emergency attack in order to
divert German forces from the Russian front.

(3) That the term "Roundup", or any other name
which you may desire, be used to designate an offensive opera-
tion against German dominated Europe to be carried out by com-
bined American and British forces in 1943 or later.

Signed ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 2003/4
By  Date MAY 1 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

July 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

The President asked me to show this to you.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
SECRET

CABLEGRAM

July 6, 1942

From: London
To: President of United States.

Personal and most secret number one zero six our code words need clarification. By "Bolero" we British mean the vast arrangements necessary both in nineteen forty two and nineteen forty three for the operation against the continent. The joint Anglo American Staffs Committees are all working on this basis. They are not operational but purely administrative. What you in conversation have called "one third Bolero" we have hitherto been calling "Sledgehammer". The name "Round Up" has been given to the nineteen forty three operation. I do not much like this name, as it might be thought over confident or over gloomy, but it has come into considerable use. Please let me know whether you have any wishes about this.

Prime
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 164.

THE FOLLOWING VESSELS ARE BUILT OR BUILDING IN CANADA:

10 TWIN SCREW CORVETTES
15 ALGERINE MINESweepERS
8 FAIRMINE MOTOR LAUNCHES

I AM TOLD THAT THESE VESSELS ARE ALL SUITABLE FOR COMBATING
ENERGY SUBMARINE AND MINING OPERATIONS AND ARE URGENTLY NEEDED BY THE
U. S. FORCES FOR THIS PURPOSE. I KNOW YOUR CONCERN IN REGARD TO THE
SUBMARINE MENACE AND I WONDER IF WE COULD HAVE THESE VESSELS TEMPORARILY
ASSIGNED TO U. S. IN ADDITION TO 15 SINGLE SCREW CORVETTES WHICH I
UNDERSTAND ARE IN PROCESS OF ASSIGNMENT TO U. S. BY LONDON MUNITIONS
ASSIGNMENT BOARD. THIS PROCEDURE FOR THE TIME BEING WOULD MAKE A
REAL DENT IN THE OBJECTIVE.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.R. STUART
Date OCT 12, 1977

Released at 1920, EWT, July 9, 1942

[Signature]
CHESTER HAMMOND
Major, J.A.G.L.
Proposed draft of dispatch from the President to Prime Minister Churchill

The following vessels are built or building in Canada:

10 twin screw corvettes
15 Algerine minesweepers
8 Fairmile motor launches

These vessels are all suitable for combating enemy submarine and mining operations and are urgently needed by the U.S. forces for this purpose. I know your concern in regard to the submarine menace and wonder if we could temporarily assign to U.S. in addition to 15 single screw corvettes which I understand are in process of assignment to U.S. by London Munitions Assignment Board. This procedure for the time being would make a real dent in the objection.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.R. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
JULY 12, 1942

PRIORITY

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 165.

HAVE NOT RECEIVED YOUR DISPATCHES NOS. 108 AND 109. WILL YOU BE
GOOD ENOUGH TO REPEAT SAME.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1930, EWT, July 12, 1942

G. M. Elsey
ENSIGN, USNR
WATCH OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.L. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 166

AFTER CONSULTATION WITH KING I MUST RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO THE POSITION WHICH THE Admiralty HAS TAKEN REGARDING THE RUSSIAN CONVOY TO THE NORTH AND I THINK YOUR MESSAGE TO STALIN IS A GOOD ONE. I ASSUME YOU WILL SEND IT AT ONCE.

IN THE MEANWHILE WE MUST OMIT NOTHING THAT WILL INCREASE THE TRAFFIC THROUGH PERSIA.

A SUGGESTION HAS BEEN MADE THAT AMERICAN RAILWAY MEN TAKE OVER THE OPERATION OF THE RAILROAD. HAVE YOU ANY OPINION ABOUT THIS? THEY ARE FIRST CLASS AT THIS SORT OF THING.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1720, EWT, July 15, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S.N.,
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. P. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
TELEGRAM

JULY 15, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 166

AFTER CONSULTATION WITH KING I MUST RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO THE POSITION WHICH THE ADMIRALTY HAS TAKEN REGARDING THE RUSSIAN CONVOY TO THE NORTH AND I THINK YOUR MESSAGE TO STALIN IS A GOOD ONE. I ASSUME YOU WILL SEND IT AT ONCE.

IN THE MEANTIME WE MUST OMIT NOTHING THAT WILL INCREASE THE TRAFFIC THROUGH PERSIA.

A SUGGESTION HAS BEEN MADE THAT AMERICAN RAILWAY MEN TAKE OVER THE OPERATION OF THE RAILROAD. HAVE YOU ANY OPINION ABOUT THIS?" They are first class at this sort of thing"

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.F. Stewart
Date: Nov 1 1971
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

JULY 15, 1942

AFTER CONSULTATION WITH KING I MUST RELUCTANTLY AGREE TO THE POSITION WHICH THE ADMIRALTY HAS TAKEN REGARDING THE RUSSIAN CONVOY TO THE NORTH AND I THINK YOUR MESSAGE TO STALIN IS A GOOD ONE. I ASSUME YOU WILL SEND IT AT ONCE.

IN THE MEANTIME WE MUST OMIT NOTHING THAT WILL INCREASE THE TRAFFIC THROUGH PERSIA.

A SUGGESTION HAS BEEN MADE THAT AMERICAN RAILWAY MEN TAKE OVER THE OPERATION OF THE RAILROAD. HAVE YOU ANY OPINION ABOUT THIS?
JULY 15, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 167

MARSHALL, KING AND HOPKINS LEAVING FOR LONDON AT ONCE.
THEY WILL DISCUSS ALL IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR SEVERAL CABLES TO
ME. I WILL SEND YOU PERSONAL CABLE IN A DAY OR TWO.

[Signature]

Released at 1720, EWT, July 15, 1942

JOHN L. MCCREA
Captain, U.S.M.,
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
BY: J.E. Stewart
DATE: OCT 1 2 1971
The attached three pages - Roosevelt to Marshall, undated (1), Roosevelt to Marshall, undated (2), and Roosevelt to Marshall and King, undated (3) - were sent to this Library by Vice Admiral John L. McCrea, USN, Ret. in June 1972. Admiral McCrea was Naval Aide to President Roosevelt from January 16, 1942 to February 3, 1943 and was associated with the operations of the Map Room. He recalls that these items were written during a long weekend in Hyde Park, July 10-14, 1942. The first two were drafted by Hopkins and signed by Roosevelt; the third was drafted by Hopkins and signed by Roosevelt.

The originals are filed with an attached note in Map Room Papers, Box 2, May-July 1942 (Roosevelt to Churchill, #167, 7/15/42).

C. Pollard
6/28/72
To Mr. Marshall

Ely to God, King and Mr. Arnold:

I have carefully read your estimate of Sunday. My first impression is that it is exactly what Germany expected the United States would do: fulfill her Maritime Program. Secondly, it does not in fact provide any of American troops in fighting, except in a list of islands where occupation will not affect the world situation this year or next. Thirdly, it does not help Russia or the Near East. Therefore, it is now viewed as of the present.

Providence, Co. 1125
General Marshall -

I am considering asking you and Hopkins to go to London Wednesday or Thursday. Please be prepared. I will decide by Tuesday.

Roosevelt
To Marshall

I have definitely decided to send you and King to London immediately. Can you arrange for ships to leave Thursday night?

I want you to know now that I do not oppose the idea proposed, and will see you in the morning. I will probably want joint conferences with King and Arnold later in the day.

Roosevelt

- D. King
July 16, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: NAVYMIN, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 168

I REALLY THINK IT BETTER FOR OUR FRIENDS TO GO STRAIGHT TO LONDON AND NOT GO TO RESORT FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS. THEY OUGHT TO ORIENT THEMSELVES FIRST BEFORE ANY GENERAL MEETING. I KNOW YOU WILL UNDERSTAND. ALSO I HOPE SECRECY IN REGARD THEIR VISIT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1405, EWT, July 16, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide
FROM: OPAV
TO: ALUSMA, LONDON
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 169

YOUR MESSAGE NO. 121. I AGREE THAT ANTI-SUBMARINE CRAFT, WHETHER BRITISH OR AMERICAN, SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO OPERATE IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THEIR SERVICES ARE MOST URGENTLY NEEDED AS THE INTENSITY OF THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN SHIFTS. IT APPEARS TO ME THIS DISPOSITION CAN BEST BE DECIDED UPON FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

DUE TO THE NEED FOR ACTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ALL ANTI-SUBMARINE CRAFT IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING AVAILABLE AFTER COMPLETION, IT APPEARS TO ME TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A STRATEGIC POOL OF SUCH CRAFT IF BY THIS IS MEANT A RESERVE POOL OF VESSELS NOT ACTUALLY OPERATING OFFENSIVELY AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINES.

IN THE ALLOCATION OF ANTI-SUBMARINE CRAFT PRIOR TO COMPLETION THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE THE EXPEDITIOUS COMPLETION OF THESE CRAFT FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS. SUCH ALLOCATION SHOULD THEREFORE BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROSPECTIVE AVAILABILITY OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT, WHETHER BRITISH OR AMERICAN. WHETHER OR NOT AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT IS THE GOVERNING FACTOR IT WOULD SEEM THAT ALLOCATION CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE MACHINERY OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF. IN OTHER WORDS I APPROVE IDEA OF THE POOL SO LONG AS EVERYTHING IN IT IS CONSTANTLY EMPLOYED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1920, EWT, July 24, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide.
I have talked over the matter of anti-submarine craft and their allocation to a strategic pool with Vice Admiral Willson and we believe this matter should await the return of Admiral King before the despatch is answered. If it is considered necessary to answer the despatch without delay, it is suggested that you request the Prime Minister to talk to Admiral King on this subject while he is in London.

We have had a talk with Admiral Cunningham and he agrees with the following as practicable and advisable, and it is therefore suggested that these ideas be included in a reply to the Prime Minister, if sent before Admiral King's return:

"I agree that anti-submarine craft, whether British or American, should be assigned to operate in those areas where their services are most urgently needed as the intensity of the U-boat campaign shifts. It appears to me this disposition can best be decided upon from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

"Due to the need for active employment of all anti-submarine craft immediately upon being available after completion, it appears to me to be impracticable to establish a strategic pool of such craft if by this is meant a reserve pool of vessels not actually operating offensively against enemy submarines.

"In the allocation of anti-submarine craft prior to completion the primary consideration should be the expeditious completion of these craft for active operations. Such allocation should therefore be made in accordance with the prospective availability of essential equipment, whether British or American. Whether or not availability of equipment is the governing factor it would seem that allocation can best be accomplished through the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff." In other words, I approve the idea of the pool so long as everything in it is constantly employed."
The three musketeers arrived safely this afternoon and the wedding is still scheduled.

I am, of course, very happy in the result and especially in the successful meeting of minds.

I cannot help feeling that the past week represented a turning point in the whole war and that now we are on our way shoulder to shoulder.

I agree with you that secrecy and speed are vital and I hope the October date can be advanced.

I will talk with Marshall in regard to scale of supplies and equipment in terms of tonnage and in terms of the U. K. importations of food and raw materials.

Also I will do my best to get the air squadron on the Russian southern flank. I fully agree that this should be done.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1905, July 27, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA —
Captain, U. S. Navy Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L. L. Stewart
Date OCT 12 1971
TELEGRAM

JULY 29, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

No. 171

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT YOUR REPLY TO STALIN MUST BE HANDLED WITH GREAT CARE. WE HAVE GOT ALWAYS TO BEAR IN MIND THE PERSONALITY OF OUR ALLY AND THE VERY DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS SITUATION THAT CONFRONTS HIM. NO ONE CAN BE EXPECTED TO APPROACH THE WAR FROM A WORLD POINT OF VIEW WHOSE COUNTRY HAS BEEN INVADEN. I THINK WE SHOULD TRY TO PUT OURSELVES IN HIS PLACE.

I THINK HE SHOULD BE TOLD, IN THE FIRST PLACE, QUITE SPECIFICALLY THAT WE HAVE DETERMINED UPON A COURSE OF ACTION IN 1942. I THINK THAT WITHOUT ADVISING HIM OF THE PRECISE NATURE OF OUR PROPOSED OPERATIONS THE FACT THAT THEY ARE GOING TO BE MADE SHOULD BE TOLD HIM WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION.

WHILE I THINK THAT YOU SHOULD NOT RAISE ANY FALSE HOPES IN STALIN RELATIVE TO THE NORTHERN CONVOY, NEVERTHELESS I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD RUN ONE IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS, IN SPITE OF THE GREAT RISK INVOLVED.

I AM STILL HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN PUT AIR POWER DIRECTLY ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT AND I AM DISCUSSING THAT MATTER HERE. I
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO PROMISE THIS AIR POWER ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THE BATTLE IN EGYPT GOES WELL. RUSSIA'S NEED IS urgent AND IMMEDIATE. I HAVE A FEELING IT WOULD MEAN A GREAT DEAL TO THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE IF THEY KNEW SOME OF OUR AIR FORCE WAS FIGHTING WITH THEM IN A VERY DIRECT MANNER.

WHILE WE MAY BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED USE OF OUR COMBINED AIR FORCES IS STRATEGICALLY THE BEST, NEVERTHELESS I FEEL THAT STALIN DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS. STALIN, I IMAGINE, IS IN NO MOOD TO ENGAGE IN A THEORETICAL STRATEGICAL DISCUSSION AND I AM SURE THAT OTHER THAN OUR MAJOR OPERATION THE ENTERPRISE THAT WOULD SUIT HIM THE BEST IS DIRECT AIR SUPPORT ON THE SOUTHERN END OF HIS FRONT.

Released at 1320, EWT, July 29, 1942.

J. L. McCrea
Captain, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By (Signature)
Date OCT 12 1971
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the wishes you expressed to me on the telephone this morning, I am sending you herewith the telegram for you to send to Mr. Churchill with regard to Chiang Kai-shek's message. I presume that you will wish to have this message sent by Captain McCrea through the Navy code.

I think I should add, however, that I do not believe the message as now drafted will be productive of any useful results. All of the information we have in the Department of State confirms the views expressed by Chiang Kai-shek that a desperately serious situation is going to break out in India after the meeting of the Indian National Congress on August 6. This is a question of vital concern to our own military and naval interests in the Far East. It would seem to me that the services of representatives of the American Government and of the Chinese Government as friendly intermediaries between the Indian

The President,

The White House.
National Congress and the British Government might serve in bringing about some satisfactory arrangement which would hold during the war period and could in any event, in view of the critical nature of the situation now existing, do no harm.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT NO. 172.

I have today received a long and urgent message from Chiang Kai-shek. He asks me to regard this message as strictly confidential, but in view of its nature I naturally wish to inform you immediately of its contents.

The following is the text of this message:

QUOTE With both sides remaining adamant in their views, the Indian situation has reached an extremely tense and critical stage. Its development in fact constitutes the most important factor in determining the outcome of the United Nations war and especially the war in the East. The war aims which the anti-aggression nations have proclaimed to the world are twofold, first to crush brute force and second to secure freedom for all mankind. If India should start a movement against Britain

Enciphered by or against the United Nations, this will cause deterioration
in the Indian situation from which the Axis powers will surely reap benefit. Such an eventuality will seriously affect the whole course of the war and at the same time the world might entertain doubts as to the sincerity of the lofty war aims of the United Nations. This will not only prove a great disadvantage to Britain but will also reflect discredit to the democratic front.

At this juncture the United Nations should do their best, when there is yet time, to prevent the occurrence of such an unfortunate state of affairs. Your country is the leader in this war of right against might and Your Excellency's views have always received serious attention in Britain. Furthermore for a long time the Indian people have been expecting the United States to come out and take a stand on the side of justice and equality. I therefore venture to lay before you my personal views on this question.

Inevitably Britain will regard the Indian National Congress' recent demand as an attempt to take advantage of her present predicament. The step contemplated by the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, however, still leaves sufficient time and opportunity for the
reaching of an agreement. During my recent visit to India, I earnestly advised the Indian people to consider their primary duty to join the anti-aggression front in a common struggle for mankind.

From the point of view of the Indian people, their consistent purpose is to secure national freedom. With this object in view the Indian National Congress, in seeking national independence, is dominated by sentiment rather than by reason. Consequently I believe attempts at repression in the form of either public censure or force, whether military or police with a view to compelling the Indian people to capitulate, will have the opposite result.

From the psychological point of view of the Indian, he considers that India before attaining her national freedom is not the master of her own vast territory and abundant resources. Just because he owns nothing, he has nothing to be afraid of. Moreover beyond national independence and freedom he demands nothing of the world. Likewise the Indian people as a whole only desire freedom for their country and their only expectation is that the United Nations would sympathize with them in their aspiration.

Enciphered by ________________

Sent by operator __________ M., _________, 19_________
The Indian people are by nature of a passive disposition but are apt to go to extremes. I think that in launching its freedom movement today when Axis aggression is a pressing reality, the Indian Congress must have felt in their hearts a certain amount of anguish. If however the United Nations should show them no sympathy and pursue a laissez-faire policy and thereby cause them to despair, I greatly fear that following the National Congress meeting in August there is danger of the situation getting out of control. In case an anti-British movement or some other unfortunate incident occurs in India, the United Nations war in the East will be adversely affected immediately. For the sake of our common victory the United Nations must seek to stabilize the Indian situation and to secure the Indian people's participation in the joint war effort.

The United Nations depend upon India for her to contribute to the war whereas the Indian people have little need to depend upon the outside world. From their own point of view their movement for independence and freedom is not something new that has come into existence after the outbreak of the war. Hence they do
not stop to think whether their movement will have any harmful effect on the world situation. This being the case they have no hesitation in taking whatever steps they may think necessary in furtherance of their national movement. Whether they are right or wrong is immaterial. The fact remains they have now already become irresponsible to even well-considered public opinion or a realistic analysis of India's real interests. Once they abandon hope of an amicable settlement, they are liable to take any risk without hesitation even to the extent of sacrificing themselves and others.

The only way to make them reconsider their course of action is for the United Nations, and especially the United States which they have always admired, to come forth as third parties and to offer them sympathy and consolation. This will help them to regain their sense of proportion and strengthen their faith that there is justice in this world. Once the situation is eased it can be stabilized and the Indian people, grateful to the United Nations for what they have done, will willingly participate in the war. Otherwise the Indian people in despair will have the same feeling towards other members.
of the United Nations as towards Britain and when this comes to pass it will be the world's greatest tragedy in which Britain is not the only loser.

So far as Britain is concerned she is a great country and in recent years she has been pursuing an enlightened policy towards her colonial possessions. She is one of the principals in this war against aggression. On the other hand India is a weak country. With this unprecedentedly extensive war in progress, naturally things cannot be handled in the ordinary manner. It is my opinion that in order to uphold the British Empire's prestige and safeguard her real interests, the British should unhesitatingly show extraordinary courage, forbearance, farsightedness and resolution by removing the causes which tend to aggravate the situation. In this way the deceptive Axis propagandists will have no occasion to take advantage of these causes.

Should however the situation be allowed to drift until an anti-British movement breaks out in India, any attempt on the part of the British to cope with the crisis by enforcing existing colonial laws or by resorting to military and police force, will only help to spread
disturbances and turmoil. The greater the oppression, the greater the reaction. Even if such measures should prove effective in curbing the non-violence movement, the spiritual loss and blow to the United Nations will far exceed that resulting from any reverse in the field. Such a situation will particularly be detrimental to Britain's interests.

There is no doubt a section of the Indian people which, having lost their sense of proportion, is asking if India will never attain freedom, what choice does she have between Britain and Axis Powers. This mistaken idea the United Nations should of course do everything possible to correct. On the other hand the wisest and most enlightened policy for Britain to pursue would be to restore to India her complete freedom and thus to prevent Axis troops from setting foot on Indian soil. If Britain would reorientate her present attitude and spirit, I firmly believe that not only will Indian sentiment towards Britain undergo a radical change for the better but Britain's action will have an ameliorating effect on the whole situation. Therefore I earnestly hope that the United States would advise both Britain and India in the name of justice and righteousness to seek a reasonable and satisfactory
solution for this affects vitally the welfare of mankind and has a direct bearing on the good faith and good name of the United Nations. The United States as the acknowledged leader of democracy has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem.

In saying so I have not the slightest intention to arouse attention by exaggerated statements. The war aims of the United Nations and our common interests at stake make it impossible for me to remain silent. An ancient Chinese proverb says: INNERQUOTE Good medicine, though bitter, cures one's illness; words of sincere advice, though unpleasant, should guide one's conduct. END INNERQUOTE. I sincerely hope that Britain will magnanimously and resolutely accept my words of disinterested advice, however unpleasant they may be, and believe that they are voiced in the common interests of the United Nations.

In view of the critical situation and in view of China's responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, I have ventured to offer you my views. This despatch is strictly confidential. It is only for Your Excellency's personal reference. I hope Your Excellency will give the

Eniphered by

Sent by operator \[M, \ldots\] 19.
minutest consideration to such practical measures as will break the existing deadlock and avert a crisis. I shall persevere in my efforts. My only feeling is that the United Nations should lose no time in adopting a correct policy towards the Indian situation and in striving for its realization so that our entire war effort will not suffer a major setback. I ardently hope Your Excellency will favor me with your sound judgment.

UNQUOTE

I shall have to give a reply to Chiang Kai-shek in the near future and I shall be grateful if you will let me have as soon as possible your thoughts and any suggestions you may wish to offer with regard to the nature of the reply I should make to him.

[Signature]

U:SW:DMK

Enciphered by ____________________________

Sent by operator ______________________ M., ___________ 19_____ ____________________________