FROM: OPNAV
TO: BALISNA, LONDON

FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND
NO. 205.

I AM DELIGHTED THAT MY WIFE'S VISIT SEEMS TO BE GOING
SO SUCCESSFULLY, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO WHAT YOU AND MRS.
CHURCHILL ARE DOING FOR HER. SHE HAS HAD WHAT I WOULD CALL AN
ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY FAVORABLE PRESS IN THIS COUNTRY.

I HAD TO MAKE A QUICK DECISION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE
THIS MORNING, BUT IT WAS SO OBVIOUSLY RIGHT AND CALLED FOR SUCH
IMMEDIATE ACTION THAT I DID NOT EVEN REFER IT TO YOU. PLEASE
ASK THE AMERICAN EAGLE ABOUT IT.

ROOSEVELT

Released from Map Room at
1550, EET, November 2, 1942.

ROBERT R. DODDERIDGE
Captain, Cavalry

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date: OCT 14 1971
TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

NOVEMBER 2, 1942

FROM The White House
Washington

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I AM DELIGHTED THAT MY WIFE'S VISIT SEEMS TO BE GOING SO SUCCESSFULLY, THANKS IN LARGE PART TO WHAT YOU AND MRS. CHURCHILL ARE DOING FOR HER. SHE HAS HAD WHAT I WOULD CALL AN ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY FAVORABLE PRESS IN THIS COUNTRY PARAGRAPH I HAD TO MAKE A QUICK DECISION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THIS MORNING BUT IT WAS SO OBVIOUSLY RIGHT AND CALLED FOR SUCH IMMEDIATE ACTION THAT I DID NOT EVEN REFER IT TO YOU. PLEASE ASK THE AMERICAN EAGLE ABOUT IT.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: CPHNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND

REPLYING YOUR NO. 182 I AGREE THAT MESSAGE TO RETAIN
SHOULD BE TONED DOWN AND I HAVE REWRITTEN IT SO THAT I AM SURE
IT WILL NOT OFFEND THE FRIENDS OF FRANCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 12:25, HWT, November 4, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By G.S. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
FROM: OPHAY
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PRESIDENT PERSONAL
AND NO. 207.

REPLYING TO YOUR 185 OF NOVEMBER 5 I AM VERY APPREHENSIVE
IN REGARD TO THE ADVERSE EFFECT THAT ANY INTRODUCTION OF DE GAULLE
INTO THE TORCH SITUATION WOULD HAVE ON OUR PROMISING EFFORTS TO
ATTACH A LARGE PART OF THE FRENCH AFRICAN FORCES TO OUR EXPEDITION.

THEREFORE, I CONSIDER IT INADVISABLE FOR YOU TO GIVE
DE GAULLE ANY INFORMATION IN REGARD TO TORCH UNTIL SUBSEQUENT TO A
SUCCESSFUL LANDING. YOU WOULD THEN INFORM HIM THAT THE AMERICAN
COMMAND OF AN AMERICAN EXPEDITION WITH MY APPROVAL INSISTED ON
COMPLETE SECRECY AS A NECESSARY SAFETY PRECAUTION.

DE GAULLE'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON FRIDAY OF A GOVERNOR GENERAL OF
MADAGASCAR WILL NOT BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE TO TORCH AND IT SHOULD BE
SUFFICIENT AT THE PRESENT TIME TO MAINTAIN HIS PRESTIGE WITH HIS
FOLLOWERS.

ADMIRAL LEARY AGREE WHOLLY WITH THE THOUGHTS EXPRESSED
ABOVE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1310, EWT, November 5, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Chester Hammond
Lt. Colonel, General Staff
TELEGRAM

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

Replying to your 185 of November 5 I am very apprehensive in regard to the adverse effect that any introduction of deGaulle into the Torch situation would have on our promising efforts to attack a large part of the French African forces to our expedition. Therefore consider it inadvisable for you to give deGaulle any information in regard to Torch until subsequent to a successful landing and you may then inform him that the American Command of an American expedition with my approval insisted on complete secrecy as a necessary safety precaution.

DeGaulle's announcement on Friday of a Governor General of Madagascar will not be of any assistance to Torch and it should be sufficient at the present time to maintain his prestige with his followers. Admiral Leahy agrees wholly with the thoughts expressed above.

Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 14 1971
NOVEMBER 6, 1942.

FROM: CAPTAIN NORRIS
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL
AND CAPTAIN NORRIS.

REPLYING TO YOUR 186 NOVEMBER 6 I WILL ISSUE MY STATEMENT TO THE AMERICAN PRESS IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF INFORMATION THAT
LANDING OF TROOPS HAS COMMENCED.

EISENHOWER HAS BEEN DIRECTION TO INFORM US AT ONCE BY
CABLE AND RADIO.

I AM STILL OF THE OPINION THAT RELEASE OF EISENHOWER'S
PROPOSED ISAFLETS WOULD NOT BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THE EXPEDITION BUT WOULD ON THE CONTRARY DETE. SOME OF THE FRENCH FORCES THAT ARE EXPECTED TO JOIN WITH US.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1640, EWT, November 6, 1942.

By Chester Hammond
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date OCT 14 1971
PRESIDENT TO PRIME

# 208

Replying to your 186 November 6 I will issue my statement to the American press immediately upon receipt of information that landing of troops has commenced.

Eisenhower has been directed to inform us at once by cable and radio.

I am still of the opinion that release of Eisenhower's proposed leaflets would not be of assistance to the expedition but would on the contrary deter some of the French forces that are expected to join with us.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: L.R. Stewart

Date: Oct 14, 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
6 November 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Attached hereto are (1) PM despatch No. 186 to the President of 6 November 1942; (2) Eisenhower's despatch No. 3646 of 16 October and (3) Chief of Staff's despatch R-2121 of 19 October.

The President requested that the draft of reply to the PM get to him before he leaves town this afternoon, about 4:15.

Very respectfully,

J. W. McCrea
JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 21 1972
To: The President of the United States.

No. 186, November 6, 1942.

and personal from Former Naval Person to President.

1. As at present arranged no reference will be made to the participation of British divisions in "Torch", as distinct from the supporting action by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, before your press release. It would greatly help me if you could let me know at what time you intend to issue this. I would then follow up your press release with a statement of my own.

2. Since in your press release you are referring to the participation of British divisions, I much hope that you will reconsider your decision not to allow the use of the leaflet submitted by Eisenhower making known the arrival of British troops in Algeria. I feel that this leaflet should not be held up more than two or at the most four eight hours after British troops have landed.

3. I am still sorry about De Gaulle. Of course we control all his telegrams outwards. But we are ready to accept your view. All goes well.

Prime.

Received in War Room at 0950, EWT, November 6, 1942.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER

SEC. ARMY BY TAG PER 720464
By RH. Date MAY 1972

PRIORITY

COMMANDING GENERAL
European Theater of Operations
No. R-2121

The proposal made in your October 16, 1942 is regard to context of leaflets to be dropped when British arrive in the area is not approved by the President. He is of the firm belief that the least publicity possible should be given to this angle and that to drop the leaflets you describe would only result in advertising to people of the area a fact unknown to many. It will be necessary of course to explain the presence of British troops. The President believes this can best be done at the time by an announcement by you to the local officials with which you may be dealing to the effect that the British are assisting and supporting the Americans without reference to British strength, and that emphasis should be placed on the point that the ultimate objective of both the British and ourselves is to defeat the Axis Forces.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Gen Deane
(for Adm Leahy)

CM-OUT-05999 (10/19/42) 17572 cen

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
By Authority of ORDER

From: London
To: Agwar
No. 3646 October 16, 1942

As explained in my three four nine five, I am submitting for your approval the proposed text of the leaflet to be dropped in the Algiers area to coincide with the entrance of the British troops. For Operations Division and Patton.

The leaflet will have three crossed flags, United States, British and French, at the top and will be signed by me. The Prime Minister has seen and approved the text.

Because of the limited time remaining before the leaflets must be printed, I feel that prompt action must be taken. The text of the leaflet follows: "Frenchmen of North Africa:

The United Nations have commenced a series of full scale operations aimed at the total destruction of the enemy in the shortest possible time.

To this end a great American Army, escorted by British and American Naval forces, and followed up by British land and air forces, is in process of landing at various points on the coastline of French North Africa. We come as allies, to dispel for ever the possibility of the extension of German domination from France to North Africa.

Enemy propaganda attributes to us territorial designs at the expense of France. We have no such designs: the Sovereignty of France over French Territory remains intact.
From: London
To: Agwar
No. 3646 October 16, 1942
Page two.

The object of the very powerful British forces landing in Algeria is indeed to ensure that Sovereignty.

They have been directed to Free North African bases now controlled by the Italian Armistice Commission and to clear the Italian and German forces from Tripolitania in conjunction with allies armies from Egypt.

The immense possibilities of these operations are obvious. Shoulder to shoulder in North Africa, Americans, British and Frenchmen will be able to turn the whole military position of Germany in Europe, to crush Italy and eliminate her fleet, to liberate France and to bring the war to a victorious end.

In this glorious task for the ultimate liberation of France we invite you to participate.

Together, on Les Aura?"

Eisenhower

FOOTNOTE: 3495 is CM-IN-05515 (10/13/42) OPD

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: GEN PATTON

CM-IN-06836 (10/16/42) 1647E nov
The following message is received today from the United States Ambassador to Spain quote:

This morning I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs and reminded him that I had on Monday given him a formal declaration by my Government solemnly engaging it in connection with any future military operations by the United States in Africa or in Europe to respect the integrity and sovereignty of all Spanish territory. The declaration by my Government contained a statement to the effect that it is its purpose to do everything possible to prevent Spain's being brought into the war. The declaration further stated that the United States fully recognizes Spain's desire to stay out of the war. I stated to the Foreign Minister that it was my understanding that the British Ambassador had on behalf of his Government given similar assurances and that therefore any threat to Spain's neutrality could obviously come only from the Axis.

Reports have reached me since last Monday to the effect that the Spanish Government had been requested by Germany to permit passage of German troops through Spain in the event of military operations in Northwest Africa by the United Nations. Although I did not request confirmation of these reports, I did state to the Foreign Minister that I wanted to make clear to him on behalf of my Government the simple fact that compliance with any such request on the part of Germany by the Spanish Government either now or in the future would immediately bring Spain into the war. I added that it is my Government's understanding that that is precisely what the Spanish Government wishes to avoid.

I stated to the Foreign Minister that Spain's only hope of remaining out of the war in the face of the threat by the Axis to bring Spain into the war would be for Spain to make it perfectly clear in advance that it is determined to defend its neutrality not only against the United Nations but also against the Axis thereby discouraging efforts by Germany to force Spain into the war.
In this connection I said that I was perturbed by two existing circumstances which made it questionable whether Spain intended in fact to give effective resistance to pressure from Germany to bring it into the war. I pointed out that the Spanish armed forces are at present disposed in such a way as to permit resistance to possible attack from the south by United Nations' forces but not so as to permit resistance in the north to a possible attack by Germany from that direction. Secondly, I pointed out that the attitude by the Spanish press censorship was pro-Axis and that it had converted the Spanish press, and particularly the official Falange press, into an instrument of political warfare on the side of the Axis.

I informed the Foreign Minister that I had been authorized by the President to state to him that should Spain decide to make plain its determination to resist all possible aggression by the Axis and if Spain should so desire in the event that such resistance should become necessary my Government would be prepared immediately to extend all possible assistance of every description to Spain.

I informed the Foreign Minister that my statement was for his information and for the information of the Chief of State (reference your telegram of November 4, 6 p.m., no. 1161).

The Foreign Minister emphatically denied that the German Government had requested his Government's consent to the passage through Spain of German troops. General Jordana added that the role which Spain had played during the Civil War was appreciated by Germany and Italy and that since the outbreak of the World War no demands on Spain had been made by either of those countries. On its part, Spain appreciated the noble assistance which she had received from those two countries during her tragic trials.

Released at 2010, November 7, 1942, WWT

J. L. McCrea
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide
General Jordana stated that his Government had no fear that the Germans would enter Spain or that his country would be forced into the war by the Axis -- unless French Morocco or Oran were invaded by the United Nations. He added that the European population of French Morocco and Oran was principally Spanish.

Morocco must be treated as a whole from the Spanish point of view. In both the French and the Spanish zones there is a homogeneous Moslem population. A great deal of Spanish blood has been shed in Morocco. In both zones there are common problems. The situation in all Morocco would be disturbed by the entry of any outside nation. There would inevitably be repercussions in Spanish Morocco in the event of military activity in French Morocco and Spain would immediately be obliged to adopt precautionary military measures. Spain might not be in a position to decline assistance from Germany. I made it clear to the Foreign Minister that such action would involve Spain in war against the United Nations.

General Jordana endeavored to intimate that Spain would not be involved in a war against the United Nations by the passage of German troops through Spain unless we came into Spain. I stated that we would be obliged to enter Spain in such circumstances and again made it clear that it would involve Spain in war against us.

The Foreign Minister stated that in as much as the two should be treated as a whole, the United Nations must also respect French Morocco if they desired to respect Spanish Morocco.

I stated that I was not able to agree with this assumption. I said that our entrance into French Morocco would be no different than our landing in France itself.

I informed the Foreign Minister that in the event that Spain permitted itself to be used by the Axis, Spain would bear the full responsibility of having attacked us in as much as we had already given the Spanish Government our solemn promise not to violate Spanish sovereignty. I added that in so far as I had been informed the Spanish Government had not received similar assurances from the Axis. General Jordana made a special plea that no matter what we believed to be our rights we keep out
of French Morocco and Oran. He added that should our troops enter those territories he has fears that it will not be possible for Spain to keep out of the war. He added further that in the event that we do remain out of French Morocco and Oran it will be possible for Spain to continue to remain neutral as it so ardently desires.

In my opinion this conversation was intended as a threat, that should we enter French Morocco or Oran Spain will enter the war on the side of the Axis. After my earlier conversation with General Jordana, at which time he expressed his appreciation for the assurances which I had given him on behalf of our Government, he spent the entire day (Tuesday) with General Franco. It is my opinion that his statements of today reflect Franco's attitude.

In my opinion and in view of the risk to Spain presented by military activities by the United Nations in Northwest Africa, Franco is endeavoring to dissuade us by means of this implied threat from entering that territory. I do not believe that he is necessarily prepared to carry out the threat implied in Jordana's statements to me. I believe, nevertheless, that in view of present circumstances we must reckon with the possibility that any attempt by us to invade French Morocco or Oran may be opposed with force by Spain.

The Foreign Minister stated to me that he had spoken to the British Ambassador yesterday morning in a similar vein. Sir Samuel Hoare has not yet informed me of his conversation with the Foreign Minister. I have not had an opportunity to discuss this latest development with the British Ambassador. Unquote.
President W. D.,

The following message is received today from the United States Ambassador to Spain:

Frank
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

November 7, 1942

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1705  Dated: November 6, 10 p.m.
From: Madrid        Rec'd: November 7, 1:40 a.m.

The following message is headed "SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY!"

This morning I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs and reminded him that I had on Monday given him a formal declaration by my Government solemnly engaging it in connection with any future military operations by the United States in Africa or in Europe to respect the integrity and sovereignty of all Spanish territory. The declaration by my Government contained a statement to the effect that it is its purpose to do everything possible to prevent Spain's being brought into the war. The declaration further stated that the United States fully recognizes Spain's desire to stay out of the war. I stated to the Foreign Minister that it was my understanding that the British Ambassador had on behalf of his Government given similar assurances and that therefore any threat to Spain's neutrality could obviously come only from the Axis.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] Date [Redacted]
Reports have reached me since last Monday to the effect that the Spanish Government had been requested by Germany to permit passage of German troops through Spain in the event of military operations in Northwest Africa by the United Nations. Although I did not request confirmation of these reports, I did state to the Foreign Minister that I wanted to make clear to him on behalf of my Government the simple fact that compliance with any such request on the part of Germany by the Spanish Government either now or in the future would immediately bring Spain into the war. I added that it is my Government's understanding that that is precisely what the Spanish Government wishes to avoid.

I stated to the Foreign Minister that Spain's only hope of remaining out of the war in the face of the threat by the Axis to bring Spain into the war would be for Spain to make it perfectly clear in advance that it is determined to defend its neutrality not only against the United Nations but also against the Axis thereby discouraging efforts by Germany to force Spain into the war.

In this connection I said that I was perturbed by two existing circumstances which made it questionable whether Spain intended in fact to give effective resistance to pressure from Germany to bring it into the war. I pointed out
out that the Spanish armed forces are at present disposed in such a way as to permit resistance to possible attack from the south by United Nations' forces but not so as to permit resistance in the north to a possible attack by Germany from that direction. Secondly, I pointed out that the attitude by the Spanish press censorship was pro-Axis and that it had converted the Spanish press, and particularly the official Falange press, into an instrument of political warfare on the side of the Axis.
I informed the Foreign Minister that I had been authorized by the President to state to him that should Spain decide to make plain its determination to resist all possible aggression by the Axis and if Spain should so desire in the event that such resistance should become necessary my Government would be prepared immediately to extend all possible assistance of every description to Spain.

I informed the Foreign Minister that my statement was for his information and for the information of the Chief of State (reference your telegram of November 4, 6 p.m., no. 1161).

The Foreign Minister emphatically denied that the German Government had requested his Government's consent to the passage through Spain of German troops. General Jordana added that the role which Spain had played during the Civil War was appreciated by Germany and Italy and that since the outbreak of the World War no demands on Spain had been made by either of those countries. On its part, Spain appreciated the noble assistance which she had received from those two countries during her tragic trials.

General
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Morocco must be treated as a whole from the Spanish point of view. In both the French and the Spanish zones there is a homogeneous Moslem population. A great deal of Spanish blood has been shed in Morocco. In both zones there are common problems. The situation in all Morocco would be disturbed by the entry of any outside nation. There would inevitably be repercussions in Spanish Morocco in the event of military activity in French Morocco and Spain would immediately be obliged to adopt precautionary military measures. Spain might not be in a position to decline assistance from Germany. I made it clear to the Foreign Minister that such action would involve Spain in war against the United Nations.

General Jordana endeavored to intimate that Spain would not be involved in a war against the United Nations by the passage of German troops through Spain unless we came into Spain. I stated that we would be obliged to enter
enter Spain in such circumstances and again made it clear that it would involve Spain in war against us.

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I stated that I was not able to agree with this assumption. I said that our entrance into French Morocco would be no different than our landing in France itself.
I informed the Foreign Minister that in the event that Spain permitted itself to be used by the Axis, Spain would bear the full responsibility of having attacked us in as much as we had already given the Spanish Government our solemn promise not to violate Spanish sovereignty. I added that in so far as I had been informed the Spanish Government had not received similar assurances from the Axis. General Jordana made a special plea that no matter what we believed to be our rights we keep out of French Morocco and Oran. He added that should our troops enter those territories he has fears that it will not be possible for Spain to keep out of the war. He added further that in the event that we do remain out of French Morocco and Oran it will be possible for Spain to continue to remain neutral as it so ardently desires.

In my opinion this conversation was intended as a threat, that should we enter French Morocco or Oran Spain will enter the war on the side of the Axis. After my earlier conversation with General Jordana, at which time he expressed his appreciation for the assurances which I had given him on behalf of our Government, he spent the entire day (Tuesday) with General Franco. It is my opinion that his statements of today reflect Franco's attitude.

In my opinion and in view of the risk to Spain presented by military activities by the United Nations in Northwest Africa
Africa, Franco is endeavoring to dissuade us by means of this implied threat from entering that territory. I do not believe that he is necessarily prepared to carry out the threat implied in Jordana's statements to me. I believe, nevertheless, that in view of present circumstances we must reckon with the possibility that any attempt by us to invade French Morocco or Oran may be opposed with force by Spain.

The Foreign Minister stated to me that he had spoken to the British Ambassador yesterday morning in a similar vein. Sir Samuel Hore has not yet informed me of his conversation with the Foreign Minister. I have not had an opportunity, therefore, to discuss this latest development with the British Ambassador.

HAYES
American Ambassador
SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON


I AM VERY HAPPY WITH THE LATEST NEWS OF YOUR SPLENDID CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT, AND OF THE SUCCESS THAT HAS ATTENDED OUR JOINT LANDING IN WEST AND NORTH AFRICA.

THIS BRINGS UP THE ADDITIONAL STEPS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN WHEN AND IF THE SOUTH SHORE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN IS CLEARED AND UNDER OUR CONTROL.

IT IS HOPED THAT YOU WITH YOUR CHIEFS OF STAFF IN LONDON AND I WITH THE COMBINED STAFF HERE MAY MAKE A SURVEY OF THE POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING FORWARD MOVEMENTS DIRECTED AGAINST SARDINIA, SICILY, ITALY, GREECE AND OTHER BALKAN AREAS AND INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING TURKISH SUPPORT FOR AN ATTACK THROUGH THE BLACK SEA AGAINST GERMANY'S FLANK.

IN REGARD TO DE GAULLE, I HAVE HITHERTO ENJOYED A QUIET SATISFACTION IN LEAVING HIM IN YOUR HANDS -- APPARENTLY I HAVE NOW ACQUIRED A SIMILAR PROBLEM IN BROTHER GIRAUD.

I WHOLLY AGREE THAT WE MUST PREVENT RIVALRY BETWEEN THE FRENCH ELIGE Factions and I have no objection to a de Gaulle emissary visiting kingpin in ALGIERS. WE MUST

Lee PM # 159
REMEMBER THAT THERE IS ALSO A CAT FIGHT IN PROGRESS BETWEEN KINGPIN AND DARLAN, EACH CLAIMING FULL MILITARY COMMAND OF FRENCH FORCES IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA.

THE PRINCIPAL THOUGHT TO BE DRIVEN HOME TO ALL THREE OF THESE PRIMA DONNAS IS THAT THE SITUATION IS TODAY SOLELY IN THE MILITARY FIELD AND THAT ANY DECISION BY ANY ONE OF THEM, OR BY ALL OF THEM, IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF EISENHOWER.

ALSO I THINK IT WOULD BE WELL TO FIND OUT BEFORE DE GAULLE'S MAN LEAVES FOR AFRICA JUST WHAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1900, EWT, November 11, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I am very happy with the latest news of your splendid campaign in Egypt, and of the success that has attended our joint landing in West and North Africa.

This brings up the additional steps that should be taken when and if the South shore of the Mediterranean is cleared and under our control.

It is hoped that you with your Chiefs or Staff in London and I with the Combined Staff here may make a survey of the possibilities including forward movements directed against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece and other Balkan areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for an attack through the Black Sea against Germany's flank.

In regard to deGaulle, I have hitherto enjoyed a quiet satisfaction in leaving him in your hands -- apparently I have now acquired a similar problem in brother Giraud.

I wholly agree that we must prevent rivalry between the French Emigre factions and I have no objection to a deGaulle emissary visiting Kingpin in Algiers. We must remember that there is also a cat fight in progress between Kingpin and Darlan, each claiming full military
command of French forces in North and West Africa.

The principal thought to be driven home to all three of these primadonnas is that the situation today solely in the military field and that any decision by any one of them, or by all of them, is subject to review and approval of Americal Eagle Eisenhower.

Also I think it would be well to find out before deGaulle's man leaves for Africa just what his instructions are.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

I am very happy with the latest news of your splendid campaign in Egypt, and of the success that has attended our landing in West and North Africa.

This brings up the additional steps that should be taken when and if the South shore of the Mediterranean is cleared and under our control.

It is hoped that you with your Chiefs of Staff in London and I with the Combined Staff here may make a survey of the possibilities including forward movements directed against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, and other Balkan areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for an attack through the Black Sea against Germany's flank.

In regard to deGaulle, it is still my considered opinion that any association by him with the Torch operation at this time would add serious difficulties to our efforts in that area.

I have enjoyed a quiet satisfaction in leaving the problem of deGaulle in your hands - apparently I have now acquired a similar problem in brother Giraud.

I trust it will not come to a meeting at thirty paces on the Field of Honor each provided with a rifle.
November 14, 1942.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSMA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND PERSONAL NUMBER 189.

I THINK YOU AND I HAVE OVERTOOK ONE VERY IMPORTANT STEP IN RELATION TO ANY OPERATIONS SPRINGING FROM THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. I SUGGEST THAT AFTER WE HAVE CONSIDERED OUR PRELIMINARY STUDIES WE SHOULD SEND A SMALL BRITISH-AMERICAN STAFF GROUP, POSSIBLY LIMITED TO TWO OFFICERS FROM EACH OF US, TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURE WITH MR. STALIN AND HIS STAFF.

I REALIZE THAT THIS MAY CAUSE SOME DELAY BUT ONE WEEK IN MOSCOW SHOULD SUFFICE AND FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW IT LOOKS WISE TO HAVE CLOSER STAFF COOPERATION THE Nearer WE GET TO THE BLACK SEA AND RUSSIA.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 11:46, EWT, November 14, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.G. Ferrell
Date Oct 14 1971
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL
AND AUTO NO. 212.

MRS. ROOSEVELT ARRIVED SAFELY THIS MORNING AND I LET HER
AT AIRPORT AND FOUND HER WELL AND THRILLED BY EVERY MOMENT
OF HER VISIT. MY THANKS TO YOU AND MRS. CHURCHILL FOR TAKING
SUCH GOOD CARE OF HER.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1025, EWT, November 17, 1942.

JOHN L. McCrea
Captain, U. S. Navy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By ~ Oct 14 1971
SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSMA, LONDON

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL
AND SECRET No. 213.

I too have encountered the deep currents of feeling
about Darlan. I felt I should act fast so I have just given
out a statement at my press conference which I hope you will
like and I trust it will be accepted at face value. It follows
in my Number 214.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map
Room at 1730, EWT, November 17, 1942.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.S. Stewart
Date: OCT 14 1971

SECRET
I have read the report of the investigation of General Darlan, and I feel I should not just sit silent, but make a statement at any Press conference which I hope you will like and which I trust it will be accepted at face value.

Very yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt
PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
NO. 214.

PRESS RELEASE FOLLOWS:

I HAVE ACCEPTED GENERAL EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL
ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE TIME BEING IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN AFRICA.

I THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND AND APPROVE THE FEELING IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN AND AMONG ALL THE OTHER UNITED
NATIONS THAT IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE PAST TWO YEARS NO
PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE MADE WITH ADMIRAL DARLAN. PEOPLE
IN THE UNITED NATIONS LIKewise WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND THE RECOGNITION
OF A RECONSTITUTING OF THE VICHY GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE OR
IN ANY FRENCH TERRITORY.

WE ARE OPPOSED TO FRENCHMEN WHO SUPPORT HITLER AND THE
AXIS. NO ONE IN OUR ARMY HAS ANY AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE
GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE AND THE FRENCH EMPIRE.

THE FUTURE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL BE ESTABLISHED -- NOT
BY ANY INDIVIDUAL IN METROPOLITAN FRANCE OR OVERSEAS -- BUT BY THE
FRENCH PEOPLE THEMSELVES AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN SET FREE BY THE
VICTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THE PRESENT TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA
IS ONLY A TEMPORARY EXPERIMENT, JUSTIFIED SOLELY BY THE STRESS OF
BATTLE.

THE PRESENT TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT HAS ACCOMPLISHED TWO
MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST WAS TO SAVE AMERICAN AND BRITISH LIVES
ON THE ONE HAND, AND FRENCH LIVES ON THE OTHER HAND.

THE SECOND WAS THE VITAL FACTOR OF TIME. THE TEMPORARY
ARRANGEMENT HAD MADE IT POSSIBLE TO AVOID A "MOPPING UP" PERIOD
IN ALGIERS AND MOROCCO WHICH MIGHT HAVE TAKEN A MONTH OR TWO TO
CONSOLIDATE. SUCH A PERIOD WOULD HAVE DELAYED THE CONCENTRATION
FOR THE ATTACK FROM THE WEST ON TUNIS, AND WE HOPE ON TRIPOLI.

EVERY DAY OF DELAY IN THE CURRENT OPERATION WOULD HAVE
ENABLED THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS TO BUILD UP A STRONG RESISTANCE,
TO DIG IN AND MAKE A HUGE OPERATION ON OUR PART ESSENTIAL BEFORE
WE COULD WIN. HERE AGAIN, MANY MORE LIVES WILL BE SAVED UNDER THE
PRESENT SPEEDY OFFENSIVE, THAN IF WE HAD HAD TO DELAY IT FOR A
MONTH OR MORE.

IT WILL ALSO BE NOTED THAT FRENCH TROOPS, UNDER THE
COMMAND OF GENERAL GIRAUD, HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN ACTION AGAINST
THE ENEMY IN TUNISIA, FIGHTING BY THE SIDE OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH
SOLDIERS FOR THE LIBERATION OF THEIR COUNTRY.

ADMIRAL DARLAN'S PROCLAMATION ASSISTED IN MAKING A
"MOPPING UP" PERIOD UNNECESSARY. TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH
ADMIRAL DARLAN APPLY, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, TO THE CURRENT LOCAL
SITUATION ONLY.

I HAVE REQUESTED THE LIBERATION OF ALL PERSONS IN
NORTHERN AFRICA WHO HAD BEEN IMPRISONED BECAUSE THEY OPPOSED THE
REPORTS OF THE NAZIS TO DOMINATE THE WORLD, AND I HAVE ASKED FOR
THE ABROGATION OF ALL LAWS AND DECREES INSPIRED BY NAZI GOVERNMENTS
OR NAZI IDEOLOGISTS. REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE FRENCH OF NORTH
AFRICA ARE SUBORDINATING ALL POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO THE FORMATION
OF A COMMON FRONT AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1730, EWT, November 17, 1942.

CHESTER NAMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff
November 17, 1942.

I have approved General Eisenhower's acceptance for the time being of the present political arrangements in Northern and Western Africa.

I thoroughly understand and approve the feeling in the United States and Great Britain and among all the other United Nations that in view of the history of the past two years no permanent arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan. People in the United Nations likewise would never understand recognition of a reconstituting of the Vichy Government in France or in any French territory.

We are opposed to Frenchmen who support Hitler and the Axis. No one in our Army has any authority to discuss the future Government of France and the French Empire.

The future French Government will be established — not by any individual, either in metropolitan France or overseas, but by the French people themselves after they
have been set free by the victory of the United Nations.

The present temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle.

The present temporary arrangement has accomplished two military objectives. The first was to save American and British lives on the one hand, and French lives on the other hand.

The second was the vital factor of time. The temporary arrangement has made it possible to avoid a mopping up period in Algiers and Morocco which might have taken a month or two to consummate. Such a period would have delayed the concentration for the attack from the West on Tunis, and we hope on Tripoli.

Every day of delay in the current operation would have enabled the Germans and Italians to build up a strong resistance, to dig in and make a military operation on our part essential before we could win.
Here again, many more lives would have been lost even under the present speedy and undelayed attack.

It will also be noted that French troops, under the command of General Giraud, have already been in action against the enemy in Tunisia, fighting by the side of American and British soldiers for the liberation of their country.

Admiral Darlan's proclamation assisted in making a mopping up period unnecessary. Temporary arrangements made with Admiral Darlan apply, without exception, to the current local situation only.

I have requested the liberation of all persons in Northern Africa who had been imprisoned because they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate the world, and I have asked for the abrogation of all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi Governments or Nazi ideologists. Reports indicate that the French of North Africa are subordinating all political questions to the formation of a common front against the common enemy.
I have accepted General Eisenhower's political arrangements made for the time being in Northern and Western Africa.

I thoroughly understand and approve the feeling in the United States and Great Britain and among all the other United Nations that in view of the history of the past two years no permanent arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan. People in the United Nations likewise would never understand the recognition of a reconstituting of the Vichy Government in France or in any French territory.

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The present temporary arrangement has accomplished two military objectives. The first was to save American and British lives on the one hand, and French lives on the other hand.

The second was the vital factor of time. The temporary arrangement has made it possible to avoid a "mopping up" period in Algiers and Morocco which might have taken a month or two to consummate. Such a period would have delayed the concentration for the attack from the West on Tunis, and we hope on Tripoli.

Every day of delay in the current operation would have enabled the Germans and Italians to build up a strong resistance, to dig in and make a huge operation on our part essential before we could win. Here again, many more lives will be saved under the present speedy offensive, than if we had had to delay it for a month or more.

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URGENT PRIORITY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1942.

FROM: CEMAY
TO: ALUSHA LONDON

NUMBER 215

Your No. 198. I have not the slightest objection to the unofficial conference at Gibraltar or your sending Cadogan with Bedell Smith. However, I think it is of the utmost importance that Eisenhower and your people should not (repeat not) discuss the political aspects in North or West Africa at this time except to explore the existing situation in its military aspects. Most certainly no political decisions should be reached at the conference.

Released at 1200, GMT, November 18, 1942

W.C. MOTT

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Stewart
Date Oct 14 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: ALUSNA LONDON

November 18, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND
No. 216.

Your No. 197. I also have received through

Russian Ambassador here a message from Stalin which
is almost a paraphrase of his message to you. I note
a great improvement in the tone of our messages from
Moscow and I hope this will continue.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map
Room at 1200, EWT, November 18, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

SECRET
November 19, 1942.

From: Opnav.
To: Alusne, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and number 217.

Reference your No. 195 of November 18th the Combined Chiefs of Staff are now studying the possibilities for future actions in the Mediterranean Theater, basing their studies on the following favorable and unfavorable assumptions and/or a combination of both.

The favorable assumptions are: (1) That Tunisia has been cleared of Axis troops. (2) That the British 8th Army has reached Bengasi, but that the remnants of Rommel's force are still in being to the west of that place. (3) That the Spanish reactions to Torch remain satisfactory. (4) That the lines of communication are secure.

The unfavorable assumptions are the converse of the favorable assumptions stated above.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will consider the contents of your No. 195 of November 18th in connection with the studies on which they are now engaged. I will tell you of their conclusions as soon as possible.

Roosevelt.

Released from the Map Room at 1135, EWT, November 19, 1942.

[Signature]
JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 14 1971
Telegram
November 19, 1942.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

Reference your No. 195 of November 18th the Combined Chiefs of Staff are now studying the possibilities for future actions in the Mediterranean Theater, basing their studies on the following favorable and unfavorable assumptions and/or a combination of both.

The favorable assumptions are:

(1) That Tunisia has been cleared of Axis troops.
(2) That the British 8th Army has reached Bengasi, but that the remnants of Rommel's force are still in being to the west of that place.
(3) That the Spanish reactions to TORCH remain satisfactory.
(4) That the lines of communication are secure.

The unfavorable assumptions are the converse of the unfavorable assumptions stated above.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will consider the contents of your No. 195 of November 18th in connection with the studies on which they are now engaged. You will be informed of their conclusions as soon as possible.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 14 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Plans and operations in the Mediterranean.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you send the following reply to the Prime Minister in response to his message, No. 195, of November 18th, on the above subject:

"From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

Reference your No. 195 of November 18th the Combined Chiefs of Staff are now studying the possibilities for future actions in the Mediterranean Theater, basing their studies on the following favorable and unfavorable assumptions and/or a combination of both.

"The favorable assumptions are:

"(1) That Tunisia has been cleared of Axis troops.

"(2) That the British 8th Army has reached Bengasi, but that the remnants of Rommel's force are still in being to the west of that place.

"(3) That the Spanish reactions to TORCH remain satisfactory.

"(4) That the lines of communication are secure.

"The unfavorable assumptions are the converse of the unfavorable assumptions stated above.

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff will consider the contents of your No. 195 of November 18th in connection
with the studies on which they are now engaged. You will be informed of their conclusions."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: AUSNA LONDON
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND NO. 218

REPLYING TO YOUR MESSAGE NO. 196 OF NOVEMBER 18

I AM IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SEND ANOTHER CONVOY TO RUSSIA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, 

IT IS NOTED THAT YOU CAN MAKE AVAILABLE ESCORT VESSELS FOR THE CLOSE ESCORT AND SOME FOR THE COVERING AND STRIKING FORCES BUT YOU FEEL THAT TWELVE ADDITIONAL DESTROYERS ARE NECESSARY FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION.

YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE NECESSITY OF OUR RADICAL REDUCTION OF ESCORT FORCES EVEN TO RETAINING IN THE ATLANTIC DESTROYERS URGENTLY REQUIRED IN THE PACIFIC IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ESCORT VESSELS FOR TORCH.

THE MOVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL FOLLOW UP CONVOYS FROM AMERICA TO AFRICA IS CONTINGENT UPON AVAILABILITY OF ESCORT VESSELS AND THE TORCH OPERATION MUST BE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED.

DESTROYER LOSSES AND DAMAGE TO DESTROYERS IN RECENT NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE BEEN SO SERIOUS AS TO NECESSITATE AN IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE DESTROYERS BORROWED FROM THE PACIFIC FOR TORCH.

THIS WILL LEAVE IN THE ATLANTIC ONLY MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR FOLLOW UP CONVOYS TO AFRICA AND MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO PROVIDE THE DESTROYERS FOR THE RUSSIAN CONVOY SUGGESTED IN YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 196. I WISH I COULD SEND YOU A MORE FAVORABLE ANSWER.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 11:38 EWT, November 19, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy Aide

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By Date: 12/14/1971
PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

Replying to your message No. 196 of November 18 I am in complete agreement that every effort should be made to send another convoy to Russia at the earliest possible date.

It is noted that you can make available escort vessels for the close escort and some for the covering and striking forces but you feel that twelve additional destroyers are necessary for adequate protection.

You are familiar with the necessity of our radical reduction of escort forces even to retaining in the Atlantic destroyers urgently required in the Pacific in order to provide escort vessels for Torch.

The movement of essential follow up convoys from America to Africa is contingent upon availability of escort vessels and the Torch operation must be adequately supported.

Destroyer losses and damage to destroyers in recent naval operations in the Pacific have been so serious as to necessitate an immediate return of the destroyers borrowed from the Pacific for Torch.

This will leave in the Atlantic only minimum requirements for follow up convoys to Africa and makes it impossible for us to provide the destroyers for the Russian convoy suggested in your message Number 196. I wish I could send you a more favorable answer.
MEMO FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY
ADMIRAL KING

The President directed that I refer the attached to you for consideration and preparation of a draft of a reply.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

[Handwritten note: PM # 196]

[Handwritten note: Message sent in writing]

[Handwritten note: 2SM]
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Subject: Request of Prime Minister for 12 U.S. Destroyers for Supporting Movement of a Convoy to North Russia.

1. The following proposed draft is submitted as a reply to the Prime Minister's request:

"I am in full agreement that every effort should be made to send another convoy to North Russia at the earliest possible date. It is noted that you can provide the close escort and most of the necessary covering and striking forces including seventeen destroyers, but that you feel that twelve additional destroyers are needed to insure adequate protection to the convoy.

"You are familiar with the necessity of our stripping to the bone all of our escort forces and even retaining in the Atlantic seven DDs assigned to and urgently required in the Pacific, in order to provide the destroyers for TORCH. The movement of follow-up convoys from U.S. to TORCH area is contingent upon the availability of escort vessels. Our destroyer losses in the Pacific which have been heavy during the past few weeks necessitate returning immediately DDs borrowed from the Pacific for TORCH. When this is done there remain in Atlantic DDs sufficient to meet only minimum requirements for the absolutely necessary follow-up movements for WORCH which I deem essential to exploit the success so far attained. I regret that the situation does not permit furnishing the destroyers suggested in your No. 196 of the eighteenth".

E. J. KING.
November 19, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and No. 219.

I told the press yesterday in confidence an old orthodox church proverb used in the Balkans that appears applicable to our present Darlan - de Gaulle problem. Quote: My children, it is permitted you in time of grave danger to walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge. Unquote.

In regard to North Africa and possibly additional future areas, I think you and I might give some consideration to the idea of appointing one Britisher and one American to whom would be given authority not to administer civil functions but to hold a veto power over French civil administrators, and to direct them in rare instances to follow out certain policies. For example, I sent word to Eisenhower that all political prisoners in North and West Africa must be released. If Darlan fails to carry out this directive, Eisenhower must at once exercise his authority as Supreme Commander and take independent action in the matter.

Roosevelt.

Released from the Map Room at 1730, EWT, November 19, 1942.

JOHN L. MCREEA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President
I told the press yesterday in confidence an old orthodox church proverb used in the Balkans that appears applicable to our present Darlan - de Gaulle problem.

Quote: My children, it is permitted you in time of grave danger to walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge: unquote

In regard to North Africa and possibly additional future areas, I think you and I might give some consideration to the idea of appointing one Britisher and one American to whom would be given authority not to administer civil functions but to hold a veto power over French civil administrators, and to direct them in rare instances to follow out certain policies. For example, I sent word to Eisenhower that all political prisoners in North and West Africa must be released. If Darlan fails to carry out this directive, Eisenhower must at once exercise his authority as Supreme Commander and take independent action in the matter.

P.O.
From the President To the Former Naval Person personal and No. 220.

I have received a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia as and/or he does not say that he is repeating it to you, I am sending it to you in my following dispatch.

I have sent it to the Combined Staffs in Washington with the following memorandum:

Quote. I enclose telegram from Prime Minister of Australia. I hope you will consider this and let me have your judgment as to what reply should be made. Obviously the British Combined Staffs should be consulted and their opinion be given great weight, in view of the fact that while the African operation is largely American on the western end, it is preponderantly British on the eastern end.

It is my snap judgment that Mr. Curtin should be told:

(A) That it is essential that General Alexander's and General Montgomery's operations continue in full swing and that is cannot be interrupted by the removal of any division or unit until the whole African operation from Algiers to Egypt is definitely settled in our favor and every German and every Italian is driven out of Africa.

(B) I think we should impress on Mr. Curtin that the opening of the Mediterranean to through shipping to the Far East via the Suez Canal is of major benefit to the
safety of Australia, and that the work of the Ninth Division is a component part of the whole.

(C) As to the return of the Division to Australia after the completion of the African operation, I feel that this is a matter primarily for the decision of the Combined Staffs here and in London.

(D) If I felt sure that the return of the Ninth Division to Australia would result in its being reconstituted as an experienced fighting division available for use in New Guinea or some other Island, I would be inclined to let it go back to Australia for that purpose. The division is entitled to a rest period after its strenuous campaigns in the Egyptian area, but I think it should be kept intact, filled up with trained officers and made definitely available to take the offensive northward from Australia. Unquote.

I hope, therefore, that you will take this up with your people and my people in London. The primary consideration must, of course, be the relationship of the Ninth Division to the Africa campaign and after that there is the secondary consideration of building up the Australian strength for use north of Australia.

Roosevelt.
FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I have received a telegram from the Prime Minister of Australia and as he does not say that he is repeating it to you, I am sending it to you in my following dispatch.

I have sent it to the Combined Staffs in Washington with the following memorandum:

"I enclose telegram from Prime Minister of Australia. I hope you will consider this and let me have your judgment as to what reply should be made. Obviously the British Combined Staffs should be consulted and their opinion be given great weight, in view of the fact that while the African operation is largely American on the western end, it is preponderantly British on the eastern end.

It is my snap judgment that Mr. Curtin should be told:
(a) That it is essential that General Alexander's and General Montgomery's operation continue in full swing and that it cannot be interrupted by the removal of any division or unit until the whole African operation from Algiers to Egypt is definitely settled in our favor and every German and every Italian is driven out of Africa."
(b) I think we should impress on Mr. Curtin that the opening of the Mediterranean to through shipping to the Far East via the Suez Canal is of major benefit to the safety of Australia, and that the work of the Ninth Division is a component part of the whole.

(c) As to the return of the Division to Australia after the completion of the African operation, I feel that this is a matter primarily for the decision of the Combined Staffs here and in London, and I am advising Mr. Churchill to that effect.

(d) If I felt sure that the return of the Ninth Division to Australia would result in its being reconstituted as an experienced fighting division available for use in New Guinea or some other island, I would be inclined to let it go back to Australia for that purpose. The division is entitled to a rest period after its strenuous campaigns in the Egyptian area, but I think it should be kept intact, filled up with trained officers and made definitely available to take the offensive northward from Australia."

I hope, therefore, that you will take this up with your people and my people in London. The primary consideration
must, of course, be the relationship of the Ninth Division to the Africa campaign and after that there is the secondary consideration of building up the Australian strength for use north of Australia.

ROOSEVELT
"Dear President Roosevelt,

I have carefully considered the suggestion in your telegram of November 1st for the retention of the 9th Imperial Division in the Middle East and your proposal to send the United States Division to Australia from Hawaii conditional on the right to divert it elsewhere within the Southwest and South Pacific areas.

2. As explained to Mr. Churchill in my telegram of October 17th, which was repeated to you, it is impossible for Australia to despatch to the Middle East the reinforcements necessary for the maintenance of the 9th Division in view of the difficulties already being experienced in maintaining the Australian Army and meeting the heavy wastage from tropical warfare in New Guinea. Unless the Division returns to Australia it cannot be maintained, whereas it can be built up again in Australia by the allocation of personnel from other formations which are being disbanded owing to contraction in the number of our divisions.

3. The attitude of the Australian Government has all along been quite definite and clear regarding the future employment of this Division.

4. After the outbreak of war with Japan, and
2. following a statement generously volunteered by Mr. Churchill that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Australian troops returning to defend their homeland, the Government requested that all Australian troops overseas should return to Australia.

5. In March we allowed two brigade groups of the 6th Division to be used in Ceylon on the understanding that the 9th Division would return to Australia as soon as possible. Had these brigades returned directly to Australia we would have been able to strengthen the forces in New Guinea much earlier with battle trained troops.

6. In April the Government agreed to the postponement of the return of the 9th Division until it could be replaced in the Middle East.

7. When the Australian Government had every reason to expect the return of the Division in July it raised no objection to its transfer from Palestine to the Western Desert to help stem the Axis advance. Mr. Churchill was advised there would be difficulties in the despatch of further reinforcements from Australia and that when available reserves were exhausted the Division would have to be withdrawn from the line of battle.

8. On July 30th in a further personal telegram to Mr. Churchill I stated it was impossible for the
Government to do more than agree to an extension of the period for the temporary retention of the 9th Division in the Middle East. A limit was set to reinforcements that would be available and it was specifically stated ancillary units were not to be broken up for use as reinforcements. It was emphasized the Commander-in-Chief Middle East would therefore need to have these facts in mind in his use of the Division.

9. Mr. Churchill, the Australian Representative on the United Kingdom War Cabinet and the Commander of the Division have been informed:

(a) No further reinforcements for the 9th Division are being despatched from Australia.

(b) The Government is not agreeable to the 9th Division being broken up by the replacement of wastage from ancillary and other units.

(c) It is essential that the Commander-in-Chief Middle East should have regard to this position in his use of the 9th Division.

The Government views the present use of the Division as absolutely governed by the fulfilment of the conditions laid down by it some time ago and I have told Mr. Churchill that in our plans and dispositions we are relying on the Division being returned in good shape and
strength. Now that the situation in the Middle East for which the 9th Division was retained has been cleared up satisfactorily, the Government expects early effect to be given the understanding reached in April.

10. You might be interested to know that on the entry of Italy into the war certain units of the 6th Division reinforcements and Corps troops were diverted to the United Kingdom, where they were organized into the 9th Division for the defence of Britain against invasion. This Division, which was later transferred to the Middle East and withstood the siege of Tobruk, therefore really became an additional overseas commitment. It was realized at the time that it would probably be beyond our capacity to maintain it and experience has proved this to be the case.

11. Decisions on global strategy have been taken by Mr. Churchill and yourself. The Commonwealth Government has shown a ready willingness to co-operate in other theatres at considerable risk to the security of Australia. This has been demonstrated by the service overseas of our naval, land and air forces and our continued participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Government considers the contributions it has made to
other theatres entitle it to the assurance that the fullest possible support will be given to the situation in the Pacific. You will recall that the military advisers of the Commonwealth Government consider that three further divisions are necessary in the Southwest Pacific area. In view of its responsibilities for the local defence of Australia and in light of the views of its advisers, the Government feels that the maximum strength of Australian forces should be concentrated in the Southwest Pacific area to meet all contingencies of the military situation in the Pacific.

12. We are grateful to learn that you are sending to the South or Southwest Pacific Area the Division from Hawaii. We would be delighted to welcome it to Australia where it would be an invaluable addition to the two splendid American Divisions already here.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN CURTIN.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 17:45, EWT, November 19, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna London

From The President for The Former Naval Person personal and No. 222.

In reply to your 211. We of course have no intention of abandoning Roundup. No one can possibly know now whether or not we may have the opportunity to strike across the Channel in 1943 and if the opportunity comes we must obviously grasp it. However the determination as to the size of the force which we should have in Bolero in 1943 is a matter which should require our joint strategic considerations. It is my present thought that we should build up as rapidly as present active operations permit a growing striking force in the U.K. to be used quickly in event of German collapse or a very large force later if Germany remains intact and assumes a defensive position.

The conclusions of The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting last summer in London indicated that the mounting of Torch necessarily postponed the assembling of the required forces in the United Kingdom. In view of our requirements for the initiation and maintenance of Torch our studies indicated that we could not send forces and materiel to the United Kingdom at this time in excess of that stated by General Hartle. Until we have provided adequately against the possible reactions from
Spanish Morocco, and are clear as to the situation in Tunisia, North Africa must naturally take precedence. We are far more heavily engaged in the Southwest Pacific than I anticipated a few months ago. Nevertheless, we shall continue with Bolero as rapidly as our shipping and other resources permit. I believe that as soon as we have knocked the Germans out of Tunisia, and have secured the danger against any real threat from Spain, that we should proceed with a military strategical conference between Great Britain, Russia and The United States. I am hoping that our military position in Africa will be such that a conference might be held in a month or six weeks. Our own Combined Chiefs of Staff will, I believe, have a recommendation for us within a few days as to what the next steps should be, but I feel very strongly that we have got to sit down at the table with the Russians. My notion would be a conference in Cairo or Moscow: that each of us would be represented by a small group meeting very secretly: that the conclusions of the conference would of course be approved by the three of us. I would probably send Marshall to head up our group but I presume that all services should be represented. I think it would be wise to keep the numbers down to three from each of us.

I have given Oliver some private messages to you which I do not wish to put on the cables and he will be returning I believe next Monday. I hope that all of his problems will
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

have been substantially resolved.

Will you let me know as soon as you can what you think of my proposal?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2350, EWT, November 25, 1942.

R. R. Dodderidge
Capt., U.S.A.
TELEGRAM

NOVEMBER 24, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

IN REPLY TO YOUR 211. WE OF COURSE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING ROUNDUP. NO ONE CAN POSSIBLY KNOW NOW WHETHER OR NOT WE MAY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE ACROSS THE CHANNEL IN 1943 AND IF THE OPPORTUNITY COMES WE MUST OBVIOUSLY GRASP IT. HOWEVER THE DETERMINATION AS TO THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE IN BOLERO IN 1943 IS A MATTER WHICH SHOULD REQUIRE OUR JOINT STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. IT IS MY PRESENT THOUGHT THAT

I BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME WHEN A MILITARY STRATEGICAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE HELD. I THINK SUCH A CONFERENCE SHOULD BE HELD AT ONCE BECAUSE WE MUST NOT DELAY OUR ACTIONS A MOMENT LONGER THAN IS NECESSARY AFTER WE HAVE DRIVEN THE GERMANS OUT OF AFRICA. THAT HAPPY EVENT MAY COME SOONER THAN WE EXPECT. DELAY IN FOLLOWING THAT UP WOULD BE FATAL AND THE NEXT ENTERPRISE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REQUIRE FROM THIRTY DAYS TO THREE MONTHS TO GET PROPERLY MOUNTED. HENCE EARLY DECISIONS ARE IMPORTANT. WE MUST MAKE THESE DECISIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT OUR OPERATIONS MUST TIE IN WITH THEIR ACTIONS. IT IS HIGH TIME TOO THAT WE HAVE A REAL JOINT STRATEGY WITH THE RUSSIANS AT THE TABLE.
MY NOTION WOULD BE A CONFERENCE IN CAIRO OR MOSCOW; THAT EACH OF US WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY A SMALL GROUP MEETING VERY SECRELY; THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCES WOULD OF COURSE BE APPROVED BY THE THREE OF US. I WOULD PROBABLY SEND MARSHALL TO HEAD UP OUR GROUP BUT I PRESUME THAT ALL SERVICES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED. I THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO KEEP THE NUMBERS DOWN.

I HAVE GIVEN OLIVER SOME PRIVATE MESSAGES TO YOU WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO PUT ON THE CABLES AND HE WILL BE RETURNING I BELIEVE NEXT MONDAY. I HOPE THAT ALL OF HIS PROBLEMS WILL HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY RESOLVED.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS YOU CAN WHAT YOU THINK OF MY PROPOSAL?

ROOSEVELT
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

IN REPLY TO YOUR 221. WE OF COURSE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING ROUNDUP. NO ONE CAN POSSIBLY KNOW HOW WHETHER OR NOT WE MAY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE ACROSS THE CHANNEL IN 1943 AND IF THE OPPORTUNITY COMES WE MUST OBVIOUSLY GRASP IT. HOWEVER THE DETERMINATION AS TO THE SIZE OF THE FORCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE IN BOLERO IN 1943 IS A MATTER WHICH SHOULD REQUIRE OUR JOINT STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. IT IS MY PRESENT THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD BUILD UP AS RAPIDLY AS PRESENT ACTIVE OPERATIONS PERMIT A GROWING STRIKING FORCE IN THE U.K. TO BE USED QUICKLY IN EVENT OF GERMAN COLLAPSE OR A VERY LARGE FORCE LATER IF GERMANY REMAINS INTACT AND ASSUMES A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE MEETING LAST SUMMER IN LONDON INDICATED THAT THE MOUNTING OF TORCH NECESSARILY POSTPONED THE ASSEMBLING OF THE REQUIRED FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IN VIEW OF OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INITIATION AND MAINTENANCE OF TORCH OUR STUDIES INDICATED THAT WE COULD NOT SEND FORCES AND MATERIEL TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THIS TIME IN EXCESS OF THAT STATED BY GENERAL HARTLE. UNTIL WE HAVE PROVIDED ADEQUATELY AGAINST THE POSSIBLE REACTIONS FROM SPANISH MOROCCO, AND ARE CLEAR AS TO THE SITUATION IN TUNISIA, NORTH AFRICA MUST NATURALLY TAKE PRECEDENCE. WE ARE FAR MORE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THAN I ANTICIPATED A FEW MONTHS AGO. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHALL CONTINUE WITH BOLERO AS RAPIDLY AS OUR SHIPPING AND OTHER RESOURCES PERMIT. I BELIEVE THAT AS SOON AS WE HAVE KNOCXED THE GERMANS OUT OF TUNISIA, AND HAVE SECURED THE DANGER AGAINST ANY REAL THREAT FROM SPAIN, THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH A MILITARY STRATEGICAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES. I AM HOPING THAT OUR MILITARY POSITION IN AFRICA WILL BE SUCH THAT A CONFERENCE MIGHT BE HELD IN A MONTH OR SIX WEEKS. OUR OWN COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL, I BELIEVE, HAVE A RECOMMENDATION FOR US WITHIN A FEW DAYS AS TO WHAT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE, BUT I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT WE HAVE GOT TO SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE WITH THE RUSSIANS. MY NOTION WOULD BE A CONFERENCE IN CAIRO OR MOSCOW: THAT EACH OF US WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY A SMALL GROUP.
MEETING VERY SECRETLY: THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE WOULD
OF COURSE BE APPROVED BY THE THREE OF US. I WOULD PROBABLY SEND
MARSHALL TO HEAD UP OUR GROUP BUT I PRESUME THAT ALL SERVICES SHOULD
BE REPRESENTED. I THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO KEEP THE NUMBERS DOWN
TO THREE FROM EACH OF US.

I HAVE GIVEN OLIVER SOME PRIVATE MESSAGES TO YOU WHICH I
DO NOT WISH TO PUT ON THE CABLES AND HE WILL BE RETURNING I BELIEVE
NEXT MONDAY. I HOPE THAT ALL OF HIS PROBLEMS WILL HAVE BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY RESOLVED.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS YOU CAN WHAT YOU THINK OF
MY PROPOSAL?

ROOSEVELT
Of course, we have no intention of abandoning Roundup. However, as the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicated at their meeting in London, the mounting of Torch necessarily postponed the possibility of assembling the required forces in U.K. General Hartle's statement referred to construction. After determining the requirements for the initiation and maintenance of Torch, our studies indicated that we could not send forces and materiel to the U.K. in excess of that stated by General Hartle. Limited shipping and available military forces in the U.S. preclude the sending of those forces for several months. Until we have provided adequately against the possible reactions through Spanish Morocco and are clear as to the situation in Tunisia, North Africa must continue to take precedence. Once Tunisia is in our hands, we should seek to knock Italy out of the war by intensive air action against her cities and her industrial structures, thus exploiting our advantage in the Mediterranean Area.

Any further extension of our operations in that area to include the seizure of Sicily, etc. must necessarily further delay the possibility of mounting Roundup.

Evidences of the deterioration of the German effort are beginning to appear and it is my thought that you, with your Joint Chiefs in London, and I, with the Combined Chiefs here, should at once undertake to estimate the extent to which that deterioration can be hastened by intensive air bombardment of the sources sustaining
the German War Effort. Thus, we could reach definite conclusions as to the limiting date when we must be fully prepared to undertake Roundup and make our decision on assembling the required forces in U.K. accordingly.

I believe that a military strategical conference between Great Britain, Russia and the United States should be held. However, I consider such a conference inadvisable until the Tunisian situation has been cleared up and we are in a position to provide for German reaction through Spain.

War in Pacific
30 November 1942

Letter from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 30 November 1942. This letter answers Churchill's letter to Roosevelt, dated 31 October 1942.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY.

Mr. Hopkins sends these to you and calls attention to a note at the bottom of the long letter to Winston Churchill.

Memorandum to Admiral Land was rewritten here and dispatched.

Ruth Daggett
My dear Winston:

I presume that we shall never satisfy ourselves as to the relative need of merchant ships versus escort vessels. In this case I believe we should try to have our cake and eat it too.

At any rate we are moving aggressively here to increase both of these programs and have given them the highest priority for material and machine tools.

So far as merchant shipping is concerned, we have, after reexamination of our steel plate problem and other facilities, determined to increase it to 18,800,000 deadweight tons in 1943. I intend to raise this to 20 million tons if after reexamination by our people it should prove possible.

Of one thing I think you can be sure, that we will build in this country a minimum of 18,800,000 tons of merchant shipping of all kinds. Your offices here will keep you informed of the types of ships that are being built and, naturally, I would welcome your judgment in regard to this, because it is very important that we have a proper balance between tankers, cargo vessels and transports.

I agree that this is the time for me to reply to you concerning the very urgent requirements of the British shipping program in 1943.

I have had the 27 million ton figure of imports to the British Isles examined rather hurriedly here by our own people and they are satisfied that this figure is substantially correct.

Our joint war effort requires that this pipe line of materiel and food to Britain be maintained, that the moving of this tonnage at reasonably even levels is a matter of primary importance. I recognize it as such.
I am well aware of the concern with which your government faces the serious net losses in tonnage to your merchant fleet. It is a net loss which persists and I think we must face the fact that it may well continue through all of next year. I, therefore, want to give you the assurance that from our expanding fleet you may depend on the tonnage necessary to meet your import program.

Accordingly, I am instructing our Shipping Administration to allocate through the machinery of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board enough dry cargo tonnage out of the surplus shipbuilding to meet your imports, the supply and maintenance of your armed forces, and other services essential to maintaining the war effort of the British Commonwealth, to the extent that they cannot be transported by the fleet under British control.

I have been given to understand by our combined shipping people that an average of nearly 300,000 tons each month of carrying capacity will have to be used to supplement the tonnage already engaged on behalf of the British war effort. Because of the commitments already made, the allocation of ships during the next three months must of necessity be less than the average for the whole period.

We may hope for a substantial reduction in this if we can make our way through the Mediterranean. Furthermore, I think that you and I should insist that every possible economy is exercised by our shipping and military authorities.

You will, I am sure, agree that emergencies may develop which may require me to divert for our own military purposes tonnage which it is now contemplated will be utilized for imports to Great Britain. There will, no doubt, be other cases in which we shall wish jointly to confer relative to vital military uses of merchant tonnage.

I want you to know that any important diversions of tonnage will be made only with my personal approval, because I am fully cognizant of the fact that your government may feel that decisions might be made to divert tonnage in contravention of the policy which I am laying down in this letter.

The allocation of tonnage month by month must be worked out by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. And hence I confine myself to the above statement of policy. I wish to give you the definite assurance, subject to the qualifications I have indicated, that your requirements will be met.
We have increased our escort program recently by 70 for 1943, so that we should turn out 336 escort vessels during the next calendar year. I am asking Admiral King to confer with your representative here and make arrangements about the distribution of these ships.

The problem of getting our troops to England is a serious one. I recognize that there must be a minimum joint force there, well equipped and prepared to meet any eventuality.

While Round-Up seems more and more difficult, I do not think it should be taken off the boards by any means. We never can tell when the opportunity may come for us to strike across the Channel and if that opportunity comes we must be ready to take it. Obviously, however, the success of our joint enterprise in North Africa requires us to review the movement of our troops during the next few months. We need to come to an early decision as to what our next steps are going to be and upon that decision must rest the determination of the number of American divisions that should be in England. We have this whole matter very much in mind here and our Chiefs of Staff have it under constant consideration.

As you know, we have recently agreed upon a program of 82,000 combat planes. There have been misgivings in some quarters about the size of this program. I have none. We simply must get a complete domination of the air next year, even though other important things give way.

One thing is sure, that the aircraft must be brought to bear on the enemy at the earliest possible moment and, if there are competent British and Russian crews to fight these planes and you can get at the enemy quicker and just as effectively as we can, then I have no hesitancy in saying that you and the Russians should have the planes you need.

We must give consideration to the shipping difficulties that are met when we send our U. S. air forces great distances. We have heavy commitments in the Southwest Pacific. We are rapidly assuming similar commitments in North Africa, and the bombing of Germany and Italy, whether from England or Russia, must be an unrelenting and constant business.

There have been many conferences taking place here between our respective representatives regarding the distribution of aircraft. I am in accord with the agreement that has been reached. Oliver will tell you of this. A detailed memorandum of the agreement will follow in a few days. Oliver has impressed upon me the necessity of making an early decision regarding the distribution of our combined aircraft production. I think the decisions that we have come to regarding aircraft are of the highest importance.
I am told that there is a substantial meeting of minds between your representatives and ours relative to the medium tank. I must confess that I think we are both underrating the need for these medium tanks. It is quite possible that the Russians may again press for large increases in medium tanks and I have a feeling that we are cutting our pattern pretty thin. I am asking General Marshall to explore this once more. I should think it would be no great strain on our production to get a few more thousand medium tanks in 1943.

I understand that some of your ground force requirements have not yet been discussed with my officers. These are being considered. Every effort will be made to include your essential requirements in our Army Supply Programme and I have asked to have a report of these further discussions submitted to me as early as possible.

I also recognize that your own production for Navy, Army and Air, and for the minimum needs of the civilian population, requires an assured flow of materials, machine tools, components and complementary items from America. These supplies, unless unforeseen circumstances intervene, will be maintained.

In conclusion, I want you to feel that this letter, together with the agreements that Oliver is taking home with him, gives you the assurances that you need in planning your own production, and that you may regard them as a firm base upon which to make the allocations of your remaining reserves of manpower.

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Miss Tully:

The President added in long hand substantially as follows: "I would like to reserve final decision on the matter of transport planes. The Russians have asked us for 500 and I think we should give them some."

12-1-42

Harry L. Hopkins

The Right Honorable
Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LAND.

I have been going over with Oliver Lyttelton the import needs of the United Kingdom for 1943, together with the whole shipping problem of the British Government. In all probability, the British are going to lose again in 1943 more ships than they can build. If we are going to keep England in the war at anything like this maximum capacity, we must consider the supplementing of their merchant fleet as one of the top military necessities of the war. Naturally, the support of our forces in the Southwest Pacific and in Africa fall in the same category.

I am very anxious that the British programs shall be carried out in accordance with the principle of the memorandum of October 6th which I have approved and that there be no substantial diversions from any of these enterprises. I wish you would consult me prior to any action taken by you which would seriously affect any one of them. Of course, I do not expect to be consulted by you on the many adjustments you are required to make from day to day.

signed - Franklin D. Roosevelt
November 23, 1942

My dear Winston:

Oliver's visit has been most welcome and I hope he goes home reassured about our ability and determination to stand beside you vigorously until the war is won. Thanks so much for letting him come over. He will convey to you some of the private thoughts, serious and otherwise, which we have discussed together.

Very cordially yours,

The Right Honorable
Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister,
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSMA LONDON

December 1, 1942.

PRIORITI

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND

NO. 223

Reference your No. 177 concerning the Plough Project, the vehicle will be produced on schedule and the special service force will have the vehicles for use this winter. Development of improved design now in progress and tests will be made this winter for possible production for future use. The training of the special group of U. S. and Canadian soldiers is proceeding vigorously.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0035, EWT, December 2, 1942.

R. R. Dodderidge
Capt., U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D.C. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Plough Project.

Production of Vehicles for Plough Project. The vehicles for the Plough Project are scheduled for complete delivery to the Special Service Force before December 31, 1942. The Force now has some vehicles for training, and it is planned to continue the Force in being throughout the winter regardless of the possibility of their use.

Recommendation for Reply to Prime Minister. I recommend that the following reply be transmitted to the Prime Minister in reply to his communication to you, which was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

REFERENCE YOUR COMMUNICATION CONCERNING PLough SCHEME THE VEHICLE WILL BE PRODUCED ON SCHEDULE AND THE SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE WILL HAVE THE VEHICLES FOR USE THIS WINTER STOP DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED DESIGN NOW IN PROGRESS AND TESTS WILL BE MADE THIS WINTER FOR POSSIBLE PRODUCTION FOR FUTURE USE.

The training of

Chief of Staff.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: 

URGENT PRIORITY

December 2, 1942

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND SECR NO 224.

I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT TO OUR PROPOSED JOINT CONFERENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS AND I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE ONLY SATISFACTORY WAY OF COMING TO THE VITAL STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS THE MILITARY SITUATION REQUIRES, IS FOR YOU AND ME TO MEET PERSONALLY WITH STALIN. MY THOUGHT WOULD BE THAT EACH OF US WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A VERY SMALL STAFF MADE UP OF OUR TOP ARMY, AIR AND NAVAL CHIEFS OF STAFF. I SHOULD BRING HARRY AND AVERELL BUT NO STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ARRIVE AT TENTATIVE PROCEDURES TO BE ADOPTED IN EVENT OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE. I SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CONFERENCE HELD ABOUT JANUARY FIFTEENTH OR SOON THEREAFTER. TUNIS AND ROME SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARED UP AND ROOSEVELT'S ARMY LIQUIDATED BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. AS TO THE PLACE, ICELAND OR ALASKA ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME AT THIS TIME OF YEAR AND I BELIEVE EQUALLY SO FOR STALIN. I SHOULD PREFER A SECURE PLACE SOUTH OF ALGIERS OR IN OR NEAR KHARTOUM. I DON'T LIKE MOSQUITOES. I THINK THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE VERY SECRET AND THAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. I WOULD QUESTION THE ADVISABILITY OF MARSHALL AND THE OTHERS GOING TO ENGLAND PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE BECAUSE I DO NOT WANT TO GIVE STALIN THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE SETTLING EVERYTHING BETWEEN OURSELVES BEFORE WE MEET HIM.

I THINK THAT YOU AND I UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER SO WELL THAT PRIOR CONFERENCES BETWEEN US ARE UNNECESSARY AND WHEN THE TIME COMES WE CAN WORK THINGS OUT FROM
DAY TO DAY, OUR MILITARY PEOPLE WILL ALSO BE IN CLOSE COOPERATION AT ALL TIMES FROM NOW ON.

I THINK THAT THIS CONFERENCE MAY WELL RESULT IN KNOCKING OUT GERMANY SOONER THAN WE ANTICIPATED. AS YOU KNOW STALIN HAS ALREADY AGREED TO A PURELY MILITARY CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN MOSCOW AND I HAVE TODAY SENT HIM A MESSAGE URGING HIM TO MEET YOU AND ME. I BELIEVE HE WILL ACCEPT.

I PREFER A COMFORTABLE OASIS TO THE RAFT AT TIISIT.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1740, EWT, December 2, 1942.

CHESER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature] 14 1971
I have been giving a good deal of thought to our joint conference with the Russians and I agree with you that the only satisfactory way of coming to the vital strategic conclusions the military situation requires is for you and me to meet personally with Stalin. My thought would be that each of us would be accompanied by a very small staff made up of our top army, air, and naval chiefs of staff I should bring Harry and I would both be state.
department representative although I believe we should arrive at tentative procedures to be adopted in event of a German collapse. I should like to see the conference held about Jan. fifteenth or soon thereafter. Time at night should have been cleaned up and Rommel's army liquidated before the conference.

As to the place, Iceland and Alaska are impossible for me at this time of year and I believe equally so for Stalin. I should prefer a secure place north of Algiers.
in or near Khartoum. I don't like wireless. I think the conference should be very secret and that the press should be excluded. It's essential that you and I have a thorough understanding before the conference takes place. I would question the advisability of Marshall and the others going to England prior to the conference because I do not want to give Stalin the impression that we are settling every thing
between ourselves before we meet him. I think that you and I understand each other by
realizing the importance of you and will that open conferences between us are unnecessary.
I am going into that conference only very and when the time comes we can work things
after the fullest exchange of views and out from day to day. Our military people
will also be in close cooperation at try to suggest a method in the meet all times from now on.

few days at would welcome any
other suggestions from you. I
think that this conference may
well result in harmonizing out
Germany comes than we anticipated. As you know Stalin has already agreed to a purely military conference to be held in Moscow and I hope today sent him a message urging him to meet you and me. I believe he will accept.

I prefer a comfortable basis to the raft at Tibet

Peaceful
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
December 3, 1942

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND
AND No. 225.

I AM INFORMED TODAY THAT THE DAKAR NEGOTIATIONS ARE
IMPEDED BY A QUESTION OF THE RELEASE OF FRENCH PRISONERS
HELD BY DE GAULLISTS IN EQUATORIAL AFRICA IN EXCHANGE FOR
RELEASE OF ALLIED NATIONALS HELD IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO BOISSON
THAT IF HE RELEASES ALL DE GAULLE SYMPATHIZERS IN DAKAR,
DE GAULLE WILL ALSO RELEASE ALL VICHY OR DARLAN SYMPATHIZERS
IN FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA. THE USE BY US OF DAKAR
IS AS YOU KNOW VERY IMPORTANT AND EISENHOWER IS WAITING
FOR A QUICK DECISION.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room
at 1250, EWT, December 3, 1942.

J. L. McCrea
Captain J. L. McCrea, USN
Naval Aide to the President

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Oct 14 1971
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

I am informed today that the Dakar negotiations are impeded by a question of the release of French prisoners held by de Gaullists in Equatorial Africa in exchange for release of allied nationals held in French West Africa.

It seems to me that it should be made clear to Boisson that if he releases all de Gaulle sympathizers in Dakar, de Gaulle will also release all Vichy or Darlan sympathizers in French Equatorial Africa. The use by us of Dakar is as you know very important and Eisenhower is waiting for a quick decision.

Roosevelt.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

I am informed today that

The Dakar negotiations are impeded by a

question of the release of French prisoners held by de Gaulists

in Equatorial Africa in exchange for release of allied nationals

held in French West Africa.

To avoid possibility of failure, complete agreement

for Boisson to join with us it is important that you arrange

without delay for the release of de Gaulist French prisoners

in Africa.

It seems to me that it should be

made clear to Boisson that if he

releases all de Gaulle sympathizers in

Dakar, de Gaulle will also release

all Vichy sympathizers in French

Equatorial Africa. The view by us

of Dakar is as you know very in-

portant and the leader is waiting

for a quick decision.

Roosevelt
URGENT PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL
AND "NO. 226"

YOUR DESPATCH NUMBER 217 OF DECEMBER 2, 1942, HAS RECEIVED
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. YOUR OFFERS OF COOPERATION ARE DEEPLY
APPRECIATED.

IN SPITE OF THE ADVANTAGES WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THE
EMPLOYMENT OF BOTH VICTORIOUS AND ILLUSTRIOUS AS A TACTICAL UNIT
IN THE PACIFIC, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MAKE IT NECESSARY TO FORGO
THE SERVICES OF VICTORIOUS THERE. IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO SEND
YET ANOTHER CARRIER TO THE PACIFIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE, RANGER WOULD
BE CHOSEN BECAUSE SHE DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR
OPERATIONS WITH OTHER AMERICAN FORCES.

THE EARLY ARRIVAL OF ILLUSTRIOUS IN PEARL HARBOR IS LOOKED
FORWARD TO WITH ANTICIPATION.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the Map Room
at 1205, EWT, December 5, 1942.

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 14 1971
Your despatch number 217 of December 2, 1942, has received serious consideration. Your offers of cooperation are deeply appreciated.

Para. Two. In spite of the advantages which would result from the employment of both VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS as a tactical unit in the Pacific, other considerations make it necessary to forego the services of VICTORIOUS there. If it becomes necessary to send yet another carrier to the Pacific in the near future, RANGER would be chosen because she does not require special preparation for operations with other American forces.

Para. Three. The early arrival of ILLUSTRIOUS in Pearl Harbor is looked forward to with anticipation.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date OCT 14 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy.

1. I enclose draft of a dispatch which I propose be sent by the President in answer to Naval Person's No. 217 of 2 December.

2. While I appreciate the willingness of the British to give us two carriers, I feel that any such scheme would result in employing our combined carrier strength to poor advantage. It would result in having two mixed British-U.S. Task Forces, one built around two British carriers in the Pacific and the other built around RANGER in the home fleet. Mixed Task Forces, as you so well know, are always undesirable. They are particularly undesirable when carriers are included, because of wide differences in the technique of carrier operations. I am convinced that we should keep our carriers in our own fleets to the greatest extent possible and that the British should do the same.

3. We do need temporary air reinforcement in the Pacific and, in order to obtain it, I think we should accept the offer of the ILLUSTRIOUS, but I do not think that any further mixing of U.S. and British carriers is either necessary or desirable.

4. I am particularly anxious that RANGER be kept under my control, in order that it may be used in the Atlantic or the Pacific as the situation may require.

E. J. King

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART.0445

By OPNAVINST 5510.6C and 06050.1C 4/6/44

By Date MAY 1 1944
SUGGESTED DESPATCH

Your despatch number 217 of December 2, 1942, has received serious consideration. Your offers of cooperation are deeply appreciated.

Para. Two. In spite of the advantages which would result from the employment of both VICTORIOUS and ILLUSTRIOUS as a tactical unit in the Pacific, other considerations make it necessary to forego the services of VICTORIOUS there. If it becomes necessary to send yet another carrier to the Pacific in the near future, RANGER would be chosen because she does not require special preparation for operations with other American forces.

Para. Three. The early arrival of ILLUSTRIOUS in Pearl Harbor is looked forward to with anticipation.
URGENT PRIORITY

FROM: OPMNAV
TO: ALUSHA LONDON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND
NO. 227 REPLYING TO YOUR TWO TWO ZERO, I AGREE WITH
YOU THAT OUR TWO REPRESENTATIVES IN MOSCOW MARK TIME
IN RELATION TO VELVET. ON THE OTHER HAND, I WOULD
NOT WISH TO GIVE THEM ANY AUTHORITY TO CALL THAT
ENTERPRISE OFF BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME TO HAVE GREAT
POLITICAL AND POSSIBLY MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1445, EDT, Dec. 6, 1942.

J. D. Coffey Jr.,
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. P. Harman
Date OCT 14 1971
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL
AND NO. 228

THIS MESSAGE SENT TO FRAZER QUOTE I HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED TO
LEARN YOU ARE LEAVING THE NEW ZEALAND DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST FOR THE PRESENT. THIS ACTION ON THE PART OF YOUR
GOVERNMENT IS A RENEWED EVIDENCE OF OUR MUTUAL MILITARY
INTERESTS.

I BELIEVE YOU HAVE DONE THE RIGHT THING. IT IS ALTOGETHER
GENEROUS. UNQUOTE

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room
at 1545, EWT, December 6, 1942

E. I. Carson, Lt.(jg) USNR
WATCH OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED
BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Stewart
Date Oct 14 1941
PRIORITY

December 8, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

For the Prime Minister from the President personal and

No. 229.

I am in full agreement with your number 225 on the subject
Velvet and instructions will be issued to American representative
in Moscow to be guided by instructions contained in sub paragraphs
a, b, and c of your number 225.

Roosevelt.

Released from the Map Room at
1620, EWT, December 8, 1942.

W. C. Mott
W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. E. Strong
Date Oct 14 1971

See "Background File."
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

I am in full agreement with your number 225 on the subject Velvet and instructions will be issued to American representative in Moscow to be guided by instructions contained in sub paragraphs a, b, and c of your number 225.

Roosevelt
From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and
No. 230.

Your No. 224:

The telegram you received from Moscow is essentially identical
with the one sent to me.

For the sake of the record, I am sending another telegram
which follows in my next number, as I think we should continue
to make every effort for the African meeting and put the re-
sponsibility for declining up to our friend.

I think it would be a mistake for our Staff people to discuss
in Moscow any major moves planned for this coming summer. From
the practical point of view they could not bind your Government
or mine, nor could final plans be approved by you or me without
careful study with our Staffs at home.

What would you think, therefore, of suggesting that Staff
conversations between military officials from U.K., Russia, and
America take place in Africa, either in Algiers, Khartoum, or some
other suitable place. The results and recommendations of such a
meeting would, of course, have to be taken up in all three
Capitals before final approval.

Roosevelt.

Released from the Map Room at
1635, EWT, December 8, 1942.
W. C. MOTT  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
Despatched as #230.

December 3, 1942.

Former Naval Person

Your No. 224:

The telegram you received from Moscow is essentially identical with the one sent to me.

For the sake of the record, I am sending another telegram which follows in my next number, as I think we should continue to make every effort for the African meeting and put the responsibility for declining up to our friend.

In the meantime, I am inclined to think we should send our Staff people to Moscow if they are only to take up the Caucasus air matter or similar relatively small operational moves. On the other hand, I think it would be a mistake for our Staff people to discuss in Moscow any major moves planned for this coming Summer. From the practical point of view they could not bind your Government or mine, nor could final plans be approved by you or me without careful study with our Staffs at home.
What would you think, therefore, of suggesting that the
between military officers from UK, Russia, and America
Staff conversations take place in Africa, either in Algiers
or some other suitable place
of Khartoum? The results and recommendations of such a
meeting would, of course, have to be taken up in all three
Capitals before final approval.

ROOSEVELT

W.F.
December 8, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 231.

The following is a close paraphrase of the message I sent to Stalin today.

It was with deep disappointment that I learned that you felt that you could not get away for a meeting with me in January. Many matters of great import should be discussed between us. They appertain not only to vital strategic decisions, but likewise to matters we should discuss in a tentative way respecting emergency policies which we should be prepared with, if and when conditions in Germany permit.

Included also would be other matters relating to future policies in North Africa and the Far East, which matters cannot be discussed by our military people alone.

The necessity for your presence near the fighting front, and your strenuous situation which exists now and in the immediate future, is fully realized by me.

Therefore I wish to offer a suggestion that a tentative date be set for a meeting in North Africa about the first of March.

ROOSEVELT

 Released from the Map Room at 1720, EN1, December 8, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
From: Opnav  
To: Alusma, London  

From the President for the Former Naval Person  

No. 232.  

Very glad to have you read my No. two one four in  

Secret Session Thursday.  

You might add from me if you wish that General  

Eisenhower has definite instructions from me to enter  

into no agreement or bilateral contract with Admiral  

Darlan, but that all decisions by Eisenhower shall be  

unilateral on our part, and shall take the form of  

announcements from the military Commander-in-Chief of  

our armed forces.  

Furthermore I hope you will call attention to the  

fact that Dakar instead of being a menace is today open  

to use by British and American ships and planes in the  

prosecution of the war.  

ROOSEVELT  

Released from the White House Map Room  
at 1150, EWT, December 9, 1942.  

W. O. Mott  

W.C.Mott, Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
Very glad to learn you read my No. Two once more in Secret Session Thursday. You might add from me if you wish that General Eisenhower has definite instructions from me to enter into no agreement or contract with Admiral Doolan, but that all decisions by Eisenhower shall be unilateral and at our part, and shall take the form of announce-ment from the military.
Commander in chief of our armed forces,

Furthermore I hope you will call attention to the fact that Dakar instead of being a

harbor is a bay upon which Dutch and American ships and plans in the

provision of the main.

Ravenel
December 11, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Alusana, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 233.

The receipt is acknowledged of your message number 227 of December 9.

I have communicated the reports enumerated therein to General Eisenhower with directions that he comment and advise me in regard thereto and take such corrective measures as are practicable.

I will send you the contents of Eisenhower's report when it is received.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1115, EWT, December 11, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM:      THE PRESIDENT
TO:        THE PRIME MINISTER

The receipt is acknowledged of your message number 227 of December 9.

I have communicated the reports enumerated therein to General Eisenhower with directions that he comment and advise me in regard thereto and take such corrective measures as are practicable.

I will send you the contents of Eisenhower's report when it is received.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: [Date]
December 14, 1942

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

From the President for the Former Naval Person

personal and number 234.

I am sending you a letter by courier in regard to our future plans. You should get it, weather permitting, in three or four days.

ROosevelt

Released White House Map Room
2000, EWT, Dec. 14, 1942

Charles A. Sullivan, Jr.
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, JR.
1st Lieutenant, Infantry-Res.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L. E. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
December 14 1942.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I am sending you a letter by courier in regard to our future plans. You should get it, weather permitting, in three or four days.

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]
December 11, 1942.

Dear Winston:

I have not had an answer to my second invitation to our Uncle Joe but, on the assumption that he will again decline, I think that in spite of it you and I should get together, as there are things which can be definitely determined only by you and me in conference with our Staff people. I am sure that both of us want to avoid the delays which attended the determination on TORCH last July.

1. On the grounds of vile climate and icing on the wings, Iceland must be definitely out for both of us.

2. England must be out for me for political reasons.

3. There will be a commotion in this country if it is discovered that I have flown across any old seas. Therefore, Bermuda would be just as much out for me as Africa. However, on condition that I can get away in absolute secrecy and have my trip kept secret until I am back, I have just about made up my mind to go along with the African idea -- on the theory that public opinion here will gasp but be satisfied when they hear about it after it is over.

4. One mitigating circumstance would be the knowledge that I had seen our military leaders in North and West Africa, and that is why I think it would be best if we could meet somewhere in that neighborhood instead of Khartoum. Incidentally, I could actually see some of our troops.

5. Incidentally also, it would do me personally an enormous amount of good to get out of the political atmosphere of Washington for a couple of weeks.

6. My thought is, therefore, that if the time suits your plans we could meet back of Algiers or back of Casablanca about January fifteenth. That would mean that I would leave about January eleventh, and pray for good weather. My route would be either from here to Trinidad and thence to Dakar and thence north -- or from here to Natal, Brazil, and cross to Liberia or Freetown and north from there.
7. In view of Stalin's absence, I think you and I need no foreign affairs people with us -- for our work will be essentially military. Perhaps your three top men and my three top men could meet at the same place four or five days in advance of our arrival and have plans in fairly good tentative shape by the time we get there. I asked General Smith, who left here four or five days ago, to check up confidentially on some possible tourist oasis as far from any city or large population as possible. One of the dictionaries says "an oasis is never wholly dry". Good old dictionary!

8. Here is an alternate plan in case Uncle Joe says he will meet us about March first:

I would suggest that your Staff people and mine should meet with the Russian Staff people somewhere in Africa, or even as far as Bagdad, and come to certain recommendations which would at least get the preliminaries of new moves started. The three of us could, when we meet, close up the loose ends and also take up some of the post-war matters.

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
London,  
England.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1942.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

My courier has already been delayed four days and will probably be delayed four more. Therefore, I am quoting to you the message which he carries: Please keep it very secret.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND NUMBER 235.

Referring to your 273 of December 11 I will appoint Mr. Murphy personal representative of the President on General Eisenhower's Staff with the rank of Minister.

Harold MacMillan will be entirely acceptable in the same status if approved by Eisenhower.

Roosevelt

December 16, 1942

Released White House Map Room
1230, EWT, Dec. 16, 1942

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date OCT 14 1971
Referring to your 273 of December 11 I will appoint Mr. Murphy personal representative of the President on General Eisenhower's Staff with the rank of Minister.

Harold MacMillan will be entirely acceptable in the same status if approved by Eisenhower.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date 0CT 14 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff today recommended that steps be taken without delay to give Mr. Murphy a higher rank in the Foreign Service in consideration of the great importance of his present assignment.

This idea was presented by the British Chiefs of Staff, and it may be expected that Great Britain will relieve their Mr. Mack with an officer who has the rank of Minister or Ambassador.

This is a promotion that would probably have to be accomplished by your direction and by the Department of State.

[Signature]

[Handwritten notes:
Pres sang
Talk to State
Sup T Pers on Staff
Discuss to have Murphy appointed Personal Representative of President with Gen. E.
Staff with the rank of Minister.]
December 16, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date Oct 14 1971

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND

No. 236

Your No. 227, December 9, 1942, was forwarded to General Eisenhower as coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was accomplished by changing the first word to "We" rather than "I". The last paragraph of your message referring to political and administrative help was deleted. A paraphrase of his reply follows:

I have had many reports similar to those you refer to in your message and I have been dealing with them as they arise and will continue to do so.

There will always be disturbing reports from discontented elements. In French North Africa these include Axis sympathizers, disappointed office seekers, and the de Gaulle element. The latter group is small but there is a definite sentiment against them among Army and Navy officers which should not be underestimated. We have not been able to discuss publicly the reasons for many of the developments here which were brought about by the necessity of consolidating our military position and by our efforts to bring French West Africa into the fold.

Some officers and men were imprisoned at the time of our arrival in North Africa for having aided us. They have now been released and restored to their grades.

The Franco-Spanish frontier is being brought under control.

The situation is not entirely satisfactory but should improve
steadily. The difficulties include the type of terrain and the length of the frontier. I have instructed General Patton to do everything possible to gain French Assistance in this matter. Consul Meyer at Rabat has been requested to urge French Protectorate Authorities to give us their aid in this respect and at Tangier the Charge d'Affairs is acting in close cooperation with General Patton. I shall continue to give my attention to this matter.

Control of postal and telegraphic communication to the outside world is under Allied control, as also in some measure is censorship of local postal and telegraphic communication. Censorship will improve upon the arrival from the United Kingdom of additional personnel already requested for this purpose. General McClure is coming from London to aid us in this respect.

I have allowed the Spanish consul to continue to enjoy cipher and pouch privileges because of the necessity of avoiding friction with Madrid. There is no doubt that these consuls will give information of our activities.

In my opinion, your informants are mistaken when they state that hidden anti-Allied propaganda is indulged in by the press and radio and also that such propaganda is on the increase. A great improvement has occurred in this field, particularly as regards the press. The situation should improve further regarding the radio, cinema, and press after we obtain from the United Kingdom and the United States
material and film for these facilities which have been requested.

With reference to Bethourd and Mast, I have been in close touch with Darlan and Giraud. Mast is a liaison officer at my headquarters and Bethourd is at Gibraltar in accordance with General Giraud's request. It is likely that he will return today. It is planned by Giraud that Bethourd will go to Washington for discussions concerning the supply of military equipment needed by French forces here. I have assurances from Giraud that both Mast and Bethourd will, as soon as he considers it appropriate, be given suitable commands. I can see no other way to handle this matter. Yesterday Giraud went to Morocco on a much needed inspection trip. This has been impossible for him to do up to this time because the military operations in Tunisia have been both his and my primary interest. Considering the French lack of means and equipment, he has accomplished a fine job and his troops which have been in contact with the enemy have done well. His appearance in Morocco will do much to eliminate misunderstandings, many of which arise because of the distances involved and the lack of information. When he returns, he will report to me and corrective measures will be taken on conditions which he finds to be unsatisfactory.

Admittedly, the political situation is confused and difficult. I think you shall continue to receive disturbing reports. Our main effort has been to maintain sufficient control of the situation to enable us to fight a battle.
I feel that we have made progress toward establishing a sound civil administration. The progress will be hastened by help from our home governments. The authorities here have cooperated in every way to help in the success of our military operations. End of paraphrase.

I think that in the above message Eisenhower has given a clear picture of the situation and indicates that he is cognizant of the dangers pointed out by you. There can be no doubt that his handling of the political and civil affairs in North Africa to date has been a tremendous aid to his military operations. Therefore, until the military situation has stabilized, I feel that he should be allowed to continue handling such matters and that we should refrain from setting up any political or administrative agencies which would act independently of him.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at White House Map Room, 1245 EWT, Dec. 16, 1942.

Chester Hammond, 
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

Your No. 227, December 9, 1942, was forwarded to General Eisenhower as coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was accomplished by changing the first word to "We" rather than "I". The last paragraph of your message referring to political and administrative help was deleted. A paraphrase of his reply follows:

I have had many reports similar to those you refer to in your message and I have been dealing with them as they arise and will continue to do so. There will always be disturbing reports from discontented elements. In French North Africa these include Axis sympathizers, disappointed office seekers, and the de Gaulle element. The latter group is small but there is a definite sentiment against them among Army and Navy officers which should not be underestimated. We have not been able to discuss publicly the reasons for many of the developments here which were brought about by the necessity of consolidating our military position and by our efforts to bring French West Africa into the fold.

Some officers and men were imprisoned at the time of our arrival in North Africa for having aided us. They have now been released and restored to their grades.

The Franco-Spanish frontier is being brought under control. The situation is not entirely satisfactory but should improve steadily. The difficulties include the type of terrain and the length of the frontier. I have instructed General Patton to do everything possible to gain French assistance in this matter. Consul Meyer at Rabat has been requested to urge French Protectorate Authorities to give us their aid in this respect and at
Tangier the Charge d'Affaires is acting in close cooperation with General Patton. I shall continue to give my attention to this matter.

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Bethourd will, as soon as he considers it appropriate, be given suitable commands. I can see no other way to handle this matter. Yesterday Giraud went to Morocco on a much needed inspection trip. This has been impossible for him to do up to this time because the military operations in Tunisia have been both his and my primary interest. Considering the French lack of means and equipment, he has accomplished a fine job and his troops which have been in contact with the enemy have done well. His appearance in Morocco will do much to eliminate misunderstandings, many of which arise because of the distances involved and the lack of information. When he returns, he will report to me and corrective measures will be taken on conditions which he finds to be unsatisfactory.

Admittedly, the political situation is confused and difficult. I think you shall continue to receive disturbing reports. Our main effort has been to maintain sufficient control of the situation to enable us to fight a battle.

I feel that we have made progress toward establishing a sound civil administration. The progress will be hastened by help from our home governments. The authorities here have cooperated in every way to help in the success of our military operations.

I think that in the above message Eisenhower has given a clear picture of the situation and indicates that he is cognizant of the dangers pointed out by you. There can be no doubt that his handling of the political and civil affairs in North Africa to date has been a tremendous aid to his military operations. Therefore, until the military situation has stabilized, I feel that he should be allowed to continue handling such matters and that we should refrain from setting up any political or administrative agencies which would act independently of him.
December 17, 1942.

FROM: OPMAY
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND

No. 237

In consideration of an apparent impasse between our combined aviation mission and Russian authorities regarding our proposed contribution of air power to the Caucasus, I have sent the following message to Stalin:

Quote

"I am not clear as to just what has happened in regard to our offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus.

I am fully willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think they should operate by units under their American Commanders but each group would of course be under overall Russian command as to tactical objectives.

Please let me know your desires in this matter as soon as possible as I truly want to help all I can. Pursuit plane program would of course not be affected. What I refer to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to the Caucasus." Unquote

ROOSEVELT

Released at White House Map Room at 1145, December 17, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. L. Stewart
Date OCT 14, 1971

See "Background" file
In consideration of an apparent impasse between our combined aviation mission and Russian authorities regarding our proposed contribution of air power to the Caucasus, I have sent the following message to Stalin:

"I am not clear as to just what has happened in regard to our offer of American air assistance in the Caucasus. I am fully willing to send units with American pilots and crews. I think they should operate by units under their American Commanders but each group would of course be under overall Russian command as to tactical objectives.

Please let me know your desires in this matter as soon as possible as I truly want to help all I can. Pursuit plane program would of course not be affected. What I refer to is essentially the bombing plane type which can be flown to the Caucasus."

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
Date 06/14/1971
December 17, 1942.

SECRET

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL AND
No. 238

I have received the following from Stalin: Quote

"I too must express my deep regret that it is impossible for me to leave the Soviet Union either in the near future or even at the beginning of March. Front business absolutely prevents it, demanding my constant presence near our troops.

So far I do not know what exactly are the problems which you, Mr. President, and Mr. Churchill intended to discuss at our joint conference. I wonder whether it would not be possible to discuss these problems by way of correspondence between us, as long as there is no chance of arranging our meeting? I admit that there will be no disagreement between us.

Allow me also to express my confidence that the time is not being lost and that the promises about the opening of a second front in Europe given by you, Mr. President, and by Mr. Churchill in regard of 1942 and in any case in regard of the spring of 1943, will be fulfilled, and that a second front in Europe will be actually opened by the joint forces of Great Britain and the United States of America in the spring of the next year."
In view of all sorts of rumors about the attitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics toward the use made of Darlan and of other men like him, it may not be unnecessary for me to tell you that, in my opinion, as well as in that of my colleagues, Eisenhower's policy with regard to Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and others is perfectly correct. I think it a great achievement that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the waterway of the Allies fighting Hitler. Some time ago I made this known also to Mr. Churchill. "Unquote.

When you receive the letter I sent you by courier please send me your answer yes or no.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at the White House Map Room at 1210 EWT, 17 December, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. SHAW
Date OCT 14 1971
For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and
No. 239.

Your 233 and 234. I am most anxious that every practicable measure may be taken to assure adequate petroleum supply to United Kingdom. The problem continues to have the constant attention of authorities here. Assuming average two notional cargoes per day from New York pool beginning January 1, 1943, plus two additional notional cargoes per day from Caribbean and U.S. gulf, shipments would amount to approximately 1,250,000 tons per month or 15,000,000 tons per year, thus levelling off if not increasing your inventories in view possibility your offtakes being somewhat reduced if movements direct to Torch area are later found practicable. This development seems reasonably assured under present plans without giving effect to convoy and escort changes suggested in your 234. Navy Department studying your proposal alterations upon which reply will be made promptly, but time is required to consider possible effect upon all other convoy and escort responsibilities. Any immediate interruption or diversion of our limited carrying and escorting facilities at this time would entail new procedures with consequent loss of efficiency.

As of December 3, U.K. reported stock positions very substantially better by comparison than those of other combatant areas. For example, no Pacific base, including Australia, had over ten weeks supply of
100 octane gasoline against at least 27 weeks supply U.K. Similarly these bases did not have over 12 weeks supply fuel oil, and this in Noumea only, as against 21 weeks supply in U.K. Atlantic bases including West Indies, Greenland, Newfoundland had average of 100 octane gasoline and fuel oil of eight and four weeks supply respectively compared to above U.K. figures. While everything possible will be done to prevent further shrinkage of U.K. inventories and in fact build these stocks to safer levels, I am confident you agree that the importance of inventories in other areas must be considered and facilities so distributed as to prevent actual shortage in any important area.

Supply petroleum products to North Africa for civil administration also dependent upon availability tankers and escorts. Present arrangements for regular convoys that area do not make any provision for such tankers. When and if French tankers and French escort vessels are made available, a more accurate estimate as to petroleum relief for North Africa will be possible.

The two special convoys, one slow and one fast, scheduled to depart from Netherlands West Indies early January should relieve the situation to the extent of at least one million barrels, the resulting deliveries being of course applied against total requirements allied services Torch area.

Roosevelt

Released from Map Room at 1635, EWT, December 18, 1942.

Charles A. Sullivan, Jr.,
1st Lieutenant, Inf-Res.
White House Map Room.
Proposed Reply to Dispatches Nos. 233 and 234 from London to the President.

YOUR 233 and 234. I AM MOST ANXIOUS THAT EVERY PRACTICABLE MEASURE MAY BE TAKEN TO ASSURE ADEQUATE PETROLEUM SUPPLY TO UNITED KINGDOM. THE PROBLEM CONTINUES TO HAVE THE CONSTANT ATTENTION OF AUTHORITIES HERE. ASSUMING AVERAGE TWO NOTIONAL CARGOES PER DAY FROM NEW YORK POOL BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1943, PLUS TWO ADDITIONAL NOTIONAL CARGOES PER DAY FROM CARIBBEAN AND U.S. GULF, SHIPMENTS WOULD AMOUNT TO APPROXIMATELY 1,250,000 TONS PER MONTH OR 15,000,000 TONS PER YEAR, THUS LEVELLING OFF IF NOT INCREASING YOUR INVENTORIES IN VIEW POSSIBILITY YOUR OUTFITS BEING SOMewhat REDUCED IF MOVEMENTS DIRECT TO TORCH AREA ARE LATER FOUND PRACTICABLE. THIS DEVELOPMENT SEEMS REASONABLY ASSURED UNDER PRESENT PLANS WITHOUT GIVING EFFECT TO CONVOY AND ESCORT CHANGES SUGGESTED IN YOUR 234. NAVY DEPARTMENT STUDYING YOUR PROPOSAL ALTERATIONS UPON WHICH REPLY WILL BE MADE PROMPTLY, BUT TIME IS REQUIRED TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE EFFECT UPON ALL OTHER CONVOY AND ESCORT RESPONSIBILITIES. ANY IMMEDIATE INTERRUPTION OR DIVERSION OF OUR LIMITED CARRYING AND ESCORTING FACILITIES AT THIS TIME WOULD ENTAIL NEW PROCEDURES WITH CONSEQUENT LOSS OF EFFICIENCY.

AS OF DECEMBER 3, UK REPORTED STOCK POSITIONS VERY SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER BY COMPARISON THAN THOSE OF OTHER COMBATANT AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE, NO PACIFIC BASE, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA, HAD OVER TEN WEEKS SUPPLY OF 100 OCTANE GASOLINE AGAINST AT LEAST 27 WEEKS SUPPLY UK. SIMILARLY THESE BASES DID NOT HAVE OVER 12 WEEKS SUPPLY FUEL OIL, AND THIS IN NOUMEA ONLY, AS AGAINST 21 WEEKS SUPPLY IN UK. ATLANTIC BASES INCLUDING WEST INDIES, GREENLAND, NEWFOUNDLAND HAD AVERAGE OF 100 OCTANE GASOLINE AND FUEL OIL OF EIGHT AND FOUR WEEKS SUPPLY RESPECTIVELY COMPARED TO ABOVE UK FIGURES. WHILE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WILL BE DONE TO PREVENT FURTHER SHRINKAGE OF UK INVENTORIES AND IN FACT BUILD THESE STOCKS TO SAFER LEVELS, I AM CONFIDENT YOU AGREE THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF INVENTORIES IN OTHER AREAS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND FACILITIES SO DISTRIBUTED AS TO PREVENT ACTUAL SHORTAGE IN ANY IMPORTANT AREA.
SUPPLY PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO NORTH AFRICA FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ALSO DEPENDENT UPON AVAILABILITY TANKERS AND ESCORTS. PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR REGULAR CONVOYS THAT AREA DO NOT MAKE ANY PROVISION FOR SUCH TANKERS. WHEN AND IF FRENCH TANKERS AND FRENCH ESCORT VESSELS ARE MADE AVAILABLE, A MORE ACCURATE ESTIMATE AS TO PETROLEUM RELIEF FOR NORTH AFRICA WILL BE POSSIBLE.

THE TWO SPECIAL CONVOYS, ONE SLOW AND ONE FAST, SCHEDULED TO DEPART FROM NETHERLANDS WEST INDIES EARLY JANUARY SHOULD RELIEVE THE SITUATION TO THE EXTENT OF AT LEAST ONE MILLION BARRELS, THE RESULTING DELIVERIES BEING OF COURSE APPLIED AGAINST TOTAL REQUIREMENTS ALLIED SERVICES TORCH AREA.
URGENT PRIORITY

December 18, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and

No. 240

Courier has been delayed but will arrive on the twentieth.

HARRY

Released at White House Map Room at
1745 EWT, 18 December, 1942.

J. L. McLean

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J. L. Stewart
Date Oct 4 1971
December 19, 1942

PRIORITY

From: Opanav
To: Alusna London

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND
NO. 241

REFERENCE YOUR TWO THREE SIX OF DECEMBER 18th X IT WAS MY
UNDERSTANDING THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVE MACMILLAN WAS TO HAVE
THE SAME STATUS AS MURPHY COMMA A POLITICAL MEMBER OF THE STAFF
OF GENERAL EISENHOWER AND IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY NECESSITIES
OF THE SITUATION I HOPE THAT YOU CAN ARRANGE TO GIVE MACMILLAN
SIMILAR STATUS WITH MURPHY AND THUS SIMPLIFY GENERAL EISENHOWER'S
PROBLEMS X ALSO I AM CONFIDENT THAT IF MURPHY AND MACMILLAN HAVE
PRECISELY THE SAME STATUS THEY WILL FIND LIFE EASIER X

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2310, EWT, December 19, 1942.

J.D. Coffee, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0406
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND
NO. 242.

FOLLOWING IS THE SUBSTANCE OF LETTER WHICH COURIER HAS FOR
YOU:

QUOTE. IN SPITE OF STALINS INABILITY TO MEET WITH US I THINK
WE SHOULD PLAN A MEETING AT ONCE WITH OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY STAFFS.
I SHOULD LIKE TO MEET IN AFRICA ABOUT JANUARY FIFTEENTH. THERE IS
I BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY AND SAFE PLACE JUST NORTH OF CASABLANCA.
IT MIGHT BE WISE FOR SOME OF OUR MILITARY MEN TO PRECEDE US BY A
FEW DAYS TO CLEAR THE GROUND. I SHOULD THINK IF WE COULD HAVE FOUR
OR FIVE DAYS TOGETHER WE COULD CLEAR UP ALL OF OUR BUSINESS.

WILL YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK OF THIS. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at
1340, EWT, December 21, 1942.

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
From: Opnav
To: Comnaveu

211805 Dec 42.

My immediately following despatch number two four two personal and from president to prime is to be decoded by the senior communication officer only repeat only and delivered by him to Admiral Stark or in his absence Admiral Kirk. It is the President's wish that his number two four two be shown only repeat only to Admiral Stark or Admiral Kirk who will effect delivery direct to Churchill. Any reply will be handled by the same procedure in reverse. Admiral Stark or Admiral Kirk please inform the Prime of this arrangement.

Released from the Map Room at
EWT, December 21, 1942.

W.C. Mott
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: pc Stetewart
Date: OCT-14-1971
Following is the substance of letter which
Commie has for you quoted in order of
Stalin's inability to meet with us. I think
we should plan a meeting at one station
with our respective military staffs. I
should like to meet in Africa about Jan.
fifteenth. There is I believe a satisfactory
and safe place just north of Casablanca.
It might be wise for some of our military
men to precede us by a few days to
clear the ground. I should think if so
Could have four or five days together
we could clear up all of our business.
Will you let me know what you think of
this.
December 22, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Alusana, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and secret No. 243.

I have agreed to send certain relief into Norway to be furnished by the American Red Cross to the Swedish Red Cross and by that organization used in Norway for the feeding and clothing of children. The food would be put in their mouths in the centers of populations where it is most needed and would not be obtainable by the enemy.

However a trial would be made in one locality to determine its practicability and safety before any further food is sent in.

Apparently your government does not agree to this suggestion. I hope that either this plan or an equally good one can be put through as the internal situation in Norway is heartrending. A few extra calories for the children might save a lot of lives.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1525, EWT, December 22, 1942.

W. C. Mott
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
I have agreed to send certain relief into Norway to be furnished by the American Red Cross and the Swedish Red Cross and by that organization used in Norway for the feeding and clothing of children. The food would be put in their mouths in the centers of populations where it is most needed and would not be obtainable by the enemy.

However, a trial would be made in one locality to determine its practicability and safety. Before any further food is sent in.

Apparently your Government does not agree to this suggestion. I hope that either this plan or an equally good one can be put through as the international situation in Norway is heart-rending. A few extra calories for the children might save a lot of lives.

ROOSEVELT

Sent on #243 - of 23 Dec. 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am referring to your recent memorandum regarding the question of providing relief to the people of Norway in the form of food packages and clothes.

It was necessary to present the matter to the British Government to obtain its agreement because of the fact that at our request the British Government had entered into an agreement with us that neither party would undertake any new relief movement through the blockade without the consent of the other.

The British Government after some delay has replied that they are unable to give their assent.

This was confirmed in a subsequent conversation in which the British Government said that the Government of Norway in London would be satisfied with some other arrangements the British are making which was a clandestine operation and which I will explain to you orally if you desire.

Because of our agreement with the British and their position in respect to this matter, I suggest that you may care to address Mr. Churchill directly.

The American Red Cross is prepared through the agency of the Swedish Red Cross to furnish that organization with supplies

The President,

The White House.
supplies which by it will be administered - not in the form of packages but in bulk shipments of food intended primarily for children and to be distributed at the schools and feeding centers in the populous areas, and to put the food directly into the mouths of the children so that none will fall into the hands of the Germans. They are also prepared to furnish clothes for the children.

The delay in this matter has been caused by the failure of the British to respond promptly and partly by their negative answer.

Faithfully yours,
Suggestion for the President to Communicate to Mr. Churchill.

I have agreed to send certain relief into Norway to be furnished by the American Red Cross to the Swedish Red Cross and by that organization used in Norway for the feeding and clothing of children. The food would be put in their mouths in the centers of populations where it is most needed and would not be obtainable by the enemy.

A trial would be made in one locality to determine its practicability and safety.

The representatives of your Government are withholding their agreement. I would appreciate it if you would give proper instructions for this to be carried through.
Dec. 25, 1942

From: OPNAV
To: ALUSNA, LONDON

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 244.

The Roosevelts send the Churchills warm personal Christmas greetings. The old teamwork is grand.

ROOSEVELT

Released, White House Map Room
1250 EWT, December 25, 1942

Capt. J. L. McCrea, U.S.N.
OPERATIONAL-PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

December 26, 1942.

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 245.

In consideration of unsettled condition in North Africa caused by assassination of Admiral Darlan, I believe that arrival of MacMillan in Africa should be postponed until situation is stabilized.

I think it would be best for DeGaulle to postpone visit here. This will give "Symbol" a chance to clear situation first.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at White House Map Room

1205 ETT, 12-26-42.

HC Mott

W. C. Mott, Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date Aug 1, 1971

261629

OCR 8311
In consideration of unsettled condition in North Africa caused by assassination of Admiral Darlan, I believe that arrival of McMillan in Africa should be postponed until situation is stabilized.

I think it would be best for de Gaulle to postpone visit here - this could give "Ephraim" a chance to clear situation first.

Roosevelt

W.E.
December 26, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 246

The following message to General Eisenhower was authorized by me today quote

With approval of the President you are authorized to appoint General Giraud provisionally in charge of both Civil and French Military Authorities in your Area. Unquote

ROOSEVELT

Released at WhiteHouse Map Room
1200 EWT, 12-26-42.

W. C. Mott,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
December 29, 1942.

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL-PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and

No. 247.

The designation of MacMillan as quote Minister Resident at
Allied Headquarters unquote is satisfactory to me period. It is
my understanding that General Eisenhower will continue to have full
veto power over all civil officials in the area of operations when
in his Eisenhower's opinion such veto is advantageous to military
operations or prospects.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at White House map room
1210 EWT, 12-29-42.

M C Mott
W. C. Mott,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature] Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

See "Background File"
MEMORANDUM TO Secretary of State:

In reply to a message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain saying that he can send Mr. MacMillan to Africa as "Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters" instead of as "British Representative", to which latter designation the President objected, the President will send the following message if it is satisfactory to you:

The designation of MacMillan as quote Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters unquote is satisfactory to me period It is my understanding that General Eisenhower will continue to have full veto power over all civil officials in the area of operations when in his Eisenhower's opinion such veto is advantageous to military operations or prospects.

29 Dec. noon

Secretary of State in telephone conversation says the form of proposed message seems to protect our interests as well as we can expect.

J.D.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
URGENT - PRIORITY

December 31, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: ComNavEu

My immediately following despatch Number two four eight personal and from the President to the Prime Minister is to be treated in exactly the same manner prescribed in my 211805 December.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1015, EWT, December 31, 1942.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

*Filed in the PRES-748

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 14 1974

0422
URGENT - PRIORITY

December 31, 1942.

From: Opnav
To: ComNavEdu

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 248.

Arrangements for SYMBOL satisfactory. Our Chiefs of Staff will arrive twelfth and I will follow two days later so that we could all meet together on fifteenth. I believe our staffs can cover the ground in a two day preliminary conference. The prospect pleases me.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1015, EWT, December 31, 1942.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.
To:
Former Naval Person

Arrangements for Sywell satisfactory
our chiefs of staff will arrive twelfth
and I will follow two days later
as that we could all meet together on
fifteenth. I believe our staff could
cover the ground in a two day preliminary
conference, the prospect pleases me.

Prescott

DEClassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.G. Stewart
Date: Oct 14 1911