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CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
AUGUST - OCTOBER 1942

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AMWAR 1
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md

Cablegram

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

URGENT

~~SECRET~~

August 1, 1942

0804 Z M. WZ

From Amon Embassy London

To Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 120, August 1, 1942

Number one two six, Prime Minister to President.

Personal and ~~SECRET~~

I strongly endorse recommendations sent you today by
Combined Shipping Boards.

Prime

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date **MAY 5 1972**

Action Copy

BLDFORM-PATD-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

0140

NAVAL MESSAGE
IN

T.O.O. —

Addressed: B.A.D. Washington
From: Mideast.

Receive d: 2047/4/8

Date: 4/8/42.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 126-A

No. REFLEX No.11, GOF 4/8 M [REDACTED] T.

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt.

I should greatly like to have your aid and countenance in my talks with Joe. Would you be able to let Averell come with me. I feel that things would be easier if we all seemed to be together. I have a somewhat raw job. Kindly duplicate your reply to London.

Am keeping my immediate movements vague.

T.O.O. —

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. ref., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room
at 2200, EWT, August 4, 1942

0141

126-A

NAVAL MESSAGE
IN

T.O.O. 0950Z/6/8

Received: 1215

Date: 6/8/42.

Addressed: B.A.D. Washington
Repeated: Air Ministry S. Office.
From: Mideast.

WSP

IMMEDIATE

Reflex 23 6/8. Following [redacted]
and Personal for President Roosevelt from former
Naval person.

Begins:

Thank you so much about Averell. He
will be a great help to me.

T.O.O. 0950Z/6

CSB

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. Dept. of State, 3-29-72
H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room
at 1310, SWT, August 6, 1942

0142

Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 8, 1942

1438 Z M.

MAIL

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

[Redacted]

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 123, August 8, 1942

Number 127 [Redacted] Personal Former Naval Person to
President Roosevelt.

You will no doubt have seen the cables sent by the British
Chiefs of Staff London to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington
about accelerating the date of Torch. I am sure that nothing is
more vital than this, and that superhuman efforts should be made.
Every day counts. I have already telegraphed to London welcoming
the appointment of General Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief
for Torch and the British Chiefs are cooperating with him to the
full.

Paragraph 2. I also wish to endorse the suggestion of the
Admiralty about some United States submarines working from
Gibraltar.

Paragraph 3. I have been busy here with a reorganization
of the High Command which was necessary. I am detaching Iraq
and Persia from the Middle East Command and transferring General
Auchinleck there. Alexander will succeed him as Commander in Chief.
General Gott who was to have been appointed to command Eighth Army
under Alexander was killed yesterday. I propose to appoint
General Montgomery in his place. This will promote the utmost

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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[Redacted]

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M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2, No. 123, August 8, 1942 from London

concentration upon the battle. A victory here might have a decisive effect upon the attitude of the French towards Torch.

Paragraph 4. All these changes are of the utmost secrecy and no announcement will be made until the command has been definitely transferred. Pray therefore let this be for yourself alone.

Paragraph 5. I am giving my own personal attention in detail on the spot to the reception and utilization of the Shermans and 105's for which we are eagerly waiting. I am visiting the units tomorrow that are to receive these weapons.

Paragraph 6. Averell has just arrived, and we shall be off soon on our further quest. I will keep you informed.

Paragraph 7. I am also seeing Generals Maxwell and Brereton.

PRIME

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By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room
at 1155, EWT, AUG 8, 1942.

Action Copy

RESIPORN-PAID-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

0144

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8/10.

Prime Minister No. 128

By direction of the President,

Copy to Mr. Cordell Hull

Copy to Mr. Sumner Welles

Shown to Mr. Elmer Davis by Captain McCrea

0145

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 9, 1942

URGENT

2253Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States

W-1

Copies furnished as noted:

No XXXC 124 August 9, 1942

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
number one two eight [redacted] and personal.

1. I hope you will let me see beforehand the text of any message you are thinking of sending me upon the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter on August fourteen. We considered the wording of that famous document line by line together and I should not be able, without mature consideration, to give it a wider interpretation than was agreed between us at the time. Its proposed application to Asia and Africa requires much thought. Great embarrassment would be caused to the defence of India at the present time by such a statement as the Office of War Information has been forecasting. Here in the Middle East the Arabs might claim by majority they could expel the Jews from Palestine, or at any time forbid all further immigration. I am strongly wedded to the Zionist policy, of which I was one of the authors. This is only one of the many unforeseen cases which will arise from new and further declarations.

2. Would it not be sufficient to dwell on the progress made in this memorable year, to the growth of the United Nations, to the continued magnificent resistance of Russia to aggression, to the success of the arms of the United States in the Pacific and to the growth of our combined airpower? Finally we could reaffirm our principles and point to the hope of a happier world after some preliminary intervening unpleasantness has been satisfactorily got over. I am sure you will consider my difficulties with the kindness you always show to me.

Prime

RECEIVED IN MAP
ROOM 2024, EWT,
AUGUST 9, 1942

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

NAVAL MESSAGE
IN

T.O.O. 0845/10
Date . 10.8.42
Time . 0900

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Addressed : J.S.M. Washington
Repeated : Air Ministry
From : Mideast.

IMMEDIATE

REFLEX No. 62 10/8 . Following **[REDACTED]** and
Personal for President ROOSEVELT from Former
Naval Person, begins:

Your 176. Thank you very much.

0845/10

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

MM

*Received in Map Room
0955, EWT, Aug. 10, 1942.*

0147

No. 128-A

Cablegram

CSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 13, 1942

M.

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

Former naval person to President Roosevelt personal and ~~reference~~ number one two nine. I repeat for your information following report which I have telegraphed to Deputy Prime Minister.

One. Machine carrying Brooke, Cadogna, Wavell and Tedder was forced to return to Teheran, but Harriman and I arrived here comfortably at five PM twelfth and were met by Molotov, Voroshilov and many others.

Two. Not being at all tired, I began conference with Stalin at Kremlin at seven PM. This lasted nearly four hours. There were present only Stalin, Molotov, Vorishilov, myself, Harriman and our Ambassador with interpreter. The first two hours were bleak and sombre. I explained at length, with maps and arguments, why we would not do sledgehammer. He said that he did not agree with our reasons. He argued the other way and everyone was pretty glum. Finally he said that he did not accept our view but we had the right to decide. In this discussion I had, ofcourse, explained round up, which he passed over too lightly because it was remote and there were great difficulties in landing anywhere outside fighter cover. However, the figures of American arrivals in UK and our own proposed expeditionary force were told as solid facts.

Three. We then passed on to the ruthless bombing of Germany, which gave general satisfaction. Monsieur Stalin emphasised the importance of striking at the morale of the German population, and I made it clear that this was one of our leading military objectives. He said he attached the greatest importance to bombing and that he knew raids were having a tremendous effect in Germany. After this prolonged discussion, it seemed that all we were going to do was no sledgehammer, no

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August 13, 1942

M.

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

round up and pay our way by bombing Germany. I thought it was best to get the **worst over first**. I did not try to relieve it, and I asked specially that there should be the plainest speaking between friends and comrades in peril. However courtesy and dignity prevailed.

Four. This was the moment in the battle **when I brought Torch** into action. As I told the whole story Stalin became intensely interested. His first question was what would happen in Spain and Vichy France. A little later on he remarked that the operation was militarily right but he had political doubts about the effect on France. He asked particularly the timing, and I said not later than October thirtieth, but President and all of us were trying to pull it forward to October seventh. This seemed a great relief to the three Russians. At this point Monsieur Stalin said, according to the interpreter, (May God prosper this undertaking).

Five. This marked the turning point in our conversation. He then began to raise various political objections fearing that the Anglo-American seizure of Torch Regions would be misunderstood in France. What were we doing about De Gaulle? I said if he were thought helpful he would be used, but at present we thought the American Flag was a far better chance of an easy entry. Harriman backed this very strongly by referring to reports by American Agents all over Torch Territories on which The President relies, and also Admiral Leahys opinion. Presently Monsieur Stalin epitomized four main reasons for Torch. First. It would hit Rommel in the back. Second. It would over awe Spain. Third. It would produce fighting between Germans and Frenchmen in France and, fourth it would expose Italy to the whole brunt of the war. This statement pleased me greatly as showing his swift and complete mastery of a problem hitherto Novel. I added, of course, the fifth reason, namely

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By K. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 13, 1942

M.

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

shortening of the sea route through the Mediterranean. He was concerned to know whether we were able to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar. I also told him the changes of command in Egypt and our determination to fight a decisive battle there in late August or September. Finally, it was clear that they all liked Torch though Molotov asked whether it could not be in September.

Six. I then proceeded to open the prospect of our placing an Anglo-American Air Force on the Southern Flank of the Russian Armies to defend the Caspian and the Caucasian Mountains and generally to fight in this theatre. I did not, however, go into details, as of course we had to win our battle in Egypt first and I had not the Presidents plans for the American contribution. If Stalin liked the idea we would set to work in detail upon it. He replied that they would be most grateful for this aid, but that the details of location etc, would require study. As you know, I am very keen on this project because it will bring about more hard fighting between the Anglo-American air power and the Huns, all of which aids the gaining of mastery in the air under more fertile conditions than looking for trouble over the Pas De Calais.

Seven. Thus all ended cordially, and I expect I shall establish a solid and sincere relationship with this man and convince him of our ardent desire, shared by the President, to get into battle heavily and speedily to the best advantage. About the Russians, he said only that the Germans had produced more tanks and power than had been expected, that the news from the South was not good, and that the Russians had started diversions as at Rshev, which was making progress.

Eight. I must tell you what a help Harriman was in this extremely serious, tense, and at one time critical discussion. He came in heavily in the name of the President in everything about Torch, and his presence throughout was invaluable.

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Govt., State Dept. rel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 13, 1942

M.

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

Nine. It is arranged that I see Monsieur Molotov today, ~~when he can go some at length~~ into the political sides of Torch and reassure them about France and Vichy.

Ten. If, as I hope, Brooke and the others arrive this evening, the military authorities on both sides are to sit together and check up both on strategy and technical detail.

Eleven. I told Stalin I should hold myself at his disposition should he wish to see me again. He replied that the Russian custom was that the visitor should state his wishes and that he was ready at any time. Accordingly I am going to propose another talk for this evening, perhaps at ten PM. He knows the worst, and we parted in an atmosphere of great good will. I am lodged in State Villa No seven where Stalin sometimes stays himself. It stands in the midst of a thick wood, is strongly guarded on every side, and has a spacious underground suite in case of air raids. The weather is beautiful, and what we should like best in England.

Prime

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Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

TELEGRAM *Bot*

The White House

Washington

August 14 1942

FROM LONDON
FOR THE PRESIDENT

NUMBER 128 from London August 14 1942

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt

~~██████████~~ and personalNumber 130

Your number 177

I take it amiss Chiang should seek to make difficulties between us and should interfere in matters about which he has proved himself most ill informed which affect our Sovereign rights. Decision to intern Gandhi was taken by executive of twelve, at which only one European was present. These Indians are as good Indian patriots and as able men as any of the congress leaders. They have shown great courage and it is essential not to weaken their authority. All Chiang's talk of congress leaders wishing us to quit in order that they may help the Allies is eye wash.

They are concerned with one thing only namely, congress supremacy. It occurred to me you could remind Chiang that Gandhi was prepared to negotiate with Japan on the basis of a free passage for Japanese troops through India in (garbled group) of their joining hands with Hitler. Personally I have no doubts that in addition there would have been an understanding that the congress would have the use of sufficient Japanese troops to keep down the composite majority of ninety million Moslems, forty million Untouchables and ninety million in the princes states. The style of his message prompts me to say "Cherchez la Femme".

It may well be that the ensuing weeks will show how very little real influence the Hindu congress has over the masses of India.

Averall and I are sending you full accounts of our conversation with Stalin, and upshot of which is so far satisfactory.

PRIME

745pm/d

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Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0152

Received at the War Department Message Center
Rosen Building Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 14, 1942

1816 Z M.

WAS

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 128 from London August 14, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. [redacted] and
personal. Number 130. Your number 177.

I take it smiss Chiang should seek to make difficulties
between us and should interfere in matters about which he has
proved himself most ill informed which affect our Sovereign Rights.
Decision to intern Gandhi was taken by executive of twelve, at
which only one European was present. These Indians are as good
Indian patriots and as able men as any of the Congress leaders.
They have shown great courage and it is essential not to weaken
their authority. All Chiangs talk of Congress leaders wishing
us to quit in order that they may help the Allies is eye wash.
They are concerned with one thing only namely, congress supremacy.
It occurred to me you could remind Chiang that Gandhi was prepared
to negotiate with Japan on the basis of a free passage for Japanese
troops through India in (garbled group) of their joining hands
with Hitler. Personally I have no doubts that in addition there
would have been an understanding that the congress would have
the use of sufficient Japanese troops to keep down the composite
majority of ninety million Moslems, forty million Untouchables
and ninety million in the Princes States. The style of his message

[redacted stamp]

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By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #2 of Number 128 from London August 14, 1942 XXX-C

It may well be that the ensuing weeks will show how very little real influence the Hindu Congress has over the masses of India.

Averell and I are sending you full accounts of our conversation with Stalin, and upshot of which is so far satisfactory.

Prime

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

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REGIFORM-PATD.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK

0154

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 15, 1942

1616 Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

W.A.H.

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942 XXX-C

From Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Number 131
personal and [redacted]

Para 1. I visited Molotov at the Kremlin yesterday morning in order to explain to him more clearly and fully the character of the operations Sledgehammer, Roundup, Bolero, Torch and Jupiter. I pointed out how injurious to the common cause it would be if, owing to recriminations about dropping Sledgehammer, we were forced to argue publicly against such enterprises. I also explained more fully the political setting of Torch. He listened affably but contributed nothing. I proposed to him that I should see Stalin at ten PM that night, and later in the day got word that eleven o'clock would be more convenient and that as the subjects to be dealt with would be the same as those of the night before, would I wish to bring Harriman. I said yes, and also Cadogan, Brooke, Wavell and Tedder who had meanwhile arrived safely from Teheran in a Russian plane. They might have had a very dangerous fire in their Liberator.

Para 2. Accordingly, we all repaired to the Kremlin at eleven PM and were received only by Stalin and Molotov with the interpreter. Then began a most unpleasant discussion. Stalin handed me the enclosed document to which see also my reply. When

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Date MAY 5 1971
By R. H. Parks

[redacted]

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Received at the War Department Message Center
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~~SECRET~~

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Page #2 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

it was translated I said I would answer it in writing and that he must understand we have made up our minds upon the course to be pursued and that reproaches were vain. Thereafter we argued for about two hours, during which he said many disagreeable things, especially about our being too much afraid of fighting the Germans, and if we tried it like the Russians we should find it not so bad, that we had broken our promise about Sledgehammer, that we had failed in delivering the supplies promised to Russia and only sent remnants after we had taken all we needed for ourselves. Apparently these complaints were addressed as much to the United States as to Britain.

Para 3. I repulsed all his contentions squarely but without taunts of any kind. I suppose he is not used to being contradicted repeatedly but he did not become at all angry or even animated. On one occasion I said "I pardon that remark only on account of the bravery of the Russian troops". Finally he said we could carry it no further. He must accept our decision and abruptly invited us to dinner at eight o'clock tonight.

Para 4. Accepted the invitation said I would leave by plane at dawn the next morning i. e. fifteenth. Jo seemed somewhat concerned at this and asked could I not stay longer. I said,

~~SECRET~~
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0156

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #3 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

certainly, if there was any good to be done, and that I would wait one more day anyhow. I then exclaimed there was no ring of comradeship in his attitude. I had travelled far to establish good working relations. We had done our utmost to help Russia and would continue to do so. We had been left entirely alone for a year against Germany and Italy. Now that the three great nations were allied, victory was certain provided we did not fall apart, and so forth. I was somewhat animated in this passage and before it could be translated he made the remark that ~~(garbled group)~~ ^{he liked the} temperament ^{(or} spirit?) of my utterance. Thereafter the talk began again in a somewhat less tense atmosphere.

Para 5. He plunged into a long discussion of two Russian trench mortars firing rockets which he declared were devastating in their effects and which he offered to demonstrate to our experts if they could wait. He said he would let us have all information about them, but should there not be something in return. Should there not be an agreement to exchange information of inventions.

I said that we would give them everything without any bargaining except only those devices which, if carried in aeroplanes over the enemy lines and shot down would make our bombing of Germany more difficult. He accepted this. He also agreed that his military

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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Received at the War Department Message Center
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M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #4 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

authorities should meet our generals and this was arranged for three o'clock this afternoon. I said they would require at least four hours to go fully into the various technical questions involved in Sledgehammer, Roundup, Torch. He observed at one moment that Torch was militarily correct but that the political side required more delicacy, i. e. more careful handling. From time to time he returned to Sledgehammer, grumbling about it. When he said our promise had not been kept, I replied "I repudiate that statement. Every promise has been kept". And I pointed to the aide memoire I gave Molotov. He made a sort of apology saying that he was expressing his sincere and honest opinions, that there was no mistrust between us but only a difference of view.

Para 6. Finally I asked about the Caucasus. Was he going to defend the mountain chain, and with how many divisions. At this he sent for a relief model and with apparent frankness and knowledge explained the strength of this barrier, for which he said twenty five divisions were available. He pointed to the various passes and said they would be defended. I asked were they fortified and he said yes certainly. The Russian front line which the enemy had not yet reached is north of the main range. He said they would have to hold out for two months when the snow would make the mountains

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Govt., S. 1.1.1. Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 25 1977

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Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #5 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942
impassable. He expressed himself quite confident of his ability to do this, and also recounted in detail the strength of the Black Sea fleet which was already at Batum. He expressed however, suspicion of Turkish intentions and indicated that he did not trust them not to attack him in the rear. If they did he would smash them.

Para 7. All this part of the talk was easier, but when Harriman asked about the plans for bringing American aircraft across Siberia, to which the Russians have only recently consented after long American pressing, he replied, curtly, "wars are not won with plans". Harriman backed me up throughout and we neither of us yielded an inch nor spoke a bitter word.

Para 8. It was arranged that Cadogan and Molotov should meet today to draw up a communique and to discuss publicity. Stalin assented to this with a short laugh, remarking that they were the two who had drawn up the Anglo American Russian communique issued in London.

Para 9. He made his salute and held out his hand to me on leaving and I took it. In the public interest I shall go to the dinner tonight.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY

Action Copy

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From _____

_____ M.

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 6 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

Para 10. Asked ourselves what was the explanation of this performance and transformation from the good ground we had reached the night before. I think the most probable is that his council of commissars did not take the news I brought as well as he did. They perhaps have more power than we suppose and less knowledge. And that he was putting himself on record for future purposes and for their benefit and also letting off steam for his own. Cadogan says a similar hardening up followed the opening of the Eden interview at Christmas, and Harriman says that this technique was also used at the beginning of the Beaverbrook mission.

Para 11. It is my considered opinion that in his heart so far as he has one Stalin knows we are right and that six divisions on Sledgehammer would do him no good this year. Moreover I am certain that his sure footed and quick military judgement makes him a strong supporter of Torch. I think it not impossible that he will make amends. In that hope I persevere. Anyhow I am sure it was better to have it out this way than any other. There was never at any time the slightest suggestion of their not fighting on and I think myself that Stalin has good confidence that he will win.

Para 12. When I thanked Stalin for the forty Bostons he made a half disdainful gesture, saying "they were American planes.

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By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972

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Received at the War Department Message Center
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From _____ ~~SECRET~~ _____ M.
To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #7 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

When I give you Russian planes then you may thank me". By this he did not mean to disparage the American planes but said that he counted on his own strength. He stated his aircraft production at one thousand eight hundred a month plus six hundred trainers.

Para 13. I make great allowances for the stresses through which they are passing. Finally, I think they want full publicity for the visit. Translation aide memoire to follow (Potus 130).

Prime

~~SECRET~~

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Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

Cablegram

CSWD
Aug. 15

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Aug. 15, 1942

URGENT

1932 Z M.

London

To President of the United States

WSP

No. 130, Aug. 15, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and
number one three one (Translation Aide Memoire).

As the result of an exchange of views in Moscow which took place on August twelfth of this year I ascertained that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, considered the organization of a Second Front in Europe in one nine four two to be impossible. As is well known the organization of a Second Front in Europe in one nine four two was pre-decided during the sojourn of Molotov in London and it found expression in the agreed Anglo Soviet communique published on June twelfth last. It is also known that the organization of a Second Front in Europe has as its object the withdrawal of German Forces from the Eastern Front to the West and the creation in the West of a serious base of resistance to the German Fascist Forces and the affording of relief by this means to the situation of the Soviet Forces on the Soviet German Front in one nine four two. It is easy to grasp that the refusal of the Government of Great Britain to create a Second Front in one nine four two in Europe inflicts a moral blow to the whole of Soviet public opinion, which calculates on the creation of a Second Front and that complicates the situation of the Red Army at the front and prejudices the plan of the Soviet Command. I am now referring to the fact that the difficulties arising for the Red Army as a result of the refusal to create a Second Front in one nine four two will undoubtedly have to deteriorate the Military situation of England and all the remaining Allies. It appears to me and my Colleagues that the most favourable conditions exist in one nine four two for the creation of a

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

_____ M.

~~SECRET~~

To _____

Page 2 No. 130; Aug. 15, 1942

Second Front in Europe, inasmuch as almost all the Forces of the German Army and the best Forces to boot have been withdrawn to the Eastern Front leaving in Europe an inconsiderable amount of Forces and these of inferior quality. It is unknown whether the year of one nine four three will offer conditions for the creation of a Second Front as favourable as one nine four two.

We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is particularly in one nine four two that the creation of a Second Front in Europe is possible and should be effective. I was however unfortunately unsuccessful in convincing Mr. Prime Minister of Great Britain there-of while Mr. Harriman the Representative of the President of the U S A fully supported Mr. Prime Minister in the negotiations held in Moscow.

In reply to Premier Stalins Aide Memoire of August thirteenth the Prime Minister of Great Britain states; (One) The best Second Front in one nine four two and the only large scale operation possible from the Atlantic, is Torch. If this can be effected in October it will give more aid to Russia than any other plan. It also prepares the way for one nine four three and has the four advantages mentioned by Premier Stalin in the conversation of August Twelfth. The British and United States Governments have made up their minds about this and all preparations are proceeding with the utmost speed. (Two) Compared with Torch, the attack with six or eight Anglo American Divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula and the Channel Islands would be a hazardous and futile operation. The Germans have enough troops in the West to block us in this narrow

~~SECRET~~
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A. H. Parks

Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

_____M.

To _____

Page 3 No. 130, Aug. 15, 1942

Peninsula with fortified lines and would concentrate all their Air Forces in the West upon us. In the opinion of all the British Naval Military and Air authorities the operation could only end in disaster even if the lodgement were made it would not bring a single Division back from Russia. It would also be far more a running sore for us than for the enemy, and would use wastefully and wantonly the key men and the landing craft required for real action in one nine four three. This is our settled view. The C I G S rpt Cast Inter George Sail will go into details with the Russian Commanders to any extent that may be desired. (Three) No promise has been broken by Great Britain or the United States. I point to paragraph five of my Aide Memoire ^{9/1942} ~~(Cabled Group)~~ to Mister Molotov on the tenth June one nine four two which distinctly says "We can, therefore, give no promise." This Aide Memiore followed upon lengthy conversations, in which the very small chance of such plan being adopted was made abundantly clear. Several of these conversations are on record. (Four) However, all the talk about an Anglo American invasion of France this year has misled the enemy and has held large Air Forces and considerable Military Forces on the French Channel Coast. It would be injurious to all common interests, especially Russian interests, if any public controversy arose in which it would be necessary for the British Government to unfold to the Nation the crushing argument which they conceive themselves to possess against Sledgehammer. Widespread discouragement would be caused to the Russian Armies who have been buoyed up on this subject, and the enemy would be free to withdraw further Forces from the West. The wisest course is to use Sledgehammer as a blind for Torch and proclaim Torch when it begins as the Second Front. This is what we ourselves mean to do. (Five) We cannot admit that the conversations with Mister Molotov about the Second Front, safeguarded as they were by reservations to both oral and written, formed any ground for

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M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 4 No. 130, Aug. 15, 1942

altering the strategic plans of the Russian High Command. (Six) We reaffirm our resolve to aid our Russian Allies by every practicable means. For Garbled Group in Paragraph Four (Potus one two nine) Please read: Made the remark that he liked the temperament (or spirit?) of my utterance.* Garbled Group in (Three) of Aide Memoire should read: United States. I point to Paragraph Five of my Aide Memoire given to Mister Molotov on tenth June one nine four two.*

Prime

* Corrections
Made.

S.

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By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

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0165

AMWAR 1
filed 1043A/15
fb

CSWD

CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 16, 1942

~~SECRET~~

0957 Z M.

From LONDON

To The President of The United States

W.H.

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 131 August 16, 1942

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ~~██████████~~ AND
PERSONAL NUMBER ONE THREE TWO.

ONE. YOUR ONE SEVEN EIGHT. AM MUCH OBLIGED TO
YOU FOR THE FORM IN WHICH YOU HAVE COUCHED YOUR MESSAGE
WHICH IS ENTIRELY AGREEABLE TO ME. FEAR IT IS TOO LATE
FOR ME TO REPLY NOW.

TWO. ANY CONSOLING OR HEARTENING MESSAGE YOU FEEL
LIKE SENDING TO STALIN SECRETLY WOULD BE HELPFUL. YOU
WILL HAVE SEEN MY FULL ACCOUNTS. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT
I SHOULD HAVE DONE WITHOUT AVERELL.

PRIME

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

*Received in my
Room 0705/16 E.A.T.*

Action Copy

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

REGIFORM-PAID-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

0166

AMWAR 8
filed 17/714P
md

Cablegram

GSWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 17, 1942

SECRET

1839 Z M.

WAT
B

From Embassy London

To Potus

Copies furnished as noted:

No. 132, August 17th, 1942

From former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal
and **[REDACTED]** Number 133. Reference my telegram Number 131.

Para 1. The dinner passed off in a very friendly atmosphere
and the usual Russian ceremonies. Wavell made an excellent speech
in Russian. I proposed Stalin's health and Alexander Cadogan
proposed death and damnation to the Germans. Though I sat on
Stalin's right I got no opportunity of talking about serious things.
Pavlov, the little interpreter, was a very poor substitute for
Maisky. Stalin and I were photographed together, also with Harri-
man. Stalin made quite a long speech proposing the "intelligence
service" in the course of which he made a curious reference to
the Dardanelles in 1915, saying that the British had won and the
Germans and Turks were already retreating but we did not know
because the intelligence was faulty. This picture, though inac-
curate, was evidently meant to be complimentary to me.

Para 2. I left about one thirty AM as I was afraid we
should be drawn into a lengthy film and was fatigued. When I said
good bye to Stalin he said that any differences that existed were
only of method. I said we would try to remove even those differences
by deeds. After a cordial handshake I then took my departure and
got some way down the crowded room but he hurried after me and

*Received Mar Room
Aug 17, 1942*

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
1600 GWT

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Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #2 of Number 132, August 17, 1942

accompanied me an immense distance through corridors and staircases to the front door where we again shook hands.

Para 3. Perhaps in my account to you of the Thursday night meeting I took too gloomy a view. I feel I must make full allowance for the really grievous disappointment which they feel here that we can do nothing more to help them in their immense struggle. In the upshot they have swallowed this bitter pill. Everything for us now turns on hastening Torch and defeating Rommel.

Para 4. I have just had a long talk, with dinner lasting six hours, with Stalin and Molotov alone in his private apartment with a good interpreter. I will send you a fuller account later but we covered the whole ground and parted on most cordial and friendly terms. At this meeting the communique was agreed and our ambassador will be getting into touch with London about its publication on either seventeenth or eighteenth August.

Para 5. C I G S met the Russian military authorities twice yesterday fifteenth. He was much impressed with the demonstration of the mortar on the fourteenth. I am leaving at dawn today sixteenth and hope to reach Cairo morning seventeenth.

Prime
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By R. H. Parks Date

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Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 18, 1942

1610 Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 133 from London, August 18, 1942. XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and
secret. Number 134. Reference my telegram Number 133.

Para 1. Following is telegram I sent my colleagues from
Teheran describing final stage of Moscow conversations. Begins
I went to wind up with Monsieur Stalin at seven PM on August 15
and we had an agreeable conversation in the course of which he
gave me full account of the Russian position which seemed very
encouraging. He certainly speaks with great confidence of being
able to hold out until the winter. At eight thirty PM when I
got up to leave he asked me when was the next time he was going
to see me. I said that I was leaving at dawn. He then said
"Why do you not come over to my apartment in the Kremlin and have
some drinks". I went and stayed to dinner to which Monsieur
Molotov was also summoned. Monsieur Stalin introduced me to
his daughter who was a nice girl and kissed him shyly but was
not allowed to dine. The dinner and (garbled group) communique
lasted till three AM this morning. I had a very good interpreter
and was able to talk much more easily. The greatest goodwill pre-
vailed and for the first time we got on to easy and friendly
terms. I feel that I have established a personal relationship
which will be helpful. We talked a great deal about Jupiter which

*received in
Map Room - 181334*

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #2 of Number 133 from London, August 18, 1942.

he thinks essential in November or December. Without it I really do not see how we are going to be able to get through the supplies which will be needed to keep this tremendous fighting army equipped. The Trans-Persian route is only working at half what we hoped. What he requires most of all are lorries. He would rather have lorries than tanks, of which he is making two thousand a month; also he wants aluminium.

Para 2. I only got home at half past three and as Monsieur Molotov was going to conduct me to the plane at four thirty AM it was not worth going to bed. We started at five AM with full military ceremonies as dawn was breaking. We travelled on east side of the Caspian, rather farther from the enemy than last time and crossed the mountains at thirteen thousand feet making a very good journey of nine and a half hours to Teheran where I am now resting in the summer legation which is very cool and pleasant. I start for Cairo at five AM tomorrow August 17 and should be there in about a week.

Para 3. On the whole I am definitely encouraged by my visit to Moscow. I am sure that the disappointing news I brought could not have been imparted except by me personally without leading to really serious drifting apart. It was my duty to go. Now they

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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0170

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Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

~~SECRET~~

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #5 of Number 133 from London, August 18, 1942.

know the worst, and having made their protest are entirely friendly: this in spite of the fact that this is their most anxious and agonizing time. Moreover Monsieur Stalin is entirely convinced of the great advantages of Torch and I do trust that it is being driven forward with superhuman energy on both sides of the ocean.

Prime

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Received -
222045

Subject:

URGENT

To:

AMWAR 7
FILED 1205A/22
BVC

CCWD
August 23, 1942
2335 Z

From: London
To: POTUS

No. 134, August 22, 1942

Former Naval Person to President
and personal number one three five.

Your one six six of sixteenth July. I have delayed my reply until I could study the Trans Persian situation on the spot. This I have now done both at Teheran and here, and have conferred with Averell, General Maxwell, General Spalding and their railway experts. The traffic on the Trans Persian Railway is expected to reach three thousand tons a day for all purposes by end of the year. We are all convinced that it ought to be raised to six thousand tons. Only in this way can we ensure an expanding flow of supplies to Russia while building up the military forces which we must move into Northern Persia to meet a possible German advance.

To reach the higher figure, it will be necessary to increase largely the railway personnel and to provide additional quantities of rolling stock and technical equipment. Furthermore, the target will only be attained in reasonable time if enthusiasm and energy are devoted to the task and a high priority accorded to its requirements.



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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

To:

From: London
To: POTUS

No. 134, August 22, 1942

Page 2

I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained in your telegram, that the railway should be taken over, developed and operated by the United States Army. With the railway should be included the ports of Khorran-shahr and Bandarshahpur. Your people would thus undertake the great task of opening up the Persian corridor, which will carry primarily your supplies to Russia. All our people here agree on the benefits which would follow your approval of this suggestion. We should be unable to find the resources without your help and our burden in the Middle East would be eased by the release for use elsewhere of the British Units now operating the railway. The railway and ports would be managed entirely by your people, though the allocation of traffic would have to be retained in the hands of the British Military Authorities for whom the railway is an essential channel of communication for operational purposes. I see no obstacle in this to harmonious working.

The changeover would have to be carefully planned to avoid any temporary reduction of effort, but I think it should start as soon as possible. Averell is cabling you detailed suggestions.

PRIME



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM NAVCOM LONDON	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			RRRRR
DATE 27 AUG 42	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 0949			DEFERRED
DECODED BY WILBY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY SARNOFF			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROBINSON

270849 NCR 4163

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

PM 136 in 4 parts

ACTION

F-00
F-01
F-015
F-0015
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-11
F-2
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-35
F-37
IG-00
VCNO

MESSAGES 261349° 261250° 261149° AND 261321° TRANSMITTED AT REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR WINNANT. ONLY PLAIN LANGUAGE COPY NOW IN POSSESSION OF AMBASSADOR. SEEN ONLY BY COMDR J H LEPPERT USN AND LT COMDR W W WELLS USNR BY WHOM ENCIPHERED. ALL CODE COPIES BURNED.

*SEALED SECRET

P-1-A...ACTION

FILE

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- **MAY 5 1972**

Signature- *RAND*

SECRET

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-22815-1

270849

201

0174

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FORMER NAVAL PERSON (VIA ALUSNA LONDON)	PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT	OPPOPOPOP PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE	26 AUG 1942		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			PRIORITY
DECODED BY	ROONEY	DECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972	ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

261349 NCR 3491

PART ONE DE FOUR

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

NUMBER 136.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND ~~TOP SECRET~~;

PART ONE: I AM CONCENTRATING MY MAIN THOUGHT UPON "TORCH" FROM NOW ON, AND YOU MAY TRUST ME TO DO MY UTMOST TO MAKE YOUR

GREAT STRATEGIC CONCEPTION A DECISIVE SUCCESS. IT SEEMS TO ME FROM TALKS I HAVE HAD WITH EISENHOWER, CLARK AND OUR OWN PEOPLE

HERE THAT THE BEST AND INDEED THE ONLY WAY TO PUT THIS JOB THRU IS TO FIX A DATE FOR THE PARTY AND MAKE EVERYTHING CONFORM TO

THAT. RATHER THAN SAYING IT WILL START WHEN EVERYTHING IS READY. IT WOULD BE AN IMMENSE HELP IF YOU AND I WERE TO GIVE EISENHOWER

A DIRECTIVE SOMETHING LIKE THIS:- (BEGINS) YOU WILL START "TORCH" ON OCTOBER 14, ATTACKING WITH SUCH TROOPS AS ARE AVAILABLE AND

AT SUCH PLACES AS YOU DEEM FIT. (ENDS). THIS WILL ALTER THE WHOLE CHARACTER OF THE PREPARATIONS. EISENHOWER WILL REALLY

HAVE THE POWER HE SHOULD HAVE AS THE ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. ENDLESS OBJECTIONS, MISGIVINGS AND WELL MEANT IMPROVEMENTS WILL

FALL BACK INTO THEIR PROPER PLACES, AND ACTION WILL EMERGE FROM WHAT WILL OTHERWISE BE ALMOST UNENDING HMMINGS AND HAWINGS.

I THINK EISENHOWER WOULD LIKE THIS, AND IT WOULD ANYHOW GIVE HIM A CHANCE WHICH HE HAS NOT NOW GOT.

P1A.....ACTION

(PART TWO FOLLOWS:)

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~~**SECRET**~~

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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON (ALUSNA LONDON)		PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT	OPOROP PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
RELEASED BY			
DATE 26 AUG 1942			
TOR CODEROOM			PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
DECODED BY	REGRADED Govt. By R.	UNCLASSIFIED by British State Dept. tel., 3-29-73 By R. Parks Date MAY 5 1972	
PARAPHRASED LT JG ROONEY			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

261257 NCR 3482 PART TWO OF FOUR

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

PART TWO;

AS I SEE THIS OPERATION IT IS PRIMARILY POLITICAL IN ITS FOUNDATIONS. THE FIRST VICTORY WE HAVE TO WIN IS TO AVOID A BATTLE.

THE SECOND, IF WE CANNOT AVOID IT, TO WIN IT. IN ORDER TO GIVE US THE BEST CHANCES OF THE FIRST VICTORY WE MUST (A) PRESENT

THE MAXIMUM APPEARANCE OF OVERWHELMING STRENGTH AT THE MOMENT OF THE FIRST ATTACK, AND (B) ATTACK AT AS MANY PLACES AS POSSIBLE.

THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT KIND OF OPERATION FROM THE DIEPPE BUSINESS OR ANY VARIANTS OF "SLEDGEHAMMER". THERE WE WERE UP

AGAINST GERMAN EFFICIENCY AND THE STEEL-BOUND, FORTIFIED COASTS OF FRANCE. IN "TORCH" WE HAVE TO FACE AT THE WORST WEAK, DI-

VIDED OPPOSITION AND AN ENORMOUS CHOICE OF STRIKINGS POINTS AT WHICH TO LAND. RISKS AND DIFFICULTIES WILL BE DOUBLED BY DELAY

AND WILL FAR OUSTRIP INCREASE OF OUR FORCES. CAREFUL PLANNING IN EVERY DETAIL, SAFETY FIRST IN EVERY CALCULATION, FAR SEEING

PROVISIONS FOR A LONG-TERM CAMPAIGN, TO MEET EVERY CONCEIVABLE ADVERSE CONTINGENCY, HOWEVER ADMIRABLE IN THEORY WILL RUIN THE

ENTERPRISE IN FACT. ANYTHING LATER THAN THE DATE I HAVE MENTIONED ENORMOUSLY INCREASES THE DANGER OF LEAKAGE AND FORESTAL-

MENT.

PART THREE FOLLOWS;

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~~**SECRET**~~

P1A.....ACTION

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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON (ALUSNA LONDON)	FOR ACTION	PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT	PRIORITY OPOPOPOPOPOP
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE 26 AUG 1942	FOR INFORMATION	REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. E. Parks Date MAY 5 1972	DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY LT JO ROONEY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE ONE. 261149 NCR 3508 PART THREE OF FOUR

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

PART THREE:

IN ORDER TO LIGHTEN THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY ON THE MILITARY COMMANDERS I AM OF OPINION THAT YOU AND I SHOULD LAY DOWN THE POLITICAL DATA AND TAKE THIS RISK UPON OURSELVES. IN MY VIEW IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO ASSUME (A) THAT SPAIN WILL NOT GO TO WAR WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ON ACCOUNT OF "TORCH"; (B) THAT IT WILL BE AT LEAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE GERMANS CAN FORCE THEIR WAY THROUGH SPAIN OR PROCURE SOME ACCOMODATION FROM HER; (C) THAT THE FRENCH RESISTANCE IN NORTH AFRICA WILL BE LARGELY TAKEN RESISTANCE, CAPABLE OF BEING OVERCOME BY THE SUDDENNESS AND SCALE OF THE ATTACK, AND THAT THEREAFTER THE NORTH AFRICAN FRENCH MAY ACTIVELY HELP US UNDER THEIR OWN COMMANDERS; (D) THAT VICHY WILL NOT DECLARE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN; (E) THAT HITLER WILL PUT EXTREME PRESSURE ON VICHY, BUT THAT IN OCTOBER HE WILL NOT HAVE THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO OVER-RUN UNOCCUPIED FRANCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WE KEEP HIM PINNED IN THE PAS DE CALAIS, ETC. ALL THESE DATA MAY PROVE ERRONEOUS. IN WHICH CASE WE SHALL HAVE TO SETTLE DOWN TO HARD SLUGGING. FOR THIS WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PREPARED, BUT A BOLD

(PAGE TWO FOLLOWS)

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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON (AEUSNA LONDON)	FOR ACTION	PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT	0POPOPOPOPOP PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE 26 AUG 1942	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY LT JC ROONEY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE TWO 261149 NCR 3508 PART THREE OF FOUR

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

PART THREE CONTINUED;

AUDACIOUS BID FOR A BLOODLESS VICTORY AT THE OUTSET MAY WIN A VERY GREAT PRIZE. PERSONALLY I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ANY AMOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUNNING THE POLITICAL RISKS AND BEING PROVED WRONG ABOUT THE POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS.

P1A.....ACTION

(PART FOUR FOLLOWS)

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~~SECRET~~

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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>FORMER NAVAL PERSON</u> <u>(AEUSNA LONDON)</u>	FOR ACTION	PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT	OPOPOPO PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE <u>26 AUG 1942</u>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>LT JC ROONEY</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

261321 NCR 3488 PART FOUR OF FOUR

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

PART FOUR;

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD BE GREATLY HELPED BY A BATTLE WON IN THE WESTERN DESERT. EITHER ROMMEL ATTACKS US BY THE AUGUST MOON, OR WE SHALL ATTACK HIM BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER. EITHER WAY THERE WILL BE A DECISION, AND I FEEL VERY CONFIDENT THAT THE DECISION WILL BE HELPFUL.

PARAGRAPH FIVE.

I HAVE REFRAINED AS YOU KNOW FROM GOING INTO ANY DETAILS HERE BECAUSE I FEEL IT IS A NOTE THAT MUST BE STRUCK NOW OF IRREVOCABLE DECISION AND SUPERHUMAN ENERGY TO EXECUTE IT.

(THIS IS FINAL PART OF FOUR PART DISPATCH)

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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

P1A.....ACTION

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~~**SECRET**~~

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~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO
AMWAR 10
Filed 26/84OP

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

WDCC
AUGUST 26
2004 Z

Subject:

Number 137 from PRIME, LONDON
XXXC

To:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

WRD

~~SECRET~~

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT
PERSONAL NUMBER ONE THREE SEVEN.

I HAVE JUST SEEN THE PICTURES OF THE
PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL WHICH YOU SENT
ME. I TRUST ITS DELIBERATIONS ARE
PROGRESSING. SO MANY THANKS.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

XXX-C



Received in Map Room
at 1710, EWT, August 26, 1942.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO
AMWAR 11
Filed 26/904P

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

WDCC
AUGUST 26
2018 Z

Subject: Number 138 from PRIME, LONDON
XXXC

To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

TO PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET NUMBER ONE
THREE EIGHT.

I HAVE NOW SEEN THE NEW DIRECTIVE
PROPOSED BY YOUR CHIEFS OF STAFF IN
JSM THREE SIX FIVE. THIS IS BEING
URGENTLY CONSIDERED BY BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF. I WILL DISCUSS IT WITH
THEM, AND TELEGRAPH YOU OUR VIEWS AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PRIME

XXX-C

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972



Received in Map Room at
1710, EWT, Aug. 26, 1942.

WAR 6
Filed 2:25P/27
JMN

CABLEGRAM

WDCC

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

August 27, 1942

1352 Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 139, August 27th, 1942. XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret No.

139.

Para 1. We are all profoundly disconcerted by the memorandum sent us by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the twenty fifth instant about (Torch). It seems to me that the whole pith of the operation will be lost if we do not take Algiers as well as Oran on the first day. In Algiers we have the best chance of a friendly reception and even if we got nothing except Algeria a most important strategic success would have been gained. General Eisenhower with our cordial support was in fact planning landings at Philippeville and Bone for day three. We cannot of course be sure of getting to Tunis before the Germans, but neither is it certain that the Germans would be well received by the French in Tunis even if Vichy gave them permission.

Para 2. Strongly established in Algeria with Oran making good the communications, we could fight the Germans for Tunis, even if they got there. But not to go east of Oran is making the enemy a present not only of Tunis but of Algiers. An operation limited to Oran and Casablanca would not give the impression of strength and of widespread simultaneous attack on which we rely for the favourable effect on the French in North Africa. We are all convinced

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By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

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REG-IPORN-PATD.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

0182

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Number 139, August 27th, 1942. XXX-C (Page #2)

that Algiers is the key to the whole operation. General Anderson, to whom this task has been assigned by Eisenhower, is confident of his ability to occupy Algiers. The occupation of Algeria and the movement towards Tunis and Bizerta is an indispensable part of the attack on Italy which is the best chance of enlisting French co-operation and one of the main objects of our future campaign.

Para 3. We are all agreed about Oran and of course we should like to see Casablanca occupied as well, but if it came to choosing between Algiers and Casablanca it cannot be doubted that the former is incomparably the more hopeful and fruitful objective. Inside the Mediterranean landings can be made in October on four days out of five. On the Atlantic shores of Morocco the proportion is exactly reversed, only one day in five being favourable.

Para 4. Nevertheless if the operations at Oran and Algiers yield good reactions and results, entry might easily be granted to a force appearing off Casablanca, and a feint would certainly be justified. It is however by far the most difficult point of attack and the one most remote from the vital objectives in the Mediterranean. Casablanca might easily become an isolated failure and let loose upon us for a small reward all the perils which have anyway to be faced in this great design. So far as Algiers is concerned all we ask

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Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

SECRET
[Redacted]

_____ M.

From _____

To _____

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 139, August 27th, 1942. (Page #3)

from you is an American contact team to show the flag. We cannot however do Algiers and Oran at the same time. If therefore you wish to do Casablanca on a large scale with all its risks, it is indispensable that United States forces should continue to be directed on Oran as now planned by the Allied Commander in Chief.


Para 5. A complete change in the plans such as the memorandum suggests would of course be fatal to the date and thus possibly to the whole plan. In October Hitler will not have the power to move into Spain or into unoccupied France. In November and with every week that passes this power to bring pressure upon Vichy and Madrid governments increases rapidly.

Para 6. I hope, Mr. President, you will bear in mind the language I have held to Stalin supported by Harriman with your full approval. If (Torch) collapses or is cut down as is now proposed, I should beel my position painfully affected. For all these reasons I most earnestly beg that the memorandum may be reconsidered and that the American Allied Commander in Chief may be permitted to go forward with the plans he has made, upon which we are all now working night and day. The staffs are communicating similar views to their American colleagues.

Prime [Redacted]

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Action Copy



~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

URGENT

WZ

To:

AMWAR 4
filed 330P/30
AEL

CABLEGRAM

CCWD
August 30
1440 Z

URGENT XXXC

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 141, August 30, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and
~~_____~~. No one four zero.

1. The project of placing on the southern flank of the Russian Armies a British and presently American Air Force must be viewed as a long term policy in our cooperation with Russia and for the defence of the Persian oilfields. The main reasons appear to be: - (a) to strengthen the Russian Air power generally; (b) to form the advance shield of all our interests in Persia and Abadan; (c) for moral effect of comradeship with the Russians which will be out of all proportion to the forces employed; (d) because this is no dispersion of forces but a greater concentration on the supreme Allied Air Force target, namely, wearing down the German Air Force by daily fighting contact.

2. Following on the various references to this subject which occur in our correspondence and to the favour with which you have viewed it in principle, I have committed his Majestys government in my talks with Stalin to the general policy and have stated that you also took a great interest in the matter. I now submit, Mr. President, a formal draft proposal on which you may feel disposed to give me your decision:

(1) The proposal is to establish in Transcaucasia an Anglo American Air Force to assist



Received in Map Room
1250 August 30.

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

IN REPLY REFER TO

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

To:

Page 2. No. 141 from London

the Russian Land and Air Forces in holding the line of the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea Coast. The necessary air forces would be withdrawn from Egypt as soon as the situation in the Western Desert is such that they can be spared from that front and could be concentrated in the Baku Batum Area in about two months from that time.

(2) This proposal has already been offered in general terms to Premier Stalin who accepted it gratefully and indicated that the details of the plan should receive further study. In discussion between the C I G S Air Marshal Tedder and Marshal Voroshilov it was agreed that combined planning and preparation should start at once and the suggestion put that Allied Air Representatives should go to Moscow for this purpose.

(3) Subject to American agreement the force envisaged would comprise the following units. Eight short range fighter squadrons, one long range fighter squadron, three light bomber squadrons, two medium bomber squadrons, one U S heavy bombardment group and possibly later one general reconnaissance squadron.

(4) Owing to the extreme difficulties which the lack of good ground communications will impose on the maintenance of this force ample air transport will be essential for its maintenance. One U S transport group of approximately fifty aircraft is considered the minimum necessary for this purpose.

(5) Thus the American contribution suggested is one heavy bombardment group now in Egypt and one transport group which is not at present available in the Middle East. The former will require an adequate flow of aircraft and trained crews to meet attrition. In addition it is of the utmost importance that every effort should be made to ensure that at least the aircraft



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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0187

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

To:

Page 3. No. 141 from London

and air crews both first line and replacements together with minimum maintenance parties of the U S pursuit and medium bomber groups scheduled for the Middle East should be operationally fit in Egypt by the dates agreed. Even if Rommel is driven out of Cyrenaica the air defense of Egypt and our long line of communications in the Western Desert will be a heavy commitment. It is also vitally important that the RAF allocations of American fighters for Egypt be fully and promptly supplied since we must expect a high rate of attrition in the Caucasus Area not only in air fighting but on account of the poor communication and lack of adequate repair facilities in that area.

(6) The force will have to rely for the protection of its bases and line of communication mainly on the Russian Forces but we should be prepared to send light anti aircraft units for the defense of aerodromes. We might also have to send some engineer units for work on aerodromes.

(7) It is important that the ground echelon of the force should be kept as small as possible consistent with the effective operation of the aircraft since it can only be concentrated and maintained at the expense of Russian supplies through the Persian Gulf route. The interference with these supplies should not be serious. The concentration of the force will involve a movement on the rail and sea communications between Iraq and Caucasus of the order of twelve thousand personnel two thousand vehicles four thousand tons of stores. Its subsequent maintenance on the assumption that petrol and lubricants can be supplied by the Russians should not exceed two hundred tons a day of which a substantial proportion should be lifted by air.

(8) The force will operate under the strategic control of the Russian High Command but will remain a homogeneous Allied Force under a British Air Officer with the right of appeal to his own government.



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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

To:

Page 4. No. 141 from London

(9) The foregoing should constitute the basis of instructions in a mission consisting of British and American Air Force Officers who should be despatched forthwith to Russia to undertake the necessary planning reconnaissance and practical preparations in combination with the Russians. It is urgently important that this be put in hand without delay.

Prime



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By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/40
August 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

The President showed this to Marshall and asked him to make a copy of it and a report on it. Marshall has returned it.

I think this can now be filed.

H.L.H.

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

URGENT

WAL

To:

WA 5
filed 1135Z/31
AEL

CABLEGRAM

CCWD
August 31
1211 Z

URGENT XXXC

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 142, August 31, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and ~~_____~~
number one four one.

Rommel has begun the attack for which we have been
preparing. An important battle may now be fought.

Prime.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date **MAY** 5 1972



Received in Map Room
0910 August 31, 1942

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

*Return to Capt
McLain*

Subject:

URGENT

To:

AMWAR 3
filed 244P/1
AEL

CABLEGRAM

CCWD
September 1
1403 Z

URGENT XXX-C

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. C 143, September 1, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and
Number one four two.

1. We have carefully considered your number one eight zero. The Chiefs of Staff have also talked things over with Eisenhower.
2. We could not contest your wish if you so desire it to take upon the United States the whole burden, political and military, of the landings. Like you I assign immense importance to the political aspect. I do not know what information you have of the mood and temper of Vichy and North Africa, but of course if you can get ashore at the necessary points without fighting or only token resistance, that is the best of all. We cannot tell what are the chances of this.
3. I hope however that you have considered the following points: (a) Will not British participation be disclosed by the assembly of British small craft and aircraft at Gibraltar for some time beforehand? (b) Would it not be disclosed at the time of landing whatever flag we wear? (c) Would not initial fighting necessarily be between French and British aircraft and French batteries and British ships? (d) If the approach and landing take place in the dark as is indispensable to surprise, how will the Americans be distinguished from British? In the night all cats are grey. (e) What happens if, as I am assured is four to one probable, surf prevents disembarkation on Atlantic beaches?



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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

To:

Page 2. No. C 143, September 1 from London

4. Moreover if, contrary to your hopes, the landings are stubbornly opposed and even held up, we shall not be able to give you the follow-up help for some considerable time because all our assault vessels would have been used for your troops and our reinforcements would be embarked in vessels which can only enter by captured harbours. Thus if the political bloodless victory, for which I agree with you there is a good chance, should be amiss, a military disaster of very great consequence will supervene. We could have stormed Dakar in September nineteen forty if we had not been cluttered up with preliminary conciliatory processes. It is that hard experience that makes our military experts rely so much upon the simplicity of force. Will you have enough American trained and equipped forces to do this all by yourselves, or at any rate to impress the enemy by the appearance of ample strength?

5. This sudden abandonment of the plan on which we have hitherto been working will certainly cause grievous delay. General Eisenhower says that October thirtieth will be the very earliest date. I myself think that it may well mean the middle of November. Orders were given to suspend loadings yesterday in order that, if necessary, all should be recast. I fear the substitution of November for October will open up a whole new set of dangers far greater than those which must any how be faced.

6. Finally, in spite of the difficulties it seems to us vital that Algiers should be occupied simultaneously with Casablanca and Oran. Here is the most friendly and hopeful spot where the political reaction would be most decisive throughout North Africa. To give up Algiers for the sake of the doubtfully practicable landing at Casablanca seems to us a very serious decision. If it led to the Germans forestalling us not only in Tunis but in Algeria, the results on balance would be lamentable throughout the Mediterranean.



~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

To:

Page 3. No. C 143 from London, September 1

7. Mr. President, to sum up, Torch like Gymnast before it has always been viewed as primarily a United States enterprise. We have accepted an American command and your leadership and we will do our utmost to make a success of any plan on which you decide. We must however say quite plainly that we are sure that the best course is to persevere along the general lines so clearly set out in the agreed directive handed to General Eisenhower on August fourteen, with or without the modifications suggested in the Chiefs of Staffs telegram number C O S (W) two six five of August twenty nine. I am sure that if we both strip ourselves to the bone as you say, we could find sufficient naval cover and combat loadings for simultaneous attempts at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

Prime

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972



0194

8
3/807P

CABLEGRAM

WDCC

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 3, 1942

1932 Z M.

WLI

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

as furnished as noted:

Number 144 from London September 3, 1942 XXX-C

, Former Naval Person to President personal and

~~Number 143.~~ Your 182.

Para 1. We have spent the day looking into physical possibilities. Accepting your general outlines we think that a working plan can be made on the basis that the emphasis is shifted somewhat, namely reducing Casablanca by ten or twelve thousand (making up deficiency in the follow ups). These troops with their combat loaded ships would give sufficient strength inside, while making the entire assault American. This evens up the three landings and gives the essential appearance ^{OF STRENGTH} at all vital points. Without such a transference there is no hope of Algiers on account of shortage of combat loaders and landing craft. We all think this would be a great embellish to the plan.

Para 2. Tomorrow we suggest that either General Clark or General Eisenhower should come with Admiral Ramsy who knows the whole transportation escort story and the naval aspect from our end, and Mountbatten on the landing details which are crucial, party reaching you Sunday morning. We do not here know what naval forces

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 Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map
m at 1705 Sep
942.

Action Copy

REFORM-PAT.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

0195

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

M.

From

[REDACTED]

To

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #2 of Number 11/4 from London

you are able to supply. Please let these be imparted
to admiral ^{Cunningham} to whom in view of the importance of the
operation we propose to give the naval command under
the Allied C in C.

Para 3. Delay due to change already extends three
weeks. Free French have got inkling and are leaky. Every
day saved is precious. We have therefore already
ordered work to go forward on these lines but of course
the decision rests with you. Message ends. (Following
is correction to paragraph one: three landings and
gives the essential appearance of strength at all
vital points.)

*Correction made
in text of message
amc*

Prime

[REDACTED]

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

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URGENT

IN REPLY REFER TO

**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON**

Subject:

CABLEGRAM

AMWAR 1
4/1131Z
alt

To:

CCWD
9-4-42
1102Z

URGENT

From: London

To: POTUS

No. 145, September 4, 1942

Formal Naval person to President personal
and secret Unnumbered.

Reference my No. one forty three, please
insert name "Cunningham" after word "Admiral" in
last sentence of paragraph two.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972



~~SECRET~~

0197

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

URGENT

To:

AMWAR 2
filed 130P/5
AEL

CABLEGRAM

CCWD
September 5
1237 Z

URGENT XXXC

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 148, September 5, 1942

Most secret. ~~Number one four four~~. From
Former Naval Person to President. Your number one
eight three.

1. We agree to the military layout as you
propose it. We have plenty of troops highly trained
for landing. If convenient, they can wear your
uniform. They will be proud to do so. Shipping will
be all right.

2. I have just had your number one eight four
and it is evident that you too have skinned yourselves
to the bone. Unless we suffer serious losses in P Q
we consider that Naval forces now jointly to be pro-
vided justify us in going full speed ahead with staging
the operations.

3. I am sending Admiral Ramsay with the agree-
ment of General Eisenhower over at once to furnish
Admiral Cunningham with the means of going into Naval
details with you. It is imperative now to drive straight
ahead and save every hour. In this way alone shall we
realize your strategical design and the only hope of
doing anything that really counts this year.

Received in
Map Room at
0925 Sept. 5.



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject:

URGENT

To:

Page 2. No. 148 from London, September 5, 1942

4. We strongly endorse the request which we understand Eisenhower has already made to Marshall that the force you are relasing from Casablanca may be sent over here complete with its regimental combat team. Kindest regards.

Prime.

Copies



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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET

AMWAR 1
filed 6/238A
JMW

CABLEGRAM

WDCC

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 6, 1942

0146 Z M.

From London

~~SECRET~~

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 149 from London, September 5, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to the President. Personal
and ~~██████~~ No. 145. Reference your No. 185. Okay
full blast.

Prime

Received in Map Room
at 2020, EWT, Sept.
5, 1942.

~~SECRET~~

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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REGIFORM-PATD.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

0200

AMWAR 2
filed 7/317A
JMY

CABLEGRAM

WDCC

TOR 062530

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 7, 1942

0230 Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 151 from London September 6th, 1942. XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and secret.

Number 146.

First four ships carrying 193 Shermans and 28 SP 105's
arrived second and were unloaded in record time.

The rest are close behind. Twentyfourth, second, and
ninth brigades should all be fully equipped with these tanks in
the next ten days. I am sure the troops will do full justice
to these fine weapons. Remembering that dark Tobruk day I am
most grateful to you. I have good hopes about all the Egyptian
fighting and believe Rommel is hard pressed.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room
at 2330, Sept. 6, 1942.

*Copies made for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

Action Copy

AMWAR 4
Filed 440P/12
ACM

Cablegram

CCWD

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 12, 1942

16:55 Z M.

From London.

To POTUS

WAB

Copies furnished as noted:

No. XXXC 154, September 12th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal
and secret. Number one four seven.

Three one seven Shermans and nine four S P
one zero five's which you so kindly gave me on
that dark Tobruk day in Washington have now all
safely arrived in Egypt. Eight two Shermans
have already been issued to the troops. It is
proposed to arm three brigades with nine four
each and the rest Crusaders, this being thought
the best combination. Averell will tell you of
our visit to these brigades. I now hear they
have received these weapons with the greatest
enthusiasm, and I trust it will not be long be-
fore I give good accounts of their use. As
these tanks were taken from the hands of the Ameri-
can Army, perhaps you would show this message to
General Marshall.

PRIME

[Redacted]

*Received 11/14/42
121405*

Copies to General Marshall
and to the Secretary, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, by Capt. McCrea.

Action Copy

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

11720 1
1160 2077/15

SECRET

0012

XXX

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 347 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 15, 1942

3200 P. M.

From London

To The President of the United States, White House

WAF

Copies furnished as noted:

[redacted] September 14, 1942

[redacted] Former Naval person to President personal and [redacted]
No. one four eight

Overall who arrived and stayed with us last night gave me the latest news of you. He says Trans-Caspian Railway is settled. Please let me have your final plan.

I am hoping to receive your wishes about the Anglo American Air Force on the Russian Southern Flank. I am not without hopes of a favorable decision in Egypt in the next few weeks. Unless we can offer Stalin something definite for say December, we shall not get the full facilities we need for preparing Airfields etc thereabouts. Moreover if we are able to make a firm offer, albeit contingent on favorable events in Egypt, it would be possible at the same time to ask for some favors for the Poles. Stalin has given us sixty thousand Poles with thirty thousand dependents out of which two and a half Divisions are being made, but no provision has been made for recruitment of further Poles, Officers and men, to keep these forces going. Of these there are great numbers in various sorry plights throughout Russia. I thought we might help two birds with one piece of sugar.

I have had long conferences and conversations with Eisenhower and Clark, bringing in all our people as required with the sole aim of keeping to (for date see my next) for Torch as now settled between us. If you can make it from your end, we will make it from this.

I entirely agree with your political outlook on Torch. It is sound unless we are forestalled. There is no sign in any of the secret matter which I see that the enemy is aware, and the mood of France is now at its very best. I count the days.

XX-C

RECEIVED War Room
Sept. 15, 1942, 0115

Action Copy

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-78
By E. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

0203

CABLEGRAM

XXX

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

Sent. 15. 1942

0200 Z.M.

From London

To The President of the United States, Whitehouse

Copies furnished as noted:

Page 2, [redacted], September 14, 1942

In the whole of Torch, military and political, I consider myself your Lieutenant as long only to put my viewpoint plainly before you. We shall have a wireless station of overriding power available by zero, so that if you dictate your appeals to France and other propaganda material to gramophone records beforehand, these can be blared out over everything during the performance. To British will come in only as and when you judge expedient. This is an American enterprise in which we are your help mates.

I agree with you that De Gaulle will be an irritant and his movement must be kept out. We do not yet know what the local Generals will do or whether perhaps you are going to bring Giraud to the scene. At your leisure please let me know your ideas.

I repeat, the outlook seems good to me and will be bettered by good news from Egypt.

Had news from the PQ convoy, twelve being sunk by torpedo bombers already, and there are at least two more days to run in the danger zone. When we know the results of PQ eighteen we must decide about P, nineteen. All preparations for this are going forward but it looks almost impossible to fit in another PQ before Torch, and if the losses are very heavy this time it would not be worth trying. Should the decision be adverse to P, nineteen you will have to help me with Utah, and here again the offer of air support on the Russian Southern Front may be important. Kindest regards to all.

Primo

XXX-C

Action Copy

REGRADU UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. Isl., 1-28-76

By S. S. TAPES

Date MAY 5 1977

0204