The preceding document has reproduced poorly because the original is very faint.
September 15, 1942

From London

To POTUS

September 15, 1942

Former Naval Person to President
personal and number one four nine. My number one four eight Para three.
Date is November four.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room
at 0505, Sept. 15, 1942.

Action Copy

SECRET

0205
Cablegram

September 16, 1942

From: Amembassy London
To: Potus Wasbn DC

Copies furnished as noted:

September 16th, 1942
Former Naval Person to President

The results of the first operations by your flying fortresses have been most encouraging. General Spaatz has wisely been feeling his way and they have not struck very deep. But we may hope that when they are available in sufficient numbers they will be able, with the help of their escorting fighters, to carry the Air War into Germany by day on a heavy scale. This would be a development of the highest importance.

In spite of the fact that we cannot make up more than thirty two Squadrons of Bombers, instead of forty two last year, we know our Night Bomber Offensive is having a devastating effect. Nuremberg, Mainz, Karlsruhe and Dusseldorf are the latest additions to the growing list of German Cities to feel its weight and the blows at Hamburg and Bremen cannot fail to have an effect on rate of U Boat building. I have told Air Marshal Ewill to send you a copy of a paper on our Bomber Offensive recently prepared at my request by Air Marshal Harris, who has almost unique qualifications to express an opinion on the subject. Out of zeal he has no doubt overstated a good case. None the less the paper is an impressive contribution to thought on the subject.

If we can add continuity and precision to the attack by your Bombers striking deep into the heart of Germany by day the effect would be redoubled. To do this effectively and without prohibitive loss they must have numbers to saturate and desparse the defences, and time is precious. A few hundred fortresses this autumn and winter, while substantial German Air Forces are still held in Russia may well be worth many more in a years time when the enemy may be able greatly to reinforce his Western Air Defences. Together we might even deal a blow at the enemy’s Air Power from which he could never fully recover.

I hope you may consider it wise to build up General Spaatz’s strength. We are following with admiration
From London

To Potus

No. 150, September 16th, Page 2

your fight in the Solomons. We must make Torch a success. But I am sure we should be missing great opportunities if we did not concentrate every available fortress and long range escort fighter as quickly as possible for the attack on our primary enemy.

I cannot help feeling some concern at the extent to which the programme for the build up of American Air Forces in this country is falling behind expectations, particularly in view of the withdrawal from the United Kingdom of over eight hundred British and American Aircraft for Torch. We had hoped to see twelve heavy groups and seven pursuit groups in the United Kingdom by the first of November. Obviously the claims of Torch will substantially reduce those figures, but I hope they will not be permitted to obscure the importance of keeping up and intensifying the direct pressure on Germany for which the fortress and the long range fighter are indispensable. Moreover, the deliveries of American Aircraft to the R A F in the Middle East show some startling deficiencies on the figures in the new air agreement which you and I initialled in June. This is especially serious in view of our possible minor commitment in the Caucasus this winter. I know General Arnold is doing his best and that the shortcomings are due to the failure of U S production to come up to schedule. After Dunkirk we gave our Aircraft Industry special priorities which resulted in a great acceleration in the curve of deliveries. I understand you are considering giving similar priorities for the time being to aircraft production; may I suggest that special emphasis should be laid on that of heavy bombers and pursuit aircraft, to provide for a rapid and constantly increasing intensity of air attack on Germany? I am told that the heavy bomber programme of the Army Air Force has been reduced from a figure of one one seven groups by the end of nineteen forty three to one of six five groups whereas that for dive bombers has been doubled. I wonder whether these priorities will be reconsidered in the light of the new turn in our strategy.
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

September 22, 1942

From  London

To  The President of the United States
    The White House

Number 151 from London  September 22, 1942  XXX-C
Former Naval Person to President personal and

Number 151.

Para 1. Had long conference this morning with Eisenhower and
your officers. Cunningham and Ramsay present and our chiefs of staff.

Para 2. General Eisenhower announced that the final date for
Torch would be (see my following telegram). Everything is being
worked to this.

Para 3. We now know that P Q 18 carried 27 ships safely to
Archangel and 13 are sunk. For P Q 19 forty ships are already loaded
but it is impossible to send this convoy without throwing back the
date of Torch by three weeks. We all regard any delay in Torch as
inadmissible.

Para 4. The time has therefore come to tell Stalin, first
that there will be no P Q 19 and secondly we cannot run any more
P Q's till the end of the year, that is January. This is a for-
midable moment in Anglo-American-Soviet relations and you and I must
be united in any statement made about convoys.

Para 5. We are solemnly pledged to the supply of Russia and
the most grave consequences might follow from failure to make good.
For one nine four three there may be two choices. First to run from
January onwards arctic convoys under the present conditions of danger,
waste and effort observing that we used 77 warships for P Q 18 and think ourselves fortunate to have lost no more than one third of the merchant ships.

Para 6. Secondly, the operation called Jupiter. It is more than doubtful whether the developments of Torch will leave shipping and escort resources sufficient for Jupiter unless you can help at any rate with the latter. We must however also know what importance Stalin would attach to the operation and what contribution he would make to it. See the account of my last conversation with him where I mentioned two divisions and he offered three. Our estimate here is that larger numbers would be required and I repeat the shipping problem is unsolved and is anyhow dependent on Torch developments.

Para 7. It seems to me that simply to tell him now that no more P Q's till 1943 is a great danger, and I therefore wish to open staff conversations on Jupiter under all necessary reserves. See the telegram I propose to send to him after consulting MacKenzie King, which, as you will see, leaves both Britain and Soviet Governments free to decide when the result of the joint staffs study is completed. Of course if you were able to take an interest in this it would be most helpful. As in a few days it will be necessary to unload and discharge P Q 19 I felt this new project necessary to break the blow.
Para 8. I gained the impression at the conference that Round-up was not only delayed or impinged upon by Torch but was to be regarded as definitely off for 1943. This will be another tremendous blow for Stalin. Already Maisky is asking questions about the spring offensive. I understood that the words of our agreement stood, namely, that all preparations should go forward in a balanced way as fast as possible. Under all circumstances it is indispensable to hold the Germans pinned on the channel coast of France. However Mountbatten says landing craft are not going forward as arranged, and of course the movement of American troops across the Atlantic will evidently be greatly reduced.

Para 9. We ought now to make a new programme. So far three United States Divisions have arrived here, all of which will shortly leave for Torch. We have six divisions from the United Kingdom this year and are holding four more ready for Torch. If we are to be able to take advantage of a breakdown in enemy morale, or an undue weakening of their forces in Europe next spring, or alternatively, if things go badly for us and we have to face the possibility of invasion, it will be necessary for you in the next six months to send at least eight United States divisions to the United Kingdom in addition to your air force programme. U S General Smith says that at least twenty
ship loads could be saved by use of the proportion of British which we hope to be able to supply. Also these divisions can work up here almost as well as at home.

Para 10. I can quite see how in the altered circumstances you would be inclined to shift the emphasis from building landing craft to escort vessels, but I hope this will not go too far and that you will give me a steady flow both of troops and landing craft up to the limit of shipping possibilities. Could you please send as soon as possible revised programmes of what we may expect in the next twelve months between now and next September under the Bolero-Roundup scheme. Only then can we make plans for our own safety and the accommodation of your men apart altogether from enterprises such as Jupiter. By a further rigorous handling of the British manpower problem we are hoping to bring the nine beach divisions up to full field standard. It seems vital to all our plans not only that we should be free from the invasion menace but that the enemy should feel our pressure and we be able to take advantage of any serious deterioration in German morale. In this connection every argument used for Sledgehammer and or Roundup count even more in 1943 and 1944 than it did in 1942 and 1943.
Para 11. If Torch proves hard and costly and if we have to fight French and Germans and perhaps Spaniards, there could of course be no question of Jupiter. We British would require to reinforce Torch from Great Britain. Thus it is all the more necessary that we receive the fullest flow of American divisions and air forces to the United Kingdom.

Para 12. But there is a more favourable assumption to which personally I incline, namely, that by the end of November the United States with French assistance will be masters of French North Africa and that the British expedition will be striking from Torch at Tripoli. General Alexander will attack in sufficient time to influence Torch favourably should he be successful. His operation is called (see my telegram number 163). If all goes well on both operations we might control the whole North African shore by the end of the year, thus saving some of the masses of shipping now rounding the cape. This is our first great prize.

Para 13. It would then be open to us to decide on the next move. If the Russian need were sufficiently grave and their demands imperative we might decide to do Jupiter instead of attacking the underbelly of the Axis by Sardinia, Sicily and even possibly Italy. We ought to have the option open which entails not only paper staff studies
but all such preparations as do not hamper our immediate agreed action.

Para 14. To sum up, my persisting anxiety is Russia, and I do not see how we can reconcile it with our consciences or with our interests to have no more P Q's till 1943, no offer to make joint plans for Jupiter, and no signs of a spring, summer or even autumn offensive in Europe. I should be most grateful for your counsel on all this. We wish urgently to send the telegram (of which copy follows separately) to Stalin, and hope that you will back it up as strongly and as soon as you can.

Following are corrections to paragraph 9: "shortly leave for Torch. We have" and "the proportion of British equipment which we hope".
Cablegram

From London

To The President of the United States
The White House

Number 161 from London September 22, 1942 XXX-C

(Former Naval Person to President personal and)

Number 162. My 161 Paragraph 2. Date is eight November.

Prime

Copies to:
Admiral Leahy,
Mr. Harry Hopkins,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Action Copy
From London

To The President of the United States

The White House

Number 155 from London September 22, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential.

Number 155. Reference paragraph 12 of my number 161. The operation is called Lightfoot.

Prime

Copies furnished as noted:

Copies to:
Admiral Leahy.
Mr. Harry Hopkins.
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Number 154 from London September 22, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Number 154. Following is text of telegram referred to in my number

151 which I wish to send to Stalin.

Para 1. As I told you in Moscow we are convinced that the most
effective contribution that we and the United States can make in
1942 to the defeat of Germany is to launch Torch at the earliest
possible date.

Para 2. The date which has now been finally fixed with the
President is early in November.

Para 3. The effect of Torch must be either (A) to oblige the
Germans to divert air and land forces to counter our move, or (B)
to compel them to accept the new position created by the success of
Torch, which would then create a further diversion by the threat of
attack against Sicily and the south of Europe.

Para 4. The considerable success of the last convoy operation
was achieved only because no less than 77 warships were employed on
the operation. Protection on anything like this scale will be impossi-
ble until the end of the year, when the naval escorts which we must
now assemble for Torch can again be made available in northern waters.

Para 5. In the meanwhile we are trying to find means of sending
you supplies on a reduced scale by the Northern route during the
Page 2 of Number 154 from London September 22, 1942 XXX-C

Para 6. We intend to resume the full flow of supplies from January 1943.

Para 7. In order to reduce losses of merchant ships by enemy action and thus make the convoys in 1943 as effective as possible, we are anxious to examine with you the possibility of carrying out operation Jupiter during this winter.

Para 8. I therefore suggest to you that I send to Moscow General McNaughton, Commander in Chief of the Canadian Army arriving in the early days of October, so that he may discuss the matter fully with your staff. He has already made a preliminary examination of this question.

Prime
London

To The President of The United States

No. 155, September 28, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. Your No. one eight seven. Earliest date
P. Q. one nine could have sailed is October second,
I. E. five days from date of your message of
September twenty seventh. However if you think
well we can keep it, as if it really was sailing,
till seventh or even later. Bulk of the ships are
in Scottish ports. Agree it is most important to
make a firm offer about Caucasus air support.

2. Am encouraged by the way our troops were
received in Tananarive. Kindest regards.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
I have been furnished with a copy of the progress report which the combined Production and Resources Board have submitted to you in response to your letter of August one nine. I have followed with interest the work of the Board since its inception in June, and I fully appreciate the importance to the success of their task of integrating the production programmes of the two countries, of a statement of requirements directly related to strategic needs. I also realize the formidable difficulties which stand in the way of the preparation of such a statement for a date so far ahead as April one, nineteen forty four. The progress towards the ideal at which the Board is aiming may well be slow.

In the meanwhile, it seems to me that there are certain features of our combined programmes which, if they are allowed to stand unmodified, must lead to a misdirection in nineteen forty three of resources of materials and industrial capacity which we can ill afford. I think I can best illustrate my meaning by taking as examples the combined production programmes of tanks and of ball ammunition.

Our combined tank programme for one nine four three allows for the production in the United States of some thirty one thousand light tanks and forty five thousand medium and heavy tanks. In the United Kingdom, the production will be eleven thousand of all types. The total amounts to some eighty seven thousand tanks, which I am advised would be sufficient to equip some two hundred armoured divisions of two two five tanks each with one hundred per cent reserves. This appears to me to be a provision on a scale out of all proportion to anything that might be brought to bear on the enemy in nineteen forty three. It was, of course, necessary for us to fix high targets in the early days, so as to get production moving on a great scale. Have we not now reached the time when we could, with advantage, scrutinise our targets more closely? In our efforts to reach to too great a height, we may well exhaust an undue quantity of our resources.

A further effect of setting the targets of the main items of equipment too high is that everything else is then calculated in proportion. For example, the United States production in nineteen forty three of ball ammunition will be about twenty thousand million rounds of all calibres. That of the United Kingdom will be about two thousand million rounds. Observing that the entire expenditure of ball ammunition by our Army in the Middle East, from the beginning of the war to the present date, is little more than two thousand million rounds and remembering that the total expenditure of the American Expeditionary Force in the last war was around one thousand million rounds, it would appear that we are making provision on a scale which is altogether too lavish.

I bring these matters to your attention because of my anxiety that, if inflated demands are given full rein, we shall create for ourselves unnecessary difficulties in the provision of raw materials and industrial capacity, and shall be unnecessarily curtailing our power to expand the production of such vital requirements as escort vessels, ships, and aircraft, of which it is almost impossible to have too many.

I am ready to cooperate in any way you may think desirable in scrutinising our programmes so as to rectify those anomalies which may exist and so as to ensure that our combined resources will be used to the best advantage.
No. 157, October 5, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I have just received the telegram immediately following from Stalin. It seems to me that in addition to Velvet we ought to make a desperate effort to meet him as far as possible and include the promise in our impending telegram about P Q 19. This is becoming urgent now as much unloading has to be done and assembly of P Q ships complicates somewhat Torch. Should be most grateful to hear from you at earliest. Elliot, who is in great form, was with me last night together with Eisenhower and the American Eagle.

Prime
No. 158, October 5, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and . Following is text of telegram from Stalin referred to in my No. 157. Begins.

1. I have to inform you that the situation in the Stalingrad area deteriorated since the beginning of September. The Germans were able to concentrate in this area great reserves of aviation and in this way managed to secure superiority in the air in the ratio two to one. We had not enough fighters for the protection of our forces from the air. Even the bravest troops are helpless if they lack the air protection. We more particularly require Spitfires and Airacobras. I told about all that in great detail to Mr. Wendell Willkie.

2. The ships with arms arrived at Archangel and are being unloaded. This is a great help. In view however of the scarcity of tonnage we would be prepared temporary to forego some forms of assistance and in this way to reduce the amount of tonnage necessary if there would be secured the increased number of the fighter aircraft. We would be prepared temporary to forego our claims on tanks and artillery equipment if Great Britain and the USA could supply us with eight hundred fighters a month (approximately Great Britain three hundred and the USA five hundred). Such a help would be more effective and would improve position at the front.

3. The information of your intelligence to the effect that Germany manufactures not more than thirteen hundred combat machines a month is not confirmed by our sources. According to our information the German aircraft works together with the works in the occupied countries engaged in making of aircraft parts are producing not less than twenty five hundred combat machines a month.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/6/42

Harry

Here are two PHi's that came in last night - The President has seen and asked that I get them to you.

John McLean
CABLEGRAM

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

October 7, 1942

OJM M.

London Embassy London

To The President of the United States

No. 159, October 7, 1942.

Prime Minister to President Personal and

Your No. one eight nine. There is no possibility of

letting PQ nineteen sail in successive groups with

reduced escorts as you suggest. I append a note by

the Admiralty on this subject. Neither can the fact

that the Convoy is not sailing be concealed from the

Russians any longer. Maisky is already aware of the

position, though not officially informed and I expect

he has let Stalin know the general prospect. We are pre-

paring ten ships to sail individually during the October

dark. They are all British ships for which the crews will

have to volunteer, the dangers being terrible and their

sole hope if sunk far from help being Arctic clothing and

such heating arrangements as can be placed in lifeboats.

Absolutely nothing else is possible unless you are able

to help by providing some American ships for independent

sailing after November nine should experience have proved

that the chances are sufficiently good.

2. I believe that the blunt truth is best with

Stalin but that there has been advantage in the delay of a

fortnight in telling him, which you proposed. I feel

strongly he should be told now.

3. With regard to velvet nothing can move before

the Battle in Egypt. There is danger that the Germans will

pull thier Air Force off Russia, and turn it on to Egypt.

There is also the probability that they will be forced

anyway to turn a large proportion on to Torch. But although

we cannot be definite about an early date it seems to me

that we could be more definite as to the composition of the

Force than in the wording which you suggest for paragraph nine.

We have for weeks had the exact composition of the twenty

Squadrons planned out subject to your concurrence and help.

I should like to state the actual detail of the Force and

the time required for it to move and come into action.
The wording I should suggest we use to Stalin is in my immediately following telegram.

4. I am puzzled to know what message Admiral Standley is bringing home to you, but I cannot believe it threatens a separate peace. So far the Russian Campaign has been very adverse to Hitler, and though they are angry with us both they are by no means in despair.

5. If therefore we offer Velvet as now defined, plus increased aircraft deliveries and the individual ships on the PQ Route, I trust this will be sufficient to bridge the gap before Torch opens. Appendix. Note by Admiralty:

1. Arrangements already to sail/ten ships from Iceland (C) during dark period twenty-eighth October to eighth November. These would sail singly at about two hundred mile intervals with occasional larger gaps and rely on evasion and dispersion.

2. We had already considered sailing small groups with weak escort but in our view there is no half way between independent sailings and fighting through with full escorting Forces.

3. Our reasons are: (A) Possibilities of evasion are slight as German Air Reconnaissance for North Russian Convoys is very intensive and anything in the nature of a group of ships would be continually shadowed. (B) A group is more likely to draw attack by enemy surface vessels which are still waiting in their Northern Anchorages. (C) Anything short of full covering support invites disaster both to the Group and Naval Forces. (D) To send a total of forty ships in groups of two or three ships with two or three escorts would employ as many escorts as were
No. 159, October 7, 1942.

required for PQ eighteen. Torch is absorbing every available craft.

1. The voyage in anything but a fully escorted Convoy is so hazardous that it should be only undertaken by volunteers who clearly understand the risk. The chance of crews of stricken ships surviving when they take to their boats is remote.

Prime

[Handwritten note:]

A. J. King - I do not agree. Please consider a talk with me at 11 a.m. Wed.

[Signature: J. W.]
From: London

To: The President of the United States
The White House

Number 160 from London October 7, 1942 XXX-C

From Former Naval Person to President, and personal.

This is what I suggest we send to Premier Stalin.

Para 1. We shall attack in Egypt towards the end of this month and Torch will begin early in November. The effect of these operations must be either - A to oblige the Germans to send air and land forces to counter our move: B to compel them to accept the new position created by our success, which would then create a diversion by the threat of attack against Sicily and the south of Europe.

Para 2. Our attack in Egypt will be in good force. Torch will be a heavy operation in which, apart from the United States Navy, two four zero British warships and more than half a million men will be engaged. This is all rolling forward irrevocably.

Para 3. Should these affairs prosper, we will begin to send North as soon as they can be disengaged from the battle in Egypt the following air forces - British: nine fighter squadrons five bomber squadrons United States: one heavy bombardment group one transport group. This Allied force would operate under the strategic control
of the Soviet High Command. It should be able to take station on your southern flank early in the new year.

Para 4. In the letter which Monsieur Waisky delivered to me on the fifth of October, you asked for a great increase in fighter aircraft supplied to Russia by this country and the United States. We will send you as soon as possible by the Persian Gulf route one five zero Spitfires, with the equivalent of fifty more in the form of spares to be sent as they become available, as a special reinforcement which we cannot repeat. This special reinforcement is over and above the protocol supplies by the Northern route so far as it can be used. The United States will send you (to be filled in by President Roosevelt).

Para 5. I was greatly relieved that so large a proportion of the last convoy reached Archangel safely. This success was achieved only because no less than seventy seven warships were employed on the operation. Naval protection will be impossible until the end of the year. As the necessary escorts are withdrawn from Torch they can again be made available in northern waters.

Para 6. Nevertheless, we intend in the meanwhile to do our best to send you supplies by the northern route by means of ships sailed independently instead of in escorted convoys. Arrangements have been made
to sail about ten ships from Iceland during the moonless period twenty eighth October to eighth November. The ships will sail singly, at about two hundred mile intervals, with occasional larger gaps, and rely on evasion and dispersion.

Para 7. We hope to resume the flow of supplies in strongly escorted convoys from January 1943.

Para 8. It would of course greatly help both you and us if the Germans could be denied the use of airfields in Northern Norway. If your staffs could make a good plan the President and I would at once examine the possibility of cooperating up to the limit of our ability.

Prime
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 7, 1942
1638 Z

From: London

To: The President of the United States
   The White House

Number 161 from London October 7, 1942 XXX-C

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Bracken tells me that when he heard of the Chicago Tribune's
proposal he told some of the American correspondents that the Ministry
of Information would not allow McCormick to publish any paper in Eng-
land on the ground that the Chicago Tribune had done everything in
its power to injure the cause of the United Nations. No official
application for facilities has yet been made. When it is McCormick
will be told that no opportunity will be given to him to reproduce in
England the lies and misrepresentations which are the staple of the
Chicago Tribune's editorial policy.

Braken told Eisenhower yesterday that every possible facility
will be given to the American Army if it will produce a daily paper
for the American Troops.

Prime
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FILED: OCTOBER 7, 1942
1243 AM

FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 162

Former Naval Person to President Personal and

I send you three telegrams, A, B, and C about "Aspidistra". Please let me know whether you like the idea of preparing one or more records which can be released and reiterated as circumstances require. When the situation allows it I hope to come along myself.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-73
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FILED: OCTOBER 7, 1942
217 AM

FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 163

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret. My telegram number one six two. Following is "A". Use of Aspidistra for "Torch". Part one

1. The use of Aspidistra will form an integral part of the general plan of political warfare for Torch.

2. Aspidistra at full power produces a minimum of five hundred KW and surpasses the power of any known broadcasting transmitter in Europe. Even so it cannot be relied upon to reach either unoccupied France or North Africa with sufficient intelligibility except between seventeen point zero zero hours and zero five point thirty hours (GMT). Therefore from zero to zero plus sixteen hours the successful dissemination of the President's proclamation and of other urgent information will depend on leaflet dropping by the RAF over unoccupied France and over North Africa by Catalinas and Hudsons based on Gibraltar and by the fleet air arm. Part two.

3. Since the construction of Aspidistra is flexible, en-
abling rapid changes to be made in approximately fifteen minutes from one medium wave length to any of six, and in view of the zero hour selected for the operation, the following plan for use on D-Day is proposed. (A) Object: to provide the maximum listening public in France and North Africa with the information best calculated to assist Torch. (B) Method: On D-Day, beginning two hours before the peak listening period, that is at about nineteen point zero zero hours (GMT), and subsequently at selected intervals throughout the night, as Aspidistra will come in alongside specially selected Vichy controlled wavelengths, thus achieving the maximum surprise at the most advantageous moment.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by Brittel Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 164

Former Naval Person to President Personal and

My telegram number one six two. Following is "B".

The records should be made, if possible, on RCA cutting

machine at thirtythree point one slant three RPM not, seventy-

eight. The length of the records must not exceed ten minutes

and the records themselves should be cut preferably from centre

outwards. The talks should be in French, and the records should

be made on aluminium base to avoid hazard from breakage in transmit

by air.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  May 5 1972
Former Naval Person to President personal and

My telegram number one six two. Following

is "C".

Reference my telegram regarding loud WT transmitter for Torch. I should be very grateful if you

would kindly arrange for immediate priority for the delivery of six tubes type eight seventy dash A, manufactured by the General Electric Corporation of America. They are urgently required as essential spares for the maintenance of the instrument and should be flown over at the earliest possible moment.

Prime
To the President and personal.

1. I have despatched telegram to Premier Stalin. Exact text is in my immediately following telegram. All the suggestions contained in your No one nine two have been adopted.

2. You did not fill in the blank in paragraph four of my No one six zero. I have therefore used the following words in my telegram to Premier Stalin: "President Roosevelt will cable separately about United States contribution".

Prime
From Former Naval Person to President and personal. Following is text referred to in para one of my immediately preceding telegram: Prime Minister to Premier Stalin.

We shall attack in Egypt towards the end of this month and "Torch" will begin early in November. The effect of these operations must be either (A) to oblige the Germans to send air and land forces to counter our move: or (B) to compel them to accept the new position created by our success, which would then create a diversion by the threat of attack against Sicily and the South of Europe.

Our attack in Egypt will be in good force. "Torch" will be a heavy operation in which, in addition to the U S Navy, two four zero British warships and more than half a million men will be engaged. This is all rolling forward irrevocably.

The President and I are anxious to put an Anglo-American Air Force on your southern flank and operate it under the strategic control of the Soviet High Command. This force would consist of the following: British: Nine fighter squadrons, five bomber squadrons. United States: one heavy bombardment group, one transport group. Orders have been issued by us to assemble this force and take their station so that they would be available for combat early in the new year. Most of this force will come from Egypt as soon as they can be disengaged from the battle there, which we believe will be successful on our part.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
In the letter which Monsieur Maisky delivered to me on the fifth October, you asked for a great increase in fighter aircraft supplied to Russia by this country and the United States. We will send you as soon as possible by the Persian Gulf Route, one five zero Spitfires, with the equivalent of fifty more in the form of spares to be sent as they become available, as a special reinforcement which we cannot repeat. This special reinforcement is over and above the protocol supplies by the Northern Route so far as it can be used. President Roosevelt will cable separately about the United States contribution.

I was greatly relieved that so large a proportion of the last convoy reached Archangel safely. This success was achieved only because no less than seven seven warships were employed on the operation. Naval protection will be impossible until our impending operations are completed. As the necessary escorts are withdrawn from Torch they can again be made available in Northern waters.

Nevertheless, we intend in the meanwhile to do our best to send you supplies by the Northern Route by means of ships sailed independently instead of in escorted convoys. Arrangements have been made to sail ships from Iceland during the Moonless Period twenty eighth October to eighth November. Ten of ours are preparing in addition to what the Americans will do. The ships will sail singly, at about two hundred mile intervals, with occasional larger gaps, and rely on evasion and dispersion.

We hope to resume the flow of supplies in strongly escorted convoys from January nineteen forty three.

It would of course greatly help both you and us if the Germans could be denied the use of airfields in Northern Norway. If your staffs could make a good plan the President and I would at once examine the possibility of cooperation up to the limit of our ability.
The President directed you
see the attached two dispatches
He asks that you have
a draft I a dispatch
for Mr. Stalin ready to
work on when he
the President's return
from the theatre this afternoon.

Very yours,
John F. Kennedy
Date October 18, 1942
Time 5:45 P.M.

From AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON
To PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Number 188 Dated October 18, 1942

Former naval person to President personal and sensitive

I am perturbed by the one hundred octane position. Demands increase and stocks diminish. Your authorities are considering proposals to increase plant capacity beyond present programme and to accelerate plant construction already under way. This is necessary to meet demands on a basis agreed by your air staff and ours. Can you hasten a favourable decision and so ease our anxieties about the U.K., Egypt and India.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5, 1972

Received in Map Room 2:05 PM, EWT, Oct 18
From London, England

To The President of the United States

Number 169 Dated October 21, 1942

For President from Former Naval Person. Most Secret and Personal.

I am convinced that the danger of offensive action by the French Fleet in the Mediterranean would be markedly reduced by the showing of the American Flag by United States Warships inside the Mediterranean, particularly in view of the recent developments which the American Eagle is now testing.

The attachment of four American Destroyers to the British Naval Units inside the Mediterranean would be enough. They would be replaced in the American Atlantic Flotilla by corresponding number of British Destroyers, and should not be required for more than four or five days.

I am sure that the administrative and command difficulties of this arrangement could easily be overcome, even at this late hour, and I beg you to give the matter your personal attention. Cunningham would like it.
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Number 170 Dated October 24, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and 

The Battle in Egypt began tonight at eight P.M. London time. The whole force of the Army will be engaged. I will keep you informed. A victory there will be most fruitful to our main enterprise. All the Shermans and one zero five S. B.'s which you gave me on that dark Tobruk morning will play their part.

Prime

Received at 2150, EWT, Oct. 23, 1942 in Map Room.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Number 171 Dated October 24, 1942

Former Naval Person to President private and

I am delighted that Mrs. Roosevelt has arrived safely, though she was delayed by weather for two days at Foynes. My wife and I are looking forward so much to her coming at the week end. Thank you indeed for the letter which she brought me from you. I am convinced that better days are coming in. I am pressing Smuts to go to you. He has been a great help here and is, I believe, one of the finest men in the world.

Prime

Received at 2150, EWT, Oct. 25, 1942 in Map Room.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: Prime  
To: The President of the United States  

October 24, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and
Number one seven two.

You have seen my message to Stalin which I sent you for your concurrence and dispatched on the eight October (our series message number one six seven). There is also the telegram you sent him quoted in your number one nine three to me.

On the same day that I sent my long telegram I sent a short one to him imparting a piece of secret news. On the thirteen October I received the somewhat cryptic answer "thank you". Otherwise I have had no response.

We asked our Ambassador to which telegram the "thank you" referred. Molotov's private secretary though repeatedly pressed has given an evasive answer. But Maisky has now indicated in response to an indirect enquiry that he regards Stalins reply as referring to the longer message. Have you had any answer to your message quoted in your one nine three.

Meanwhile fourteen days have passed and no progress has been made in the necessary arrangements with the Russians for choosing landing grounds etc to enable our twenty squadrons to take station on the Russian southern flank in January. Nor have we received any comment from Moscow on the other parts of the message affecting the hundred and fifty plus equivalent spare parts of fifty Spitfires offered by us all mounting cannon guns.

Lastly we are sending both of us our ships in the dark period of October by the Arctic route hoping to get a good many through to Murmansk or Archangel. Yet this effort on our part entails a considerable Russian movement of aircraft and submarines to help these brave ships in.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Man Room  
0950 EWT October 24  

SECRET
As I say I have received nothing but this cryptic "thank you". Baffling as all this is we are persevering because of the splendid fighting of the Russian armies. I wonder whether anything has occurred inside the Soviet Animal to make it impossible for Stalin to give an effective reply. It may be that the Russian army has acquired a new footing in the Soviet machine. All this chatter about Hess may be another symptom. I am frankly perplexed and would be grateful for your thoughts at the earliest moment because time is passing.

Signed Prime
WAR DEPARTMENT
CODE CENTER

Date October 25, 1942
Time 1411 Z

From London, England

To The President of The United States

Number 173 Dated October 25, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and

I have seen Monsieur Boheman, the Swedish Secretary dash
General, several times during his visit here and consider him
a remarkable man. He virutally combines in Sweden the permanent
guidance of the foreign office with a kind of secretaryship to
the cabinet. He is thoroughly well dash disposed to our cause,
though very guarded on account of the danger in which Sweden
lies. He is now going to the United States, and I trust you
will find an opportunity of having a talk with him.

I feel it most important that Sweden should be in with us
all before the end, though the moment for bringing her in must
be wisely chosen.

Prime

Received in May Room
at 1110, EWT, Oct 25, 1942

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: AMBASSADOR, LONDON

To: PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Number: 174  Dated: OCTOBER 26, 1942

I HEAR THAT YOU WOULD PREFER TO OMIT FROM THE BRITISH MESSAGE TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT A REFERENCE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF BRITISH FORCES IN TORCH.

I AM SATISFIED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO INFORM BOTH THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENTS OF BRITISH PARTICIPATION, IF ONLY TO REMOVE ANY SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE OBJECT OF OUR OWN CONCENTRATIONS AT GIBRALTER AND TO LEND FORCE TO THE ASSURANCES WE ARE GIVING TO THEM. THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH APPLY TO THE HANDLING OF THE FRENCH DO NOT NECESSARILY APPLY TO THAT OF THE SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE, FOR WHICH YOU AGREED THAT WE SHOULD BE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE.

THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF OUR PUBLISHING THE FULL TEXT OF OUR DECLARATIONS TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL ON ZERO DAY. ALL THAT WE SHOULD MAKE PUBLIC WOULD BE THE SUBSTANCE, OMITTING ANY PASSAGES, SUCH AS THOSE ABOUT BRITISH PARTICIPATION.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
R. H. Parks  Date: MAY 5 1942
ICIPATION WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORD WITH THE GENERAL LINE WE ARE BOTH TAKING IN PUBLIC IN THE FIRST STAGE OF THE OPERATION.

WE SHOULD OF COURSE SAY TO BOTH SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE THAT WHAT WE TELL THEM ABOUT OUR SHARE IN THE OPERATION IS FOR THEIR STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

I HOPE THAT WITH THIS EXPLANATION YOU WILL AGREE TO THE RETENTION OF THE ORIGINAL TEXT, TO WHICH WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE.

SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO ANY MESSAGE TO DR. SALAZAR.

PRIME
From London

To The President of the United States

Number 175 Dated October 27, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Mrs Roosevelt has I think enjoyed her first three days in England. She spent Sunday with us at Chequers and went to see my wife's Maternity Hospital. She went with my wife today a long round of women's army services. She seems extremely well and in the best of spirits. By official engagements I suppose you mean ceremonial affairs. These can be cut to any extent. But Mrs Roosevelt has an immense programme of official engagements in the sense of scheduled appointments to see things. I have urged her to apply to me in any case where she wanted to have them cancelled or warded off. I also urged the importance of keeping a good many days spare so that she could do whatever she felt inclined. Elliot came to luncheon Sunday. I will telegraph again in a day or two.

Prime
Former Naval Person to President Personal and
Your number two zero three. I am deeply grateful for your help. General Alexander has just telegraphed that it is impossible to withdraw this division during the battle. Later on, if Curtin insists, it will have to go, but I trust your telegram will be decisive.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copy to Admiral Leahy.
To President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person and personal.

Although I understand from Mountabatten that the plough scheme as originally conceived is not a practicable proposition this winter, I am convinced that it is of the utmost importance that the development and production of the vehicle should not be delayed.

I am sure that even if its employment is impossible in the near future, it is essential that every opportunity should be taken to improve upon the present design so that we shall be fully prepared to grasp our opportunity when it occurs as it certainly will.

Prime
From: Embassy London

To: The President of The United States

No.: 178

October 30th, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Your one nine nine. I like your press release very much and deem it admirably conceived for its purpose. I have only two suggestions: for "Egyptian campaign" read "British campaign in Egypt", and at the end add "and prove the first historic step to the liberation and restoration of France."

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No.: 179 October 31, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and.

I have received the following report from the Commander-In-Chief Eighth Army. I should be grateful if you would show it to General Marshall. Begins: First reports from western desert indicate great satisfaction with Shermans. Position of gun has enabled maximum concealment in Hull-Down positions with good observation by commander. Have definite evidence that enemy tanks including MK IV special being destroyed at ranges up to two thousand yards using good American M sixty one ammunition. One zero five MM S P guns have done well, gun and ammunition both good. They have not yet been used in a very mobile role but consider they have possibilities against enemy guns which we hope to exploit soon.

PRIME
From: London
To: POTUS
No.: 180

October 31, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I am most grateful for your telegram number two zero
zero of October two seven. Your point about American Com-
mand has already been covered. We shall say "These opera-
tions are being carried out primarily by American Forces
under American Command".

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room
11:44 PM, EDT, Oct. 31, 1942.
Copy of
Prime Minister - President
No. 181
given to
ADMIRAL LEAHY
by direction of the President
(thru Miss Tulley)

-L00c-

(Later developed that Miss Tulley wanted No. 180, rather than 181, sent to the Admiral. Copy of No. 180 was sent, but copy of 181 was not returned to the Map Room.)

amc
8-31-42
31 October 1942

Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated 31 October 1942.
Answered by Roosevelt in a letter to Churchill dated 30 November 1942.
My dear Mr. President,

Oliver Lyttelton will talk to your officers about Production in its various aspects as they affect the layout we now have to make on what are our last remaining reserves of manpower; but I hope you will let him discuss with you some of the major points governing our joint action in the war.

First of all, I put the U-boat menace. This, I am sure, is our worst danger. It is horrible to me that we should be budgeting jointly for a balance of shipping on the basis of 700,000 tons a month loss. True, it is not yet as bad as that. But the spectacle of all these splendid ships being built, sent to sea, crammed with priceless food and munitions, and being sunk - three or four every day - torments me day and night. Not only does this attack cripple our war energies and threaten our life, but it arbitrarily limits the might of the United States coming into the struggle.
The Oceans which were your shields, threaten to become your cage.

Next year there will be many more U-boats, and they will range far more widely. No ocean passage will be safe. All focal points will be beset and will require long range air protection. I expect all convoys will have to have anti-U-boat escorts, and often auxiliary aircraft carriers, throughout the greater part of their journeys, and fast convoys will have to be arranged for the ships at present routed independently. How are we to find the craft for this?

Nothing is more clearly proved than the efficacy of the convoy system. The marvellous recovery of your Atlantic shore is one proof. The immunity hitherto enjoyed by the vast and numerous troop convoys with ample escorts, is another. We are doing all we can to strike at the U-boat bases and U-boat plants, and you are proposing to base strong bomber forces here to multiply our effort. All the same, it is Escorts that we need, even more than merchant ships. We want both, but I am all with those who say, 'A ship not sunk in 1943
is worth two built for 1944'.

Therefore I submit to you for your good judgment the maximum allocation of steel for merchant shipbuilding, and then out of that, the maximum construction of escort vessels which engine capacity will allow. From the important measures which you have lately taken, I am sure your mind is moving in exactly the same direction.

We must ask for a fair share of the merchant shipping and of the escort vessels. All our labour and capacity is engaged in the war effort. We have had to sacrifice 100,000 tons of merchant shipbuilding in order to get more corvettes, and we cannot hope to produce more than 1,100,000 British gross tons of new merchant ships in the calendar year 1943. We have lost enormously in ships used in the common interest, and we trust to you to give us a fair and just assignment of your new vast construction to sail under our own flag.

We have agreed together that the escort vessels should be in the common pool, to be drawn upon in accordance with strategic requirements. In January 1942,
you accepted a requisition bringing the total of escort vessels to be built on our behalf to 300, 150 to be delivered in 1943 and 150 in 1944. Since then we have sent some assistance to the successful conflict you have waged against the U-boats on the East coast. The balance of strategic needs is such that we do not expect even the majority of these craft, but we ask most earnestly for a distribution of long range escort vessels from the common pool in the ratio of 1 to Britain to 1.37 to the United States, which is the ratio of our shortages mutually agreed. We are counting on this.

We have been so well treated by you in tanker tonnage, that it is with diffidence that I mention the figure of 1,000,000 tons additional, which is what we need in 1943.

Mr. President, I cannot cut the food consumption here below its present level. We need to import 27,000,000 tons for our food and war effort in 1943. More than three-quarters of our immense marine is engaged in war transport of one kind or another. We are asking for 2,500,000 dead-weight non-tanker tonnage to
be assigned to us from the beginning of 1943 from your new construction. Our stocks are running down with dangerous rapidity. Any further inroads upon them, except for some great emergency, would be highly improvident. These islands are the assembly base for the war against Hitler; many of your troops will be here; and we must have a margin in case of a renewed 'blitz' on the Mersey and the Clyde, or exceptional concentration of U-boats on the Atlantic routes. Rather than cut any further on the food of the people, I should be forced to reduce our general contribution to the overseas war effort.

II

I send you herewith my directive for 1943 about the British Army. During 1942 we have sent abroad six divisions apart from the five either on the sea or earmarked for "TORCH". We may easily have to send two, or even four, more at short notice, and we shall be ready to do so. To help fill this gap, I am bringing up (as you will see from the paper) the nine "Beach" divisions, six to full standard and freeing the other
three with one additional for the draft-finding process for overseas, so exhausting to military efficiency. But the paper will speak for itself in detail, and I am sure you will feel it is a considerable contribution to the struggle.

I have not yet heard from you in reply to that part of my long telegram about Russia which dealt with the need to place more American divisions in this country, and to go forward with "BOLEHO" for a retarded "ROUNDUP". I had hoped to have, even on the new layout, seven or eight United States divisions in these islands by April, and we are still making preparations on a very large scale for the reception of a great American Army. I recognise that shipping is the limiting factor. Practically only the two Queens are running now. I trust however you will allow your officers to discuss with ours the whole process of moving continuously divisions at the fastest rate into these islands, and thus make us both able to push our forces outwards where needed, as well as making the
forward striking base safe, and holding the enemy pinned on the French shore.

III

Lastly, I come to the Air. Oliver Lyttelton is also thoroughly informed about this, and I have already communicated with Harry on the subject. An ever-increasing weight of bomb discharge upon Germany and Italy must be our unrelenting aim. In our view, night bombing has already yielded results which justify it being backed by the United States, at any rate as a follow-up to your day bombing. But also the Anti-U-boat war will require many long range flying boats and aircraft. So far as fighters are concerned, our opinion is that the latest British Spitfires and the improved American Mustang will hold the leadership in 1943.

Lyttelton is fully authorised to discuss all the above matters with you, and he is in full possession of our views. He will be with you during tremendous days, about which I shall be telegraphing to you pretty constantly. I pray that this great American enterprise,
in which I am your lieutenant and in which we have the honour to play an important part, may be crowned by the success it deserves. So far, all promises well.

I hope also to report to you about the battle in Egypt, which is now entering upon a more important phase.

Believe me,

Always your most sincere friend,

[Signature]

The President of the United States of America.
The President of the United States of America.

The White House,

WASHINGTON.

PRIME MINISTER.
10, Downing Street.
Whitehall
ARMY STRENGTHS.

THE Secretary of State for War has prepared a scheme for the reorganisation of the Army for 1943, with which I am in full agreement. The attached paper shows the relation of this new layout to that described in my D.O. (41) 18.

Of course, these requirements must be considered in relation to other sections of our war programme, and it may be that some compression will be necessary. I earnestly hope, however, that we shall be able to achieve this plan, which is most necessary to our effective conduct of the war.

October 30, 1942.

W. S. C.
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

ARMY STRENGTHS.

DIRECTIVE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

WE have now in Great Britain and Northern Ireland (including Canadian and Allied troops) 8 armoured divisions, 14 standard motorised infantry divisions, 1 Royal Marine division and 1 airborne division, total 24 fully mobile divisions, well equipped with guns and transport, with an average strength of about 15,300 men, with 9 corps organisations and corps troops (53,000). We have 3 brigade groups with artillery and engineers, which are equivalent to another fully mobile division. Of the 14 standard infantry divisions 5 have been reorganised in the past year to include a tank instead of an infantry brigade, thus increasing their striking power. There are also 9 lower establishment divisions, averaging about 10,000, organised for semi-mobile defence with reduced scales of artillery and engineers and little transport. In addition, there are 3 armoured, 5 tank and 10 infantry brigades not included in divisions and 17 un-brigaded battalions; furthermore, 95 home defence and young soldiers’ battalions are employed on vulnerable points and airfield defence.

2. During 1942 we have sent abroad 1 armoured and 5 infantry divisions which are not included above; also 252,000 men in non-divisional units and drafts. Under orders for overseas are 2 armoured, 2 infantry and 1 Royal Marine divisions; total 10 divisions. Of these 5 divisions must be taken from those given in paragraph 1 and will require their quota of corps, army, anti-aircraft and base units. These additional forces for overseas service could only be found at the expense of troops in the United Kingdom; and it is necessary to take steps to build up the forces remaining.

[24597]
3. It is proposed to transform the forces remaining in the United Kingdom, after despatch of the 5 divisions mentioned above, into 7 armoured divisions (increase of 1 Canadian armoured division), 18 standard motorised infantry divisions and 1 airborne division, total 26 fully mobile divisions. The 3 brigade groups will remain as at present. Of the 18 standard divisions 7 will include tank brigades and 6 will be formed from lower establishment divisions brought up in strength. There will be a reserve organisation consisting of 4 divisions and 1 officer training brigade, whose main task will be to complete the training of reinforcements for the considerable forces overseas instead of our having, as at present, to find these men from the mobile divisions to the continuous detriment of their efficiency.

Independent tank and armoured brigades will be reduced to 2 and infantry brigades not in divisions to 5. Battalions for vulnerable points and airfield defence will be reduced to 24 and the task of guarding aerodromes handed over mainly to the R.A.F. Regiment.

The foregoing will constitute the Home Field Army which can be reckoned as the equivalent of 33 divisions.

4. The object of these changes is to increase the war-power of the Army by concentrating scattered defensive elements into proper formations which can be turned later on into forces for overseas operations. There will be an increase in divisions with an armoured element and additional field, anti-tank and flak artillery will be provided.

5. No reduction in the force mentioned in paragraph 3 is compatible with our war needs; indeed, it is necessary that rearward services should be provided in 1943 for as many of the divisions as possible with a view to passing to the offensive on the Continent of Europe or elsewhere. To maintain the Army, to provide for the replacement of casualties as they occur and to build up the necessary units for offensive action, there will be required an intake to the Army averaging 45,000 men per month from November till April 1943, when a further review will be made.

6. A.D.G.B. has been reduced to 280,000 men by using women and Home Guards to the maximum extent possible under present circumstances. 76,000 at least of the 280,000 will be formed into mobile flak units to accompany any Field Army divisions used for offensive operations, and further examination is being made to reduce overheads and make additional savings in the number of fit men employed on anti-aircraft defences in the United Kingdom. The anti-aircraft force is formed into 7 groups which are the equivalent of 12 divisions.

7. The Army of the Nile has lost the services of the Australian corps with 2 Australian divisions, and the remaining Australian division will be returned to Australia in 1943. Also the 70th British Division was sent to India to assist in meeting the Japanese threat to Burma and Ceylon. These reductions have been offset by the arrival in the Middle East of the 8th British Armoured Division, and 44th and 51st British Infantry Divisions. A separate Command has been established for Persia and Iraq to which the 5th British Division from India and the 56th now at sea have been assigned.
8. It is proposed to reorganise the forces in the Middle East to include 3 British armoured and 2 South African armoured divisions, 2 British, 1 New Zealand, 2 Indian and the equivalent of 2 Allied divisions of Fighting French and Greek troops; total, 12 divisions.

9. The Army in Persia and Iraq will comprise 1 Indian armoured division and 1 British armoured brigade, 2 British, 3 Indian divisions and the Polish Army of the East of 2 divisions and 2 tank brigades; total, 9 divisions. Grand total in the former Middle Eastern area: 26 divisions.

10. For the defence of India there will be assembled and ready by next Spring 1 Indian armoured division and 2 tank brigades, 2 British divisions and 1 brigade group, 10 complete Indian divisions and the equivalent of 2 further divisions in brigade groups, &c. This excludes troops for defence of the North-West Frontier and for Internal Security, which amount to the equivalent of 4 divisions and 92 battalions; the whole totalling 20 divisions. There are, in addition, 2 Chinese divisions which are in process of being formed and equipped.

11. There remain our garrisons abroad, to wit:
- Gibraltar and Malta—the equivalent of 2 divisions.
- East Africa, including Madagascar—that of 3½.
- West Africa and minor garrisons—that of 3½.

Total division—equivalent of garrisons, 9.

12. We have suffered grievous losses in Malaya, Burma and the Middle East, including the loss of 4 complete divisions at Singapore and 1 South African division in Tobruk. In spite of this, the total strength of British, Dominion and Allied forces has been maintained at the equivalent of approximately 100 divisions. In maintaining our fighting strength, India has provided the greatest contribution and has expanded by several divisions, but we have had to find British cadres for these divisions.

13. If we estimate our Army in divisions or their equivalent, the general lay-out for 1943 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Type</th>
<th>Number of Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under orders for overseas operations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft divisions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of the Nile</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of Persia and Iraq</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of India</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrisons in Africa and elsewhere</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total: 100

14. It is our duty to develop, equip and maintain all these units during 1943.

November 1, 1942.

W. S. C.
ARMY STRENGTHS.

DIRECTIVE BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

WE have now in the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) 26 standard motorised infantry divisions and the Polish division, total 27, well equipped with guns and transport, with an average strength of about 15,500 men, with 10 Corps organisations and Corps troops (61,000). There are 8 county divisions for work on the beaches, averaging about 10,000, without artillery other than coast artillery and with little transport. We have 5 armoured divisions and 4 Army Tank brigades; the whole comprising 14 armoured brigades (with 5 divisional elements); 4 Brigade Groups with artillery and transport; 7 infantry brigades and 12 un-brigaded battalions: furthermore, 8 aerodrome defence battalions and the 100,000 men in the Home Defence and Young Soldiers' battalions.

2. It is proposed to transform this organisation into 27 standardised divisions (hereinafter to be called Field Divisions), plus the Polish Division (which will have an armoured element), total 28; and to increase the armoured forces to 7 armoured divisions with 8 Army Tank brigades, the whole comprising 22 armoured brigades (with 7 divisional elements). The 4 Brigade Groups are to remain. Instead of the 8 county divisions and other units mentioned above, there will be 13 brigades, plus the equivalent of 2 Ally brigades, and 8 “Detached Battalions”; the foregoing constituting the Home Field Army, which can thus be reckoned the equivalent of 45 divisions. In addition, there will still be the 8 aerodrome battalions and the Home Defence and Young Soldiers' battalions.

3. The object of these changes is to increase the war-power of the army, particularly in armoured troops; and to provide additional field, anti-tank and flak artillery, including that required for 5 additional Indian divisions, to be formed during 1942. For this last purpose also it will be necessary to provide up to 17 British battalions for the Indian army.
4. No reduction in the force mentioned in para. 2 is compatible with our war needs. To maintain it during the next nine months, i.e., to July 1, 1942; and also to maintain the drafts for the army of the Middle East, for India and for our garrisons in Iceland, Gibraltar, Malta and Hong-Kong, &c., with a normal wastage of 50,000 a quarter there must be provided an intake to the army of 278,000 men. Measures are being taken to provide this. The army also requires at least 142,000 more women above the 63,000 already recruited.

5. In my directive on A.D.G.B. I have proposed that the personnel should be fixed at 280,000 men and that the suggested increase of 50,000 be disallowed: also that the suggested increase of 9,000 in the Coast batteries should be disallowed. The savings thus provided will be applied towards strengthening the Field Army. Finally A.D.G.B. will continually endeavour to develop for the service of the Home Field Army the largest amount of mobile flak possible, and also a transferable force available to strengthen the coastal batteries should the Emergency Period of Invasion be instituted. As it is unlikely that the enemy could afford prolonged and widespread bombing of our towns in the advent of Invasion, a shuttle arrangement of this kind should be possible, enabling us to meet according to events either a sustained air attack or Invasion. The Anti-Aircraft force is formed into 12 Divisions.

6. The Army of the Nile now consists of the 50th and 70th (formerly 6th) British Divisions, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions with the Cavalry Armoured Division (forming) and two Army Tank Brigades; the three Australian Divisions; one New Zealand; two South African; one Polish and Foreign equivalent, and the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, total 16 Divisions. It is intended to reinforce the Middle East with two British Divisions, the 18th and 2nd, from the United Kingdom as convenient.

7. Apart from the 2 divisions mentioned above, India has in action in Persia and Iraq the 6th, 8th and 10th Indian divisions, and General Wavell proposes to send the 17th by the end of the year. During 1942, 4 extra Indian divisions and one Indian armoured division will also take the field; total 9.

8. For the defence of India, there will remain the equivalent of 3 British divisions and 5 Indian divisions, over and above those which will operate outside India.

9. There remain our garrisons abroad, to wit:—

Iceland (C)—the equivalent of 1 division.
Gibraltar and Malta—that of 2.
Singapore—that of 3.
Aden, Hong Kong and other minor garrisons—that of 1.

Total division-equivalent of garrisons, 7.
10. If we estimate our Army in divisions or their equivalent, the general layout for 1942 is as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft divisions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of the Nile</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of India in Iraq and Persia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of India at home</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortress Garrisons</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native African Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. It is our duty to develop, equip and maintain all these units during 1942.

10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, October 9, 1941.

W. S. C.