URGENT - PRIORITY

January 1, 1943.

From: ONNAV
To: ComNavEu

No. 249 personal and from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Our censor plans to issue just before departure the following instructions to all papers, radio and wire communications systems:

Quote. The President is going on another trip in the immediate future and for security reasons no comment should be made on his whereabouts or the purpose of the trip until a release is approved by this office. Unquote.

I am particularly anxious that no confidential information be given to the press as to the place or time of SYMBOL. I wonder if your censor could give out substantially the same statement to your own press regarding you as well as myself. I intend to clamp down the lid a few hours before I leave.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1855, EWT, January 1, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971
To: Former Naval Person

Our censor plans to issue the following instructions to all papers, radio and wire communications systems.

The President is going on a trip in the immediate future and for security reasons no comment should be made on his whereabouts or the purpose of the trip until a release is approved by this office. I am particularly anxious that no information be given to the press as to the place or time of the trip.
I wonder if your censor could give me substantially the same statement to go on in reply as well as myself. I am pressing urgent need to clamp down the lid a few hours before I leave.

Rueweh
From: Opnav
To: Alsana, London

Personal and No. 250 from the President to the Former Naval Person.

In reply to your 249 I feel very strongly that we have a military occupation in North Africa and as such our Commanding General has complete charge of all matters civil as well as military. We must not let any of our French friends forget this for a moment. By the same token I don't want any of them to think that we are going to recognize any one or any committee or group as representing the French Government or the French Empire. The people of France will settle their own affairs after we have won this war. Until then we can deal with local Frenchmen on a local basis wherever our armies occupy former French territory. And if these local officials won't play ball we will have to replace them.

I agree that Eisenhower has had to spend too much time on political affairs but Marshall has sent him very explicit instructions on this point. I don't know whether Eisenhower can hold Giraud in line with another Frenchman running the civil affairs but I shall find out. Why doesn't De Gaulle go to war? Why doesn't he start North by West half West from Brazenville? It would take him a long time to get to the Oasis of Somewhere.

A happy new year to you and yours.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1920, EST January 1, 1943.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date Champ

0557
To

Honourable Person

In reply to your 249 I feel very strongly that we have a military occupation in North Africa and as such our commanding general has complete charge of all matters civil as well as military. We must not let any of our French friends forget this for a moment. By the same token, I don't want any of them to think that we are going to recognize any committee or group one of any as representing the
French government or the French Empire. The people of France will settle their own affairs after we have this war. Until then let us can deal with local Frenchmen on a local basis whereas our armies occupy former French territory. And if these local officials won't play ball we will have to replace them.

I agree that Eisenhower has had to spend too much time on political affairs but Marshall has sent him very explicit instructions on this point. I don't know.
Whether Eisenhower can hold
Gibraltar in line with another Frenchman
ruling the civil affairs, but I shall
find out. Why doesn't De Gaulle
go to war.
A happy new year to you
and yours.

Why doesn't he start North by
West half West from Brazzaville. It
would take him a long time to get
to the Oasis of Somewhere.

Proverb
January 2, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and secret for the Former Naval Person from the President No. 251.

Referring further to your 233 and 254. As result of studies in Navy Department it has been found that the following can be accomplished: Lengthen cycle in North Atlantic convoys to ten days and deliver average of two notional tanker cargoes daily by that route. This will release four Canadian escort groups for assignment to UK for replacement of long ranged escorts for duty with Aruba UK tanker convoys which should deliver an additional two notional cargoes daily. Total of above deliveries supplemented from time to time by spare tankers as found available should be about fifteen million tons annually. Consider independently routed tankers inadvisable at this time. US can not agree to delivery of more than above amount to UK and even this not practicable except as considered with problem of Torch supply which in our opinion must be combined responsibility. Can furnish fast tankers to insure adequate supply that area but escorts must be combined and provided equally by US and UK. Fast tankers will not proceed beyond Gibraltar or Casablanca. Further deliveries into Mediterranean to be made by UK tankers. Above most economical use of allied tankers for delivery of requirements of oil for UK and Torch. If the foregoing meets your approval I suggest that further details be worked out between the Admiralty and the Navy Department.
PROPOSED REPLY TO DESPATCHES NUMBERS 233 AND 234 FROM LONDON TO THE PRESIDENT

Referring further to your 233 and 234, as result of studies in Navy Department it has been found that the following can be accomplished: Lengthen cycle in North Atlantic convoys to ten days and deliver average of two notional tanker cargoes daily by that route. This will release four Canadian escort groups for assignment to UK for replacement of long-legged escorts for duty with Aruba UK tanker convoys which should deliver an additional two notional cargoes daily. Total of above deliveries supplemented from time to time by spare tankers as found available should be about fifteen million tons annually. Consider independently routed tankers inadvisable at this time. US can not agree to delivery of more than above amount to UK and even this not practicable except as considered with problem of Torch supply which in our opinion must be combined responsibility. Can furnish fast tankers to inaugurate supply that area but escorts must be combined and provided equally by US and UK. Fast tankers will not proceed beyond Gibraltar or Casablanca. Further deliveries into Mediterranean to be made by UK tankers above most economical use of Allied tankers for delivery of requirements of oil for UK and Torch. If the foregoing meets your approval I suggest that further details be worked out between the Admiralty and the Navy Department.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By U. J. Stewart Date APR 4 1972
December 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As a result of a conference on the supply of oil to United Kingdom and Torch, at which representatives of the British, Canadian and United States Navies were present, and after further study on the subject by the Navy Department, the attached draft of a message to the Prime Minister is submitted.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
URGENT - PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: ComNavEu

January 2, 1943.

Personal and for the Former Naval Person from the President No. 252. Your 251:

1. I heartily approve your Paragraph One.
2. The aliases from this end will be (a) Don Quixote and (b) Sancho Panza.
3. No press correspondents. I will bring one Navy photographer and we can join in joint release.
4. I honestly think De Gaulle would feel happier if he postponed visit until after "Symbol". Also I would find great difficulty in giving him any time even if he were to leave at once.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EST, January 2, 1943.

W.C. Mott
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
January 2, 1942.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

Your 251:

1. I heartily approve your Paragraph #1.

2. The aliases from this end will be (a) Don Quixote and (b) Sancho Panza.

3. No press correspondents. I will bring one Navy photographer and we can join in joint release.

4. I honestly think De Gaulle would feel happier if he postponed visit until after Symbol. Also I would find great difficulty in giving him any time even if he were to leave at once.

ROOSEVELT
From: Opnav
To: ComNavKu

Personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person No. 253.

I hope you can bring Averill with you and I have asked him to go to see you. He can be very helpful.

ROOSEVELT

January 4, 1943.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1105, EWT, January 4, 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
White House Map Room.
To Former Naval Person

I hope you can bring
Overhill with you and I
have asked him to go
to see you. He can be
very helpful.

Respectfully

#253 To Former Naval Person

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Lauter
Date Nov 1 1971
January 7, 1943.

From: Opnav  
To: Alusma, London

Personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person No. 254.

I should like to acquaint you with a message received by me from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Begin brief of Generalissimo's message:

Last spring the Prime Minister assured the members of the Pacific War Council that before the end of the next monsoon season, eight battleships, three aircraft carriers and the usual complement of other vessels would be in the Indian Ocean to assist in the recapture of Burma. We have been counting on the support of this naval force, for without it the recapture of Burma will be impossible. General Stilwell upon returning from a conference in India informs me that Admiral Somerville stated the British Navy has at its disposal only a few destroyers and submarines for operations in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, two months ago General Wavell promised General Stilwell the British could make seven divisions available to assist in the recapture of Burma. Now I learn that only three divisions are to be employed in limited operations with the objective of capturing Akyab and occupying the line of the Chindwin River. You can rely on the Chinese force being concentrated and ready for action on time in accordance with plans already made. I am sure the American air help for the campaign will be present. However, it is impossible to undertake the offensive with my troops unless the British carry out their part of the undertaking. All the principle United Nations spokesmen have pledged that Burma will be recovered in 1943. I therefore earnestly ask that you urge our British
Allies to provide the necessary naval, air and land forces to carry out their part. End of brief of Generalissimo’s message.

I understand that definite progress is being made not only in preparations of the Chinese troops in India for the Burma Road operation but also of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. Units are being reorganized and equipped. Some of the supply essentials are even being flown in.

I feel that we must do something to ensure that the Chinese put their full weight into the operations which are due to start in March. Can you suggest any assurance which we can give Chiang Kai Shek which will have this effect?

Offensive action by the Chinese and the timeliness of a thrust into Burma this spring are all important. We also want to get started on our air offensive from China against Jap sea lanes (if not Japan itself), the moment sufficient and dependable communications over Burma warrant such action.

That we may forfeit neither the Chinese potential nor the lift to United Nations morale of early action in Burma, I would like to give the Generalissimo the necessary assurances to prevent the Chinese attack stalling. We might together go over the substance of my reply to the Generalissimo later.

Dill has seen this message.

ROOSEVELT.
I should like to acquaint you with a message received by me from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Begin brief of Generalissimo's message:

Last spring the Prime Minister assured the members of the Pacific War Council that before the end of the next monsoon season, eight battleships, three aircraft carriers and the usual complement of other vessels would be in the Indian Ocean to assist in the recapture of Burma. We have been counting on the support of this naval force, for without it the recapture of Burma will be impossible. General Stilwell upon returning from a conference in India informs me that Admiral Somerville stated the British Navy has at its disposal only a few destroyers and submarines for operations in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, two months ago General Wavell promised General Stilwell the British could make seven divisions available to assist in the recapture of Burma. Now I learn that only three divisions are to be employed in limited operations with the objective of capturing Akyab and occupying the line of the Chindwin River. You can rely on the Chinese force being concentrated and ready for action on time in accordance with plans already made. I am sure the American air help for the campaign will be present. However, it is impossible to undertake the offensive with my troops unless the British carry
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That we may forfeit neither the Chinese potential nor the lift to United Nations morale of early action in Burma, I would like to give the Generalissimo the necessary assurances to prevent the Chinese attack stalling. We might together go over the substance of my reply to the Generalissimo later.

Dill has seen this message.
January 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY -
ADMIRAL KING -
GENERAL ARNOLD -

Subject: Burma Operations.

On December 26, General Stilwell reported on the progress being made in preparation of the Chinese for the coming operation against Burma. The only serious obstacle in connection with the operation is the Generalissimo's insistence on a British promise to have a sufficient naval force in the Bay of Bengal to insure supremacy. The Generalissimo told Stilwell that all preparations for the operation to jump off on D-day will go forward, but that the attack will not be carried out unless the British establish naval predominance in the Bay of Bengal. In this connection Admiral Somerville had previously told Stilwell that his naval forces were insufficient and that there were no prospects for reinforcement. Stilwell considers it important that some sort of naval demonstration take place just before D-day.

In a message to the President, on December 28, Chiang Kai-Shek stated that Mr. Churchill assured the members of the Pacific War Council last spring that a formidable concentration of eight battleships, three aircraft carriers, and other vessels would be ready in the Indian Ocean by the end of the monsoons to participate in the recapture of Burma. The Generalissimo further informed the President of Admiral Somerville's statement to Stilwell on the insufficiency of his naval means to take action in the Bay of Bengal.

The Generalissimo, calling attention to a previous promise on the part of the British in India to make available seven divisions for the recapture of Burma, now learns from Stilwell of the British plan to employ but three divisions in limited operations looking toward the capture of Akyab and the establishment of a line on the Chindwin River. In this same message he made it clear to the President that despite the fact his troops will be ready for the campaign in Burma as planned, the Chinese could not undertake the offensive unless the British carry out their undertakings, as the campaign would be doomed to failure. He finally appealed to the President to urge the British to furnish sufficient naval, air, and land forces to insure the recapture of Burma.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER

SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720464
By Date MAY 1 1972
As you know, Marshal Wavell is skeptical about the extent of the land operations due to the supply difficulties that will exist after the monsoon season begins. However, advantage must be taken of the willingness of the Chinese to take the offensive. Means must be found to give the Generalissimo the necessary assurance that will enable the attack to jump off. I therefore propose that we submit to the President for his approval the attached message for the Prime Minister.

1 Incl. - Draft of radio from President to Prime Minister.

NOTE: The attached correspondence between Field Marshal Sir John Dill and General Marshall (Tabs A, B & C) explains the build up to this proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister.
Dear Marshall

How would this telegram do for our Chiefs of Staff, or have I said too much?

Reference the secret letter in question, I cannot believe that Wavell ever made the promise of seven divisions to which Chiang Kai-Shek refers. He has always been careful not to promise more than he can do.

Of course if Chiang Kai-Shek is referring to the whole thing in autumn, i.e. Anakim, then he may be right. It looks to me as if Chiang Kai-Shek were getting mixed between the relatively small affair in North Burma before the rains and the big thing after them.

Yours ever

J. C. Dill

General G.C. Marshall
Chief of Staff
Pentagon Building
Washington, D.C.
PERSONAL FROM FIELD MARSHAL DILL

Your C.O.S. (W) 421.

General Marshall is fully aware that naval action in the Bay of Bengal cannot affect Ravencous and I have asked him to tell Stilwell so.

2. "Promise" to which Chiang Kai Shelk alludes appears to refer to statement attributed to Prime Minister at Pacific Council here last June when he said that there would be large British naval concentrations in the Indian Ocean before the end of monsoon season. All this, I understand most confidentially, has been put to President by Chiang Kai Shek.
3rd January, 1943

Dear Marshall:

My feeling is that this telegram will give the Prime Minister a wrong impression - i.e., it implies that the President thinks there is some sense in Chiang Kai-Shek's demand for strong naval action in the Bay of Bengal and the employment of seven British and Indian Divisions before the monsoon.

Such promises as were made clearly referred to the operations to re-capture Burma in the fall of this year after the rains. Would it not therefore be better to delete the final sentence of the second paragraph on page 2 of the draft telegram and say instead "I feel that we must do something to ensure that the Chinese put their full weight into the operations which are due to start in March. Can you suggest any assurances which we can give Chiang Kai-Shek which will have this effect?"

Offensive action by the Chinese and the timeliness etc. (as in your draft telegram).

I would, of course, be glad to discuss this further with you if you wish.

Yours ever

J. C. Dill

General C. G. Marshall,
Room No. 5E-324
Pentagon Building
I should like to acquaint you with a message received by me from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Begin brief of Generalissimo's message:

Last spring the Prime Minister assured the members of the Pacific War Council that before the end of the next monsoon season, eight battleships, three aircraft carriers and the usual complement of other vessels would be in the Indian Ocean to assist in the recapture of Burma. We have been counting on the support of this naval force, for without it the recapture of Burma will be impossible. General Stilwell upon returning from a conference in India informs me that Admiral Somerville stated the British Navy has at its disposal only a few destroyers and submarines for operations in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, two months ago General Wavell promised General Stilwell the British could make seven divisions available to assist in the recapture of Burma. Now I learn that only three divisions are to be employed in limited operations with the objective of capturing Akyab and occupying the line of the Chindwin River.

You can rely on the Chinese force being concentrated and ready for action on time in accordance with plans already made. I am sure the American air help for the campaign will be present. However, it is impossible to undertake the offensive with my troops unless the British carry out their part of the undertaking. All the principle United Nations spokesmen have pledged that Burma will be recovered in 1943. I therefore earnestly ask that you urge our British Allies to provide the necessary naval, air and land forces to carry out their part. End of brief of Generalissimo's message.

I understand that definite progress is being made not only in preparations of the Chinese troops in India for the Burma operation but also of the Chinese troops...
in Yunnan. Units are being reorganized and equipped. Some of the supply essentials are even being flown in. The only serious matters as yet unsettled appear to be those brought out in the Generalissimo's message.

Offensive action by the Chinese and the timeliness of a thrust into Burma this spring are all important. We also want to get started on our air offensive from China against Jap sea lanes (if not Japan itself), the moment sufficient and dependable communications over Burma warrant such action.

That we may forfeit neither the Chinese potential nor the lift to United Nations morale of early action in Burma, I would like to give the Generalissimo the necessary assurances to prevent the Chinese attack stalling. We might together go over the substance of my reply to the Generalissimo later.

Dill has seen this message.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER

SEC. ARMY BY TAG PER 79644
By _RE_ Date MAY 1 1972
Field Marshal Dill,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dill:

Thanks very much for your comments on the proposed message to the Prime Minister reference the Generalissimo's telegram to the President.

I am sending the redraft of this message, which now incorporates the change you suggested, to Leahy, King and Arnold.

As regards your message to the British Chiefs of Staff on the same subject, I am returning it herewith, together with following suggestion. In view of the Jap capability to reinforce Burma by sea, don't you think we might amplify the first paragraph somewhat as follows:

"Marshall and Stilwell are aware that naval superiority in Bay of Bengal is not essential to "Ravenous" prior to the monsoon. A naval threat to movement of Japanese reinforcements by sea is believed necessary and assurance of the means to establish this threat would, they think, greatly reassure the Generalissimo and facilitate wholehearted participation on his part for "Ravenous"."

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

Encl.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for Former Naval Personnel
and No. 255

Your 255, am referring matter to Eisenhower for
his consideration. Sounds good to me.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at White House Map Room
at 1930 EWT, 1-7-43.

W. C. MOTT,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for Former Naval Person personal and No. 256.

I wholly approve of your view that we should send a message to Stalin generally as indicated in your 260. I suggest the following changes in the draft you sent me:

Paragraph (B) to be changed to read: "When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Yugoslavia, and wearing down the German air force; this to be closely followed by an operation in the Eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese."

Paragraph (D), change this paragraph to read as follows: "We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-channel operation in August, in which both British and U.S. units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must of course be dependent upon the
condition of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that time."

Please inform Stalin that I approve of this message. I was thrilled by your visit to Inonu. All goes reasonable well here. I take it that your bride and my bridegroom have not yet started throwing the crockery. I trust the marriage will be consummated.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1250, EWT, 5 February 1943.

W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for Former Naval Person personal and
No. 256.

I wholly approve of your view that we should send a
message to Stalin generally as indicated in your 260. I suggest the
following changes in the draft you sent me:

Paragraph (B) to be changed to read: "When this is
accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible,
to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean,
promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect
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British and U.S. units would participate. Here again, shipping
and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the
operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be
prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing
of this attack must of course be dependent upon the condition
of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that
time."

Please inform Stalin that I approve of this message

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not yet started throwing the crockery. I trust the marriage will be
consummated.

ROOSEVELT.
PROPOSED DRAFT
SECRET

February 5, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for Former Naval Person personal and
No. 256.

I wholly approve of your view that we should send a
message to Stalin generally as indicated in your 260. I suggest the
following changes in the draft you sent me:

Paragraph (B) to be changed to read: "When this is
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and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the
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not yet started throwing the crockery. I trust the marriage will be
consummated.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

W.S. Hoovers

ROOSEVELT.

CONFIDENTIAL

By date: Nov 1, 1943

0584
February 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall
Admiral King

Subject: Message to Mr. Stalin.

Attached hereto as Incl. A is a message received by the President from the Prime Minister. It contains a suggested radio to Mr. Stalin.

Attached as Incl. B is the reply which the President proposes to send to the Prime Minister.

The President would like to have your concurrence in this reply so that he may dispatch it this afternoon. Admiral Leahy has already expressed his concurrence.

Think para (d) promises much more than can be done, even though the word "aimed" is "aiming". DEANE

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of the President
9O7/495-1 2 May 1972
By W. J. DEANE Date MAY 8 1972
From: London

To: The President of the United States

No. 260, February 3, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

See Stalin's telegram to us both of January 30, I think he is entitled to more precise information, and no one can keep secrets better.

I think therefore we should say that -

(a). There are quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier.

(b). When this is accomplished we intend, in July or earlier if possible, to attack Italy across the Central Mediterranean with the object of promoting an Italian collapse, and establishing contact with Yugoslavia. We expect to meet with serious opposition from German forces. If not, our task will be much easier.

(c). This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of three or four hundred thousand men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established.

(d). We are aiming at August for a heavy operation across the Channel, for which between seventeen and twenty British and US divisions will be available, of which four to seven will be US divisions, with a gross strength of fifty thousand each. Here again assault landing craft will be a limiting factor. Weather may, of course, spoil the Channel operation, in which case it will be prepared with stronger forces for Sept.

(e). Both the operations will be supported by very large US and Brit Air Forces, and that across the Channel by the whole metropolitan air force of Great Brit. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Brit and the US.
It would also say that in accepting the conclusions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister have enjoined upon them the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible. Let me know what you feel about all this. I have talked it all over with CIGS who is in agreement.

I am so glad that you are home again. I hope all has gone well with the constitution. I shall soon be moving back by stages. Kindest regards to Harry.

Prime
PROPOSED DRAFT

SECRET

February 3, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for Former Naval Person personal and secret No. 256.

I wholly approve of your proposed draft of message to Stalin quoted in your number 260. Will you please send it and sign my name as well as yours. I was thrilled by your visit to Inonu. All goes reasonably well here. I take it that your bride and my bridegroom have not yet started throwing the crockery. I trust the marriage will be consummated.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971

Incl. B
8 February 1943

PRIORITY

From: OPNAV
To: Alusna London

From the President for Former Naval Person personal and No. 257.

Your 261 of February 8 I am in agreement to your announcing on February 11 the placing of your Eighth Army under the command of General Eisenhower and the appointment of Alexander as deputy under Eisenhower, and also the appointment of Tedder.

It is my opinion that cooperation by French forces will be best if the American Supreme Command in North Africa is stressed, and I consider it inadvisable to release and thereby make available to the enemy any information whatever as to the details of the duties of Alexander or Tedder.

It is recommended that British and American press officers in London send me draft of proposed press release and London time of release in order that the news may be given to the press of both countries simultaneously.

I am so glad you are safely back. You have accomplished marvels.

ROOSEVELT
FROM MAP ROOM FOR GEN WATSON X FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME X YOUR TWO SIX ONE OF FEBRUARY EIGHT I AM IN AGREEMENT TO YOUR ANNOUNCING ON FEBRUARY ELEVEN THE PLACING OF YOUR EIGHTH ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER AND THE APPOINTMENT OF ALEXANDER AS DEPUTY UNDER EISENHOWER COMA AND ALSO THE APPOINTMENT OF TEDDER PD PARA IT IS MY OPINION THAT COOPERATION BY FRENCH FORCES WILL BE BEST IF THE AMERICAN SUPREME COMMAND IN NORTH AFRICA IS STRESSED COMMA AND I CONSIDER IT INADVISABLE TO RELEASE AND THEREBY MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY ANY INFORMATION WHATEVER AS TO THE DUTIES OF ALEXANDER OR TEDDER PERIOD X X IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT BRITISH AND AMERICAN PRESS RELEASE OFFICERS IN LONDON SEND MM DRAFT OF PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE IN ORDER THAT THE NEWS MAY BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS OF BOTH COUNTRIES SIMULTANEOUSLY X NOTE FROM MOTT TO GENERAL WATSON X ABOVE IS PROPOSED DRAFT COMPOSED BY ADMR LEAHY X IF APPROVED IN ITS ENTIRETY SUGGEST MAP ROOM BE NOTIFIED BY PHONE AND IT CAN BE SENT IMMEDIATE
FROM: PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

Your 261 of February 8 I am in agreement to your announcing on February 11 the placing of your Eighth Army under the command of General Eisenhower and the appointment of Alexander as deputy under Eisenhower, and also the appointment of Tedder.

It is my opinion that cooperation by French forces will be best if the American Supreme Command in North Africa is stressed, and I consider it inadvisable to release and thereby make available to the enemy any information whatever as to the (particular) duties of Alexander or Tedder.

It is recommended that British and American press officers in London send me draft of proposed press release and London time of release in order that the news may be given to the press of both countries simultaneously. **

ROOSEVELT

* change "particular" to "details of the"

** add new para "I am so glad you are safely back. You have accomplished marvels."

NOTE: Corrections dictated by Captain Greer from Hyde Park by phone, authorized by General Watson.
From President to Prime

Your 261 of February 8. I am in agreement to your announcing
of February 11 the placing of
your rights of army president in
command of General Eisenhower,
and the appointment of Alexander
and the appointment of Alexander
and Tedder as deputy under
Eisenhower, and also the appointment of
it is my opinion that cooperation
by French forces will be best.
If the American Supreme Command
of North Africa is stressed, and
I consider it inadvisable to
release and thereby make available
to the enemy any information
whatever as to the particular
duties of Alexander or Tedder.

It is recommended that British
and American press officers in London
send me draft of proposed press
release and similar items of release
in order that the news may be given
to the press of both countries
simultaneously.

Roosevelt

By: William A. Stimson
From: Opnav
To: Alusa London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and
No. 258.

I am making a twenty minute broadcast Friday evening at White
House Newspaper Man's Smoker. In regard to the bride and bridegroom
problem I thought of saying something along the following lines:

Quote. At the Casablanca Conference the Prime Minister and
I made it abundantly clear to all of our French friends that we are
waging war in French North Africa against the Axis Powers and that
this is a part of the effort of the United Nations for the liberation
of France itself. We also made it clear that we welcome unity of all
Frenchmen in aiding this great objective, and that only the French
people themselves, after they shall have regained their liberty,
can determine for themselves the Government they desire. Nothing
should be done now outside of France to influence or prejudice that
untrammelled freedom of the French later on and everything should be done
for present unity toward the prosecution of the war. Unquote.

If you speak at secret session of the House on Thursday I do
wish you would give me any suggestion of what you propose to say.

I still do not like the things that deGaulle and his
headquarters are saying to the Press. I understand that he intimated
yesterday some form of elections in North Africa for a system of central government. In my judgement this would raise the Jewish and Moslem troubles. I said to both Giraud and deGaulle that elections should not be held.

ROOSEVELT.
February 10, 1943,

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I am making a twenty minute broadcast Friday evening at White House Newspaper Men's Smoker, in regard to the bride and bridegroom problem I thought of saying something along the following line:

"At the Casablanca Conference the Prime Minister and I made it abundantly clear to all of our French friends that we are waging war in French North Africa against the Axis Powers and that this is a part of the effort of the United Nations for the liberation of France itself. We also made it abundantly clear that we welcome unity of all Frenchmen in aiding this great objective, and that only the French people themselves, after they shall have regained their liberty, can determine for themselves the Government they desire. Nothing should be done now outside of France to influence or prejudice that untrammeled freedom of the French later on and everything should be done for present
unity toward the prosecution of the war."

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Africa for a system of central government. In my
judgment this would raise the Jewish and Moslem troubles.
I said to both Giraud and deGaulle that elections
should not be held.

ROOSEVELT.
10 February 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret No. 259.

Your 263.

I see no particular harm in method you suggest announcing appointments and will proceed accordingly. I am sending Eisenhower's name to Senate Thursday noon to be full general.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1355, EWT, February 10, 1943.

W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Nov 1 1971

Copy to Mr. Marshall.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Your 263

I see no particular harm in method you suggest
announcing appointments and will proceed according
I am sending Eisenhowers name to Senate Thursday to be full
General

TR

Pweswel
11 February 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and for the Former Naval Person from the President, despatch No. 260.

That is an excellent thought about Anthony Eden. Delighted to have him come -- the sooner the better.

Your speech was grand and will do lots of good everywhere.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 1815, EWT, February 11, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. E. Staunton
Date NOV 1 1971
February 11, 1943.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

That is an excellent thought about Anthony Eden.

Delighted to have him come -- the sooner the better.

Your speech was grand and will do lots of good everywhere.

ROOSEVELT
For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and No. 261.

In accordance with our discussions at Casablanca, I think the time has arrived to make definite arrangements for a third Soviet protocol to cover the period July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944.

I feel our two countries should make a combined offer to Russia somewhat similar in principle to the offering under the second protocol. If you agree, I would be pleased if you would designate some one to represent you in discussions to be held here in the formulation of the protocol. I am designating Harry Hopkins as my representative.

In order to initiate action, we have already asked Russia for a statement of her needs from United States production during above period.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1815, EWT, February 19, 1943, by:

W. C. Mott
W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY.

I RECOMMEND THAT THIS CABLE BE SIGNED.

H.L.H.
FEBRUARY 19, 1943.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

In accordance with our discussions at Casablanca, I think the time has arrived to make definite arrangements for a third Soviet protocol to cover the period July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944.

I feel our two countries should make a combined offer to Russia somewhat similar in principle to the offering under the second protocol. If you agree, I would be pleased if you would designate some one to represent you in discussions to be held here in the formulation of the protocol. I am designating Harry Hopkins as my representative.

In order to initiate action, we have already asked Russia for a statement of her needs from United States production during above period.
March 5, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President. Personal and No. 262

Replying to your message 271 of March 4th I am sorry we failed to send you my reply to Stalin's message of February 16th which I sent to him on February 22nd and which is quoted herewith following:

Quote I have received your message of February 16th in which you present certain considerations that you have communicated to Mr. Churchill in reply to his message to you of February 12th.

I regret equally with you that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule which was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both troops and supplies enroute from our landing ports to the front lines and made the fields and mountains impassable.

I realize fully the adverse effect of this delay on the common allied effort and I am taking every possible step to begin at the earliest possible moment successful aggressive action against the Axis forces in Africa with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

You are fully informed in regard to the wide dispersion of America's transportation facilities at the present time and I can assure you that we are making a maximum effort to increase the output...
of ships to improve our transportation.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected onto the Continent of Europe at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We hope that the success of your heroic army, which is an inspiration to all of us, will continue. Signed ROOSEVELT.

Unquote

I have no suggested changes to your proposed reply to Stalin as contained in your number 271 to me.

In view of my reply to Mr. Stalin it does not seem advisable that your message be considered a joint message from both of us.

ROOSEVELT.

Released at the White House Map Room
1135 EWT, March 5, 1943.

W. C. MOTT,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S.N.R.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

March 20, 1943

From: Cpnav
To: Aluana, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President. Personal and No. 263

Your message of March 18th.

In the face of known German naval and air force concentration on route of March convoy (J. W. 54) there appears to be no military justification for its departure at scheduled time.

In consideration however of possible political implications it is in my view advisable to inform Stalin only that in view of known German preparations for its destruction and in view of the impossibility of providing at the present time adequate protection in the restricted waters, it is necessary to postpone its departure.

I am in agreement with you to not unload convoy (J. W. 54) and, as a deception move, to start it under protection of the fleet, if you consider such a move desirable, with the intention of diverting the convoy to Iceland.

We share your distress over recent sinkings in the Atlantic which we must endeavor to reduce by the provision of additional long range airplanes without any delay. I will provide as many as can be made available and I hope you can augment the number. Additional escort vessels cannot be provided at this time and there is no time to lose.

In another three or four weeks it may of course be necessary to
break the news to Stalin that convoys to Russia must be interrupted until August or September in order to provide for the Rusky effort, but it seems to me now that a delay in giving him the bad news would be the wiser course. Incidentally none of us can be positive about the situation four or five months hence. Will you send me your proposed message to Stalin.

ROOSEVELT

Released at the White House Map Room
1230 EWT, March 20, 1943.

H.C. MOTT
Lieut.-Comdr., U.S.N.R.
Your message of March 18th.

In the face of known German naval and air force concentration on route of March convoy (J. W. 54) there appears to be no military justification for its departure at scheduled time.

In consideration however of possible political implications it is in my view advisable to inform Stalin only that in view of known German preparations for its destruction and in view of the impossibility of providing at the present time adequate protection in the restricted waters, it is necessary to postpone its departure.

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In another three or four weeks it may of course be necessary to break the news to Stalin that convoys to Russia must be interrupted until August or September in order to provide for the Husky effort, but it seems to me now that a delay in giving him the bad news until about at which time we can reach a definite decision as to the date of Husky would be the wiser course. Incidentally, since until us can be positive about the situation, we or in months with it, would you accept our proposal now to discuss it personally.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

March 20, 1943.

From: Opnav.
To: Alusna, London.

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and No. 264.

We are getting a number of reports of rather large German movements, especially of material, to Spanish border. I wish you would let me know how much importance your people attach to this.

I think that if it develops into a definite threat to invade Spain, the Combined Staffs should immediately study methods of reestablishing the Duke of Wellington's war of a number of years ago. We should not be caught without an answer which would be effective.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room, at 1515, EWT, March 20, 1943.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. B. STEWART
Date Nov. 1, 1971

Copy to Admiral Leahy at Admiral Leahy's direction.
March 28, 1943

PRIORtTY

From: Cunne
To: Alansa, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and no. 265.

Referring to your proposed message to Stalin delivered by Mr. Eden, I agree with you. I have after serious consideration further concluded that we are not justified in wasting available tonnage by keeping the present Russian convoy (J. W. 54) loaded, and that it is advisable to give Stalin the inevitable bad news now. It is suggested that your proposed message be amended as follows:

"1. The Germans have concentrated at Harvik a powerful battle fleet consisting of 'Tirpitz', 'Scharnhorst', 'Lutzow', one six-inch cruiser and eight destroyers. Thus danger to Russian convoys which I described in my message to you of July 17th, last year has been revived in even more menacing form. I told you then that we did not think it right to risk our Home Fleet in Barents Sea where it could be brought under attack of German shore-based aircraft and U-boats, without adequate protection against either, and I explained that if one or two of our most modern battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while 'Tirpitz' and other large units of the German battle fleet remained in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be jeopardized with dire consequences to our common cause.

"2. President Roosevelt and I have therefore decided with the greatest reluctance that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the next Russian convoy and that without such protection there is not the slightest chance of any of the ships reaching you in the face of the known German preparations for their destruction. Orders have therefore been issued that sailing of March convoy is to be postponed.

"3. It is a great disappointment to President Roosevelt and myself that it should be necessary to postpone March convoy. Had it not been for German concentration it had been our firm intention to send you a convoy of 30 ships each in March and again early May. At the same time we feel it only right to let you know at once that it will not be possible to continue convoys by Northern route after early May, since from that time onward every single escort vessel will be required to support our offensive operations in the Mediterranean leaving only a minimum to safeguard our lifeline in the Atlantic. In the latter we have had grievous and almost unprecedented losses during the last three weeks. Assuming HUSKY goes well we should hope to resume the convoys in early September, provided disposition of German main units permits and that the situation in North Atlantic is such as to enable us to provide the necessary escorts and covering force.

"4. We are doing our utmost to increase the flow of supplies by Southern
route. The monthly figure has been more than doubled in the last six months. We have reason to hope that increase will progress and that figures for August will reach 240,000 tons. If this is achieved, the monthly delivery will have increased eight-fold in 12 months. Furthermore the United States will materially increase shipments via Vladivostok. This will in some way offset both your disappointment and ours at the interruption to northern convoys."

When you send this or similar message to Stalin would you like to have me send confirming or supporting message. Let me have text of your final message.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room at 2359 EWT March 28, 1943

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (jr.) USNR
Referring to your proposed message to Stalin delivered by Mr. Eden, I have after serious consideration concluded that we are not justified in wasting available tonnage by keeping the present Russian convoy (J.W. 54) loaded, and that it is advisable to give Stalin the inevitable bad news now. It is suggested that your proposed message be amended as follows:

1. The Germans have concentrated at Narvik a powerful battle fleet consisting of "Tirpitz", "Scharnhorst", "Lutzow", one six-inch cruiser and eight destroyers. Thus danger to Russian convoys which I described in my message to you of July 17th last year has been revived in even more menacing form. I told you then that we did not think it right to risk our home fleet in Barents Sea where it could be brought under attack of German shore-based aircraft and U-boats, without adequate protection against either; and I explained that if one or two of our most modern battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while "Tirpitz" and other large units of the German battle fleet remained in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be jeopardized with dire consequences to our common cause.

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let you know at once that it will not be possible to continue convoys by Northern route after early May, since from that time onward every single escort vessel will be required to support our offensive operations in the Mediterranean leaving only a minimum to safeguard our lifeline in the Atlantic.

In the latter we have had grievous and almost unprecedented losses during the last three weeks. Assuming HUSKY goes well we should hope to resume the convoys in early September provided disposition of German main units permits and that the situation in North Atlantic is such as to enable us to provide the necessary escorts and covering force.

4. We are doing our utmost to increase the flow of supplies by Southern route. The monthly figure has been more than doubled in the last six months. We have reason to hope that increase will progress and that figures for August will reach 240,000 tons. If this is achieved, the monthly delivery will have increased eight-fold in 12 months. Furthermore the United States will materially increase shipments via Vladivostok. This will in some way offset both your disappointment and ours at the interruption to northern convoys."

When you read this or similar message to Stalin, would you like to have me send confirming or supporting message, let me have text of your final message.
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and no 266.

Repying to your message handed me by Anthony, we shall find all the ships for HUSKY and are going to scrape the bottom otherwise but we cannot escape the fact that something must give if all of our military operations are to be fully supported. I am going into this matter in detail and Anthony will bring you my immediate views.

ROOSEVELT

March 29, 1943

Released from the Map Room
at 2030 EMT March 29, 1943

Robert H. Myers
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By \\
Date Nov 1 1971
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

REPLYING TO YOUR MESSAGE HANDED ME BY ANTHONY, WE SHALL FIND ALL THE SHIPS FOR HUSKY AND ARE GOING TO SCRAPE THE BOTTOM OTHERWISE BUT WE CANNOT ESCAPE THE FACT THAT SOMETHING MUST GIVE IF ALL OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE TO BE FULLY SUPPORTED.

I AM GOING INTO THIS MATTER IN DETAIL AND ANTHONY WILL BRING YOU MY IMMEDIATE VIEWS.

Pursuant
MARCH 30, 1943.

FROM: CPHAV
TO: ALBANIA, LONDON

PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
NO. 267.
SOME BABY!

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1700, EWT, March 30, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

NOTE FOR RECORD: This message is the reply to Prime's No. 276. The
letter referred to in these despatches is in Miss Tully's files, and
is not to be filed in the Map Room. (per Admiral Brown).

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Nov 1 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1943.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

SOME BABY!

ROOSEVELT