ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL
AUGUST - OCTOBER 1942

Microfilmed at The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York
August 5, 1942.

FROM: OPMAN
TO: ALUSMA, LONDON

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT No. 173

I AM ASKING HARRIMAN TO LEAVE AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE
MOMENT FOR MOSCOW. I THINK YOUR IDEA IS SOUND AND I AM TELLING
STALIN HARRIMAN WILL BE AT HIS AND YOUR DISPOSAL TO HELP IN ANY
WAY.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 0945, EWT, August 5, 1942.

John L. McCrea
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide

NOTE: The above message was repossed before it had gone out
from the Navy Code Room and turned over to the E. A. D. Washington
for transmission to the Prime Minister (somewhere in the Near East)
with copy to London, wholly through British channels.
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND

NO. 174

THE PROPOSAL OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF DATED

AUGUST SIXTH THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER BE DESIGNATED AS COMMANDER

IN CHIEF FOR THE TORCH OPERATION IS ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND TO THE

UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF PERIOD THE FORMAL DIRECTIVE FOR

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S GUIDANCE SUBMITTED BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS

OF STAFF IS BEING STUDIED AND WILL BE REPORTED UPON SHORTLY

PERIOD MEANWHILE GENERAL EISENHOWER SHOULD HAVE YOUR AUTHORITY

TO PROCEED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS STAFF AND PLANNING.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1820, EWT, August 6, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, USNR,
White House Map Room.

(This message was delivered to E. A. D., Washington for transmission

to the Prime Minister at temporary location and repeat to London)

(AMELIAMAY FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY WITH DRAFT OF ABOVE MESSAGE FILED

IN "PRESIDENT - PRIME MINISTER BACKGROUND - ROUGH DRAFT" FOLDER)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

Received one (1) sealed envelope addressed for delivery to Brigadier V. Dykes.

[Signature]

6:45 p.m. 6/8/42
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Commander for TORCH.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that the President as Commander-in-Chief send the following message to the Prime Minister:

"THE PROPOSAL OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF DATED AUGUST SIXTH THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER BE DESIGNATED AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF FOR THE TORCH OPERATION IS ACCEPTABLE TO ME AND TO THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF PERIOD THE FORMAL DIRECTIVE FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER'S GUIDANCE SUBMITTED BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF IS BEING STUDIED AND WILL BE REPORTED UPON SHORTLY PERIOD MEANWHILE GENERAL EISENHOWER SHOULD HAVE YOUR AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS STAFF AND PLANNING"
AUGUST 8, 1942

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 175.

PARA ONE. THANKS MUCH FOR YOUR NEWS. I WHOLLY AGREE DATE FOR TORCH SHOULD BE ADVANCED AND I AM ASKING THREE WEEKS ADVANCE OVER THE SELECTED DATE.

PARA TWO. ANNOUNCEMENT OF EISENHOWER COMMAND I LEAVE TO DISCRETION OF CHIEFS OF STAFF IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON.

PARA THREE. BEST OF LUCK TO YOU AND AVERELL ON YOUR GREAT ADVENTURE.

ROOSEVELT

Released 1250, EWT, August 8, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
White House Chart Room

(This message was delivered to B.A.D., Washington, for transmission to the Prime Minister at temporary location, and also to London.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
MEMORANDUM

FROM

TO

[Handwritten]

Reed Tel. No.
175


Aladyic

1315 8/6/42
For Tomp, Saudi Arabia —

Thanks much for your

issues. I wholeheartedly agree that

the Torch should be advanced

and I am asking three

weeks advance over the

scheduled date.

2. Announcement of

Eisenhower command of

troops to discretion of

Chief of Staff in London

and Washington
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

But if lack of your a General in your next adventure

Roosevelt
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NUMBER ONE SEVEN SIX

YOUR MESSAGE NO. 125.

IN VIEW OF THE MESSAGE YOU HAVE SENT ME, I HAVE REPLIED TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK THAT IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME TO BE WISE OR EXPEDIENT FOR THE TIME BEING TO CONSIDER TAKING ANY OF THE STEPS WHICH HE SUGGESTED IN HIS MESSAGE TO ME. I HAVE EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE NOT WISH TO PURSUE ANY COURSE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AT THIS CRITICAL TIME. I HAVE, HOWEVER, TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE HIM KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ME WITH REGARD TO THIS AND ANY OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH AFFECT THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS BECAUSE OF MY BELIEF THAT IT IS WISER TO HAVE HIM FEEL THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS SENT TO ME RECEIVE FRIENDLY CONSIDERATION. I FEAR THAT IF I DID NOT DO SO HE WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO TAKE ACTION ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, WHICH I KNOW YOU WILL AGREE MIGHT BE VERY DANGEROUS AT THIS MOMENT. I HAVE THEREFORE, LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR HIM TO MAKE ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS WHICH HE MAY HAVE IN MIND LATER ON, SHOULD HE THINK THE NEED THEREFOR EXISTS.

ROOSEVELT

Released 0955, EWT, August 9, 1942

Charles A. Sullivan, Jr.
1st Lieutenant, Inf-Res.
White House Chart Room

Declasified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date Oct 14 1971

(This message was delivered to B.A.D., Washington for transmission to the Prime Minister at temporary location.)
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING FROM THE GENERALISSIMO IN

CHUNGKING COIN

QUOTE. I FEEL CERTAIN THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED AS I AM AT THE
NEWS OF THE ARREST OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE OF THE INDIAN CONGRESS
INCLUDING GANDHI AND NEHRU. IN MY LAST TELEGRAM I EXPRESSED MY
DREAD THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD PROVE TO BE A GREAT SETBACK
TO THE ALLIED CAUSE IN THE FAR EAST AND WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE A
DISASTROUS EFFECT ON THE ENTIRE WAR SITUATION. I FEAR ALSO THAT
IF MATTERS ARE ALLOWED TO DETERIORATE FURTHER THE INFLUENCE OF THE
AXIS POWERS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY STRENGTHENED AND THE AVOED OBJECT
OF THE ALLIES IN WAGING THIS WAR WOULD NO LONGER BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY
BY THE WORLD AND THE PROFESSIONED PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD
LOSE MUCH OF THEIR SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE. AT ALL COSTS THE UNITED
NATIONS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD BY THEIR ACTION THE SINCERITY
OF THEIR PROFESSIONED PRINCIPLE OF ENSURING FREEDOM AND JUSTICE FOR MEN OF
ALL RACES. I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOU AS THE INSPIRED AUTHOR OF THE AT-
LANTIC CHARTER TO TAKE (EFFECTIVE?) MEASURES WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE
ALREADY OCCURRED TO YOU TO SOLVE THE PRESSING PROBLEM NOW FACING INDIA
AND THE WORLD SO THAT NORMALCY WILL RETURN AND UNIMPEDED WAR EFFORT
MAY CONTINUE TO HASTEN OUR COMMON VICTORY. YOUR POLICY WILL SERVE
AS A GUIDE TO ALL OF US WHO HAVE RESISTED FOR SO LONG AND SO BITTERLY
THE BRUTE FORCE OF THE AGGRESSORS. TRUSTING YOU WILL FAVOR ME WITH AN
EARLY REPLY. UNQUOTE.
WHAT DO YOU THINK?

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1700, EWT, August 11, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President

(This message was delivered to B.A.D., Washington, for transmission to the Prime Minister at temporary location, and also to London.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date OCT 14 1971
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL AND
NO. 176.

PARA ONE. I AM SENDING YOU HEREWITH THE ATLANTIC CHARTER ANNIVERSARY
MESSAGE AND IT HAS GONE TO THE HEADS OF THE OTHER TWENTY-SIX UNITED NATIONS,
AS I HAD NO TIME TO SEND YOU A PRELIMINARY DRAFT:

QUOTE. A YEAR AGO TODAY YOU AND I, AS REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO
FREE NATIONS, SET DOWN AND SUBSCRIBED TO A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
COMMON TO OUR PEOPLES. WE BASED, AND CONTINUE TO BASE, OUR
HOPES FOR A BETTER FUTURE FOR THE WORLD ON THE REALIZATION OF
THOSE PRINCIPLES. THIS DECLARATION IS KNOWN AS THE ATLANTIC
CHAPTER.

A YEAR AGO TODAY THE NATIONS RESISTING A COMMON, BARBARIC
FORCE WERE UNITS OR SMALL GROUPS, FIGHTING FOR THEIR EXISTENCE.

NOW, THESE NATIONS AND GROUPS OF NATIONS IN ALL THE CON-
TINENTS OF THE EARTH HAVE UNITED. THEY HAVE FORMED A GREAT
UNION OF HUMANITY, DEDICATED TO THE REALIZATION OF THAT COMMON
PROGRAM OF PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE ATLANTIC
CHAPTER, THROUGH WORLD WIDE VICTORY OVER THEIR COMMON ENEMIES.
THEIR FAITH IN LIFE, LIBERTY, INDEPENDENCE AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
AND IN THE PRESERVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN THEIR
OWN LANDS AS WELL AS IN OTHER LANDS, HAS BEEN GIVEN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE AND POWER THROUGH A GREAT GATHERING OF PEOPLES NOW
KNOWN AS THE UNITED NATIONS.

FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE ARE TODAY IN JEOPARDY THE WORLD
OVER. IF THE FORCES OF CONQUEST ARE NOT SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED
AND DEFEATED THERE WILL BE NO FREEDOM AND NO INDEPENDENCE AND NO OPPORTUNITY FOR FREEDOM FOR ANY NATION.

IT IS, THEREFORE, TO THE SINGLE AND SUPREME OBJECTIVE OF DEFEATING THE AXIS FORCES OF AGGRESSION THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE PLEDGED ALL THEIR RESOURCES AND EFFORTS.

"WHEN VICTORY COMES, WE SHALL STAND SHOULDERS TO SHOULDERS IN SEEKING TO NOURISH THE GREAT IDEALS FOR WHICH WE FIGHT. IT IS A WORTHWHILE BATTLE. IT WILL BE SO RECOGNIZED THROUGH ALL THE AGES, EVEN AMID THE UNFORTUNATE PEOPLES WHO FOLLOW FALSE GODS TODAY."

"WE REAFFIRM OUR PRINCIPLES. THEY WILL BRING US TO A HAPPIER WORLD." UNQUOTE.

PARA TWO. I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A SINGLE LINE IN IT AS IT QUITS WHOLLY ANYTHING WHICH WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS OR CONTROVERSY.

I HOPE YOU WILL LIKE IT.

ROOSEVELT

NOTE. FOR THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION. THIS MESSAGE WILL BE RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE AFTERNOON PAPERS OF TOMORROW, AUGUST 14, 1942.

Released at 1400, EWT, August 13, 1942.

J. D. COFFIN JR
Ensign, U. S. N. R.
White House Map Room

(This message was delivered to P.A.D., Washington, for transmission to the Prime Minister at temporary location, and also to London.)
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

August 13, 1942.

1. I am sending you herewith the Atlantic Charter anniversary message and it has gone to the heads of the other twenty-six United Nations, as I had no time to send you a preliminary draft: "A year ago today the Prime Minister of Great Britain and I, as representatives of two free nations, set down and subscribed to a declaration of principles common to our peoples. We based, and continue to base, our hopes for a better future for the world on the realization of these principles. This declaration is known as the Atlantic Charter.

"A year ago today the nations resisting a common, barbaric foe were units or small groups, fighting for their existence.

"Now, these nations and groups of nations in all the continents of the earth have united. They have formed a great union of humanity, dedicated to the realization of that common program of purposes and principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter, through world wide victory over their common enemies. Their faith in life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and in the preservation of human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, has been given form and substance and power through a great gathering of peoples now known as the United Nations.

"Freedom and independence are today in jeopardy --
the world over. If the forces of conquest are not successfully resisted and defeated there will be no freedom and no independence and no opportunity for freedom for any nation.

"It is, therefore, to the single and supreme objective of defeating the Axis forces of aggression that the United Nations have pledged all their resources and efforts.

"When victory comes, we shall stand shoulder to shoulder in seeking to nourish the great ideals for which we fight. It is a worthwhile battle. It will be so recognized through all the ages, even amid the unfortunate peoples who sold to twisted thinking and follow false gods today.

"We reaffirm our principles. They will bring us to a happier world."

2. I am sure you will have no objection to a single line in it as it omits wholly anything which would raise questions or controversy. I hope you will like it.

ROOSEVELT
August 14, 1942.

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA MOSCOW

FOR PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL FROM THE PRESIDENT No. 179

I AM MADE VERY HAPPY BY MR. STALIN'S CORDIALITY AND UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. I WISH I COULD BE WITH YOU BOTH FOR THAT WOULD MAKE THE PARTY COMPLETE. GIVE HIM MY WARM REGARDS AND KEEP ME IN TOUCH.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1840, August 14, 1942.

JOHN L. Mccrea
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 14 1971
August 30, 1942.

I have considered carefully your numbers 136 and 139 in reference to the Torch operation. It is my earnest desire to start the attack at the earliest possible moment. Time is of the essence and we are speeding up preparations vigorously.

I feel very strongly that the initial attacks must be made by an exclusively American ground force supported by your naval and transport and air units. The operation should be undertaken on the assumption that the French will offer less resistance to us than they will to the British.

I would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simultaneous landing by British and Americans would result in full resistance by all French in Africa whereas an initial American landing without British ground forces offers a real chance that there would be no French resistance or only a token resistance.
I need a week if possible after we land to consolidate the position for both of us by securing the non-resistance of the French. I sincerely hope I can get this.

Then your force can come in to the eastward. I realize full well that your landing must be made before the enemy can get there. It is our belief that German air and parachute troops cannot get to Algiers or Tunis in any large force for at least two weeks after initial attack. Meanwhile your troops would be ashore we hope without much opposition and would be moving eastward.

As to the place of the landings it seems to me that we must have a sure and permanent base on the Northwest coast of Africa because a single line of communication through the Straits is far too hazardous in the light of our limited joint resources.

I propose therefore that:

(a) American troops land simultaneously near Casablanca and near Oran.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
(b) That they seek to establish road and rail communication with each other back of the mountains. The distance is little more than 300 miles. This gives to the enterprise a supply base in Morocco which is outside the Straits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Algiers and Tunis.

The real problem seems to be that there is not enough cover and combat loadings for more than two landings. I realise it would be far better to have three with you handling the one to the eastward a week after we get in. To this end I think we should re-examine our resources and strip everything to the bone to make the third landing possible. We can give up the Russian convoy temporarily at that time and risk or hold up other merchant shipping. It is essential, of course, that all ships now assigned to Eisenhower for his two landings remain intact. Hence the eastward landing must be made on ships not now available to Torch. I will explore this at our end.
Can we not get an answer on this within forty-eight hours or less?

I want to emphasize however that under any circumstances one of our landings must be on the Atlantic.

The directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the operation should prescribe that the attack should be launched at the earliest practicable date. The date should be consistent with the preparation necessary for an operation with a fair chance of success and accordingly it should be determined by the Commander-in-Chief, but in no event later than October 30th. I still would hope for October 14th.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 2335, EWT, August 30, 1942.

H. R. Dodderidge
Capt., U. S. A.
White House Map Room

DECASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 21 1971
August 30, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I have considered carefully your numbers 136 and 139 in reference to the Torch operation. It is my earnest desire to start the attack at the earliest possible moment. Time is of the essence and we are speeding up preparations vigorously.

I feel very strongly that the initial attacks must be made by an exclusively American ground force supported by your naval and transport and air units. The operation should be undertaken on the assumption that the French will offer less resistance to us than they will to the British.

I would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simultaneous landing by British and Americans would result in full resistance by all French in Africa whereas an initial American landing without British ground forces offers a real chance that there would be no French resistance or only a token resistance.
I need a week if possible after we land to consolidate the position by securing the non-resistance of the French. I sincerely hope I can get this.

Then your force can come in to the eastward. I realize full well that your landing must be made before the enemy can get there. It is our belief that German air and parachute troops cannot get to Algiers or Tunis in any large force for two weeks after initial attack. Meanwhile your troops would be ashore we hope without much opposition and would be moving eastward.

As to the place of the landings it seems to me that we must have a sure and permanent base on the Northwest coast of Africa because a single line of communication through the Straits is far too hazardous in the light of our limited joint resources.

I propose therefore that:

(a) American troops land simultaneously near Casablanca and Oran.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

It is essential that all ships now assigned to Eisenhower for his two landings remain intact. Hence the eastern landing must be made on ships not now available to Torch.
-3-

(b) That they seek to establish road and rail communication with each other back of the mountains. The distance is little more than 300 miles. This gives to the enterprise a supply base in Morocco which is outside the Straits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Algiers and Tunis.

The real problem seems to be that there is not enough cover for more than two landings. I realize it would be far better to have three with you handling the one to the eastward a week after we get in. To this end I think we should re-examine our resources and strip everything to the bone to make the third landing possible. We can give up the Russian convoy temporarily at that time and risk or hold up other merchant shipping. I will explore this at our end. Can we not get an answer on this within forty-eight hours or less?

I want to emphasize however that under any circumstances one of our landings must be on the Atlantic.
The directive to the Commander-in-Chief of the operation should prescribe that the attack should be launched at the earliest practicable date. The date should be consistent with the preparation necessary for an operation with a fair chance of success and accordingly it should be determined by the Commander-in-Chief, but in no event later than October 30th. I still would hope for October 14th.

[Signature]

0025
August 28, 1942.

Replying to your Nos. 136 and 139, it is reassuring to me to know that you are personally concentrating your main thought upon TORCH, and it is my desire also to start the attack at the earliest date when a sufficient force to give reasonable promise of success can be embarked and escorted.

We are pressing preparations in every way possible to that end. However, the results of a United States initial failure because of inadequate preparations for a highly dangerous tactical undertaking as proposed in General Eisenhower's outlined plan would be far-reaching, not only affecting our own subsequent conduct of the war, but would, in my opinion, certainly have a most serious if not a determining effect on the subjugated peoples of Europe and on Turkey. Russia and China might possibly even give up the struggle because of America's apparently demonstrated impotence.

Because of the lack of time and means, my military advisers inform me that a landing prior to October 30th will involve so much of a probability of failure as not to justify such an undertaking.

I am agreeable to a directive to Eisenhower to attack where he may see fit on or about October 30th.

My interest in a seizure of Casablanca is in a large part due to advice from my naval and military commanders here that a dependence upon a safe passage through the Straits of Gibraltar of a continuous train of supply ships subsequent to the landing is so hazardous as to promise a disastrous collapse of the expedition, as well as ruinous attrition of naval craft and transport. It is not the initial voyage or landings or hazards of a single vulnerable staging field for vital air craft at Gibraltar that give rise to our most serious reservations.
(Cont'd)

We are far more concerned over the action against shipping during the succeeding weeks and months.

I request your considered views on this vital question.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
August 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: TORCH Operations.

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose that the following message be transmitted by you to the Prime Minister:

"Repying to your number 136 it is very pleasing to me to know that you are personally concentrating your main thought upon TORCH, and it is my desire also to start the attack at the earliest date when a sufficient [Combined American-British] force to promise success can be made available.

We are pressing preparations in every way possible to that end. However, the results of a United States initial failure because of inadequate preparations for a highly dangerous tactical undertaking as proposed in General Eisenhower's outlined plan would be far-reaching, not only affecting our own subsequent conduct of the war, but would certainly have a most serious if not determining effect on the subjugated peoples of Europe and on Turkey. Russia and China might possibly even give up the struggle because of America's apparently demonstrated impotence.

Because of the lack of time and means, my military advisers inform me that a landing prior to October 30th will involve so much of a probability of failure as not to justify such an undertaking.

I am agreeable to a directive to Eisenhower to attack where he may see fit on or about October 30th, provided that a landing on the Atlantic Coast of Africa shall be included in the initial operation in order to control at least one reasonably secure line of communications."

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

By Authority of JCS
927/495-1 3/28/22

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
I have considered carefully
your numbers 136 and 139 in
reference to the Torch operation. It
is my earnest desire to start the
attack at the earliest possible
time. Of the Essence and an
moment, we are proceeding with
preparations vigorously.

I feel very strongly that
the initial attacks must be made
ground
by an exclusively American force
and transport,
supported by our naval and air
units. The operation should be
undertaken on the assumption that
the French will offer less
resistance to us than they
will to the British. I need
work if possible
a few days after we land to
consolidate the position by
recovery the support of the French.

I believe I can get this. Then
your force can come in to
the eastward. I make full
well that your landing must
be made before the enemy can
got there. (B)

As to the plan of
the landings it seems to me
our's and permanent
that we must have a

0030
I would not go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simultaneous landing by British and Americans would result in full resistance by all French in fifteen minutes for mutual American and British forces offer a real chance that their initial in the French resistance can only a token resistance.

It is our belief that German air and parachute troops can not get to Algiers in time to help large force for two weeks after initial attack. Therefore your troops should be ready at Algiers without delay or premature movement eastward.
on the Northwest coast of Africa because of the single line of communications through the Straits is far too hazardous in the light of our limited joint resources. A simultaneous landing will be made by us at base (C) The real problem seems to be that there is not enough cover for more than two landings.

I realize it would be far better to have three gun handling the
I propose that American troops land simultaneoulsy in the California and Mexican ports, that they wish to establish road and rail communication with each other back of the mountains. The distance is little more than 300 miles. This gives to the enterprise a supply base in Mexico which is outside the V. traits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Arizona and Texas.
on to the eastward a few days after we get in. To this end I think we should examine our resources and stop everything to the line to make the third landing possible. We can give T.4
up the Russian convoy and risk a half up other merchant shipping. I will report this at our end. Can we not get an answer on this within forty-eight hours or less?
I want to emphasize here that under any circumstances one or our landings must be on the Atlantic
The directive to the C and C of the operation should prescribe that the attack should be launched at the earliest practicable date. The date should be consistent with the preparation necessary for an operation with a fair chance of success and accordingly it should be determined by the C and C, Lt. Col. 9/10 38241. Later than October 20, I still would hope for October 14.
August 30, 1942.

PRIORITI

FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND No. 181

I will let you know by Tuesday in regard to your
Number 140. I am in full accord with the desirability
of it and will make every effort to dovetail it into the
other operations.

Also we are working on the Persian Railway problem
and I will advise you.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 2335, EWT, August 30, 1942.

R. R. Dodderidge
Capt., U. S. A.
White House Map Room

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. F. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Former Naval Reserve

London

I will let you by Tuesday

In regard Navy List Number

141. I am in full

accord with the desirability

of it and will make every

effort to dovetail it into

the other operations.

Also we are working

on the Persian Railway

problem and I will

advise you Parmelee.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Attached is a copy of the message I sent to the Prime Minister last night.

Will you show it to Admiral King and General Marshall and tell Marshall to use his discretion about acquainting Eisenhower with the contents of it.

August 31, 1942

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

ADMIRAL KING:

The following message was sent to Prime by Boss last night, August 30th:

"I have considered carefully your numbers 136 and 139 in reference to the Torch operation. It is my earnest desire to start the attack at the earliest possible moment. Time is of the essence and we are speeding up preparations vigorously.

I feel very strongly that the initial attacks must be made by an exclusively American ground force supported by your naval and transport and air units. The operation should be undertaken on the assumption that the French will offer less resistance to us than they will to the British.

I would even go so far as to say I am reasonably sure a simultaneous landing by British and Americans would result in full resistance by all French in Africa whereas an initial American landing without British ground forces offers a real chance that there would be no French resistance or only a token resistance.

I need a week if possible after we land to consolidate the position for both of us by securing the non-resistance of the French. I sincerely hope I can get this."
Then your force can come in to the eastward. I realize full well that your landing must be made before the enemy can get there. It is our belief that German air and parachute troops cannot get to Algiers or Tunis in any large force for at least two weeks after initial attack. Meanwhile your troops would be ashore we hope without much opposition and would be moving eastward.

As to the place of the landings it seems to me that we must have a sure and permanent base on the Northwest coast of Africa because a single line of communication through the Straits is far too hazardous in the light of our limited joint resources.

I propose therefore that:

(a) American troops land simultaneously near Casablanca and near Oran.

(b) That they seek to establish road and rail communication with each other back of the mountains. The distance is little more than 300 miles. This gives to the enterprise a supply base in Morocco which is outside the Straits and can be used to reinforce and supply the operations in Algiers and Tunis.

The real problem seems to be that there is not enough cover and combat loadings for more than two landings. I realize it would be far better to have three with you handling
the one to the eastward a week after we get in. To this end I think we should re-examine our resources and strip everything to the bone to make the third landing possible. We can give up the Russian convoy temporarily at that time and risk or hold up other merchant shipping. It is essential, of course, that all ships now assigned to Eisenhower for his two landings remain intact. Hence the eastward landing must be made on ships not now available to Torch. I will explore this at our end. Can we get an answer on this within forty-eight hours or less?

I want to emphasize however that under any circumstances one of our landings must be on the Atlantic.

The directive to the Commander in Chief of the operation should prescribe that the attack should be launched at the earliest practicable date. The date should be consistent with the preparation necessary for an operation with a fair chance of success and accordingly it should be determined by the Commander in Chief, but in no event later than October 30th. I still would hope for October 14th.

ROOSEVELT®

William D. Leahy.
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 182.

PARA ONE. YOUR MESSAGE NO. 142 HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

PARA TWO. YOUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE BY AGREEING THAT ALL INITIAL LANDINGS WILL BE MADE BY U.S. GROUND FORCES IS APPRECIATED. IT IS TRUE THAT BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE FORM OF NAVAL AND AIR SUPPORT WILL BE DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENDERS EARLY IN THE OPERATION. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL HAVE QUITE THE SAME EFFECT THAT BRITISH FORCES MAKING THE FIRST PEACH LANDING WOULD HAVE.

PARA THREE. BAD SURF CONDITIONS ON THE ATLANTIC BEACHES IS A CALCULATED RISK. THE USE OF NUMEROUS SMALL LIGHTLY DEFENDED PORTS MAY BE NECESSARY.

PARA FOUR. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO USE ALL AVAILABLE COMBAT LOADERS IN THE FIRST ASSAULT. THE ASSAULTING TROOPS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE BRITISH OR AMERICAN, MUST SEIZE A PORT BEFORE FOLLOW UP FORCES CAN BE LANDED. REGARDLESS OF WHAT TROOPS ARRIVE SUBSEQUENT TO THE INITIAL LANDING, THE SITUATION WILL BE THE SAME.

PARA FIVE. IN VIEW OF YOUR URGENT DESIRE THAT ALGIERS SHOULD BE OCCUPIED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH CASABLANCA AND ORAN, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING SOLUTION:

SUB-PARA ONE. SIMULTANEOUS LANDINGS AT CASABLANCA, ORAN AND ALGIERS WITH ASSAULT AND IMMEDIATE FOLLOW UP TROOPS GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS:
(A) CASABLANCA (U.S. TROOPS):
34,000 IN THE ASSAULT AND 24,000 IN THE IMMEDIATE
FOLLOW UP TO LAND AT A PORT.

(B) ORAN (U.S. TROOPS):
25,000 IN THE ASSAULT AND 20,000 IN THE IMMEDIATE
FOLLOW UP TO LAND AT A PORT.

(C) ALGIERS (U.S. AND BRITISH TROOPS):
IN THE BEACH LANDING 10,000 U.S. TROOPS FOLLOWED WITHIN
THE HOUR BY BRITISH TROOPS TO MAKE THE LANDING SECURE,
THE FOLLOW UP TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CINC, THIS FOLLOW
UP TO LAND AT A PORT IN NON COMBAT LOADED SHIPS.

SUB-PARA TWO. TROOPS. FOR THE ABOVE LANDINGS THE U.S. CAN
FURNISH:

(A) FROM THE U.S., THE CASABLANCA FORCE, AND

(B) FROM THE U.K., THE ORAN FORCE AND 10,000 MEN FOR THE
ALGIERS FORCE.

AS IMMEDIATE FOLLOW UP FORCES WE HAVE ONE ARMORED DIVISION IN THE
U.S. AND ONE ARMORED DIVISION IN THE U.K. (BOTH LESS ELEMENTS IN-
CLUDED IN THE ASSAULT ECHELONS) WITH SUPPORTING AND SERVICE TROOPS
INCLUDING GROUND ECHELONS OF AIR UNITS. LATER, ADDITIONAL INFANTRY
AND ARMORED DIVISIONS CAN BE FURNISHED FROM THE U.S. AND THE REMAIN-
ING U.S. TROOPS IN THE U.K. CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE.

SUB-PARA THREE. SHIPPING. THE FOLLOWING SHIPPING CAN BE MADE
AVAILABLE BY THE U.S. TO SAIL FROM U.S. PORTS OCTOBER TWENTIETH:

(A) COMBAT LOADERS WITH A LIFT OF 34,000 MEN, AND

(B) TRANSPORTS, OTHER THAN COMBAT LOADERS WITH A LIFT OF
52,000 MEN WITH SUFFICIENT CARGO VESSELS TO SUPPORT THIS
PERSONNEL.
IN ADDITION TO THIS SHIPPING THERE WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE U.K.
U.S. TRANSPORTS WITH PERSONNEL LIFT OF 15,000 AND NINE CARGO VESSELS
WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY SET ASIDE BY AGREEMENT TO TRANSPORT U.S.
TROOPS FROM THE U.K. FOR THIS OPERATION. IN ROUND NUMBERS, THE
SHIPPING SHOWN AS AVAILABLE IN THE U.S. IS ESTIMATED TO BE SUFFICIENT
TO MOVE THE FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD CONVOYS OF THE CASABLANCA FORCE.

SUB-PARA FOUR. NAVAL. THE U.S. CANNOT PROVIDE FORCES FOR ESCORT
AND SUPPORT IN THIS OPERATION IN EXCESS OF THOSE NOW AVAILABLE IN THE
ATLANTIC PLUS ALL SHIPS WHICH CAN BE EXPEDITED IN READINESS FOR
SERVICE AS IS NOW BEING DONE.

PARA SIX. THE ABOVE SHOWS THE TOTAL GROUND, NAVAL AND SHIPING EFFORT
WHICH THE U.S. CAN PUT INTO THIS OPERATION. IF THE OPERATION IS TO BE EXECU-
TED ALONG THE LINES INDICATED, NAMELY: SIMULTANEOUS LANDINGS AT CASABLANCA,
ORAN AND ALGIERS, ALL THE REMAINING REQUIREMENTS MUST BE FURNISHED FROM
BRITISH SOURCES. AS WE SEE IT, THIS WOULD MEAN IN GENERAL THAT IT WILL
BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO FURNISH:

(A) ALL SHIPING (INCLUDING COMBAT LOADERS) REQUIRED FOR THE ORAN
AND ALGIERS FORCES EXCEPT THE U.S. SHIPING NOW IN THE U.K.
EARMARKED FOR TORCH,
(B) THE ADDITIONAL TROOPS REQUIRED FOR THE ALGIERS ASSAULT AND
FOLLOW UP FORCES, AND
(C) THE NAVAL FORCES REQUIRED FOR THE ENTIRE OPERATION LESS THE
U.S. NAVAL FORCE INDICATED ABOVE.

PARA SEVEN. IN ORDER THAT I MAY CONTINUE WITH VIGOROUS PREPARATIONS
FOR THE EXECUTION OF TORCH AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE PLEASE CONFIRM
BY CABLE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL PROVIDE THE TROOP LIFT, TROOPS,
NAVAL FORCES AND SHIPING NOTED HEREIN AS NECESSARY.
Para eight. I reiterate the belief expressed in my No. 180 that the Commander in Chief should be directed to execute the operation at the earliest practicable date and that this date should be fixed by him. I am convinced of the absolute necessity for an early decision. I feel that the operation, as outlined herein, is as far as I can go toward meeting your views, and seems to me to be a practical solution which retains the Algiers operation and is sufficiently strong to be a good risk throughout.

Para nine. Our latest and best information from North Africa is as follows:

(A) An American expedition led in all three phases by American officers will meet little resistance from the French Army in Africa. On the other hand, a British commanded attack in any phase or with de Gaulleist cooperation would meet with determined resistance.

(B) Maintenance of the French civil government is essential to friendly relations, and I have several experienced civilians who would be persona-grata to accompany the landings and be charged with getting French civil cooperation.

(C) I am willing to risk explanation of British troops in Algiers by telling the French that they are not intended to remain in French territory but that their object is primarily to march into Axis-held Tripoli from the rear.

Para ten. Because of this information I consider it vital that sole responsibility be placed with Americans for relations with French military and civil authorities in Africa.
Para Eleven. As you and I decided long ago, we were to handle the French in North Africa, while you were to handle the situation in Spain.

Roosevelt

Released at 1800, EWT, September 2, 1942.

John L. McCrea
Captain, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:  

SUBJECT: Torch.

The following is proposed in answer to the Prime Minister's message of September 1st:

Your message No. 142 has been received and given careful consideration.

Your willingness to cooperate by agreeing that all initial landings will be made by U.S. ground forces is appreciated. It is true that British participation in the form of naval and air support will be disclosed to the defenders early in the operation. However, I do not believe that this will have quite the same effect that British forces making the first landing would have.

Bad surf conditions on the Atlantic beaches is a calculated risk. The use of numerous small lightly defended ports may be necessary.

It will be necessary to use all available combat loaders in the first assault. The assaulting troops, regardless of whether they are British or American, must seize a port before follow up forces can be landed. Regardless of what troops arrive subsequent to the initial landing, the situation will be the same.

In view of your urgent desire that Algiers should be occupied simultaneously with Casablanca and Oran, we offer the following solution:

Simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers with assault and immediate follow up troops generally as follows:

(A) Casablanca (U.S. Troops):

34,000 in the assault and 24,000 in the
(Cont'd)

immediate follow up to land at a port.

(c)

Oran (U.S. Troops):
25,000 in the assault and 20,000 in the immediate follow up to land at a port.

(c)

Algiers (U.S. and British Troops):
In the assault 10,000 U.S. troops. British troops for the assault and follow up to
be determined by the CINC.
The immediate follow up to land at a port is non combat loaded o/./.

TROOPS

For the above landings the U.S. can furnish:

1. from the U.S., the Casablanca force
2. from the U.K., the Oran force and 10,000 men for the Algiers force.

As immediate follow up forces we have one armored division in the U.S. and one armored
division in the U.K. (both less elements included in the assault echelons) with supporting and
service troops including ground echelons of air units. Later, additional infantry and armored
divisions can be furnished from the U.S. and the remaining U.S. troops in the U.K. can be made available.

SHIPPING

The following shipping can be made available by the U.S. to sail from U.S. ports October 20th:

1) Combat loaders with a lift of 34,000 men.

5) Transports, other than combat loaders with a lift of 52,000 men with sufficient cargo vessels to support
this personnel.
In addition to this shipping there will be available in the U.K. U.S. transports with a personnel lift of 15,000 and 9 cargo vessels which have been previously set aside by agreement to transport U.S. troops from the U.K. for this operation. In round numbers, the shipping shown as available in the U.S. is estimated to be sufficient to move the 1st, 2d and 3d convoys of the Casablanca force.

NAVAL

The U.S. cannot provide forces for escort and support in this operation in excess of those now available in the Atlantic plus all ships which can be expedited in readiness for service as is now being done.

The above shows the total ground, naval and shipping effort which the U.S. can put into this operation. If the operation is to be executed along the lines indicated, namely; simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, all the remaining requirements must be furnished from British sources. As we see it, this would mean in general that it will be necessary for you to furnish:

(1) all shipping (including combat loaders) required for the Oran and Algiers forces except the U.S. shipping now in the U.K. earmarked for Torch,

(2) the additional troops required for the Algiers assault and follow up forces, and

(3) the naval forces required for the entire operation less the U.S. naval force indicated above.
In order that I may continue with vigorous preparations for the execution of Torch at the earliest practicable date please confirm by cable that the United Kingdom will provide the troop lift, troops, naval forces and shipping noted herein as necessary.

I reiterate the belief expressed in my No. 180 that the commander in chief should be directed to execute the operation at the earliest practicable date and that this date should be fixed by him. I am convinced of the absolute necessity for an early decision. I feel that the operation, as outlined herein, is as far as I can go toward meeting your views, and seems to me to be a practical solution which contains the Algerian operation and is sufficiently strong to be a good risk throughout.

Our latest and best information from North Africa is as follows:

(1) An American expedition led in all three phases by American officers will meet little resistance from the French Army in Africa.

On the other hand, a British Commanded attack in any phase or with de Gaullist cooperation would meet with determined resistance.

(2) Maintenance of the French Civil Government is essential to friendly relations, and I have several experienced civilians who would be persona-grata to accompany the landings and be charged with getting French civil cooperation.
(S) I am willing to risk explanation of British troops in Algiers by telling the French that they are not intended to remain in French territory but that their object is primarily to march into Axis held Tripoli from the rear.

Because of this information I consider it vital that sole responsibility be placed with Americans for relations with French military and civil authorities in Africa.

As you and I decided long ago, we were to handle the French in North Africa, while you were to handle the situation in Spain.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 4 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Admiral Leahy directed that the attached get to you at once.

This message was sent by me at 3:15 p.m., today.

Very respectfully,

John McCrea

JOHN L. MCCREA

DEClassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By H.E. Sharp
Date 06/14/1971
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 183

143

Replying to your [143], we are getting very close together. I am willing to reduce the Casablanca force by the number of combat loaders capable of carrying a force of one regimental combat team, approximately 5,000 men. Since a similar reduction was made in original Oran assault force this releases a total of British and U.S. combat loaders for some 10,000 men for use at Algiers. The combat loaded force of American troops can be used as the nucleus on which to complete that force. I am sure that the additional troops can be found in the U.K.

I do not see advantage of Eisenhower or Clark coming over at this time. I know they have heavy and pressing responsibilities in organizing slowly-arriving American forces and I am sure we have a full understanding of their viewpoint. Furthermore, I do want to see Eisenhower later on before final takeoff and two trips appear out of the question. We would be glad to see Ramsay and Mountbatten if you wish to send them, but I do not desire that their visit shall cause any delay. I am directing all preparations to proceed. We should settle this whole thing with finality at once.

I hope to cable you today a list of U.S. naval craft which can be made available for the operation.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 183

REPLYING TO YOUR NUMBER 143, WE ARE GETTING VERY CLOSE TOGETHER. I AM WILLING TO REDUCE THE CASABLANCA FORCE BY THE NUMBER OF COMBAT LOADERS CAPABLE OF CARRYING A FORCE OF ONE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM, APPROXIMATELY FIVE THOUSAND MEN. SINCE A SIMILAR REDUCTION WAS MADE IN ORIGINAL ORAN ASSAULT FORCE THIS RELEASES A TOTAL OF BRITISH AND UNITED STATES COMBAT LOADERS FOR SOME TEN THOUSAND MEN FOR USE AT ALGIERS. THE COMBAT LOADED FORCE OF AMERICAN TROOPS CAN BE USED AS THE NUCLEUS ON WHICH TO COMPLETE THAT FORCE. I AM SURE THAT THE ADDITIONAL TROOPS CAN BE FOUND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

I DO NOT SEE ADVANTAGE OF EISENHOWER OR CLARK COMING OVER AT THIS TIME. I KNOW THEY HAVE HEAVY AND PRESSING RESPONSIBILITIES IN ORGANIZING SLOWLY-ARRIVING AMERICAN FORCES AND I AM SURE WE HAVE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR VIEWPOINT.

FURTHERMORE, I DO WANT TO SEE EISENHOWER LATER ON BEFORE FINAL TAKEOFF AND TWO TRIPS APPEAR OUT OF THE QUESTION. WE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE RAMSAY AND MOUNTBATTEN IF YOU WISH TO SEND THEM, BUT I DO NOT DESIRE THAT THEIR VISIT SHALL CAUSE ANY DELAY. I AM DIRECTING ALL PREPARATIONS TO PROCEED. WE SHOULD SETTLE THIS WHOLE THING WITH FINALITY AT ONCE.

I HOPE TO CABLE YOU TODAY A LIST OF UNITED STATES NAVAL CRAFT WHICH CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE OPERATION.

ROOSEVELT

September 4, 1942.

Released at 1515, EWT, September 4, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. JOHN L. McCREA
Date 07.4.1971

O.K. Pooch draft in "Pres
dent - P.W. Pouch Draft Flle."
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date: September 4, 1942

To: Captain McCrea

Subject:

Please insure that the attached despatch from the President to Prime is transmitted as expeditiously as possible.

[Signature]

Send a copy to the President P.O. Q by air mail
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

I am willing to reduce the Casa Blanca force by the number of combat loaders capable of carrying a force of one regimental combat team, approximately 5,000 men. Since a similar reduction was made in the original Oran assault force this releases a total of British and U.S. combat loaders for some 10,000 men for use at Algiers. As that locality has been estimated as a suitable base, this combat loaded force may be found sufficient to meet any requirements of the force as it arrives, with whatever else it is found possible to improvise.

I do not see advantage of Eisenhower or Clark coming over at this time. I know they have heavy and pressing responsibilities in organizing slowly-arriving American forces and I am sure we have a full understanding of their viewpoint. Furthermore, I do want to see Eisenhower later on before final takeoff and two trips appear out of the question. We would be glad to see Ramsay and Mountbatten if you wish to send them, but I do not desire that their visit shall cause any delay in reaching a final decision.

I hope to cable you tomorrow a list of U.S. naval craft which can be made available for the operation.

W.W.
September 4, 1942.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

Replying to your 143, we are getting very close together. I am willing to reduce the Casablanca force by the number of combat loaders capable of carrying a force of one regimental combat team, approximately 5,000 men. Since a similar reduction was made in original Gran assault force this releases a total of British and U.S. combat loaders for some 10,000 men for use at Algiers. The combat loaded force of American troops can be used as the nucleus on which to complete that force. I am sure that the additional troops can be found in the U.K.

I do not see advantage of Eisenhower or Clark coming over at this time. I know they have heavy and pressing responsibilities in organizing slowly-arriving American forces and I am sure we have a full understanding of their viewpoint. Furthermore, I do want to see Eisenhower later on before final takeoff and two trips appear out of the question. We would be glad to see Ramsay and Mountbatten if you wish to send them, but I do not desire that their visit shall cause any delay. I am directing all preparations to proceed. We should settle this whole thing with finality at once.

I hope to cable you today a list of U.S. naval craft which can be made available for the operation.

ROOSEVELT.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NUMBER 184. REFERENCE
LAST PARAGRAPH MY NUMBER 183 OF THIS DATE. KING REPORTS MAXIMUM NUMBER
OF AMERICAN NAVAL VESSELS THAT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR TORCH OPERATION
ONE MODERN BATTLESHIP X TWO OLD BATTLESHIPS X ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER X
TWO SMALL CONVERTED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TENTATIVE PLANES CARRIED TOTAL
SEVENTY-EIGHT FIGHTERS THIRTY DIVE BOMBERS X TWO EIGHT-INCH CRUISERS X
THREE LARGE SIX-INCH CRUISERS X FORTY DESTROYERS X SIX FAST MINESWATCHERS X
TOTAL FIFTY-SEVEN VESSELS

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1820, EWT, September 4, 1942

JOHN L. McCrea
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D.G. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
September 4, 1942.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

The following is a statement of the maximum number of American naval vessels that can be made available for the Torch operation:

1 Modern Battleship
2 Old Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier
2 Converted Aircraft Carriers, Small, Tentative planes carried total 78 Fighters, 30 Dive Bombers
2 8" Cruisers
3 Large 6" Cruisers
40 Destroyers
6 Fast Minesweepers

ROOSEVELT

DECATEGORIZED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAR 6 1972

0059
September 4, 1942.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

The following is a statement of the maximum number of American naval vessels that can be made available for the Torch operation:

1. Modern Battleship
2. Old Battleships
1. Aircraft Carrier
2. Converted Aircraft Carriers, Small, Tentative planes carried total 78 Fighters, 30 Dive Bombers
2. 8" Cruisers
3. Large 6" Cruisers
40. Destroyers
6. Fast Minesweepers

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAR 6-1972
SYNOPSIS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC

MEMORANDUM

Date: September 4, 1942

To: Captain McCrea

Subject:

Please send this to the President immediately for approval.

Keep a copy in order to send P.D.Q. when the message is approved.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS 927/495 3/68/72
By RHEB Date APR 4 1972
September 5, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 185 REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER 144 HURRAH

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1130, September 5, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Aide
FROM: CPHAY
TO: AIUSWA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND
NO. 186.

YOUR DEAREST TO LEARN OF AVERILL'S SAFE ARRIVAL. WE ARE
PREPARED TO TAKE OVER THE PERSIAN RAILWAY AND ALL PLANS NOW BEING
DEVELOPED. I UNDERSTAND FROM OUR AMY THAT THEY ARE HAVING SOME
DIFFICULTY WITH YOUR BRIGADIER BOURNE REGARDING DETAILED PLANS. I
SUGGEST YOU A P AVERILL TO SEE BOURNE. WE ARE EXAMINING CLOSELY THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR FORCE IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND I HOPE TO HAVE WORD
FOR YOU VERY SOON IN REGARD TO THIS. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE
OF STALIN KNOWING THAT WE MEAN BUSINESS. I HAVE A FEELING THAT IF WE
DECIDE AFFIRMATIVELY THE DECISION SHOULD NOT BE CONDITIONED UPON
THE OUTCOME OF EVENTS ELSEWHERE. I WILL CABLE YOU REGARDING THIS AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU HAVE GOOD REPORTS ABOUT
OUR MAIN BUSINESS. I HAD LONG AND SATISFACTORY TALK WITH RAMSAY AND
CUNNINGHAM LAST NIGHT. WE ARE IN THIS TOGETHER AND I HAVE GREAT
CONFIDENCE OF OUR SUCCESS. THE NEWS THIS MORNING ABOUT THE PQ CONVOY
IS DISCOURAGING BUT THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO HIT IT AGAIN AND I
PREMISE WE CAN WAIT FOR A FEW DAYS TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION. IF
THE DECISION IS AGAINST SENDING FURTHER CONVOYS I OF COURSE WILL DO
EVERYTHING I CAN WITH STALIN.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1720, EWT, September 15, 1942.
TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

Your 148 delighted to learn of Averill's safe arrival. We are prepared to take over the Persian railway and all plans now being developed. I understand from our Army that they are having some difficulty with your Brigadier Bourne regarding detailed plans. I suggest you ask Averill to see Bourne. We are examining closely the Anglo-American air force in southern Russia and I hope to have word for you very soon in regard to this. I fully appreciate the importance of Stalin knowing that we mean business. I have a feeling that if we decide affirmatively that the decision should not be conditioned upon the outcome of events elsewhere. I will cable you regarding this as soon as possible. I am delighted that you have good reports about our main business. I had long and satisfactory talk with Ramsay and Cunningham last night. We are in this together and I have great confidence of our success. The news this morning about the PQ convoy is discouraging but they may not be able to hit it again and I presume we can wait for a few days to make a final determination. If the decision is against sending further convoys I of course will do everything I can with Stalin.

ROOSEVELT

In final draft of message, "that" -- the seventh word in the ninth line down -- was omitted. Checked with Miss Tully.

W.C.M.
September 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

We got balled up the other day because the President asked me to answer the same wire he asked you to answer — I got my answer off first and then I saw yours and I took the liberty of stopping it. I am terribly sorry about it.

I am enclosing a copy of the message I sent. Do you think this covers it?

H.L.H.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND

NO. 186.

YOUR 148 DELIGHTED TO LEARN OF AVERELL'S SAFE ARRIVAL. WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER THE PERSIAN RAILWAY AND ALL PLANS NOW BEING DEVELOPED. I UNDERSTAND FROM OUR ARMY THAT THEY ARE HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH YOUR BRIGADIER BOURNE REGARDING DETAILED PLANS. I SUGGEST YOU ASK AVERELL TO SEE BOURNE. WE ARE EXAMINING CLOSELY THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR FORCE IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND I HOPE TO HAVE WORD FOR YOU VERY SOON IN REGARD TO THIS. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF STALIN KNOWING THAT WE MEAN BUSINESS. I HAVE A FEELING THAT IF WE DECIDE AFFIRMATIVELY THE DECISION SHOULD NOT BE CONDITIONED UPON THE OUTCOME OF EVENTS ELSEWHERE. I WILL CABLE YOU REGARDING THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I AM DELIGHTED THAT YOU HAVE GOOD REPORTS ABOUT OUR MAIN BUSINESS. I HAD LONG AND SATISFACTORY TALK WITH RAMSAY AND CUNNINGHAM LAST NIGHT. WE ARE IN THIS TOGETHER AND I HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE OF OUR SUCCESS. THE NEWS THIS MORNING ABOUT THE PQ CONVOY IS DISCOURAGING BUT THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO HIT IT AGAIN AND I PRESUME WE CAN WAIT FOR A FEW DAYS TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION. IF THE DECISION IS AGAINST SENDING FURTHER CONVOYS I OF COURSE WILL DO EVERYTHING I CAN WITH STALIN.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1720, EWT, September 15, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President desires that a draft of a despatch to the Prime Minister be prepared on the items checked. He stated that he "thought" he had told someone to handle this before, but he couldn't remember to whom he had given the job.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

This matter was first brought up in the Prime Minister's despatch No. 123, then mentioned in the President's 170 and 171, the Prime Minister's 125A, 129, and 140, the President's 181, and the Prime Minister's 148. It was also taken up in Mr. Harriman's despatch to the President of September 14, 1942.

Respectfully,

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

With reference to the information desired by the President for his reply to the Prime Minister's No. 148, the following information is furnished to you:

(1) The question of the United States taking over the repair, operation, and maintenance of the Trans-Iranian Railway south of Teheran is now being given consideration by the Combined Staff Planners who have not yet submitted their recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(2) With regard to the Anglo-American Air Force on the Russian South Front, there is now a study being made in the War Department on this subject. The study has not as yet been submitted to the Chief of Staff for his approval. The plan that has been evolved and which will probably be acted upon by the Chief of Staff in the near future is as follows:

If and when the situation in Egypt will permit the diversion of any air forces, either British or American, it is suggested that the British send a balanced combat air force, entirely British, from Egypt to the Caucasus, and the United States replace these units by fulfilling their commitments to Egypt on dates previously agreed upon, the United States to participate directly in the Russian support by making available one group of transport airplanes to operate in support of the British Combat Air Force. In no event would this transport group be available until after November 1st.
These are the salient points of the proposed plan. I wish to repeat that it does not yet have the approval of the Chief of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Secretary.
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

Replying to your message number 151 of September 22 in which you submitted suggestions with reference to our current and projected plans. I am in complete accord with the emphasis you place upon retaining Russia as an effective fighting ally, but I am not in agreement with the disposition of forces that you suggest to attain that end. Your message indicates that you appreciate the necessity for concentrating our resources in order to bring direct pressure against the enemy. In contravention to that premise however, you advance urgent proposals requiring further dispersion of means. It is apparent that we must accomplish a new program which envisages the most effective employment of our available resources and those which will become available as our war effort gains momentum. Although your strategic survey disposes of our combined resources very broadly, there is no mention of the Pacific area.

The following are my immediate reactions to your message.

Our commitments with reference to the Torch operation must remain firm.

I agree that nothing should be permitted to delay the initiation of Torch or to militate against its success. The U.S. will bend every effort to insure that this operation is launched on the date indicated.

It is my conviction that the fate of PQ 13 fully justifies immediate discontinuance of convoys to Archangel. The losses of shipping sustained and the convoy requirements for escort vessels which are needed elsewhere in connection with projected military operations, are sound grounds for such decision. An analysis of the situation in the Murmansk-Archipelago area extending over the past several months indicates that the enemy may have intentionally permitted those ports and the rail
lines running southward to remain operational. It is reasonable to assume that the enemy has had the capability of severing that line of supply, but that from a long-range viewpoint, it appeared more profitable to destroy our ships in addition to the valuable cargoes enroute to those ports. German naval forces, supplemented by air, can effectively operate from bases in Norway against the convoys, destroying not only cargo ships, but also inflicting losses upon escort vessels which could possibly be of fatal consequence.

I agree that we must in candor indicate our capabilities to Stalin not only with reference to the delivery of supplies, but also in connection with the creation of a diversion operation. He is realistic in his views and must appreciate the necessity for discontinuing convoys via the northern route until more effective means can be found to insure safe arrival in port. The U.S. has recently undertaken the difficult task of increasing the flow of supplies to Russia by assuming the responsibility for the expansion of rail, road and port facilities in the Persian Gulf Area. Furthermore planes, spare parts and other necessary supplies have been concentrated in Alaska, to be ferried to Russia overland. The first group of 41 planes is about to take off. There is some misunderstanding to be cleared up regarding succeeding groups, the Russian representative here without knowledge of our Col. Bradley in Moscow having notified us that no more planes will be accepted by the Alaskan Siberian route. We are endeavoring to clear this up.

In the Torch operation we fulfill our pledge to undertake military operations that may divert Axis forces from the Russian front. The most grave consequences might be reasonably expected if Torch does not actually create a tangible diversion, particularly in the light of your conversations with Stalin recently in Moscow wherein you indicated that a most effective U.S.-British contribution to the diversion of enemy forces from the Russian
front would be accomplished by Torch.

An examination of U.S. potential resources indicates that there will be neither shipping nor suitably trained and equipped military forces available from the U.S. for the Jupiter operation within next few months after fulfilling the Torch commitments and providing for vital dispositions in the Pacific. Jupiter would therefore have to be undertaken in its entirety by the British, supplemented, if feasible, by the Russians. In assessing the value of Jupiter to current, overall strategy, I am advised that the disadvantages inherent in the plan far outweigh the advantages. Primarily Allied resources, both shipping and military, would be further and very seriously dispersed by Jupiter, so that the concentration of effective fighting forces for direct employment against the enemy would be made still more difficult, if not impossible. The more forces we deploy on the perimeter of Continental Europe, obviously the fewer forces will be available to penetrate vital enemy areas. I do not believe that Stalin attaches to the Jupiter operation the great importance implied in your message.

My military advisers inform me that it will be impossible with our available means to undertake Roundup in 1943 after fulfilling the requirements of Torch and providing the means urgently required in other vital areas including the Pacific, certainly not before the early fall. The strongest argument for Sledgehammer and/or Roundup included the Allied capability of amassing strong forces in the U.K. for employment under effective air cover direct against the enemy. Our present strategy, which now envisages an extensive operation in North Africa and concurrently the strengthening of our positions in the Pacific and the Middle East, definitely precludes the concentration of our resources in the U.K. on the scale previously planned under Solero.
The three U.S. divisions now in the United Kingdom are scheduled to join four other U.S. divisions to be sent from here for Torch. Two additional divisions will be sent from the U.S. to Torch at a later date as soon as shipping becomes available. It is also planned to send to the U.K. four divisions in addition to large numbers of air forces, and supporting and service troops, but the dispatch of these is dependent upon available transport and cargo shipping. Thus, shipping requirements militate against the early dispatch of additional U.S. divisions to the U.K. despite the fact that they might be in part equipped by the British.

I appreciate your full recognition of our problem involving escort vessels. When Bolero was accepted by the British as a firm basis for planning last May, I directed that every available facility be concentrated on the construction of landing craft which were urgently required for that operation. Obviously drastic changes in our naval construction program were required, which not only delayed air carrier completion but suspended construction of escort vessels then on the ways and partially canceled approved escort vessel program. The United States does not plan to send to the United Kingdom during the next ten months landing craft in excess of the number for which there will be operating personnel, and adequate to carry troops for any probable 1943 offensive which might be based on the United Kingdom.

I am entirely in agreement with you that the U.K. should not only be free from the menace of invasion, but that the enemy should feel our pressure and that we should be in position to take prompt advantage of any deterioration in German morale. For this very reason I do not subscribe to such an operation as Jupiter which will further disperse our means. In the implementation of plans such as Jupiter, Allied military resources...
would be employed on the perimeter of the enemy citadel, within which are sufficient manpower, raw materials, and industrial facilities for the conduct of major military operations; whereas the Allied forces would not have sufficient and appropriate means remaining for the initiation of a strong, decisive blow in any selected area. On the other hand, a concentration of our means is most desirable in an area where it will be possible to deal the enemy a decisive blow and to come to grips with him.

I incline to your more favorable assumption relative to French reaction to our operation in Northwest Africa and agree that General Alexander's attack will strongly influence the overall success of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean area. Allied control of that important area will increase our ability to conduct operations to improve Russia's position.

I share your great anxiety about Russia and will wholeheartedly support plans that envisage tangible assistance to those desperate fighters. We both have experienced the unfortunate position of having insufficient resources to meet "must" requirements and concurrently to husband adequate and appropriate means for the accomplishment of a successful operation against the enemy. The expansion of U.S. military forces is encouraging; however, the requirements in all theaters increase correspondingly, rendering difficult, the creation of an effective strategic reserve for employment in a selected area at a propitious time. In the Pacific the United Nations are opposed by strong Japanese troop and air concentrations and by a Navy operating on interior lines. The commitments of United States forces to operations in other theaters must necessarily include appropriate consideration of the United Nations situation in the Pacific. We cannot permit the present critical situation in the Southwest Pacific to develop into a second Bataan.
As you stated, this is a most formidable moment in American-British-Soviet relations and unanimity of purpose, as well as of action, is imperative. Unless we analyze every implication of present and projected operations, we will find ourselves committed to the unforgivable military blunder of dispersion to the point where decisive action against a concentrated enemy becomes impossible.

I suggest that your proposed telegram to Stalin be changed as follows:

Par. 1. As I told you in Moscow, we are convinced that the most effective contribution that we and the United States can make in 1942 to create a diversion of Axis strength on the Russian front is to launch Torch at the earliest practicable date, preceded by an attack in force out of Egypt.

Par. 2. The anticipated effect of Torch and the Middle East attack must be either (a) to force the Germans to a serious diversion of air forces to counter our move, including of course some ground troops, or (b) to compel them to accept the new position created by the success in Northern Africa which would greatly strengthen the Allied position from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf.

Par. 3. The limited success of the last northern convoy operation was achieved only because no less than 77 warships were employed in the operation. Continued protection on anything like this scale will be impossible because of requirements in connection with Torch. However, we and the United States will bend every effort to insure the uninterrupted and increasing flow of supplies to Russia. In the latter connection, the United States has energetically initiated positive steps to increase the tonnage capacity.

**Note:** The document contains a notation at the bottom indicating it was not used and not sent.
of communication facilities in the Persian Gulf Area approximately threefold.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1942

WATCH OFFICER:

THIS MESSAGE IS BEING HELD UP IN CODE ROOM AWAITING A RELEASE BY US. MR. HOPKINS WILL LET US KNOW WHETHER IT IS TO BE SENT AS IS OR CHANGED.

CB

This is the copy returned from the code room.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FR\M THE PR\\\N\T\E\N FOR THE FORMER NA\V PERSON PERSONAL AND

NO. 187.

IT IS PLEASING TO BE REASSURED BY YOUR MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 15th
THAT ON YOUR SIDE EFFORT IS CONCENTRATED ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE
EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE. WE HERE ARE MAKING THE SAME EFFORT.

I AGREE FULLY AND CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT DE GAULLE BE KEPT
OUT OF THE PICTURE AND BE PERMITTED TO HAVE NO REPEAT NO INFORMATION
WHATEVER REGARDLESS OF HOW IRRITATED AND IRRITATING HE MAY BECOME.
WHAT WOULD YOU THINK OF OUR ASKING HIM TO COME TO WASHINGTON ABOUT
NOVEMBER 10TH? HE MIGHT ADVERTISE THIS UNDILY BUT ON THE OTHER
HAND IT MIGHT TEND TO SOFTEN HIS ATTITUDE AFTER A CERTAIN EVENT
TAKES PLACE.

IT IS MY PRESENT INTENTION TO PREPARE A RADIO STATEMENT FOR
BOTH THE CONTINENTAL AND COLONIAL FRENCH TO BE MADE AS LATE AS POSS­
SIBLE PRIOR TO THE LANDING.

IT APPEARS ADVISABLE FOR YOU TO ACCOMPLISH THE PROPAGANDA AND
PREVENTATIVE EFFORT IN SPAIN.

IN REGARD TO THE PERSIAN RAILWAY THE COMBINED PLANNERS HAVE NOT
YET COMPLETED THEIR STUDY. I AM PUSHING THEM.

THE PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR FORCE ON RUSSIA'S SOUTHERN
FLANK IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT. IT IS EX­
PECTED THAT THE WAR DEPARTMENT WILL RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING
POSSIBILITY:
AS SOON AS THE SITUATION IN EGYPT PERMITS GREAT BRITAIN DIVERT
A BALANCED COMBAT AIR FORCE FROM EGYPT TO THE CAUCASUS, THE U.S.
TO REPLACE THESE BRITISH UNITS BY FULFILLING COMMITMENTS TO EGYPT
ON DATES PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON. THE U.S. TO PROVIDE AFTER NOVEMBER
FIRST ONE GROUP OF TRANSPORT PLANES TO OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE
CAUCASUS FORCE.

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS TENTATIVE PENDING COMPLETION OF THE STUDY.
I AM DISTRESSED BY YOUR NEWS OF THE P.Q. CONVOY.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1435, EWT, September 16, 1942.

R. R. Dodderidge
Captain, Cavalry
White House Map Room

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date OCT 14 1971
From President to

Former Naval Person

It is pleasing to be reassured by your message of September 15th that on your side effort is concentrated on preparations for the earliest practicable date. We here are making the same effort.

I agree fully and consider it essential that de Gaulle be kept out of the picture and be permitted to have no repeat no information whatever regardless of how irritated and irritating he may become. (A)

It is my present intention to prepare a radio statement for both the Continental and Colonial French to be made as late as possible prior to the landing.

It appears advisable for you to accomplish the propaganda and preventative effort in Spain.

In regard to the Persian railway the Combined Planners have not yet completed their study.

The proposed Anglo-American air force on Russia's southern flank is now under consideration by the War Department. It is expected that the War Department will recommend the following possibility:

As soon as the situation in Egypt permits Great Britain divert a balanced combat air force from Egypt to the Caucasus, the U.S. to replace these British units by fulfilling commitments to Egypt on dates previously agreed upon. The U.S. to provide after November First one group of transport planes to operate in support of the Caucasus force.
All of the above is tentative pending completion of the study. I am distressed by your views of the P.Q. Convoy.

[Signature]

A) What would you think of our asking him to come to Washington about Nov. 18? He might advertize this weekly but on the other hand it might tend to soften his attitude after a certain event takes place.
MEMO FOR CAPTAIN MCCREA:

ATTACHED ARE COPIES OF PM MESSAGES PREPARED FOR ADMIRAL LEAHEY, WHICH HE RETURNED THIS AFTERNOON.

ALSO IS ATTACHED THE ORIGINAL AND COPY PLUS THE MAP ROOM FILE COPY OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE #187, WHICH ADMIRAL LEAHEY TURNED OVER TO MAP ROOM FOR TRANSMISSION.

THE SPELLING OF THE WORK CONTINENTAL WAS CHANGED BY AUTHORITY OF COMDR. PRESEMAN.

COL. HAMMOND WAS INFORMED BEFORE THE MESSAGE WAS SENT. RESPECTFULLY,

COFFEE
Note remark on

Unclassified

Hold
Do not enquire further and
Resubmit from Chart Room W.O.

Ticked chart at 0200/7 - no change in dep

NCR 6507
TELEGRAM

SEPTEMBER 25, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I agree with you that the realities of the situation require us to give up PQ 19. While I think that is a tough blow for the Russians, I nevertheless think that the purposes for which the escorts are to be used, both as to time and place, make that decision inevitable. PQ 19, however, would not have sailed under any circumstances for another ten days and I feel very strongly that we should not notify the Russians until that time arrives and we know with finality that the convoy will not go. I can see nothing to be gained by notifying Stalin sooner than is necessary and, indeed, much to be lost. Furthermore, I believe that within ten days we could come to a final conclusion regarding the air force in Trans-Caucasia, regarding which Stalin should be notified at the same time.

For security reasons I think it would be unwise to unload any of the ships at Iceland. While it is true we are short of shipping, we probably do not need those particular ships for TORCH and I think we had better take the sacrifice of letting the ships remain idle in Iceland rather than risk giving the enemy the information that we are not running the next convoy.

I believe that TORCH should not be delayed a single day. We are going to put everything in that enterprise and I have great hopes for it.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: W.P. Stewart
Date: Oct 13 1971
I will be back in Washington Thursday and will cable you then regarding the air force in the Caucasus and other matters. I am having a great trip. The training of our forces is far advanced and their morale excellent. Production is good but must be better.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 187.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION REQUIRE US TO GIVE UP PQ 19. WHILE I THINK THAT IS A TOUGH BLOW FOR THE RUSSIANS, I NEVERTHELESS THINK THAT THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE ESCORTS ARE TO BE USED, BOTH AS TO TIME AND PLACE, MAKE THAT DECISION INEVITABLE. PQ 19, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT HAVE SAILED UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ANOTHER TEN DAYS AND I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT NOTIFY THE RUSSIANS UNTIL THAT TIME ARRIVES AND WE KNOW WITH FINALITY THAT THE CONVOY WILL NOT GO. I CAN SEE NOTHING TO BE GAINED BY NOTIFYING STALIN SOONER THAN IS NECESSARY AND, INDEED, MUCH TO BE LOST. FURTHERMORE, I BELIEVE THAT WITHIN TEN DAYS WE COULD COME TO A FINAL CONCLUSION REGARDING THE AIR FORCE IN TRANS-CaucASIA, REGARDING WHICH STALIN SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AT THE SAME TIME.

FOR SECURITY REASONS I THINK IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO UNLOAD ANY OF THE SHIPS AT ICELAND. WHILE IT IS TRUE WE ARE SHORT OF SHIPPING, WE PROBABLY DO NOT NEED THOSE PARTICULAR SHIPS FOR TORCH AND I THINK WE HAD BETTER TAKE THE SACRIFICE OF LETTING THE SHIPS REMAIN IDLE IN ICELAND RATHER THAN RISK GIVING THE ENEMY THE INFORMATION THAT WE ARE NOT RUNNING THE NEXT CONVOY.

I BELIEVE THAT TORCH SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED AN A SINGLE DAY. WE ARE GOING TO PUT EVERYTHING IN THAT ENTERPRISE AND I HAVE GREAT HOPES FOR IT.

I WILL BE BACK IN WASHINGTON THURSDAY AND WILL CABLE YOU THEN REGARDING THE AIR FORCE IN THE CAUCASUS AND OTHER MATTERS. I AM HAVING A GREAT TRIP. THE TRAINING OF OUR FORCES IS FAR ADVANCED AND THEIR MORALE EXCELLENT. PRODUCTION IS GOOD BUT MUST BE BETTER.

Lt. Colonel, G.S.C. ROOSEVELT

Released White House Map Room, 1245, E.W.T., September 26, 1942
OCTOBER 2, 1942

FROM: OPMNAV
TO: AUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL
AND

AND NO. 189.

I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MY TRIP AND AM IN CONFERENCE
WITH THE CHIEFS OF STAFF. I AM SENDING YOU THIS PRELIMINARY
MESSAGE TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I WILL WIRE YOU FULLY TOMORROW
RELATIVE TO THE MATTERS WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH, PARTICULARLY THE
RUSSIAN SITUATION.

I DID NOT GET A CHANCE TO SEE THE AMERICAN EAGLE BECAUSE
I THOUGHT IT BEST THAT HE RETURN AT ONCE BUT I WANT YOU TO KNOW
THAT OUR MUTUAL ENTERPRISE IS PROGRESSING WELL HERE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1645, October 2, 1942.

GEORGE M. EISEY
Ensian, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Howard
Date Oct 73 1971
October 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Could you put this before the President and tell him I think he should send a preliminary message to Churchill, a draft of which is attached.

H.L.H.
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MY TRIP AND AM IN CONFERENCE WITH THE CHIEFS OF STAFF. I AM SENDING YOU THIS PRELIMINARY MESSAGE TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I WILL WIRE YOU FULLY TOMORROW RELATIVE TO THE MATTERS WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH, PARTICULARLY THE RUSSIAN SITUATION.

I DID NOT GET A CHANCE TO SEE THE AMERICAN EAGLE BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT BEST THAT HE RETURN AT ONCE BUT I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT OUR MUTUAL ENTERPRISE IS PROGRESSING WELL HERE.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND
NO. 189.

I HAVE GONE OVER CAREFULLY YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 164, WHICH IS
THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO STALIN. I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD
MAKE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO PUT AN AIR FORCE IN THE CAUCASUS AND THAT THAT
OPERATION SHOULD NOT BE CONTINGENT ON ANY OTHER.

THE RUSSIAN FRONT IS TODAY OUR GREATEST RELIANCE AND WE SIMPLY
MUST FIND A DIRECT MANNER IN WHICH TO HELP THEM OTHER THAN OUR
DIMINISHING SUPPLIES. WE SHALL, ON OUR PART, UNDERTAKE TO REPLACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST ALL OF OUR OWN PLANES WHICH ARE TRANSFERRED AND ASSIST YOU
IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE WITH YOUR OWN AIR PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN SO FAR AS PQ-19 IS CONCERNED, I FEEL MOST STRONGLY THAT WE
SHOULD NOT TELL STALIN THAT THE CONVOY WILL NOT SAIL. AFTER TALK WITH
KING I WOULD LIKE TO URGE THAT A DIFFERENT TECHNIQUE BE EMPLOYED IN
WHICH EVASION AND DISPERSION ARE THE GUIDING FACTORS. THUS LET PQ-19
SAIL IN SUCCESSIVE GROUPS COMPRISING THE FASTEST SHIPS NOW LOADED AND
LOADING FOR RUSSIA. THESE GROUPS WOULD COMPRISE TWO OR THREE SHIPS,
EACH SUPPORTED BY TWO OR THREE ESCORTS, AND SAIL AT 24 TO 48 HOUR
INTERVALS. THEY MIGHT HAVE TO GO WITHOUT THE FULL NAVAL COVERING
SUPPORT THAT WOULD PROTECT THE CONVOY FROM THE TIRPITZ OR HEAVY CRUISERS
BUT THAT MUST SIMPLY BE A RISK THAT WE HAVE TO TAKE. WE KNOW THAT IN
SO FAR AS AIR ATTACK IS CONCERNED THE WEATHER WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY
NOT BE AGAINST US EVERY DAY AND THAT THE LONGER NIGHTS WILL BE OF HELP.

I BELIEVE WE WOULD STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF GETTING AS HIGH
PROPORTION OF THE SHIPS THROUGH AS WE DID WITH FQ-18. UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK IT IS BETTER THAT WE TAKE THIS RISK THAN TO ENDANGER OUR WHOLE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AT THIS TIME. I KNOW THAT YOU AND POUND WILL GIVE THIS PROPOSAL OF MINE EVERY CONSIDERATION. I SHOULD TELL YOU THAT OUR AMBASSADOR HAS ASKED TO COME HOME TO DELIVER IN PERSON A VERY IMPORTANT MESSAGE AND I HAVE SOME FEARS AS TO WHAT THAT MESSAGE MIGHT BE.

I HAVE THEREFORE SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

END OF PARAGRAPH ONE ADD: QUOTE SINCE MY TALK WITH YOU THE ENTERPRISE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED IN SCOPE. UNQUOTE.

PARAGRAPH FOUR: ELIMINATE ALTOGETHER.

PARAGRAPH FIVE TO READ AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN THE MEANWHILE WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPLIES BY THE NORTHERN ROUTE. UNQUOTE.

PARAGRAPH SIX: ELIMINATE ENTIRELY.

PARAGRAPH NINE: QUOTE YOU WILL RECALL OUR CONVERSATIONS RELATIVE TO PUTTING A BRITISH-AMERICAN AIR FORCE IN THE CAUCASUS. I HAVE EXAMINED THIS MATTER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WE HAVE DETERMINED TO MOVE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WITHOUT DELAY. I WILL LET YOU KNOW THE EXTENT OF THE AIR FORCE THAT WE CAN MAKE AVAILABLE AND OUR PLANS FOR BUILDING THE FORCE UP DURING THE SUCCEEDING MONTHS. UNQUOTE.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU SEND MESSAGE TO STALIN AND I WILL IMMEDIATELY SEND HIM A SIMILAR MESSAGE, BUT I AM CERTAIN BOTH OUR MESSAGES SHOULD BE SO PHRASED AS TO LEAVE A GOOD TASTE IN HIS MOUTH.

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at 1800, October 5, 1942.

Copy to Mr. Hopkins

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I have gone over carefully your message number 154, which is the proposed message to Stalin. I feel very strongly that we should make a firm commitment to put an air force in the Caucasus and that that operation should not be contingent on any other.

The Russian front is today our greatest reliance and we simply must find a direct manner in which to help them other than our diminishing supplies. We shall, on our part, undertake to replace in the Middle East all of our own planes which are transferred and assist you in every way possible with your own air problems in the Middle East.

In so far as PQ-19 is concerned, I feel most strongly that we should not tell Stalin that the convoy will not sail. After talk with King I would like to urge that a different technique be employed in which evasion and dispersion are the guiding factors. Thus let PQ-19 sail in successive groups comprising the fastest ships now loaded and loading for Russia. These groups would comprise two or three ships, each supported by two or three escorts, and sail at 24 to 48 hour intervals. They might have to go without the full naval covering support that would protect the convoy from the TIRPITZ or heavy cruisers but that must simply be a risk that we have to take. We know that in so far as air attack is concerned the weather would in all probability not be against us every day and that the longer nights will be of help.

I believe we would stand a good chance of getting as high proportion of the ships through as we did with PQ-18. Under any circumstances, I think it is better that we take this risk.
than to endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time. I know that you and Pound will give this proposal of mine every consideration. I should tell you that our Ambassador has asked to come home to deliver in person a very important message and I have some fears as to what that message might be.

I have therefore suggested amendments as follows:

End of Paragraph one add: QUOTE Since my talk with you the enterprise has been substantially increased in scope. UNQUOTE

Paragraph four: Eliminate altogether.

Paragraph five to read as follows: QUOTE In the meanwhile we are making every effort to continue our supplies by the northern route. UNQUOTE

Paragraph six: Eliminate entirely.

Paragraph nine: QUOTE You will recall our conversations relative to putting a British-American air force in the Caucasus. I have examined this matter with the President and we have determined to move to accomplish this without delay. I will let you know the extent of the air force that we can make available and our plans for building the force up during the succeeding months. UNQUOTE

Please let me know when you send message to Italy and I will immediately send him a similar message. But I am certain both our messages should be so phrased as to have a good tone in his mouth.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY.

Dear Admiral:

I return herewith the rough draft message from the President to Mr. Churchill, in which I have marked up the naval part which, when smoothed out, should read as follows:

"In so far as PQ-19 is concerned, I feel most strongly that we should not tell Stalin that the convoy will not sail. After talk with King I would like to urge that a different technique be employed in which evasion and dispersion are the guiding factors. Thus let PQ-19 sail in successive groups comprising the fastest ships now loaded and loading for Russia. These groups would comprise two or three ships, each supported by two or three escorts, and sail at 24 to 48 hour intervals. They might have to go without the full naval covering support that would protect the convoy from the TIRPITZ or heavy cruisers but that must simply be a risk that we have to take. We know that in so far as air attack is concerned the weather would in all probability not be against us every day and that the longer nights will be of help.

I believe we would stand a good chance of getting as high proportion of the ships through as we did with PQ-18. Under any circumstances, I think it is better that we take this risk than to endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time. I know that you and Pound will give this proposal of mine every consideration. I should tell you that our Ambassador has asked to come home to deliver in person a very important message and I have some fears as to what that message might be."

It is my understanding that General Marshall will do likewise as regards the Caucasus air project - and send it to you.

The two parts - Marshall's and mine - fitted into your mark-up of the opening paragraphs, should approach what the President wants.

E. J. King

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (2/27/59)

Date- OCT 13 1971
Signature- [Signature]
October 2, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I have gone over carefully your message number 154, which is the proposed message to Stalin. I feel very strongly that we should make a firm commitment to put an air force in the Caucasus and that that operation should not be contingent on any other.

The Russian front is today our greatest reliance and we simply must find a direct manner in which to help them other than our diminishing supplies. We shall, on our part, undertake to replace in the Middle East all of our own planes which are transferred and assist you in every way possible with your own air problems in the Middle East.

In so far as PQ-19 is concerned, I feel very strongly that we should not tell Stalin that that convoy will not sail. After a different technique be employed in which session talk with King I would like to urge that PQ-19 sail in successive groups comprising the fastest ships now loaded for Russia, that these ships go to two ships at a time, each supported by one corvette and sailing at 24 hour intervals. We would have to go without the heavy naval support that would protect the convoy from the TIRPITZ or heavy cruisers, but that must simply be a risk. We know that in so far as air attack is concerned the weather would in all probability not be against us ever day, and that the longer might help us of help.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By WIJ.Stuart
Date OCT 13 1971
I believe we would stand a good chance of getting as high proportion of the ships through as we did with PC-18. It would only require 6 corvettes, which might prove to be a successful technique and we stand to lose very little.

Under any circumstances, I think it is better that we take this risk than to endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time. I should tell you that our Ambassador has asked to come home to deliver in person a very important message and I have some fears as to what that message might be. I know that you and Pound will give this proposal of mine every consideration.

I have therefore suggested amendments as follows:

End of Paragraph one: QUOTE Since my talk with you the enterprise has been substantially increased in scope. UNQUOTE

Paragraph four: Eliminate altogether.

Paragraph five: QUOTE In the meanwhile we are making every effort to continue our supplies by the northern route. UNQUOTE

Paragraph six: Eliminate entirely.

Paragraph nine: QUOTE You will recall our conversations relative to putting a British-American air force in the Caucasus. I have examined this matter with the President and we have determined to move to accomplish this at once. I will let you know the extent of the air force that we can make available this fall and our plans for building the force up during the winter months. UNQUOTE
TELEGRAM

October 2, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I have gone over carefully your message number 154, which is the proposed message to Stalin. I feel very strongly that we should make a firm commitment to put an air force in the Caucasus and that that operation should not be contingent on any other.

The Russian front is today our greatest reliance and we simply must find a direct manner in which to help them other than our diminishing supplies. We shall, on our part, undertake to replace in the Middle East all of our own planes which are transferred and assist you in every way possible with your own air problems in the Middle East.

In so far as PQ-19 is concerned, I feel very strongly that we should not tell Stalin that that convoy will not sail. After talk with King I would like to urge that PQ-19 sail with 16 of the fastest ships now loaded for Russia; that these ships go two at a time, each supported by one escort and sailing at 24 hour intervals. We would have to go without the heavy naval support that would protect the convoy from the TIRPITZ or heavy cruisers. That must simply be a risk. We know that in so far as air attack is concerned the weather would in all probability not be against us every day.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By,f.
Date OCT 13 1971
I believe we would stand a good chance of getting as high proportion of the ships through as we did with PQ-18. It would only require 8 corvettes, which might prove to be a successful technique and we stand to lose very little.

Under any circumstances, I think it is better that we take this risk than to endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time. I should tell you that our Ambassador has asked to come home to deliver in person a very important message and I have some fears as to what that message might be. I know that you and Pound will give this proposal of mine every consideration.

I have therefore suggested amendments as follows:

End of Paragraph one add: QUOTE Since my talk with you the enterprise has been substantially increased in scope. UNQUOTE

Paragraph four: Eliminate altogether.

Paragraph five to read as follows: QUOTE In the meanwhile we are making every effort to continue our supplies by the northern route. UNQUOTE

Paragraph six: Eliminate entirely.

Paragraph nine: QUOTE You will recall our conversations relative to putting a British-American air force in the Caucasus. I have examined this matter with the President and we have determined to move to accomplish this without delay. I will let you know the extent of the air force that we can make available this and our plans for building the force up during the succeeding months. UNQUOTE
FROM: OPNAV 
TO: ALUSHKA, LONDON 

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORGER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL 
AND 

WINANT TELLS ME THAT THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE HAS APPLIED TO 
BRACKEN FOR LICENSE TO PUBLISH A DAILY PAPER IN ENGLAND PRIMARILY 
FOR THE USE OF OUR TROOPS. HARNESSTLY HOPE THAT THIS APPLICATION 
WILL NOT BE APPROVED. 

THE FACT IS THAT IT SHOULD BE TURNED DOWN ON THE GROUND 
THAT THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE PRINTS LIES AND DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATIONS 
IN LIEU OF NEWS. 

APPLICATION CAN BE REJECTED IF YOU AGREE ON THE GROUND THAT 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO PRINT A DAILY PAPER THROUGH 
AN AGENCY APPROVED BY YOU OR A DAILY PAPER PUBLISHED BY OUR ARMY OR 
THE TROOPS THEMSELVES, SUCH AS "THE STARS AND STRIPS" IN PARIS IN 
1918. I DO NOT BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE APPLICATION SHOULD BE 
TURNED DOWN ON THE LACK OF PAPER. 

YOU WILL READILY SEE THAT I DO NOT TRUST THE CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE FURTHER THAN YOU CAN THROW A BULL BY THE TAIL BUT I DO THINK 
WE NEED A PAPER OF OUR OWN FOR THE SOLDIERS IN ENGLAND. 

ROOSEVELT 

 Released from Map Room at 
1415, EWT, October 6, 1942. 

GEORGE M. ELSEY 
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

Winant tells me that the CHICAGO TRIBUNE has applied to Bracken for license to publish a daily paper in England primarily for the use of our troops. 

Ethnically hope that this application will not be approved.

The fact is that it should be turned down on the ground that the CHICAGO TRIBUNE prints lies and deliberate misrepresentations in lieu of news.

Application can be rejected if you agree on the ground that the United States Government proposes to print a daily paper through an agency approved by you or a daily paper published by our Army or the troops themselves, such as THE STARS AND STRIPES in Paris in 1918. I do not believe, therefore, that the application should be turned down on the lack of paper.

You will readily see that I do not trust the CHICAGO TRIBUNE further than you can throw a bull by the tail but I do think we need a paper of our own for the soldiers in England.

ROOSEVELT
TELEGRAM

OCTOBER 6, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. 191

I FORGOT TO TELL YOU IN MY WIRE LAST NIGHT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND A HEAVY BOMBER GROUP TO VELVET IN ADDITION TO AN AIR TRANSPORT GROUP. I AM ANXIOUS THAT WE HAVE ON THAT FRONT A REAL ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR FORCE. UNDER THIS PLAN YOU WOULD PROVIDE THE FIGHTERS AND THE MEDIUM OR LIGHT BOMBERS.

Roosevelt

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at 1805, EWT, October 6, 1942.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.F. Stewart
Date OCT 13 1971
In reply to your 159, I agree to the method of delivering supplies by the Northern Route until such time as they can be adequately protected by convoy. I shall move at once to get American ships and crews to add to the ten which you are planning to sail. We may have better luck than we think with this.

I realize that it is going to take us some time to get our joint air force on the Russian front but I believe we can now make a firm commitment. I think a too obvious conditional commitment would mean little or nothing to Stalin. It seems to me the wording I am suggesting is better, although I have no decided objection to the words in Paragraph 3 as you have written it.

I am suggesting the following amendments to your number 160:

Paragraph 2 delete the words QUOTE apart from UNQUOTE and add the words QUOTE in addition to UNQUOTE.

Substitute for the whole of Paragraph 3 the following:

QUOTE The President and I are anxious to put an Anglo-American air force on your southern flank and operate it under the strategic control of the Soviet High Command. This force would consist of the following: British: nine fighter squadrons, five bomber squadrons. United States: one heavy bombardment group, one transport group. Orders have been issued by us to assemble this
force and take their station so that they would be available for combat early in the new year. Most of this force will come from Egypt as soon as they can be disengaged from the battle there, which we believe will be successful on our part. UNQUOTE

Paragraph 4 delete the words QUOTE the United States will send you UNQUOTE and add QUOTE President Roosevelt will wire you direct relative to American planes which may be available. UNQUOTE

Paragraph 5 delete QUOTE the end of the year UNQUOTE and add QUOTE our impending operations are completed UNQUOTE.

Paragraph 6 eliminate the words QUOTE about ten UNQUOTE.

I agree that this wire must go off at once and I can see no advantage in further interchange between you and me on the text. I leave it to you to send the message. On my part I intend to follow it up with a message of my own which will support your case.

I think there is nothing more important than that Stalin feel that we mean to support him without qualification and at great sacrifice to our own military operations.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1705, EWT, October 7, 1942.

C. A. SULLIVAN, JR.
1st Lieutenant, Inf-Res.
October 8, 1942

PRIO!ITY
FROM: OPMNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND
NO. 193.

I AM SENDING THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PREMIER STALIN TODAY.
QUOTE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT ME COPY OF HIS MESSAGE TO YOU.
WE ARE GOING TO MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO PLACE AN AIR FORCE UNDER
YOUR STRATEGIC COMMAND IN THE CAUCASUS. I AM NOW TRYING TO FIND ADDITIONAL
PLANES FOR YOU IMMEDIATELY AND WILL ADVISE YOU SOON.

I AM ALSO TRYING TO ARRANGE TO HAVE SOME OF OUR MERCHANT SHIPS TRANSFERRED TO YOUR FLAG TO INCREASE YOUR FLOW OF MATERIALS IN THE PACIFIC.

I HAVE JUST ORDERED AN AUTOMOBILE TIRE PLANT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

WE ARE SENDING VERY SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF TO
INCREASE THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES OVER THAT ROUTE AND ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CAN
BE DONE. WE ARE SENDING A LARGE NUMBER OF ENGINES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, AS WELL
AS PERSONNEL.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR CONTEMPLATED OPERATION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

EVERYONE IN AMERICA IS THRILLED BY THE GALLANT DEFENSE OF STALINGRAD AND
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL SUCCEED. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

released from map room
1800, 10, October 8, 1942

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.B. Stewart
Date Oct. 13, 1971
FROM: OPNAV  
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 194.

REPLYING TO YOUR 163 I AM MAKING A RADIO DISC IMMEDIATELY, AND INCIDENTALLY WHILE YOUR FRENCH GRAMMAR IS BETTER THAN MINE, MY ACCENT IS MOST ALLURING.

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at 1745, EST, October 9, 1942.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date 30 OCT 13 1971
TELEGRAM

OCTOBER 9, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

#191

REPLYING TO YOUR 163 I AM MAKING RADIO DISC IMMEDIATELY, and incidentally while your French pronunciation is better than mine, my accent is most alluring.

ROOSEVELT

ROosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCT 13 1971
OCTOBER 12, 1942

FROM: OPMNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

AND PERSONAL NO. 196.

REPLYING TO YOUR NO. 196 OF OCTOBER 4, 1942, THE FOLLOWING
REPLY PREPARED BY THE U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETS WITH MY APPROVAL:

I HAVE YOUR CABLEGRAM OF OCTOBER 4, 1942, IN WHICH YOU
POINT OUT THE DESIRABILITY OF SCRUTINIZING OUR PRODUCTION PROGRAMS SO
THAT WE MAY BE SURE THAT THESE PROGRAMS ARE DIRECTED TO THE BEST WAR
INTEREST. I AM IN FULL ACCORD WITH YOUR DESIRES IN THIS MATTER AND I
AM CONVINCED THAT OUR RESPECTIVE PROGRAMS SHOULD BE REEXAMINED PERIODICALLY SO THAT THEY WILL BE REALISTIC IN OBJECTIVE AND IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE WAR EFFORT.

WITH RESPECT TO THE TANK PROGRAM, THE FIGURES IN YOUR
CABLEGRAM ARE CUMULATIVE FOR 1942 AND FOR 1943. THEY WERE ESTABLISHED
AS PRODUCTION OBJECTIVES TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM OUTPUT. HOWEVER,
REALIZING THE ACUTE SHORTAGES OF MATERIALS, WE HAVE REDUCED OUR
OBJECTIVES FOR THE MEDIUM AND HEAVY TANKS FOR 1945 TO A TOTAL OF
39,527, OF WHICH 4,500 ARE TO BE FURNISHED TO RUSSIA AND 23,108 ARE
CAPTURED AS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AS FIXED BY THE
JOINT TANK COMMITTEE WHICH MEET HERE DURING THE PAST SUMMER. IF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE NOW IN EXCESS OF OPERATIONAL
NEEDS, IT WILL PERMIT A REDUCTION IN OUR TANK PROGRAM. OUR OWN REQUIRE-
MENTS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO APPROXIMATELY 11,000 MEDIUM TANKS FOR 1943,
INCLUDING MAINTENANCE AND RESERVE.
The National Archives,

March 7, 1972

Dear Secretary,

I am writing in response to your letter of February 21, 1972, regarding the production of light tanks and small caliber ammunition for the United Kingdom and for Russia. I understand that the Light Tank program requires the production of approximately 16,501 tanks during 1943, of which 6,250 are required for the United Kingdom and for Russia.

Our production program for small caliber ammunition for 1943 includes calibers .22, .30, .45 and .50 and aggregates approximately twenty-three billion rounds, including ball, tracer, A.P. and incendiary. Our own requirements for the ball type of ammunition aggregates approximately nine billion rounds. I agree with you that the expenditure of ball ammunition in the Middle East to date indicates the desirability of a reexamination of requirements for this type of ammunition. However, we are seriously deficient in all types of small caliber ammunition for the present. We still have an insufficienct amount of small ammunition for our own training purposes.

I agree with you that the necessity for the direction of our raw materials into end products, which will contribute most directly to the successful prosecution of the war, compels a careful study of our combined requirements. I believe that the most effective procedure to secure the careful examination of these requirements is for periodic review by the Combined Munitions Assignments Board and by the combined chiefs of staff. I suggest that your representatives on these agencies present the question for both tank and small caliber ammunition with your revised requirements so that there may be a prompt joint review with such corrective action as this review indicates to be warranted.

I believe the combined production and resources board, rather than questioning specific requirements items, should analyze the total supply situation and make a determination of the most effective use of our resources. I trust that you will keep me informed of the progress toward solving these problems.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Name]
No. 195 -- page three.

U. S. AND U. K. REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THEM AND THEN ADVISE THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE REALITIES OF PRODUCTION MAKE IT NECESSARY TO REVISE THEM.

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at
1615, EWT, October 12, 1942.

R. R. Dodderidge
Captain, Cavalry
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The proposed despatch from the President to the Prime Minister meets with my concurrence.

E. J. KING,
Admiral, U. S. Navy

October 12, 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall
Admiral King

Attached is a radiogram sent by the Prime Minister to the President with regard to production programs.

There is also attached a draft reply submitted to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for their approval by the U. S. members of the Munitions Assignments Board.

DECLASSIFIED By Authority of JCS 927/495-1 3/28/42
By DEANE Date APR 4 1972

Enclosures
Replying to your No. 156 of October 4, 1942, the following reply prepared by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff meets with my approval:

I have your cablegram of October 4, 1942, in which you point out the desirability of scrutinizing our production programs so that we may be sure that these programs are directed to the best war interest. I am in full accord with your desires in this matter and I am convinced that our respective programs should be reexamined periodically so that they will be realistic in objective and in the best interest of the war effort.

With respect to the tank program, the figures in your cablegram are cumulative for 1942 and for 1943. They were established as production objectives to encourage maximum output. However, realizing the acute shortages of materials, we have reduced our objectives for the medium and heavy tanks for 1943 to a total of 38,527, of which 4,500 are to be furnished to Russia and 23,108 are carried as the requirements of the United Kingdom as fixed by the Joint Tank Committee which met here.
during the past summer. If the requirements for the United Kingdom are now in excess of operational needs, it will permit a reduction in our tank program. Our own requirements have been reduced to approximately 11,000 medium tanks for 1943, including maintenance and reserve.

Our light tank program requires the production of approximately 16,501 tanks during 1943, of which 6,250 are required for the United Kingdom and for Russia.

Our production program for small caliber ammunition for 1943 includes calibers .22, .30, .45 and .50 and aggregates approximately twenty-three billion rounds, including ball, tracer, A.F. and incendiary. Our own requirements for the ball type of ammunition aggregates approximately nine billion rounds. I agree with you that the expenditure of ball ammunition in the Middle East to date indicates the desirability of a re-examination of requirements for this type of ammunition. However, we are seriously deficient in all types of small caliber ammunition for the present. We still have an insufficient amount of small ammunition for our own training purposes. I agree with you that the necessity for the direction of our raw materials into end products, which will contribute most directly to the successful prosecution of the war, compels a careful study of our combined requirements. I believe that the most effective procedure to secure the careful examination of these requirements is for periodic review by the Combined Munitions Assignments Board.
and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I suggest that your representatives on these agencies present the question for both tank and small caliber ammunition with your revised requirements so that there may be a prompt joint review with such corrective action as this review indicates to be warranted.

I believe the Combined Production and Resources Board, rather than questioning specific requirements items, should analyze the total U. S. and U. K. requirements which have been presented to them and then advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff if it is found that the realities of production make it necessary to revise them.

President

JRD:db
10/8/42
From PRIME

To POTUS

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 156, October 4, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President and personal.

I have been furnished with a copy of the progress report which the combined Production and Resources Board have submitted to you in response to your letter of August one nine. I have followed with interest the work of the Board since its inception in June, and I fully appreciate the importance to the success of their task of integrating the production programmes of the two countries, of a statement of requirements directly related to strategic needs. I also realize the formidable difficulties which stand in the way of the preparation of such a statement for a date so far ahead as April one, nineteen forty four. The progress towards the ideal at which the Board is aiming may well be slow.

In the meanwhile, it seems to me that there are certain features of our combined programmes which, if they are allowed to stand unmodified, must lead to a misdirection in nineteen forty three of resources of materials and industrial capacity which we can ill afford. I think I can best illustrate my meaning by taking as examples the combined production programmes of tanks and of ball ammunition.

Our combined tank programme for one nine four three allows for the production in the United States of some thirty one thousand light tanks and forty five thousand medium and heavy tanks. In the United Kingdom, the production will be eleven thousand of all types. The total amounts to some eighty seven
thousand tanks, which I am advised would be sufficient to equip some two hundred armoured divisions of two two five tanks each with one hundred per cent reserves. This appears to me to be a provision on a scale out of all proportion to anything that might be brought to bear on the enemy in nineteen forty three. It was, of course, necessary for us to fix high targets in the early days, so as to get production moving on a great scale. Have we not now reached the time when we could, with advantage, scrutinize our targets more closely? In our efforts to reach to too great a height, we may well exhaust an undue quantity of our resources.

A further effect of setting the targets of the main items of equipment too high is that everything else is then calculated in proportion. For example, the United States production in nineteen forty three of ball ammunition will be about twenty thousand million rounds of all calibres. That of the United Kingdom will be about two thousand million rounds. Observing that the entire expenditure of ball ammunition by our Army in the Middle East, from the beginning of the war to the present date, is little more than two hundred million rounds and remembering that the total expenditure of the American Expeditionary Force in the last war was around one thousand million rounds, it would appear that we are making provision on a scale which is altogether too lavish.

I bring these matters to your attention because of my anxiety that, if inflated demands are given full rein, we shall create for ourselves unnecessary difficulties in the provision of raw
Page three, No. 156, October 4, 1942.

materials and industrial capacity, and shall be unnecessarily curtailing our power to expand the production of such vital requirements as escort vessels, ships, and aircraft, of which it is almost impossible to have too many.

I am ready to cooperate in any way you may think desirable in scrutinizing our programmes so as to rectify those anomalies which may exist and so as to ensure that our combined resources will be used to the best advantage. Signed

PRIME
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FOREIGN NAVAL PERSON

AND PERSONAL NO. 196.

THE HUNDRED OCTANE POSITION AS IT CONCERN THE UNITED NATIONS
IS BEING GIVEN THE MOST CAREFUL SCRUTINY HERE. THE SIZE OF THE
PROGRAM IS GOING TO BE DEPENDENT ON THE NUMBER OF PLANES THAT ARE
MANUFACTURED IN 1943 IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES. WE MUST
ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS MAY INCREASE.
WE ARE EXPEDITING PLANT CONSTRUCTION AND WE WILL COME TO A FINAL
DECISION ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR INCREASING PLANT CAPACITY BEYOND
PRESENT PLANS AT AN EARLY DATE.

I ASSURE YOUR MEN HERE HAVE SENT YOU ALL OF THE FIGURES.
YOU PROBABLY KNOW THAT ON THE BASIS OF ACTUAL BATTLE EXPERIENCE
OUR JOINT REQUIREMENTS HAVE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED.

I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT HUNDRED OCTANE CAN BE HANDLED BUT I
AM GOING TO WATCH IT CAREFULLY AND WE WILL LET NO GRASS GROW
UNDER OUR FEET.

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at
1640, EWT, October 19, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date Oct 13 1971

CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, JR.
1st Lieutenant, Inf-Res.
TELEGRAM  

OCTOBER 19, 1942

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

NO. 196

THE HUNDRED OCTANE POSITION AS IT CONCERNS THE UNITED NATIONS IS BEING GIVEN THE MOST CAREFUL SCRUTINY HERE. THE SIZE OF THE PROGRAM IS GOING TO BE DEPENDENT ON THE NUMBER OF PLANES THAT ARE MANUFACTURED IN 1943 IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES. WE MUST ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE RUSSIAN REQUIREMENTS MAY INCREASE. WE ARE EXPEDITING PLANT CONSTRUCTION AND WE WILL COME TO A FINAL DECISION ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR INCREASING PLANT CAPACITY BEYOND PRESENT PLANS AT AN EARLY DATE.

I ASSUME YOUR MEN HERE HAVE SENT YOU ALL OF THE FIGURES. YOU PROBABLY KNOW THAT ON THE BASIS OF ACTUAL BATTLE EXPERIENCE OUR JOINT REQUIREMENTS HAVE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED.

I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT HUNDRED OCTANE CAN BE HANDLED BUT I AM GOING TO WATCH IT CAREFULLY AND WE WILL LET NO GRASS GROW UNDER OUR FEET.

ROOSEVELT
October 25, 1942.

FROM: OPAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NO. 197 PERSONAL AND

I FULLY APPRECIATE THE CONSIDERATIONS PROMPTING YOUR NUMBER 169.

THE PROPOSED INTERCHANGE OF DESTROYERS HAS BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED. AS A
RESULT I FIND THAT DETAILED PLANS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DESTROYERS
IN TORCH, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, GUN FIRE SUPPORT
AND COMMUNICATIONS, ARE SUCH THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE EFFECTIVELY TO SUBSTITUTE
BRITISH DESTROYERS, IN THE TIME AVAILABLE. THERE ARE AVAILABLE NO UNITED
STATES DESTROYERS NOT ASSIGNED TO TORCH, WHICH COULD REACH THE MEDITERRANEAN
IN TIME.

IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE AN EXCHANGE OF DESTROYERS
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE ASSAULT PHASE. HOWEVER, SUCH
AN EXCHANGE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE LESS EFFECT ON THE FRENCH AND WOULD HAVE
TO BE PREMISED ON NOT DECREASING THE DESTROYER STRENGTH OF THE WESTERN
NAVAL TASK FORCE WHILE OFF CASABLANCA OR ON THE RETURN VOYAGE TO THE
UNITED STATES. I HAVE ASKED OUR PEOPLE TO DISCUSS WITH YOUR PEOPLE THE
PRACTICABILITY OF THIS ARRANGEMENT.

Roosevelt

Released at Map Room
1240, E.W., October 23

By Chester Hammond
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date OCT 13 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a proposed draft of reply to the Prime Minister's No. 169, also attached.

Very respectfully,

John Mccrea

JOHN L. McCREA

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart
Date OCt. 13 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

VICE ADMIRAL RUSSELL WILSON, U.S.N.

The President approved in general the draft of the despatch attached. I have drawn a line through part of the prepared draft and inserted one word.

The President wanted consideration given to including a sentence to read somewhat as follows:

"I have asked our people to discuss with your people the practicability of four of our destroyers entering the Mediterranean immediately following the assault their places in the west-bound escort to be taken by four of your destroyers."

Do you approve?

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

JOHN E. MCGEE
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Oct 13 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The following is the revised draft of the proposed reply to P.M.'s despatch #169 (this has been furnished Captain McCrea):

"From: The President.
To: Former Naval Personnel.

I fully appreciate the considerations prompting your No. 169. The proposed interchange of destroyers has been carefully examined. As a result I find that detailed plans for the employment of American destroyers in Torch, particularly as regards landing craft control, gun fire support and communications, are such that it is impossible effectively to substitute British destroyers, in the time available. There are available no U.S. destroyers not assigned to Torch, which could reach the Mediterranean in time.

It might be possible to arrange an exchange of destroyers immediately after the completion of the assault phase. However, such an exchange would probably have less effect on the French and would have to be premised on not decreasing the destroyer strength of the Western Naval Task Force while off Casablanca or on the return voyage to the U.S. I have asked our people to discuss with your people the practicability of this arrangement."

RUSSELL WILLSON,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN IC CREAA, Naval Aide to the President

October 22, 1942

1. Referring to the attached papers, I believe that the pencil changes indicated in the second paragraph are questionable. The addition of the word "immediate" may involve difficulty. What is really intended is "after the completion of the assault phase". This may be a matter of hours or a matter of several days, during which time detaching four of our destroyers could well be a serious matter.

2. With respect to including the sentence suggested in your memorandum, there is no reason why this should not be included as a means of making the refusal sound a bit less direct. However, I suggest the pencil change indicated, if this sentence is to be used. Actually, however, the practicability of this arrangement is extremely doubtful. Aside from the question of time, one item comes to mind at once, namely, the difficulty of fueling British destroyers at sea from our tankers without preliminary arrangements as to fittings.

3. I would recommend that the despatch be sent as originally submitted with the additions indicated in red. This would make the last paragraph read:

"It might be possible to arrange an exchange of destroyers immediately after the completion of the assault phase. However, such an exchange would probably have less effect on the French and would have to be premised on not decreasing the destroyer strength of the Western Naval Task Force while off Casablanca or on the return voyage to the U.S. I have asked our people to discuss with your people the practicability of this arrangement."

RUSSELL WILLSON,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Deputy Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART 0495, OPNAVINST
5510.1C BY OP-04951C 2/30/72
By PADC Date APR 4 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Proposed Exchange of British and American Ships (Special Operation)

Reference: (a) Despatch 169 from a former naval person.
(b) President's conversation with Rear Admiral Hewitt, 2 P.M., October 21.

1. The following is submitted as a suggested reply to despatch 169.

"From: The President.
To: Former Naval Personnel.

I fully appreciate the considerations prompting your No. 169. The proposed interchange of destroyers has been carefully examined. As a result I find that detailed plans for the employment of American destroyers in Torch, particularly as regards landing craft control, gun fire support and communications, are such that it is impossible effectively to substitute British destroyers, in the time available. There are available no U.S. destroyers not assigned to Torch, which could reach the Mediterranean in time.

It might be possible to arrange an exchange of destroyers after the assault. However, such an exchange would probably have less effect on the French and would have to be premised on not decreasing the destroyer strength of the Western Naval Task Force while off Casablanca or on the return voyage to the U.S."

RUSSELL WILLSON,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Act 445, ONAVINST
5510.1C, By OP09B91C 3/59/72
By BMA, Pt APR 4 1972
October 24, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FOMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND

I have been canvassing this morning the possibilities of increasing our escort vessels and merchant ships for 1943 and I am convinced that by making some readjustments we can build at least seventy more escort vessels than we now plan in 1943 and something more than two million additional dead weight tons of merchant ships which would enable us to transport before the end of 1943 more than five hundred thousand additional soldiers abroad with their equipment and maintain them. I have felt for a long time that our airplane program was dragging here and I took the bull by the horns the other day and told them they had to build one hundred thousand combat planes in 1943. Since that time I have held numerous conferences about it and have agreed this morning to reduce it to eighty-two thousand combat planes but I am telling our production people that I want that many combat planes actually delivered in 1943 and it is not merely a goal to shoot at. The types of course must be decided by the military with appropriate conferences with you. I will talk to Lyttleton about this when he gets here. I have no additional news about Guadalcanal but you of course know that that we are hard pressed there.

I am sure you are keeping my wife's official business to the minimum. I would appreciate it if you would let me know occasionally how things are going with her. Harry and I are going off for a quiet week-end. All good luck in the Libyan desert.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1250, October 24, 1942.

JOHN J. MCCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
October 26, 1942.

[Signature]

For your information and comment the following is a draft of a press release prepared for issue to the American press immediately following the landing:

Quote: In order to forestall an invasion of Africa by Germany and Italy, which if successful would constitute a direct threat to America across the comparatively narrow sea from Western Africa, a powerful American force equipped with adequate weapons of modern warfare and under American command is today landing on the Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts of the French Colonies in Africa.

The landing of this American Army is being assisted by the British Navy and air forces and it will, in the immediate future, be reinforced by a considerable number of divisions of the British Army.

This combined allied force, under American command, in conjunction with the Egyptian campaign, is designed to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of Northern or Western Africa, and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic Coast of the Americas.

In addition, it provides an effective second front assistance to our heroic allies in Russia.

The French Government and the French people have been informed of the purpose of this expedition, and have been assured that the allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French authorities in Africa.

The Government of France and the people of France and the French Possessions have been requested to cooperate with and assist the American expedition in its effort to repel the German and Italian international criminals, and by so doing to liberate France and the French Empire from the Axis yoke.

This expedition will develop into a major effort by the Allied Nations and there is every expectation that it will be successful in repelling the planned German and Italian invasion of Africa. Unquote: "Step to the liberation and restoration of France." - Roosevelt

Released at 1840, EST, October 26, 1942.

[Signature]

W. C. Mott
Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.
For your information and comment the following is a draft of a press release prepared for issue to the American press immediately following the landing:

"In order to forestall an invasion of Africa by Germany and Italy, which if successful would constitute a direct threat to America across the comparatively narrow sea from Western Africa, a powerful American force equipped with adequate weapons of modern warfare and under American Command is today landing on the Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts of the French Colonies in Africa.

The landing of this American Army is being assisted by the British Navy and air forces and it will, in the immediate future, be reinforced by a considerable number of divisions of the British Army.

This combined-allied force, under American Command, in conjunction with the Egyptian campaign is designed to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of Northern or Western Africa, and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic Coast of the Americas.

In addition, it provides an effective second front assistance to our heroic allies in Russia.

The French Government and the French people have been informed of the purpose of this expedition, and have been assured that the allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French Authorities in Africa.

The Government of France and the people of France and the French Possessions have been requested to cooperate with and assist the American expedition in its effort to repel the German and Italian international criminals, and by so doing to liberate France and the French Empire from the Axis yoke.

This expedition will develop into a major effort by the Allied Nations and there is every expectation that it will be successful in repelling the planned German and Italian invasion of Africa."
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 200.

REPLYING TO YOUR 174 OF OCTOBER 26TH I AM IN AGREEMENT 
THEREWITH REGARDING YOUR MESSAGES TO FRANCO AND SALAZAR 
IN BOTH OF WHICH I HOPE YOU WILL STRESS THE FACT THAT THE 
EXPEDITION IS UNDER AMERICAN COMMAND.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room 
at 1845, EWT, October 26, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J.D. Harley
Date 067 1 9 1971
FROM:  THE PRESIDENT
TO:  PRIME

Replying to your 174 of October 26th I am in agreement therewith regarding your messages to Franco and Salazar in both of which I should you will stress the fact that the expedition is under American Command.
OCTOBER 26, 1942

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 201.

I AM DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOUR INFORMATION IN REGARD TO MONSIEUR BOHMAN AND WILL BE PLEASED TO SEE HIM WHEN HE ARRIVES IN THE UNITED STATES.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1845, EWT, October 26, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

I am delighted to have your information in regard to Monsieur Boheman and will be pleased to see him when he arrives in the United States.

PRUSSIUS

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J.L. Stewart
Date Oct 13 1971
OCTOBER 27, 1942

FROM: CPNAV
TO: ALUSWA, LONDON

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL
AND NO. 202.

I AM NOT UNDULY DISTURBED ABOUT OUR RESPECTIVE RESPONSES OR LACK OF RESPONSES FROM MOSCOW. I HAVE DECIDED THEY DO NOT USE SPEECH FOR THE SAME PURPOSES THAT WE DO.

I HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY DIFFICULTY AT OUR END ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR LANDING FIELDS ON THE RUSSIAN SOUTHERN FLANK BUT I SHALL EXPLORE THAT FROM MY END AT ONCE.

I FEEL VERY SURE THE RUSSIANS ARE GOING TO HOLD THIS WINTER AND THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED VIGOROUSLY WITH OUR PLANS BOTH TO SUPPLY THEM AND TO SET UP AN AIR FORCE TO FIGHT WITH THEM. I WANT US TO BE ABLE TO SAY TO MR. STALIN THAT WE HAVE CARRIED OUT OUR OBLIGATIONS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1830, EWT, October 27, 1942.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By LF Stewart
Date OCT 13 1971
TELEGRAM

OCTOBER 27, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I AM NOT UNDULY DISTURBED ABOUT OUR RESPECTIVE RESPONSES OR LACK OF RESPONSES FROM MOSCOW. I HAVE DECIDED THEY DO NOT USE SPEECH FOR THE SAME PURPOSES THAT WE DO.

I HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY DIFFICULTY AT OUR END ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR LANDING FIELDS ON THE RUSSIAN SOUTHERN FLANK BUT I SHALL EXPLORE THAT FROM MY END AT ONCE.

I FEEL VERY SURE THE RUSSIANS ARE GOING TO HOLD THIS WINTER AND THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED VIGOROUSLY WITH OUR PLANS BOTH TO SUPPLY THEM AND TO SET UP AN AIR FORCE TO FIGHT WITH THEM. I WANT US TO BE ABLE TO SAY TO STALIN THAT WE HAVE CARRIED OUT OUR OBLIGATIONS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date OCT 13 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In order to assist you in preparing a reply to the Prime Minister's No. 172, the following information is furnished:

(a) On October 16th Ambassador Litvinov transmitted to you the following message from Mr. Stalin:

"I AM IN RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 12TH
AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR COMMUNICATION - J. STALIN."

No message of October 12th was sent. One, however, of October 11th was sent and it is possible that Mr. Stalin's reply refers to that message. On the other hand, our files do not show any acknowledgment of the message which you sent to Mr. Stalin on 8 October in which you remarked, "The Prime Minister has sent me a copy of his message to you." Our communication log shows that this message was received by ALUSNA Moscow at 1130, 9 October.

(b) On October 14th you despatched a message to Mr. Stalin having to do with the availability, generally, of trucks, explosives, wheat, canned meats, etc., etc. On 19 October you received the following:

"FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT:
I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 16. MY ANSWER HAS BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE FRONT HAVE DIVERTED MY ATTENTION. THE WHOLE BUSINESS NOW ENTIRELY A MATTER OF YOUR CARGOES REACHING THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE TIME STATED."

We sent no despatch of 16 October so it is possible that the above quoted message refers to earlier despatches.

I add the foregoing in order that you may have the whole picture as bearing on Mr. Stalin's immediate frame of mind.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea

JOHN L. McCREA
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
ByLPStumpf
Date 09/18/1971
FROM: OPNAV
TO: USNRA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL
AND NO. 203.

I HAVE SENT THE FOLLOWING TO CURTIN IN REPLY TO HIS OF
OCTOBER EIGHTEENTH AND I HOPE YOU WILL APPROVE.

QUOTE: DEAR MR. CURTIN:

I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED YOUR LETTER REGARDING THE
STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES IN AUSTRALIA, WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO ME
THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OCTOBER 18, 1942.

I APPRECIATE THE ANXIETY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT CONCERNING
THE ABSENCE OF FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I AM, HOWEVER, CONVINCED
THAT OUR COMMON CAUSE CAN BEST BE SERVED IF THE 9TH A.I.F. DIVISION
IS ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

I REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE MESSAGE TO ME WAS A COPY
OF A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND I AM AWARE
THAT HIS ANSWER TO YOU MAY BE FROM AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT POINT OF
VIEW. HOWEVER, I AM PREPARED TO OFFER A MEANS TO AMELIORATE NOT
ONLY AUSTRALIA'S PRESENT POSITION, BUT THE POSITION IN THAT AREA
OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS WELL.

IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DISPATCH A U.S. DIVISION TO
AUSTRALIA FROM HAWAII. THIS IS A READJUSTMENT IN THE PACIFIC WHICH
I FEEL IS JUSTIFIED IN THE EXISTING SITUATION. HOWEVER, IT MUST
BE APPRECIATED THAT THE SITUATION MAY DEVELOP IN SUCH MANNER AS TO
REQUIRE THE DIVERSION OF THIS ADDITIONAL DIVISION FOR AUSTRALIA TO
ANOTHER LOCALITY WITHIN THE SOUTH OR SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS WHERE
ITS EMPLOYMENT WILL BE OF GREATER ADVANTAGE TO THE DEFENSE OF AUSTRALIA.

I ASSUME THAT SENDING THIS DIVISION WILL OBVIATE THE NECESSITY FOR THE AUSTRALIAN WAR COUNCIL TO CALL BACK THE 9TH A.I.F. DIVISION FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. I CANNOT TOO STRONGLY STRESS THAT LEAVING THE 9TH A.I.F. DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL BEST SERVE OUR COMMON CAUSE. SINCERELY YOURS, ROOSEVELT, UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at 1930, EWT, October 28, 1942

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NO. 204,
YOUR ONE SEVEN EIGHT.

THE SUGGESTED CHANGES HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN OUR PRESS RELEASE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ONE SEVEN NINE AND THE GOOD NEWS IT BEARS. MUCH LUCK TO YOU IN THE DESERT EFFORT.

ROOSEVELT

Released Map Room, 1230 EWT, OCT. 31, 1942

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy