OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: CPNAV

TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

From the President for the Former Naval Person personal and no. 268.

Anthony will give you my thoughts in regard to Anakim. The quid pro quo is threefold. First, greater air support for China air operations against Japanese shipping and home islands. Second, more general shipping leeway during next six months. Third, opportunity definitely to mount Bolero for a later date.

I have not consulted Combined Staffs on this as I want your personal slant first.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 2230, EDT, April 1, 1943

Boyd P. Price
1st Lieutenant, CE
Formal. Naval Person.

Anything will give you my thoughts in
regard to land. This quid pro quo is
two-fold. First, greater air support for
China air operations against Japanese
shipping and home islands. Second, more
general shipping loss will occur next six months.
Third, opportunity definitely to maintain
Boleros for a later date. I have not
consulted Combined Staffs on this as I
want your personal input first.

Roosevelt

#268
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and from the President for the Former Naval
Person No. 269.

Reply your 277.

I think our friends reply not too bad. Am preparing message
to him and will send you copy.

ROOSEVELT

APRIL 3, 1943.

Released from the Map Room at
1620, EWT, April 3, 1943.

W. A. BURNS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. STUART
Date Nov 1 1971
To Fomer Naval Peron

Reply your 277. I think our friends reply not too bad and preparing message to him and will send you copy.

Ruswii
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

APRIL 11, 1943

TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND
NO. 270.

OUR STAFFS NOW URGENTLY AT WORK ON WHAT TO DO AFTER HUSKY.
I THINK THERE ARE TWO OR THREE GOOD ALTERNATIVES BUT UNTIL OUR
RESPECTIVE STAFFS GIVE US THEIR VIEWS I SEE NO ADVANTAGE OF IMMEDIATE
CONFERENCES WITH MARSHALL AND HARRY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE AND, I HOPE
PROBABLE, THAT WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT QUICKLY ABOUT OUR POST-HUSKY
OPERATIONS. AT THE MOMENT WE HAVE THE TUNISIAN BUSINESS TO CLEAN UP
AND THAT MAY TAKE LONGER THAN WE THINK. SHOULD THAT BE UNDULY DELAYED
THAT, IN ITSELF, MIGHT WELL UNFAVORABLY AFFECT HUSKY AND IF ROMMEL'S
ARMY SHOULD ESCAPE IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL FORCE TO HUSKY LAND THAT WOULD
MAKE IT DOUBLY DIFFICULT.

I THINK THE SITUATION IN TUNISIA WILL CLARIFY WITHIN A WEEK SO THAT
IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE A PRETTY GOOD GUESS AS TO WHEN THE
ENEMY WILL BE OUT OF AFRICA.

AS I THINK I TOLD YOU AT CASABLANCA WE SHOULD CONTINUE EVERY
PREPARATION FOR HUSKY BUT THAT YOU AND I SHOULD HOLD OURSELVES READY
TO CONSIDER ONE OR MORE ALTERNATIVES UP TO JUNE 1. CONDITIONS MAY
GREATLY CHANGE BY THAT TIME. OUR PREPARATIONS FOR HUSKY SHOULD NOT BE
SLOWED DOWN ONE IOTA BUT 95% OF THESE OPERATIONS WOULD BE EQUALLY
VALUABLE FOR SOME OTHER POINT IF THAT SHOULD SEEM BEST.

WE PRETTY MUCH SCRAPPED THE BOTTOM TO GET THE FIRST TWENTY CARGO SHIPS
FOR ANAKIN AND THAT WHOLE BUSINESS OF THE COMBINED USE OF OUR MERCHANT
FLEET NEEDS THE CLOSEST WATCHING OR WE WILL FIND OURSELVES CONDUCTING
OPERATIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE CARGO SHIPPING. I HAVE BEEN HAVING AN
EXAMINATION MADE HERE OF A MODIFIED AMIKIM AND WILL LET YOU KNOW LATER
MY THOUGHTS ON THAT.

I AM PLANNING TO LEAVE EARLY IN THE WEEK FOR A TWO WEEKS TRIP OF ARMY
AND NAVY BASES. THIS TRIP WILL BE OFF THE RECORD, HENCE I DO NOT WISH
IT KNOWN IN ENGLAND. I HAVE GOOD COMMUNICATIONS, HOWEVER, AND YOU CAN
GET IN TOUCH WITH ME QUICKLY. HARRY WILL REMAIN HERE.

I HAVE BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL BOMBINGS OF
GERMANY AND WE MUST GIVE THEM AN EVER INCREASING DOSE. WE ARE MAKING
SPECIAL EFFORTS HERE TO GET OUR BIG BOMBER UNITS IN ENGLAND BUILT
UP AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. I DON'T BELIEVE THE GERMANS LIKE THAT
MEDICINE AND THE ITALIANS WILL LIKE IT LESS.

GIVE MY CONGRATULATIONS TO PORTAL AND HARRIS.

ANTHONY'S VISIT CLEARED UP MANY THINGS HERE AND I THINK IT WAS
ALTOGETHER USEFUL.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1500, EWT, April 11, 1945.

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

OUR STAFFS NOW URGENTLY AT WORK ON WHAT TO DO AFTER HUSKY.
I THINK THERE ARE TWO OR THREE GOOD ALTERNATIVES BUT UNTIL OUR RESPECTIVE STAFFS GIVE US THEIR VIEWS I SEE NO ADVANTAGE OF IMMEDIATE CONFERENCES WITH MARSHALL AND HARRY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE AND, I HOPE PROBABLE, THAT WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT QUICKLY ABOUT OUR POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS. AT THE MOMENT WE HAVE THE TUNISIAN BUSINESS TO CLEAN UP AND THAT MAY TAKE LONGER THAN WE THINK. SHOULD THAT BE UNDULY DELAYED THAT, IN ITSELF, MIGHT WELL UNFAVORABLY AFFECT HUSKY AND IF ROMMEL'S ARMY SHOULD ESCAPE IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL FORCE TO HUSKY LAND THAT WOULD MAKE IT DOUBLY DIFFICULT.

I THINK THE SITUATION IN TUNISIA WILL CLARIFY WITHIN A WEEK SO THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE A PRETTY GOOD GUESS AS TO WHEN THE ENEMY WILL BE OUT OF AFRICA.

WE PRETTY MUCH SCRAPED THE BOTTOM TO GET THE FIRST TWENTY CARGO SHIPS FOR ANAKIM AND THAT WHOLE BUSINESS OF THE COMBINED USE OF OUR MERCHANT FLEET NEEDS THE CLOSEST WATCHING OR WE WILL FIND OURSELVES CONDUCTING OPERATIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE CARGO SHIPPING. I HAVE BEEN HAVING AN EXAMINATION MADE HERE OF A MODIFIED ANIKIM AND WILL LET YOU KNOW LATER MY THOUGHTS ON THAT.

I AM PLANNING TO LEAVE EARLY IN THE WEEK FOR A TWO WEEKS TRIP OF ARMY AND NAVY BASES. THIS TRIP WILL BE OFF THE RECORD, HENCE I DO NOT WISH IT KNOWN IN ENGLAND. I HAVE GOOD COMMUNICATIONS, HOWEVER, AND YOU CAN GET IN TOUCH WITH ME QUICKLY. HARRY WILL REMAIN HERE.

I HAVE BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL BOMBINGS OF GERMANY AND WE MUST GIVE THEM AN EVER INCREASING DOSE. WE ARE MAKING SPECIAL
SPECIAL EFFORTS HERE TO GET OUR BIG BOMBER UNITS IN ENGLAND BUILT UP AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. I DON'T BELIEVE THE GERMANS LIKE THAT MEDICINE AND THE ITALIANS WILL LIKE IT LESS.

GIVE MY CONGRATULATIONS TO PORTAL AND HARRIS.

ANTHONY'S VISIT CLEARED UP MANY THINGS HERE AND I THINK IT WAS ALTOGETHER USEFUL.
As I think I told you at Casablanca we should continue every preparation for Husky but that you and I should hold ourselves ready to consider one or more alternatives up to June 14.
may greatly change
by that time. Our
preparations for Husky
should not be slowed
down one iota but
95% if those operation
would be equally valuable
for some other front if
that should seem best.
Personal and secret from the President to the Former Naval
Person No. 271.

Replying to your 282 of April 13th I have given my approval
to the appointment of General Alexander as Allied Military Governor
of Husky-land during the occupation and under the direction of the
Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower.

In view of the friendly feeling toward America entertained
by a great number of the citizens of Italy and in consideration of
the large number of citizens of the United States who are of Italian
descent, it is my opinion that our military problem will be made less
difficult by giving to the allied military government as much of an
American character as is practicable.

This can be accomplished at least to some extent by appointing
to the offices of the allied military government a large proportion of
Americans.

I believe that this military government should be presented to
the world as a definitely joint allied control and that there should
be no "senior partner."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1500, EWT, April 14, 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
REPLYING to your 232 of April 13th I have given my approval to the appointment of General Alexander as Allied Military Governor of Husky-land during the occupation and under the direction of the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower.

In view of the friendly feeling toward America entertained by a great number of the citizens of Italy and in consideration of the large number of citizens of the United States who are of Italian descent, it is my opinion that our military problem will be made less difficult by giving to the allied military government as much of an American character as is practicable.

This can be accomplished at least to some extent by appointing to the offices of the allied military government a large proportion of Americans.

I believe that this military government should be presented to the world as a definitely joint allied control and that there should be no "senior partner".

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
4/14/43
April 13, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

At the meeting at Casablanca it was agreed that the British General Alexander was to be the Force Commander of Husky. From this fact it will be claimed that under international usage it necessarily follows that General Alexander will also be the Military Governor. If this is accepted, then the plan referred to below which has been drawn up in Allied Headquarters in North Africa and recently brought here is a logical result. If, however, it is not deemed of controlling importance that the General commanding the Expeditionary Force be also the Military Governor, then it is suggested that the plan approved by you which Admiral Leary has transmitted to us on April 9th should be at once taken up with the British.

Already the British Government, through Mr. Eden when he was in Washington, has submitted a plan which is based on the assumption that General Alexander will be the Military Governor. The text is quoted:

"It is proposed in territory subject to supreme command of General Eisenhower and covered by operation Husky that following should be plan: Officer
Commanding Force 141 (who is British general) would become military governor of occupied territory and in that capacity exercise all functions attaching to such a position. In order to assist him he would have organization comparable to O.E.T.A.* but adapted to meet special conditions of a metropolitan European country and joint Allied responsibility, the chief officer of which would be British; the deputy American; the staff Anglo-American." (*Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, the British system developed and now in force in occupied Italian territory in Africa).

From discussions with one of Mr. Eden's assistants who accompanied him, Mr. William Strang, as well as from conversations had with Mr. Harold MacMillan in Algiers, it is apparent that the British Government feels that because of its interests in the Mediterranean in the past and future, the character of the administration of the Husky territory should be British.

It will be recalled that in February General Eisenhower sought guidance with respect to this matter, and that a telegram was dispatched stating that plans

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By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 720464
By MAY 1 1972
should be made for a joint military government under his responsibility as Allied Commander-in-Chief. General Eisenhower has submitted a plan which calls for Allied responsibility. This plan is substantially as follows:

General Eisenhower, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, would be responsible to the two Governments for the administration of the enemy territory concerned in the operation Husky. He would be guided by a general policy directive covering political, financial, and economic matters which would be agreed upon between the two Governments and transmitted to General Eisenhower through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Later matters of broad policy would be agreed upon between the two Governments and sent to him in the same manner. It is believed important that in these matters the views of the two Governments should be reconciled and given to General Eisenhower as an agreed directive.

General Eisenhower would create at Allied Force Headquarters a military government section, which would be headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff, who would be the Commander-in-Chief's executive in all matters relating to the administration of the territory. This officer would be American.
As General Alexander has been selected as the Commander of the expeditionary force, he would under this plan, by virtue of that command, become the Military Governor. The principal administrative officer under General Alexander would be British. He would have an American deputy. There would be a mixed staff of American and British officers, divided into administrative divisions as follows: legal, financial, public safety, enemy property custodian, civilian supply and resources, public welfare and public health, labor, and public information (press, radio, etc.). The administrative staff throughout the area would be mixed Anglo-American. This organization would be known as Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) and would be similar to the administrative system developed in recent months by the British in enemy territory in Africa, but adapted to conditions obtaining in a metropolitan area and giving it an Allied character. This administrative organization would be Allied in the same sense as Allied Force Headquarters. The governing principles of both the American and British system are based on the Notes to the Hague Convention of 1907.

Both the State and War Departments believe that this plan as outlined above, which places emphasis on an
Allied military government, would be acceptable to the British.

This plan for Allied Government does not conform to that outlined in your memorandum transmitted by Admiral Leahy which would give a preponderant American character to the administration. In the event that you feel it is vital to insist on a military government of preponderant American character, it is recommended that steps should be taken to obtain the concurrence of the Prime Minister thereto. It is believed that any attempt to proceed on a lower level would consume time which can be ill afforded and that in any event a decision would ultimately have to be reached by agreement between you and Mr. Churchill.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson  Cordell Hull
Secretary of War  Secretary of State

Approved by the President
13 April 1943

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 72646
By
Date MAY 1 1972
April 14, 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna London

From the President to the Former Naval Person, personal and
No. 272
I am off on a trip which will take me South and as far West as
Denver.

The news from Tunisia is grand and I hope Montgomery did not repeat
not destroy all the wherewithal when he took Sousse; you and I still have
to celebrate.

Harry remains in Washington.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2210, EWT, April 14, 1943
From: Cpmav
To: Alusna, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President personal and No. 273.

I have received and considered carefully your telegram number 280 in regard to the conscription question in Northern Ireland. The situation has, I feel, changed as regards public opinion in the United States since this matter was under consideration by the Government of Northern Ireland two years ago. I frankly doubt whether it would create much of an issue in this country. I do not feel that I am in a position to express any opinion concerning the effect in Eire and Northern Ireland of the reopening of this question. Your information is of course much better than ours in this regard and you are doubtless in a position to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such a move.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1850, EWT, April 19, 1943.

Owen Kruep
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0735
From: Oppen
To: Aluana, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President personal and No. 274.

The following is a paraphrased copy of a message sent by the President to Mr. Stalin this date:

QUOTE. While on my inspection trip out West, your telegram was received by me. I am well able to understand the problem which you have. However, I am in hopes that in this present situation you will be able to discover means to label your action as a suspension of conversation with the Polish Government-in-exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.

Sikorski, I believe, has not dealt in any manner with the Hitler gang, but in fact he has merely made a mistake in bringing up with the International Red Cross this particular affair.

Also I am of the opinion that ways and means will be found by Churchill of getting the Polish Government, which is in London, to act more sensibly in the future.

Please advise me if I am able to help in any way, particularly in regard to taking care of any Poles you may wish to send out of the U.S.S.R.

I have several million Poles in the United States, incidentally, a large proportion of them being in the Army and Navy. Knowledge by them of a complete diplomatic break between you and Sikorski, in view of the fact that they are all bitter against the Nazis, would not help the present situation. Signed Roosevelt. UNQUOTE.
Released from the White House Map Room at 1400, EWT, April 26, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: NOV 1 1971
TELEGRAM FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

I appreciate your helpful telegram of April 28 containing your message of that day to Stalin and approve everything which you said, in particular your statement to the effect that we would not recognize another Polish Government set up in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. You are quite correct in expressing the belief that we share your view that Sikorski is the most helpful Polish leader whom we or the Russians are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause.

The setting up of a rival Polish Government by the Soviet Government constitutes in my opinion the chief danger at the present time and should be avoided at all costs. I believe you have chosen exactly the right line with Stalin on this point.

I also note with gratification that you do not mention the underlying territorial dispute between the Poles and the Russians, attempts at the solution of which would not add to the unity of the United Nations at this time, and that your approach to Stalin is based primarily upon the obvious necessity of creating the most favorable conditions for bringing the full weight of the armed forces of all the United Nations to bear upon the common enemy. Our efforts to heal the present breach will of course continue to be of a friendly nature and void of partisanship towards either side. Unless the other Allied nations can prevail on Russia...
Russia and Poland to adopt a course of collaboration with all members of the United Nations and to declare a truce with regard to all controversial questions likely to impede the prosecution of the war, our whole war effort will be jeopardized.

The winning of the war is the paramount objective for all of us. For this unity is necessary. All individualistic and nationalistic ambitions in the meantime must be held in abeyance. We must close our ranks on every front for the prosecution of the war. This is the only road to freedom. Thus both the Russians and the Poles and all United Nations alike during the period of the war must subordinate factional differences to the common struggle for victory. Each government has obligations not only to its own people but to the friends of freedom throughout the world.

The peoples on territory conquered by the enemy or those who have escaped from such territories must put their full weight behind the war effort and not by division and dissension become an impediment to the successful conduct of the war.

I have read a copy of the instructions to Clark Kerr and feel that they bring up various practical problems which must be squarely faced and solved if relations...
between the Soviet and Polish Governments are to be resumed on an enduring basis.

If the Soviet Government displays a willingness to accept in principle the broad considerations advanced in your message to Stalin, the practical problems which have created difficulties between the Soviet and Polish Governments can then be considered in more detail. I feel sure, however, that both of us realize that an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution of these problems must accompany the formal resumption of diplomatic relations.

It is also important that when diplomatic relations are resumed it be understood by both parties that the grievances of the past are not to be permitted to plague the future.

So far as the practical problems are concerned, I feel from a study of recent Polish-Soviet relations that a major defect in the agreement of July 30, 1941 as supplemented by informal agreements of the same year was the setting up of what amounted to an extraterritorial apparatus of a foreign government functioning in the Soviet Union. I wonder, therefore, if a more workable solution could not be reached if the Poles would agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations.
organizations with, of course, the understanding that Polish citizens would receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens in similar circumstances. If the Poles would agree to this, the Russians on their part might be prepared to permit Polish citizens in the Soviet Union to have contact with the appropriate Polish consular officers.

With regard to the question of citizenship, it might be helpful if both the Russians and the Poles would permit the non-racial Poles to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship. Racial Poles, of course, as you suggest, would be recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens and would, therefore, not be called upon to opt. I place particular importance on the problem of evacuating from the Soviet Union Polish citizens who have close relatives abroad especially those who are members of the immediate families of men in the Polish armed forces. Similarly I feel that every effort should be made for the evacuation as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care elsewhere of Polish orphans and other children who cannot be adequately cared for in the Soviet Union.
Admiral Brown:
This was not sent
for your felic...
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

The following is a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's radio which we discussed today. I have read it to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, to whom Admiral Leahy introduced the subject of the message. They are in agreement with me.

"Reference your radio number 291 regarding general meeting in Washington May 11th or in London:

"Marshall and King are due to leave here for Pacific on May 5th or 6th in order to be back in Washington first week in June for final consideration of post-HUSKY matters. Their Pacific trip at this time is most important relative to final adjustments of matters pertaining to combined operations in the South and Southwest Pacific areas about to be initiated.

"I suggest that the reactions of the British Chiefs of Staff to your minute of April 5th reference post-HUSKY operations be made available to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and vice versa, this procedure preliminary to more formal and final consideration early in June in the light of Tunisian and HUSKY developments.

"I would also suggest that Wavell, Peirse, and Somerville come here immediately in time to discuss with Marshall and King and others in company with General Stilwell and Chenannault now here, matters relative to ANAKIM."

Chief of Staff.
To the Po-=".px a ..

I am really delighted you are coming. I agree most heartily that we have some important business to settle at once; the sooner the better. Marshall and King have postponed their Pacific trip. I want you of course to stay here with me.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1608 EWT, May 2, 1943.

W. A. BURNS JR, Lt, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Stwart
Date Nov 1, 1971
To Hiram Revels

I am really delighted you are coming. I
most heartily agree that we have some important
business to settle at once. Marshall
and I have postponed their
Pacific trip, I want you to stay
herewith me.

Roosevelt
May 27, 1943.

To: General Eisenhower.

For General Eisenhower from the President for delivery to the Prime Minister. This is my number 276.

We are all very happy to hear this afternoon that you have safely completed the second leg of the trip. I have given the one sentence announcement of the end of the conferences to the Press. I miss you much. It was a highly successful meeting in every way and proved that it was well timed and necessary.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, WNT, May 27, 1943.

Boyle P. Price

ROYCE P. PRICE,
1st Lieutenant, C.S.
May 26, 1943.

GENERAL EISENHOWER

Please deliver the following to the Prime Minister:

"We are all very happy to hear this afternoon that you have safely completed the second leg of the trip. I have given the one sentence announcement of the end of the conferences to the Press. I miss you much. It was a highly successful meeting in every way and proved that it was well timed and necessary.

ROOSEVELT"
May 27, 1943.

To: General Eisenhower.

For General Eisenhower from the President for delivery to the Prime Minister. This is my number 276.

We are all very happy to hear this afternoon that you have safely completed the second leg of the trip. I have given the one sentence announcement of the end of the conferences to the Press. I miss you much. It was a highly successful meeting in every way and proved that it was well timed and necessary.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, EWT, May 27, 1943.

Boyce P. Price

BOYCE P. PRICE,
1st Lieutenant, C.E.
From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

3 June 1943

Number 277

I know that you will agree with me that we may expect the followers of the Mikado to seize upon any hint we may let fall about weapons, method or tactics used by us in successful anti-submarine warfare. It would be difficult to foretell the serious consequences of premature publication of our scientific development. We may be sure it will cost us many submarines and many lives. It seems to me that within the past month too much has been published both in the United States and in England and that serious harm will result if we do not check further disclosures. Can we not agree on a submarine statement to be issued jointly on the tenth day of each calendar month and take steps to prevent any other public statements about submarine warfare except carefully censored versions of individual combat?

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1230, EWT, June 3, 1943.

W. C. MOTT, Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.
PROPOSED DRAFT

From: The President.
To: The Prime Minister.

I know that you will agree with me that we may expect the followers of the Mikado to seize upon any hint we may let fall about weapons, method or tactics used by us in successful anti-submarine warfare. It would be difficult to foretell the serious consequences of premature publication of scientific development. We may be sure it will cost us many submarines and many lives. It seems to me that within the past month too much has been published both in the US and in England and that unless we check further disclosures serious harm will result. Can we not agree on a submarine statement to be issued jointly on the tenth day of each calendar month and take steps to prevent any other public statements except carefully censored versions of individual combat?

Roosevelt

Info:

Secretary Early
O.W.I.
Admiral Dooby

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0750
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY
CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. NAVY
SECRETARY EARLY
HON. ELMER DAVIS

The President has authorized me to furnish you with paraphrased copies of the attached messages between the President and the Prime Minister for your information and guidance.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

2 Incls.
Following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the President to the Prime Minister, dated 3 June 1943:

You will concur with me, I am sure, in that we may expect the Japanese to jump on any clue we let fall about tactics, weapons, or methods employed by us in successful warfare against the submarine. The serious results of too early publication of our technical advances would be difficult to foretell. There is no question but that it will cost us the lives of many men and many submarines. During the past month it seems to me that too much has been released both in England and in the United States, and that, if we do not curtail further disclosures, serious harm will result. Don't you think we should agree on a submarine release which we would issue jointly on the tenth day of every month, and take measures to eliminate all other releases to the public about our anti-submarine campaign, with the exception of censored descriptions of individual engagements?
Following is a paraphrase of Paragraph 1 of a dispatch from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 4 June 1943:

I am in complete agreement with your idea of a monthly joint statement, approved personally by you and me, although I have not been aware of a serious leakage. This statement should cover all information in general terms on the progress of the attacks on U-Boats and on the loss in tonnage, saying whether it is better or worse. As you suggest, all other statements should be prevented. I will send you a more formal confirmation as soon as I return to London.
From: War Department
To: General Eisenhower

For Eisenhower for Murphy and MacMillan to give to the Prime Minister.
I am, of course, twenty-four or forty-eight hours behind the actual events in Algiers but it seems to me that even if they are temporarily settled you and I will be sitting on top of a probable volcanic explosion.

I want to put in a strong plea for Boisson to remain at Dakar. He is thoroughly competent for that post and is probably the best administrator in all the French colonies.

Incidentally, I want to give you the thought that North Africa is, in the last analysis, under British and American military rule and that for this reason Eisenhower can be used to insist on what you and I want. The bride evidently forgets that there is still a war in progress.

Over here we receive only the bride's publicity. What is the matter with our British-American information services?

Best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headaches.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1230, EWT, 4 June 1943

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

As directed by the President, I am forwarding herewith a paraphrase of a secret dispatch from the President to the Prime Minister. The original dispatch was sent this morning.

Very respectfully,

W. C. HOTT,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By 1971
From: The President  
To: General Eisenhower for Murphy and McNmillan to give to the Prime Minister.

June 4, 1943.

It seems to me, though I am of course 24 or 48 hours behind the actual events in Algiers, that even if affairs are temporarily settled you and I will be sitting atop a probable volcanic explosion.

Poisson is thoroughly competent for the Dakar post and I want to put in a strong plea for him to remain there. He is probably the best administrator in all the French Colonies.

Incidentally, I should like to remark that North Africa is, all things considered, under American and British military rule, and that for this reason Eisenhower can be used to insist on what you and I want. De Gaulle apparently forgets that a war is still in progress.

In this country we see only De Gaulle’s publicity. What is wrong with our British-American information services?

Best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headache.

Roosevelt,
EISENHOWER FOR MURPHY AND McMILLAN TO GIVE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I am, of course, twenty-four or forty-eight hours behind the actual events in Algiers but it seems to me that even if they are temporarily settled you and I will be sitting on top of a probable volcanic explosion.

I want to put in a strong plea for Boisson to remain at Dakar. He is thoroughly competent for that post and is probably the best administrator in all the French colonies.

Incidentally, I want to give you the thought that North Africa is, in the last analysis, under British and American military rule and that for this reason Eisenhower can be used to insist on what you and I want. The bride evidently forgets that there is still a war in progress.

Over here we receive only the bride's publicity. What is the matter with our British-American information services?

Best of luck in getting rid of our mutual headache.

ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAMMOND,
The White House:

The following message has been received from
General Eisenhower:

"Roosevelt's message number 278 for Churchill
arrived after he departed for England. Please pass infor-
mation to Roosevelt. It is being relayed to Churchill by
MacMillan. As far as can be determined now Boisson remains
at Dakar."

W. T. SEXTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 790464
By RMEL Date MAY 1 1972
June 7, 1943.

Personal and to the Former Naval Person from the President No. 279.

Reply your 301 I think it not/advisable at this time to release my letter for publication and on the whole think it unwise to refer to the matter in your speech to the House on Tuesday.

Delighted that you have returned safely.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 12:00, WST, June 7, 1943.

C. G. Hamond,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0759
JUNE 7, 1943

#279
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL FROM THE PRESIDENT.

REPLY YOUR 301 I THINK IT NOT ADVISABLE AT THIS TIME TO RELEASE MY LETTER FOR PUBLICATION AND ON THE WHOLE THINK IT UNWISE TO REFER TO THE MATTER IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE HOUSE ON TUESDAY.

DELIGHTED THAT YOU HAVE RETURNED SAFELY.

[Signature]

[Declassified]
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
by [Signature]
Date: May 1971
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 9, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusa, London

Personal and

To the Former Naval Person from the
President No. 280.

Joe Davies has returned and has brought on the whole a
favorable report but nothing definite will be known for another
month and I will keep you informed.

Admiral Standley has delivered to him the Chiefs of Staff
plan for forty-three and he is going to answer in a day or two.
I think he will send the answer to both of us but if he does not
I will transmit it to you at once.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1700, EWT, June 9, 1943.

GEORGE H. CLOYD,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.C. Stewart
Date: NARA 1971
JUNE 9, 1943

POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBSERVATIONS TO THE FORMAL NAVAL POLICIES FROM THE PRESIDENT

JOE EDWARDS HAS RETURNED AND HAS BROUGHT ON THE WHOLE A FAVORABLE REPORT BUT NOTHING DEFINITE WILL BE KNOWN FOR ANOTHER MONTH AND I WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

ADMIRAL STANLEY HAS DELIVERED TO HIM THE CINCPAC OF STAFF PLAN FOR FORTY-THREE AND HE IS GOING TO ANSWER IN A DAY OR TWO. I THINK HE WILL SEND THE ANSWER TO BOTH OF US BUT IF HE DOES NOT I WILL TRANSMIT IT TO YOU AT ONCE.

Roosevelt
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

June 10, 1943.

From: Cprnav
To: Alusna, London

Subject: Message from the President to the Former Naval Person

I have just received the following message from Murphy:

QUOTE. I was told this afternoon by Giraud that de Gaulle, during this morning's session of French Committee, finally brought into the open his wish to act as Commissioner for National Defense, having the attributes of a Minister of War in the ordinary cabinet set up. He also demanded the command of French forces not actively engaged in operations which is contrary to what he has told Eisenhower, MacMillan and me with respect to his intentions.

Giraud absolutely refused to yield command of French forces. He insisted that General Georges be appointed Commissioner of National Defense. A compromise proposal submitted by Catroux very much favored de Gaulle's proposition.

Giraud told me of his determination to retire if the Committee outvoted him on this question and to inform the British and American Governments and the French people of the injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition. I have asked Giraud to delay any such action until there has been an opportunity to discuss this question with several members of the committee. MacMillan and I are disturbed regarding the actions of Gaston Palewski who is a personal counselor of de Gaulle. Palewski is passing around stories harmful to the Allies, such as, for example, that Giraud has not properly protected French interests since he has allowed the Allies to have their way in all things. We believe he is

the inspiration for the story of 7 June by Geoffrey Parsons that what is happening here is a victory for de Gaulle over Giraud and the State Department.

Giraud also told me that de Gaulle raised the subject of Boisson, demanding his removal on the ground that some of his followers such as de Pons Lambert has suffered at his hands as a result of the Dakar incident of September 1940. Giraud noted that President Roosevelt had indicated we consider Boisson a most capable administrator who had cooperated with the United States wholeheartedly. De Gaulle brushed this aside, Giraud said, as of no consequence. UNQUOTE.

Undoubtedly McMillan has advised you in similar terms.

I have just sent the following to Eisenhower:

QUOTE. I request that the following message from yourself be delivered orally to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as nearly simultaneously as possible. INMR QUOTE.

You will remember that we have conferred together for the ultimate destruction of the enemy forces and for the restoration and liberation of France as a great nation. We have been successful in the first phase of this; the second phase we have still before us. For reasons of our common cause, I feel I should continue to convey from time to time my views, both to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as frankly in the future as in the past, especially upon the happy announcement of the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation.

In this spirit may I express to you a concern over reports which have reached me, but which are happily unconfirmed, that the Council possibly may be considering the removal of Governor General Boisson from his West African post. Such action would be contrary to the very idea we
have in view because of Boisson's ability as an able French Administrator. I very much hope that I may receive reassurances from the Committee that these reports as to the future of General Boisson are indeed unfounded.

END INNOCENT QUOTE.

With this I trust you will agree. In view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude, it is inconceivable to me that French West Africa should come under his domination.

Please read my dispatch to Churchill with particular regard to your ordering troops there. END QUOTE.

I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up.

Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle domination of French West Africa.

This is so serious that I should have to consider sending several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa. Such things would be highly unfortunate.

Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about the safety of the rear of the British and American positions, the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American forces left for the protection of the rear.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1630, EWT, June 10, 1943.

Cousin, Marked
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
June 10, 1943.

From: Cunay
To: Algim, London

Personal and
From the President to the Former Naval Person
Number 281.

I have just received the following message from Murphy:

"QUOTE: I was told this afternoon by Giraud that de Gaulle, during this morning's session of French Committee, finally brought into the open his wish to act as Commissioner for National Defense, having the attributes of a Minister of War in the ordinary cabinet set up. He also demanded the command of French forces not actively engaged in operations which is contrary to what he has told Eisenhower, Macmillan and me with respect to his intentions.

Giraud absolutely refused to yield command of French forces. He insisted that General Georges be appointed Commissioner of National Defense. A compromise proposal submitted by Catroux very much favored de Gaulle's proposition.

Giraud told me of his determination to retire if the Committee overthrew him on this question and to inform the British and American Governments and the French people of the injustice caused by de Gaulle's ambition. I have asked Giraud to delay any such action until there has been an opportunity to discuss this question with several members of the committee, Judge (ex-commissioner) Portal, Macmillan and I are disturbed regarding the actions of Jasten Palewski who is a personal counselor of de Gaulle. Palewski is passing around stories harmful to the Allies, such as, for example, that Giraud has not properly protected..."

French intendants since he has allowed the Allies to have their way in all things. We believe he is the inspiration for the story of 7 June by Geoffrey Parsons that what is happening here is a victory for de Gaulle over Giraud and the State Department.

Giraud also told me that de Gaulle raised the subject of Poisson, demanding his removal on the ground that some of his followers such as de Bals Lambert has suffered at his hands as a result of the Dakar incident of September 1940. Giraud noted that President Roosevelt had indicated we consider Poisson a most capable administrator who had cooperated with the United States wholeheartedly. De Gaulle brushed aside this aside, Giraud said, as of no sequence. UNQUOTE.

Undoubtedly McMillan has advised you in similar terms.

I have just sent the following to Eisenhower:

QUOTE: I request that the following message from yourself be delivered orally to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as nearly simultaneously as possible. INNER QUOTE.

You will remember that we have conferred together for the ultimate destruction of the enemy forces and for the restoration and liberation of France as a great nation. We have been successful in the first phase of this; the second phase is still before us. For reasons of our common cause, I feel I should continue to convey from time to time my views, both to General de Gaulle and General Giraud as frankly in the future as in the past, especially upon the happy announcement of the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation.

In this spirit may I express to you a concern over reports which have reached me, but which are happily unconfirmed, that the Council possibl
may be considering the removal of Governor General Boisson from his West African post. Such action would be contrary to the very aims we have in view because of Boisson's ability as an able French Administrator. I very much hope that I may receive reassurances from the Committee that these reports as to the future of General Boisson are indeed unfounded.

END INITIAL QUOTE.

With this I trust you will agree. In view of the uncertainty of de Gaulle's future attitude, it is inconceivable that French West Africa should come under his domination.

Please read my dispatch to Churchill with particular regard to your ordering troops there. END QUOTE.

I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up.

Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle domination of French West Africa.

This is so serious that I should have to consider sending several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over in French West Africa. Such things would be highly unfortunate.

Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about the safety of the rear of the British and American positions, the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American forces left for the protection of the rear.

Roosevelt.

Release from the White House Map Room at 9:00, 1943, June 10, 1943.

C. S. MACDONALD, Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I have just received the following message from Murphy:

(Quote paraphrase of Murphy's message of June 9th.
Undoubtedly McMillan has advised you in similar terms.
I have just sent the following to Eisenhower:

(Quote paraphrase of President's message of June 10th

I think this whole matter of de Gaulle domination of
Dakar is too serious for me to remain quiescent. Neither
you nor I know just where de Gaulle will end up.

Therefore I find it impossible to consider any de Gaulle
domination of French West Africa.

This is so serious that I should have to consider sending
several regiments to Dakar and also naval vessels if there
were any sign that de Gaulle proposes to take things over
in French West Africa. Such things would be highly
unfortunate.

Finally, I cannot feel happy unless Giraud has complete
control of the French Army in North Africa. Control by
de Gaulle would create a definitely uneasy feeling about
the safety of the rear of the British and American positions,
the line of supply and the adequacy of British and American
forces left for the protection of the rear.

ROOSEVELT
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: Cpaav
TO: Lusma, London

June 11, 1943.

From the President to the Prime Minister personal and
 confidential.

Referring to your No. 305 of June 11, I am in full agreement
with your proposal to instruct your Ambassador to make an immediate
proposition to Dr. Salazar along the lines suggested by you.

My only thought about Brazil is that Salazar might be glad
to return some of his first line troops from the Azores to
Portugal and that Brazil would be happy to replace them in the
Azores.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 12:05, EDT, June 11, 1943.

W. C. Mott
Lt. Comdr., F.S.N.R.

Shown to State Department by Admiral Leahy.
June 11, 1943.
From the President to the Prime Minister.

Referring to your No. 305 of June 11, I am in full agreement with your proposal to instruct your Ambassador to make an immediate proposition to Dr. Salazar along the lines suggested by you.

My only thought about Brazil is that Salazar might be glad to return some of his first-line troops from the agreement to Portugal and that Brazil would be happy to replace them in the interim.

Roosevelt
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna, London

Personal and from the President to the Prime Minister
No. 283.
Your Number 307.
I am delighted we obtained the Italian Gibraltar with such little cost. I hope this is an accurate forerunner of things to come.

Roosevelt

June 11, 1943.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1815, June 11, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date: NOV 1, 1971
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: Cnsav
TO: Alusna, London

Personal and from the President to the Prime Minister No. 284

The following is a dispatch from Eisenhower to me on the subject of his conversations with Generals Giraud and De Gaulle. See my Number 281.

Quote. Due to language difficulties, the message to De Gaulle and Giraud was delivered orally and personally by Murphy instead of me. Giraud's answer was quote tres bien unquote. De Gaulle's answer was that it brought up a grave question of French sovereignty on which he felt he personally could not yield, but which, of course, was one for the committee to decide upon. He requested that a written copy of the dispatch be given him but was advised that it should be looked upon only as an informal oral message. The De Gaulle conversation lasted for an hour, and will be transmitted in a following dispatch. End quote.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1415, 12 June 1943

[Signature]

CODEN KNIGHT
Captain, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971

0773
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Conant
To: Mr. President

June 14, 1943.

The President to the former Naval Person and personal number 88.

Referring to your message No. 302 of 10 June 1943, I am wholly in agreement as to the military necessity of interfering with railroad communications to the southward and delaying movement of the Herman Goering Division by bombing attacks on San Lorenzo Railway Junction and the Marshalling Yards at San Lorenzo and Littorio.

In consideration of your approval of the proposal I will request the Combined Chiefs of Staff to instruct General Eisenhower as follows:

"You are authorized to undertake daylight bombing attacks against the San Lorenzo Railway Junction and the San Lorenzo and Littorio Marshalling Yards at any time that you consider best for the successful prosecution of MUSKY. Prior to launching these attacks, all pilots concerned must be thoroughly instructed in the geography of the area, the location of the Vatican, and directed that they must not permit any bombs to fall in the Vatican City."

I shall inform the Pope and I hope you will also inform him that all pilots operating over Italy have orders and instructions which will prevent bombs from falling in the Vatican City but that we have no reason to believe that Axis planes will not bomb the Vatican with the purpose of charging us with the outrage.

Roosevelt

By Deputy Assistant of the U.S. Secretary of War Date 1943
June 12, 1943.

Referring to your message No. 302 of 10 June 1943 I am wholly
in agreement as to the military necessity of interfering with
railroad communications to the southward and delaying movement of
the Herman Goering Division by bombing attacks on San Lorenzo Railway
Junction and the Marshalling Yards at San Lorenzo and Littorio.

In consideration of your approval of the proposal I will
request the Combined Chiefs of Staff to instruct General Eisenhower
as follows:

"You are authorized to undertake daylight bombing
attacks against the San Lorenzo Railway Junction and the San Lorenzo
and Littorio Marshalling Yards at any time that you consider best
for the successful prosecution of HUSKY. Prior to launching these
attacks all pilots concerned must be thoroughly instructed in the
geography of the area, the location of the Vatican, and directed
that they must not permit any bombs to fall in the Vatican City."

I shall inform the Pope and I hope you will also inform
him that allied pilots operating over Italy have orders and
instructions which will prevent bombs from any of our planes falling
in the Vatican City but that we have no reason to be assured that
Axis planes will not bomb the Vatican with the purpose of charging
us with the outrage.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Marshalling yards at Rome.

The United States Chiefs of Staff feel that the marshalling yards at Rome and the San Lorenzo railroad junction are purely military objectives. They consider that while the destruction of these objectives would be of material benefit to the HUSKY Operation, the psychological effect would be even more important. The bombings should be executed by a very large force of aircraft.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur with the approval already given by the British which would authorize General Eisenhower to take action against these targets at such time as he considers most advantageous to the HUSKY Operation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Marshalling yards at Rome.

The United States Chiefs of Staff feel that the marshalling yards at Rome and the San Lorenzo railroad junction are purely military objectives. They consider that while the destruction of these objectives would be of material benefit to the HUSKY Operation, the psychological effect would be even more important. The bombings should be executed by a very large force of aircraft.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur with the approval already given by the British which would authorize General Eisenhower to take action against these targets at such time as he considers most advantageous to the HUSKY Operation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Distribution: Admiral Leahy
mef
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Cnav
To: Alusan, London

The President to the Former Naval Person [BLANK] and personal
Number 286.

Replying to your 303 and 304 of 10 June 1943 I am in agreement
that the present equal status of MacMillan and Murphy should continue
unchanged in the HUSKY and Post-HUSKY periods and that they should
continue to communicate to the heads of their respective Governments
early and intimate information regarding the civil and political
sphere informing the Supreme Commander in each instance.

I am also in agreement that in territory occupied by our
combined forces in the future the Supreme Commander should during
the period of occupation inform our two Governments what British
and American officials he wants and the purposes for which he desires
to use them in the local administration and that no other civil officials
than those requested by the Supreme Commander should be sent to his area.

Roosevelt

RELEASED from the White House Map Room
at 1250, WIT, June 14, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date 1971

Copy to Lt. Col. F. W. Hammond, Jr., RM 3C-878, Pentagon
Building, for General Widtring.
June 14, 1943.

To Former Naval Person from the President No. 286.

With reference to your 303 and 304, dated June 10, 1943, I agree that the equal status of Murphy and MacMillan should continue without change during the HUSKY and Post-HUSKY periods, and also that they should continue to communicate early and intimate information regarding the political and civil sphere to the heads of their respective Governments, in each case of course informing the Supreme Commander.

Also I agree that in the territory which is occupied in the future by our combined forces, the Supreme Commander should during the period of occupation inform our two Governments what American and British officials he desires and the purposes for which he wants to use these officials in the local administration, and that no other civil officials should be sent to his area except those requested by the Supreme Commander.

Roosevelt

For: LT. Colonel T. V. Manning, Jr.,
Room 3C-F75, Pentagon Building.

For: General Marshall.

(For covering memorandum see Prime Minister to President 303.)

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Nov 1 1971

0779
June 12, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO [NAME] [TITLE], Prime Minister,

Replying to your 303 and 304 of 10 June 1943.

I am in agreement that the present equal status of MacMillan and Murphy should continue unchanged in the HUSKY and Post-HUSKY periods and that they should continue to communicate to the heads of their respective Governments early and intimate information regarding the civil and political sphere informing the Supreme Commander in each instance.

I am also in agreement that in territory occupied by our combined forces in the future the Supreme Commander should during the period of occupation inform our two Governments what British and American officials he wants and the purposes for which he desires to use them in the local administration and that no other civil officials than those requested by the Supreme Commander should be sent to his area.

[Signature]

[Handwritten note]

DEClassified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [MARKED OUT]

[Marked-out date reads: Nov 1, 1971]
June 15, 1943.

From: Trmav
To: Alumex, London.

Personal and for the former Naval Person from the President Number 287.

I received a letter from the Pope yesterday and have replied as follows:

QUOTE. Your Holiness:

The letter of 19 May 1943 from your Holiness, stating in eloquent words the deep feelings of emotion with which your Holiness observes the devastating effects of war on Italy, strikes a very responsive chord in my heart. No one understands better than I the ever-repeating attempts of your Holiness to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, and subsequently to prevent its spread. Your Holiness knows the repeated efforts made in 1940 by this Government and by many groups within the United States to prevent the Chief of the Italian Government from throwing his country and its people into a ruinous war whose outcome, as I reminded him at that time, could only prove disastrous.

I understand and appreciate the sympathetic response of your Holiness to the numerous appeals of the people of Italy on behalf of their country. May I say that my countrymen are among those who treasure most highly the historic monuments and the religious shrines of Italy. However Americans are also united in their determination to win the war which has been thrust upon them, a war for which the present Italian Government must bear its full measure of responsibility. My countrymen and I regret profoundly the loss of life on both sides and the destruction of resources and property.

To the extent humanly possible, our attacks against Italy are limited to military objectives. We have not and will not wage war on civilians or on non-military objectives. Should it be found a military necessity for Allied planes to operate over Rome, our aviators will be thoroughly instructed as to the location of the Vatican and specifically ordered to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City.

Your Holiness, this may be an apropos time to say that I cannot feel assured that the planes of the Axis would not manufacture an opportunity to strike Vatican City with the purpose of charging Allied planes with the brutalities which they had committed themselves.

There is no choice for my country but to carry forward the war with all force against the enemy until all resistance has been destroyed. I am confident your Holiness will understand that in this battle for human liberty we can make no exception to the full prosecution of the war against any legitimate military objective of the enemy. To follow
any other course would only delay the realization of that desire in which the governments and peoples of the United Nations and your Holiness—and I believe the people of Italy—are joined, namely, the return of peace on earth. UNNOTED.

His letter to me was not a request not to bomb Rome but he spoke of the historic places and also spoke of the Holy See, which, I suppose, includes the Churches outside the Vatican.

Roosevelt
Your Holiness:

The communication of May 19, 1945, from Your Holiness setting forth in eloquent language the deep feelings of emotion with which Your Holiness views the devastating effects of war on Italy strikes a very responsive chord in my heart. No one appreciates more than I the ceaseless efforts of Your Holiness to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and subsequently to limit its contagion. Your Holiness is familiar with the repeated efforts which were made in 1940 by this Government, and by many elements within the United States to deter the Chief of the Italian Government from plunging his country and ourmen into a ruinous war whose outcome, I reminded him even at that time, could only prove disastrous.

The sympathetic response of Your Holiness to the many appeals of the Italian people on behalf of their country is understood and appreciated by me. May I say that Americans are among those who value most the religious shrines and the historical monuments of Italy. However, my countrymen are likewise united in their determination to win the war which has been thrust upon them and for which the present government of Italy must share its full responsibility. My countrymen and I deplore the loss of life on both sides which must result and the destruction of property and resources.

Attacks against Italy are limited, to the extent humanly possible, to military objectives. We have not and will not make warfare on civilians or against non-military objectives. In the event it should be found militarily necessary for Allied planes to operate over Rome our aviators are thoroughly instructed to the location of the Vatican and have been specifically instructed to prevent bombs from falling within the Vatican City. This may be an opportune time to warn Your Holiness that I have no reason to feel assured that Axis planes would not have an opportunity to bomb Vatican City with the purpose of carrying Allied planes with the outrageous they themselves had committed.

My country has no choice but to prosecute the war with all force against the enemy until every resistance has been overcome. Your Holiness will understand, I am confident, that in this struggle for human liberty no exception can be made to the full prosecution of the war against any legitimate military enemy objective. Any other course would only delay the fulfillment of that desire in which Your Holiness and the governments and peoples of the United Nations—and I believe the people of Italy likewise—are joined—the return of peace on earth.

Believe me, with the assurances of my highest regard,

Yours very sincerely,
June 17, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Allen, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President and personal Number 288.

I am fed up with De Gaulle and the secret personal and political machinations of that Committee in the last few days indicates that there is no possibility of our working with De Gaulle. If these were peace times it wouldn't make so much difference but I am absolutely convinced that he has been and is now injuring our war effort and that he is a very dangerous threat to us. I agree with you that he likes neither the British nor the Americans and that he would doublecross both of us at the first opportunity. I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him. It is an intolerable situation. I think the important thing is that we act together and my thinking regarding the whole matter runs about as follows:

We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because, first, he has proven to be unreliable, uncooperative, and disloyal to both our Governments. Second, he has more recently been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war and these machinations have been carried on without our knowledge and to the detriment of our military interests. One result of this scheming on the part of De Gaulle has been that Eisenhower has had to give half his time to a purely local political situation which De Gaulle has accentuated. The war is so urgent and our military operations so serious and fraught with danger that we cannot have them manuever any longer by De Gaulle.
Our two countries have solemnly pledged that they will liberate
the French Republic and when we drive the Germans out, return that
country to the control of the sovereign French people. This pledge
we renew.

All of the above can be put by us in language which will be
mutually agreeable. Above all I am anxious that the break be made
on a basis and for reasons which are identical with both our Govern-
ments. There are plenty of emotional and dissident people throughout
the world who will try to separate England and the United States in
this matter and we must stand shoulder to shoulder, identically and
simultaneously through this miserable mess. My affirmative thought
is that we should go ahead and encourage the creation of a committee
of Frenchmen made up of people who really want to fight the war and are
not thinking too much about politics. I am sure we can find such a
group. During the formation period we can continue to deal with the
military authorities as in the past.

The first step in any event should be the deferment of any
meeting of the French Committee in North Africa until later. In the
meantime you can well suggest your views as to how you will approach
and deal with the de Gaulle situation most effectively from the
standpoint of later public opinion, also anything this government
might say concurrently with any public utterance you may make. Will
you communicate with MacMillan to cooperate with Eisenhower in
postponing any further meeting of the French Committee in North Africa.

I am anxious to have your thoughts on this as soon as possible.

The following is a paraphrase of a cable I have today sent to
General Eisenhower:

...
QUOTE. To General Eisenhower secret and personal from the President. To Mr. Murphy for information.

Murphy's telegram 1198 is very disturbing. I wish you would carefully read once more War Department Number Nine relative to your 22382 of the 10th of June.

The position of this government is that, during our military occupation of North Africa, we will not tolerate the control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander's direction. We must have someone whom we completely and wholly trust. We would under no, repeat no, circumstances continue the arming of a force without being completely confident in their willingness to cooperate in our military operations; we are not interested, moreover, in the formation of any government or committee which presumes in any way to indicate that, until such time as the French people select a government for themselves, it will govern in France. When we get into France, the Allies will have a civil government plan that is completely in consonance with French sovereignty. Lastly, it must be absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, without your full approval no independent civil decision can be made.

Our policy, as you know, has been to encourage, as long as they cooperate with our military interests, local officials to manage their own affairs. It is our policy to encourage an extension of this; but civil or military direction which in any way might endanger the safety of our troops, our lines of communication, or otherwise interfere with our military operations must not be tolerated by us. This would include the necessity of keeping in North Africa more troops than we now plan.
I want to state for your exclusive information that at this
time we will not permit De Gaulle to direct himself or to control
through partisans on any committee, the African French army, either
in the field of supplies, training, or operations.

This message has been seen by Hull and Marshall and has their
approval.

Please acknowledge receipt.

Again I want to assure you that you are authorized to take such
action as you think best in behalf of this government. UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1530, EST, June 17, 1943.

George E. Day
GEORGE E. DAY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.
I am fed up with De Gaulle and the secret machinations of that Committee in the last few days indicates that there is no possibility of our working with De Gaulle. If these were peace times it wouldn't make so much difference but I am absolutely convinced that he has been and is now injuring our war effort and that he is a very dangerous threat to us. I agree with you that he likes neither the British nor the Americans and that he would doublecross both of us at the first opportunity. I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him.

It is an intolerable situation. I think the important thing is that we act together and my thinking regarding the whole matter runs about as follows:

We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because, first, he has proven to be unreliable, uncooperative, and disloyal to both our Governments. Second, he has more recently been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war and these machinations have been carried on without our knowledge and to the detriment of our military interests. One result
result of this scheming on the part of De Gaulle has been that Eisenhower has had to give half his time to a purely political situation which De Gaulle has accentuated. The war is so urgent and our military operations so serious and fraught with danger that we cannot have them menaced any longer by De Gaulle.

Third, our two countries have solemnly pledged that they will liberate the French Republic and when we drive the Germans out, return that country to the control of the sovereign French people. This pledge we renew.

All of the above can be put by us in language which will be mutually agreeable. Above all I am anxious that the break be made on a basis and for reasons which are identical with both our Governments. There are plenty of emotional and dissident people throughout the world who will try to separate England and the United States in this matter and we must stand shoulder to shoulder, identically and simultaneously through this miserable mess. My affirmative thought is that we should go ahead and organize a committee of Frenchmen made up of people who really want
to fight the war and are not thinking too much about politics. I am sure we can find such a group. During the formation period we can continue to deal with the military authorities as in the past.

I am anxious to have your thoughts on this as soon as possible.

The following is a cable I have today sent to General Eisenhower:

I have been asked to communicate with MacMillan and Eisenhower at the earliest possible hour in order to discuss the situation.

The first step in any event that will be the settlement of any meeting of the French Committee in North Africa would later. In the meantime you can well suggest your views as to how you will approach and deal with the de Gaulle situation most effectively from the standpoint of later public opinion.
June 18, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alcina, London

Personal and from the President to the Former Naval Person No. 200.

By message from Uncle Joe did not come until two days after you got yours. I heartily approve of your reply and am sending the following to him myself.

BEGIN. I was away when your message came, consequently I am a few days late in answering it. I whole-heartedly concur in Mr. Churchill's message to you, and you may be sure that we are really doing everything that is possible at this time. I trust you will realize that the shipping situation is still tight, though we are encouraged by the satisfactory progress of our campaign against the U-Boats during the past 30 days, showing us an appreciable net gain in ships available. END.

Averill and Max will be over there in just a few days, and you will hear from Averill about the latter Joe Davies brought from Moscow for us.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1700, EDT, June 12, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: [Signature]

Date: Nov 1, 1971

0791
June 18, 1943.

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I did not get the message from Uncle Joe until two days after you got yours. I heartily approve of your message and am sending the following to Uncle Joe:

"QUOTE I am a few days late in answering your message as I was away when it came. I fully subscribe to what Mr. Churchill telegraphed you and I want to assure you that at this time we are really doing everything that is possible. I hope you will understand that the shipping situation is still tight, though we have been greatly encouraged by the better progress of our anti-submarine campaign during the last two months which shows us a good net gain in available ships. UNQUOTE"

Max and Averill will be with you in a few days and Averill will tell you about the letter Joe Davies brought me from Moscow.

ROOSEVELT

Paraphrased and sent to London as Message No. 289.
June 14, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I believe your proposed message to Jo quoted in your 310 of 13 June is excellent.

I have received through the Soviet Embassy here a message similar to the one to which your 310 replies and I shall in a following message send you a draft of my proposed reply.
This message contains nothing in reply to Prime's inquiry about the "Davos letter" or about "Scapa Flow"

Not sent

NOT USED
June 14, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO FORMER NAVAL PERSON

This is what I propose to send to Jo in reply to his message referred to in my letter if you approve:

"I am in complete sympathy with your disappointment at our inability to provide shipping and equipment in time to make possible an immediate invasion of Western Europe with the purpose of administering together with your gallant Army an early decisive defeat of Germany.

"It has long been my desire to make an effective landing of allied forces in Western Europe and now with improvement in our anti-submarine effort and augmentation of our productive capacity it appears certain that such an invasion of Europe from the west can be successfully undertaken next Spring.

"Our present effort in the Mediterranean which will be greatly augmented in the immediate future together with our greatly increased bombing offensive in Germany are already certainly reducing enemy pressure on your army, and the operations now about to be launched in the Mediterranean should necessitate a further reduction in enemy forces available for use against you.

"I am convinced that the early future holds much relief for your magnificent military effort and much prospect of an early defeat of Hitlerism.

"It is my opinion that a conference between you and me and Churchill this Summer would be very helpful to all of us in accomplishing our common purpose."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By [Signature]
Date [May 1971]
June 21, 1943

OPERATIONAL BRICORITY

From: Cnopay
To : Alusne, London

From the President to the Former Naval Person personal and
Number 290.

Replying to your messages numbered 316 and 318 of the eighteenth
of June, I am glad to be reassured that you are in complete agreement
with me on the major question of the control in Africa of the Military
forces which question includes the security of our lines of supply.

My telegram Number 288 was based on the fact that the Committee
of seven had, by an unpublished decree of the seventh of June, been
increased to fourteen, a fact which had not been made known to MacMillan
or Murphy until the sixteenth of June. It would appear that the Com-
mittee now stands as overwhelmingly De Gaulist. Full authority over
all the war effort of French territory and the French is claimed by
this augmented Committee. I am sure you agree that the jeopardizing
of our military position in North Africa by an antagonistic element in
such control cannot be accepted by us.

Roosevelt

 Released from the White House Map Room
 at 1635, EWT, June 21, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971

0796
June 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is suggested in reply to the Prime Minister's messages Nos. 316 and 318 of June 18. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and General Hull, acting for General Marshall, concur in this draft.

From the President to the Prime Minister.

With reference to your Nos. 316 and 318 of June 18, I am happy to be reassured that you completely agree with me on the major question of the control of the military forces in Africa which includes the safety of our supply lines.

My telegram 288 was based upon the fact that the Committee of seven has now been increased to fourteen by the unpublished decree of June 7 which was not made known to Murphy or MacMillan until June 16. It would appear that the Committee now stands as overwhelmingly deGaulist. This augmented Committee claims full authority over all the war effort of the French and French Territory. We cannot accept, and I am sure you will agree, that our allied military position in North Africa can be jeopardized by an antagonistic element in such control.

/\ William D. Leahy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date 1971
June 21, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person and personal No. 291.

I am directing our people to carry out your excellent suggestion in regard to churches outside the Vatican.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1845, EWT, June 21, 1943

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date  NOV 1 1971
June 21, 1943.

From: Opan
To: Alusna, London

Personal and from the President for the Former Naval
Person Number 292.

I am very happy at the way things are going with Portugal.

The thought has come to me that if any question arises in
regard to Timor, Australia might be interested in purchasing it
in the interest of the defense of the Southwest Pacific. I think
it has never brought the Portuguese Government any interest on the
investment.

On the other hand, there is no repeat no reason why such
questions should not repeat not be left until after the war is
over. The same thing applies to Macao.

Roosevelt

[Signature]

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1850, EWT, June 21, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.P. Stewart
Date: [01/31/71]
June 24, 1943.

From: Comnav
To: Alusma, London

Personal and [redacted] from the President to the Former Naval Person
No. 293.

Your India appointments have met with general approval in this
country.

With regard to your No. 320 of June 19, I feel that, for operations
against Burma and Southeast Asia, unity of command is desirable. I agree
with you that British elements to be engaged in the recapture of Burma
are predominant and, therefore, the Supreme Commander for this operation
should be a Britisher. I am not prepared at the moment, however, to
accept Sholto Douglas and would appreciate your proposing some additional
names.

Your proposal also raises certain critical problems which must be
given serious consideration before a detailed plan can be decided upon.

The United States Air Force deployment in India was specifically
carried out for the purpose of supporting China. Our plan to aid China
has furthermore resulted in the concentration of a considerable number
of Chinese troops at Ramgarh, as well as Ramgarh trained Chinese troops
supported by U.S. service forces, along the Ledo Road. The plan for the
Burma campaign moreover involves eleven divisions of Yunnan troops, the
control of which is to a large extent exercised by Stilwell.

As you have indicated, we must accept the fact that Chennault will
continue to report to the Generalissimo.

Meanwhile, we will have to remember that the Generalissimo is the
Supreme Commander of the China Theater. Accordingly, as far as China is
concerned we shall have a most difficult task in securing the
Generalissimo's cooperation to the suggestion of a Supreme Command
for all East Asia.

Viewed in the light of the above, I am having members of my
staff consider the matter from every angle. They will have a proposal
for our consideration within a few days.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1625, EDT, June 24, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
From the PRESIDENT to the PRIME:

Reference your No. 320 of June 19, Your India appointments have met with general approval in this country.

The organization for unity of command in operations in Burma appears desirable and I am in accord with you as to the formula. However, your No. 320 suggestion raises critical problems which I feel must be taken into consideration before a detailed plan can be decided upon.

In the first place, the United States deployment in India-Burma was specifically carried out for the purpose of supporting China. It now involves a considerable number of Chinese troops concentrated at Rangarh, as well as other Chinese troops, the product of Rangarh training, along the Ledo Road. Furthermore, the plan for the Burma campaign involves eleven divisions of Yunnan troops.

At the present time General Stilwell commands the Chinese elements in India and North Burma and to a certain extent exercises control over those in Yunnan. He has undertaken a large training program in this connection. He also commands the U. S. Air Forces in India and the special troops involved in preparations of roads, airfields, etc., in North Burma. General Chennault is a portion of Stilwell’s command, and our most recent proposal was an arrangement for the better coordination of U. S. Air matters between Karachi and the 10th Air Forces in Eastern India,

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
the Assam Detachment, and Chennault's command in China, by providing Stilwell with an Air Officer to command the whole. This the Generalissimo declined to accept because he felt it diminished the authority of Chennault.

I am puzzled as to how we could secure the cooperation of the Generalissimo to the suggestion. As a matter of fact, I feel confident that he would, as far as Chinese affairs are concerned, decline to go along with us and would probably be definitely antagonistic.

The problem is an extremely difficult one and I do not think your present proposal provides the solution. I am having members of my staff struggle with the matter, to see if they can offer something that would meet with your approval, and, at the same time, secure the acquiescence of the Generalissimo.

I agree with you that British elements to be engaged in the recapture of Burma are predominant and, therefore, the Supreme Commander for this operation should be a Britisher, but I am not prepared at the moment to accept Sholto Douglas and would appreciate your proposing some additional names. I feel that Montgomery would be an ideal selection.

I do not believe that the possible appointment of Stilwell as Deputy to the Supreme Commander would solve our problem with the Generalissimo. Frankly, up to the present time we have treated Stilwell as the only practicable medium of cooperation between your British forces out of India and whatever Chinese forces could be mustered for operations in Burma. When the
question of unity of command has been raised over here we
have, so far, never progressed beyond the recognition that
this highly abnormal situation had to be treated in an ab-
normal manner. This has had its difficulties because of the
Generalissimo's attitude to the air operations under Chennault,
for which he undoubtedly wishes as far as possible to eliminate
Stilwell. However, this presents the insurmountable complication
of not providing—for those air operations—the supply service,
lines of communication out of India, and the trained and
equipped Chinese troops to protect the fields, which Stilwell
has been endeavoring to provide. Altogether the matter is a
most complicated one, and is not easy of solution. I would
propose, however, that any further plans on this matter be
limited to consideration of unity of command for South-East
Asia, that is for operations against Burma, Indo-China, Thailand,
Malaya, and Sumatra.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

ADMIRAL KIRK:

Subject: Proposed Message from the President to the Prime Minister regarding Supreme Command in Asiatic Theater.

Attached hereto marked Inclosure No. 1 is copy of message from the Prime Minister to the President dated 19 June regarding Supreme Command in Asiatic Theater.

Inclosure No. 2 is proposed reply to the Prime Minister, which General Arnold and I have both approved.

Please let Colonel Timberman know as to whether you also agree. If you approve, I should appreciate Admiral Leahy's presenting the matter to the President.

Chief of Staff.

2 Incls.
Incl. 1 - Msg No. 320 frm the Prime Minister to the President, 19 June, 43.
Incl. 2 - Draft of Msg frm President to Prime.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PERTH.
By: RAME. Date: MAY 1, 1972
Proposed Message to the Prime Minister
24 June 1943

From the PRESIDENT to the PRIME:

Your India appointments have met with general approval in this country.

With regard to your No. 320 of June 19, I feel that, for operations against Burma and Southeast Asia, unity of command is desirable. I agree with you that British elements to be engaged in the recapture of Burma are predominant and, therefore, the Supreme Commander for this operation should be a Britisher. I am not prepared at the moment, however, to accept Sholto Douglas and would appreciate your proposing some additional names.

Your proposal also raises certain critical problems which must be given serious consideration before a detailed plan can be decided upon.

The United States Air Force deployment in India was specifically carried out for the purpose of supporting China. Our plan to aid China has furthermore resulted in the concentration of a considerable number of Chinese troops at Rangarh, as well as Rangarh trained Chinese troops supported by U.S. service forces, along the Ledo Road. The plan for the Burma campaign moreover involves eleven divisions of Yunnan troops, the control of which is to a large extent exercised by Stilwell.
As you have indicated, we must accept the fact that Chennault will continue to report through American channels to the Generalissimo.

Meanwhile, we will have to remember that the Generalissimo is the Supreme Commander of the China Theater. Accordingly, as far as China is concerned we shall have a most difficult task in securing the Generalissimo's cooperation to the suggestion of a Supreme Command for all East Asia.

Viewed in the light of the above, I am having members of my staff consider the matter from every angle. They will have a proposal for our consideration within a few days.
June 24, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alunna, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and
No. 294.
Your No. 327, June 23.

I agree with you about the so-called agreement of the French
Committee in Algiers. I still have my fingers crossed. I hope
Uncle Joe will agree with us.

Roosevelt
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1943.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I agree with you about the so-called agreement of the French Committee in Algiers. I still have my fingers crossed. I hope Uncle Joe will agree with us.

ROOSEVELT

Answer 827, June 23.
From: Onav
To: Alsue, London

From the President to the Former Naval Person  
Number 295.
Your 329.
I agree and have already asked Giraud to postpone his visit at least until after Boisson's resignation is finally settled.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1156, EWT, June 25, 1943.

Chester Hammond,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Sturdivant
Date Nov 1 1971
Your 329 I agree
and have already
ordered to
postpone his visit
till after Treason
reignation is
finally settled.

#295

inheritance

Daly
June 25, 1943.

Proposed message from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Your 329.

I agree and have already asked Giraud to postpone his visit, at least until after Boisson's resignation is finally settled.

Roosevelt
June 28, 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

For the former Naval Person from the President personal and
No. 296.

I like the name of Tidal Wave. May they grow bigger and
better.

By the way, if you have not already met him I hope you will
see General Devers. I know he will give the fine same support to
you as did General Eisenhower and General Andrews.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1055, EWT, June 28, 1943.

Chester Hammond,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W. Stewart
Date: Nov 1 1971
June 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

The President has directed that a copy of the attached message from the President to the Prime Minister, No. 296 dated 28 June 1943, be furnished for the information of General Marshall.

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,  
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By [Signature]  
Date 1971
June 22, 1943.

FOR

THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:  

I like the name of Tidal Wave. May they grow bigger and better.

By the way, if you have not already met him I hope you will see General Devers. I know he will give the fine same support to you as did General Eisenhower and General Andrews.

ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Message from Ambassador Winant regarding General Devers.

I received your note of June 18th with Ambassador Winant's radio attached stating that,

"It would greatly help General Devers' standing here if our Chiefs of Staff made known to the British Staff that we wanted him to be informed on total global strategy rather than having his information limited to plans in the European Theater only."

I took the liberty of communicating directly with Ambassador Winant in order to get a more exact idea of his views. General Devers had already been furnished copies of TRIDENT so that he was familiar with global strategy. I asked Mr. Winant if what he had in mind was General Devers being placed in the position of discussing with the British Chiefs of Staff details of operations in other theaters than the European theater; that if that was his thought I did not think it a good practice.

The main point was that General Devers had been made aware of global strategy.

I am very glad that Mr. Winant is so interested in building up Devers' prestige, because this is a matter of great importance to us as it was in the case of Eisenhower and Smith and later of Frank Andrews.

I had previously requested the British Chiefs of Staff to call in General Devers in relation to all matters of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that relate to his theater and they have promised me to do so.

I can only suggest now that in some message of yours to the Prime Minister you express the hope that he has met General Devers and that he will give him the same fine support he gave General Eisenhower and General Andrews.
From: Opnav
To: Alusla, London.

Personal and [redacted] from the President to the Former Naval Person
Number 297.

Your #328. I did not suggest to UJ that we meet alone but he told
Davies that he assumed (a) that we would meet alone and (b) that he
agreed that we should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary
meeting.

He intimated that he would bring only a total of four or five people
and on this assumption I would propose to take only Hopkins and Harriman.

There are certain advantages in such a preliminary meeting which I
know you will appreciate. First, that without staffs there will be no
military collisions in regard to demands for an immediate roundup.
Second, that he will not think that we are demanding a Russian offensive
this summer if the Germans do not attack. Third, that in my opinion he
will be more frank in giving his views on the offensive against Japan now
and later. Fourth, that he would also be more frank in regard to China.
Fifth, that he would be more frank in regard to the Balkan States, Finland
and Poland.

I want to explore his thinking as fully as possible concerning Russia's
post-war hopes and ambitions. I would want to cover much the same field
with him as did Eden for you a year ago.

What would you think of coming over soon afterwards and that you and
I with staffs should meet in the Citadel in Quebec? I am sure the
Canadian Government would turn it over to us and it is a thoroughly com-
fortable spot, with thoroughly adequate accommodations there and at the
Hotel Frontenac. It is far better than Washington at that time of year.

While UJ gave no definite dates he suggested the end of July or early August. This is wholly tentative and I do not expect to hear anything further until about the fifteenth of July.

If he confirms this, I would be back about August fifteenth. I would have to be in Washington for a week but could easily get to some place in eastern Canada by the twenty-fifth of August.

Of course, you and I are completely frank in matters of this kind and I agree with you that later in the autumn we should most definitely of have a full dress meeting with the Russians. That is why I think a visit with Stalin as a preparatory talk on what you rightly call a lower level.

Finally I gather from Davie the Kremlin people do not at all like the idea of UJ flying across Finland, Sweden, Norway and the North Sea to Scapa, especially at this time of year when there is practically no darkness.

I have the idea that your conception is the right one from the short point of view, but mine is the right one from the long point of view. I wish there were no distances.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1735, EWT, June 28, 1943.

CHESTER HAMORD,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Harrelson
Date NOV 1 1971
I want to offer him nothing as fully as possible coming Russia's first war before and ambitions. I would want to cover much the same field with him as did Eden for you a year ago.
FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

Your HCS. I did not suggest to WJ that we meet alone but he told Davies that he assumed (a) that we would meet alone and (b) that he agreed that we should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary meeting.

He intimated that he would bring only a total of four or five people and on this assumption I would propose to take only Hopkins, Harriman and Admiral Leahy.

There are certain advantages in such a preliminary meeting which I know you will appreciate. First, that without staffs there will be no military collisions in regard to demands for an immediate roundup. Second, that he will not think that we are demanding a Russian offensive this summer if the Germans do not attack. Third, that in my opinion he will be more frank in giving his views on the offensive against Japan now and later [he could be in a hurry]. Fourth, that he would also be more frank in regard to China. Fifth, that he would be more frank in regard to the Balkan States, Finland and Poland. Soon.

What would you think of coming over early afterwards and that you and I with staffs should meet in the Citadel in Quebec? I am sure the Canadian Government would turn it over to us and it is a thoroughly comfortable spot, with thoroughly adequate accommodations there and at the Hotel Frontenac. It is far better than Washington at that time of year.
While UJ gave no definite dates he suggested the end of July or early August. This is wholly tentative and I do not expect to hear anything further until about the fifteenth of July.

If he confirms this, I would be back about August fifteenth.

I would have to be in Washington for a week but could easily get to some place in eastern Canada by the twenty-fifth of August.

Of course, you and I are completely frank in matters of this kind and I agree with you that later in the autumn we should most definitely have a full dress meeting with the Russians.

That is why I think of Stalin as a preparatory talk on what you rightly call a lower level. Finally I gather from Davies the Kremlin people do not at all like the idea of UJ flying across Finland, Sweden, Norway and the North Sea to Scapa, especially at this time of year when there is practically no darkness.

I have the idea that your conception is the right one from the short point of view, but mine is the right one from the long point of view. I wish there were no distances.

ROOSEVELT
June 30, 1943.

From: Conav
To: Alusna, London.

Number 298 from the President to the Former Naval Person and personal.

Regarding our messages on Supreme Command for South East Asia, I should like to ask your consideration of the following plan which appears to be in general accord with your ideas. The one point in which this plan differs from that set forth in your number 332, June 28th, lies in the method of integration of the Chinese effort.

General Stilwell, I feel, should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. His function as Deputy would be to command, under the Supreme Commander, all ground and air forces at present under him in the South East Asia Theater and such additional U.S. and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available. Furthermore he must continue to have certain direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo. Upon his relationship with the Generalissimo will depend the positive action by the Chinese in operations against Burma. To secure this cooperation, Stilwell should have under his immediate control the tangible means to give effect to his requests, including the command of all those U.S. forces which have been deployed for the purpose of making effective the U.S. aid to China.

The deployment of the 10th Air Force in India, as has been previously mentioned, was for the purpose of supporting China. Its offensive operations now and in the future against strategic targets in Burma and Thailand and in support of Chinese troops in the Assam-North Burma area, its operations in defense of the India-China air line, and its situation
as a strategic air reserve for the 14th Air Force are all bound up with our program of increasing aid to China. As regards the 14th Air Force, I am of the opinion that the Generalissimo would raise serious objection to subjecting Chennault's operations into Burma under any direct supreme command in India other than that provided by the channels already in existence.

I agree with your boundary for the South East Asia Theater. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham would be especially acceptable as supreme commander. Air Marshal Tedder is also favorably considered. In view of the established United States policy of aid to China, however, the more appropriate command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I could agree, therefore, only to this command relationship following the Eisenhower pattern, with the British Chiefs of Staff designated as the agency for the Combined Chiefs of Staff charged with the issue of instructions to the Supreme Commander.

A British Allied Naval Commander, RAF Commander, and a British Army Commander all would be selected by you.

I believe that the above plan will permit us to integrate the Chinese potential with operations against Burma from India.

Roosevelt.
Regarding our messages on Supreme Command for South East Asia, I should like to ask your consideration of the following plan which appears to be in general accord with your ideas. The one point in which this plan differs from that set forth in your number 332, June 29th, lies in the method of integration of the Chinese effort.

General Stilwell, I feel, should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. His function as Deputy would be to command, under the Supreme Commander, all ground and air forces at present under him in the South East Asia Theater and such additional U.S. and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available. Furthermore he must continue to have certain direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo. Upon his relationship with the Generalissimo will depend the positive action by the Chinese in operations against Burma. To secure this cooperation, Stilwell should have under his immediate control the tangible means to give effect to his requests, including the command of all those U.S. forces which have been deployed for the purpose of making effective the U.S. aid to China.

The deployment of the 10th Air Force in India, as has been previously mentioned, was for the purpose of supporting China. Its offensive operations now and in the future against strategic targets in Burma and Thailand and in support of Chinese troops
in the Assam-North Burma area, its operations in defense of the India-China air line, and its situation as a strategic air reserve for the 11th Air Force are all bound up with our program of increasing aid to China. As regards the 11th Air Force, I am of the opinion that the Generalissimo would raise serious objection to subjecting Chennault's operations into Burma under any direct supreme command in India other than that provided by the channels already in existence.

I agree with your boundary for the South East Asia Theater. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham would be especially acceptable as supreme commander. Air Marshal Tedder is also favorably considered. In view of the established United States policy of aid to China, however, the more appropriate command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I could agree, therefore, only to this command relationship following the Eisenhower pattern, with the British Chiefs of Staff designated as the agency for the Combined Chiefs of Staff charged with the issue of instructions to the Supreme Commander.

A British Allied Naval Commander, RAF Commander, and a British Army Commander all would be selected by you.

I believe that the above plan will permit us to integrate the Chinese potential with operations against Burma from India.
June 30, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

Personal and [redacted] for the Former Naval Person from the President Number 299.

The circumstances of our peaceful occupation of the Azores and the attitude of cooperation and common endeavor of the Government of Portugal in my opinion, place an obligation upon us to furnish military assistance to Portugal. Under these circumstances, I believe that Salazar should be assured that military forces will be sent to Portugal.

The Axis thus far has avoided commitment in the Iberian Peninsula under very favorable circumstances, and even though the movement of United Nations' forces into Portugal might precipitate an Axis invasion of Spain, that action appears unlikely. However, we must expect Germany to launch concentrated air and submarine attacks upon Portugal as retaliation and in order to impress neutral nations. It is inevitable that grave consequences would result if adequate provision were not made by the United Nations to meet this contingency.

A defensive force capable of providing the necessary initial assistance might include one infantry division, plus strong air defense elements consisting of 26 anti-aircraft battalions, ten day and two night fighter squadrons, two anti-submarine squadrons, together with supporting and service troops. Combat elements (less anti-aircraft troops) and possibly, though not probably, a part of the service units for this force could be obtained from the Mediterranean area with, however, a limiting effect on the scope of Priceless. The anti-aircraft and the remainder of the service troops must be secured elsewhere, with a resulting effect on Overlord.
A preliminary examination indicates that the provision of shipping for this force would limit the scope of Priceless and would cost Overlord from two to four divisions.

My suggested action in these circumstances will cause certain delays in operations agreed to in Trident. However, I believe that we must accept this interference.

I should appreciate having your views on the foregoing. I think there is something to be said for the thought that a peninsular campaign would be very difficult for the Axis and that secure landing places for us are not to be laughed off.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1205, PWT, June 30, 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Nov 1 1971
The circumstances of our peaceful occupation of the AZORES and the attitude of cooperation and common endeavor of the Government of PORTUGAL in my opinion, place an obligation upon us to furnish military assistance to PORTUGAL. Under these circumstances, I believe that Salazar should be assured that military forces will be sent to PORTUGAL.

The AXIS thus far has avoided commitment in the IBERIAN PENINSULA under very favorable circumstances, and even though the movement of UNITED NATIONS' forces into PORTUGAL might precipitate an AXIS invasion of SPAIN, that action appears unlikely. However, we must expect GERMANY to launch concentrated air and submarine attacks upon PORTUGAL as retaliation and in order to impress neutral nations. It is inevitable that grave consequences would result if adequate provision were not made by the UNITED NATIONS to meet this contingency.

A defensive force capable of providing the necessary initial assistance might include one infantry division, plus strong air defense elements consisting of 26 anti-aircraft battalions, ten day...
and two night fighter squadrons, two anti-submarine squadrons, together with supporting and service troops. Combat elements (less anti-aircraft troops) and possibly, though not probably, a part of the service units for this force could be obtained from the MEDITERRANEAN area with, however, a limiting effect on the scope of PRICELESS. The anti-aircraft and the remainder of the service troops must be secured elsewhere, with a resulting effect on OVERLORD.

A preliminary examination indicates that the provision of shipping for this force would limit the scope of PRICELESS and would cost OVERLORD from two to four divisions.

My proposed action in these circumstances will cause certain delays in operations agreed to in TRIDENT. However, I believe that we must accept this interference.

I should appreciate having your views on the foregoing. I think there is something to be said for the thought that a peninsular campaign would be very difficult for the Axis and that undue landing plans for us are not to be laughed off.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]  
Date NOV 1940
FROM: OPMAX
FOR: ALUSNA LONDON
JUNE 30, 1943

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT
PERSONAL AND NO 200 300

THE SHORT-SHORTER DOLLAR IS ON ITS WAY. PLEASE
WELCOME THE KING INTO THE CLUB WITH ADEQUATE INITIATION
AND TELL HIM I HOPE TO CATCH HIM WITHOUT HIS CERTIFICATE
SOME DAY.

HARRY AND I ARE CHANGING THE ACCOUNT TO A FUND TO
GIVE THE CONGRESS A LONG RECESS.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room
301600 USN

Robert Myers
Lt (Js) U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1, 1971

Lee PM's # 338
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
MISS GRACE TULLY

If you will get the President's signature I will see that it gets flown to England.

H.L.H.

encl. cable
and new dollar bill
re "Short Shorter".
June 30, 1943.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

The short—shorter dollar is on its way. Please welcome the King into the Club with adequate initiation and tell him I hope to catch him without his certificate some day.

Harry and I are charging the account to a fund to give the Congress a long recess.

ROOSEVELT