CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT

NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1942

Microfilmed at The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York
From: LONDON

To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No.: 181, November 1, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential

1. My wife and I have had the pleasure of seeing a good deal of Mrs. Roosevelt in the last week, and my wife escorted her to Canterbury and Dover in my train on Friday. Dover is of course within range of enemy artillery, but all passed off happily. It was lucky Friday was chosen instead of the next day for Canterbury was then quite heavily bombed in a daylight raid as you will have seen. Mrs. Roosevelt has been winning golden opinions here from all for her kindness and her unfailing interest in everything we are doing. I think she has been impressed herself, and we are most grateful for her visit and for all the encouragement it is giving to our women workers. I did my best to advise a reduction of her programme and also entserping it with blank days, but I have not met with success, and Mrs. Roosevelt proceeds indefatigably. My wife is writing to you by the earliest plane and will give you more details. I only wish you were here yourself. I hope that may come to pass one day.

2. Meanwhile General Smuts seems much more inclined to accept your invitation to go to the United States. He has of course great responsibilities in South Africa where his personality has held the fort. I hope however he may be persuaded to go. There are things he could say to the American people about the British Empire or Commonwealth of Nations which
we could not say ourselves with equal acceptance. Naturally people are much hurt over here by the Luce-Willkie line.

3. Oliver Lyttelton leaves today. He brings you a personal letter from me to which I attach very great importance. I am sure you will read it with your invariable friendship and kindness to me.

4. The Battle in Egypt is now rising to its climax, and our hopes are higher than I dare to say.

Prime
From: London
To: The President of The United States
No.: 182, November 2, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and number 182.

The battle of Egypt goes well. We have good hopes of breaking
the enemy lines in the Northern Sector, with consequences which
may well be far-reaching.

Will you allow me to say that your proposed message to Petain
seems to me too kind. His stock must be very low now. He has used
his reputation to do our cause injuries no lesser man could have
done. I beg you to think of the effect on the De Gaullists, to whom
we have serious obligations and who have now to go through the
great trial of being kept outside, I am advised that unfavourable re-
actions would be produced in various other quarters. Of course it is
absolutely right to send him a friendly message. But will you consider
toning it down a bit.

Giraud has wirelessed us saying he has decided to come over at
once and asking for an airplane to fetch him to Gibraltar. Eisenhower
has replied advising that he use the British submarine under a United
States Captain which is already off the coast, W.S.C.
From: London, England

To: President of the United States

No.: 183, November 3, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and

For yourself alone.

The reports from Egypt now justify confidence in a decisive victory. In the event of a satisfactory break through in the north it will be very difficult for Rommel to disengage his army. Particularly the eight unmotorized divisions to the southwards.

I am so glad to see that your news from the Solomons and New Guinea is also so much better.

PRIME

Code as underlined

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
Former Naval Person to President personal and

I have just received the following from General Alexander. We are not proclaiming anything at present. Begins: "After twelve days of heavy and violent fighting Eight Army has inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy's German and Italian forces under Rommel's command in Egypt. The enemy's front has broken and British armoured formations in strength have passed through and are operating in the enemy's rear areas. Such portions of the enemy's forces as can get away are in full retreat and are being harassed by our armoured and mobile forces and by our air forces. Other enemy divisions are still in position endeavouring to stave off defeat and these are likely to be surrounded and cut off. 

The RAF has throughout given superb support to the battle and are bombing the enemy's retreating columns incessantly. 

Fighting continues."

I feel sure you will regard this as a good prelude to "Torch".

Prime
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No.: 185, November 5, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. It will be necessary for me to explain Torch to De Gaulle sometime during D.minus one when it is certain the weather is all right. You will remember that I have exchanged letters with him of a solemn kind in one nine four zero recognising him as the Leader of Free Frenchmen. I am confident his military honour can be trusted. I will however take all precautions.

2. I shall explain to him that the reason I have not mentioned Torch to him is that it is a United States enterprise and a United States secret, and that the reason he and his friends are not in on it is not any want of goodwill on our joint part towards him and his movement, but because of the local complications in the Torch area and the need to have as little fighting as possible. I am arranging to let him announce General Legentilhomme as Governor-General of Madagascar sometime Friday. This we have been keeping for his consolation prize. It will be a proof that we do not think of throwing over the Free French. As for his relations with Giraud I should think myself they will join forces politically.

From the archive of British Government, State Department, 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5, 1972

Received Map Room
050635
From: London

To: The President of the United States

No.: 185, November 5, 1942

Page 2.

though under what conditions I cannot foresee. I hope you will approve of the course I propose.

Prime
and personal from Former Naval Person to President.

1. As at present arranged no reference will be made to the participation of British divisions in "Torch", as distinct from the supporting action by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, before your press release. It would greatly help me if you could let me know at what time you intend to issue this. I would then follow up your press release with a statement of my own.

2. Since in your press release you are referring to the participation of British divisions, I much hope that you will reconsider your decision not to allow the use of the leaflet submitted by Eisenhower making known the arrival of British troops in Algeria. I feel that this leaflet should not be held up more than two four or at the most four eight hours after British troops have landed.

3. I am still sorry about De Gaulle. Of course we control all his telegrams outwards. But we are ready to accept your view. All goes well.

Prime.
Former Naval Person to President Personal and General.
Number one eight seven.

I have just heard the following from General Alexander. Begins. Prisoners estimated now twenty thousand, tanks three five zero, guns four zero zero, mechanical transport several thousand. Our advanced mobile forces are south of Mersa Matruh. Eighth Army is advancing.

Prime
From: Prime
To: The President of The United States
No. 188, November 11th, 1942

Former Naval Person To President Roosevelt personal and

It is surely of the highest importance to unify in every possible way all Frenchmen who regard Germany as the foe. The invasion of unoccupied France by Hitler should give the opportunity for this. You will I am sure realize that his Majesty’s Government are under quite definite and solemn obligations to De Gaulle and his movement. We must see they have a fair deal. It seems to me that you and I ought to avoid at all costs the creation of rival French Emigre Governments each favoured by one of us. We must try to fuse all Anti-German French Forces together, and make a United Government. This may take some time and nothing must prejudice the Military Operations, but we ought to make it clear to all parties what we want and what we are going to work for.

Prime
FROM: London
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 189, November 13, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. Thank you very much for all you say. Our enterprises have prospered beyond our hopes and we must not neglect the good gifts of fortune. All your three generals are splendid, and relations with ours are perfect.

2. Everything you say in your paragraph beginning "It is hoped" down to the words "Germanys flank" is in absolute harmony with our views. I shall spend all this week end with our Chiefs of the Staff reviewing the whole scene, which may be more clear than than now. On Sunday morning we will confer with General Smith, and I hope early next week to send you our views.

3. Meanwhile let me say that nothing pleases me more than to read what you say about trying to bring Turkey in. Our minds have indeed moved together on this, as in so much else. It seems to me there are four stages:
(A) The clearance of the North African Coast and the opening of the Mediterranean for military traffic. (B)
A guarantee to Turkey by Great Britain, Russia and the United States of her territorial integrity and status quo. (C) The rapid stocking up of Turkey with British and American arms, particularly tanks, flak and antitank guns. (D) The movement of air forces to the Russian Southern Flank, which must in any case be pressed forward at once, and the gathering during the winter of a considerable army in Syria. I hope next week to make you specific proposals and suggestions.

4. Rommels panzer army is reduced to a few thousand men with barely a score of tanks and guns. It looks as if he would have to clear out of Cyrenaica altogether and try to make a stand at Agheila and in the Gulf of Sirte.

5. The reaction in Spain has been excellent and in France all to the good. We hope soon to turn the bombing heat on to Italy. (signed Prime).

6. I am still deeply anxious about the U-boat depredations, and I beg you to give favourable consideration to the letter I sent you by Oliver Lyttelton. All good wishes.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of The United States
Number 090 November 15, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

General Eisenhower's number five two seven on political arrangements in French North Africa.

We cannot say that our doubts or anxieties are removed by what is proposed or that the solution will be permanent or healthy. Nevertheless, in view of the dominating importance of speed and of the fact that the Allied Commander in Chief's opinion is so strongly and ably expressed that it is endorsed by our officers including Admiral Cunningham who were with him on the spot, we feel we have no choice but to accept General Eisenhower's arrangements for maintaining local and interim equilibrium and for securing the vital positions in Tunis.

We feel sure you will consult us on the long-term steps pursuing always the aim of uniting all Frenchmen who will fight Hitler.

Great care must be taken that we are not double-crossed. There were some disquieting evidences in our magics two days ago. On the other hand we have these men in our power and should be vigilant lest they escape from us.

We do not see any need to publish the press release contained in General Eisenhower's number five four four or anything like it at present, pending further developments in Tunis and Dakar, and hope our views may be met. (Signed Prime).
Page 2 No 090 November 15, 1942. From London

To save time we are repeating this telegram to you to General Eisenhower for his immediate information.

No Sig.
From: London
To: POTUS

November 15, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and most immediate No 191.

Your 211 I entirely agree with the course you propose and do not think any time will be lost by the procedure which is most necessary. We ought to reach a preliminary agreement in outline ourselves before sending a joint mission.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R.H. Parks Date MAY 3 1972
From: LONDON ENGLAND
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT PERSONAL AND
NO. ONE NINE TWO.
I AM SO GLAD TO READ ABOUT THIS SPLENDID AMERICAN NAVAL
VICTORY IN THE SOLOMONS. PRAY ACCEPT MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS
AND THANKS.

PRIME
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM: PRIME

No. 193. November 17, 1942

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt personal and No. one nine three.

I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more convinced I become that it can only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle. We must not overlook the serious political injury which may be done to our cause, not only in France but throughout Europe, by the feeling that we are ready to make terms with the local quislings. Darlan has an odious record. It is he who has inculcated in the French Navy its malignant disposition by promoting his creatures to command. It is but yesterday that French sailors were sent to their death against your line of battle off Casablanca and now, for the sake of power and office, Darlan plays the turncoat. A permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan government in French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary people whose simple loyalties are our strength.

My own feeling is that we should get on with the fighting and let that overtake the parleys, and we are all very glad to hear that General Eisenhower expects to be able to order the leading elements of our first army to attack the Germans in Tunis and Bizerte in the course of the next (signed Prime) few days.
FROM London

TO The President of the United States

NUMBER 194, November 17, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential.

Your two one zero and two one one.

1. As promised in paragraph two of my one eight nine, I am sending you in my immediately following telegram the text of a note which I have given to the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with this note and are busily engaged in studying the implications of the various possibilities which it contemplates. I will send you the results as soon as possible.

3. Meanwhile you might find it convenient to let the Combined Chiefs of Staff see my note before their discussions. This would facilitate and hasten the agreement which we must reach between ourselves before we send a joint mission to Moscow.

4. Thank you so much for your statement about Darlan. This puts it all right for us. (Signed Prime)

No Signature

REGRADED UNGRADED by British Govt., Sec. Apr. 26, 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
November 18, 1942
filed 18/300 AM

From: Prime
To: The President of The United States

No. 195, November 18th, 1942

President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person and personal.

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Note by the Minister of Defence to the Chiefs of Staff on plans and operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and near East.

In settling what to do in a vast war situation like this, it may sometimes be found better to take a particular major operation to which one is committed and follow that through vigorously to the end, making other things subordinate to it, rather than to assemble all the data from the whole world scene in a baffling array. After the needs of the major operation have been satisfied so far as possible, other aspects of the war will fall into their proper places. Moreover, it is by the continued stressing of the major operation that our will may be imposed upon the enemy and the initiative regained.

The paramount task before us is, first, to conquer the African shores of the Mediterranean and set up there the Naval and Air installations which are necessary to open an effective passage through it for Military Traffic; and secondly, using the bases on the African shore, to strike at the under-belly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time.

There are therefore two phases-consolidation and exploitation. Dealing with consolidation first we may hope that General Alexander will become master of the whole of Cyrenaica during the present month, and that he will be pressing the enemy in the Agheila position or even at Sirte. We may also assume that in the same period or not long after the American and British Forces will become masters of the whole of French North Africa including Tunis, provided they press forward with their present energy and violence.

It will be necessary to set up Air Stations at suitable intervals along all the African shore in our power, but particularly and urgently in the Tunis tip. The largest installations for American bombers ought to be set up here so that long range bombers sent by the United States to North Africa, together with American bombers already based on the Middle East can operate against Italian targets. The United States form of day light attack would have its best chance in the better weather of the Mediterranean.
From: Prime
To: The President of The United States
No. 195, November 16th, 1942

The bombing weight of the British night attack should be brought to bear on Italy whenever the weather is more favourable than for bombing Germany. Every endeavour should be made to make Italy feel the weight of the war. All the industrial centres should be attacked in an intense fashion, every effort being made to render them uninhabitable and to terrorize and paralyze the population. I have asked for a scheme of desirable targets in Italy.

It will no doubt be necessary also to act against the Catania and Cagliar Airfields so as to keep down the attack on Tunis during the period of consolidation.

As soon as we are sure of ourselves, and consolidated, in French North Africa, including especially Tunis, two successive operations present themselves. The first is the advance to Tripoli. It is possible that General Alexander may be able to take this important prize from the East, and I have asked him how he feels about it, and how long he thinks it would require; but we must also be prepared for a rapid advance from the West. Would General Anderson's two British Divisions be sufficient, assuming that Tunis itself can be held by American and French Allied Troops? I should like the best possible estimate of the time that this will take.

The second immediate objective is obviously either Sardinia or Sicily. The possession of either of these Islands and of the Airfields in the South would create an air triangle, in which we should fight for and secure air mastery. Moreover from either of them continuous intensified short range attacks on Naples, Rome, and the Italian Fleet Bases would raise the war against Italy to an intense degree. Let an immediate report be prepared in order that a decision can be taken. Whichever it may be, the fight for air control in the Central Mediterranean should be undertaken as a great air battle with extreme priority, the fullest advantage being taken of the Axis shortage of aircraft.

The swift success in French North Africa has completely changed the character of the problem which we had been bound to face in that region. We need no longer contemplate a protracted campaign against French in Algeria, nor immediate trouble with the Spaniards.
in Morocco. On the contrary, all is well in Algeria, and a French Army will be coming into existence, fed by Allied munitions at our discretion. An examination should be made as to how the follow up Torch convoys can be drastically reduced and revised. Will the four British Divisions now in North Africa or under orders to go there be required for Torch? It should be possible sensibly to reduce the "Tail" of these Divisions thus saving escorts for other purposes, including, in the following order: (A) Sardinia or Sicily (B) restoration of the British trans Atlantic convoys up to standard strength. (C) resumption of the PQ convoys in the latter part of December. To facilitate these vital needs, and to provide the large Naval, particularly anti-submarine, forces which will be required, together with the necessary air forces, to secure a safe passage through the Mediterranean, United States Naval help will be urgently needed. Cannot the American Naval authorities reduce the strength of their follow up Transatlantic convoys and can the American "Tail" be reduced in the same way as I hope the British "Tail" will be combed?

What are General Eisenhower's wishes about the force to attack Sardinia or Sicily? There are two British Divisions of the First Army, as well as the two others which are standing by. Is there any need to put the first two into North Africa? Can that not be combat loaded here? Are the losses among our combat loaders crippling? How serious are they? There are great advantages and saving of time in going straight from the United Kingdom to the landings in Sardinia or Sicily. We must expect a steady reinforcement of both Islands by the enemy, and speed will make our task definitely lighter. Now that the preparations to attack Sardinia may take as long as those to attack Sicily and that Sicily is by far the greater prize. Decisions on all the above are needed within the next week.

The relief and resupplying of Malta should follow naturally from the operations now in progress or in prospect in the central Mediterranean, and the immediate needs of the Island are being dealt with on an effective scale. It would be well, when circumstances and shipping permit, to exchange the units who have long been in the fortress for some of those who have been in the desert, and vice versa.

I have received a telegram from the President containing the following paragraph: "It is hoped that your with your Chiefs of Staff in London and I with the Combined Staff here may make a survey of the possibilities including forward movement directed against..."
From: Prime
To: The President of The United States

No. 195, November 18th, 1942

Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece and other Balkan Areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for an attack through the Black Sea against Germany's Flank." I endorse the above conception by the president. The first part of the President's wishes are being studied by the Combined Staffs in Washington, and are the subject of the foregoing paragraphs for our discussions.

The second part relating to Turkey is also of vital importance, though it is a slower process. A supreme and prolonged effort must be made to bring Turkey into the war in the spring. We must expect that our Naval Forces and shipping, landing craft, etc., will be fully engaged in the Central Mediterranean, and that only minor amphibious facilities will be available in the Levant. Access can however be had to Turkey by the railways through Syria as well as by coastal shipping, and by a gradual build up of air protection not only Adalia but the Dardanelles itself might become open to supplies for Turkey. Troops can move by rail and road from Syria. I wish to record my opinion that Turkey may be won if the proper measures are taken. Turkey is an Ally. She will wish to have a seat among the victors at the peace conference. She has a great desire to be well armed. Her Army is in good order except for the specialized modern weapons, in which the Bulgarians have been given so great an advantage by the Germans. The Turkish Army has been mobilized for nearly three years, and is warlike. Hitherto Turkey has been restrained by fear from fulfilling her obligations, and we have taken an indulgent view of her policy on account of our own inability to help. The situation has now changed. By the destruction of Rommel's Army, large forces may presently become available in Egypt and Cyrenaica. By a strengthened Russian resistance and a possible counterstroke in the Caucasus, which we should urge upon the Russians with all emphasis, great easement will be secured in Persia and the Tenth Army may be drawn upon. There is also the Ninth Army in Syria. From all these sources it should be possible, on the assumption of the Russians maintaining themselves in the Caucasus north of the mountain line and holding the Caspian, to build up a powerful British land and air force to assist the Turks. A target date for the concentration should be April or May. Let me have proposals.

The following is the order of procedure, political and military:

(A) Turkey should be offered a Russian-American-British guarantee of...
From: Prime
To: The President of The United States

No. 198, November 18th, 1942

territorial integrity and status quo. The Russians have already agreed with us upon this. The addition of the United States would probably be a decisive reassurance. This should be followed by the dispatch to Turkey of a strong Anglo-American Military Mission.

(B) All through the winter from now on, Turkey must be equipped from Egypt and from the United States with tanks, A/T and AA guns, and active construction of airfields must be under taken. We have been working upon airfield construction in Turkey for two years. What progress has been made so far? Now that Rommel has been beaten, there is evidently a surplus of material in Egypt. We had over two thousand five hundred tanks at the disposal of the Middle East Army. Much enemy material has been captured, both German and Italian. This is also true of A/T and a AA guns. Experts must be provided to assist the Turks in learning to use and maintain this material. A ceaseless flow of weapons and equipment must go into Turkey. We have already promised a consignment, but the moment Turkey agrees secretly with the plan above, far greater quantities must be sent. What is the capacity of the railways from Syria to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles? It would seem a great mistake to attack Rhodes and other Islands in enemy hands in the Eastern Mediterranean until we have got Turkey on our side. Any attacks can then be supported by heavy shore based air power. We have to creep round this coast both by land and sea, building up our air as we go. (C) In conjunction with the above, we should urge the Russians to develop their strength on their southern flank, to try to clear the Caucasus, to regain Novorossisk and, above all, to resume at the earliest date their intentions explained to me by Premier Stalin, of striking south west from the region north of Stalingrad towards Rostov on the Don. An ultimate result of these operations, if successful, would be the opening of the Dardanelles under heavy air protection to the passage of supplies to Russian Black Seas Ports, and to any Naval assistance the Russians might require in the Black Sea. (D) Lastly, all being well we should assemble in Syria the British and imperial forces mentioned in preceding paragraphs.

The following are corrections: In paragraph eight delete "Aces" after "Italian Fleet". Paragraph nine should read "Completely Changed".
From: Prime  
To:  The President of The United States  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and

No. 196, November 18th, 1942

I know your earnestness about sending another convoy to North Russia as soon as possible. We can have thirty one ships ready to sail from Iceland on two two December.

As Turpitz, Hipper and two small enemy cruisers are stationed in Norway, it is essential to have with the convoy, in addition to their close escort, a striking force of sixteen destroyers to deal with the German Surface Forces.

We can provide the close escort for convoy but, owing to Torch commitments and the casualties to destroyers in that operation we can only provide seventeen out of the twenty nine destroyers required for a screen for the battle fleet and cruisers and the destroyer striking force mentioned above.

I am reluctant to risk sending this convoy unless we give it adequate protection. It is hoped therefore that you would be prepared to send twelve long endurance destroyers to assist in passing the convoy in.

It would be desirable for your destroyers to arrive at Scapa by seventh December in order to give time for them to get accustomed to working with our fleet.

Prime

REGRADED UNECLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date May 5 192

Red ink Ink Pen  
No. 822735 E/W  
Copy to Adm. Fisely x Adm. King 1/18/42  

0448
From: Prime
To: The President of the United States
Number 197 November 18, 1942

Personal and (former Naval Person to President).

On the thirteenth November I sent you through Lord Halifax an unnumbered telegram containing the texts of two messages from Stalin and my reply. I have now received the following from him in answer to my last telegram. Begins. Many thanks for your message of the thirteenth November we all here delighted at your successes in Libya and at the successes of the British American Forces in the French North Africa. Let me congratulate you from the bottom of my heart on your victory and wish you further successes.

In the last few days we succeeded in stopping the Germans near Vladikavkas and in stabilizing the situation there. Vladikavkas is in our hands and, it seems to me, will remain in our hands. We are taking all possible measures to keep our positions in the Northern Caucasus.

We hope to start our winter campaign in the near future. The exact moment of the beginning depends on weather which is beyond our power. I will regularly inform you on the course of the operation.

Prime
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
FROM: LONDON

NO. 198 November 18, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and

Thank you for your statement about North Africa, which I thought admirable.

I understand that Eisenhower is planning to hold a small unofficial conference at Gibraltar. I think it would be helpful if some one from here who understands the political aspect could sit in for the conference. Eisenhower would like this. As Bedell Smith is leaving here tomorrow Cadogan plans to fly down with him. We should of course keep his journey secret.

No Sig
FROM London

TO The President of the United States

NUMBER 199, November 18, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt (signed Prime) personal and . Your number two one five. Thank you so much. Of course no decisions will be taken.

No Sig
FROM  London
TO The President of the United States
NUMBER 200, November 18

Personal and Secret Former Naval Person to President
(signed Prime) personal and secret

Your public statement about Darlan has settled the matter in the best possible way. I am as anxious however as you and Eisenhower that we should profit to the full in the actions which are impending by French cooperation. Also I fully recognize that if Darlan and company render real services during the operations these would naturally count in their favour. I feel pretty sure we are looking at it from exactly the same point of view. Every good wish.

No Sig
From: London England
To: The President of the United States
Number: 201, November 19, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Prime. Your number two one five. On further consideration I think it unnecessary for Cadogan to go now.

No Sig
FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 202, NOVEMBER 20, 1942

From the Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Could you put the following before the President on a suitable occasion.

1. One of the most potent weapons for hunting the U-boat and protecting our convoys is the long range aircraft fitted with ASV equipment.

2. The German U-boats have recently been fitted with a device enabling them to listen to our one and one half metre ASV equipment and thus dive to safety before our aircraft can appear on the scene. As the result our day patrols in the bay have become largely ineffective in bad weather and our night patrols, with searchlight aircraft, have been rendered almost entirely useless. Sightings of U-boats have accordingly declined very sharply from one two zero in September to five seven in October. No improvement can be expected until aircraft fitted with a type of ASV to which they cannot at present listen called "Centimetre ASV" become available.
3. One of the main objects of patrolling the bay is to attack U-boats in transit to and from the American Atlantic Seaboard. This region is doubly urgent now so many American Torch convoys pass in the vicinity.

4. We can deal with the inner zone of the Bay of Biscay by modifying and diverting to our Wellingtons a form of Centimètre ASV which has been developed as a target location device for our heavy bombers.

5. A more difficult situation arises in the outer zone of the bay where aircraft of longer range fitted with Centimètre ASV are essential.

6. The very heavy sinking in Mid-Atlantic have forced us to convert our own liberators for work in this area. This leaves us with no aircraft with adequate range for the outer zone of the bay, unless we make a further diversion from the small force of long range bombers responsible for the air offensive against Germany. Even if this diversion were made a considerable time would necessarily elapse before the essential equipment could be modified and installed.

7. I am most reluctant to reduce the weight of bombs we are able to drop on Germany as I believe it is of great importance that this offensive should be maintained and developed to the utmost of our ability throughout the winter months. I would, therefore, ask you Mr. President to consider the immediate allocation of some three zero liberators with Centimètre ASV equipment from the supplies which I understand are now available in the United States. These aircraft would be put to work immediately, in an area where they would make a direct contribution to the American War Effort.

PRIME

(ANSWERED BY MR. HOPKIN'S MESSAGE OF DEC. 1, 1942)
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 203, November 20, 1942

From Former Naval Person to President (signed Prime) personal
and confidential. Following from Smuts who spent this morning twentieth
at Gibraltar Headquarters. I am in full agreement with him. Begins:

This is a most secret telegram. After arrival this morning I had
a long talk with Eisenhower and Cunningham, which I summarise for
your information. As regards coming operation next Sunday or Monday
it is doubtful whether Anderson is strong enough to take Bizerta
but Tunis appears more hopeful. In any case every effort will be
made to press enemy into as small an area or bridgehead as possible
so that air and other attack may finish him later. Further south
attempt will be made to clean up small pockets of enemy at Sfax and
elsewhere, but no large forces will be employed in Tripoli direction
at present. Sea losses so far have been made good. Loss of personnel
ships have been compensated by equal number of French ships acquire,
and for every merchant vessel lost a U-boat has been sunk. As regards
Darlan statements published have had unsettling effect on local
French leaders and it would be dangerous to go further on those lines.
Nogues has threatened to resign and as he controls Morocco population
results of such a step might be far reaching. From point of view of
securing French cooperation and stabilising situation nothing could
be worse than impression that we were merely using leaders to discard
them as soon as they have served our purpose. There can be no doubt
that Darlan and his friends have burnt their boats and are doing
their best to fight the Axis and consolidate French behind us in this
fight. French are cooperating in non combatant tasks and even in
fighting on small scale, but their fighting value is at present low
for want of proper arms. Darlan was not Eisenhower's choice but
that of other French leaders some of whom were his enemies and our
strong supporters and who all agreed that his leadership in cooperation
was essential for our operations. It would be great mistake to
create impression that he is to be discarded at early date. Military
situation may call for his retention for fairly long period and meanwhile impression to contrary should not be publicly created. I explained to Eisenhower that I do not think there was any intention to repeat or go beyond statements already made which were only intended to correct impression that political accord with Vichy elements had been come to. Future political arrangements should be left to governments concerned and agreement of French among themselves. I think it would be wise to pass on to President Roosevelt my strong impression that further anti Darlan statements might be harmful to our cause, and indeed are not called for.

No Sig
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FILED: NOVEMBER 21, 1942
1321 Z

RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 21, 1942
1323 Z

FROM: LONDON ENGLAND

TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER: 20h, November 21, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and

We entirely agree with your view reported in your R-3361 (Fan 21).

In particular we agree that every effort should be made to avoid
the form of a protocol or other formal diplomatic document.

PRIME

 Degraded: Unclassified by British Govt., State Dept., 3-29-72
Received in Map Room by H. H. Parks Date May 5, 1972.
November 20, 1942.

The President agrees with the provisions of your draft protocol but does not wish it to take the form of a protocol in view of the fact that the term "Protocol" carries with it certain implications which the President wishes to avoid. (For Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff) He would prefer to have the agreement in the form of an announcement by you and with a statement of Darlan's concurrence. (Para 21) The President would not insist upon this to the point of causing a collapse of negotiations or seriously jeopardizing the success of your military operations, but within these limits he desires you to make every effort to avoid the form of a protocol or other formal diplomatic document. The President desires to keep the entire arrangement on a purely military rather than a diplomatic or political basis. He does not desire to elevate Darlan to a position of a national plenipotentiary. A copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the Prime Minister.
From London, England
To The President of the United States
No. 205 November 22, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and General De Gaulle wished on November two one to broadcast, through the BBC, the following statement (see my next telegram) denouncing the maintenance of the Vichy regime in North Africa. I felt that, in view of impending operations, I should not allow anything that might compromise arrangement made by Eisenhower with Darlan or prejudice the military situation. I accordingly vetoed the broadcast, which will not now be made. De Gaulle was told that as the operations were under the United States Command I felt bound to take your opinion before agreeing to anything which might be detrimental to them. If your view was that broadcasts of this kind were undesirable at the moment, being your ardent and active Lieutenant I should bow to your decision without demur.

Prime
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. 206 November 22, 1942

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM. TEXT BEGINS.

LA NATION FRANÇAISE PREVOYAIT QUE, MALGRE L’ARRIVEE DE SES ALLIES, LA LIQUIDATION DE VICHY EN AFRIQUE DU NORD FRANÇAISE N’IRAIT PAS SANS DELAIS, NI SANS PERPETIES. MAIS, AU FOND DE SON CACHOT, LA NATION FRANÇAISE A RESSENTI DE LA STUPEUR EN APPRENANT QUE LES DELAIS SERAIENT TELS ET QUE LES PERPETIES PRENdraient UN PAREIL CARACTERE. LA NATION, AU FOND DE SON CACHOT, ENTEND SAVOIR DE QUOI IL RETOURNE?

GUERRE SOUS LE SIGNE DE L'HONNEUR, SI ON VIT OU SION LA LIBERATION NATIONALE A PARTIR DE L'EMPIRE LIBERE DEVRA ETRE DESHONOREE PAR UN QUARTERON DE COUPABLES, CAMOUFLER POUR LA CIRCONSTANCE SOUS UN PARJURE SUPPLEMENTAIRE? IL SERAIT GRAVE ET DANGEREUX QU'EN POSANT SEULEMENT CES QUESTIONS ON NE PUISSE EN MEME TEMPS LES RESOUDRE.

CERTES, LA FRANCE A QUE TROP RECONNU QUE DANS LA CONFUSION DE CETTE GUERRE MONDIALE IL Y A DES RISQUE DE ERREUR DE LA PART DES MEINS INTENTIONNEES. MAIS ELLE A RECONNU AUSSI QUE L'ALLIANCE DE TOUS SES ALLIES ETAIT UNE ALLIANCE SINCERE ET QUE L'IDEAL SACRE POUR LEQUEL SOUFFRENT ET MEURENT TANT ET TANT D'HOMMES ET DE FEMMES DANS LE CAMP DE LA LIBERTE REJETAIT NCESSAIREMENT, COMME ELLE LES MAUDIT ELLE-MEME, LE DESHONNEUR ET LA TRAHISON.

CERTES, LA FRANCE SAIT COMBIEN UN REGIME D'OPPRESSION ET DE MENSONGE A PU LONGTEMPS, EN ALGERIE, AU MAROC, EN TUNISIE, BAILLONNER LA LIBRE OPINION. MAIS ELLE SAIT AUSSI QU'UN PEuple EBRANLEES LES COLONIES DU TEMPLE DE L'IDOLE, REIN N'ETOUFFERA PLUS, EN AFRIQUE DU NORD, COMME AILLEURS, L'EXPRESSION PUISSANTE DE LA VOLonte NATIONALE.

CERTES, LA FRANCE MESURE QUELLE DIFFICULTE COMPORTE LA COOPERATION DANS LA GUERRE DE TERRITOIRES AUSSI DIVERS ET AUSSI LONGTEMPS SEPARES QUE CEUX QUI FORMENT SON EMPIRE, ET L'ACTION COMMUNE DANS LES COMBATS DES FORCES ARMEEES DONT ELLE DISPOSE OU QU'ELLE VA POUVoir LEVER DANS TOUTES LES PARTIES DU MONDE. MAIS ELLE SAIT QUE, POUR UNIR TOUTES LES FORCES QUI LUI APPARTIENNENT ET TOUS LES ETATS QUI ELLE PROTÈGE, IL EXISTE DES LIENS EPROUVES: LES JUSTES.
Page 3 Message Number 206 from London, England November 22, 1942

Lois de la Legitime Republique et les traites qu'elle a conclus. Elle sait que ses soldats, qu'ils combattent en Tunisie, en Libye, au Tchad, au Pacifique, ne sont pas les soldats de quelqu'un, mais les soldats de la France.

Depuis que la patrie succomba sous les coups de l'ennemi et des complots de la trahison, le tresor de l'independance et de la dignite nationales a pu etre sauvegarde. A travers quelles ep Reeves? Dieu le sait. Mais, ayant connu cela, la France a vu jaillir jusqu'aux trefonds de l'ame du peuple la flamme de l'esperance en sa grandeur et en sa liberte. C'est grace a cette flamme sacrée que s'est levee et organisee, sous le talon de l'ennemi et de ses collaborateurs, l'immense Resistance francaise. C'est en vertu de la meme flamme que se sont eeu a peu groupes beaucoup de nos territoires et une partie de nos forces. C'est autour de la meme flamme que tout l'empire va maintenant s'unir a toute la nation pour lutter et pour vaincre cote a cote avec tous les allies de la France. C'est par la et par la seulement que la victoire effacera glorieusement, d'un seul coup, nos malheurs, nos divisions, nos larmes stop.

Un seul combat pour une seule patrie.

Prime

RECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 5 1972

0463
The French nation foresaw that in spite of the arrival of her allies the liquidation of Vichy in French North Africa would not take place without delay or even sudden changes. But the French nation, in its imprisonment, felt greatest concern on learning that delays may be such and such and that sudden turns may take on such a character. The nation in its imprisonment intends to find out what goes on.

Much French territory is occupied by the allied armies with the consent and enthusiastic support of the people. The nation asks whether or not the regime and spirit of Vichy will remain there in force, whether or not the present Vichy "lords" will continue in office, whether or not this part of the French empire will be able to unite with that part which has already taken up arms again under the banner of honor, whether or not national deliverance beginning with the liberated empire ought to be dishonored by a four-some of culprits, camouflaged for the time being under additional perjury. It would be serious and dangerous simply to ask these questions if at the same time they could not be answered.

Certainly France has only too many times known that in the confusion of this world war there are risks of making mistakes on the part of individuals with the best of intentions. But she (France) has also recognized that the alliance of all her allies was a sincere one and that the sacred ideal for which so many, many men and women suffer and die on the field of liberty necessarily rejected dishonor and treason as France herself cursed them.

Of a certainty, France knows how a regime of oppression and of lies has long been able to silence free speech and public opinion in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. But she also knows that once the columns of the temple of the idol have been shaken, nothing will again stifle the powerful expression of national will either in Africa or elsewhere.

Likewise, France is fully aware of the difficulty in bringing about co-operation in the war of territories so diverse and so long separated as those making up its empire and (she is also aware of the difficulty) of united action in combat of armed forces which she has or which she is going to be able to draw upon from all parts of the earth. But she knows that in order to unite all the forces which belong to her and to her possessions which she protects, there exist ties of long standing, just laws of the legally constituted republics and treaties which she has concluded. She knows that her soldiers, whether they fight in Tunisia, Libya, in Chad, or in the Pacific, are not the soldiers belonging to an individual but are the soldiers of France.

Since the country fell beneath enemy blows and from treacherous plots, the treasure of national independence and dignity has been safe-
guarded. Through what trials? Only God knows. But having experienced that, France saw leap from the very depths of the soul of the people, the all-enveloping flame of hope and liberty. It is due to this sacred flame that there has been raised up and organized, under the very heel of the enemy and of his collaborators, the tremendous resistance of the French people. It is by virtue of this same flame that much of our territory and a part of our forces have little by little come together. It is around this same flame that the whole empire will unite itself with the whole nation to fight and to conquer side by side with all the allies of France. It is thus and thus alone that victory will gloriously wipe out with a single blow, our misfortunes, our factions and our tears.

A single struggle for a unified country.
FROM: London
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 207, November 23, 1942

Personal and secret

Former Naval Person to President (signed Prime).

Re your proposed reply about recall of Australian Division. I should be glad if this could be delayed for a few days as we are studying the question here especially in its shipping aspect. It must be remembered that the Australian action will probably entail similar movement of New Zealand Division.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 208, November 24, 1942.

One. Your No. two two zero of November twenty. I cannot do better than send you the two telegrams I have despatched to Mr. Curtin and Mr. Fraser respectively. We cannot of course in any way oppose in principle the withdrawal of either or both of these divisions, but you who have a great army in the Pacific theatre and have assumed a considerable measure of responsibility for the defense of Australia have every right to express an opinion, more especially as American armies are also engaged in North Africa and it is arguable their position might be affected. Moreover there is a great case against the uneconomical use of our limited shipping. It therefore seems to me that the view taken by General Marshall is sound and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should lay
No. 208, Nov 24/42 From: London Page TWO

their view before the Dominion Governments concerned.
We are very grateful to the United States for the help you are giving to the defence of Australia and New Zealand while our own troops are so fully engaged with the enemy in other quarters.

No Sig
FROM: London
TO: The President of the United States Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

NUMBER: 209, November 24, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret.

Following are texts referred to in my No. two zero eight. Number One. Begins: Prime Minister to Prime Minister of New Zealand personal and secret.

1. Your President No eight (for text see my immediately following telegram). I should very much regret to see the New Zealand Division quit the scene of its glories, but I quite understand your feelings and how embarrassing to you would be the withdrawal of the Ninth Australian Division. I am having the whole situation reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff in London. In the meanwhile I send you a copy of the telegram I have today despatched to Mr. Curtin. I am sure it would be a mistake for Australia and New Zealand to ignore the opinion of the United States Military Authorities, having regard to the great contribution they are now making to the defence of the Southern Pacific and the still greater efforts we must expect from them.

Number Two. Begins: Prime Minister to Mr. Curtin personal and secret.

Your John four five (Presidents No. two two one to Former Naval Person) and President Roosevelt's telegram of November first. We recognise of
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 209, November 24, 1942

REGRaded UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks

MAY 5 1972

course that the withdrawal of the Ninth Australian Division from the Mediterranean Theatre rests with the Commonwealth Government. However, the United States forces are now heavily engaged both in helping Australia and mastering French North Africa as a prelude to further action in Europe. They are therefore entitled to have the opportunity of considering the position as a whole and of making any representations to you which they may think desirable.

2. It seems probable that the Eastern Mediterranean will be the scene of large scale action in the early spring and the position of Turkey is of peculiar interest. If the Ninth Australian Division is withdrawn to Australia, it will of course have to be replaced in the Middle East either by British or American Forces. In the present acute and aggravated shipping stringency it will be necessary to save tonnage as much as possible. For instance it might be most economical to move one of the American Divisions in Australia or destined for the Pacific direct to Suez, where they could pick up the Ninth Australian Division on the return journey. There might be no other way of maintaining the necessary strength in the Middle East. On the other hand it might be possible to carry the Australians away from the Middle East as an isolated shipping operation. This again
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 209, November 24, 1942

would have to be at the expense of our general power to move troops about the world and would have to be considered in relation to the dominating military exigencies. The matter is one on which the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, who alone have the central point of view, should in the first instance advise.

3. So far as we are concerned we shall of course not oppose your wishes, although we greatly regret the departure from the Middle Eastern Theatre of a division which has rendered distinguished service. The object should be to bring the greatest number of the United Nations Divisions into contact with the enemy, and certainly it would appear more helpful to the common cause if fresh troops were moved from the United States into the Pacific and into action against Japan than that troops already engaged with the enemy in another part of the world should be withdrawn.

4. As I know the great importance which you have always attached to American opinion and how much you value the substantial aid they have given to the defence of Australia, I feel bound to put these points before you.
The time has come I feel when I must raise with you the question of the return of the Second New Zealand Division from the Middle East. In doing so, I assure you that the exigencies of the war situation, both in this part of the world and in the North African Theatre, are fully in my mind. We in New Zealand have for considerable time been of the opinion that, in view of the growing difficulties of the manpower position and of our increased and increasing commitments in the Pacific Area, this request should be made by my colleagues and I also felt that to do so in the adverse circumstances which existed hitherto in the Middle East and in Russia would be inappropriate. It was always my intention however at the proper time, and when the situation in Egypt became easier, to place the whole position before you. As late as August of this year, when approval was given for the despatch of reinforcements for the Middle East, it was felt that the urgent needs of that theatre outweighed those of the area in which New Zealand was situated. Now however with the launching of the most promising Anglo American offensive, the immediate security of
the Middle East, which we have always regarded as being of such vital importance, appears for all practical purposes to have been achieved, and, with the accession of large new forces from the United States and Britain, the presence of one New Zealand division in this theatre becomes a matter of diminishing importance. Here in the Pacific, on the other hand, we are faced not only with the possibility of Japanese launching further offensive action, both to retrieve the situation arising from her recent setback, and to take advantage of the preoccupations of the United Nations in Europe and in Africa, but also with what we regard as the necessity on the part of the United Nations to launch a counter offensive at the earliest possible date. In either case it is felt that the place of the Second Division is here in the South Pacific.

Now that the New Zealand Army and Air Forces have, at our own request, been placed under the Commander of the South Pacific Area, we anticipate that increasingly heavy demands will inevitably be made upon the resources of this Dominion, both in manpower and materials. Already as you are aware we have, in response to requests from the Commander South Pacific Area, readily and promptly agreed to send a New Zealand Division for service in the islands, part of which has already proceeded to its several destinations. In addition to our Army commitments, it has been
decided that the New Zealand Air Force also should be trained and equipped to undertake an offensive role in the Pacific, and, for some time now, I should add a large proportion of our limited force of modern aircraft have been operating in Guadalcanal and Esperitu Santo and other Pacific Islands. New Zealand is now endeavouring to complete preparations for an air force of sixteen squadrons for service in the Pacific, with an ultimate aim of achieving a thirty squadron air force.

You will appreciate that with our extremely limited manpower resources, which have now reached straining point, it is not possible for us to maintain two divisions overseas, and an adequate home defence force together with our air commitments, which include, of course, the Empire Air Training Scheme, and our comparatively small but increasingly useful Naval units. We have in fact reached the limit of our manpower resources in New Zealand. Up to the present we have taken over one hundred and sixty three thousand men and five thousand women from industry. We now find ourselves unable to reach the establishment which our Chiefs of Staff laid down as the minimum force required for the defence of the Dominion. There is also the question of production of food and other supplies, both for the United Kingdom and the South Pacific Area. The United States Forces are becoming increasingly dependent upon resources of the Dominion for...
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 210, November 24, 1942

those essential supplies and services which we must endeavour to provide under the Mutual Aid Agreement. Already, in order to maintain production, it has become necessary to strip the Army of a large number of its personnel and return such men to industry, and we are now forced, in considering the needs of essential industry, and our commitments in respect of the armed forces, to come to the decision to reduce establishment below the level which our military advisers regard as sufficient.

I think I should tell you also of the attitude of the New Zealand people, both Maori and European generally, towards the return of the division from overseas. The main body left New Zealand three years ago next January, and the greater proportion of the men now fighting in the Middle East have been absent from New Zealand for well over two years. There is general feeling in the country, particularly in view of the extremely heavy casualties which our division has suffered—eighteen thousand five hundred so far out of a total of forty three thousand five hundred sent to the Middle East—that our men have a strong claim to return, and further, that our own tried and well trained troops should be used for the defence of New Zealand in the Pacific Area.

And finally I must draw your attention to the effect on New Zealand public opinion of the possible withdrawal of the Ninth Australian Division from the Middle East, concerning which Mr. Curtin has now sent me (corrupt

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.

0475
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 210, November 24, 1942

You will appreciate that it would be absolutely impossible for the New Zealand government to resist the strong feeling to which I have referred should it become known that all three Australian Divisions have returned. I feel bound therefore to place the whole matter fully and frankly before you and to ask that as soon as circumstances permit effect should be given to this request.

That there will be difficulties and embarrassments I fully realise, and particularly in regard to shipping, but I hope that it will be possible for some adequate and early provision to be made. The urgent question at the moment is of course the despatch of the reinforcements which we had undertaken to send to the Middle East and for which transport is already bound for New Zealand. It will be necessary therefore to give further consideration to this matter upon receipt of your reply to this telegram.

I would like in conclusion to make it plain that it is not our intention to regard the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force as a force to be stationed permanently in New Zealand itself. We are firmly convinced that a long and difficult conflict with the Japanese lies ahead, irrespective of the success of any operations against Italy and Germany and that the United Nations must, at the earliest possible date, make a forward move against Japan. We would wish to participate in any such
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 210, November 24, 1942

offensive in the Pacific to the fullest extent of our capacity.

Dominion has, I hope, given unmistakeable evidence of its fixed determination to fight this war through to the end, and the losses we have suffered in successive campaigns are proof of the spirit of the New Zealand people and of their willingness to make every sacrifice to this end. I know you will appreciate the reasons which induce me to raise this matter and that you will give to it your full and sympathetic consideration.

No Sig
FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 211, November 21, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and

1. We have had a letter from General Hartle stating that under directive from the United States War Department ("Any construction in excess of the requirements for a force of four two seven zero zero zero must be accomplished entirely by your own labour and with your own materials and that Lend-Lease materials cannot be furnished in these instances"). This has caused us very great concern, not so much from the standpoint of Lend-Lease but on grounds of grand strategy. We have been preparing under "Bolero" for one one zero zero zero zero zero men, and this is the first intimation we have had that this target is to be abandoned. We had no knowledge that you had decided to abandon forever "Round-Up", and all our preparations were proceeding on a broad front under "Bolero".

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
2. It seems to me that it would be a most grievous decision to abandon "Round-Up". "Torch" is no substitute for "Round-Up" and only engages one three divisions as against the four eight contemplated for "Round-Up". All my talks with Stalin in Averells presence, were on the basis of a postponed "Round-Up". But never was it suggested that we should attempt no Second Front in Europe in one nine four three or even one nine four four.

3. Surely, Mister President, this matter requires most profound consideration. I was deeply impressed with all General Marshall's arguments that only by "Round-Up" could the main forces be thrown into France and the low countries and only in this area could the main strength of the British Metropolitan and United States overseas Air Forces be brought into action. One of the arguments we used against "Sledgehammer" was that it would eat up in one nine four two the seed-corn needed for the much larger "Round-Up" in one nine four three. No doubt we have all been sanguine of our shipping resources, but that is a matter which time can correct. Only by the building up of a "Round-Up" force here as rapidly and regularly as other urgent demands on shipping allow can we have the means of coming to grips with the main strength of the enemy and liberating the European Nations. It may well be that, try as we will, our strength will not reach the necessary levels in one nine four three. But if so it becomes all the more important to make sure...
we do not miss one nine four four.

4. Even in one nine four three a chance may come. Should Stalins offensive reach Rostov on the Don, which is his aim, a first-class disaster may overtake the German Southern Armies. Our Mediterranean Operations following on "Torch" may drive Italy out of the war. Widespread demoralization may set in among the Germans, and we must be ready to profit by any opportunity which offers.

5. I do beg of you, Mister President, to let me know what has happened. At present we are completely puzzled by this information and the manner in which it has reached us. It seems to me absolutely necessary either that General Marshall and Admiral King with Harry should come over here or that I should come with my people to you.

PRIME
FROM: London

TO: The President of the United States

NUMBER: 212, November 24, 1942

I think that the proposal made in the second paragraph of your telegram number two one nine of two zero November is a good one, and we shall be glad to appoint someone to act side by side with the person you select.

The functions of our two civilians should, I suppose, be defined by us before they go.

Am I right in assuming that your proposal is that they should not be accredited as representatives to Darlan or to the French Administration, but would act as the political agents of their governments on the civilian side in the territory, side by side with the Allied Commander in Chief, concerting their action with him.

No Sig
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM:  London

TO:    The President of the United States

NUMBER: 213, November 25, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

My number two one one. In conference with Major-General
Smith, who has just returned from Gibraltar and was out of England
when we received General Hartles letter, we have learnt that there
is no change in the general plan of "Bolero" and "Roundup", and
that the letter quoted related only to the rate at which accommoda-
tion should be provided for the build-up. I am very glad this
misunderstanding has been cleared away and that we are as ever in
closest agreement.

No Sig
URGENT

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 214, November 26, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and (signed Prime). Your two two two.

Thank you so much about my two one one. As I cabled you last night, we are in full agreement.

I entirely agree in principle that there should be a conference with the Russians, but I doubt very much whether a conference on general war policy, apart from some special point, between officers would be of much value. Certainly if a Russian delegation went to Cairo, which I deem unlikely, they would be so tied up that they would have to refer every point of substance back to Stalin at Moscow. If the conference were held in Moscow there would be less delay, but I trust that before British and United States missions went to Moscow they would have a joint and agreed view, to serve at least as a basis for discussion. I hope also that if General Marshall were sent by you he would not by pass this country.

I think I can tell you in advance what the Soviet view will be. They will say to us both "How many German divisions will you be engaging in the summer of one nine four three? How many have you engaged in one nine four two?" They will certainly demand a strong second front in one nine four three by the heavy invasion of the continent either from the west or from the south, or from both. This sort of argument, of which I had plenty in Moscow, requires to be met either by principals or by Naval and shipping authorities who would certainly have to be present. It would be very difficult to spare all our Chiefs for so long at this time.
Stalin talked to me in Moscow in the sense of being willing to come to meet you and me somewhere this winter, and he mentioned Iceland. I pointed out that England was no farther and more convenient. He neither accepted nor rejected the idea. At the same time, apart from the climate, there is a lot to be said for a new triple Atlantic conference in Iceland. Our ships might lie together in Halfjord and we would place a suitable ship at Stalin's disposal wearing the Soviet flag prominently. He talked with some zest of his desire to fly and of his confidence in the Russian machines. Only at a meeting between principals will real results be achieved. What about proposing it for January? By that time Africa should be cleared and the great battle in south Russia decided.

I may add that if ever I can persuade you to come to Iceland I shall never be satisfied unless you look in on this small place before returning.
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FROM: London

TO: The President of the United States

NUMBER: 215, December 2, 1942

1. I have had a telegram from Mr. Curtin insisting on the return of the Ninth Australian Division and assuming that their equipment will go too.

2. We cannot resist longer the return of the personnel, but we ought not to impede future operations by moving the equipment, which makes a further inroad on shipping and is urgently needed for the Polish Corps. I still hope that New Zealand will allow its division to remain.

No Sig
FROM: London
TO: The President of the United States
NUMBER: 216, December 2, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential:

1. I give below the text of telegrams exchanged between me and Premier Stalin.

2. Please note particularly the last sentence of Para 5 of Stalin's message. The chances of Round-Up may be greatly improved by the present battles on the Russian Front.

3. It seems to me that the whole question ought to be re-examined in the light of the Russian victories. It would be unwise in my view for us to send separate delegations to Moscow without having decided what we are going to do about Round-Up, which is almost the sole thing they will want to know.

4. I hope therefore that you will allow General Marshall and Admiral King to come over here, if possible with Harry, at the earliest moment.

5. I still cherish the hope of an Iceland meeting after the ground has been fully explored.

6. Telegram to Premier Stalin dated two four Nov. one nine four two begins:

FILED 0047Z
DATE Dec 2
From London to the President of the United States, Page 2.

"Para 1. It gave me the very greatest pleasure to receive your warm and heartfelt congratulations. I regard our trustful personal relations as most important to the discharge of our duties to the great masses whose lives are at stake.

Para 2. Although the President is unable with great regret to lend me twelve American destroyers for which I asked, I have now succeeded in making arrangements to sail a convoy of over thirty ships from Iceland on December twenty second. The Admiralty will concert the operation with your officers as before. The Germans have moved the bulk of their aircraft from the north of Norway to the south of Europe as a result of 'Torch'. On the other hand the German surface forces in Norway are still on guard. The Admiralty are pleased so far with the progress of the Q.P. Convey which has been helped by bad weather and is now under the protection of our cruisers which have been sent out to meet it.

Para 3. I have communicated to President Roosevelt some preliminary ideas about Turkey, and have found that he independently had formed very similar views. It seems to me that we ought all of us to make a new intense effort to have Turkey enter the war on our side in the spring. For this purpose I should like United States to join in an Anglo-Soviet guarantee of the territorial integrity and status of Turkey. This would bring our three countries all into line, and the Americans count for a lot with the Turks. Secondly, we are already sending Turkey a considerable consignment of munitions includ-
From London to the President of the United States, Page 3.

I have agreed to President Roosevelt's suggestion that we each send in the near future, if agreeable to you, two high British officers and two Americans to Moscow to plan this part of the war in one nine four three. Pray let me know if you agree.

Para 5. I hope you realise, Premier Stalin, that shipping is our limiting factor. In order to 'Torch' we have had to cut our Trans-Atlantic escorts so fine that the first half of November has been our worst month so far. We and the Americans have budgeted...
From Londn to the President of the United States, Page 4.

to lose at the rate of seven hundred thousand tons a month and still improve our margin. Over the year the average loss has not been quite so bad as that, but this first fortnight in November is worse. You who have so much land may find it hard to realise that we can only live and fight in proportion to our sea communications.

Para 6. Do not be disturbed about the rogue Darlan. We have thrown a large Anglo-American Army into French North Africa and are getting a very firm grip. Owing to the non-resistance of the French Army and now to its increasing support, we are perhaps fifteen days ahead of schedule. It is of the utmost consequence to get the Tunisian tip and the Naval Base of Bizerta at the earliest moment. The leading elements of our First Army will probably begin their attack immediately. Once established there with overpowering air, we can bring the war home to Mussolini and Fascist gang with an intensity not yet possible.

Para 7. At the same time, by building up a strong Anglo-American Army and Air Force in Great Britain and making continuous preparations along our southeastern and southern coasts, we keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais, etc., and are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. And all the time our bombers will be blasting Germany with ever increasing violence. Thus the halter will tighten upon the guilty doomed.

Para 8. The glorious news of your offensive is streaming in. We are watching it with breathless attention. Every good wish. Ends.
From Lond to the President of the United States, Page 5.

Telegram from Premier Stalin dated two eight Nov one nine four two. Begins:

Para 1. Many thanks for your message which I received on the two five November. I fully share your view on the importance of developing our personal relations.

Para 2. I am grateful to you for the measures you are taking to send a new big convoy to Archangel. I realise that in view of the considerable Naval Operations in the Mediterranean Sea this constitutes great difficulty for you.

Para 3. I am in full agreement with you and President Roosevelt on the question of Turkey. It would be desirable to do everything possible to have Turkey enter the war on our side in the spring. This would be of great importance in order to accelerate the defeat of Hitler and his accomplices.

Para 4. It seems to me that the Americans want Darlan not badly in order to facilitate the occupation of the Northern and Western Africa. The military diplomacy must be able to use for military purposes not only Darlan but 'Even the Devil himself and his grandma'. Maiskys footnote: This is a strong Russian proverb.

Para 5. I paid close attention to your communication that you and Americans do not relax preparation along your south-eastern and southern coasts in order to keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais etc. and that you are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. I hope this does not mean that you changed your mind.
From London to the President of the United States, Page 9.

with regard to your premise given in Moscow to establish a second front in Western Europe in the spring of one nine four three.

Para 6. I am in full agreement with President Roosevelt's suggestion and your wish to arrange in Moscow conversations of the representatives of the three general staffs to prepare the respective military plans for one nine four three. We are ready to meet the British and American representatives whenever you wish.

Para 7. In the Stalingrad operations we were so far successful partly because of snowfall and fog which hinder the activities of the German aviation.

Para 8. We have intention to start in the next few days active operations on the central front in order to pin here the enemy forces and to prevent the transfer of any portion of them to the south.

No Sig
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FILED O1L3 Z
DATE December 2

FROM: London
TO: The President of the United States
NUMBER: 217, December 2, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. Ever since we received a request for carrier reinforcement for your Pacific fleet we have been earnestly seeking to meet your wishes. We did not feel able to come to a decision about these very few vital units until we knew how our carriers had fared in the restricted and dangerous waters in which they had to operate for 'Torch'.

2. The hazards of 'Torch' are not yet ended, as our build-up of shore-based aircraft will not enable the withdrawal for some time of the two carriers now employed on 'Torch'. Knowing however, how urgently you require a reinforcement of carriers in the Pacific we are prepared to take a risk new and come to a decision as to what assistance we can give you.

3. As you are aware, our carrier strength consists of the following: - (A) four long endurance armoured fleet carriers: Victorious-efficient and just withdrawn from 'Torch' Indomitable-efficient and the only carrier now with the Eastern Fleet Indomitable-undergoing after action repairs, and will not be worked up before February. Formidable--now employed on 'Torch' but has turbine trouble
From London to the President of the United States, Page 2.

and must go into dockyard hands for six or seven weeks as soon as possible (B) one short endurance fleet carrier, Furious, which is now employed in 'Torch' (C) an aircraft repair ship, Unicorn, which can operate about twenty five aircraft but will not be ready for service until early February.

4. In the hope that your operations in the South Pacific will prevent the Japanese from making serious raids into the Indian Ocean we are prepared to take the serious risk of withdrawing Illustrious from the Eastern fleet, and given Admiral Somerville the Unicorn and an auxiliary carrier. We are also prepared to withdraw Victorious from the Home Fleet, and to send you both Victorious and Illustrious if you can allow Ranger to join the Home Fleet.

5. In view of the vital importance of the Atlantic communication, the necessity of supporting the North Russian convoys, the possible appearance of Graf Zeppelin at the end of the year, and the present condition of Indomitable and Formidable, we could not release both Victorious and Illustrious without the addition of Ranger to the home fleet.

6. I am much in favour of sending you two carriers rather than one if this can be managed, as this will not only give you increased strength but would allow the two ships to work as a tactical unit, which would appear to be necessary as neither ship carries sufficient aircraft to operate singly. I would propose to send Admiral

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From London to the President of the United States, Page 3.

Lyster, who is known to a good many of your officers, in command.

7. It is considered necessary for both ships to proceed to Pearl Harbour, where they should arrive about the end of December to adjust their complement of aircraft.

8. If you are in favour of this exchange Pound will settle details with King.

No Sig
From: London

To: The President of the United States

Filed 2/11372
No. 218 December 2, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

Your two two three. Thank you very much.

Prime
FROM: London

TO: The President of the United States

NUMBER: 219, December 3, 1942

Former Naval Person to President (signed Prime) personal and

1. Your two two four. I am delighted at your proposal which is the only way of making a good plan for one nine four three. At present we have no plan for one nine four three which is on the scale or up to the level of events. It is grand of you to come and I will meet you anywhere. I am telegraphing Stalin to reinforce your invitation.

2. Meanwhile I deprecate sending our military representative to Moscow. It will only lead to a deadlock and queer the pitch. We still think that Marshall, King and Arnold should come here in advance, so that at least we have some definite plans as a basis for discussion when we all meet in January ("Somewhere in Africa"). Otherwise Stalin will greet us with the question ("Have you then no plan for the second front in Europe you promised me for one nine four three").

3. Khartoum is at your disposal and would be most satisfactory as regards weather, security and communications. I will report on accommodation tomorrow. We should be honoured to be the hosts. I am not informed, though quite ready to learn, about the Cases south of
From London to the President of the United States, Page 2.

Algiers. Marrakesh I can personally vouch for as regards accommodation, climate and, barring any extraordinary lapse, weather.

4. A supreme war conference, as this would be, ought to have the necessary staffs. For ourselves I should like to bring Eden from the War Cabinet with me and three Chiefs of Vice-Chiefs of the Staff, supported by a powerful secretariat, cypher staff, map room, etc., say about twenty-five.

5. As to timing, the sooner the better. Every day counts. We may reasonably expect that Tunis will be settled by the end of December and Tripolitania by the end of January. We ought not to be dependent on the actual working out of these operations. All prospect of attack in Europe in one nine four three depends on early decision.

6. However everything hangs on whether "(Bark is willin)."

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
December 4, 1942
Filed 4/4l4 A.M.

From: Ambambsay London
To: The President of the United States

No. 220, December 3rd, 1942

Former Naval Person to President (signed Primo) personal and

We have had the following exchange of telegrams with Air
Marshal Drummond in Moscow. Extract from 0 Z two zero seven
seven of first December to Drummond.

Para 1. The operational and administrative advantages to
the RAF in the Middle East of Russian alternative proposal of
number of aircraft equivalent to "Velvet" force and your suggested
compromise are fully realized, but these alternatives would not
achieve the overriding political benefits which were the object
of the original plan. It was hoped that by sending "Velvet" force
to Caucasus an example would be given of Allied forces working
hand in hand with the Russians for the same military objectives
and under unity of strategic control on a bigger scale than any-
thing yet attempted. Not only would there have been practical
cooperation on a considerable scale but there might also have
developed a genuine spirit of comradeship in arms which would
have opened up considerable possibilities in the political and
military fields. This spirit was very evident in the Russian
Navy as a result of our small fighter force going to North Russia
in one nine four one.

Para 2. The replacement of the whole or the greater part
of "Velvet" force by the equivalent in aircraft would not have
this effect and would destroy the whole Haizen D'etre of the
plan. There would be the further risk that if we only gave air-
craft on this occasion we might let ourselves in for sending
"Velvet" force as well at a later stage in the war if the situation
in Caucasus should deteriorate. Provision of aircraft is also
bound to leave Middle East short at least in certain types and
so cause the dismounting of squadrons.

Following is Drummond's reply dated second December.

Para 1. Your O Z two zero seven seven first December gives
me political background which I needed. It is already clear be-
yond question that the Russians will not resume discussions and
will allow us to proceed to the Caucasus to arrange any further
details for the establishment and operation of the force until
they are convinced that we shall not agree to their alternative
Page 2
From: Ambasssdy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 220, December 3rd, 1942

Proposal of providing aircraft in lieu of the force. I must, therefore, preface my renewed approach with a reasoned refusal to entertain their alternative proposal. Even so I do not think they will accept this unless I can assure them that it is the agreed decision of the joint British and American Governments. (?) I, therefore, suggest that I be authorized to convey to the Russians as from the Anglo/American Governments a reply in the sense of paragraphs two, three, four and five following.

Para 2. The British and American Governments cannot agree to disarm twenty two fully operational squadrons in order to provide aircraft for the Red Air Force additional to those already promised and being supplied.

Para 3. At the present date, the military situation in the Caucasus appears to be not unfavourable and there is, therefore, less urgent need for the Anglo American Force to be provided. These units would however, prove a most valuable asset in any offensive operations which the Russian High Command may undertake on the Caucasus Front in the spring one nine four three. In the meanwhile these squadrons can be usefully employed in the operations now proceeding in North Africa.

Para 4. The Anglo American proposal, therefore, is that the complete Anglo American Force as originally accepted by Premier Stalin should be dispatched to the Russian Southern Front at a time which will permit it to be fully operational by early one nine four three. For this purpose detailed arrangements for the reception of the force must now be undertaken by the Allied Staffs and all administrative arrangements including pre-dumping must proceed in the Caucasus and in North Persia. The basis of these arrangements has already been most amicably agreed between representatives of the Red Army Air Force and my mission. The principles agreed to in Moscow should now be applied in the Caucasus and a Nucleus Anglo American headquarters should be set up at Caucasus G.H.Q forthwith. It is desired to perfect these administrative preparations now so that the force can move in at short notice.

Para 5. If this later date for the arrival of the force in the Caucasus is agreed a longer period is available for assembling supplies for it. In consequence the proportional
From: Amembassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 220, December 3rd, 1942

interruption of this flow of aid over the Trans Persian Railway to Russia will be smaller. We compute that there would be a twelve percent interruption in January, a ten percent interruption in February, a nine percent interruption in March and thereafter less than eight percent monthly. Moreover, if in the meanwhile the Russians will develop or allow us to develop the road Romanz-Lake Urmia we may be able to maintain the force without any interference with the flow of Russian aid.

Para 5. I would re-emphasize that General Pakalaev has clearly indicated that the Russian High Command will not engage in further discussion of the original project unless and until a firm Anglo American Government refusal to consider the Russian alternative proposal is received.

It seems to me that the situation is changing so rapidly that we should do well to let a week or so pass before ourselves taking steps to break the deadlock. We have made an offer which could only be fulfilled by heavy sacrifices on our part. We made that offer largely to take the edge off various Russian disappointments about the Second Front in one nine four two, about the P Q conveys, etc, and to show that we really wished to help. The offer stands. Since it was made immense improvements have occurred in the Russian position which have already altered and made completely changed the strategic situation on the Russian Southern Front. At the same time by the Anglo American successes along the whole North African Front we have shown the Russians that we are active comrades in the war and they are impressed by this. I do not wish to force upon them what it costs us so much to give. I consider therefore that Air Marshal Drummond and your representative, General Adler, might mark time a little on the ground defined in Air Marshal Drummonds telegram without bringing matters to a sharp point. Meanwhile the strategic situation will be clarifying itself and we can make the arrangements for the conference proposed in your number two two four, about which I am sending you a separate telegram. It seems to me that Velvet might well be brought into the general scheme and should be decided at this conference. In the meanwhile all preparations for Velvet should go forward so far as they rest with Britain and the United States.
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER: 221, December 6, 1942

FROM: LONDON ENGLAND

Personal and former naval person to President.

Reference your number two two six. I bow to your wishes, though I should have preferred on general grounds the arrangement we proposed. Not only on account of her earlier arrival at Pearl Harbour but also for various reasons connected with equipment of aircraft and better fighter directions, it is preferred to send Victorious. Pound will communicate with King regarding the transfer.

PRIME

REGRADED OF TARES FD by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-2972
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Ref Room 12/6 1150, EWT.
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FILING: DECEMBER 6, 1942
1432 Z

RECEIVED: DECEMBER 6, 1942
1443 Z

FROM: LONDON ENGLAND

TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER: 222, December 6, 1942

I have received a very handsome telegram from Fraser stating that his government and house of representatives have unanimously decided that the New Zealand division shall stay in the Middle East. I am sure they would appreciate a complimentary message from you.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received in Map Room 1150, 8 ET, Dec. 6, 1942.
December 6, 1942
Filed 062255 Z

From, London

To The President of The United States

No. 223, December 6, 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and Secret

Your No. 227. I entirely agree.

PRIME

Received Map Room at 2020/6

REGRATED UNGCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. 224, December 7, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President following just received from M. Stalin. Begins Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill Personal and your message of the fourth December received.

I welcome the idea of a meeting between the heads of the Governments of the three countries being arranged in order to fix a common line of military strategy.

To my great regret however I will not be in a position to leave the Soviet Union. Time presses us and it would be impossible for me to be absent even for a day as it is just now that important military operations of our winter campaign are developing. These operations will not be relaxed in January, probably to the contrary.

I am waiting your reply to the paragraph of my preceding letter dealing with the establishment of the second front in Western Europe in the Spring of one nine four three.

The operations in the Stalingrad area as well as on the central front are developing. In the Stalingrad area we are keeping a large group of the German troops surrounded and we hope to annihilate them completely.

Pray look especially at sentence beginning "I am waiting"
From Former Naval Person to President and personal.

Your no. two two seven on the subject "Velvet". I suggest that we should now send to our two representatives in Moscow the instructions proposed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, namely:

(a) Alternative proposals of Soviet officials that either the equivalent number of aircraft or of aircraft with US or British air crews be sent to South Caucasus in place of Anglo-US air units are not acceptable to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Proposal to send only aircraft or aircraft and crews which can only be found by disarming existing formations is bound to lead to a loss of effective air strength and serious complications in matters of maintenance, and is therefore most undesirable in Russian as well as in Anglo-American interests. Many practical difficulties would arise from the proposal to mix air crews.
(c) Combined Chiefs of Staff are convinced that experience will show that the most effective force will be brought to bear against Germany by establishing in the Caucasus the combined British-American air force to be employed under strategic direction of Russian High Command. Upon approval of the original proposal by the Russian Government, every effort will be made to expedite operations of the combined force and to meet the logistical problems involved without interference with flow of allied supplied obviously committed to Russia.

Prime
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Filed 240 AM
Date December 9

FROM: London
TO: The President of the United States
NUMBER: 226, December 9

Personal and Former Naval Person to President (signed Prime). I should like to read your No. two one four to the House in Secret Session on Thursday as there is a good deal of uneasiness about Darlan which the reading of the above message would clear away. There is nothing in it which could be harmful even if published but you may be sure Parliament will observe the strictest secrecy.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-73
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 227. December 9, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and

I have been disturbed by reports received during the last few
days from North Africa about conditions in French Morocco and
Algeria. These reports, which come from independent and reliable
sources, all paint the same picture of the results which follow
from our inability in existing circumstances to exercise a proper
control over the local French authorities in internal administrative
matters. You are, I am sure, fully aware of this state of affairs,
but I think it my duty to let you know the position as it appears
in the light of our own reports.

These reports show that the S. O. L. and kindred Fascist
organization continue their activitives and victimize our former French
sympathisers some of whom have not yet been released from prison.
The first reaction of these organizations to the allied landing
was rightly one of fear but it seems that they have now taken
courage to regroup themselves and continue their activities. Well-
known German sympathisers who had been ousted have been reinstated.
Not only have our enemies been thus encouraged but our friends have been correspondingly confused and cast down. There have been cases of French soldiers being punished for desertion because they tried to support the allied forces during the landing.

There is an almost complete absence of control on the Franco-Spanish Frontier. The result of this is that undesirables of all sorts, including Axis agents, cross the frontier in both directions, carrying information to the enemy and preparing trouble for us throughout North Africa. Unless proper control is instituted soon our military operations may be endangered and we may witness sabotage in North Africa on a large scale and other incidents of a serious nature which may culminate in risings in various parts of North Africa.

There is no allied control of postal and telegraph censorship and therefore nothing to stop enemy agents from writing and telegraphing information to Europe. One informant for example states that certain Germanophile Spanish Consuls in the French Zone send full reports about the military situation by telephone and telegraph to the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan.

Veiled anti-allied propaganda continues in the press and on the radio and positive enemy propaganda increases daily.

In short elements hostile to the United Nations are being consolidated within the administration and conditions are being created which will make North Africa a favourable resort for Axis trouble-makers. If we were to suffer serious setbacks in Tunisia the Axis may be relied upon to exploit the situation to the full and there is no
knowing what difficulties we may then encounter even at the hand of those Frenchmen who now appear to be cooperating with us.

It occurs to me that there is one step which we might usefully take and that is to see that such good friends of ours as Generals Bethouard and Mast are appointed to high military commands in Moroco. Mast is at present serving as Giraud's Liaison Officer at Allied Headquarters while Bethouard has been sent to Gibraltar to perform non-existent liaison duties. It is a pity that men like these, who took such grave risks on our behalf, should not be in active employment. Bethouard, who commanded a division at Casablanca, would be particularly useful in Morocco where a man of his stamp seems to be badly needed.

All of this reinforces the need for immediate political and administrative help for Eisenhower. As you know we are very ready to give any assistance in our power.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 228, December 10, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and
I have never seen the House so unanimous as it was today
in secret session. I explained the whole story to them
and they understood it as well as you and I do our-
selves. Your message was much appreciated. I am going
to send you a message tomorrow about Joe. I suspect
he thought he would have put across him by us both
"no second front in one nine four three" and that he
thought he might just as well get that by post as
verbally. We have got to go into the whole of this
matter again. I am most grieved not to meet you and
still hope we may fix it. But anyhow in the interval
surely you will let Marshall, Arnold and King come
over here with Harry to survey the new scene with your
faithful friends. Every day counts.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., S-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London  
To: President of the United States  
Date: December 11, 1942.

Personal and confidential (signed Prime) former Naval Person to President.

I am glad that you have it in mind to appoint a political representative for North Africa who will relieve Eisenhower of day to day administrative and political problems. We should like to collaborate with you in this. I understand from Halifax that you have the names of Murphy or Matthews in mind. If you decide to appoint either of these I would like to appoint someone to work with him, and would choose an under secretary of administrative experience whom Eisenhower might be expected to find sympathetic. For your personal information I had Harold MacMillan in mind.

No Sig.

Degraded unclassified by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5, 1972.
FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 230

Former Naval Person to President and personal. The only question which the Russians will ask or the only one that matters will be "Are you going to make a Second Front in 1943 and when and with what forces?"
I cannot answer this except jointly with you because the forces we British can dispose of are obviously insufficient. Therefore, we cannot reply to Stalin's question until our Staffs have explored the possibilities together and hence my strong wish that your friends should come here. If this is not agreeable I am willing to come to you. We are all here sure that a talk whether at Moscow or Khartoum among the three Staffs apart from the heads of governments would not be useful.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No 231 December 14, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President and personal.

I congratulate you warmly on getting the West African announcement through in so satisfactory a form. We are particularly grateful to Eisenhower for securing the desired arrangement about our internees who have we understand now been released. Please send him our congratulations and thanks.

Prime

Message sent to Eisenhower 14 Dec
(sent via star dept.) M.R.

REGEARED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-74
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No 232 December 14, 1942.

Message with the above heading should have serial number changed to read No. 231.

WDCG

Filed 14/13502
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 232, December 17, 1942

Former Naval person to President (and personal (sgd Prime) your number two three four.

I am anxiously awaiting the arrival of your courier. Our affairs are so interdependent that I cannot make any plans or even think ahead until I know your wishes.

Thank you so much for your long letter about Lyttelton’s affairs to which I am preparing a full answer. We are most grateful to you for all your help.

No Sig
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

FILED: DECEMBER 17, 1942
1400 Z

RECEIVED: DECEMBER 17, 1942
1443 Z

FROM: LONDON ENGLAND

TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER: 233

From the Former Naval Person to the President

1. I am most grateful for the assistance you have given us by establishing a pool of oil in New York from which our tankers can draw. Without this assistance our oil position would soon have become grave in the extreme. Unfortunately, despite this new arrangement, our consumption will continue to exceed imports, and it is clear that very early steps are necessary not only to check this drain but also to build up stocks, which are at a dangerously low level.

2. If the present situation is allowed to persist, our stocks will be reduced in the coming months to such a degree that it may be necessary to restrict the movements of our warships and oil burning ships, which would affect the north Russian and Torch convoys.
3. I am advised that his serious state of affairs has arisen as a result of the lengthened turn-round of tankers occasioned by the extension of the convoy system to the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean, accentuated by the unexpectedly large demands of oil supplies to the Torch area which under present arrangements can only be made from the United Kingdom resources.

4. Drastic measures are obviously necessary to remedy this situation and proposals which have been worked out by the Admiralty and Ministry of War transport are contained in my immediately following telegram.

5. One of the proposed measures is that as you have assumed responsibility for the civil administration of North Africa, you should also assume responsibility for the supply of petroleum products both civil and military to this area. I very much hope you will be able to agree to this though we cannot offer you any assistance in providing escorts for the tankers so employed.

6. In view of the urgency of preventing our position from deteriorating further, I should be grateful if the proposals contained in para five above and in my immediately following telegram could be given very early consideration.

PRIME
From Naval Person to President personal and

1. With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, the following are the measures proposed for arresting the decline of the UK oil stocks.

2. (a.) To institute direct tanker convoys every twenty days between the Dutch West Indies and the United Kingdom, by which we should hope to improve our imports by one hundred thousand tons a month. (b.) To find the escorts for these convoys by a further opening of the cycle of the transatlantic convoys from eight to ten days, which will enable four groups of escort vessels to be released.

3. By the opening of the transatlantic cycle to ten days, it will be possible to operate these convoys with eight groups of escorts by accepting a shorter period of lay-over between voyages and it is proposed that the eight British manned groups should be employed on
this duty. The four groups released would therefore consist of the American group and three Canadian manned groups which it is proposed should be temporarily transferred to the escort of Torch build up convoys. This would enable four long endurance groups to be released which would provide three groups of increased strength for the D W I to UK tanker convoys. It is necessary to have groups of increased strength for these convoys as we hope to include an escort aircraft carrier in the escort of these convoys.

4. The effect of our non tanker import programme of opening the transatlantic cycle is serious in view of the acute shortage of shipping in the early part of next year. It is estimated it will result in a loss of thirty thousand tons a month using the shipping we have at present available. It is hoped however when more escorts become available in the summer of one nine four three that it will be possible to restore the cycle to eight days.

5. The effect of the above measures on the UK oil situation combined with the loading of tankers from the US Navy pool at New York will, it is estimated, do little more than arrest the decline of our stocks and it is therefore necessary to consider measures to build up our stock position. Measures for improving the UK stock position.

6. The only ways that can be suggested of effecting any substantial improvement in our stock position are: (A) By direct shipment of oil from the Gulf or Dutch West Indies to the UK using fast
independently sailed U S tankers. This is the quickest way of building up the stocks in this country. (B) Increasing the supplies of oil in the New York Navy pool for on-carriage to the U K, thus enabling more tankers of convoy speed to be employed on the shortest voyage from New York to the United Kingdom. (C) To meet the oil requirements, both civil and military, of the Torch area by direct shipment from the United States or Dutch West Indies, preferably by fast United States tankers. (D) The tankers referred to in (C) above to be allowed to proceed to discharge ports in the Mediterranean.

PRIME
From: LONDON ENGLAND
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Number: 235

Former Naval Person to President personal and urgent your number two three eight. This bears out what I have said and shows how absolutely necessary it is for us to have a plan which we can put to him fairly and squarely. It is bound to be a joint plan, and I can do nothing until I hear from you.

PRIME
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAFY:

Attached is a copy of a despatch, dated December 19, 1942, from Mr. Winant to the President, with reference to the appointment of Harold MacMillan by the British Government as its representative in French North Africa.

The President desires that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare draft of a reply to the Prime Minister for the President's signature on this subject. The President states that he agrees with the thought implied in Mr. Winant's message.

A copy of the Prime Minister's message No. 236, dated December 18, 1942, to the President on this same subject was furnished you earlier today.

Very respectfully,

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls.-

Incl.1 - Winant-President Message.
Incl.2 - PM-POTUS No. 236.

Draft of reply to P.M.-POTUS 236, mentioned and requested in above memorandum, dispatched as POTUS-PM No. 241.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Unnumbered December 19, 1942.

Personal and [redacted] to the President from Winant.

I do not like the Prime Minister's message on MacMillan. It is not what Eden told me the British wanted, namely to place both Murphy and MacMillan under General Eisenhower.

Leaving here today.

Winant

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] Date FEB 4 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 236, December 18, 1942.

Personal and Former Naval Person to President

I am glad that you agree that Harold MacMillan is a good choice. We propose that he should remain a member of His Majesty's Government as a Junior Minister. Locally, we should propose to give him the title of Agent General in French Northern Africa of H M G in the U.K. This avoids the difficulty of his being accredited to anyone.

His status will thus not be quite the same as that of Murphy, since on the one hand he is not like Murphy the personal representative of the head of a State, nor on the other can we well appoint him to Eisenhower Staff. One of his functions would be to supervise our consular officers in French North Africa, who are, of course, British officials and not members of Eisenhower staff. In all that he does he will have instructions to act in the closest concert with Eisenhower, who has supreme authority in all Military Political and Administrative matters in the territory.

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
December 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL DEANE:

Admiral Leahy requests that
the attached secret despatch be sent to the
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for their information.

Respectfully,

W. L. Fraseman,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Aide.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

December 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The President directed that I bring to your attention the attached for the information of the Chiefs of Staff.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S.Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Attachment  

RECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. F. Stewart Date  

MAY 5 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy /
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

Subject: Appointment of Harold
MacMillan as Agent General
in French Northern Africa
of H.M.G. in the U.K.

Enclosure: Copy of message from the
Prime Minister to the
President, No. 236, 12-18-42.

The attached is for your information.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Sec Army

By TAG per 720674

By RH Date JUL 26 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 236, December 18, 1942

Personal and Former Naval Person to President (sgd Prime).

I am glad that you agree that Harold MacMillan is a good choice. We propose that he should remain a member of His Majesty's Government as a Junior Minister. Locally, we should propose to give him the title of Agent General in French Northern Africa of H.M.G. in the U.K. This avoids the difficulty of his being accredited to anyone.

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From: London

To: The President of the United States

Number: 236, December 18, 1942

Personal and Former Naval Person to President (sgd Prime).

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No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks Date May 5 1972

COPES TO ADM. LEAHY (FOR C.E.S.)
AND TO UNDER SEC. OF STATE.
FROM: London

TO: The President of the United States

NUMBER: 237, December 19, 1942

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential

Please see No. two three zero one of the seventeenth instant Eisenhower to General Marshall. While of course we should all like to get Godfrey and his squadron over, we have waited for two years or more and there cannot be any particular hurry for a day or two or even a week or two. We are bound to get him in the end. I therefore hope that no promise will be made tying us up with Darlan till the end of "active hostilities". I should have to consult War Cabinet before I could agree in the name of his Majesty's Government.

With time and patience the Godfrey problem will straighten itself out in Alexandria. I should therefore be grateful if you will let me know your wishes before taking any irrevocable decision.

PRIME
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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<tr>
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<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
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<td>COMNAVEU</td>
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**RELEASED BY**

**DATE**

**TOR CODEROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY**

**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**212130**

**2/17/30**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**TEXT**

**ACTION**

211440

DELIVERY 211840 EFFECTED TO ULTIMATE ADDRESSEE BY ADMIRAL KIRK.

MY NEXT MESSAGE 212215 IS REPLY.

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING AS ABOVE REFERENCE DID.

**ACTION: LT MOTT, WHITE HOUSE CHART ROOM.**

**FILE.**
NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTER

FROM

COMNAVEU

RELEASED BY

DATE

DEC. 21, 1942

TOR CODEROOM

2314

DECODED BY

ROBINSON

PARAPHRASED BY

ROBINSON

ADDRESSEES

OPNAV

INFORMATION

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

212215 NCR 5749

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

"OFFICER WHO ENCIPHERED OPNAV 211846 MUST DECIPHER THIS AND NO OTHER OFFICER HANDLE"

FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT:

(PERSONAL AND )

NUMBER 238:

YES, CERTAINLY; THE SOONER THE BETTER.

I AM GREATLY RELIEVED. IT IS THE ONLY THING TO DO.

ALL ARRANGEMENTS HERE WILL BE MADE ON BASIS THAT IT IS A STAFF MEETING ONLY.

SUGGESTED CODE NAME "SYMBOL"

ACTION: P1A....

FILE.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-39-7A
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 239 December 23, 1942

Former Naval Person to President and personal.

Your no two four one. The differences between our systems of government make it impossible to achieve exact similarity. For instance, by minister I meant political minister and you think diplomatic minister. Again Murphy is the personal representative of you as head of the state. I could not make any similar appointment of a diplomatic character. The best I can do is to send MacMillan out as "His Majesties Governments Political Representative at General Eisenhowers Headquarters", reporting to me direct, and enjoying exact equality of rank with Murphy. Will this suit you?

In your no two one nine of November twenty you seemed to contemplate the two political representatives being capable of relieving Eisenhower of large part of his political burdens and that real power should be vested in them jointly subject of course to the ultimate military control of the Commander in Chief. I think this is most urgently necessary as from all I hear the tangles of local French politics and their world implications force themselves into the first place in the military mind and might well become detrimental to operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY.

The President requests that you bring this dispatch to the attention of the Secretary of State and General Marshall and have the necessary draft reply prepared for the President.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
December 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State Hull
General Marshall

The President desires that I bring the attached despatch to your attention and that I prepare for him a draft reply.

I shall appreciate receiving, as soon as practicable, your suggestions concerning the reply, as well as any comment you may desire to make on the situation discussed in the Prime Minister's message.

PM-POTUS #239

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By
Date Nov. 1 1971
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 239 December 23, 1942

Former Naval Person to President [REDACTED] and personal.

Your number two four one. Due to the differences between our systems of government it is impossible to achieve exact similarity. For example, by minister I meant political minister and you think diplomatic minister. Again Murphy is the personal representative of you as head of the state. It would be impossible for me to make a similar appointment of a diplomatic character. The best that can be done is to send MacMillan out as "His Majesties Governments Political Representative at General Eisenhower's Headquarters", reporting directly to me, and enjoying precise equality of rank with Murphy. Will this suit you?

In your number two one nine of November twenty you seemed to contemplate the two political representatives being capable of relieving Eisenhower of large part of his political burdens and that real power should be vested in them jointly subject of course to the ultimate military control of the Commander in Chief. I believe this is most urgently necessary as from all I hear the tangles of local French politics and their world implications force themselves into the first place in the military mind and might well become detrimental to operations.

PRIME

COPY

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT.
PERSONAL AND NUMBER 240.

YOUR COURIER HAS ARRIVED. I LIKE IT ALL. I WILL DISCREETLY CONTACT GENERAL SMITH.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 241 December 25, 1942.

Prime Minister to President.

Last year I passed a happy Christmas in your home and now I send my heartfelt wishes to you and all around you on this brighter day than we have yet seen. My wife joins with me in this message to you and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Winston and Clementine Churchill
December 27, 1942
Filed 0008Z

From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. 242, December 27, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and (signed Prime).

1. Your two four five. As I told Barry I had already asked United States Headquarters London to delay plane which was carrying De Gaulle for forty eight hours as it is essential to see how Torch situation develops. De Gaulle sent on twenty fifth through American Embassy message repeated in my immediately following to Giraud. It seems to me that we ought to try above anything to bring them all together and have some French nucleus solid and united to work with. I am seeing De Gaulle today and will cable you further.

2. I am sure that North African settlement cannot be held up for "Symbol". We have received news that Kingpin has been unanimously elected High Commissioner and C in C by the French group of notabilities. I have already informed Eisenhower that so far as we are concerned we entirely agree with the solution.

3. War Cabinet attach much importance to MacMillan's appointment and arrival. We feel quite unrepresented there yet our fortunes are deeply involved and we are trying to make a solid contribution to your enterprise. Murphy's appointment has already been announced and I hope you will agree to my publishing MacMillan's appointment. He will be I am sure a help. He is animated by the friendliest feelings towards the United States and his mother hails from Kentucky.
From: London, England

To: The President of the United States

No. 243, December 27, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President personal and (signed Prime).

My immediately preceding telegram. Following is translation of most secret message from General De Gaulle to General Giraud, Algiers. Begins.

The assassination at Algiers is an indication and warning: An indication of the exasperation into which the tragedy of France has thrown the mind and soul of Frenchmen: A warning of the consequences of every kind which necessarily result from the absence of a national authority in the midst of the greatest national crisis of our history. It is more than ever necessary that this national authority should be established. I propose, my General, that you should meet me as soon as possible on French soil either in Algeria or in Chad in order to study the means of grouping under a provisional central authority all French forces inside and outside the country and all the French territories which are in a position to struggle for the liberation and the salvation of France.

No Sig.
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

TIME RECEIVED: 1740z/28
TIME FILED: 1733z/28

FROM: LONDON

TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO: 244 December 26, 1942

Former Naval person to President personal and

I had some long talks yesterday with Generals De Gaulle and D'Astier, the latter just returned from Algiers. De Gaulle holds it of first importance to create a strong, united, national French authority. He is anxious to meet Giraud, in whom he sees the commander who will lead the French troops to the liberation of France after North Africa has been cleared. He considers that Giraud is more suited for military than for political functions. He is quite ready to work with Nogues but apparently less so with Boisson, though I cannot think he would be obstinate about it. I must say I strongly favor a meeting between De Gaulle and Giraud as soon as possible, before rivalries crystallize.

No Sig

BENGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0542
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 245, December 29th, 1942

Former Naval Person to President (signed Prime)

I am delighted to receive the beautiful book of our addresses. Thank you so much for it, and for the inscription.
From: London
To: President of the United States

No. 246, December 29th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President [redacted] and personal.

MacMillan. I could if you like call him Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters instead of British Representative or H M Government's Representative. Am being much pressed here and feel announcement should be made tomorrow thirtieth.

Jibouti has passed off quite pleasantly. The Governor Dupont has signed adherence to United Nations as part of fighting France.

PRIME
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 247, December 30th, 1942.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and
begins: My Dear Mr. President,

1. The letter which Oliver Lyttelton brought and the
associated agreements about air and ground force equipment are
very welcome. I am deeply grateful. These Washington discus-
sions and the conclusions reached show that our departments
and yours are developing a closer understanding of each others
problems and getting nearer to a common view of the war. This
is essential to success.

2. The agreements arranged by Lyttelton, together with
the assurances of your letter, give me a basis on which to
allocate our reserves of man-power in full confidence that our
British effort will be effectively balanced and rightly applied.
We have now taken our decisions. I will not burden you with
details. In broad terms we calculate that between midsummer
one nine four two and December one nine four three we may be
able to draft into the services and draw into munition pro-
duction some one million six hundred thousand extra men and
women. Considering the degree of mobilization already achieved
in the past three years this is a large figure, and to reach
it will mean a further straitening of living conditions and
will call upon all the Nations latent resources. But it is
less by one million one hundred thousand than is asked for by
the services and those responsible for our munition production
whose combined requirements total two million seven hundred
thousand. We have therefore had to ration out reserves of man-
power and confine the programmes to essentials without allowing
any margins for insurance or contingencies.
3. The following is what we have decided. First, we must give the Navy all they need for the anti-U boat war up to the limit of our shipbuilding capacity and the resources which you can assign to us. The Admiralty will get the men for manning the ships but they must reduce their industrial requirements by labour economies in the shipyards and workshops, even though this means slowing down somewhat the building of big ships. Escort vessels will have the highest priority in the Navy's programme, and I am obliged to you for the allocations made to us from the pool.

4. Secondly, we shall strain every nerve to prevent labour shortage from checking the expansion of our aircraft industry. Our policy, subject to the limitations of training, technical problems, the availability of management and the supply of material and machines, will be to move labour into the factories as fast as it can be absorbed. The RAF, which has been taking in recruits on a large scale, will be able to use effectively all the aircraft which we can make or which you will send us under the new agreement dash or more. But, like other services, it will have to be economical in its use of man-power and even reduce some of its defensive services, such as the balloon barrage and airfield guards.

5. There are two things concerning the aircraft programme about which I am greatly concerned; one is the Fleet Air Arm and the other is Transport Aircraft. I have the impression that neither of our countries is devoting enough of its aircraft production to either of these two objects. We must be certain that we have enough Fleet Air Arm type aircraft to match the carrier programmes in the two countries, and, as things are, it looks as if we might fall behind. Again, the experiences of both the Egyptian and North African campaigns emphasise the great value of transport aircraft, and I am personally much impressed with the Russian argument with which they back their demands for further transport aircraft. It may be that their power to start a successful offensive in one nine four three will depend upon increasing our ability to supply them with transport aircraft to supplement their rather rudimentary communications. As you know, we ourselves are woefully short of transport aircraft, but we are providing them with one hundred Alabemarles for conversion for this purpose. I believe there are proposals in the United States for building wooden aircraft, and I feel that, if you could personally stimulate this production, it might prove a decision of the highest strategic importance.
6. Third, we have had to limit the Army's man-power intake considerably, and we are having to curtail our plans for producing army equipment. The Army will take its cut where it hurts least; we can now run more risk in thinning out the home defences, in generally in combing the Army's tail, in order to sharpen its teeth. Here and there, as in the Middle East, we shall have to make two divisions into one by compression. But at home the main decision is to convert the home Army to an offensive basis with a possible increase in its striking power. We shall be able to reduce the numbers in the factories making ground equipment, partly because the personnel is becoming more efficient and output per head is rising, partly because the initial equipment of the Army is in many items nearly complete and we are reaching the point where we can maintain it on a reduced output. We have been fortified in taking the decision to reduce the labour at the disposal of the Ministry of Supply by the agreements which Oliver Lyttelton brought back covering tanks and other Army supplies.

In the circumstances, we shall rely heavily upon your medium tanks; I agree with your view that some increase in your programme would be wise.

7. Lastly shipping. Here again we are fortified by your assurance that our twenty seven million ton import programme will be met, as well as our other essential needs. This is an undertaking of the highest importance to these Islands. You may rest assured that we shall do our utmost to limit the demands of the British import programme upon the common pool of shipping. We are now running down our stocks, and we shall make what economies we can. But these devices only give us a little relief for a little while. You have warned me that the early months of one nine four three will be difficult. This I fully understand. But I must tell you frankly that the prospect in the next few months is going to be more acute than we expected when the figures were prepared which Lyttelton took to Washington. American shipbuilding has turned your own net losses of the spring into a surplus. British and Allied net losses are, however, very serious indeed. In November, for example dash admittedly a bad month dash losses from all causes of American dash controlled and United Nations tonnage other than our own were two hundred sixty thousand D W tons, against which, excluding the Todd ships for us, you built eight hundred fifty thousand tons D W, giving a net gain of five hundred ninety thousand tons. Losses of British dash controlled tonnage, on the other hand, were eight hundred fifty thousand
tons D W (one hundred thousand due to Torch), against which new construction of British and Canadian yards, plus the Todd contracts, gave us two hundred fifty thousand tons leaving us a net loss of six hundred thousand tons. With this position before us you will understand how vital it is that the reinforcement of our depleted shipping resources should not be deferred. The situation which we now foresee will only give us imports over the five months November to March at the rate of seventeen million tons a year. This is indeed a grim prospect, and one which means for us dangerous and difficult decisions between Military operations, food and raw materials.

8. The suggested average supplement figure of three hundred thousand tons of dry dash cargo carrying capacity each month will only be enough if certain conditions are fulfilled. First and foremost, we must be able to load a sufficient proportion of our total import on the North Atlantic Seaboard or at other near or convenient sources of supply. Our joint machinery will examine this and other technical aspects, but in thanking you for the directions which you have given, I must sound the alarm of mortal urgency. I am relieved by knowing that you will keep this whole business constantly under your own eye and that no further important diversion of tonnage to Military purposes will be made without your personal direction after I have had my say.

9. I was also reassured by your resolve to raise the shipbuilding programme to twenty million dead dash weight tons, if it should prove feasible; and, as we live and fight upon our shipping, I hope you will be able to give me some good news about the result of this inquiry. Indeed, any news of progress of this would be helpful.

10. In conclusion, Mister President, let me emphasize the fact that our whole man-power lay-out is based upon striking the strongest blows we can in one nine four three. We will run the utmost risk for this; but unless our shipping resources are, in fact, repaired as you so kindly propose, I shall be forced immediately to reduce the British War Effort in overseas theatres even though this involves prolongation of the war and leaves you a greater portion of the burden we are eager to share, believe me, always your most sincerest friend, Winston S Churchill.
FROM COMNAV EU

RELEASED BY

DATE 30 December 1942.

TOR CODE ROOM 1620/30

DECODED BY GERMAN

PARAPHRASED BY

OPNAV

DECODED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78

By R. H. Parks Date

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT. GERMAN

301511 NCR 2039

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

PART 1 301506 NCR 2034

PART 2 301511 NCR 2039

(DECIPHER ONLY REPEAT ONLY TO BE DONE BY OFFICER WHO HANDLED OPNAV 211840)

AND PERSONAL NUMBER 24g FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT.

I SENT BRIGADIER JACOB TO NORTH AFRICA ON CHRISTMAS DAY TO CONSULT WITH GENERALS EISENHOWER AND SMITH ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR SYMBOL. JACOB HAS NOW TELEGRAPHED THAT THEY HAVE FOUND ADMIRABLE ACCOMMODATION AND THAT GENERAL SMITH WHO IS IN FULL AGREEMENT IS TELEGRAPHING THE RESULTS OF THEIR RECONNAISSANCE TO YOU.

2. I DO NOT THINK WE CAN DO BETTER THAN ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS, AND AS TIME IS SHORT, I AM GOING AHEAD ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT YOU APPROVE.

3. MY INTENTION IS THAT HMS BULOLO, WHICH IS A SPECIALLY FITTED HEADQUARTER SHIP, SHOULD LEAVE THE UKAY ON ABOUT 4TH JANUARY WITH THE MORE JUNIOR STAFF OFFICERS OF MY DELEGATION, CYPHER STAFF

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREDS.)

NCR 18
CLERICAL STAFF, ETC. BULOLO WILL BE BERTHED IN THE HARBOUR AND
SERVE AS SIGNAL SHIP.

4. IN YOUR 242 YOU SUGGESTED THAT SOME OF OUR MILITARY MEN
SHOULD PRECEDE US BY A FEW DAYS TO CLEAR THE GROUND. I ENTIRELY
AGREE, AND WILL ARRANGE FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF TO ARRIVE BY
AIR AT RENDEZVOUS ON WHATEVER DAY IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR AMERICAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF TO REACH THERE. CAN YOU GIVE ME A DATE?

5. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE YOUR OWN PROGRAMME AND I WILL MAKE MY OWN ARRANGEMENTS
ACCORDINGLY.

6. MANY THANKS ABOUT MACMILLAN. I AGREE TO WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT
EISENHOWER'S FINAL AUTHORITY.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
LT. KELLEY
311951 NCR 3047

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT, PERSONAL AND NUMBER 249, YOUR MESSAGE JUST RECEIVED.

I NEED NOT SAY HOW MUCH I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SYMBOL BUT IN THE MEANWHILE I SEND YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS ON OUR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FRENCH.

1. WE OUGHT NOT TO ACCEPT THE SUGGESTION THAT OUR ARMIES IN NORTHWEST AFRICA ARE ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THEY WERE IN FRANCE IN 1918. WE WERE NOT INVITED BUT FOUGHT OUR WAY ON SHORE WITH THE LOSS OF 2,000 MEN. THEREFORE THE ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF REPRESENTING YOU AS HEAD OF OUR JOINT ENTERPRISE IN THESE REGIONS MUST BE SUPREME IN ALL MATTERS MILITARY AND CIVIL OF COURSE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF FRANCE REVIVING WHEN THE WAR IS OVER.

2. GIRAUD IS IN MY OPINION QUITE UNSUITED TO THE DISCHARGE OF CIVIL RESPONSIBILITIES. HE IS A BRAVE CAPABLE FLAMBOYANT SOLDIER AND IT IS HIS DUTY TO ANIMATE AND LEAD THE FRENCH ARMIES IN THIS THEATER UNDER EISENHOWERS ORDERS.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-78
PAGE 1 By R. H. Parks Date
3. A civil regime should be set up in whatever form is found locally convenient in which Murphy and Macmillan should have as you suggested a veto as well as powers of guidance and initiation veiled under appropriate forms.

4. I trust Eisenhower will soon be freed from the distraction of local French politics the rate of exchange problems of French sovereignty etc.

I am most anxious about the military situation. If Nehring can get enough transport—a big if—he might bring off the same kind of attack along the sea flank that Alexander and Montgomery did a Alamein with the disastrous results to all our forces to the southward that befell the Italians. The danger to our first army or rather corps for it is no more seems to me far more serious than anything which threatens us on the southern flank. Only a supreme commander like Eisenhower concentrating his whole thought upon the fighting can cope with these military perils.

5. For you alone, Alexander and Montgomery hope to have
TRIPOLI EARLY IN FEBRUARY. ROMMEL WILL MOST LIKELY MAKE HIS WAY WITH HIS REMNANTS SOME OF WHICH ARE FORMIDABLE TO TUNISIA.

WE HOPE TO BE HARD AT HIS TAIL IN SUPERIOR FORCE AND I AM ENCOURAGING GENERAL ALEXANDER TO PRESS FORWARD TO THE UTMOST.

6. WE ARE PUTTING HARD PRESSURE ON DE GAULLE TO SHUT HIS BRAZANVILLE MOUTH AND I AM SUGGESTING THAT SWINTON HAVE A TALK WITH BOISSON.

DISTRIBUTION:

P1A.......ACTION

SEALED SECRET FILE.

RE Classified UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. 3-29-72
By R. E. Farnell, Date: MAY 5 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

NCR 18