CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

May 27, 1942

From LONDON

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 81, May 27th, 1942. XXXC

Former Naval Person to President personal and
Number 89.

We have done very good work this and last week with Molotov
and as Winant will no doubt have informed you we have completely
transformed the treaty proposals. They are now in my judgment
free from the objections we both entertained and are entirely
compatible with our Atlantic Charter. The treaty was signed
yesterday afternoon with great cordiality on both sides.

Molotov is a statesman and has a freedom of action very
different from what you and I saw with Litvinov. I am very sure
you will be able to reach good understandings with him. Please
let me know your impressions.

So far all has gone well with the Northern Convoy but the
dangers on the next 2 days must necessarily be serious.

I had an opening talk with Arnold and Towers and both are
coming to me for the weekend. I am arranging for them to meet
all our air chiefs and they will go into every detail together.
I have hope that a good arrangement will be possible. The 2
principles seem to be (A) optimum impact on the enemy and
(B) maximum American contribution thereto.
Number 81, May 27th, 1942. XXXC

Mountbatten and Lyttelton will come together but former's visit must be short on account of our common work with which he is charged.

I am fully aware of your preoccupations in the Pacific at the present time and if you considered it necessary to withdraw Washington at once we should quite understand. It is however most important to complete our concentration in the Indian Ocean of Warspite, Valiant, Nelson and Rodney by the middle of July. This can be done if we can retain Washington until King George V finishes refitting at the end of June.

The introduction of convoys between Key West and Hampton roads has evidently had the good effect we all expected, but the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico are still very sore spots. King and Pound have been in communication about this and I hope it may be found possible, even by running risks elsewhere, to provide sufficient escort craft to deal with these areas.

I must express my gratitude for your allocation of 70 tankers to build up United Kingdom stocks of oil. Without this help our stocks would have fallen to a dangerous level by the end of the year. This action is the more generous considering recent heavy American tanker losses and the sacrifices involved in re-
Number 81, May 27th, 1942. XXXC
leasing so many ships.

PRIME
May 27, 1942

From Prime

To The President of the United States

No. 82, May 27, 1942

To President No. 90. I am venturing to send you a collection of the books I have written, which I have had bound up, hoping you will find a place for them in your shelves. Kindest good wishes.

Former Naval Person.

Prime
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2966, May 28, 4 a.m.

Embassy's 2943, May 27, 11 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER M.I.V.I.L PERSON.

"No. 91. Your 149.

One. I send in my immediate following report of our formal conversation, which covers Bolero, Sledgehammer and Super-Round-Up.

Additional private conversation improved atmosphere but did not alter substance. We made great progress in intimacy and goodwill.

Two. We are working hard with your officers and all preparations are proceeding ceaselessly on the largest scale. Dickie will explain to you the difficulties of 1942 when he arrives. I have also told the Staffs to study a landing in the north of Norway, the occupation of which seems necessary to ensure the flow of our supplies next year to Russia. I have told Molotov we would have something ready for him about this
him about this to discuss on his return here. We did not go deeply into it in any way. Personally, I set great importance upon it if a good plan can be made.

Three. So far our northern convoy is fighting its way through having lost five ships, sunk or turned back, out of 35. Tomorrow, 28th, we ought to be getting under the Russian air umbrella if any has been provided. Otherwise, two more days of this.

Four. Auchinleck's news tonight indicates that the battle in Libya has begun. This may be the biggest encounter we have ever fought. General Smuts who has visited the whole front expresses high confidence in the result. I am sure all American hearts will be with us. The issue seems to depend on the armoured fighting on the desert flank. Personally I welcome the trial of strength and am glad if it has come about by Rommel's attack.

Five. We must never let gymnast pass from our minds. All other preparations would help if need be towards that.

WINANT

AIC
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 28, 1942

7:25 A.M.

LCR LONDON

To POTUS

No. HR 1

Former Naval Person to President number 92
following is report referred to in my number 91 begins
"May 22 11 AM Operations on the Continent 1942-43.

Mr. Churchill welcoming Molotov and his ad-
visers, said that he understood that Molotov was
anxious to place before the British Government
the views held by the Soviet Government on the
subject of an invasion of the Continent.

Molotov said that he had been charged by
the Soviet Government to come to London to dis-
cuss the question of the establishment of a
"Second Front."

This was no new problem. It had first been
raised nearly ten months ago and now, more recently,
the impetus had come from President Roosevelt,
who had suggested to Mr Stalin that he (Molotov)
should go to the United States to discuss this
question. Although, therefore, the initiative
for the present enquiry had come from the United
States, the Soviet Government had thought it
right that he should proceed to the United States
via London, since it was upon Great Britain that
the main task for organizing the Second Front
would initially fall.

Speaking generally, Molotov said that the
Soviet Government considered this to be a most
urgent and pressing problem, in which both Great
Britain and Russia were vitally concerned. It
was indeed a matter for discussion with complete
frankness, as becoming conversations between
allies. On the Russian front, operations of the
greatest intensity and importance were now impen-
ing and the weeks and months which lay immediately

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
by R. H. Parks . Date
ahead were fraught with the most serious consequences to the Soviet Union and their allies. During last winter, the Soviet army had got the better of Hitler’s army, and had immediately set about preparing for the campaign of 1942. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government contemplated a fierce and bitter struggle in which the Germans would not yield easily or quickly. In this battle, the main weight would fall upon the Soviet army. They were proud of this honor. On both sides, immense forces, backed by mighty armaments, were ranged against each other. The material aid rendered by Great Britain and the United States was highly prized and appreciated by the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, the most urgent issues were involved in the establishment of a "Second Front".

The object of his (Molotov's) visit was to learn how the British Government viewed the prospects of drawing off some of the weight from Russia, where it seemed that, at the present time, the balance of advantage in armed strength lay with the Germans. It should be remembered that Hitler could call upon vast resources seized from the subjugated and enslaved peoples scattered over a large part of Europe.

In concrete terms, the proposal he had to make was that Russia’s allies, and Great Britain in the first place, should aim at containing forty enemy divisions in western Europe. If this could be done, the doom of Hitler was sealed, if not in 1942, at any rate very soon afterwards.

Mr Churchill said that, in all previous wars, control of the sea had given the power possessing it the great advantage of being able to land, at will, on the enemy’s coast, since it was impossible for the enemy to be prepared at every point to meet
seaborne invasion. The advent of air power had altered the whole situation. For example, in France and the low country the enemy could move his air forces in a few hours to threatened points anywhere along the coast; and bitter experience had shown that landing, in the teeth of enemy air opposition, was not a sound military proposition. The inescapable consequence was that large portions of the Continental coastline were denied to us as places for disembarkation. We were forced, therefore, to study our chances at those parts of the coast where our superior fighter force would give us control in the air. Our choice, in fact, narrowed down to the Pas de Calais, the Cherbourg "Tipe" and part of the Brest area. The problem of landing a force this year in one or more of these areas was being studied, and preparations were being made, with the utmost energy. Our plans were being based on the assumption that the landing of successive waves of assault troops would bring about air battles which, if continued over a week or ten days, would lead to the virtual destruction of the enemy's air power on the continent. Once this was achieved and the air opposition removed, landings at other points on the coast could be effected under cover of our superior sea power. The crucial point in making our plans and preparations was the availability of the special landing craft required for effecting the initial landing on the very heavily defended enemy coastline. Unfortunately, our resources in this special type of craft were, for the time being, strictly limited. As far back as last August, at the Atlantic meeting, he (Mr Churchill) had impressed upon President Roosevelt the urgent need for the United States to build as large a number of tank landing and other assault craft as possible. Later, in January of this year, the President had agreed that the United States should make an even larger effort to construct these craft. We, for our part, for more than a year, had
been turning out as large a number of assault craft as our need for constructing ships for the Navy and mercantile marine, which had suffered grievous losses, permitted.

In April, President Roosevelt had sent Mr. Hopkins and General Marshall to London with the proposal that the United States should join with Great Britain, at the earliest date, in taking the greatest possible weight off Russia. We had immediately agreed to this proposal, and joint studies were proceeding apace. It could not be expected, however, that United States forces would be available till very late in 1942, or that the landing craft we so urgently required would be available in large numbers this year. By first August we should have only 383 landing: By first Sept 566. In 1943, very much larger numbers would be available, and we could descend on the enemy coast at five or six points, anywhere between the North Cape and Bayonne. It was, however, the earnest resolve of the British Government to see what could be done this year to give the much needed support to the valiant Russian armies, who were confronting so large a part of Germany's military might, and had already inflicted such deep wounds upon it.

Two points should, however, be borne in mind. First, with the best will and endeavor, it was unlikely that any
The move we could make in 1942, even if it were successful, would draw off large numbers of enemy land forces from the Eastern front. In the air, however, the position was different; in the various theaters of war we were already containing about one half of the fighter and one third of the German bomber strength. If our plan for forcing air battles over the continent proved successful, the Germans might be faced with the choice either of seeing the whole of their fighter air force in the west destroyed, or of making withdrawals from their air strength in the east.

The second point related to Molotov's proposition that our aim should be to draw off (including those now in the west) not less than forty German divisions from Russia. It should be noted that, at the present time, we had confronting us in Libya eleven Axis divisions, of which three were German, the equivalent of eight German divisions in Norway, and 25 German divisions in France and the Low Countries. These totalled 44 divisions.

But we were not satisfied with that, and if any further effort could be made or plan devised, provided it was sound and sensible, for drawing the weight off Russia this year, we should not hesitate to put it into effect. Clearly, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfiture. Thus to sum up, we and the United States would do everything that was physically possible to meet the wishes of the Russian Government and nation in this matter.
M. Molotov enquired whether the views expressed by Mr. Churchill were shared by the United States Government on the subject of the second front.

Mr. Churchill said that the United States Government shared to the full our resolve to operate on the continent with the largest possible forces at the earliest possible moment. This was their ardent desire, and in 1943 our joint plans contemplated the landing of a force of up to one and a half million United States-British troops on the continent.

The United States were anxious to take their share in any operations carried out this year, but their contribution in the near future would not be on any considerable scale. As an earnest of their intent, we had with us now in London a number of American officers who were collaborating closely with our staffs in the preparation of plans; and more were on their way.

M. Molotov then asked whether it was possible and appropriate to make an estimate of the percentage of British troops, including those on all fronts, employed on active operations against the enemy, at any given date during the last three months.

Mr. Churchill said that the proportion of British troops on all fronts actually at grips with the enemy was naturally small. He went on to explain in general terms the dispositions of our forces; up to 52,000 men a month were leaving our shores for the middle and Far East theaters.

M. Molotov said that he had no doubt that Great Britain genuinely wished for the success of the
No. HR 1.

Soviet Army against the Germans this summer. What, in the view of the British Government, were the prospects of Soviet success? Whatever their views might be he would be glad to have a frank expression of opinion — good or bad.

Mr. Churchill said that, without detailed knowledge of the resources and reserves on both sides, it was difficult to form a firm judgment on this question. Last year the military experts, including those of Germany, had thought that the Soviet Army might be borne down and overcome. They had proved quite wrong. In the event the Soviet forces had defeated Hitler and nearly brought his Army to disaster. Consequently Russia's allies felt great confidence in the strength and ability of the Soviet Army.

The intelligence available to the British Government did not indicate the massing of vast German forces at any particular point on the eastern front. Moreover, the full scale offensive heralded for May now seemed unlikely to take place before June. In any event, it did not seem that Hitler's attack this year could be as strong or so menacing as that of 1941. In making this statement he (Mr. Churchill) did not wish it to be inferred that we were asking our guests for information which they might be reluctant to disclose.

M. Molotov, in reply, agreed that nobody could be expected to make accurate prophecies about the future.
No. HR 1. Page 8.

The great Russian country and people believed in their own strength, but they also believed in facing up to the worst possibilities. Supposing the Soviet Army failed to hold out against the maximum effort which Hitler would undoubtedly exert during 1942, how would the British Government view the position in which they would be placed.

Mr. Churchill said that if the Russians were defeated or the Soviet military power was seriously reduced by the German onslaught, Hitler would, in all probability, move as many troops and air forces as possible back to the west, with the object of invading Great Britain. He might also strike down through Baku to the Caucasus and Persia. This would expose us to the gravest dangers and we should by no means feel satisfied that we had sufficient forces to ward off the latter thrust. Therefore, our fortunes were bound up with the resistance of the Soviet Army. Nevertheless, if contrary to expectation, they were defeated, and the worst came to the worst, we should fight on, and with the help of the United States, hope to build up overwhelming air superiority, which, in the course of the next eighteen months or two years would enable us to put down a devastating weight of air attack on the German cities and industries. We should, moreover, maintain the blockade and make landings on the continent against an increasingly enfeebled opposition. Ultimately, the power of Great Britain and the United States would prevail. It should not be overlooked that after the fall of France Great Britain had stood alone for a whole year with but a handful of ill equipped troops between her and Hitler's victorious and numerous divisions.
No. HR 1.

But what a tragedy for mankind would be this prolongation of the war, and how earnest was the hope for Russian victory and how ardent the desire that we should take our share in conquering the evil foe. He, Mr. Churchill, wished M. Molotov to realise that it was the dearest wish of the British nation and Army to come to grips with the enemy at the earliest moment and so to aid the gallant fight of the Russian Army and people.

In conclusion, Mr. Churchill asked M. Molotov to bear in mind the difficulty of overseas invasions. After France fell out of the war, we in Great Britain were almost naked, a few ill equipped divisions, less than 100 tanks and less than 200 field guns. And yet Hitler had not attempted an invasion, by reason of the fact that he could not get command of the air. The same sort of difficulties confronted us at the present time. He suggested that General Isayev and Admiral Kharlamov should meet Lt. General Nyo and Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten that afternoon, in order that they might be told the exact position as regards the special landing craft necessary for overseas operations.

M. Molotov agreed. He thanked Mr. Churchill for what he had said. He would carefully report to his Government. In conclusion, he would like to say that the Russian people also believed in their strength and in the strength of their Allies.
From: LONDON

To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Number 93, May 28, 1942

Former Naval Person to President.

Personal and No. 93. Your 150. I can see nothing but good in either or both of the visits you mention. General Smuts may be coming here in the near future and a good opportunity would arise then. Shall I mention your idea to him as an additional incentive? We have been good friends for nearly forty years and I regard him as one of the greatest living men. As to Curtin, a visit could do nothing but good. I have got on very well with Evatt.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Da		MAY 5 1972
Number 04, May 28, 1942

From former Naval person. No. 24 Your 151.
I quite agree.

TEXT OF 151:

"I would suggest to Curtin that he should not come here until Evatt has returned to Australia" (Sent as 151 supplementing 150)
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

May 30, 1942

SECRET

From London

To The President of the United States

No. 95. May 30, 1942

From former Naval person to President Roosevelt personal and confidential.

Evatt is leaving quite soon for your side. He has shown himself most friendly especially to me personally, and I think you will find that he will help in every way. It will be necessary for Evatt to get back to Australia before Curtains' visit.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

June 1, 1942

1110A M.

No. 26 June 1, 1942

Former naval person to President Roosevelt.
personal and

Like you, I am anxious about Russia and also China
in the next few months. It is often easier to see
dangers gathering than to have the power to ward them
off, and very often they don't happen.

Mountbatten will explain to you some of the prac-
tical difficulties as we see them here of a medium
scale operation this year. We are still working at it
and trying to make plans to overcome them. All
preparations should go forward with the utmost speed,
and I am having your new convoy proposals examined by
the Chiefs of Staff and the Admiralty.

I had some very pleasant talks with Arnold, though
I am still much troubled on the subject.

I hope you were pleased with our mass air attack
on Cologne. There is plenty more to come, and I look
forward eagerly to the arrival of your bombing groups.

The battle in Libya goes well, and I expect
considerable results or even possibly a complete decision.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
To THE PRESIDENT

No. 97
From Former Naval Person to President.

and personal No. 97. Most grateful about Washington.
Rodney can now sail forthwith.

Prime

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
LONDON

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
To WHITE HOUSE

No. 98, June 3, 1942

From former Naval person to President.
Number 98. Personal thank you so much for the souvenir sent with your letter of the 7th May.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
June 4, 1942

6:35 P.M.

From London

To The President of The United States
Map Room, The White House

Copies furnished as noted: 99

I must tell you that we received invaluable help from Winant during our Russian negotiations. He made the Russians understand as no one else could do how injurious to good relations between us three must have been the American reaction to the old treaty. I have no doubt that his intervention and plain speaking were largely instrumental in helping us to secure a treaty which fulfilled our own ideas we are all most grateful for his help.

Prime Minister
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The P.M. sent you this personal line:

"Thank you so much for the souvenir sent with your letter seventh May." Signed Prime

GGT
URGENT

No. 85, June 7th

Msg. No. 100 from Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and secret your No. 154.

I have today telegraphed to Lyttelton approving the proposals for combined production and resources board, and I entirely concur in simultaneous announcement on Monday or Tuesday.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5 1972
To The President of The United States
The White House, Map Room

#XXXC 87, June 13, 1942

Former Naval person to President. Personal and secret.

Number 101.

Very many thanks for your number 166 PS I had a long talk with Mountbatten last night, and in view of the impossibility of dealing by correspondence with all the many difficult points outstanding, I feel it is my duty to come to see you. I shall hold myself ready to start as weather serves from Thursday 18th onwards and will advise you later. I shall bring C I G S, General Brooke, whom you have not yet met, with me, also General Ismay. My own personal group will be; Tommy and John Martin.

Colonel White thanks you very much for the invitation, by which she is complimented, but thinks she had better stay here on account of her Russian Fund.

Please let plan be secret till we arrive.

This is the moment for me to send you my heartiest congrat-
ulations on the grand American victories in the Pacific which have very decidedly altered the balance of the Naval war. All good wishes to you and friends.
Memorandum for General Marshall

The attached memorandum was presented by the P.M. to the President. Mr. Hopkins forwarded it to me in code with instructions to pass a copy to General Marshall and Admiral King.

Very rep.

J. L. H.
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

To. Captain McCrea.

For Marshall and King.
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

MR. PRESIDENT

1. The continued heavy sinkings at sea constitute our greatest and most immediate danger. What further measures can be taken now to reduce sinkings other than those in actual operations which must be faced? When will this convoy start in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico? Is there needless traffic which could be reduced? Should we build more escort vessels at the expense of merchant tonnage, and if so to what extent?

2. We are bound to preserve in the prevention for Bolero if possible in 1942 but certainly in 1943. The whole of this business is now going on. Arrangements are being made for a landing of six or eight divisions on the coast of Northern France early in September. However the British Government would not favor an operation that was certain to lead to disaster for this would not help the Russians whatever their plight, would compromise and expose to Nazi vengeance the French population involved and would gravely delay the main operation in 1943. We hold strongly to the view that there should be no substantial landing in France this year unless we are going to stay.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972

1185
3. No responsible British Military Authority has so far been able to make a plan for September 1942 which had any chance of success unless the Germans become utterly demoralized of which there is no likelihood. Have the American staffs a plan? If so, what is it? What forces would be employed? At what points would they strike? What landing craft and shipping are available? Who is the officer prepared to command the enterprise? What British forces and assistance are required? If a plan can be found which offers a reasonable prospect of success His Majesty's Government will certainly welcome it and will share to the full with their American comrades the risks and sacrifices. This remains our settled and agreed policy.

4. But in case no plan can be made in which any responsible authority has good confidence, and consequently no engagement on a substantial scale in France is possible in September 1942, what else are we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic Theatre during the whole of 1942? Ought we not to be preparing within the general structure of BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of advantage and also directly or indirectly to take some of the weight off Russia?
IT IS IN THIS SETTING AND ON THIS BACKGROUND THAT THE
OPERATION GYMNASI should be studied.

(END)

20.6.42.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 17th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had a telegram from the Foreign Office asking me to convey the following message to you from the Prime Minister:

"Hope arrive Baltimore Thursday. Portal is much occupied here but he can come over later if necessary. Looking forward to seeing you keenly."

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Halifax

I have heard nothing more as yet about time of arrival.

H.

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.
1. The continued heavy sinkings at sea constitute our greatest and most immediate danger. What further measures can be taken now to reduce sinkings other than those in actual operations which must be faced? When will this convoy start in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico? Is there needless traffic which could be reduced? Should we build more escort vessels at the expense of merchant tonnage, and if so to what extent?

2. We are bound to persevere in the preparation for BOLERO if possible in 1942 but certainly in 1943. The whole of this business is now going on. Arrangements are being made for a landing of six or eight Divisions on the coast of Northern France early in September. However the British Government would not favour an
operation that was certain to lead to disaster for this would not help the Russians whatever their plight, would compromise and expose to Nazi vengeance the French population involved and would gravely delay the main operation in 1943. We hold strongly to the view that there should be no substantial landing in France this year unless we are going to stay.

3. No responsible British military authority has so far been able to make a plan for September 1942 which had any chance of success unless the Germans become utterly demoralized, of which there is no likelihood. Have the American Staffs a plan? If so, what is it? What forces would be employed? At what points would they strike? What landing-craft and shipping are available? Who is the officer prepared to command the enterprise? What British forces and assistance are required? If a plan can be found which offers a reasonable prospect of success His Majesty's Government will cordially welcome it and will share to the full with their American comrades the risks and sacrifices. This remains our settled and agreed policy.
4. But in case no plan can be made in which any responsible authority has good confidence, and consequently no engagement on a substantial scale in France is possible in September 1942, what else are we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during the whole of 1942? Ought we not to be preparing within the general structure of BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of advantage and also directly or indirectly to take some of the weight off Russia? It is in this setting and on this background that the operation GYMNAST should be studied.

W. S. C.

20. 6. 42
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

I DON'T THINK THIS
REQUIRES AN ANSWER.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Cornelius
please file
Mr.
June 13, 1942

June 13, 1942

To President from former Naval person. Personal and...

Your number 157. I have read this with great interest. I have not yet received the terms of the suggested settlement. We are of course in your hands, but I do not understand how there could be any agreement between Arnold and Slessor as the latter was precluded from all power of making an agreement without previous reference here. I am awaiting the actual text which I hope will relieve our anxiety. Anyhow we can talk it all over when we meet. Message number 102.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tele., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
To The President of The United States

Number 103, June 27, 1942

I have received the following from Auchinleck:

General Marshall’s proposal very attractive indeed and would be of enormous help. The self propelled 105 mm gun Howitzer are the type of artillery we have been looking for. We shall have enough trained personnel to man these tanks but will be most grateful for American Key Personnel for tanks and guns including personnel able to act as instructors in care and maintenance of tank engines and self propelled guns. Presume ample ammunition and some spares will be sent with tanks and guns.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
London

To The President of The United States
The White House

Number 104, July 2, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret.

Grateful for action you are taking. We consider that French ships must be made to obey the orders of the British Naval Commander in Chief under penalty of being sunk if and when he orders them to proceed through the canal.

We agree that they should now be given the offer that on emerging from the canal they will come into the protective custody of the U. S. under the conditions you outline. Admiral Godfroy will be informed by Admiral Harwood that we have agreed to this.

Action will not be taken unless and until the land battle is definitely decided against us. Meanwhile control over French ships, personnel and supplies is to be strictly enforced.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER 94. July 3, 1942

For President from Former Naval Person personal and secret. one zero five. The Boston Bomber is doing great work in Egypt. Auchinleck reported on first July that Boston attacks "were regular as trains and most heartening to troops". But battles of this intensity take a heavy toll. Apart from the replacements which will be needed, we have in Egypt the personnel of four light bomber squadrons without any aircraft at all.

Only ten Bostons will reach us in the Middle East during July. There are, however, in Iraq, en route to Russia, forty Bostons which are ready to fly, and behind them another seventytwo as yet unerected. The Middle East have made an urgent appeal to be allowed to have these forty aircraft as an immediate reinforcement. They could be in the battle within a week.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
Would you consider allowing us to have these forty Bostons at once: and if so, would you approach Stalin and tell him that you will make them up to him as quickly as possible. With Russia in the thick of the battle, this is a hard request and I shall quite understand if you do not feel able to do as I ask. But our needs are great and there is no other way of getting the additional bombers into action at once.

PRIME

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by [Redacted]
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
CABLEGRAM

RKeivcd at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

July 6, 1942

15592 M.

CABLEGRAM

To

President Of United States

No #, July 6, 1942

Personal and most secret number one zero six our code words need clarification. By "Bolero" we British mean the vast arrangements necessary both in nineteen forty two and nineteen forty three for the operation against the continent. The joint Anglo American Staffs Committees are all working on this basis. They are not operational but purely administrative. What you in conversation have called "one third Bolero" we have hitherto been calling "Sledgehammer." The name "Round Up" has been given to the nineteen forty three operation. I do not much like this name, as it might be thought over confident or over gloomy, but it has come into considerable use. Please let me know whether you have any wishes about this. The "Gymnast" you and I have in view is, I think, the variant called by your staffs "Semi Gymnast." I also use the word "Jupiter" to describe an operation in the far north.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

July 8, 1942

0010 Z M.

From  LONDON PRIME MINISTER

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER 107, July 8, 1942

From Former Naval Person to President personal

and

1. No responsible British General, Admiral or
   Air Marshal is prepared to recommend Sledgehammer
   as a practicable operation in nineteen forty two.
   The Chiefs of the Staff have reported "The conditions
   which would make Sledgehammer a sound sensible enter-
   prise are very unlikely to occur". They are now sending
   their paper to your Chiefs of Staff.

2. The taking up of the shipping is being proceeded
   with by us for camouflage purposes though it involves
   a loss in British imports of perhaps two hundred and
   fifty thousand tons. But far more serious is the fact
   that according to Mountbatten if we interrupt the
   training of the troops we should apart from the loss
   of landing craft etc delay roundup or nineteen forty
   three Bolero for at least two or three months even if
   the enterprise were unsuccessful and the troops had to
Page #2 of Number 107 from London, July 8, 1942

be withdrawn after a short stay.

3. In the event of a lodgement being effected and maintained it would have to be nourished and the bomber effort on Germany would have to be greatly curtailed. All our energies would be involved in defending the Bridgehead. The possibility of mounting a large scale operation in nineteen forty three would be marred if not ruined. All our resources would be absorbed piecemeal on the very narrow front which alone is open. It may therefore be said that premature action in nineteen forty two while probably ending in disaster would decisively injure the prospect of well organized large scale action in nineteen forty three.

4. I am sure myself that Gymnast is by far the best chance for effective relief to the Russian front in nineteen forty two. This has all along been in harmony with your ideas. In fact it is your commanding idea.
Page #3 of number 107 from London, July 8, 1942

Here is the true second front of nineteen forty two. I have consulted cabinet and defence committee and we all agree. Here is the safest and most fruitful stroke that can be delivered this autumn.

5. We of course can aid in every way either by transfer of American or British landing forces from the United Kingdom to Gymnast and with landing craft, shipping, etc. You can if you choose put the punch in partly from here and the rest direct across the Atlantic.

6. It must be clearly understood that we cannot count upon an invitation or a guarantee from Vichy. But any resistance would not be comparable to that which would be offered by the German Army in the Pas De Calais. Indeed it might be only token resistance. The stronger you are the less resistance there would be and the more to overcome it. This is political more than a military issue. It seems to me that we ought not to throw away the sole great strategic stroke open
Page # 4 of number 107 from London, July 3, 1942 to us in the western theatre during this cardinal year.

7. Besides the above we are studying very hard the possibility of an operation in Northern Norway or if this should prove impracticable elsewhere in Norway. The difficulties are great owing to the danger of shore based aircraft attack upon our ships. We are having frightful difficulties about the Russian convoys. All the more is it necessary to try to clear the way and maintain the contact with Russia.

PRIME
Personal and No. 108.

My immediately preceding telegram No. 107.

We have been deeply considering question of command of maximum Bolero. It would be agreeable to us if General Marshall would undertake this supreme task in 1943. We shall sustain him to the last inch.

2. The War Cabinet authorises me to convey above to you.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 5 1972
Personal and No. 109.

My immediately preceding telegram No. 108.

I hope Mr. President you will make sure that appointment of a United States Commander over Bolero 1943 does not prejudice operations of immediate consequence such as Gymnast.
July 8th, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the texts of two messages for you from the Prime Minister which have just been received by telegram from the Foreign Office.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

R. J. Campbell.

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
Text of a telegram received from the Foreign Office on July 8th, 1942.

Following message from Former Naval Person for the President.


My immediately preceding telegram 108.

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
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Personal and Secret. No. 108.

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

July 9, 1942

XXXR

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 100, July 9, 1942.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 110.
Reference your one six one. Thank you so much about
the transfer of the Boston bombers destined for Russia.
We shall try to use them well.

Prime
From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 101, July 9, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and

Number one one one.

We welcome the proposal in the first paragraph of your telegram that the French warships at Alexandria should proceed by way of the canal to Martinique.

We suggest the following additions to the proposed offer. First, that the United States and the British governments will agree to the periodical relief and repatriation of the French crews from these ships after they have reached Martinique, on the same basis as proposed had the ships remained at Alexandria. Secondly, that the offer should be made irrespective of whether the fall of Alexandria becomes imminent, since they would in any case be in danger of enemy air attack there.

With regard to the last paragraph of your telegram we do not admit that these French warships are in any way within the scope of the armistice agreement.

Prime
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following message received from certain person in London:

"That the French warships at Alexandria should proceed by way of the canal to Martinique. Suggest additions to proposed offer:

(a) That United States and U. K. governments agree to periodical relief and repatriation of crews after they have reached Martinique, on the same basis had the ships remained at Alexandria.

(b) That offer be irrespective of whether fall of Alexandria becomes imminent, since they would in any case be in danger of enemy air attack there.

We cannot admit that these warships are in any way within the scope of the armistice agreement.

F. D. R.
Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a telegram which has just been received from the Foreign Office containing a message for you from the Prime Minister. Copies of the two earlier messages 108 and 109 referred to are also enclosed. I originally sent copies of these two messages to you under cover of a letter dated July 8th, which I forwarded to Mr. Sumner Welles that day with the request that he have it delivered to you as soon as possible. I am sorry to see that this letter and its enclosures do not seem yet to have reached you.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

R. J. Campbell

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
Personal and  

No. 112.

I directed that telegram Nos. 108 and 109 should be sent through the Foreign Office as I was not sure whether you would wish United States Embassy in London to be informed of the subject matter. By a regrettable mistake they were not delivered by British Embassy at Washington. They will be delivered by hand to you this morning. Naturally I was puzzled at not receiving an answer, so rang up Harry. All's well that ends well.
July 12, 1942

From London

To MILID

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 2980, July 12th, 1942.
Prime Ministers number one zero eight and one zero nine sent by him personally thru channels unknown to us. For French from Vanvoorst. Upon query to Prime Minister personally he stated that he did not repeat not desire these messages re-transmitted special circuit. Prime Ministers private Secretary refused to state exactly how messages were transmitted but we have reason to believe that same were via telephone.

McClure

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- MAR 3 1972
Signature -

Action Copy
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

No. 1658
MILATTACHE AMBASSAD
LONDON

WHITE HOUSE CHECKED FOR POTUS SERIALS ONE ZERO EIGHT AND NINE CLAIM RECORDS INDICATE MESSAGES NOT SENT VIA ARMY STATE DEPT. OR NAVY STOP FOR VANVOORST STOP EXPEDITE REPLY AS TO WHAT CHANNEL OF TRANSMISSION USED AND ON WHAT DATE SENT.

FRENCH

George G. Grimmer
1st. Lt. Sig. C.
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munition Bldg., Washington, D. C.
July 12, 1942

From_____London

To____Col. French

Re your service POTUS numbers one zero eight and
one zero nine sent thru channels unknown to us. PRIME
convinced that POTUS has received these messages.
Reply to your query delayed due to fact was sent to
USFOR and not Milattache.

Sgd. Vanvoorst.
July 11, 1942.

No Number

SIGNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

OUR RECORDS DO NOT SHOW RECEIPT OF POTUS SERIALS ONE ZERO EIGHT AND ONE ZERO NINE RPT ONE ZERO EIGHT AND ONE ZERO NINE PD PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY WHITE HOUSE INQUIPED PD REPLY TO CRYPTO WAR

FRENCH

OFFICIAL-SECRET

Mathew G. Jones
Major, Signal Corps
OC, Code Section
From London

To The President of the United States

The White House

Number 113, July 14, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Para 1. Only four ships have reached Archangel
with four or five more precariously in the ice off Nova
Zembla out of the thirty three included in convoy PQ
seventeen. If a half had got through we should have
persevered, but with only about a quarter arriving the
operation is not good enough. For instance out of nearly
six hundred tanks in PQ seventeen little over one hundred
have arrived and nearly five hundred are lost. This
cannot help anybody except the enemy. The Admiralty can-
not see what better protection can be devised, nor can
they hazard battle ships east of Bear Island. Stark
agrees with Admiralty view and that all possible was done
by us last time. Washington has already been withdrawn
for her task in the Pacific.

Para 2. We therefore advise against running
PQ eighteen which must start eighteenth at latest. If
it were composed only of our merchant ships we should
certainly not send them, but no fewer than twenty two are
your own American ships. We should therefore like to know
how you feel about it.

Para 3. Future prospects of supplying Russia by this northern route are bad. Murmansk has been largely burnt out and there are several signs of an impending German attack upon it. By the time that perpetual daylight gives place to the dark period, Archangel will be frozen. Some additional supplies may be passed over the Basra route. This is being pressed, but it will not amount to much. Thus Russia is confronted at this anxious moment with a virtual cutting off of the Northern Sea communications. We wait your answer before explaining things to Stalin. The message which it is proposed to send to him, if you agree that the convoy is not to go, is being sent to you later today. Meanwhile the convoy is continuing to load and assemble.

Para 4. Allied shipping losses in the seven days ending July thirteenth including the Russian convoy were reported at not far short of four hundred thousand tons for this week, a rate unexampled in either this war or the last, and if maintained evidently beyond all existing replacement plans.
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

JULY 14, 1942

1030 Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Message should read:

Number LCR 1, July 14, 1942.

Former Naval Permon to President personal and
number one one three.

Para 1. Only four ships etc....

War Dept. Code Center

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
No. 104, July 14, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and number one one four.

I am most anxious for you to know where I stand myself at the present time. I have found no one who regards "Sledgehammer" as possible. I should like to see you do gymnast as soon as possible, and that we in concert with the Russians should try for Jupiter. Meanwhile all preparations for roundup in nineteen forty three should proceed at full blast, thus holding the maximum enemy forces opposite England. All this seems to me as clear as noonday.

PRIME
To The President of the United States
The White House

No. 105, July 14, 1942

Formal Naval Person to President and personal number one one five.

Following is text of draft telegram to Premier Stalin mentioned in my one one three begins:

1) We commenced running small convoys to North Russia in August nineteen forty one and, until December, the Germans did not take many steps to interfere with them. From February nineteen forty two, the size of the convoys was increased and the Germans then moved a considerable force of U Boats and a large number of aircraft to North Norway and made determined attacks on the convoys. By giving the convoys the strongest possible escort of destroyers and anti submarine craft the convoys got through with varying but not prohibitive losses. It is evident that the Germans were dissatisfied with the results which were being achieved by means of aircraft and U Boats alone, because they commenced to use their surface forces against the convoys. Luckily for us, however, to start with they made use of their heavy sur-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
face forces to the westward of Bear Island and their submarines to the eastward. The home fleet was thus in a position to prevent an attack by enemy surface forces. Before the May convoy was sent off, the Admiralty warned us that the losses would be very severe if, as was expected, the Germans employed their surface forces to the eastward of Bear Island. We decided, however, to sail the convoy. An attack by surface ships did not materialize, and the convoy got through with a loss of one sixth, chiefly from air attack. In the case of PQ seventeen, however, the Germans at last used their forces in the manner we had always feared. They concentrated their submarines to the westward of Bear Island and reserved their surface forces for attack to the eastward of Bear Island. The final story of PQ seventeen convoy is not yet clear. At the moment, only four ships have arrived, but four others are believed to be off the coast of Nova Zembla. The latter may, however, be attacked from the air at any time. At the best, therefore, only one quarter
No. 105, July 14, 1942  (Page 3)

will have survived and it is possible that the figure will only be one eighth.

I must explain the dangers and difficulties of these convoy operations, when the enemy's battle squadron takes its station in the extreme north. We do not think it right to risk our home fleet east of Bear Island or where it can be brought under the attack of the powerful German shore-based aircraft. If one or two of our very few most powerful battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while Tirpitz and her consorts, soon to be joined by Scharnhorst remained in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be lost. Besides affecting the food supplies by which we live, our war effort would be crippled. And above all the great convoys of American troops across the ocean, rising presently to as many as eighty thousand in a month, would be prevented, and the building up of a really strong second front in nineteen forty three rendered impossible.

* *

By Naval advisers tell me that if they had the
No. 105, July 14, 1942 (Page 4)

handling of the German surface, submarine and air forces, in present circumstances they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia. They are unable to hold out any hopes that convoys attempting to make the passage in perpetual daylight would fare any better, even if as well, as PQ seventeen.

(More to follow)

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
No. 106, July 14, 1942

(Continuing P.H. one one five)

4. It is therefore with the greatest regret that we have reached the conclusion that to continue to attempt further convoys to North Russia during the summer months could bring no benefit to you and would only involve grievous injury to our common cause.

5. PQ eighteen will therefore not sail to Archangel but we are prepared to dispatch immediately some of the ships of this convoy to the Persian Gulf. Selection of ships would be made in consultation with Soviet authorities in London in order that priorities of cargo may be agreed. If fighter aircraft (hurricanes and miracobras) are selected, can you operate and maintain them on the southern front? We could undertake to assemble them at Basra. We hope to increase through clearance capacity of trans Persian routes so as to reach seventy five tons monthly by October and are making strenuous efforts to obtain a further increase. We are asking the United States government to help us by expediting dispatch of...
No. 106, July 14, 1942 (Page 2)

the rolling stock and trucks. An increased volume of traffic could be handled at once if you would agree to American trucks for USSR now being assembled in the Persian Gulf being used as a shuttle service for transporting goods by road between the Gulf and the Caspian. In order to insure full use of capacity, we agree to raise figure of loadings due to arrive September to ninety five thousand tons and October to one hundred thousand tons, both exclusive of trucks and aircraft.

All the above only emphasizes the importance of combined Russo-British operations to drive the enemy out of the Northern Norwegian airfields. We have been studying the possibility of these operations for some time, and if a good plan can be made between our officers we shall be prepared to help with sea, land and air forces to the best of our ability. For our direct attacks by landings from the sea we must wait till there is a reasonable amount of darkness, ie until October. The danger from enemy aircraft will then be much reduced.
No. 106, July 14, 1942  (Page 3)

All this must be studied by your officers and ours. It would be better if you could send your officers here, but if this is impossible, we will come to you. It may well be that this study will show that the difficulties are prohibitive.

In addition to a combined operation in the north, we are thinking of what we can do to help on your southern flank. If we can beat back Rommel, we might be able to send powerful air forces in the Autumn to operate on the left of your line. The difficulties of maintaining these forces over the trans Persian route will clearly be considerable, but the project is being most earnestly examined and I shall hope to put detailed proposals before you in the near future. We must, however, first beat Rommel of which I have good hopes.

Let me once again express my thanks for the forty Dostons. We are straining every nerve to beat Rommel out of Egypt, if not further. Large reinforcements are approaching General Auchinleck in a constant stream.
and the impending arrival of strong British and American heavy armored forces should give the necessary security to the Eastern Mediterranean as well as obstructing Rommel's supply ports of Tobruk and Benghazi.

I am sure it would be in our common interest, Premier Stalin, to have the three divisions of Poles you so kindly offered join their compatriots in Palestine where we can arm them fully. These would play a most important part in future fighting as well as keeping the Turks in good heart by the sense of growing numbers to the southward. I hope this project of yours, which we greatly value, will not fall to the ground on account of the Poles wanting to bring with the troops a considerable mass of their women and children who are largely dependent on the rations of the Polish soldiers. The feeding of these dependents in Palestine will be a considerable burden to us. We think it well worth while bearing that burden for the sake of forming this Polish army which will be used faithfully for our common ad-
vant age. We are very hard up for food ourselves in the Levant area but there is enough in India if we can bring it there. If we do not get the Poles we should have to fill their places by drawing on the preparations now going forward on a vast scale for the Anglo American mass invasion of the continent. I am glad to see that these preparations, so far as they have advanced, have already led the Germans to withdraw two heavy bomber groups from South Russia to the south of France. Believe me, my comrade, and friend, there is nothing that is useful and sensible that we and the Americans will not do to help you in your grand struggle. The President and I are ceaselessly searching for means to overcome the extraordinary difficulties which geography, salt water and the enemy's air power interpose.

PRIME
No. 107, July 15, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret. No. one one six most immediate.

Further to my no. one one three and appended draft to Stalin. We are as you know running a heavily guarded convoy to Malta soon relying upon very strong sea borne fighter protection. If this should succeed without serious losses it might render possible an attempt in September to run an even more powerfully mounted and protected convoy to Russia. Admiralty are studying this and I do not propose in my message to Stalin to close the door finally now as is done in paragraph three of the draft in my no. one one five telegraphed to you. The Malta convoy will decide whether very strong sea borne fighter protection is effective. That can only be proved by trial.

I am glad indeed you are sending our friends over. I feel sure this was the only thing to do. Later.

Your one six six and one six seven just received are covered by the foregoing. Many thanks.

PRIME
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

July 16, 1942

9:58P M.

London

To The President of the United States

No 108 July 16, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential

Will convey our friends on arrival to usual weekend resort where British Chiefs of Staff await them. I wish I could guarantee the beauties and the weather of Hyde Park.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 344! Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

July 16, 1942

From: London

To: President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

To: President of the United States
White House

No. 109 July 16, 1942

Former Naval person to the President.
Personal and Number one one eight.

Am holding up long telegram to Stalin for another twentyfour hours, in hopes of being able to improve paragraph three a little. Should be grateful if you would say nothing to him meanwhile.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972
From London

To The President of the United States

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 110 July 16, 1942

Prime Minister's No. 119.*

Former Naval person to President. Your one six eight. Certainly. Whatever you wish. We are always entirely at your service.

McClure

Note: No internal number. WDCS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

*The War Dept. Code Room called at 0650/17 to report that the above unnumbered message had been serviced to determine the official P.M. number. The number for it is 139.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message just received from General Eisenhower indicates that the party is going from Prestwick to London by rail, arriving there tomorrow morning at 6:00 A.M. This is a change from the original schedule as it was planned to continue to London in the same plane.

JOSEPH J. McNAIRNEY,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incl.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- MAR 3 1972

Signature- [Redacted]
XXX A - URGENT

From: London
To: AgWar

No. 451 July 17 1942

This message for Colonel Deane Secretary of General Staff. Liberates Proceeding by rail from original landing point arriving here zero six zero zero GMT Saturday.

Eisenhower

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: SOS
File

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- MAR 3 1972
Signature-

CM-IN-3964 (7-17-42) 1944 Z

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

0223GCT July 18, 1942

D223GCT M.

ONDON

To POTUS

#111, July 17, 1942

Former Naval Person to President,

Number one two zero.

Reference my number one one eight.

Apart from minor verbal amendments the telegram to Stalin as sent today, Friday, differs only in the following respect from the draft sent in my number one five (A) last three sentences of para one amended to read "At the moment only four ships have arrived at Archangel, but six others are in Oova Zembla Harbours. The latter may, however, be attacked from the air at any time. At the best, therefore, only one third will have survived" (B) Para three and first sentence of para four amended to read "My naval advisers tell me that if they had the handling of the German surface, submarine and air forces, in present circumstances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia. They have not been able so far to hold out hopes that convoys attempting to make the passage in perpetual daylight would fare better than PQ Seventeen. It is, therefore, with the greatest regret that we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy, PQ Eighteen, would bring no benefit to you and would only involve dead loss to the common cause. At the same time, I give you my assurance that, if we can devise arrangements which give a reasonable chance of at least a fair proportion of the contents of the convoys reaching you, we will start them again at once. The crux of the problem is to make the Barents Sea as dangerous for German warships as they make it for ours. This is what we should aim at doing with our joint resources. I should like to send a senior officer of the RAF to North Russia to confer with your officers and make a plan.

Meanwhile we are prepared to despatch immediately to the Persian Gulf some of the ships which were to have sailed in the PQ convoy." (C) Paragraphs five, six, and seven:

Your telegram to me on Twentieth June referred to combined operations in the North. The obstacles to sending further convoys at the present time equally prevent our sending land forces and air forces for operations in Northern Norway. But our officers

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-20-72

By R. H. Parks Data
Page two #111, July 17, from London to POTUS

should forthwith consider together what combined operations may be possible in or after October when there is a reasonable amount of darkness. It would be better if you could send your officers here, but if this is impossible, ours will come to you.

In addition to a combined operation in the North, we are studying how to help on your southern flank. If we can beat back Rommel, we might be able to send powerful air forces in the autumn to operate on the left of your line. The difficulties of maintaining these forces over the trans-Persian route without reducing your supplies will clearly be considerable but I hope to put detailed proposals before you in the near future. We must, however, first beat Rommel. The battle is now intense.

Let me once again express my thanks for the forty Bostons. The Germans are constantly sending more men and aircraft to Africa; but large reinforcements are approaching General Auchinleck, and the impending arrival of strong British and American heavy bomber aircraft forces should give security to the eastern Mediterranean, as well as obstructing Rommel's supply ports of Tobruk and Benghazi. (D) Last paragraph, words "In Palestine" omitted from fourth sentence and last sentence but two amended to read "These preparations have already led the Germans to withdraw two heavy bomber groups from South Russia to France."

I have added that I have shown this telegram to you.

PRIME
CSWD

July 21, 1942

From London

To The President of the United States
Map Room - White House

Former Naval person to President. Personal and Number one two one.

One. I am anxious to do all I can to help you combat the U dash boat. as you are no doubt aware there are some three hundred Baker Dog Easy apostrophe Sail and Dog Easy apostrophe Sail Building in U S A at British request. According to my information the Twin Screw Corvettes Building in Canada and the First Baker Dog Easy apostrophe Sail and Dog Easy apostrophe Sail complete at the same time. The ocean going minesweepers are a similar case.

Two. We cannot tell which of us or where the enemy will strike in the different phases of the war. We must act according to circumstances. I would propose therefore that all the above mentioned vessels and also the United Kingdom production should be thrown in the common pool and assigned to the best common advantage according to needs. The machinery of the combined chiefs of ST AFF and the munition assignments board is suited to the task. Decisions must be made in good time to allow the completing ships to received United States or British equipment as the case may be. This procedure has already led to the transfer of fifteen single Screw Corvettes to the United States Navy. It is in accordance with the general agreement about munitions and I urge that it should have our blessing. As our need of the eight fairmiles is at this moment less urgent the Admiralty is arranging their transfer now.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
XXXC 113, July 26th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President me and personal. No one two two. Your no. one six nine. Parling and Pound have been discussing the allocation of escort craft.

The so called pool only exists up to the time of allocation which will be some months before they are ready for service.

There was never any intention of maintaining a pool once ships are in service.

I hope this will meet your wishes.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

SECRET JULY 27, 1942

URGENT

0420 Z M.

LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 114, July 26, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. I was sure you would be as pleased as I am, indeed as we are all here, at the results of this strenuous week. Besides reaching agreement on action, relations of cordial intimacy and comradeship have been cemented between our high officers. I doubt if success would have been achieved without Harry's invaluable aid.

2. We must establish a second front this year and attack at the earliest moment. As I see it this second front consists of a main body holding the enemy pinned opposite Sledgehammer and a wide flanking movement called Torch (hitherto called Gymnast). Now that everything is decided we can, as you say, go full steam ahead. All depends on secrecy and speed and on having a regular schedule of political and military action. Every hour counts and I agree with you that October thirtieth is the latest date which should be accepted.

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By R. H. Parks

MAY 5 1972

SECRET
No. 114, July 26, 1942

3. Secrecy can only be maintained by deception. For this purpose I am running Jupiter and we must also work up Sledgehammer with the utmost vigour. These will cover all movements in the United Kingdom. When your troops start for Torch everyone except the secret circles should believe they are going to Suez or Basra thus explaining tropical kit. The Canadian Army here will be fitted for Arctic Service. Thus we shall be able to keep the enemy in doubt till the last moment.

4. Meanwhile I hope Bolero processes will continue at full blast subject only to any necessary impingement upon them made by Torch, which impingement eventuates only in a certain delay. Thus we shall be able to strike, right handed, left handed or both handed.

5. I talked to General Marshall about the scale of supplies and equipment laid down for United States Forces in Bolero. At nine tons a man initial equipment and nine dash tenths a ton a month maintenance this works out at eleven million seven hundred thousand long tons for the first nine months and over nineteen million for the second nine months,
RECEIVED at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

SECRET

To:

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PAGE 3. Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

No. 114, July 26, 1942

that is to say almost as much in one nine four three for the
American Expeditionary Forces as we are planning for the
whole importation of Great Britain both in food and raw materials.
At present it is laid down that the first million Americans
bring with them one hundred and seventy-five thousand motor
vehicles or one for every six men involving one hundred
seventy-five thousand drivers and probably as many more in the
work shops for maintenance. According to our joint shipping
authorities only two dash thirds of the shipping required for
such scales can be made available. It is therefore a case
of coming with much fewer men or lighter scales. General
Marshall promised to look into these scales with a view to
cutting them drastically.

6. I have to draw so heavily on stocks this year to
get through with twenty five millions import, and even if this
is achieved it is only one dash half our pre dash war
import and twenty seven or twenty eight millions will be our
minimum next year. It would be most imprudent to remain
without any reserve of stocks in case heavy bombing of the
No. 114, July 26, 1942

Mersey and Clyde begins again. I should be most grateful if you would examine this yourself. I am working here with Averill, Douglas and Leathers.

7. We were disappointed at not breaking Rommel's front last week though heavy losses were inflicted upon him in bitter fighting. We have far heavier reinforcements approaching and far better communications than he has and marked superiority in this air. The Eighth British Armoured and Forty-fourth British Infantry Divisions are now landed; and the Fifty-first British Infantry arrives in three weeks besides at least forty or fifty thousand replacements flowing in steadily. The Shermans should arrive early in September and we hope to bring them into action during that month. Thus I feel confident we can defend Egypt and I trust Auchinleck may destroy this man where he now stands. I am delighted to have the United States Armoured Division and hope it may follow the Fiftieth which lands early in October.
8. If Auchinleck beats Rommel we shall have about seven divisions which either be directed to follow up a victory in the Western Desert into Acrobat or, should the Russian Southern Front give way, to the Levant dash Caspian theatre.

9. I still feel that in spite all other demands upon us we ought to try to place twenty, thirty or even forty air squadrons on the Russian southern flank, thus helping them to hold the barrier formed by the Caspian, the Caucasus Mountains and a Turkey confirmed in neutrality. It also seems necessary to have something solid to offer Stalin. Whatever happens however nothing must interfere with Torch or weaken Auchinleck before he has won.

"PRIME"
CABLEGRAM

From: AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON

To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO. 117 JULY 29,1942

TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO 124.

CAMPBELL IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU STALINS ANSWER TO MY MESSAGE OF JULY EIGHTEENTH.

I DO NOT PROPOSE TO EMBARK ON AN ARGUMENT, BUT STALIN WILL NO DOUBT EXPECT SOME ACCOUNT OF OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS HERE ON THE SECOND FRONT. SUBJECT TO WHAT YOU MAY FEEL, I PROPOSE TO REFER STALIN TO THE AIDE MEMOIRE EXPLAINING OUR ATTITUDE-HANDED TO MOLOTOV HERE JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR MOSCOW, WHICH I SHOWED YOU, "AND TO SAY THAT IT STILL REPRESENTS OUR GENERAL POSITION, BUT THAT WE HAVE AGREED WITH YOU ON CERTAIN ACTION, ALTHOUGH AT PRESENT STAGE NOTHING CAN BE SAID ABOUT TIME AND PLACE.

WE MIGHT ALSO SAY THAT WE HOPE TO RESUME CONVOYS IN SEPTEMBER, IF RUSSIANS CAN PROVIDE NECESSARY AIR FORCE TO DENY GERMAN SURFACE SHIPS USE OF BARENTS SEA AND THAT IF THE BATTLE IN EGYPT GOES WELL WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE A FIRM OFFER OF AIR SUPPORT ON THE RUSSIAN SOUTHERN FLANK.

WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS?

SECRET
IN THE MEANWHILE WE ARE EXPLAINING TO MAISKY IN DETAIL NATURE OF PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN CONVOYS AND LATEST POSITION ABOUT BOMBING ATTACKS ON GERMANY AND PLANS FOR COMMANDO RAIDS

PRIME
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

July 31, 1942

SECRET

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 119 from London, England July 30, 1942

Former Naval Person to the President. Personal and

Number 125, Your one seven two

Para. 1. We do not agree with Chiang Kai Shek's estimate
of the Indian situation. The Congress Party in no way represents
India and is strongly opposed by over ninety million Mohammedans,
fourty million untouchables, and the Indian States comprising some
ninety millions, to whom we are bound by treaty. Congress represents mainly the intelligentzia of non-fighting Hindu elements,
and can neither defend India nor raise revolt. The military classes
on whom everything depends are thoroughly loyal, in fact over a
million have volunteered for the Army and the numbers recently
volunteering greatly exceed all previous records. Their loyalty
would be gravely impaired by handing over the Government of India
to Congress control. The reckless declarations of Congress have
moreover given rise to widespread misgiving, even among its own
rank and file.

Para 2. The Government of India have no doubt of their ability
to maintain order and carry on government with efficiency and secure
Indias maximum contribution to the war effort whatever Congress
may say or even do, provided of course that their authority is
not undermined. His Majesty's Government here have no intention

[Handwritten note: Action Copy]
of making any offer beyond the sweeping proposals which Sir Stafford Cripps carried to India and in fact could not do so without creating grave internal trouble in India. So far as I am concerned, I could not accept responsibility for making further proposals at this stage. We have however only today in Parliament made clear that while the specific proposals suggested by Cripps failed to secure agreement we stand firmly by broad intention of our offer which is that India should have the fullest opportunity at the earliest possible moment after the war to attain to complete self government under constitutional arrangements of her own devising. I earnestly hope therefore, Mister President, that you will do your best to dissuade Chiang Kai Shek from his completely misinformed activities, and will lend no countenance to putting pressure upon His Majesty’s Government.

Prime
BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  

July 31st, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a telegram which has been received this morning at the Embassy from the Foreign Office containing a message for you from the Prime Minister. This telegram refers to two messages sent by the Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin, and copies of these messages are also enclosed herein.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

R. J. Campbell

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.
Telegram dated July 31st from the Prime Minister to the President.

No. 125-A
Personal and

Your 171.

I have sent telegrams which follow to Stalin and I hope you will authorize me to tell him what we have settled. I am sure I can state the case in all its bearings.

2. It was necessary for me on other grounds to go to Cairo. The Chief of Imperial General Staff will come with me in both cases. I am also asking Smuts and Wavell to come to Cairo.

3. Admiralty are prepared to try to run another PQ convoy of forty ships about September 4th.

4. I cannot give up any aircraft from Middle East till Rommel is beaten, but anything additional you can find for Southern Russian front will be a godsend.

See my immediately following telegram.
Telegram from London dated July 31st containing
text of first message sent by the Prime Minister
to Monsieur Stalin.

[redacted]

We are making preliminary arrangements
(see my immediately following message) to run a
large convoy through to Archangel in the first week
of September.

2. I am willing, if you invite me, to come
myself to meet you in Astrakhan, the Caucasus or
similar convenient meeting place. We could then
survey the war together and take decisions hand in
hand. I could then tell you plans we have made with
President Roosevelt for offensive action in 1942. I
would bring Chief of Imperial General Staff with me.

3. I am starting for Cairo forthwith. I have
serious business there as you may imagine. From there
I will if you desire it fix a convenient date for our
meeting which might so far as I am concerned be between
the tenth and thirteenth of August, all being well.

4. The War Cabinet have endorsed my proposals.
See my succeeding telegram.
III.

Telegram from London dated July 31st containing text of second message sent by the Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin.

Personal and...

My immediately preceding message.

We are making preliminary arrangements for sailing a convoy of forty ships during the first week in September. I must make it clear, however, that there is little chance of even one-third of the ships getting through to you, as was the case in P.Q.17, unless air threat to German surface forces in Barents Sea is such as to deter latter from operating against convoy. As you are no doubt aware, situation has been discussed with M. Maisky and I understand that the latter has communicated to you what we consider minimum air requirements.