CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
AUGUST - OCTOBER 1942
From: Amon Embassy London  
To: Potus

<table>
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<th>Copies furnished as noted:</th>
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**No. 120, August 1, 1942**

Number one two six, Prime Minister to President.

Personal and

I strongly endorse recommendations sent you today by Combined Shipping Boards.

Prime

SECRET

**REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72**

By R. H. Parks  
**Date:** MAY 5 1972
NAVAL MESSAGE

Addressed: B.A.D. Washington
From: Mideast.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 126-A

No. REFLEX No.11, GOF 4/8

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt.

I should greatly like to have your aid and countenance in my talks with Joe. Would you be able to let Averell come with me. I feel that things would be easier if we all seemed to be together. I have a somewhat raw job. Kindly duplicate your reply to London.

Am keeping my immediate movements vague.

T.O.O.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt.  State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room at 2200, EWT, August 4, 1942
IMMEDIATE

Reflex 23 6/8. Following
and Personal for President Roosevelt from former
Naval person.

Begins:

Thank you so much about Averell. He
will be a great help to me.

T.O.O. 0950Z/6

CSB

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. R. Dept. rel., 3-29-72
M. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
August 8, 1942

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

No. 123, August 8, 1942

Number 127 Personal Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

You will no doubt have seen the cables sent by the British Chiefs of Staff London to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington about accelerating the date of Torch. I am sure that nothing is more vital than this, and that superhuman efforts should be made. Every day counts. I have already telegraphed to London welcoming the appointment of General Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief for Torch and the British Chiefs are cooperating with him to the full.

Paragraph 2. I also wish to endorse the suggestion of the Admiralty about some United States submarines working from Gibraltar.

Paragraph 3. I have been busy here with a reorganization of the High Command which was necessary. I am detaching Iraq and Persia from the Middle East Command and transferring General Auchinleck there. Alexander will succeed him as Commander in Chief. General Gott who was to have been appointed to command Eighth Army under Alexander was killed yesterday. I propose to appoint General Montgomery in his place. This will promote the utmost
concentration upon the battle. A victory here might have a decisive effect upon the attitude of the French towards Torch.

Paragraph 4. All these changes are of the utmost secrecy and no announcement will be made until the command has been definitely transferred. Pray therefore let this be for yourself alone.

Paragraph 5. I am giving my own personal attention in detail on the spot to the reception and utilization of the Shermans and 105's for which we are eagerly waiting. I am visiting the units tomorrow that are to receive these weapons.

Paragraph 6. Averell has just arrived, and we shall be off soon on our further quest. I will keep you informed.

Paragraph 7. I am also seeing Generals Maxwell and Brereton.

PRIME

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5, 1972

Received in Map Room at 1155, EWT, Aug. 8, 1942.
Prime Minister No. 128

By direction of the President,
Copy to Mr. Cordell Hull
Copy to Mr. Sumner Welles
Shown to Mr. Elmer Davis by Captain McCrea
CABLEGRAM 2253Z M.

From London

To The President of the United States

August 9, 1942

No XXXC 124 August 9, 1942

From Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
number one two eight and personal.

1. I hope you will let me see beforehand
the text of any message you are thinking of sending
me upon the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter on
August fourteen. We considered the wording of that
famous document line by line together and I should
not be able, without mature consideration, to give
it a wider interpretation than was agreed between
us at the time. Its proposed application to Asia
and Africa requires much thought. Great embarrassment
would be caused to the defence of India at the present
time by such a statement as the Office of War Informa-
tion has been forecasting. Here in the Middle East the
Arabs might claim by majority they could expel the Jews
from Palestine, or at any time forbid all further im-
migration. I am strongly wedded to the Zionist policy,
of which I was one of the authors. This is only one of
the many unforeseen cases which will arise from new and
further declarations.

2. Would it not be sufficient to dwell on the
progress made in this memorable year, to the growth
of the United Nations, to the continued magnificent
resistance of Russia to aggression, to the success of
the arms of the United States in the Pacific and to the
growth of our combined airpower? Finally we could
reaffirm our principles and point to the hope of a
happier world after some preliminary intervening un-
pleasantness has been satisfactorily got over. I am
sure you will consider my difficulties with the kindness
you always show to me.

Prime
NAVAL MESSAGE

IN

T.O.O. 0845/10
Date: 10.8.42
Time: 0900

Addressed: J.S.M. Washington
Repeated: Air Ministry
From: Mideast.

IMMEDIATE

REPLEX No. 62 10/8. Following and
Personal for President ROOSEVELT from Former
Naval Person, begins:

Your 176. Thank you very much.

0845/10

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972.

0147

No. 128-A
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

August 13, 1942

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

Former naval person to President Roosevelt
personal and number one two nine. I repeat
for your information following report which I have
telegraphed to Deputy Prime Minister.

One. Machine carrying Brooke, Cadogna, Wavell
and Tedder was forced to return to Teheran, but
Harriman and I arrived here comfortably at five PM
twelfth and were met by Molotov, Voroshilov and
many others.

Two. Not being at all tired, I began conference
with Stalin at Kremlin at seven PM. This lasted
nearly four hours. There were present only Stalin,
Molotov, Voroshilov, myself, Harriman and our Ambassador
with interpreter. The first two hours were bleak and
sombre. I explained at length, with maps and arguments,
why we would not do sledgehammer. He said that he
did not agree with our reasons. He argued the other
way and everyone was pretty glum. Finally he said that
he did not accept our view but we had the right to
decide. In this discussion I had, of course, explained
round up, which he passed over too lightly because it
was remote and there were great difficulties in landing
anywhere outside fighter cover. However, the figures
of American arrivals in UK and our own proposed
expeditionary force were told as solid facts.

Three. We then passed on to the ruthless bombing
of Germany, which gave general satisfaction. Monsieur
Stalin emphasised the importance of striking at the
morale of the German population, and I made it clear
that this was one of our leading military objectives.
He said he attached the greatest importance to bombing
and that he knew raids were having a tremendous effect
in Germany. After this prolonged discussion, it seemed
that all we were going to do was no sledgehammer, no

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date

RIPPLEFORM-PATD.-AMERICAN SALES BOOK CO., INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N.Y.
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

August 13, 1942

M.

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

round up and pay our way by bombing Germany. I thought it was best to get the worst over first. I did not try to relieve it, and I asked specially that there should be the plainest speaking between friends and comrades in peril. However courtesy and dignity prevailed.

Four. This was the moment in the battle when I brought Torch into action. As I told the whole story Stalin became intensely interested. His first question was what would happen in Spain and Vichy France. A little later on he remarked that the operation was militarily right but he had political doubts about the effect on France. He asked particularly the timing, and I said not later than October thirtieth, but President and all of us were trying to pull it forward to October seventh. This seemed a great relief to the three Russians. At this point Monsieur Stalin said, according to the interpreter, (May God prosper this undertaking).

Five. This marked the turning point in our conversation. He then began to raise various political objections fearing that the Anglo-American seizure of Torch Regions would be misunderstood in France. What were we doing about De Gaulle? I said if he were thought helpful he would be used, but at present we thought the American Flag was a far better chance of an easy entry. Harriman backed this very strongly by referring to reports by American Agents all over Torch Territories on which The President relies, and also Admiral Leahy's opinion. Presently Monsieur Stalin epitomized four main reasons for Torch. First. It would hit Rommel in the back. Second. It would over awe Spain. Third. It would produce fighting between Germans and Frenchmen in France and, fourth it would expose Italy to the whole brunt of the war. This statement pleased me greatly as showing his swift and complete mastery of a problem hitherto Novel. I added, of course, the fifth reason, namely...
London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

shortening of the sea route through the Mediterranean. He was concerned to know whether we were able to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar. I also told him the changes of command in Egypt and our determination to fight a decisive battle there in late August or September. Finally, it was clear that they all liked Torch though Molotov asked whether it could not be in September.

Six. I then proceeded to open the prospect of our placing an Anglo-American Air Force on the Southern Flank of the Russian Armies to defend the Caspian and the Caucasus Mountains and generally to fight in this theatre. I did not, however, go into details, as of course we had to win our battle in Egypt first and I had not the Presidents plans for the American contribution. If Stalin liked the idea we would set to work in detail upon it. He replied that they would be most grateful for this aid, but that the details of location etc, would require study. As you know, I am very keen on this project because it will bring about more hard fighting between the Anglo-American air power and the Huns, all of which aids the gaining of mastery in the air under more fertile conditions than looking for trouble over the Pas De Calais.

Seven. Thus all ended cordially, and I expect I shall establish a solid and sincere relationship with this man and convince him of our ardent desire, shared by the President, to get into battle heavily and speedily to the best advantage. About the Russians, he said only that the Germans had produced more tanks and power than had been expected, that the news from the South was not good, and that the Russians had started diversions as at Rhey, which was making progress.

Eight. I must tell you what a help Harriman was in this extremely serious, tense, and at one time critical discussion. He came in heavily in the name of the President in everything about Torch, and his presence throughout was invaluable.
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

August 13, 1942

London

To The President of the United States

No. 126 August 13, 1942

Nine. It is arranged that I see Monsieur Molotov today, when he can go more into the political sides of Torch and reassure them about France and Vichy.

Ten. If, as I hope, Brooke and the others arrive this evening, the military authorities on both sides are to sit together and check up both on strategy and technical detail.

Eleven. I told Stalin I should hold myself at his disposition should he wish to see me again. He replied that the Russian custom was that the visitor should state his wishes and that he was ready at any time. Accordingly I am going to propose another talk for this evening, perhaps at ten PM. He knows the worst, and we parted in an atmosphere of great good will. I am lodged in State Villa No seven where Stalin sometimes stays himself. It stands in the midst of a thick wood, is strongly guarded on every side, and has a spacious underground suite in case of air raids. The weather is beautiful, and what we should like best in England.

Prime
FROM LONDON
FOR THE PRESIDENT

NUMBER 128 from London August 14 1942

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt
and personal Number 130

Your number 177

I take it amiss Chiang should seek to make
difficulties between us and should interfere in matters about
which he has proved himself most ill informed which affect
our Sovereign rights. Decision to intern Gandhi was taken
by executive of twelve, at which only one European was present.
These Indians are as good Indian patriots and as able men as
any of the congress leaders. They have shown great courage and
it is essential not to weaken their authority. All Chiang's talk
of congress leaders wishing us to quit in order that they may
help the Allies is eye wash.

They are concerned with one thing only namely, congress supremacy.
It occurred to me you could remind Chiang that Gandhi was prepared
to negotiate with Japan on the basis of a free passage for Japanese
troops through India in (garbled group) of their joining hands
with Hitler. Personally I have no doubts that in addition there
would have been an understanding that the congress would have
the use of sufficient Japanese troops to keep down the composite
majority of ninety million Moslems, forty million Untouchables
and ninety million in the princes states. The style of his message
prompts me to say "Chez eux la femme".

It may well be that the ensuing weeks will show how very little
real influence the Hindu congress has over the masses of Indiar.

Averell and I are sending you full accounts of our conversation
with Stalin, and upshot of which is so far satisfactory.

PRIME

745pm/d

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. R. Parks Date MAY 5, 1972
From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 128 from London August 14, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. and personal. Number 130. Your number 177.

I take it amiss Chiang should seek to make difficulties between us and should interfere in matters about which he has proved himself most ill informed which affect our Sovereign Rights. Decision to intern Gandhi was taken by executive of twelve, at which only one European was present. These Indians are as good Indian patriots and as able men as any of the Congress leaders. They have shown great courage and it is essential not to weaken their authority. All Chiangs talk of Congress leaders wishing us to quit in order that they may help the Allies is eye wash. They are concerned with one thing only namely, congress supremacy. It occurred to me you could remind Chiang that Gandhi was prepared to negotiate with Japan on the basis of a free passage for Japanese troops through India in (garbled group) of their joining hands with Hitler. Personally I have no doubts that in addition there would have been an understanding that the congress would have the use of sufficient Japanese troops to keep down the composite majority of ninety million Moslems, forty million Untouchables and ninety million in the Princes States. The style of his message prompts me to say "Cherchez la femme".Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British

By R. H. Parks

MAY 5 1972

0153
Page #2 of Number 128 from London August 14, 1942 XXX-C

It may well be that the ensuing weeks will show how very little real influence the Hindu Congress has over the masses of India.

Averell and I are sending you full accounts of our conversation with Stalin, and upshot of which is so far satisfactory.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972
From London

To The President of the United States

The White House

Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942 XXX-C

From Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Number 131

Para 1. I visited Molotov at the Kremlin yesterday morning in order to explain to him more clearly and fully the character of the operations Sledgehammer, Roundup, Bolero, Torch and Jupiter. I pointed out how injurious to the common cause it would be if, owing to recriminations about dropping Sledgehammer, we were forced to argue publicly against such enterprises. I also explained more fully the political setting of Torch. He listened affably but contributed nothing. I proposed to him that I should see Stalin at ten PM that night, and later in the day got word that eleven o'clock would be more convenient and that as the subjects to be dealt with would be the same as those of the night before, would I wish to bring Harriman. I said yes, and also Cadogan, Brooke, Wavell and Tedder who had meanwhile arrived safely from Teheran in a Russian plane. They might have had a very dangerous fire in their Liberator.

Para 2. Accordingly, we all repaired to the Kremlin at eleven PM and were received only by Stalin and Molotov with the interpreter. Then began a most unpleasant discussion. Stalin handed me the enclosed document to which see also my reply. When
Page #2 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

it was translated I said I would answer it in writing and that he must understand we have made up our minds upon the course to be pursued and that reproaches were vain. Thereafter we argued for about two hours, during which he said many disagreeable things, especially about our being too much afraid of fighting the Germans, and if we tried it like the Russians we should find it not so bad, that we had broken our promise about Sledgehammer, that we had failed in delivering the supplies promised to Russia and only sent remnants after we had taken all we needed for ourselves. Apparently these complaints were addressed as much to the United States as to Britain.

Para 3. I repulsed all his contentions squarely but without taunts of any kind. I suppose he is not used to being contradicted repeatedly but he did not become at all angry or even animated.

On one occasion I said "I pardon that remark only on account of the bravery of the Russian troops". Finally he said we could carry it no further. He must accept our decision and abruptly invited us to dinner at eight o'clock tonight.

Para 4. Accepted the invitation said I would leave by plane at dawn the next morning i. e. fifteenth. Jo seemed somewhat concerned at this and asked could I not stay longer. I said,
Page #3 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

Certainly, if there was any good to be done, and that I would wait one more day anyhow. I then exclaimed there was no ring of comradship in his attitude. I had travelled far to establish
good working relations. We had done our utmost to help Russia and
would continue to do so. We had been left entirely alone for a
year against Germany and Italy. Now that the three great nations
were allied, victory was certain provided we did not fall apart,
and so forth. I was somewhat animated in this passage and before
it could be translated he made the remark that he liked the
temperament (spirit?) of my utterance. Thereafter the talk began
again in a somewhat less tense atmosphere.

Para 5. He plunged into a long discussion of two Russian
trench mortars firing rockets which he declared were devastating
in their effects and which he offered to demonstrate to our experts
if they could wait. He said he would let us have all information
about them, but should there not be something in return. Should
there not be an agreement to exchange information of inventions.

I said that we would give them everything without any bargaining
except only those devices which, if carried in aeroplanes over
the enemy lines and shot down would make our bombing of Germany
more difficult. He accepted this. He also agreed that his military
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From: ____________________

To: ____________________

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #4 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942
authorities should meet our generals and this was arranged for three o'clock this afternoon. I said they would require at least four hours to go fully into the various technical questions involved in Sledgehammer, Roundup, Torch. He observed at one moment that Torch was militarily correct but that the political side required more delicacy, i.e. more careful handling. From time to time he returned to Sledgehammer, grumbling about it. When he said our promise had not been kept, I replied "I repudiate that statement. Every promise has been kept". And I pointed to the aide memoire I gave Molotov. He made a sort of apology saying that he was expressing his sincere and honest opinions, that there was no mistrust between us but only a difference of view.

Para 6. Finally I asked about the Caucasus. Was he going to defend the mountain chain, and with how many divisions. At this he sent for a relief model and with apparent frankness and knowledge explained the strength of this barrier, for which he said twenty five divisions were available. He pointed to the various passes and said they would be defended. I asked were they fortified and he said yes certainly. The Russian front line which the enemy had not yet reached is north of the main range. He said they would have to hold out for two months when the snow would make the mountains
impassable. He expressed himself quite confident of his ability to do this, and also recounted in detail the strength of the Black Sea fleet which was already at Batum. He expressed however, suspicion of Turkish intentions and indicated that he did not trust them not to attack him in the rear. If they did he would smash them.

Para 7. All this part of the talk was easier, but when Harriman asked about the plans for bringing American aircraft across Siberia, to which the Russians have only recently consented after long American pressing, he replied, curtly, "wars are not won with plans". Harriman backed me up throughout and we neither of us yielded an inch nor spoke a bitter word.

Para 8. It was arranged that Cadogan and Molotov should meet today to draw up a communique and to discuss publicity. Stalin assented to this with a short laugh, remarking that they were the two who had drawn up the Anglo American Russian communique issued in London.

Para 9. He made his salute and held out his hand to me on leaving and I took it. In the public interest I shall go to the dinner tonight.
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

From

To

Copies furnished as noted:
Page 6 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

Para 10. Asked ourselves what was the explanation of this performance and transformation from the good ground we had reached the night before. I think the most probable is that his council of commissars did not take the news I brought as well as he did. They perhaps have more power than we suppose and less knowledge. And that he was putting himself on record for future purposes and for their benefit and also letting off steam for his own. Cadogan says a similar hardening up followed the opening of the Eden interview at Christmas, and Harriman says that this technique was also used at the beginning of the Beaverbrook mission.

Para 11. It is my considered opinion that in his heart so far as he has one Stalin knows we are right and that six divisions on Sledgehammer would do him no good this year. Moreover I am certain that his sure footed and quick military judgement makes him a strong supporter of Torch. I think it not impossible that he will make amends. In that hope I persevere. Anyhow I am sure it was better to have it out this way than any other. There was never at any time the slightest suggestion of their not fighting on and I think myself that Stalin has good confidence that he will win.

Para 12. When I thanked Stalin for the forty Bostons he made a half disdainful gesture, saying "they were American planes."
From: [Redacted]
To: [Redacted]

Copies furnished as noted:

Page #7 of Number 129 from London, August 15, 1942

When I give you Russian planes then you may thank me". By this he
did not mean to disparage the American planes but said that he counted
on his own strength. He stated his aircraft production at one
thousand eight hundred a month plus six hundred trainers.

Para 13. I make great allowances for the stresses through
which they are passing. Finally, I think they want full publicity
for the visit. Translation aide memoire to follow (Potus 130).

Prime

[Redacted]
Cablegram

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

Aug. 15, 1942

URGENT

SECRET

London

To. President of the United States

No. 130, Aug. 15, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and number one three one (Translation Aide Memoire).

As the result of an exchange of views in Moscow which took place on August twelfth of this year I ascertained that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Churchill, considered the organization of a Second Front in Europe in one nine four two to be impossible. As is well known the organization of a Second Front in Europe in one nine four two was pre-decided during the sojourn of Molotov in London and it found expression in the agreed Anglo-Soviet communique published on June twelfth last. It is also known that the organization of a Second Front in Europe has as its object the withdrawal of German Forces from the Eastern Front to the West and the creation in the West of a serious base of resistance to the German Fascist Forces and the affording of relief by this means to the situation of the Soviet Forces on the Soviet German Front in one nine four two. It is easy to grasp that the refusal of the Government of Great Britain to create a Second Front in one nine four two in Europe inflicts a moral blow to the whole of Soviet public opinion, which calculates on the creation of a Second Front and that complicates the situation of the Red Army at the front and prejudices the plan of the Soviet Command. I am now referring to the fact that the difficulties arising for the Red Army as a result of the refusal to create a Second Front in one nine four two will undoubtedly have to deteriorate the Military situation of England and all the remaining Allies. It appears to me and my Colleagues that the most favourable conditions exist in one nine four two for the creation of a

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972
Second Front in Europe, inasmuch as almost all the Forces of the German Army and the best Forces to boot have been withdrawn to the Eastern Front leaving in Europe an inconsiderable amount of Forces and these of inferior quality. It is unknown whether the year of one nine four three will offer conditions for the creation of a Second Front as favourable as one nine four two.

We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is particularly in one nine four two that the creation of a Second Front in Europe is possible and should be effective. I was however unfortunately unsuccessful in convincing Mr. Prime Minister of Great Britain there-of while Mr. Harriman the Representative of the President of the U S A fully supported Mr. Prime Minister in the negotiations held in Moscow.

In reply to Premier Stalins Aide Memoire of August thirteenth the Prime Minister of Great Britain states; (One) The best Second Front in one nine four two and the only large scale operation possible from the Atlantic is Torch. If this can be effected in October it will give more aid to Russia than any other plan. It also prepares the way for one nine four three and has the four advantages mentioned by Premier Stalin in the conversation of August Twelfth. The British and United States Governments have made up their minds about this and all preparations are proceeding with the utmost speed. (Two) Compared with Torch, the attack with six or eight Anglo American Divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula and the Channel Islands would be a hazardous and futile operation. The Germans have enough troops in the West to block us in this narrow
Peninsula with fortified lines and would concentrate all their Air Forces in the West upon us. In the opinion of all the British Naval Military and Air authorities the operation could only end in disaster even if the lodgement were made it would not bring a single Division back from Russia. It would also be far more a running sore for us than for the enemy, and would use wastefully and wantonly the key men and the landing craft required for real action in one nine-four-three. This is our settled view. The C I G S rpt Cast Inter George Sail will go into details with the Russian Commanders to any extent that may be desired. (Three) No promise has been broken by Great Britain or the United States...
altering the strategic plans of the Russian High Command. (Six) We reaffirm our resolve to aid our Russian Allies by every practicable means. For Garbled Group in Paragraph Four (Potus one two nine) Please read: Made the remark that he liked the temperament (or spirit?) of my utterance. Garbled Group in (Three) of Aide Memoire should read: United States. I point to Paragraph Five of my Aide Memoire given to Mister Molotov on tenth June one nine four two. *

Prime

* Corrections Made.
No. 131 August 16, 1942

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT AND
PERSONAL NUMBER ONE THREE TWO .
ONE. YOUR ONE SEVEN EIGHT. AM MUCH OBLIGED TO
YOU FOR THE FORM IN WHICH YOU HAVE COUCHED YOUR MESSAGE
WHICH IS ENTIRELY AGREEABLE TO ME. FEAR IT IS TOO LATE
FOR ME TO REPLY NOW.

TWO. ANY CONSOLING OR HEARTENING MESSAGE YOU FEEL
LIKE Sending TO STALIN SECRETLY WOULD BE HELPFUL. YOU
WILL HAVE SEEN MY FULL ACCOUNTS. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT
I SHOULD HAVE DONE WITHOUT AVERELL.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
No. 132, August 17th, 1942

From former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and Number 133. Reference my telegram Number 131.

Para 1. The dinner passed off in a very friendly atmosphere and the usual Russian ceremonies. Wavell made an excellent speech in Russian. I proposed Stalin's health and Alexander Cadogan proposed death and damnation to the Germans. Though I sat on Stalin's right I got no opportunity of talking about serious things. Pavlov, the little interpreter, was a very poor substitute for Maisky. Stalin and I were photographed together, also with Harriman. Stalin made quite a long speech proposing the "intelligence service" in the course of which he made a curious reference to the Dardanelles in 1915, saying that the British had won and the Germans and Turks were already retreating but we did not know because the intelligence was faulty. This picture, though inaccurate, was evidently meant to be complimentary to me.

Para 2. I left about one thirty AM as I was afraid we should be drawn into a lengthy film and was fatigued. When I said good bye to Stalin he said that any differences that existed were only of method. I said we would try to remove even those differences by deeds. After a cordial handshake I then took my departure and got some way down the crowded room but he hurried after me and
Page 2 of Number 132, August 17, 1942

accompanied me an immense distance through corridors and staircases to the front door where we again shook hands.

Para 3. Perhaps in my account to you of the Thursday night meeting I took too gloomy a view. I feel I must make full allowance for the really grievous disappointment which they feel here that we can do nothing more to help them in their immense struggle. In the upshot they have swallowed this bitter pill. Everything for us now turns on hastening Torch and defeating Rommel.

Para 4. I have just had a long talk, with dinner lasting six hours, with Stalin and Molotov alone in his private apartment with a good interpreter. I will send you a fuller account later but we covered the whole ground and parted on most cordial and friendly terms. At this meeting the communiqué was agreed and our ambassador will be getting into touch with London about its publication on either seventeenth or eighteenth August.

Para 5. C I G S met the Russian military authorities twice yesterday fifteenth. He was much impressed with the demonstration of the mortar on the fourteenth. I am leaving at dawn today sixteenth and hope to reach Cairo morning seventeenth.
Number 133 from London, August 18, 1942. XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and secret. Number 134. Reference my telegram Number 133.

Para 1. Following is telegram I sent my colleagues from Teheran describing final stage of Moscow conversations. Begins I went to wind up with Monsieur Stalin at seven PM on August 15 and we had an agreeable conversation in the course of which he gave me full account of the Russian position which seemed very encouraging. He certainly speaks with great confidence of being able to hold out until the winter. At eight thirty PM when I got up to leave he asked me when was the next time he was going to see me. I said that I was leaving at dawn. He then said "Why do you not come over to my apartment in the Kremlin and have some drinks". I went and stayed to dinner to which Monsieur Molotov was also summoned. Monsieur Stalin introduced me to his daughter who was a nice girl and kissed him shyly but was not allowed to dine. The dinner and (garbled group) communique lasted till three AM this morning. I had a very good interpreter and was able to talk much more easily. The greatest goodwill prevailed and for the first time we got on to easy and friendly terms. I feel that I have established a personal relationship which will be helpful. We talked a great deal about Jupiter which
he thinks essential in November or December. Without it I really
do not see how we are going to be able to get through the supplies
which will be needed to keep this tremendous fighting army equipped.
The Trans-Persian route is only working at half what we hoped.
What he requires most of all are lorries. He would rather have
lorries than tanks, of which he is making two thousand a month;
also he wants aluminium.

Para 2. I only got home at half past three and as Monsieur
Molotov was going to conduct me to the plane at four thirty AM it
was not worth going to bed. We started at five AM with full military
ceremonies as dawn was breaking. We travelled on east side of
the Caspian, rather farther from the enemy than last time and
crossed the mountains at thirteen thousand feet making a very good
journey of nine and a half hours to Teheran where I am now resting
in the summer legation which is very cool and pleasant. I start
for Cairo at five AM tomorrow August 17 and should be there in about
a week.

Para 3. On the whole I am definitely encouraged by my visit
to Moscow. I am sure that the disappointing news I brought could
not have been imparted except by me personally without leading to
really serious drifting apart. It was my duty to go. Now they
Page #8 of Number 133 from London, August 18, 1942.

know the worst, and having made their protest are entirely friendly: this in spite of the fact that this is their most anxious and agonizing time. Moreover Monsieur Stalin is entirely convinced of the great advantages of Torch and I do trust that it is being driven forward with superhuman energy on both sides of the ocean.

Prime
URGENT

To: POTUS

No. 134, August 22, 1942

From: London

Your one six six of sixteenth July. I have delayed my reply until I could study the Trans Persian situation on the spot. This I have now done both at Teheran and here, and have conferred with Averell, General Maxwell, General Spalding and their railway experts. The traffic on the Trans Persian Railway is expected to reach three thousand tons a day for all purposes by end of the year. We are all convinced that it ought to be raised to six thousand tons. Only in this way can we ensure an expanding flow of supplies to Russia while building up the military forces which we must move into Northern Persia to meet a possible German advance.

To reach the higher figure, it will be necessary to increase largely the railway personnel and to provide additional quantities of rolling stock and technical equipment. Furthermore, the target will only be attained in reasonable time if enthusiasm and energy are devoted to the task and a high priority accorded to its requirements.
I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained in your telegram, that the railway should be taken over, developed and operated by the United States Army. With the railway should be included the ports of Khorran-shahr and Bandarshahpur. Your people would thus undertake the great task of opening up the Persian corridor, which will carry primarily your supplies to Russia. All our people here agree on the benefits which would follow your approval of this suggestion. We should be unable to find the resources without your help and our burden in the Middle East would be eased by the release for use elsewhere of the British Units now operating the railway. The railway and ports would be managed entirely by your people, though the allocation of traffic would have to be retained in the hands of the British military Authorities for whom the railway is an essential channel of communication for operational purposes. I see no obstacle in this to harmonious working.

The changeover would have to be carefully planned to avoid any temporary reduction of effort, but I think it should start as soon as possible. Averell is cabling you detailed suggestions.
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**DATE**

27 AUG 42

**TOR CODEROOM**

949

**DECODED BY**

MILBY

**PARAPHRASED BY**

SARNOFF

**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

ROBINSON

270849 NCR 4163

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

PM 136 in 4 parts

**TEXT**

MESSAGES 261349° 261250° 261149° AND 261321° TRANSMITTED AT REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR WINNANT. ONLY PLAIN LANGUAGE COPY NOW IN POSSESSION OF AMBASSADOR. SEEN ONLY BY COMDR J H LEPPERT USN AND LT COMDR M W WELLS USNR BY WHOM ENCRYPTED. ALL CODE COPIES BURNED.

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**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

000 Dir. 8200.8 (2/27/68)

Date: MAY 5 1972

Signature: [Signature]

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1969-500-01

270549 201
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON (VIA ALUSNA LONDON)

RELEASED BY 26 AUG 1942

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY ROONEY

PARAPHRASED BY ROONEY

261349 NCR 3491 PART ONE OF FOUR

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

NUMBER 138. FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND NOT SECRET;

PART ONE: I AM CONCENTRATING MY MAIN THOUGHT UPON "TORCH" FROM NOW ON, AND YOU MAY TRUST ME TO DO MY UTMOST TO MAKE YOUR GREAT STRATEGIC CONCEPTION A DECISIVE SUCCESS. IT SEEMS TO ME FROM TALKS I HAVE HAD WITH EISENHOWER, CLARK AND OUR OWN PEOPLE HERE THAT THE BEST AND INDEED THE ONLY WAY TO PUT THIS JOB THRU IS TO FIX A DATE FOR THE PARTY AND MAKE EVERYTHING CONFORM TO THAT, RATHER THAN SAYING IT WILL START WHEN EVERYTHING IS READY. IT WOULD BE AN IMMENSE HELP IF YOU AN I WERE TO GIVE EISENHOWER A DIRECTIVE SOMETHING LIKE THIS:— (BEGIN) YOU WILL START "TORCH" ON OCTOBER 14, ATTACKING WITH SUCH TROOPS AS ARE AVAILABLE AND AT SUCH PLACES AS YOU DEEM FIT. (END). THIS WILL ALTER THE WHOLE CHARACTER OF THE PREPARATIONS. EISENHOWER WILL REALLY HAVE THE POWER HE SHOULD HAVE AS THE ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. ENDLESS OBJECTIONS, MISCIVINGS AND WELL MEANT IMPROVEMENTS WILL FALL BACK INTO THEIR PROPER PLACES, AND ACTION WILL EMERGE FROM WHAT WILL OTHERWISE BE ALMOST UNENDING HUMMINGS AND HAWMINGS.

I THINK EISENHOWER WOULD LIKE THIS, AND IT WOULD ANYHOW GIVE HIM A CHANCE WHICH HE HAS NOT NOW GOT.

PART TWO FOLLOWS:

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
PART TWO;

AS I SEE THIS OPERATION IT IS PRIMARILY POLITICAL IN ITS FOUNDATIONS, THE FIRST VICTORY WE HAVE TO WIN IS TO AVOID A BATTLE. THE SECOND, IF WE CANNOT AVOID IT, TO WIN IT. IN ORDER TO GIVE US THE BEST CHANCES OF THE FIRST VICTORY WE MUST (A) PRESENT THE MAXIMUM APPEARANCE OF OVERWHELMING STRENGTH AT THE MOMENT OF THE FIRST ATTACK, AND (B) ATTACK AT AS MANY PLACES AS POSSIBLE.

THIS IS AN ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT KIND OF OPERATION FROM THE DIEPPE BUSINESS OR ANY VARIANTS OF "SLEDGEHAMMER", THERE WE WERE UP AGAINST GERMAN EFFICIENCY AND THE STEEL-BOUND, FORTIFIED COASTS OF FRANCE. IN "TORCH" WE HAVE TO FACE AT THE WORST WEAK, DI-

VISED OPPOSITION AND AN ENORMOUS CHOICE OF STRIKINGS POINTS AT WHICH TO LAND. RISKS AND DIFFICULTIES WILL BE DOUBLED BY DELAY AND WILL FAR OUSTRIPE INCREASE OF OUR FORCES. CAREFUL PLANNING IN EVERY DETAIL, SAFETY FIRST IN EVERY CALCULATION, FAR SEEING PROVISIONS FOR A LONG-TERM CAMPAIGN, TO MEET EVERY CONCEIVABLE ADVERSE CONTINGENCY, HOWEVER ADMIRABLE IN THEORY WILL RUIN THE ENTERPRISE IN FACT. ANYTHING LATER THAN THE DATE I HAVE MENTIONED ENORMOUSLY INCREASES THE DANGER OF LEAKAGE AND FORESTAL-

MENT.

PART THREE FOLLOWS;

SEALED

SECRET

P1A......ACTION

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
PART THREE:

IN ORDER TO LIGHTEN THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY ON THE MILITARY COMMANDERS I AM OF OPINION THAT YOU AND I SHOULD LAY DOWN THE POLITICAL DATA AND TAKE THIS RISK UPON OURSELVES. IN MY VIEW IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO ASSUME (A) THAT SPAIN WILL NOT GO TO WAR WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ON ACCOUNT OF "TORCH"; (B) THAT IT WILL BE AT LEAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE GERMANS CAN FORCE THEIR WAY THROUGH SPAIN OR PRODUCE SOME ACCOMMODATION FROM HER; (C) THAT THE FRENCH RESISTANCE IN NORTH AFRICA WILL BE LARGELY TOKEN RESISTANCE, CAPABLE OF BEING OVERCOME BY THE SUDDENNESS AND SCALE OF THE ATTACK, AND THAT THEREAFTER THE NORTH AFRICAN FRENCH MAY ACTIVELY HELP US UNDER THEIR OWN COMMANDERS; (D) THAT VICHY WILL NOT DECLARE WAR ON THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT-BRITAIN; (E) THAT HITLER WILL NOT PUT EXTREME PRESSURE ON VICHY, BUT THAT IN OCTOBER HE WILL NOT HAVE THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO OVER-RUN UNOCCUPIED FRANCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WE KEEP HIM PINNED IN THE PAS DE CALAIS, ETC. ALL THESE DATA MAY PROVE ERRONEOUS, IN WHICH CASE WE SHALL HAVE TO SETTLE DOWN TO HARD SLUGGING. FOR THIS WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PREPARED, BUT A BOLD

(SEALED SECRET)

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
PART THREE CONTINUED;

AUDACIOUS BID FOR A BLOODLESS VICTORY AT THE OUTSET MAY WIN A VERY GREAT PRIZE. PERSONALLY I AM PREPARED TO TAKE ANY AMOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUNNING THE POLITICAL RISKS AND BEING PROVED WRONG ABOUT THE POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS.

P1A....ACTION

(PART FOUR FOLLOWS)
PART FOUR;

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD BE GREATLY HELPED BY A BATTLE WON IN THE WESTERN DESERT. EITHER ROMMEL ATTACKS US BY THE AUGUST MOON, OR WE SHALL ATTACK HIM BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER. EITHER WAY THERE WILL BE A DECISION, AND I FEEL VERY CONFIDENT THAT THE DECISION WILL BE HELPFUL.

PARAGRAPHS FIVE.

I HAVE REFRAINED AS YOU KNOW FROM GOING INTO ANY DETAILS HERE BECAUSE I FEEL IT IS A NOTE THAT MUST BE STRUCK NOW OF IRREVOCABLE DECISION AND SUPERHUMAN ENERGY TO EXECUTE IT.

(This is final part of four part dispatch)

PICA.... ACTION

(NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION OF THIS HAS BEEN MADE BY NCR)

SEALLED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Number 137 from PRIME, LONDON

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT
PERSONAL NUMBER ONE THREE SEVEN.
I HAVE JUST SEEN THE PICTURES OF THE
PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL WHICH YOU SENT
ME. I TRUST ITS DELIBERATIONS ARE
PROGRESSING. SO MANY THANKS.

PRIME

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5 1972

Received in Map Room
at 1710, EST, August 26, 1942.

SECRET
TO PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET NUMBER ONE
THREE EIGHT.
I HAVE NOW SEEN THE NEW DIRECTIVE
PROPOSED BY YOUR CHIEFS OF STAFF IN
JSM THREE SIX FIVE. THIS IS BEING
URGENTLY CONSIDERED BY BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF. I WILL DISCUSS IT WITH
THEM, AND TELEGRAPH YOU OUR VIEWS AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PRIME

XXX-C
From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 139, August 27th, 1942. XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret No. 139.

Para 1. We are all profoundly disconcerted by the memorandum sent us by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the twenty fifth instant about (Torch). It seems to me that the whole pith of the operation will be lost if we do not take Algiers as well as Oran on the first day. In Algiers we have the best chance of a friendly reception and even if we got nothing except Algeria a most important strategic success would have been gained. General Eisenhower with our cordial support was in fact planning landings at Philippeville and Bone for day three. We cannot of course be sure of getting to Tunis before the Germans, but neither is it certain that the Germans would be well received by the French in Tunis even if Vichy gave them permission.

Para 2. Strongly established in Algeria with Oran making good the communications, we could fight the Germans for Tunis, even if they got there. But not to go east of Oran is making the enemy a present not only of Tunis but of Algiers. An operation limited to Oran and Casablanca would not give the impression of strength and of widespread simultaneous attack on which we rely for the favourable effect on the French in North Africa. We are all convinced
that Algiers is the key to the whole operation. General Anderson, to whom this task has been assigned by Eisenhower, is confident of his ability to occupy Algiers. The occupation of Algeria and the movement towards Tunis and Bizerta is an indispensable part of the attack on Italy which is the best chance of enlisting French cooperation and one of the main objects of our future campaign.

Para 3. We are all agreed about Oran and of course we should like to see Casablanca occupied as well, but if it came to choosing between Algiers and Casablanca it cannot be doubted that the former is incomparably the more hopeful and fruitful objective. Inside the Mediterranean landings can be made in October on four days out of five. On the Atlantic shores of Morocco the proportion is exactly reversed, only one day in five being favourable.

Para 4. Nevertheless if the operations at Oran and Algiers yield good reactions and results, entry might easily be granted to a force appearing off Casablanca, and a feint would certainly be justified. It is however by far the most difficult point of attack and the one most remote from the vital objectives in the Mediterranean. Casablanca might easily become an isolated failure and let loose upon us for a small reward all the perils which have anyway to be faced in this great design. So far as Algiers is concerned all we ask
Number 139, August 27th, 1942. (Page #3)

from you is an American contact team to show the flag. We cannot however do Algiers and Oran at the same time. If therefore you wish to do Casablanca on a large scale with all its risks, it is indispensable that United States forces should continue to be directed on Oran as now planned by the Allied Commander in Chief.

Para 5. A complete change in the plans such as the memorandum suggests would of course be fatal to the date and thus possibly to the whole plan. In October Hitler will not have the power to move into Spain or into unoccupied France. In November and with every week that passes this power to bring pressure upon Vichy and Madrid governments increases rapidly.

Para 6. I hope, Mr. President, you will bear in mind the language I have held to Stalin supported by Harriman with your full approval. If (Torch) collapses or is cut down as is now proposed, I should feel my position painfully affected. For all these reasons I most earnestly beg that the memorandum may be reconsidered and that the American Allied Commander in Chief may be permitted to go forward with the plans he has made, upon which we are all now working night and day. The staffs are communicating similar views to their American colleagues.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

URGENT

CABLEGRAM

To:
AMWAR 4
filed 330P/30
AEL

URGENT XXXC

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 141, August 30, 1942

No. one four zero.

1. The project of placing on the southern flank of the Russian Armies a British and presently American Air Force must be viewed as a long term policy in our cooperation with Russia and for the defence of the Persian oilfields. The main reasons appear to be: - (a) to strengthen the Russian Air power generally; (b) to form the advance shield of all our interests in Persia and Abadan; (c) for moral effect of comradeship with the Russians which will be out of all proportion to the forces employed; (d) because this is no dispersion of forces but a greater concentration on the supreme Allied Air Force target, namely, wearing down the German Air Force by daily fighting contact.

2. Following on the various references to this subject which occur in our correspondence and to the favour with which you have viewed it in principle, I have committed his Majesty's government in my talks with Stalin to the general policy and have stated that you also took a great interest in the matter. I now submit, Mr. President, a formal draft proposal on which you may feel disposed to give me your decision:

(1) The proposal is to establish in Transcaucasia an Anglo American Air Force to assist...
Subject:

To: Page 2. No. 141 from London

the Russian Land and Air Forces in holding the line of the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea Coast. The necessary air forces would be withdrawn from Egypt as soon as the situation in the Western Desert is such that they can be spared from that front and could be concentrated in the Baku Batum Area in about two months from that time.

(2) This proposal has already been offered in general terms to Premier Stalin who accepted it gratefully and indicated that the details of the plan should receive further study. In discussion between the C I G S Air Marshal Tedder and Marshal Voroshilov it was agreed that combined planning and preparation should start at once and the suggestion put that Allied Air Representatives should go to Moscow for this purpose.

(3) Subject to American agreement the force envisaged would comprise the following units. Eight short range fighter squadrons, one long range fighter squadron, three light bomber squadrons, two medium bomber squadrons, one U S heavy bombardment group and possibly later one general reconnaissance squadron.

(4) Owing to the extreme difficulties which the lack of good ground communications will impose on the maintenance of this force ample air transport will be essential for its maintenance. One U S transport group of approximately fifty aircraft is considered the minimum necessary for this purpose.

(5) Thus the American contribution suggested is one heavy bombardment group now in Egypt and one transport group which is not at present available in the Middle East. The former will require an adequate flow of aircraft and trained crews to meet attrition. In addition it is of the utmost importance that every effort should be made to ensure that at least the aircraft
Subject: Page 3. No. 141 from London

and air crews both first line and replacements together with minimum maintenance parties of the U.S. pursuit and medium bomber groups scheduled for the Middle East should be operationally fit in Egypt by the dates agreed. Even if Rommel is driven out of Cyrenaica, the air defense of Egypt and our long line of communications in the Western Desert will be a heavy commitment. It is also vitally important that the RAF allocations of American fighters for Egypt be fully and promptly supplied since we must expect a high rate of attrition in the Caucasus Area not only in air fighting but on account of the poor communication and lack of adequate repair facilities in that area.

(6) The force will have to rely for the protection of its bases and line of communication mainly on the Russian Forces but we should be prepared to send light anti aircraft units for the defense of aerodromes. We might also have to send some engineer units for work on aerodromes.

(7) It is important that the ground echelon of the force should be kept as small as possible consistent with the effective operation of the aircraft since it can only be concentrated and maintained at the expense of Russian supplies through the Persian Gulf route. The interference with these supplies should not be serious. The concentration of the force will involve a movement on the rail and sea communications between Iraq and Caucasus of the order of twelve thousand personnel, two thousand vehicles, four thousand tons of stores. Its subsequent maintenance on the assumption that petrol and lubricants can be supplied by the Russians should not exceed two hundred tons a day of which a substantial proportion should be lifted by air.

(8) The force will operate under the strategic control of the Russian High Command but will remain a homogeneous Allied Force under a British Air Officer with the right of appeal to his own government.
Subject:

To:

Page 4. No. 141 from London

(9) The foregoing should constitute the basis of instructions in a mission consisting of British and American Air Force Officers who should be despatched forthwith to Russia to undertake the necessary planning reconnaissance and practical preparations in combination with the Russians. It is urgently important that this be put in hand without delay.

Prime
August 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

The President showed this to Marshall and asked him to make a copy of it and a report on it. Marshall has returned it.

I think this can now be filed.

H.L.H.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 142, August 31, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and number one four one.

Rommel has begun the attack for which we have been preparing. An important battle may now be fought.

Prime.

Received in Map Room
0910 August 31, 1942
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

Subject: AMWAR 3
filed 244P/1
AEL

URGENT

CABLEGRAM

CCWD
September 1
1403 Z

URGENT XXX-C

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. C 143, September 1, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and
Number one four two.

1. We have carefully considered your number one
   eight zero. The Chiefs of Staff have also talked things
   over with Eisenhower.

2. We could not contest your wish if you so desire
   it to take upon the United States the whole burden,
   political and military, of the landings. Like you I
   assign immense importance to the political aspect. I
   do not know what information you have of the mood
   and temper of Vichy and North Africa, but of course if
   you can get ashore at the necessary points without
   fighting or only token resistance, that is the best of
   all. We cannot tell what are the chances of this.

3. I hope however that you have considered the
   following points: (a) Will not British participation
   be disclosed by the assembly of British small craft and
   aircraft at Gibraltar for some time beforehand? (b)
   Would it not be disclosed at the time of landing whatever
   flag we wear? (c) Would not initial fighting necessarily
   be between French and British aircraft and French bat-
   teries and British ships? (d) If the approach and land-
   ing take place in the dark as is indispensable to surprise,
   how will the Americans be distinguished from British? In
   the night all cats are grey. (e) What happens if, as I
   am assured is four to one probable, surf prevents disem-
   barkation on Atlantic beaches?

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Subject:

Page 2. No. C 143, September 1 from London

4. Moreover if, contrary to your hopes, the landings are stubbornly opposed and even held up, we shall not be able to give you the follow-up help for some considerable time because all our assault vessels would have been used for your troops and our reinforcements would be embarked in vessels which can only enter by captured harbours. Thus if the political bloodless victory, for which I agree with you there is a good chance, should be amiss, a military disaster of very great consequence will supervene. We could have stormed Dakar in September nineteen forty if we had not been cluttered up with preliminary conciliatory processes. It is that hard experience that makes our military experts rely so much upon the simplicity of force. Will you have enough American trained and equipped forces to do this all by yourselves, or at any rate to impress the enemy by the appearance of ample strength?

5. This sudden abandonment of the plan on which we have hitherto been working will certainly cause grievous delay. General Eisenhower says that October thirtieth will be the very earliest date. I myself think that it may well mean the middle of November. Orders were given to suspend loadings yesterday in order that, if necessary, all should be recast. I fear the substitution of November for October will open up a whole new set of dangers far greater than those which must any how be faced.

6. Finally, in spite of the difficulties it seems to us vital that Algiers should be occupied simultaneously with Casablanca and Oran. Here is the most friendly and hopeful spot where the political reaction would be most decisive throughout North Africa. To give up Algiers for the sake of the doubtfully practicable landing at Casablanca seems to us a very serious decision. If it led to the Germans forestalling us not only in Tunis but in Algeria, the results on balance would be lamentable throughout the Mediterranean.
To:

Page 3. No. C 143 from London, September 1

7. Mr. President, to sum up, Torch like Gymnast before it has always been viewed as primarily a United States enterprise. We have accepted an American command and your leadership and we will do our utmost to make a success of any plan on which you decide. We must however say quite plainly that we are sure that the best course is to persevere along the general lines so clearly set out in the agreed directive handed to General Eisenhower on August fourteen, with or without the modifications suggested in the Chiefs of Staffs telegram number C O S (W) two six five of August twenty nine. I am sure that if we both strip ourselves to the bone as you say, we could find sufficient naval cover and combat loadings for simultaneous attempts at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

Prime
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 3, 1942

From: London

To: The President of the United States
The White House

Number 144 from London September 3, 1942 XXX-C
Former Naval Person to President personal and
Number 143. Your 182.

Para 1. We have spent the day looking into physical
possibilities. Accepting your general outlines we think
that a working plan can be made on the basis that the
emphasis is shifted somewhat, namely reducing Casablanca by
ten or twelve thousand (making up deficiency in the
follow ups). These troops with their combat loaded
ships would give sufficient strength inside, while making
the entire assault American. This evens up the three
landings and gives the essential appearance at all vital
points. Without such a transference there is no hope
of Algiers on account of shortage of combat loaders and
landing craft. We all think this would be a great
blemish to the plan.

Para 2. Tomorrow we suggest that either General Clark
or General Eisenhower should come with Admiral Ramsy
who knows the whole transportation escort story and the
naval aspect from our end, and Mountbatten on the
landing details which are crucial, party reaching you
Sunday morning. We do not here know what naval forces
you are able to supply. Please let these be imparted to admiral whom in view of the importance of the operation we propose to give the naval command under the Allied C in C.

Para 3. Delay due to change already extends three weeks. Free French have got inkling and are leaky. Every day saved is precious. We have therefore already ordered work to go forward on these lines but of course the decision rests with you. Message ends. (Following is correction to paragraph one: three landings and gives the essential appearance of strength at all vital points.)

Correction made in text of message

Prime
URGENT

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

CABLEGRAM

URGENT

From: London
To: POTUS

No. 145, September 4, 1942

Formal Naval person to President personal and secret Unnumbered.

Reference my No. one forty three, please insert name "Cunningham" after word "Admiral" in last sentence of paragraph two.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Urgent

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 148, September 5, 1942

Most secret. Number one four four. From Former Naval Person to President. Your number one eight three.

1. We agree to the military layout as you propose it. We have plenty of troops highly trained for landing. If convenient, they can wear your uniform. They will be proud to do so. Shipping will be all right.

2. I have just had your number one eight four and it is evident that you too have skinned yourselves to the bone. Unless we suffer serious losses in PQ we consider that Naval forces now jointly to be provided justify us in going full speed ahead with staging the operations.

3. I am sending Admiral Ramsay with the agreement of General Eisenhower over at once to furnish Admiral Cunningham with the means of going into Naval details with you. It is imperative now to drive straight ahead and save every hour. In this way alone shall we realize your strategical design and the only hope of doing anything that really counts this year.
Page 2. No. 143 from London, September 5, 1942

4. We strongly endorse the request which we understand Eisenhower has already made to Marshall that the force you are releasing from Casablanca may be sent over here complete with its regimental combat team. Kindest regards.

Prime,

Copies
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 6, 1942

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 149 from London, September 5, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to the President. Personal
and No. 145. Reference your No. 185. Okay
full blast.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Copies furnished as noted:

Number 151 from London  September 6th, 1942  XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and secret.

Number 146.

First four ships carrying 193 Shermans and 28 SP 105's arrived second and were unloaded in record time.

The rest are close behind. Twenty-fourth, second, and ninth brigades should all be fully equipped with these tanks in the next ten days. I am sure the troops will do full justice to these fine weapons. Remembering that dark Tobruk day I am most grateful to you. I have good hopes about all the Egyptian fighting and believe Rommel is hard pressed.

Prime

Received in Map Room at 2330, Sept. 6, 1942.

Copy made for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Action Copy

RECLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date  MAY  5 1972
September 12, 1942

From: London

To: POTUS

No. XXXC 154, September 12th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret. Number one four seven.

Three one seven Shermans and nine four S P one zero five's which you so kindly gave me on that dark Tobruk day in Washington have now all safely arrived in Egypt. Eight two Shermans have already been issued to the troops. It is proposed to arm three brigades with nine four each and the rest Crusaders, this being thought the best combination. Averell will tell you of our visit to these brigades. I now hear they have received these weapons with the greatest enthusiasm, and I trust it will not be long before I give good accounts of their use. As these tanks were taken from the hands of the American Army, perhaps you would show this message to General Marshall.

PRIME

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5, 1972
September 16, 1942

From: London

To: The President of the United States, White House

Copies furnished as noted:

September 16, 1942

Former naval person to President personal and not one-fourth

I am hoping to receive your wishes about the Anglo-American Air Force on the Russian Southern Flank. I am not without hope of a favorable decision in Egypt in the next few weeks. Unless we can offer Stalin something definite for say December, we shall not get the full facilities we need for preparing Airfields etc thereabouts. Moreover, if we are able to make a firm offer, albeit contingent on favorable events in Egypt, it would be possible at the same time to ask for some favors for the Poles. Stalin has given us sixty thousand Poles with thirty thousand dependents out of which two and a half divisions are being made, but no provision has been made for recruitment of further Poles, Officers and men, to keep these forces going. Of these there are great numbers in various sorry plights throughout Russia. I thought we might help two birds with one piece of sugar.

I have had long conferences and conversations with Eisenhower and Clark, bringing in all our people as required with the sole aim of keeping to (for date see my next) for Torch as now settled between us. If you can make it from your end, we will make it from this.

I entirely agree with your political outlook on Torch. It is sound unless we are forestalled. There is no sign in any of the secret matter which I see that the enemy is aware, and the mood of France is now at its very best. I count the days.

XXX - C
In the whole of Torch, military and political, I consider myself your Lieutenant as King only to put my viewpoint plainly before you. To shall have a wireless station of overwhelming power available by zero, so that if you dictate your appeals to France and other propaganda material to gramophone records beforehand, these can be played out over everything during the performance. To British will come in only as and when you judge expedient. This is an American enterprise in which we are your holy mates.

I agree with you that De Gaulle will be an irritant and his movement must be kept out. We do not yet know what the local generals will do or whether perhaps you are going to bring Giraud to the scene. If your leisure please let me know your ideas.

I repeat, the outlook seems good to me and will be furthered by good news from Egypt.

Bad news from the PQ convoy, twelve being sunk by torpedoes, hundreds already, and there are at least two more days to run in the danger zone. Then we know the results of PQ eighteen we must decide about PQ nineteen. All preparations for this are going forward but it looks almost impossible to hit another PQ, before Torch, and if the losses are very heavy this time it would not be worth trying. Should the decision be adverse to PQ nineteen you will have to talk me with Stalin, and here again the offer of six million in the Russian Southern Front may be important. Kindest regards to all.

Prime