FROM: London

TO: The President of the United States

NUMBER: 250, January 1, 1943

Personal and secret: Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt your telegram number two four three.

1. About two months ago Mr. Hull asked for an assurance, which we gladly gave, that the British Government was in agreement with the United States Government that the blockade of enemy territory should be vigorously maintained. This is our policy, as agreed with your government. The single exception is Greece, where alone of all Allied countries the enemy allowed wholesale starvation conditions to develop. We have resisted extremely strong pressure from the Belgian Government and others to depart from it. To abandon the principle that the enemy is responsible for the territories he has conquered, will lead very quickly to our having the whole lot on our backs, a burden far beyond our strength.

2. Conditions in Belgium are worse than in Norway and in our judgment it would not be right to make a concession to Norway and not to Belgium. It would be impossible, too, to dispute the claims of other Allied Governments who would certainly press violently for equal privileges.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 250, January 1, 1943

3. In our view the plan you propose might therefore have
the eventual effect of reversing our whole joint food blockade policy,
and this I am sure you will agree, we should not contemplate.

4. As you are no doubt aware, we have already agreed with
your authorities upon a secret scheme, which while distinct from ordi-
nary relief, will help our Norwegian friends without dangerous reper-
cussions. This scheme, which has been welcomed by the Norwegian Govern-
ment, provides for the despatch in the Gothenburg traffic of limited
quantities of supplies disguised as Swedish imports, to be distrib-
uted in Norway through secret channels. If it is put into operation
it will bring material aid to our friends, although it is of course
vital that none but the Norwegian officials directly concerned should
know of it.

5. We are also anxious to proceed with plans for the eva-
cuation of Norwegian, Belgian and other children to Sweden and Switzer-
land respectively, where they could be maintained by extra imports
through the blockade.

6. I should be grateful for an expression of your views.

Prime
January 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Attached is a paraphrased copy of message No. 250 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated January 1, 1943, which the President desires be furnished you for your information.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.
January 1, 1943.

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No.: 250

Former Naval Person to the President personal and confidential

Your telegram number two four three.

1. Mr. Hull asked for an assurance, about November first, that the British Government agree with the United States Government that blockade of territory of the enemy should be strongly maintained. We gladly gave this assurance. According to our agreement with your government, this is our policy. Greece is the only exception, for there alone has the enemy permitted nationwide starvation to develop. Despite very powerful Belgian influences, we have maintained our position. If we were to abandon the principle that territories over-run by the enemy are his responsibility, we would soon find ourselves facing the task of carrying the whole lot on our backs, a task too great for our strength.

2. Belgium is confronted by worse conditions than those of Norway, and we feel that it would be unjust to give Norway a helping hand while ignoring the wants of Belgium. Also, it would be impossible to deny the validity of claims made by other Allied Governments who would exert great pressure for similar privileges.

3. As we see it, your proposed plan might therefore result in a reversal of our entire policy of joint food blockade, a position I am sure you will agree we must not consider.

4. As you undoubtedly know, a secret scheme has been agreed upon by your authorities and ourselves which, while it cannot be considered...
as ordinary relief, will help our friends in Norway without dangerous repercussions. This arrangement, which the Norwegian Government has welcomed, entails sending in the Gothenburg traffic limited amounts of supplies under the guise of Swedish imports, to be distributed secretly in Norway. If carried out it will aid our friends in a material way, although of course it is highly necessary that only the Norwegian officials immediately concerned should know about it.

5. Also we are anxious to go on with plans to evacuate children of Norway, Belgium, and other countries to Sweden and Switzerland respectively, where extra imports through the blockade could maintain them.

6. Your views on the subject would be appreciated.

PRIME
YOUR 249. WE WILL CONFORM TO YOUR WISHES AND ARE OBSERVING THE STRICTEST SECRECY. IT MIGHT BE WORTH WHILE LATER ON, WHEN OUR ABSENCE BECOMES NOTICEABLE, SUGGESTING WE ARE MEETING SECRETLY SOMEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES; OR ANYHOW, THAT I HAVE GONE TO AMERICA.

2. IN SYMBOL I AM "AIR COMMODORE 'FRANKLAND'." SUGGEST YOU ALSO CHOOSE AN ALIAS AND ONE FOR HARRY.

3. ALSO SUGGEST PRESS CORRESPONDENTS BE ENTIRELY EXCLUDED, BUT PRESUME NO OBJECTION TO OUR OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHERS GOING OUT IN BULOLO (MY HEADQUARTERS SHIP), PICTURES BEING RELEASED AND AFTERWARDS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO BOTH COUNTRIES.

4. YOUR 25Ø ALSO RECEIVED. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR GOOD WISHES. ARE YOU GOING TO SEE DEGAULLE BEFORE SYMBOL, OR WAIT TILL AFTERWARDS?

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Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

LT KELLY Ø21625 NCR 4551 S

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

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TO BE DECRYPTED ONLY BY OFFICER WHO HANDLED OPNAV 211840.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT AND PERSONAL NUMBER 252.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM FRANKLAND.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. S. Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

NAVAIDE ACTION
SEALED SECRET FILE.

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRELS.)

SEALEDB

NCR 18
AFFIRMATIVE YOUR $81635. ALUSNA LONDON $21625 (AX15)
AT 1856 ON SECOND.

* OPNAV $81635 NCR 27228 - A REQUEST TO COMNAVUEU FOR #252
  (SENT BY LT. MOTT.)

** ALUSNA LONDON $21625 NCR 4551 - CONSISTS OF INSTRUCTIONS
  FOR HANDLING ALUSNA LONDON $21620 NCR 4560.

NCR NOTE: THE PARAPHRASED COPY OF ALUSNA LONDON $21620
NCR 4560 INCLUDED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRIME
MINISTERS #252 BUT FAILED TO INDICATE THAT
#252 WAS INCLUDED THEREIN. A COPY OF #252
PREPARED SEPARATELY IS FURNISHED HERewith.

NAVAIDE ACTION
SEALED SECRET FILE.

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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HAS PRIME MINISTERS NUMBER 252 BEEN SENT. IF SO, BY WHAT MEANS.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
Date: MAY 5 1972
Signature: 

NAVYDEP
SEALEO SECRET FILE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALEO
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

10-5090-1 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

0626
FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, AND PERSONAL NUMBER 253.

YOUR 252

1. YOUR PARAGRAPH 1 WILL BE DONE.

2. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2. HOWEVER DID YOU THINK OF SUCH AN IMPENETRABLE DISGUISE? IN ORDER TO MAKE IT EVEN HARDER FOR THE ENEMY AND TO DISCOURAGE IRREVERENT GUESSWORK PROPOSE ADMIRAL Q. AND MR P. (NB) WE MUST MIND OUR P'S AND Q'S

3. SHOULD YOU BRING WILLKIE WITH YOU SUGGEST CODE WORD WINDMILL.

4. DEGAULLE. I THINK IT FAR BETTER THE VISIT COULD BE POSTPONED TILL TORCH AFFAIRS ARE SYMBOLIZED.

DISTRIBUTION: ACTION....PIA

RECEIVED: UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks MAY 5 1972

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE.
No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.
No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALLED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM COMNAVEU

RELEASED BY

DATE 5 JANUARY 1943

TOR CORDEROOM 19/5

DECODED BY J ALLEN

PARAPHRASED BY

NaVAL MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR ACTION OPNAV

INFORMATION

PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

BEGIN TEXT

PERSONAL AND THROUGH ADMIRAL KIRK.
FROM FORMERNAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT NUMBER 254

DELIIGHTED TO BRING AVERELL

END TEXT

DISTRIBUTION:
P1A......ACTION

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., Sec. & Dept., tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

nx 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

Make original only, Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76(4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18
FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT NUMBER 255 AND PERSONAL SYMBOL.

I THINK IT WOULD BE WELL TO HAVE SUBSIDIARY ALTERNATIVE BASE AT MARAKESH SO THAT WE COULD MOVE THERE IF CASABLANCA BECAME TOO PUBLIC. WEATHER IS OFTEN WARM AND BRIGHT AT MARAKESH WHEN RAINING ON THE COAST. I STAYED THERE FOR A MONTH IN JANUARY 1936 AND THOUGHT IT ONE OF THE BEST PLACES I HAD EVER STRUCK ANYWAY THERE IS NO HARM IN HAVING IT UNDER OUR LEE.

I AM ASKING THAT ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE MADE ACCORDINGLY.

DISTRIBUTION: TO INVESTIGATE THE ABOVE LOCATION - COL. R. HAMMOND

P1A ACTION 1-7-43 - FLC. by Cmr

SEALLED
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO: 256 January 8, 1943
FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT PERSONAL.
MANY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR GRAND SPEECH.

PRIME

SECRET

REGRADED DIASTYFIED by British
Gov't., State Dept. Tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
FROM: LONDON ENGLAND
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NUMBER: 257. January 10, 1943

From the Prime Minister to the President personal and

1. Referring to your telegram number two five one. I
am grateful for your acceptance of our proposals regarding
the ten day cycle and the institution of direct tanker convoys
from the Dutch West Indies to the United Kingdom.

2. We agree that under the new arrangements and with the
help of the spare tankers to which you refer and assuming that
you will provide all the fast tankers required for the Torch
area, our imports into United Kingdom during one nine four three
will be about fifteen million tons which will barely meet consumption.

3. The Admiralty agree that for the moment the independent
sailing of fast tankers to the United Kingdom is inadvisable but
I suggest this decision should be reconsidered in the light of
changing events.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
4. I agree that details regarding the opening of the Trans-Atlantic cycle, the institution of the direct Dutch West Indies, United Kingdom tanker convoys and the fast tanker convoys to the Torch area should be worked out between the departments concerned. I fear it will be extremely difficult for us to find the necessary long endurance destroyers for even half of the latter commitment.

Prime
PARAPHRASE OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

Personal and Confidential from the Prime Minister No. 257.

1. Re President's 251. I deeply appreciate your acceptance of our proposal regarding the institution of direct tanker convoys to the United Kingdom from the Netherlands West Indies and the proposal regarding the ten day cycle.

2. We are in agreement that, under the new arrangements and with the aid of spare tankers to which you refer and on the assumption that the United States provide all the fast tankers needed for the Torch area, our United Kingdom imports in one nine four three will barely meet consumption, being only about fifteen million tons.

3. The independent sailing of fast tankers to the United Kingdom is inadvisable at the present. The Admiralty agree. I recommend however that this decision be reconsidered in the light of changing events.

4. I agree that all details concerning the institution of fast tanker convoys to Torch area and direct Dutch West Indies—United Kingdom convoys, and the opening of the trans-Atlantic cycle, should be ironed out by the departments concerned. It will be exceedingly hard for us, I fear, to find the needed long-endurance destroyers for even half of the former commitment.

REMARKED: UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number: 255, January 10, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and confidential

1. With regard to the Generalissimos allegations that we have broken faith with him on two important issues, I should like you to know, firstly about the fleet, that I gave no promise or assurance at the Pacific War Council, but merely stated what were then our intentions, since changed by events of which you are aware. Secondly, Field Marshal Wavell has given no undertaking to operate seven divisions for the recapture of Burma before the next monsoon. The position on these matters is as follows.

2. We had proposed to form the eastern fleet July first, one nine four two. Since then however all Somervilles essential aircraft carriers have been drawn away. Victorious has been placed at your disposal. Illustrious must come home for refit. Formidable is busy with Torch but also overdue for refit. The destroyers have been cut to a minimum for the sake of Torch and the Russian convoys. Our shortage of destroyers is frightful. Therefore, although the battleships for the Eastern Fleet are, or will be
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 258, January 10, 1943

all ready shortly, they are shorn of their indispensable ancillaries. The fleet in the Indian Ocean exercises a certain deterrent effect as the enemy do not know what it lacks. Also we hope to send Unicorn to join it pretty soon, but it will not be possible with this fleet to enter the Bay of Bengal until it has been reinforced with carriers, nor indeed is the fleet necessary for operations now being undertaken by Field Marshal Wavell before the monsoon.

3. I have been ardently pressing Field Marshal Wavell to take the offensive to the utmost but, as we have had to cut off his supplies of landing craft for the sake of Torch and future operations in the Torch area or elsewhere, he will not be able to manage anything more than operations Cannibal and Ravenous before the monsoon. I am quite sure that he has been most anxious to bring the greatest force to bear on land upon the enemy and to press forward, but it is absolutely no use Chiang or Stilwell saying that men can be maintained at particular points in these mountainous and rain sodden jungles when in effect we know that they cannot. There are plenty of troops in India but the difficulty is to supply them in the forward area under the prevailing conditions.

4. I hope therefore that any assurances to Chiang may wait till Symbol. In the meanwhile Field Marshal Wavell is keeping General Stilwell fully informed of the limitations which maintenance difficulties impose on his present operations. We had hoped that General Stilwell would have been able to make these problems clear to the Generalissimo.
Dear Mr. President,

I enclose the text of a message for you from the Prime Minister which I have just received.

I shall be delighted to hear you are safely back from your great trip, and shall much look forward to seeing you. I have no doubt your talks will have been more than worth all the trouble of getting to meet!

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
Message from the Prime Minister to the President

dated January 27th, 1943.

The Turk is delighted, as you will see from his message to you. I am again in Cairo and shall start in a day or two to secret rendezvous in Turkey, name of which I will telegraph later. I will keep you fully informed. Hope all is well with you and that you are not at all fatigued. We seem to have got a good deal of world press.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

NO 259 January 30th, 1943.

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Many happy and glorious returns of the day from your friend. Winston.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
February 2nd, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose a message which has just been received for you from the Prime Minister.

Another long telegram has just come in which is probably the document referred to in the second paragraph of the message. I will send this down as soon as it is decyphered.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
AND PERSONAL

1. I hope indeed you are safely returned and are not unduly tired.

2. My visit to Turkey was in my opinion a great success. I send you the following short note of my conversations with President Inonu and a paper called "Morning Thoughts" which I gave him.

3. I pursued a method of perfect trust and confidence, asking for no [1 group undecypherable] but giving to the utmost of our power. In this atmosphere President said that paper was wholly favourable to his views, that if Turkey was allowed to be judge we should get all we wanted, that he was in complete sympathy with us. I find him a very agreeable man and we made friends at once. Indeed he was most warm and cordial in all his attitude and he and his Ministers reiterated again and again that they longed for our victory. I made it clear that I did not wish them to enter the war in any circumstances which would lead to Turkish disaster, which would be our disaster too, but that when circumstances were favourable I was sure it would be in the interests of Turkey to play her part. Everything we said in this sense was accepted with lively accord. I asked them whether there would be trouble with the Germans about my visit. They said that they did not care. I had feeling that they have received an impression of internal condition of Germany very much more satisfactory to us all than anything previously received by them.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
President Inonu is sending you a cordial message. I hope in reply you will back me up and send a good long telegram. They all attach the greatest importance to everything you say. If you can add something about an additional packet of munitions this would also be very good, although difficulty will be getting them into their hands rather than providing them.
Dear Mr. President,

I enclose the further message from the Prime Minister which I mentioned in my earlier letter today.

I also enclose a copy of a personal message to you from Mr. Eden, which has just come in.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Halifax.

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States

of America,

Washington, D. C.
Message from the Prime Minister to the President.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

MORNING THOUGHTS

Note on Post-War Security.

When United Nations led by three Great Powers, Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. have received unconditional surrender of Germany and Italy, Great Britain and United States will turn their full force against Japan in order to punish effectively that greedy and ambitious nation for its treacherous assaults and outrages and to procure likewise from Japan unconditional surrender.

2. In this, although no treaty arrangement has been made, it seems probable that Great Britain and United States will be joined by Russia.

3. The peace conference of the victorious powers will probably assemble in Europe while final stages of war against Japan are still in progress. At this conference the defeated aggressor countries will receive directions of victors. Object of these directions will be to prevent as effectively as possible renewal of acts of aggression of the kinds which have caused these two terrible wars in Europe in one generation. For this purpose and so far as possible total disarmament of guilty nations will be enforced. On the other hand no attempt will be made to destroy their peoples or to prevent them earning their living and leading a decent life in spite of all the crimes they have committed.

4. It is recognized that it is not possible to make the vanquished pay for war as was tried last time, and consequently task of rebuilding ruined and starving Europe will demand from conquerors a period of exertion.
scarcely less severe than that of the war. Russia particularly which has suffered such a horrible devastation will be aided in every possible way in her work of restoring the economic life of her people. It seems probable that economic reconstruction and rehabilitation will occupy full energies of all countries for a good many years in view of their previous experiences and lessons they have learned.

5. Russia has signed a treaty with Great Britain on basis of Atlantic Charter binding both nations mutually to aid each other. The duration of this treaty is twenty years. By it and by Atlantic Charter the two nations renounce all idea of territorial gains. Russians no doubt interpret this as giving them right to claim, subject to their agreement with Poland, their frontier of June 1941 before they were attacked by Germany.

6. It is the intention of chiefs of the United Nations to create a world organization for the preservation of peace based upon the conceptions of freedom and justice and the revival of prosperity. As a part of this organization an instrument of European Government will be established which will embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness of former League of Nations. The units forming this body will not only be the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor only. Need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc appear to be obvious. A similar instrument will be formed in the Far East with different membership and the whole will be held together by the fact that victorious powers as yet continue fully armed, especially in the air, while imposing complete disarmament upon the guilty. None can predict with certainty that the victors will never quarrel amongst themselves, or that the United States may not once again retire from Europe, but
after the experiences which all have gone through, and their sufferings
and the certainty that a third struggle will destroy all that is left of
culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level
almost of wild beasts, the most intense effort will be made by the
leading Powers to prolong their honourable association and by sacrifice
and self-restraint to win for themselves a glorious name in human annals.
Great Britain will certainly do her utmost to organize a coalition of
resistance to any act of aggression committed by any power; it is believed
that the United States will cooperate with her and even possibly take
the lead of the world, on account of her numbers and strength, in the good
work of preventing such tendencies to aggression before they break into
open war.
7. The highest security for Turkey in post-war world will be found
by her taking her place as a victorious belligerent and ally at the
side of Great Britain, the United States and Russia. In this way a start
will be made in all friendliness and confidence, and a new instrument will
grow around the goodwill and comradeship of those who have been in the
field together, with powerful armies.
8. Turkey may be drawn into war either by being attacked in the
despairing convulsions of a still very powerful Nazi power, or because
her interests require her to intervene to help prevent total anarchy in
the Balkans, and also because the sentiments of modern Turkey are in
harmony with the large and generous conceptions embodied in the Atlantic
Charter, which are going to be fought for and defended by new generations
of men.
9. We must therefore consider the case of Turkey becoming a
belligerent. The military and technical side is under examination by
Marshal Chakmak, Generals Brooke, Alexander, Wilson and other high technical authorities. The political aspect is no less important. It would be wrong for Turkey to enter the war unless herself attacked, if that only led her to a disaster, and her ally Britain has never asked and will never ask her to do so under such conditions. On the other hand if the general offensive strength of Turkey is raised by the measures now being taken, and also by the increasing weakness of Nazi Germany, or by their withdrawal to a greater distance, or by the great divisions taking place in Bulgaria, or by the bitter quarrel between the Rumanians and the Hungarians over Transylvania, or through the internal resistance to German and Italian tyranny shown by Yugoslavia and Greece; for any or all of these reasons and causes, Turkey should play a part and win her place in the council of victors.

10. In the first instance it is possible that the military situation might be such that Turkey would feel justified in taking the same extended view of neutrality or non-belligerency as characterized the attitude of the United States of America towards Great Britain before the United States of America was drawn into the war. In this connexion the destruction of Rumanian oilfields by air attacks by British and American aircraft operating from Turkish airfields, or re-fuelling there, would have far-reaching consequences and might in view of the oil scarcity in Germany appreciably shorten the struggle. In the same way also the availability of air bases or re-fuelling points in Turkey would be of great assistance to Great Britain in her necessary attack on the Dodecanese, and later upon Crete, for which in any case, whether we get help or not, General Wilson has been directed to prepare during the present year. There is also the immensely important question of opening the Straits to Allied and then closing to
Axis traffic. The case contemplated in this paragraph is one in which Turkey would have departed from strictly impartial neutrality and definitely have taken sides with the United Nations without however engaging her armies offensively against Germany or Bulgaria; and those nations would put up with this action on the part of Turkey because they would not wish to excite her to more active hostility.

II. However, we cannot survey this field without facing the possibility of Turkey becoming a full belligerent and of her armies advancing into the Balkans side by side with the Russians on the one hand in the north and the British to the southward. In the event of Turkey becoming thus directly involved either offensively or through being attacked in consequence of her attitude, she would receive the utmost aid from all her allies and in addition it would be right for her before incurring additional risks to seek precise guarantees as to her territorial rights after the war. Great Britain would be willing to give these guarantees in a treaty at any time quite independently of any other power. She is also willing to join with Russia in giving such guarantees and it is believed that Russia would be willing to make a treaty to cover the case of Turkey becoming a full belligerent either independently or in conjunction with Great Britain. It seems certain to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt would gladly associate himself with such treaties and that the whole weight of the United States would be used in peace settlement to that end. At the same time one must not ignore the difficulties which United States Constitution interposes against prolonged European commitments. These treaties and assurances would naturally fall within the ambit of the world-instrument to protect all countries from wrong-doing which it is our main intention and inflexible resolve
to create, should God give us the power and lay this high duty upon us.

Message from Mr. Eden to President Roosevelt.

Thank you very much for the kind message which you sent me through Mack. I too much hope we may meet again soon.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

10th February 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

In my letter of February 2nd I sent you the text of the document which the Prime Minister gave to President Inonu when he was in Turkey.

I have been asked to let you know that in handing this document to President Inonu the Prime Minister emphasized that it represented his personal views, and that he had not had time to consult the Cabinet in the matter.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of British

[Stamp: Confidential, telegram 149972]
By [Stamp: Date MAY 5 1972]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

17 February 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

The "short note" and the document "Morning Thoughts", referred to in the Prime Minister's dispatch to the President of 2 February 1943, and also in Lord Halifax's letter to the President dated 10 February 1943, both of which are attached, were never received in the Map Room, nor is there any record of them in the White House. Miss Batchelder directed that the letter of 10 February 1943 be filed until the two papers were located.

W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., "S.N.R.

*Both the note & document "Morning Thought" are attached.*
From: London

To: The President of the United States

No. 260 February 3, 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

See Stalin's telegram to us both of January 30. I think he is entitled to more precise information, and no one can keep secrets better.

I think therefore we should say that -

(A). There are quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier.

(B). When this is accomplished we intend, in July or earlier if possible, to attack Italy across the Central Mediterranean with the object of promoting an Italian collapse, and establishing contact with Yugoslavia. We expect to meet with serious opposition from German forces. If not, our task will be much easier.

(C). This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of three or four hundred thousand men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established.

(D). We are aiming at August for a heavy operation across the Channel, for which between seventeen and twenty British and US divisions will be available, of which four to seven will be US divisions, with a gross strength of fifty thousand each. Here again assault landing craft will be a limiting factor. Weather may, of course, spoil the Channel operation, in which case it will be prepared with stronger forces for Sept.
(E). Both the operations will be supported by very large US and Brit Air Forces, and that across the Channel by the whole metropolitan air force of Great Brit. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Brit and the US.

It would also say that in accepting the conclusions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister have enjoined upon them the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible. Let me know what you feel about all this. I have talked it all over with CIGS who is in agreement.

I am so glad that you are home again. I hope all has gone well with the constitution. I shall soon be moving back by stages. Kindest regards to Harry.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., Secrecy Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: President of the United States

No 261 February 6, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I propose to give the House of Commons some account of our joint affairs on Thursday 11th at noon BST.

I have received from General Alexander a message saying that the directive I gave him on August 18th has been fully accomplished, as the enemy have been driven out of Egypt, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. (see my immediately following telegram) Moreover the advance forces of the Desert Army are already advancing into Tunisia. This therefore is the moment when the Eighth Army should come under the command of General Eisenhower. I propose to announce this, as it should certainly come from this end. I therefore propose to you that Alexanders and Tedders appointments should be released to synchronise with my statement in Parliament. If you agree, the best arrangements for synchronising can be made between the press officers concerned. I hope however that no advance information about the Eighth Army will get out before I tell Parliament.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copy to Admiral Lady.
From: London
To: President of the United States
No 261 February 8, 1943.

I have just returned from Algiers where I had very satisfactory talks with Eisenhower, Smith, Giraud, Murphy and others. I hope you will approve of the amended drafts of the document conferring a certain additional status and power upon Giraud. I had not seen it beforehand although my name was mentioned. Murphy and MacMillan arrived at a complete agreement which Giraud very readily accepted.

I have been travelling almost continuously since I saw you last and will send you a further report in a few days. I am sending you a separate message about your proposed amendments to my telegram to Joe. At first sight they seem to be admirable. Every good wish to you, Harry and all friends.

PRIME
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Attached are two despatches from the Prime Minister to the President, one of which (#261) will require a reply. We have communicated these despatches to the President and he, through General Watson, gave us instructions to request you to prepare said reply.

Since time is a factor in this reply, the President added that you were to use your good discretion in deciding whether or not it was necessary to get the President’s approval of your proposed reply before sending it.

Should you desire to submit your proposed draft to the President for approval, the Map Room would be glad to transmit it to Hyde Park in a secure cryptographic system.

Very respectfully,

W. C. Mott

W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

2 Incls.
From: London  
To: President of the United States  
No 262 February 8, 1943.

Prime Minister to President personal and (signed PRIME).

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is exchange of messages referred to. Begins. Prime Minister to General Alexander, Commander in Chief in the Middle East.

Your prime and main duty will be to take or destroy at the earliest opportunity the German-Italian Army commanded by Field Marshal Rommel, together with all its supplies and establishments in Egypt and Libya.

You will discharge or cause to be discharged such other duties as pertain to your command without prejudice to the task described in paragraph one, which must be considered paramount in His Majesty's interests. Ends General Alexander to Prime Minister.

Sir, the orders you gave me on August 15th 1942 have been fulfilled. His Majesty's enemies together with their impedimenta have been completely eliminated from Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya and Tripolitania. I now await your further instructions.

PRIME
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 263, February 10th, 1943

Personal and

I send you the message I have sent to Joe as amended in accordance with your wishes. "Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin most secret and personal. Your message of 30 January. I have now consulted the President and the matter has been referred to the Staffs on both sides of the ocean. I am authorized to reply for us both as follows: (A) there are a quarter of a million Germans and Italians in Eastern Tunisia. We hope to destroy or expel these during April, if not earlier. (B) When this is accomplished, we intend in July, or earlier if possible, to seize Sicily with the object of clearing the Mediterranean, promoting an Italian collapse with the consequent effect on Greece and Yugoslavia, and wearing down the German Air Force: this is to be closely followed by an operation in the eastern Mediterranean, probably against the Dodecanese. (C) This operation will involve all the shipping and landing craft we can get together in the Mediterranean and all the troops we can have trained in assault landing in time, and will be of the order of 3 or 400,000 men. We shall press any advantage to the utmost once ports of entry and landing bases have been established. (D) We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross channel operation in August, in which both British and United States units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of this attack must of course be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the channel at that time. (E) Both the operations will be supported by very large United States and British Air Forces, and that across the channel by the whole Metropolitan Air Force of Great Britain. Together these operations strain to the very utmost the shipping resources of Great Britain and the United States. (F) The President and I have enjoined upon our Combined Chiefs of Staff the need for the utmost speed and for reinforcing the attacks to the extreme limit that is humanly and physically possible."

I send you also a telegram I have had from him about Turkey,

Copy to Gen. Marshall

REGARDED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. vol., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 263, February 10th, 1943

and the consequential message I have sent to Inonu after a
long talk with Maisky who urged it. Perhaps you can emphasize
it through your channels. I hope we may be more successful
in making this marriage personal than the other. "Premier Stalin to
Premier Churchill personal and secret.

I received your messages concerning the Turkish question
on the 2nd and 3rd February. Many thanks for information on
your talks with the leading Turkish personalities in Adana.

In connection with your suggestion that the Turks would
reciprocate any friendly gesture from the Soviet Union I
would like to mention that we have already made a number of
statements, the friendly character of which is well known
to the British Government, some months before the Soviet Ger-
man war as well as after its beginning. However the Turks did
not react to our steps. Apparently they were afraid to incur
the wrath of the Germans. I am afraid that a similar reception
will be accorded to the gesture suggested by you.

The international position of Turkey remains very delicate.
On the one hand Turkey has the Treaty of Neutrality and Friend-
ship with the USSR and the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against
Aggression with Great Britain,—on the other hand she has the
Treaty of Friendship with Germany signed 3 days before the
German attack against the USSR. It is not clear to me how in
the present circumstances Turkey thinks to combine her obligations
vis-a-vis the USSR and Great Britain with her obligations vis-
avis Germany. Still if Turkey wishes to make her relations with
the USSR more friendly and intimate let her say so. In this
case the Soviet Union would be willing to meet Turkey half way.

Of course I have no objection against you making a statement
that I was kept informed on the Anglo-Turkish meeting although
I cannot say that the information was very full.

I wish the First and the Eighth Armies as well as the American
troops in North Africa every success in the coming offensive and
a speedy expulsion of the German-Italian forces from the African
soil.

Let me thank you for your friendly congratulations on the
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 263, February 10th, 1943

surrender of the Field Marshal Paulus and on the successful
annihilation of the encircled enemy troops near Stalingrad."
"Prime Minister to Monsieur Sarajoglu for President Inonu
personal and secret.

I told Premier Stalin about our talks, and have described
to him the Turkish desire for closer understanding with the
Soviet Union.

In reply Premier Stalin has recalled a number of state-
ments of a friendly character towards Turkey which have been
made by the Soviet Government in recent years. None the less
Monsieur Stalin tells me that if it is the wish of Turkey to
make her relations with the USSR more friendly and intimate,
then the Soviet Government is willing to meet the Turkish
Government half way and would welcome any suggestions that the
Turkish Government could make to improve relations between the
2 countries.

In these conditions it seems to me of first importance
that you should carefully consider the nature of the arrange-
ments which would best contribute to the growth of confidence
between Turkey and the Soviet Union. If you feel able to
formulate these I feel sure that Premier Stalin would be
ready to give them close and sympathetic examination. You will
know that my good offices are always available to promote the
successful outcome of any negotiations between our Turkish and
Soviet Allies.

I feel most strongly that this is a very fine opportunity.
I cannot conceal my desire for a warm renewal of friendship be-
tween Russia and Turkey similar to that achieved by Mustapha
Kemal. Thus Turkey while increasing her own defences would
stand between two victorious friends. In all this I am thinking
not only of the war, but of the post war period. Tell me if
there is anything I can do."

Your number 257. I will act in the way you wish but I can-
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 263, February 10th, 1943

not guarantee that there will be no criticism. I have received the attached note from Brendan Bracken who is in close touch with the British and American Press here.

"I am having quite a lot of trouble in persuading some of the newspapers not to criticize the American handling of the North African campaign. If General Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander is stressed and General Alexanders and Air Vice Marshal Tedders respective functions are left vaguely undefined, I think we must expect a state of criticism from the British Press. In this respect I have no doubt that the press would be reflecting the general feeling in the country and there would be far too many people who would honestly feel that British Commanders and Troops had been unfairly ignored for the sake of some move in international politics.

The British Government is accustomed to criticism and is not likely to be unduly ruffled. But the Americans will very much resent the almost inevitably resulting criticism of General Eisenhower's appointment or any comparison between his military qualifications and those possessed by General Alexander. I think it is important therefore that the public should be told that General Eisenhower is Generalissimo, that Alexander is commanding the Forces of the United Nations fighting in Tunisia, that Tedder is commanding the Air Forces." I shall utter the most solemn warning against controversy in these matters and every effort will be made by Bracken behind the scenes. Please do the like on your side to help your faithful partner. The Russian successes seem to me to be opening altogether a new situation. My hearty congratulations on Guadalcanal.

No Sig

Copies to General Marshall
The President received the following telegram from Prime Minister Churchill early today:

"As I have said, French North West Africa is a United States operation under American Command. The boundary between our respective spheres, we have agreed, shall be the existing frontier between Tripolitania and Tunisia. Driving forward on its quest, which is Rommel, the Desert Army is now crossing that frontier. It will naturally come under the orders of General Eisenhower as it passes into the American sphere. I regard General Eisenhower as one of the finest men I have ever met and have great confidence in him. At Casablanca the arrangement was made that General Alexander should become Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower, not only over the Tunisian area but for all purposes over the whole field, when this transfer of the Desert Army took place. Air Chief Marshal Tedder becomes Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and responsible to General Eisenhower for all air operations in his theatre at the same time. All air forces throughout the whole of the Middle East will also be under his control." This is an absolute necessity as our air forces from Libya, Cyrenaica and Egypt, and also our powerful air forces operating from Malta, are actually attacking the same targets, both by fighter and by bomber aircraft, just as the British and United States Air Forces are now working from Tunisia and Algeria. Who better than the experienced and trusted Air Chief Marshal Tedder for whom General Eisenhower so fondly asked? There must be one control over all this, and that control must be exercised by one man under the supreme commander. Air Vice Marshal Coningham, under him, previously working with the Eighth Army, and whose services have been admirable, will concentrate air operations in support of the First and Eighth British Armies and other troops on the Tunisian front. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, at the same time, who already commands all British and American Naval Forces in this theatre, will lengthen his command to the east so as to effectively comprise all the allied operations inside the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean the present commander in chief will become commander in chief in the Levant, dealing also with the Red Sea and all approaches from that quarter, his headquarters being in Egypt."
For me to announce exactly where the line is drawn is unnecessary, however the entire arrangement is very precise. General Sir Henry Taitland Wilson, now commanding in Persia and Iraq where the Tenth Army is stationed will fill the vacancy in the command of the Middle East created by General Alexander's appointment as deputy commander in chief to General Eisenhower. For the present time it is proposed to keep Persia and Iraq as a separate command, a new commander to be appointed soon.

In the meantime, the consent of General Giraud, who commands the French Army now being raised by American material to a powerful force which will play its part later on in freeing the French Motherland, has been already obtained by General Eisenhower to this army being placed under the command of General Anderson, along with the strong United States forces already moved forward into Tunisia. In this we have a series, or hierarchy, established by international arrangement totally in accord with the modern ideas, of unity of command, and also between the three services; namely, General Eisenhower with General Alexander as his deputy and directly under him, the commanders in chief mentioned. I trust the House, the press, and the country, will be extremely cautious not to criticise this arrangement or to run one General against another to the injury of the smooth and harmonious relations now prevailing among this group of brothers whose teeth are in the job. You have two men, remarkable for selflessness of character and disdain of all personal advancement, in General Eisenhower and General Alexander. It is quite possible that one of these fine days the bells will have to be rung again, if they are let alone and given a chance. If not, in all loyalty and comradeship in the light of circumstances we will address ourselves to the problem.

Everything that I am sure the enemy knows and nothing that he does not know, I have sincerely tried to tell the House. I appeal, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, to all patriotic men; let the great machines roll into battle under the best possible conditions for our success; stamp your feet on sovers of tares and mischief makers, wherever they may be found. At the present time that is all I have to say.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11 February 1943

MEMORANDUM:

The following is a paraphrase of message No. 264 (Prime Minister to the President of the United States).

To President, personal and , from Former Naval Person.

Reference your number 259. The following is my advance text with reference to changes in command and may be given out at approximately the time I shall be speaking in the House of Commons, i.e. 1815 hours BST, Feb 11th. Minor verbal amendments may be made by me later.

The text of statement starts:

As I have said, French North West Africa is a United States operation under American Command. The boundary between our respective spheres, we have agreed, shall be the existing frontier between Tripolitania and Tunisia. Driving forward on its quest, which is Rommel, the Desert Army is now crossing that frontier. It will naturally come under the orders of General Eisenhower as it passes into the American sphere. I regard General Eisenhower as one of the finest men I have ever met and have great confidence in him. At Casablanca the arrangement was made that General Alexander should become Deputy Commander in Chief under General Eisenhower, not only over the Tunisian area but, like him, for all purposes over the whole field when this transfer of the Desert Army took place. Air Chief Marshall Tedder becomes Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and responsible to General Eisenhower for all air operations in his theatre at the same time. All air forces throughout the whole of the Middle East will also be under his control. This is an absolute necessity as our air forces from Libya, Cyrenaica and Egypt, and also our powerful air forces operating from Malta, are actually attacking the same targets, both by fighter and by bomber aircraft, just as the British and United States Air Forces are now working from Tunisia and Algeria. Who better than the experienced and trusted Air Chief Marshal Tedder for
whom General Eisenhower so fervidly asked? There must be one control over all this, and that control must be exercised by one man under the supreme commander. Air Vice Marshal Coningham, under him, previously working with the Eighth Army, and whose services have been admirable, will concentrate air operations in support of the First and Eighth British Armies and other troops on the Tunisian front. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, at the same time, who already commands all British and American Naval Forces in this theatre, will lengthen his command to the east so as to effectively comprise all the allied operations inside the Mediterranean. In the Mediterranean the present commander in chief will become commander in chief in the Levant, dealing also with the Red Sea and all approaches from that quarter, his headquarters being in Egypt. For me to announce exactly where the line is drawn is unnecessary, however the entire arrangement is very precise. General Sir Henry Wavell, now commanding in Persia and Iraq where the Tenth Army is stationed will fill the vacancy in the command of the Middle East created by General Alexander's appointment as deputy commander in chief to General Eisenhower. For the present time it is proposed to keep Persia and Iraq as a separate command, a new commander to be appointed soon.

In the meantime the consent of General Giraud, who commands the French Army now being raised by American material to a powerful force which will play its part later on in freeing the French motherland, has been already obtained by General Eisenhower to this army being placed under the command of General Anderson, along with the strong United States forces already moved forward into Tunisia. In this we have a series, or hierarchy, established by international arrangement totally in accord with the modern ideas, between various allies, of unity of command, and also between the three services. Namely, General Eisenhower with General Alexander as his deputy and directly under them, the commanders in chief mentioned. I trust the House, the press, and the country, will be extremely cautious not to criticize this arrangement or to run one General against another to the injury of the smooth and harmonious relations now prevailing among this group of brothers whose teeth are in the job. You have two men, remarkable for selflessness of character and disdain of all personal advancement, in General Eisenhower and General Alexander. It is quite possible that one of these fine days the bells will have to be rung again, if they are let alone and given a chance. If not, in all loyalty and comradeship in the light of circumstances we will address ourselves

- 2 -
to the problem.

Everything that I am sure the enemy knows and nothing that he does not know, I have sincerely tried to tell the House. I appeal, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, to all patriotic men; let the great machines roll into battle under the best possible conditions for our success; stamp your feet on sowers of tares and mischief makers, wherever they may be found. At the present time that is all I have to say.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 264, February 11th, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret

Your no 259. Following is the advance text of my reference to changes in command which may be handed out at 1315 hours BST, Feb 11th i.e. at approximately the time that I shall be speaking in the House of Commons. I may make minor verbal amendments later.

Text of statement begins.

French North West Africa is, as I have said, a United States operation under American command. We have agreed that the boundary between our respective spheres shall be the existing frontier between Tripolitania and Tunisia. But the Desert Army is now crossing that frontier and driving forward on its quest which is Rommel. As it passes into the American sphere it will naturally come under the orders of General Eisenhower. I have great confidence in General Eisenhower. I regard him as one of the finest men I have ever met. It was arranged at Casablanca that when this transfer of the Desert Army took place General Alexander should become Deputy Commander in Chief under General Eisenhower, not only over the Tunisian Area but, like him, for all purposes over the whole field. At the same time Air Chief Marshal Tedder becomes Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean and responsible to General Eisenhower for all air operations in his theatre. He will control also all air forces throughout the whole of the Middle East. This is absolutely necessary because our air forces from Egypt, Cyrenaica and Libya, and also our powerful air forces operating from Malta, are actually attacking the same targets, both by bomber and by fighter aircraft, as the United States and British Air Forces now working from Algeria and Tunisia. You must have one control over all this, and that control must be exercised under the supreme commander by one man, who better than the trusted and experienced Air Chief Marshal Tedder for whom General Eisenhower so earnestly asked? Under him Air Vice Marshal Coningham,
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 264, February 11th, 1943

Hitherto working with the Eighth Army, whose services have been much admired, will concert the air operations in support of the First and Eighth British Armies and other troops on the Tunisian battlefront. At the same time, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, who already commands all the British and American Naval Forces in this theatre, will extend his command eastwards so as to comprise effectively all the cognate operations inside the Mediterranean and the present commander in chief in the Mediterranean, with his headquarters in Egypt, will become commander in chief in the Levant, dealing also with the Red Sea and all the approaches from that quarter. There is no need for me to announce exactly where the line is drawn, but everything is arranged with precision. The vacancy in the command of the Middle East created by General Alexander's appointment as deputy commander in chief to General Eisenhower will be filled by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, now commanding in Persia and Iraq where the Tenth Army is stationed. It is proposed to keep Persia and Iraq as a separate command for the present and a new commander will shortly be appointed.

Meanwhile, General Eisenhower has already obtained the consent of General Giraud, who commands the French army now being raised by American equipment to a very powerful force, which will play its part later on in liberating the French motherland, to this army being placed under the command of General Anderson, together with the strong United States forces which have been moved forward into Tunisia. Thus we have a hierarchy established by international arrangement completely in accord with the modern ideas of unity of command.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 264, February 11, 1943

between various allies, and also between the three services: To wit: General Eisenhower with General Alexander as his deputy and under them the commanders in chief that I have mentioned. The House, the press and the country will, I trust, be very careful not to criticise this arrangement or to run one general against another to the detriment of the smooth and harmonious relations which now prevail among a band of brothers whose teeth are in the job. In General Eisenhower, as in General Alexander, you have two men remarkable for selflessness of character and disdain of all personal advancement. Let them alone, and give them a chance, and it is quite possible that one of these fine days the bells will have to be rung again. If not, we will address ourselves to the problem in all loyalty and comradeship in the light of circumstances.

I have really tried to tell the House everything that I am sure the enemy knows and nothing that he does not know. I appeal to all patriotic men on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to stamp their feet on mischief makers and sowers of tares, wherever they may be found, and let the great machines roll into battle under the best possible conditions for our success. That is all I have to say at the present time.

Nosig

RECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No 265. February 11, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President, personal and most immediate. Reference my no 264.

The following passages have been deleted from the text which I sent you, and I hope that you can ensure that they are deleted from any hand out:

(A) Passage beginning "Not only over the Tunisian area" and ending "for all purposes over the whole field."

(B) Passage beginning "To wit, General Eisenhower" and ending "and under them the Commanders in Chief that I have mentioned".

PRIME
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No 266 February 11, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and (signed Hughes).

Apart from all the broad topics we have discussed together with so much agreement, there is in my opinion a real need for our foreign office and your State Department to have a much more thorough and detailed understanding of each others viewpoints than now exists. I should like to send Anthony Eden to you for this purpose. He would also be able to tell you about things here, and you would certainly find him a most agreeable companion. Pray let me know how this strikes you. He could start about the last week of this month.

PRIME
From: LONDON
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Number: 267, February 11, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and (signed Prime).

1. I entirely agree with what you propose to say about the Bride and Bridegroom problem. We too did not like what De Gaulle said at his press conference on the 9th February and we gave the press here guidance accordingly.

2. His statement about "elections" was a revival of the idea of bringing together the Conseils Generaux with elected representatives of other bodies such as Chambers of Commerce, and thus forming a central provisional authority. He was not thinking of parliamentary elections.

3. There was no secret session in the house, and I tried to put the Bride in her place by leaving her out. I am pressing very strongly that there should be substituted for De Gaulle De Gaulle in council, that is put him in commission. This will take a week or so. I will let you know how it goes on.

[Signature]

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. rel., 3-29-72
By F. H. Farm Date MAY 5 1972

0671
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 267, February 11, 1943

4. I have committed the unspeakable cruelty of refusing to pay any more English money to Godefroy to enable said Godefroy to loll about Alexandria in comfort. I intend to push this to the hard extreme and if he scuttles his ships in a final blackmailing attempt, he and his accomplices will be brought before an Egyptian Court.

5. I do beg you to put the screw on Robert who has just refused to receive Giraud's Emissary. I hope we might clean them both up about the same time.

No Sig
From: London
To: President of the United States

No. 266. February 17, 1943.

Former naval person to President personal and ••••

The British Chiefs of Staff and Mountbatten have now gone into the whole question of the date for Husky in most careful detail, and wish to make it perfectly clear that we shall be ready by the June Moon. I hope you will see their telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.O.S. (W) 4/73. It would be a great pity to lose a month if it could possibly be saved.

PRIME
From: London

To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 315

Former Naval person to President personal most immediate no. 269.

I do hope you are all right and that the fever will soon go. I have got rid of mine, which was heavy and long, I hope for good. Every good wish.

Prime

REGRADED-classified by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: President of the United States

Number 270 March 2, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Thank you for your telegram no 261 about the 3rd Soviet Protocol. I agree and designate Colonel Llewelin as re-
representative of His Majesty's Government.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., SIS & Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
FROM: London
TO: The President of the United States
NUMBER: 271, March 4, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and

So far we have sent no answer to Stalins telegram of Feb. 16th
which was addressed to both of us. We think it important here that we
should keep together. I have therefore drafted the following. Perhaps
you will let me know what you and your advisers think about it. Draft
telegram begins:

"Most secret. Jointly from President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin. Personal and most secret.

1. We thank you for your full statement of the 16th Feb.

2. In spite of the delay in clearing the Axis out of North
Africa, plans and preparations are being pressed forward to carry out
operation "Husky" (which is the new code word, see our immediately
following telegram) in June.

3. We are also preparing plans for operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean, such as (a) the capture of Crete and/or the Dodecanese, and
(b) a landing in Greece. The time of these operations is largely
governed by the result of "Husky" and the availability of the necessary.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Gvt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

in Map Room 04/1945
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 271, March 4, 1943

assault shipping and landing craft. The assistance of Turkey would of
course be of immense value.

4. The Anglo American attempt to get Tunis and Bizerta at
a run was abandoned in December because of the strength of the enemy, the
impending rainy season, the already sodden character of the ground
and the fact that the communications stretched 500 miles from Algiers and
160 miles from Bone through bad roads and a week of travelling over single
track French railways. It was only possible to get supplies up to the
Army by sea on a small scale owing to the strength of enemy air and
submarine attack. Thus it was not possible to accumulate the petrol or
other supplies in the forward areas. Indeed, it was only just possible
to nourish the troops already there. The same was true of the air, and
improvised airfields became quagmires. When we stopped attacking there
were about 40,000 Germans in Tunisia apart from Italians and from Rommel
who was still in Tripoli. The German force in North Africa is now more
than double that figure, and they are rushing over every man they can in
transport aircraft and destroyers. We suffered some sharp local reverses
towards the end of last month but the position has now been restored. We
hope that the delays caused by this setback will be repaired by the earlier
advance of Montgomery's army which should have 6 divisions (say 200,000
men) operating from Tripoli with sufficient supplies against the Mareth
position by March 19th or perhaps a little earlier. In the northern
sector of Tunisia, however, the ground is still too wet for major operations.
5. We thought that you would like to know these details of the story although it is on a small scale compared with the tremendous operations over which you are presiding.

6. Our staffs estimate that about half the number of divisions which were sent to the Soviet-German front from France and low countries since last November have already been replaced mainly by divisions from Russia and Germany, and partly by new divisions formed in France. They estimate that at the present time there are 30 German Divisions in France and the low countries.

7. The bomber offensive from the United Kingdom has been going steadily forward. During February over 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany and on German occupied territory. Our staffs estimate that out of a German first-line strength of 4500 aircraft, 1850 are now on the Russian front, the remainder being held opposite us on the Western and Mediterranean fronts.

8. With regard to an attack across the channel, it is our earnest wish that our troops should be in the general battle in Europe which you are fighting with such astounding prowess. But you should know that our shipping situation is very serious at the moment. In order to sustain the operations in North Africa, the Pacific and India, and to carry supplies to Russia, the import programme into the United Kingdom has been cut to the bone, and we have eaten, and are eating, deeply into reserves. It would be impossible to provide the shipping to bring back
any of the forces now in North Africa in time for operations across the channel this year. However we are doing all that we can to concentrate a strong American land and air force in the United Kingdom. In here again we are crippled for lack of shipping. In case the enemy should weaken sufficiently we are preparing to strike earlier than August, and plans are kept alive from week to week. If he does not weaken, a premature attack with insufficient forces would merely lead to a bloody repulse and a great triumph for the enemy.

No Sig
March 5, 1943
1719Z

URGENT

From: AmEmbassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 272, March 5, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal.

Accept my warmest congratulations on your brilliant victory in the Pacific, which fitly salutes the end of your first ten years.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
German naval concentration at Narvik now comprises "Tirpitz", "Scharnhorst", "Lutzow", one 6-inch cruiser and eight destroyers with 15 U-boats and air forces also available. Admiral Doenitz has taken command. The move of "Tirpitz" and "Scharnhorst" to north became apparent on Sunday last.

2. It is in the opinion of Defence Committee impossible to run the March convoy (J.W. 54), due to sail 27th, while this concentration is maintained. A German move through leads to Alten Fiord under close air cover cannot be prevented. The convoy and its escort would have to go south of Bear Island under air and U-boat attack. The principal units of the Home Battle Fleet would have to be sent into the Barents Sea as escort, remaining five or six days exposed to U-boat and air attacks. This move would of course open the Atlantic and enable Germans to pass fast heavy ships or, if they chose, to come with their whole fleet on to our main lines of communications with disastrous consequences to our convoys. We cannot therefore send Battle Fleet into Barents Sea and without it the convoy could easily be destroyed by German surface ships. I send you in my immediately following the minutes of the First Sea Lord on which the Defence Committee reached its conclusion.

3. However as the German concentration at Narvik may disperse, it is not proposed to unload convoy J.W. 54. It may therefore start under the protection of the Home Fleet as a blind, being turned back to Iceland, if the enemy keeps
his station. Should an opportunity occur in April or May, a renewed attempt to pass this convoy through will be made. Meanwhile two ships, which have already started to load in the United States for May convoy (J.W. 55) might continue to load in order to avoid a premature disclosure to Russians at your ports that this convoy will probably not sail.

4. This news will be a heavy blow to Stalin and his Government. Coming upon them as it does in the mood revealed in paragraph 1 of his telegram to me, which I have repeated to you in my telegram to Mr. Eden, it will certainly excite their grievous resentment. I propose therefore to allow operation PUGILIST to develop before informing Stalin. This will also give time for me to receive your views and advice. We have not yet broken it to him that convoys will have to be suspended altogether during the operation HUSKY. I feel it will be right and wise to place the picture before him as a whole, dark though it be. What do you say?

5. Sinkings in the North Atlantic of 17 ships in two days in convoys H.X. 229 and S.C. 122 are a final proof that our escorts are evidently too thin. The strain upon British Navy is becoming intolerable. If instead of carrying out blind proposed in paragraph 3 above it were definitely decided now not to run any more convoys to Russia until after HUSKY, viz. August or September, that would release one escort carrier, several ocean-going escort vessels, and six other escort vessels for immediate service and enable us to form support groups in Atlantic, which are vital, and to bridge April and May gap before our reinforcements, particularly of air power, come into play.
My mind is therefore turning to a blunt and complete cessation till after HUSKY. Here again I should be most grateful for your advice.

Given by Old Horseman to Lt Col Mort at 1800 on March 9th. [Signature]
Following is Admiralty minute referred to at the end of paragraph 2 of Prime Minister's message.

The Naval Staff have always taken the view that if the Germans concentrated a sufficient force in the far north and were prepared to use it properly it would be impossible to run a North Russian convoy.

2. Situation about the running of J.W. 54 is as follows:
   (a) Channel south of Bear Island is only 200 miles wide which means that convoy will have to pass not more than 200 miles from German aerodromes.
   (b) At time convoy passes Bear Island there will be no darkness though there will be about nine hours of twilight in which visibility is from five to seven miles.
   (c) "Tirpitz", "Scharnhorst", "Lutzow", one 6-inch cruiser and 8 destroyers are concentrated at Narvik.
   (d) There are 15 U-boats in North Norway.
   (e) Air forces in North Norway though not as strong as they have been are very considerable and as follows: dive bombers 39, long range bombers 30.

   As far as is known there are no torpedo bombers but there are 18 torpedo float planes.

   It is estimated that North Norway could be reinforced by 60 long range bombers in 3 days.

   (f) We must assume that Admiral Doenitz and Cruiser Admiral who is in command of the concentration at Narvik will be ready to play a game in which the cards are in their hands.

3. Against this force the covering forces which we have relied on, e.g. a covering force of cruisers and a
striking force of destroyers would be quite inadequate to deal with the German forces.

4. Hence to run J.W. 54 it would be necessary to send battle fleet and a carrier into the Barents Sea. I do not consider that we are any more justified in doing this now than in the past.

5. I am definitely of the opinion therefore that as long as this German concentration as given in paragraph 2(c) above continues we should not be justified in running J.W. 54. The Commander-in-Chief quite independently has expressed the same opinion.

6. In June 1942 we attempted to run convoy PQ. 17 when it was known that the "Tirpitz", "Scheer" and "Hipper" were concentrated in North Norway.

   At this time ice limit was well to the northward and there was plenty of room for a wide dispersion if this were ordered.

   As is known, in belief that attack on convoy by German surface forces was imminent the only alternative of dispersion was ordered, but even this led to disastrous results to the convoy from U-boat and air attack.

   At present time there is no room for dispersion.

7. If the majority of the Home Fleet are in the far north covering a Russian convoy we shall have inadequate forces to prevent a break-out of German surface forces into the Atlantic. We have had clear indications that the Germans have been collecting data regarding our patrols in Denmark Strait and in Iceland-Faroes Channel. The natural inference is that they are considering a break-out of some surface forces into the Atlantic.
8. It is always possible, though I do not think likely, that the concentrations at Harvik are due to the new Admiral wishing to meet all his ships. It must be realized that the concentration can only be considered to have been reduced when one of the ships forming it is known to have returned to the Baltic.

9. If the "Tirpitz" were to return to the Baltic we are still faced with a much stronger concentration than we have had to face up to date as "Scharnhorst" and "Lutzow" are considerably stronger than "Lutzow" and "Hipper".

10. To run J.W. 54 in face of the present concentration less the "Tirpitz" it would be necessary to send a battleship right through to Murmanak with the convoy. This battleship would not have any fighter protection and after a certain period would not have a destroyer escort as the latter would have run out of fuel.

11. I am of the opinion therefore that even if the "Tirpitz" returns to the Baltic we should only be justified in attempting to run J.W. 54 if political reasons for doing so are so great that it is justifiable to accept the possibility of losing a battleship of the K.G. 5 class when the latter was being used in an unsound manner, e.g. in range of shore-based air attack and in face of a U-boat concentration without fighter protection and after a time without A/S escort.

12. Apart from the possible loss of a battleship and the majority of the ships of the convoy, the loss of an appreciable number of destroyers and escort craft would mean that escorts for HUSKY would be so weak that success of the operation would be jeopardized from the start.
The present situation as regards escorts for HUSKY is that allowing for all escorts now employed on the North Russian convoys being available we are still 10 short and at the moment the only source from which they can be obtained is escorts of North Atlantic convoys which are already dangerously weak.

13. Question of Hampdens does not affect the next convoy (J.W. 54) because they cannot get there in time. Although we would like these T/B squadrons in the North as soon as practicable and particularly for J.W. 55 they do not add materially to the security of our covering force which is my main cause for concern. They do however increase our chances of damaging the enemy and if battleship were damaged by torpedo might deter the enemy surface forces from interfering. It is also possible that presence of Hampden squadrons might deter the enemy from putting to sea.

14. On basis of J.W. 54 not being sailed it is proposed:
   (a) that 38 ships already loaded for J.W. 54 be kept loaded on the possibility that the German concentration in North Norway will be dispersed.
   (b) that the ships which were to form J.W. 55 should not be loaded but be held until further orders.
   (c) that sailing of J.W. 54 be at 7 days' notice in order that as many of the destroyers and escorts earmarked for J.W. 54 are employed in the Battle of the Atlantic.

15. If it is not possible to run J.W. 54 it will not be possible to bring out as a convoy the 24 ships now in North Russia. The possibility of sailing them singly in foggy weather would be kept in mind.
16. To run a North Russian convoy during a June HUSKY it would be necessary to ask the Americans to provide up to 12 fleet destroyers and 12 other escorts. As the Americans do not possess any suitable escorts other than destroyers it would be necessary for them to provide up to 24 destroyers.

17. Even if HUSKY is postponed until July it would not be possible to run a July J.W. convoy as the interval between a June and July HUSKY is only 30 days, whereas the interval between successive North Russian convoys must be 42 days.

18. If it were decided that the chance of the German concentration breaking up was so remote as not to justify keeping merchant vessels loaded it would be possible to provide several support groups working from the United Kingdom or Iceland which should make a great difference in the Battle of the Atlantic.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

SUBJECT: Messages from Stalin to PM, Mar. 16; Message from PM to Stalin, Mar. 11.

The President and Admiral Leahy have seen these and they can now be filed.

R.M.H.

3 encls.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 5 1972
Following is text of message from Prime Minister to Stalin of March 11th.

Personal and

Roosevelt has sent me a copy of his reply to your full message of February 16th. I am well enough to reply myself.

Our first task is to clear the Axis out of North Africa by an operation the code-name of which is in my immediately following telegram. We hope that this will be accomplished towards the end of April, by which time about a quarter of a million Axis troops will be engaged by us.

Meanwhile all preparations are being pressed forward to carry out operation HUSKY (which is the new code-word, see my immediately following telegram) in June, a month earlier than we had planned at Casablanca.

Plans are also being investigated for operations in Eastern Mediterranean such as:

(a) capture of Crete and/or Dodecanese, and
(b) a landing in Greece.

The timing of these operations is largely governed by the result of HUSKY and availability of necessary assault shipping and landing craft. The assistance of Turkey and the use of Turkish air fields would of course be of immense value. Presently at the right time I shall make a request to them.

The Anglo-American attempt to get Tunis and Bizerte at a run was abandoned in December because of the strength of the enemy, the impending rainy season, the already sodden character of the ground and the fact that communications stretched 500 miles from Algiers and 160 miles from Bone through bad roads and a week of travelling over single-track French railways. It was only possible to get supplies up to
the Army by sea on a small scale owing to the strength of enemy air and submarine attack. Thus it was not possible to accumulate petrol or other supplies in conquered areas. Indeed it was only just possible to nourish troops already there. The same was true of air, and improvised air fields became quagmires. When we stopped attacking there were about 40,000 Germans in Tunisia apart from Italians and from Rommel who was still in Tripoli. The German force in North Tunisia is now more than double that figure, and they are rushing over every man they can in transport aircraft and destroyers. Some sharp local reverses were suffered towards the end of last month but the position has now been restored. We hope delays caused by this set-back will be repaired by the earlier advance of Montgomery's army, which should have six divisions (say 200,000 men) operating from Tripoli with sufficient supplies against Mareth position before the end of March. Already on March 6th Montgomery's army repulsed Rommel's forestalling attack with heavy losses. The British and American army in Northern sector of Tunisia will act in combination with Montgomery's battle.

I thought you would like to know these details of the story although it is on a small scale compared with the tremendous operations over which you are presiding.

The British staffs estimate that about half the number of divisions which were sent to Soviet-German front from France and the Low Countries since last November have already been replaced mainly by divisions from Russia and Germany and partly by new divisions formed in France. They estimate that at the present time there are thirty German divisions in France and the Low Countries.

The bomber offensive from the United Kingdom has been going steadily forward. During February over 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany and on German-occupied
territory, and 4,000 tons have fallen on Germany since the beginning of March. Our air staff estimates that out of a German first line strength of 4,500 combat aircraft about 1,780 are now on the Russian front, the remainder being held opposite us in Germany and on Western and Mediterranean fronts. Besides this there is the Italian air force with a first line strength of 1,385 aircraft the great bulk of which is opposed to us.

With regard to attack across the Channel it is the earnest wish of the President and myself that our troops should be in the general battle in Europe which you are fighting with such astounding prowess. But in order to sustain operations in North Africa, the Pacific, India, and to carry supplies to Russia, the import programme into the United Kingdom has been cut to the bone and we have eaten and are eating into reserves. However, in case the enemy should weaken sufficiently we are preparing to strike earlier than August and plans are being kept alive from week to week. If he does not weaken a premature attack with inferior and insufficient forces would merely lead to a bloody repulse, Nazi vengeance on local population if they rose and a great triumph for the enemy. The Channel situation can only be judged nearer the time and in making this declaration of our intentions there for your own personal information, I must not be understood to limit our freedom of decision.
Following is text of message from Stalin to the Prime Minister received in Washington on March 18th.

I have received your reply to my message of February 16th.

It is evident from this reply that Anglo-American operations in North Africa have not only not been expedite but on the contrary they have been postponed to the end of April. Even this date is not quite definite. Thus at height of our fighting against Hitler's forces, i.e. in February - March, the weight of Anglo-American offensive in North Africa has not only (? not) increased but there has been no development of offensive at all and time limit for operations set by yourself was extended. Meanwhile Germany succeeded in transferring 35 divisions (including 6 armoured divisions) from West against Soviet troops. It is easy to see what difficulties this created for Soviet armies and how position of Germans on Soviet-German front was alleviated.

Fully realizing importance of HUSKY I must however point out it cannot replace second front in France. Still I welcome by all means contemplated acceleration of this operation.

Now as before I see main task in hastening of second front in France. As you remember you admitted possibility of such a front already in 1942 and in any case not later than in the spring of 1943. There were serious reasons for possibility admittedly. Naturally enough I underlined in my previous message necessity of the blow from the West not later than in the spring or in the early summer of this year.

The Soviet troops spent whole winter in tense fighting which continues even now. Hitler is carrying out important measures with a view to replenishing and increasing
his army for spring and summer operations against U.S.S.R.
In these circumstances it is (words undecypherable)
important that blow from the West should not be put off and
that it should be struck in the spring or in early summer.

I recognize difficulties of Anglo-American
operations in Europe. Notwithstanding all that I deem it
my duty to warn you in the strongest possible manner how
dangerous would be from the view-point of our common cause
further delay in opening second front in France. This is
the reason why uncertainty of your statements concerning
contemplated Anglo-American offensive across Channel arouses
grave anxiety in me about which I feel I cannot be silent.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Following is text of message from Stalin to the Prime Minister received in Washington March 18th.

I received your messages of March 6th and March 13th on successful bombing of Essen, Stuttgart, Munich and Nuremberg. From the bottom of my heart I welcome British aviation striking hard against German industrial centres.

Many thanks for your congratulations on capture of Viazma. Unfortunately we had to evacuate Kharkov to-day.

As soon as we will receive your film on the 8th Army which is mentioned in your special message of March 11th I will see it myself and will take care that it should be shown widely to our army and population. I fully realize how important it will be for the cause of our fighting friendship. Let me send you personally our Soviet film Stalingrad.
March 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

SUBJECT: Prime re Spain

Dear Grace:

The President asked that I read this and return it for his files.

Harry L. Hopkins
encl.
From: London
To: President of the United States

No 273 March 24, 1943.

Personal and former Naval person to President.

Your number 264.

My people advise me that they also have received numerous reports to this effect but that they are convinced that they are being deliberately put out by the enemy. They are satisfied that such movement of material and troops as there has been is insufficient to indicate any German intention to move into Spain. The fact is that as a result of the Russian offensive a redistribution of divisions in France has been taking place since the end of November. Divisions have been taken from France to Russia. These have been partially replaced by training divisions and by a few battered divisions from Russia. The net result in the South of France has been a considerable reduction in strength and in quality since end of November. On the Spanish Frontier itself numbers, but not quality, of German forces are now approximately the same as at the end of November.

The Staffs here do not believe that Germany has any free reserves of land or air forces out of which to provide a force for the invasion of Spain. Neither do they believe Germanys intention is to invade.

Nevertheless, they are studying what would be the bill in troops, aircraft, ships and material, and what would be the effect on our other projects if their assumption proves wrong and the Axis went into Spain and, for example, threatened Portugal and the latter called for help.

PRIME
Reference the President's personal message to the Prime Minister No. 263 of March 20th.

The cargo ships of J.W. 54 are to be kept loaded but we have decided to give up the idea of running the convoy even as a bait or as a blind. To do this would have been to get the worst of both worlds, i.e. Stalin's displeasure and no relief in the battle of the Atlantic. The escort vessels have therefore been dispersed to form support groups in the Atlantic, it being understood that if threat of German naval concentration were to disappear they would reassemble as quickly as possible to escort the Russian convoy. This reassembly might in the worst case take as much as eighteen days. Thus by way of example if we learned on April 1st that German naval concentration had dispersed to Baltic it might be April 19th before the convoy could start. Further on basis of a HUSKY assault on about June 24th, the convoy must start by May 7th if it is to start at all.

2. The President proposes in his 263 of March 20th that it would be wiser to postpone breaking the news to Stalin that the convoys to Russia must be interrupted until August or September. I must admit my own instinct has always been to tell him the whole truth at once, only waiting till PUGILIST perhaps gives us some credit. The Foreign Office have deployed the following arguments in support of my view:-

(a) To withhold information for three or four weeks will surely be much more dislocating to Russian plans for the use of the material they expect on convoys than if

Stalin/
Stalin is told at once. The delay will therefore be likely to annoy Stalin.

(b) Will it not look very inefficient that we are not able to foresee interruption in convoys caused by HUSKY until the last moment.

(c) How shall we explain to the Soviet Government our decision not to press for their acceptance of GRENADINE if we do not tell Stalin that there will be for several months no more convoys to protect? Unless we do so our acquiescence in Russian refusal to accept air squadrons will look like a climb down since we told the Russians that additional air protection was so essential during the summer that, if it was not available, we would have to consider with the Americans "the whole question of despatch of future convoys".

(d) There seems no reason why Stalin should take decision to suspend convoys better later on. A frank and immediate declaration of our inability will come as a shock to him but successive evasions and postponements will inspire him with suspicions of our intentions and of our honesty.

3. On the whole therefore I think we might just as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb. Pray put this view to the President. My immediately following telegram gives text of a message that I should send to Stalin if he agrees. If he does not agree paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 would be omitted from telegram in question.

4. I should be grateful for early reply but I should not in any event send my telegram to Stalin until we know more about PUGILIST.
PRIORITY

From: American Embassy, London  
To: The President of the United States

In reply cite: Unnumbered message, March 25, 1943

Delighted to receive your letter of Mar 17th and to know that you are fully recovered. Practically everyone who came with me has been laid up but all are better now.

I had a very pleasant talk at luncheon yesterday with Archbishop Spellman, who is a worthy short arorter. I think I convinced him that there is nothing anti-Vatican or anti-Catholic about British policy.

I have sent you through Eden a draft of the proposed telegram breaking the news to Joe, and I hope you will discuss with Eden whether it is not better to let him know the worst. My instinct is to tell him the whole truth as soon as "Fugilist" takes a favourable turn. I am still confident of success. Patton's Corps has made a fine advance.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5 1972
Proposed Message from the Prime Minister to
Premier Stalin.

1. The Germans have concentrated at Narvik a powerful battle fleet consisting of "Tirpitz", "Scharnhorst", "Lutzow", one six-inch cruiser and eight destroyers. Thus danger to Russian convoys which I described in my message to you of July 17th last year has been revived in even more menacing form. I told you then that we did not think it right to risk our home fleet in Barents Sea where it could be brought under attack of German shore-based aircraft and U-boats, without adequate protection against either; and I explained that if one or two of our most modern battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while "Tirpitz" and other large units of the German battle fleet remained in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be jeopardised with dire consequences to our common cause.

2. President Roosevelt and I have therefore decided with the greatest reluctance that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the next Russian convoy and that without such protection there is not the slightest chance of any of the ships reaching you in the face of the known German preparations for their destruction. Orders have therefore been issued that sailing of March convoy is to be postponed. The cargo ships will however remain loaded so that if German naval concentration should shortly disperse, the convoy could start for North Russia as soon as/
as the necessary escort vessels could be again collected.

3. It is a great disappointment to President Roosevelt and myself that it should be necessary to postpone March convoy. Had it not been for German concentration it had been our firm intention to send you a convoy of 30 ships each in March and again early May; and it is still our intention that at least one of the convoys should be sent if position of German heavy ships is such that convoy has a reasonable chance of getting through. At the same time we feel it only right to let you know at once that it will not be possible to continue convoys by Northern route after early May, since from that time onward every single escort vessel will be required to support our offensive operations in the Mediterranean leaving only a minimum to safeguard our lifeline in the Atlantic. In the latter we have had grievous and almost unprecedented losses during the last three weeks. Assuming HUSKY goes well we should hope to resume the convoys in early September provided disposition of German main units permits and that the situation in North Atlantic is such as to enable us to provide the necessary escorts and covering force.

4. We are doing our utmost to increase the flow of supplies by Southern route. The monthly figure has been more than doubled in the last six months. We have reason to hope that increase will progress and that figures for August will reach 240,000 tons. If this is achieved, the
monthly delivery will have increased eight-fold in 12 months. This will in some way offset both your disappointment and ours at the interruption to northern convoys.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO MISS GRACE TULLY

SUBJECT: Message from P.M. to the President dated Mar. 24 re shipping

Dear Grace:

This has been discussed and it is now ready for the files.

Harry L. Hopkins
encl.
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

REPLYING TO YOUR MESSAGE HANDED ME BY ANTHONY, WE SHALL FIND ALL THE SHIPS FOR HUSKY AND ARE GOING TO SCRAPE THE BOTTOM OTHERWISE BUT WE CANNOT ESCAPE THE FACT THAT SOMETHING MUST GIVE IF ALL OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE TO BE FULLY SUPPORTED. I AM GOING INTO THIS MATTER IN DETAIL AND ANTHONY WILL BRING YOU MY IMMEDIATE VIEWS.
March 24th, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I am very glad that you have arranged for a small committee to meet, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hopkins, to explore the present shipping situation in relation to military requirements.

The Prime Minister has asked me to give you the following personal message:

"I am extremely anxious about shipping situation. The British Chiefs of Staff have been examining position in relation to requirements of military operations and analysis which they have sent to Washington shows, after allowing for our minimum import programme, there will not be sufficient shipping to implement in full the decisions taken at Casablanca. The Commanders of various/

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of British

Scott, Telegram 16102
By H.G.H. Date MAR 31 1972
"various operations have been told that they must cut their requirements to the bone. For HUSKY the mounting of British share cannot be made without an increase of 14 ships over and above shipping already allocated to the Middle East in April. Provision of these ships by you is therefore an urgent and immediate necessity. Also the British Chiefs of Staff see little prospect of ANAKIM, much less BOLERO, unless from now onwards a good deal more shipping than is now in sight can be provided for Indian and United Kingdom theatres.

"As to United Kingdom programme, I realize that the United States are making great efforts to find the necessary tonnage for our imports in accordance with terms of your letter to me. The imports during early part of this year have been at such a low rate that even with increasing allocations already notified for forward months, it is going to be extremely difficult to make up the leeway.

"I/
"I need not go into details of all this as I have asked Eden to explain the situation and its extreme gravity more fully."

He has also asked me to forward as an annex a memorandum giving some details as to our imports situation.

[Signatures]

BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
(All shipping figures refer to non-tanker vessels, and are in gross tons unless otherwise stated. Imports are reckoned in tons of 20 cwt.)

WHILE the United Nations shipping position is improving and likely to continue doing so, the British import position is becoming steadily worse.

**Imports into the United Kingdom.**

In 1937 we imported nearly 5 million tons a month. After the inevitable dislocation at the outbreak of war, our imports in the summer of 1940 recovered to about 4 million tons a month. Military demands were light and sinkings low. With the loss of France and Scandinavia, and the entry of Italy into the war, with the resultant closing of the Mediterranean, our imports dropped to about 2½ million tons a month. This was not only because we had to fetch supplies from more distant sources over more circuitous routes; increased despatches to the Middle East had made a serious inroad into our importing tonnage. The entry of Russia and Japan into the war and the growing threat to Egypt imposed more severe calls on our shipping. Despatches to the Middle East, India and Australasia increased, supplies had to be sent to Russia, and in the summer of 1942 the United Nations tonnage primarily employed on military or quasi-military purposes rose to something like 1¼ million gross tons. American resources did not make up for increased demands and our imports dropped to 2 million tons a month. In the Autumn came "Torch", using 2-2½ million gross tons of cargo shipping alone, of which we contributed more than half. This has resulted in our imports dropping in the 4 months, November to February, to a record low level of 1¼ million tons a month. Thus/
Thus our imports in the last 4 months have been only a quarter of the average in a good pre-war year, half what they averaged in 1941 (and for that matter in 1918), and only three-fifths of the monthly average in the first ten months of 1942.

**United Kingdom Import Fleet.**

Amongst the many deleterious factors which have caused this appalling drop in imports, the outstanding one is simply that the ships have not been made available for bringing goods to this country. In peace-time the equivalent of perhaps 12 million gross tons of full-time, fully laden shipping were importing to the United Kingdom. Today we have only 3 million gross tons of shipping freely available for bringing supplies from America and other convenient sources. These 3 million tons bring in about three-quarters of our imports. For the rest we rely on whatever can be brought back by vessels on their return journeys from military errands. War-time delays (convoys, ports, routeing, &c.) fade into insignificance compared with this brute fact that we are trying with the equivalent of about one-third of the normal fleet to feed this country and maintain it in full war production. The impression must be dispelled that the bulk of our ships are importing to this country and that only a small fraction is grudgingly allotted to the Services. Only one-fifth of the British-controlled fleet, or one-eighth of the United Nations fleet, is now wholly reserved for supplying the essential needs of the United Kingdom.

Owing to the large losses of shipping in the early part of 1942 and the fact that American shipbuilding has only exhibited its big rise in the latter half of the year, the United Nations fleet at the end of January 1943 was barely a million/
million tons greater than when Japan entered the war.
With all the extra military demands which have emerged since then, it is not surprising that our imports, which have always been regarded as a sort of inverted residuary legatee, have suffered severely. But this cannot go on.

**Import Requirements.**

In peace time about two-fifths of our imports were in the category which would today come under the Ministry of Food, as against three-fifths in the purview of the Ministry of Production.

The Ministry of Food has been cut by about one-half. Fruit, vegetables and feeding stuffs have been virtually eliminated, and sugar imports halved. Much of the strenuous effort of the Minister of Agriculture has been devoted to replacing the animal feeding stuffs we used to import. Even so, the output of meat, bacon and eggs has dropped to two-thirds. Despite the large increase in the wheat crop, it still provides only one-third to two-fifths of our total wheat consumption. Whether measured in calories or protein, considerably more than half the food of our 47 million people still has to be imported from overseas.

Notwithstanding the need to maintain our imports of metals, we have, on the Ministry of Production side as a whole, restricted our consumption of imports to about two-fifths of the 1937 level. Timber has been reduced to one-fifth, iron-ore to one-third, paper and papermaking materials to one-sixth. Imported materials used for purely civilian purposes are now negligible, and, unless we reduce munitions production (already drastically pruned) by a considerable amount, there is no hope of further notable economies on the Ministry of Production programme.
Thus we must have nearly a million tons of food imports a month and over a million tons of raw materials. Together with finished munitions, &c., this brings us up to something like $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons a month, corresponding to the 27 million-ton minimum import programme.

**Stocks.**

In 1941 our imports averaged just over $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons a month; war-time restrictions on consumption had taken effect and we built up stocks from 1-3/4 million to 4 million tons over and above minimum safety level laid down by War Cabinet and described by Dr. Stacy May, the American economic analyst, as "bedrock minimum". When our imports dropped to two million tons a month in the first ten months of 1942 these stocks fell by nearly 1-3/4 million tons. The recent fall in imports to 1\frac{1}{2} million tons a month has slashed our stocks further by about 2\frac{1}{2} million tons despite every expedient, and by April it seems likely that stocks will be nearly one million tons below the minimum safety level. With these stocks, industry will not as a whole come to a stop, but we shall be living from hand to mouth. Any further drop and the wheels would cease to turn and rations would be jeopardized. When we observe the enormous cost in imports of military operations ("Torch" has been costing us about half a million tons of imports a month), and the inevitable uncertainties of forecasting imports (the actual imports in 3 months of November, December and January averaged 300,000 tons less than forecasts made only a fortnight before the end of each month), it is plain that we could not undertake new military undertakings with stocks at present levels. Even if ships are more plentiful later in
the year which is none too certain it may be hard to find escorts.

Our minimum imports, which are an indispensable condition of the security of the United Kingdom and the maintenance of United Kingdom War Production, must be considered an absolute first charge of Allied shipping; they are as vital to the war effort as supplies to the various theatres. Northwest Africa has recently been receiving about three-quarters as much cargo shipping each month as the whole of the United Kingdom; one-eighth of the Allied fleet is not a great fraction to reserve for United Kingdom imports, to maintain a great munitions output, as well as 44 million civilians, and 3 millions in the Services. Our own fleet is diminished by operating, before and after America came into the war, in the most dangerous waters. We have undertaken arduous and essential operations encouraged by the belief that we could rely on American shipbuilding to see us through.

*Note: Stocks (non-tanker: food and raw materials) now stand at about 15 million tons, having been reduced by about 4 million tons since the beginning of 1941. This is approximately the total which the War Cabinet regard as the minimum safety level, beyond which they regard it as important that there should be some margin; but the stocks are in fact still falling. The stocks need (a) to give a working minimum to ensure continuous production without a hold-up at any stage of production; and (b) to provide some additional reserve required by the need of dispersal (in view of bombing) and against the interruption of inflow of supplies by enemy action. The global figure of stocks moreover exaggerates the true reserve, as some critical stocks are below the general average; for example, at the end of 1942 the import food reserves only included 17 weeks of wheat and flour, under eleven weeks consumption of meat; and reserves of raw materials included only 21 weeks stock of steel, 10 weeks of pig iron, 12 weeks of copper and 4 weeks of phosphate; and, as stated, stocks generally have fallen since then.
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DATE March 30

FROM: LONDON

TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER: 275, March 30, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Your number 265. Have sent telegram in form

you approve. Please send supporting message, which I

am sure will be most helpful.

Prime

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Govt., State Dept. 3-29-72

By R. H. Parks  MAY 5 1972
From: Amembassy London
For: The President of the United States

In reply cite: No. 276 March 30, 1943

To President from Former Naval Person personal.

Your letter of March 19. My first visit to America was in December 1895 when I was already too big for any baby carriage.

Prime