CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
APRIL - JUNE 1943
From: London
To: President of the United States

No 277 April 2nd, 1943.

Former Naval person to President personal and 

I have just received the following message from Stalin, which I consider is a very natural and stout-hearted response. I read the last sentence as meaning only that "The Soviet Armies will be worse off and suffer more ".

The answer makes me the more determined to back this man with every conceivable means.

If you like to send him some message it could only do good.

Message begins personal and secret Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill.

I received your message of the 30th March conveying to me that the necessity compels you and Mr Roosevelt to stop convoys to the USSR till Sept.

I understand this unexpected action as a catastrophic diminution of supplies of arms and military raw materials to the USSR on the part of Great Britain and the United States of America, as transport via Pacific is limited by the tonnage and not reliable and the Southern route has a small transit capacity. In view of this both just mentioned routes cannot compensate for the discontinuation of transport via the Northern route.

You realise of course that the circumstances cannot fail to affect the position of the Soviet troops. Sgd Stalin.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British T
Govt. Code Sept. Rev. 3-28-43
By A. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0833
From: London
To: President of the United States
No 278 April 2nd, 1943.

...and personal former Naval person to President.

After handing me Stalin's reply about convoys Maisky made a point of telling me that Admiral Standley had informed the Soviet Government that the Germans were willing to discuss with the Soviet the reciprocal repatriation of certain officer prisoners, presumably badly disabled, and that this proposal was known to the Vatican through whom it might be arranged for about 150 Russian officers to be sent back to Russia.

The Soviet Government had replied that they were not interested in the matter. I thought it might be significant that this should be mentioned just after I had been given the reply about the convoys: that it might have been meant to strike a note of reassurance bearing on the last sentence of the reply: ie that they meant to fight on anyhow.

PRIME
FROM: LONDON
TO: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO: 279, April 5, 1943

Personal and Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

1. I had a long talk with Anthony last night and I thank you for all your kind reassuring messages.

2. I am delighted to hear that there is a prospect of Harry coming here almost immediately. If you could let General Marshall come with him there would be enormous advantages and we could then settle about going on to "Torch" area to discuss possibilities with all our people on the spot there. The battles impending in Tunisia this week should clarify the position a good deal.

3. From what Anthony told me about your ideas for "Husky" and its exploitation if successful, it seems that we are thinking along the same lines. I therefore send you a copy of the minute which I sent on the second instant to the Chief of Staffs Committee and on which they are now at work. Please keep this to yourself, Harry and General Marshall as I have not yet heard what our Chiefs of Staff have to say about it. It is only intended as a channel for thought and planning. Minute referred to in
Paragraph 3 follows:

1. Assuming, first, that "Vulcan" is finished by the end of April, or, at worst, by May 15th and no large formed body of German or Italian troops escapes: secondly, that "Husky" takes place on July 10: thirdly, that there are not more than five Italian divisions, aggregating not more than 50,000 combatants, and not more than two German divisions, aggregating 20,000 combatants, total 70,000 combatants, in "Husky" - land, and furthermore that we place seven or eight British and American Divisions ashore, at a combatant strength of 15,000 each, total 105,000, and reinforce by another 30,000 British, grand total 135,000: and fourthly, that we win the intense battles which the landing involves: - how long is the subjugation of the armed forces of the enemy in "Husky" - land estimated to take?

2. In an operation of this kind, everything depends upon the initial battle lasting, say, a week, after which one might reasonably expect that the bulk of the enemy's forces would be destroyed, captured or driven into the mountains. The distances are not great and the resources of the country are small and once we have the ports and the airfields we should be effectively the masters of "Husky"-land, and be able to disperse by air power, and sea power covered by air power, all attempts by the enemy to reconquer it.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 279, April 5, 1943

3. Hitherto the capture of "Husky"-land has been regarded as an end in itself: but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. "Husky"-land is only a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local success. What has been done about this? Every reasonable alternative should be explored. Now that "Anakim" has receded owing to the shipping shortage, Mediterranean operations gain more prominence. If we take the end of July as the date by which we are established in "Husky"-land, what other operations are open? Of course our choice must depend upon what the enemy do. If large German forces are brought down into Italy and Italian morale and will to fight is thereby enhanced, the scale required for the taking of Rome and Naples might be beyond our power. In that case we must be ready with our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and put it hard across Turkey to come in with us. We must be ready for an attack on the Dodecanese and for supporting Turkey if she gets into trouble.

4. If however the Germans do not come, and the Italians crumble, there is no limit to the amount of Italian territory we may overrun. Italy may be forced out of the war. We may become possessed of Sardinia without fighting. Corsica may be liberated. All our available forces, including divisions in African not involved in "Husky", will have to be moved north-
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 279, April 5, 1943

ward into Italy till they come into contact with the Germans on the Brenner or along the French Riviera. How far have these possibilities been studied?

5. Even if Italy remains in the war with a certain amount of German help we ought, the moment we are masters of "Husky"-land, to try to get a footing both on the toe and heel of Italy. The possession of Taranto as well as the Isthmus governing the toe would confer great advantages upon us. The Italian fleet would have to decide on which side of Italy it would take refuge. We cannot tell what its position or condition will be as a result of the "Husky" operation. If it has not retreated up the Adriatic before we are masters of "Husky"-land with our air force established there, it will not be able to do so and will have to content itself with Spezia and Genoa. In any case, it must be considered a most important objective to get a footing on the Dalmatian coast so that we can foment the insurgents of Albania and Yugoslavia by weapons, supplies and possibly Commandos. I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailovic will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help. Evidently great possibilities are open in this theatre.

6. The object of this paper is to request with the utmost urgency the close study of these problems, and to
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 279, April 9, 1943

obtain from the Chiefs of Staff their view of what can be done
and what it is best to do. I hope this work may be pressed for­
ward with the greatest speed because the mere capture of "Husky"­
land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign
of 1943.

No Sig
April 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

There is forwarded herewith a copy of the message that was discussed at the conference yesterday afternoon.

/5/ William D. Leahy.
1. Assuming, first, that "Vulcan" is finished by the end of April, or, at worst, by May 15th and no large formed body of German or Italian troops escapes; secondly, that "Rusky" takes place on July 10; thirdly, that there are not more than five Italian divisions, aggregating not more than 30,000 combatants, and not more than two German divisions, aggregating 30,000 combatants, total 70,000 combatants, in "Rusky" - land, and furthermore that we place seven or eight British and American Divisions ashore, at a combatant strength of 15,000 each, total 105,000, and reinforce by another 30,000 British, grand total 135,000; and fourthly, that we win the intense battles which the landing involves: - how long is the subjugation of the armed forces of the enemy in "Rusky" - land estimated to take?

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3. Hitherto the capture of "Rusky"-land has been regarded as an end in itself; but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. "Rusky"-land is only a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local success. What has been done about this?

Every reasonable alternative should be explored. Now that "Anakim"
has receded owing to the shipping shortage, Mediterranean operations gain more prominence. If we take the end of July as the date by which we are established in "Husky"-land, what other operations are open? Of course our choice must depend upon what the enemy do. If large German forces are brought down into Italy and Italian morale and will to fight is thereby enhanced, the scale required for the taking of Rome and Naples might be beyond our power. In that case we must be ready with our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and put it hard across Turkey to come in with us. We must be ready for an attack on the Dodecanese and for supporting Turkey if she gets into trouble.

4. If however the Germans do not come, and the Italians crumple, there is no limit to the amount of Italian territory we may overrun. Italy may be forced out of the war. We may become possessed of Sardinia without fighting. Corsica may be liberated. All our available forces, including divisions in Africa not involved in "Husky", will have to be moved northward into Italy till they come into contact with the Germans on the Brenner or along the French Riviera. How far have these possibilities been studied?

5. Even if Italy remains in the war with a certain amount of German help we ought, the moment we are masters of "Husky"-land, to try to get a footing both on the toe and heel of Italy. The possession of Taranto as well as the Isthmus governing the toe would confer great advantages upon us. The Italian fleet would have to decide on which side of Italy it would take refuge. We cannot tell what its position or condition will be as a result of the "Husky" operation. If it has
not retreated up the Adriatic before we are masters of "Husky"-land with our air force established there, it will not be able to do so and will have to content itself with Spezia and Genoa. In any case, it must be considered a most important objective to get a footing on the Dalmatian coast so that we can foment the insurgents of Albania and Yugoslavia by weapons, supplies and possibly Commandos. I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailovic will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help. Evidently great possibilities are open in this theatre.

6. The object of this paper is to request with the utmost urgency the close study of these problems, and to obtain from the Chiefs of Staff their view of what can be done and what it is best to do. I hope this work may be pressed forward with the greatest speed because the mere capture of "Husky"-land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of 1943.
April 11, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 280  Filed: 21372

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal
and No. 280.

1. About 2 years ago the Government of Northern Ireland wished to have Conscription in its own area and I favoured the policy. However at that time American opinion was adverse and I received both from you and from Winant strong advice to the contrary. The situation is now changed. United States forces are in Ireland in considerable numbers and we have the spectacle of young Americans taken by compulsion from their homes to defend an area where young fellows of the locality loaf about with their hands in their pockets. This affects not only recruiting but the work of the important Belfast shipyards which are less active than the British yards.

2. I am thinking therefore of re-opening the question and asking the Northern Ireland government whether they would like me to have another try. A loud caterwaul may be expected from Valera, and I should like to know first of all how you feel about it and whether you could do anything to help.

No Sig

[Signature]

RECLASSIFIED by British Govt. Secret Dept. Dec. 8-22-72

By R. H. Parks  Date May 5 1972

0844
From: AMBASSADOR, LONDON
To: The President of the United States

Number 339: Filed 18352-12th.

Former Naval Person to President, personal and

No. 281. I am sure you will rejoice with me that that place you liked so much Scousse is in our hands.

No sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of The United States

No. 282, April 13th, 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

As you know joint Anglo-American planning is starting at Algiers in connection with the military administration of Italian occupied territory (Operation HUSKY). I feel it is important that both sides should at the outset be clear in their minds about the character of the administration to be set up.

I hope you may feel that in view of the fact that the Force Commander under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower will be British, we should be senior partner in the military administration of enemy occupied territory in that area. Our proposal would be that under the supreme authority of General Eisenhower a British General Officer should be appointed as Military Governor of HUSKY-Land and that he should be assisted by a joint Anglo-American Staff. Thus there would be no dualism in the actual executive decisions on the spot.

Such a local arrangement would of course in no way affect decisions on major policy being taken as usual by agreement between our two Governments or if convenient by personal correspondence between you and me.

Prime
From: London
To: The President of The United States
No. 283  Filed: 151010Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

Personal and confidence:

Your number 271. I hope that paragraph 3 of my number 282 made it perfectly clear that I contemplated "Husky" as our joint enterprise on terms of perfect equality, with our usual intimacy and confidence, and with no question of a "Senior Partner".

This expression only applied to the actual executive work to be done by the military governor who would receive his directive from you and me in complete agreement. In the executive and administrative sphere there ought not to be two voices but only one voice which will say what you and I have agreed. General Alexander would be directing the military operations under the supreme commander and he would delegate the powers of military governor to a British Officer mutually agreeable to us both.

I entirely agree with you that the utmost advantage should be taken of American ties with Italy and that at
least half of the officers of the Allied Military Government should be American and, further, if in case or district it is found that American pre-eminence is more useful to the common cause, this should at once be arranged. The 2 flags should always be displayed together and we should present a united and unbreakable front in all directions. All the above is of course without prejudice to the United States being supreme throughout the whole of French North Africa and my continuing to be your Lieutenant there. I hope I have given satisfaction.

I am ready to study with you the outlines of a directive foreseeing and forecasting as far as possible our policy towards (A) conquered districts and (B) peace overtures. These latter may come upon us swiftly and suddenly and we must be ready for them. I have on this subject at present only 2 thoughts. First, we cannot treat with Mussolini and, secondly, we should be immense gainers by getting Italy out of the war as soon as possible.

Your number 272 has just arrived. There must be a pause while the armies are regrouping in the north while Montgomery is dragging up his customary battery,
but I hope for great events before April is out. I continue to have very agreeable correspondence with Joe who has taken the convoy blow extremely well. He is very pleased that we should attempt to send the British and American aircraft quotas to him through Africa or the Mediterranean. I am trying to arrange this through Averell and will communicate with Harry. I trust your inspection tour will be as pleasant as it will be memorable.

Let me take this opportunity of thanking you for all your kindness and hospitality to Anthony. He has greatly enjoyed his visit and everyone here has acclaimed it.

Prime.
From: London  
To: The President of the United States

No. 284  Filed 1726Z/25

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

I understand that Stalin has repeated to you his mes-

sage to me of April 21st about Poland.

My two immediately following messages contain my re-

ply.

As you see, I am now going to follow these up with a
fuller message appealing to Stalin to cooperate with us in
getting as many Poles as possible out of Russia. Halifax
has already spoken to Hull about this. I shall be sending
you a further message on this subject.

Message from Prime Minister to Premier Stalin begins:

"Ambassador Maisky delivered your message to me last
night. We shall certainly oppose rigorously any "investiga-
tion" by the International Red Cross or any other body in
any territory under German authority. Such investigation
would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism.
"Eden is seeing Sikorski today and will press him as
strongly as possible to withdraw all countenance from any
investigation under Nazi auspices. Also we should never ap-
prove of any parley with the Germans or contact with them of
any kind whatever, and we shall press this point upon our

Polish allies.

"I will wire you later how Sikorski reacts to the
above points. His position is one of great difficulty. Far
from being pro-German or in league with them, he is in dan-
ger of being overthrown by Poles who consider he has not
stood up sufficiently for his people against the Soviets.
If he should go, we should only get somebody worse. I hope
therefore that your decision to "interrupt" relations is
to be read in the sense of a final warning rather than of
a break and that it will not be made public at any rate till
every other plan has been tried. The public announcement of
a break would do the greatest possible harm in the United
States where the Poles are numerous and influential.

"I had drafted a telegram to you yesterday asking you to consider allowing more Poles and Polish dependents to go into Persia. This would allay the rising discontent of the Polish Army formed there, and would enable me to influence the Polish Government to act in conformity with our common interests and against the common foe. I have deferred sending this telegram in consequence of yours to me in the hope the situation may clear. April 24, 1943." First message ends.

Message from Prime Minister to Premier Stalin personal and secret.

"Mr Eden saw General Sikorski yesterday evening. Sikorski stated that so far from synchronising his appeal to the Red Cross with that of the Germans his government took the initiative without knowing what line the Germans would take. In fact, the Germans acted after hearing the Polish broadcast announcement. Sikorski also told Eden that his government had simultaneously approached Monsieur Bogomolov on the subject. Sikorski emphasised that previously he had several times raised this question of the missing officers with the Soviet Government and once with you personally. On his instructions the Polish Minister of Information in his broadcasts has reacted strongly against German propaganda and this has brought an angry German reply.

"As a result of Eden's strong representations Sikorski has undertaken not to press request for Red Cross investigation and will so inform the Red Cross authorities in Berne. He will also restrain Polish press from polemics. In this connection I am examining possibility of silencing those Polish papers in this country which attack the Soviet Government and at the same time attack Sikorski for trying to work with the Soviet Government.

"In view of Sikorski's undertaking I would now urge you to abandon idea of any interruption of relations.

"I have reflected further on this matter and I am more than ever convinced that it can only assist our enemies, if there is a break between the Soviet and Polish Governments. German propaganda has produced this story precisely in order to make a rift in the ranks of the United Nations and to lend some semblance of reality to its new attempts to persuade the world that the interests of Europe and the smaller nations are being defended by Germany against the great extra-European powers, namely, the USSR, the USA and the British Empire.

"I know General Sikorski well and I am convinced that no contacts or understanding could exist between him or his government and our common enemy, against whom he has led the Poles in bitter and uncompromising resistance. His appeal to the International Red Cross was clearly a mistake though I
am convinced it was not made in collusion with the Germans.

"Now that we have, I hope, cleared up the issue raised in your telegram to me, I want to revert to the proposals contained in my draft telegram to which I referred in my message of the 24th April, I shall therefore, shortly be sending you this earlier message in its original form. If we two were able to arrange this matter of getting these Poles out of the Soviet Union it would be easier for Sikorski to withdraw entirely from the position he has been forced by his public opinion to adopt. I hope you will help me to achieve this. April 25, 1943."

no sig
To: The President of the United States  
From: London  

No. 283: Filed 14552/26  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt  
personal and  

I repeat to you herewith the reply I have just received to my telegram which I forwarded to you in my number 291. I shall be glad of your views.  

Begins Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill  
personal and most secret. Kremlin April 25th.  

"I received your message concerning the Polish affairs. Many thanks for your interest in the matter. I would like, however, to point out that the interruption of relations with the Polish Government is already decided and today V M Molotov delivered a note to this effect. Such action was demanded by my colleagues as the Polish official press is ceaselessly pursuing and even daily expanding its campaign hostile to the USSR. I was obliged also to take into account the public opinion of the Soviet Union which is deeply indignant at the ingratitude and treachery of the Polish Government.  

"With regard to the publication of the Soviet document concerning the interruption of relations with the Polish Government, I am sorry to say that such publication cannot be avoided."

No Sig
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 286, April 25, 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
personal and

At Casablanca you agreed that I should play the hand with Turkey. I should like you to know how things are progressing. Since the meeting at Adana much has been done to prepare the way for the move of large air forces to Turkey when the right moment comes. We are giving all the help we can to the Turks in the way of instructors and training facilities of all kinds, and we are doing what we can to improve their communications. General Wilson and Air Marshal Douglas have both visited Ankara and a start has been made with plans for joint operations. We have given them 5 ships from our strained Middle East resources to carry munitions with Turkish crews under the Turkish flag. These I am going to keep filled and busy.

We have also received from the Turks expansive requests for further arms and equipment. These go far beyond what they could receive at their ports or use profitably by their troops and also beyond what we can ship. In drawing up the lists of what we are prepared to send, I have thought it necessary to avoid any appearance of being niggardly. It is better that there should be some slight indigestion rather than that the patient should have any cause to complain that he is being starved. Any how their reception ports and transportation facilities are a bottleneck. It is better that the fault should lie with them for not being able to receive, than with us for being unwilling to offer.
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 286, April 25, 1943

There is a British-American coordination committee at Angora and you will no doubt hear from it complaints that the lists I have furnished to the Turks and the programmes of imports to which I am trying to work are excessive. In fact 1 of your people has used the expression "Feeding an 8 course dinner to an 8 day old baby". This is an overdrawn picture for the reasons I have given. I want the Turks to feel that they have a call on large supplies of the most modern equipment when the time comes as it may this autumn, for strong pressure to be put on them to let us use their bases for operation "Handcuff" (see my immediately following) and also for bombing Ploesti. Their answer will depend upon the extent to which we shall have strengthened them against the enemies counter measures and also upon their conviction that we are in earnest in wishing to help them.

I hope you will approve what I am doing, and will convey to the necessary quarters an explanation of the position. It may be that in some cases I have promised equipment which can only come from your production. This we will apply for in the usual way; but I hope our requests will meet with a sympathetic reception.

Prime
From: London
To: President of the United States
No 287 April 26, 1943.

President from former Naval person personal and

With reference to my last stop Dodecanese.

PRIME

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Transmitted to President as from Secy. (1)
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 288

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

Your number 274.

I like your telegram to Stalin very much and will read it to the Cabinet today. We must work together to heal this breach so far it has been Goebbels show.

prime
URGENT

From: Amembassy, London
To: The President of the United States

No. 289 April 28, 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and
Number 289.

The Poles are issuing tonight the communique in
my immediately following. You will see that we have
persuaded them to shift the argument from the dead
to the living and from the past to the future.

I have therefore sent the following message to
Stalin feeling sure it will be in accordance with
your views. Anything that you can put in now will
be most helpful. Message begins.

"Eden and I have pointed out to the Polish Govern-
ment that no resumption of friendly or working relations
with Soviet Russia is possible while they make charges
of an insulting character against the Soviet Govern-
ment and thus seem to countenance the atrocious Nazi
propaganda. Still more would it be impossible for any
of us to tolerate enquiries by the International Red
Cross held under Nazi auspices and dominated by Nazi
terrorism. I am glad to tell you that they have
accepted our view and that they want to work loyally
with you. Their request now is to have the dependents
of the Polish Army in Persia and the fighting Poles
in the Soviet Union sent to join the Poles you have
already allowed to go to Persia. This is surely a
matter which admits of patient discussion. We think
the request is reasonable if made in the right way and
at the right time and I am pretty sure the President
thinks so too. We hope earnestly that, remembering
the difficulties in which we have all been plunged
by the brutal Nazi aggression, you will consider this
matter in a spirit of magnanimity.

"The Cabinet here is determined to have proper
discipline in the Polish Press in Great Britain.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Central Intel. Dept. Col. 3-39-78
By R. W. Bruce Date MAY 3 1972

0858
Even miserable rags attacking Sikorski can say things which the German broadcast repeats open-mouthed to the world to our joint detriment. This must be stopped and it will be stopped.

"So far this business has been Goebbels's greatest triumph. It has now been suggested that the USSR will set up a Left-Wing Polish Government on Russian soil and deal only with them. We could not recognize such a government and would continue our relations with Sikorski who is far the most helpful man you or we are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. I expect this will also be the American view.

"My own feeling is that they have had a shock and that after whatever interval is thought convenient, the relationship established on July 30th, 1941, should be restored. No one will hate this more than Hitler and what he hates most is wise for us to do.

"We owe it to our armies now engaged, and presently to be more heavily engaged, to maintain good conditions behind the fronts. I and my colleagues look steadily to the ever closer cooperation and understanding of the USSR, the USA and the British Commonwealth and Empire, not only in the deepening war struggle but after the war. What other hope can there be than this for the tortured world?"

Message ends.

The Foreign Office are sending a fuller statement through our ambassador in Moscow setting out our formal and official view and dwelling more in detail on the Polish grievances and on the dangers to the United Nations which would follow from their being incessantly aired all over the world. Ambassador Winant is being kept fully informed.

Prime
From: American Embassy, London
To: The President of the United States

No. 290 April 28, 1943

To President from former Naval Person personal and

Following is communique referred to in paragraph one of my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:

"The Polish Government affirm that their policy aiming at a friendly understanding between Poland and Soviet Russia on the basis of the integrity and full sovereignty of the Polish Republic, was and continues to be fully supported by the Polish nation.

"Conscious of their responsibility towards their own nation and towards the Allies, whose unity and solidarity the Polish Government consider to be the cornerstone of future victory, they were the first to approach the Soviet Government with a proposal for a common understanding, in spite of the many tragic events which had taken place from the moment of the entry of the Soviet armies on the territory of the republic, that is September 17th, 1939.

"Having regulated their relations with Soviet Russia by the agreement of July 30th, 1941, and by the understanding of December 4th, 1941, the Polish Government have scrupulously discharged their obligations.

"Acting in close union with their government, the Polish people, making the extreme sacrifice, fight implacably in Poland and outside the frontiers of their country against the German invader. No traitor Quisling has sprung from Polish ranks. All collaboration with the Germans has been scorned. In the light of facts known throughout the world the Polish Government and Polish nation have no need to defend themselves from any suggestion of contact or understanding with Hitler."
"In a public statement of April 17th, 1943, the Polish Government categorically denied to Germany the right to abuse the tragedy of the Polish officers for their own perfidious schemes. They unhesitatingly denounce Nazi propaganda designed to create mistrust between Allies. About the same time, a note was sent to the Soviet Ambassador accredited to the Polish Government asking once again for information which would help to elucidate the fate of the missing officers.

"The Polish Government and people look to the future. They appeal in the name of the solidarity of the United Nations and that elementary humanity for the release from USSR of the thousands of the families of the Polish Armed Forces engaged in the fight or in Great Britain or the Middle East preparing to take their part in the fight at the side of British Forces – tens of thousands of Polish orphans and children for the education of whom they would take full responsibility and which now – in view of the German mass slaughter – are particularly precious to the Polish people. The Polish Army, in waging the war against Germany, will also require for reinforcement all fighting Polish males who are now on Soviet soil, and the Polish Government appeal for their release. They reserve their right to plead the cause of all these persons to the world. In conclusion the Polish Government ask for the continuation of relief welfare for the mass of Polish citizens who will remain in the USSR.

"In defending the integrity of the Polish Republic, which accepted the war with the Third Reich, the Polish Government never claimed and do not claim, in accordance with their statement of February 25th, 1943, any Soviet territories.

"It is and will be the duty of every Polish Government to defend the rights of Poland and of Polish citizens. The principles for which the United Nations are fighting and also the making of all efforts for strengthening their solidarity in this struggle against the common enemy, remain the unchanging basis of the policy of the Polish Government."

Prime
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has directed that the attached messages be furnished the Secretary of State.

The President, having just returned to the city, has not yet had an opportunity to read them, but has been informed briefly of their contents.

The President desires that the Secretary of State study the messages with the view of preparing by tomorrow, April 30, 1943, a recommendation for appropriate action by the President.

The attention of the Secretary of State is invited to the fact that the attached messages have not been paraphrased, and therefore, in the interest of security, no distribution should be made of them in their present form.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

3 Inc1s.
1-PM 267
2-PM 296
3-Adviser #355
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA LONDON
RELEASED BY
DATE 29 APRIL 1943.
TOR CODEROOM 2137/29.
DECODED BY PURDY
PARAPHRASED BY GERMAN

RELEATED BY GERMAN
DATE 22 APR 1943.
TOR CODEROOM 2137/29.

RECODED BY PURDY

IT SEEMS TO ME MOST NECESSARY THAT WE SHOULD
ALL SETTLE TOGETHER NOW FIRST HUSKY AND EXPLOITATION
THEREOF AND SECONDLY THE FUTURE OF ANAKIM IN LIGHT OF
BURMA CAMPAIGN EXPERIENCES AND SHIPPING STRINGENCY. THERE
ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF OTHER BURNING QUESTIONS WHICH YOU AND
I COULD WITH ADVANTAGE BRING UP TO DATE.

I THINK I COULD MANAGE TO BE WITH YOU BY TUESDAY
11TH MAY. I WOULD BRING WAVELL, PEIRSE AND ADMIRAL SOMER-
VILLE AS WELL AS POUND, BROOKE, PORTAL, MOUNTBATTEN AND
LEATHERS. PLEASE SAY WHETHER YOU WOULD LIKE THIS OR
WHETHER YOU WOULD PREFER TO SEND YOUR PEOPLE OVER HERE
WHICH OF COURSE WOULD BE EASIER FOR US.

DISTRIBUTION:
P1A.......ACTION.
FILE.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

FILE.
From: London  
To: President of the United States  
No 292 May 3, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and (sad Prime).

We are asking New Zealand to allow their fine, battle trained division to go forward into "HUSKY", which Alexander and Montgomery both desire and advise and which is in full accordance with the plans of General Eisenhower. Prime Minister Fraser is definitely in favour of this, and will put the issue to the New Zealand Parliament in secret session on or after May 8th. You sent them a message of appreciation at the time they decided to send their division forward with the desert army on the March from Alamein. Mr Fraser has asked me to send him a message for his Parliament, and hopes he may also receive one from you. Considering how we have agreed to divide our responsibilities in the East and the West, and also the great exertions the United States are making to protect New Zealand and Australia, I feel that it would be most appropriate if you would kindly send one.

No Sig
From: London
To: President of the United States
No. 293 May 4th, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

Your no. 275.

Thank you very much. I look forward to our early meeting. Am bringing Averell. Accept my warmest congratulations on the brilliant advance of the United States Troops to Mateur. This will greatly help the thrust which we shall make soon in the centre.

PRIME
Message for the President from the Prime Minister.

Admiralty have now routed us a somewhat longer course and we shall probably be several hours late. I should like to go by train to Washington and will arrive there during the afternoon. I shall be delighted to come to Hyde Park for the week-end, and I dare say we may have better news from North Africa than we did at the time of Tobruk in June. Look forward to seeing you.
From: American Embassy, London
For: The President of the United States

Number 294 May 10, 1943

Naval Person to President [redacted] and personal number 294.

Since yesterday we have been surrounded by U. S. Navy and we all greatly appreciate high value you evidently set upon our continued survival. I look forward to being at White House with you tomorrow afternoon and also to going to Hyde Park with you at weekend. The voyage has been so far most agreeable and Staff have done vast amount of work.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
May 27, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 295 Filed 21422/27

Personal and Anst. Former Naval Person to President. No 295.

Arrived "G" safely after good flight: proceeding first destination tomorrow.

no sig

REGRANED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel. 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a communication from the Prime Minister to the President, received in the Map Room this date.

Admiral Brown suggests that before the proposed message is sent to Marshal Stalin, the President discuss with General Marshall the advisability of sending the message to Marshal Stalin by officer courier. Admiral Brown feels that, because of the extreme importance of the contents of this message, it would be dangerous to risk sending it to Moscow by any of our existing codes.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]
CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 5, 1972
General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Russia. C.I.G.S. and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C.I.G.S., and that it has our (President and Prime Minister's) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me.

(Insert statement)
1. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace and the security of our overseas lines of communication.

(b) Next in priority to employ every practicable means to support Russia.

(c) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

(d) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her Military power.

(e) To undertake such measures as may be practicable
to maintain China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(f) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long-range aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

With reference to the support of Russia, agreement was reached as follows:

(a) To intensify the present air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. This for the purpose of smashing German industry, destroying German fighter aircraft and breaking the morale of the German people. The rapid development
of this air offensive is indicated by the events of the past three weeks in France, Germany and Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and by the growth of the United States' heavy bomber force in England from some 350 planes in March to approximately 700 today with a schedule calling for 900 June 30, 1,050 September 30 and 2,500 April 1. The British bomber force will be constantly increasing.

(b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of HUSKY, the assault on Sicily, for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three
British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be referred to.

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

3. We have found that the undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a
dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

26. 5. 43
Memorandum

Despatch for Stalin approved with following amendment
Strike out bracketed following words
quote meet in fact to include A & B as one priority
order to protect security suggest you
were Stalin telling him you are
coming by air to deliver
message to him in Moscow or his
agent at some appropriate place. You
may state that your message has my
approval as well as Chancellors.

HD R
From: London
To: President of the United States
No 296 June 5, 1943.

Present aerial person to President Roosevelt
(sent in Washington Direct) personal. May 26th, 1943.

General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Russia. C I O S and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C I O S, and that it has our (President and Prime Ministers) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me. Message begins draft of message from the President and the Prime Minister to Premier Stalin.

In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions: (A) to give first priority to the control of the submarine menace and the security of our overseas lines of communication. (B) next in priority, to employ every practicable means to support Russia. (C) to prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the War on the side of the Allies. (D) to maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power. (E) to undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective ally and as a base for operations (F) to prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.
From: London
To: President of the United States
No 296 June 9, 1943.

With reference to (A) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long range aircraft with new equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1st. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore, increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

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(B) in the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensive immediately following the successful completion of Husky (the assault on Sicily) for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against eastern and southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for 3 British and 4
American Divisions which are to participate in concentration in England, next to be referred to.
(C) it was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full scale invasion of the continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing craft in the Mediterranean the South West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

We have found that the undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

No Sig.
From: London

To: The President of the United States

No. 297    Filed: NFT May 28, 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and No 297.

Party arrived safely at "A".

no sig

May 28, 1943

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-69-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Transmitted to Hyde Park by Cole.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 296 Filed 3/1/372

May 31, 1943

Please accept my warmest thanks to you and Mrs Roosevelt for your great kindness and charming hospitality to me during my visit. I carry away the most pleasant memories and also I am certain that our discussions have averted many difficulties and will grip and focus our whole effort in the next few months.

I am staying here or hereabouts for the next week and (Former Naval Person to President. Most secret and personal No 296) Anthony joins me tomorrow. The weather is lovely and the conditions most agreeable. I have had very good talks with Eisenhow and our people and yesterday had a first preliminary meeting. It looks as if complete agreement will be reached when we resume the conference on Monday.

The bride arrives here noon today. I thought Anthony would make a better host man than I. I am therefore reserving for myself the part of heavy father. General Georges whom I flew out of France is here and makes a very good impression. I think there is a chance of his being included in the New Council. It seems essential to make the composition of this Council such that it can restrain any individual who pushes personal pretensions which are harmful to the cause. Murphy and MacMillan work hand in hand together, in the closest accord. I will keep you fully informed of any developments while I am here.

Sent to Hyde Park by pouch, 1400, May 31, 1943.

REORIGED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., S-00-72

By A. H. Parker Date 5.7.1972.

0881
Once more a thousand thanks. You know how I value your friendship. Kindest regards to all.

no sig
To: The President of United States
From: London - Signed Prime

No. 299, June 4, 1943.

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt personal and No 299.

1. I had not noticed any serious leakage but I entirely agree with your idea of a monthly joint statement approved personally by you and me. This should cover any information given in general terms about loss in tonnage and say whether it is better or worse, as well as the progress of the attack on U-boats. All other statements should be prevented as you suggest. Immediately on my return I will send you a more formal confirmation.

2. We have had long, most agreeable and fruitful discussions and I am not aware of the slightest difference existing between the British and American outlooks. Especially satisfactory was it to hear from all the commanders the confidence with which they undertake the considerable operations impending. General Marshall will tell you about it.

3. I have now learned officially from Macmillan that the bride and bridegroom have at last physically embraced. I am entertaining the new committee at luncheon today, but I will not attempt to mar the domestic bliss by any intrusions of my own. General Georges has been very good.

Signed Prime
From: London

To: The President of the United States

No. 300    Filed 06/14/43

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and No 300. Your telegram through Eisenhower of June 5th.

We had the whole French committee to luncheon on Friday and everybody seemed most friendly. General Georges, whom I got out of France a month ago and who is a personal friend of mine, is a great support to Giraud. If De Gaulle should prove violent or unreasonable, he will be in a minority of 5 to 2 and possibly completely isolated. The committee is therefore a body with collective authority with which in my opinion we can safely work.

I consider that the formation of this committee brings to an end my official connection with De Gaulle as leader of the Fighting French which was set out in the letters exchanged with him in 1940 and certain other documents of later date, and I propose in so far as is necessary to transfer these relationships, financial and otherwise, to the committee as a whole. While I consider the committee is a safe depository for arms and supplies, I feel that we should see how they conduct their business and themselves before deciding what degree of recognition we should give them as representing France. Mackinnon and Murphy are working in the closest accord and will keep Eisenhower, with whom the supreme and ultimate power rests, fully informed.

I was not aware that there was any question of Boisier being dismissed from his post. I should be strongly opposed to it. To make doubly sure I am tell-
ing Macmillan to associate himself with your instructions to Murphy. I expect however he has already done so.

I agree with you that the publicity is most one-sided. This is due to the press correspondents, most of whom have a de Gaulilist bias. I will consult with Anthony about what can be done to correct this. I cannot however help feeling fairly confident that things will work better now. Please note that my Godefroy has come to heel before your Robert.

I am very glad that I went to North Africa and, above all, that you sent Marshall with me. He was a tower of strength and sagacity. The concord and confidence of Eisenhower's headquarters and the ardour and conviction of the commanders actually charged with the operations was most bracing. I was nearly hung up by weather at Gibraltar but at the last moment a good report came in and we nibbled through safely and comfortably. I should have liked to stay another week as the weather was delicious and the nothing was doing me no end of good.

Every good wish to you and all.

no sig
June 6, 1943

From: London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 301  Filed 6/1625Z

Former naval person to President personal and no 301.

Have just received your letter of May 28th about ships. Let me thank you from the bottom of my heart for this broadminded, just and comprehending treatment of this problem. Let me know whether you would care to have the letter published. If so, I would write a suitable acknowledgement and would also like to refer to the matter when I speak to the House of Commons on Tuesday. However, naturally, it is entirely for you to say and I do not press for publication unless you think it would be advantageous to our partnership.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972

0886
From: London
To: The President of the United States.

No. 302, June 10, 1943.

You will recall that we agreed together that Rome should not be bombed without prior consultation and agreement between our 2 Governments. The matter came up during discussion at Algiers of air activities in preparation for HUSKY. Tedder explained the steps he was taking to drive the enemy farther back, and to disrupt their communications southwards through Italy. As part of this process, he much wished to attack the important Marshalling Yards at Rome. In this he was supported by Eisenhower, and the matter was left that I should consult my Cabinet, and Marshall would report back to you.

2. The targets are the San Lorenzo Railway Junction and Marshalling Yard, and the Littorio Marshalling Yard, each of which is about 3 1/2 miles from the Vatican City, which is on the opposite side of the Tiber from yards.

3. The attacks would be carried out in daylight by a very large force of aircraft. There would be small chance of damage to Rome itself, and none of damage to the Vatican. Severe damage to the yards would seriously impair the reinforcement route to the south of Italy, and would hold up the movement of the Herman Goering Division, elements of which we believe to be still in the north of Italy and south of France. (From Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal).

4. We have never agreed to refrain from bomb-
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 302, June 10, 1943.

....

ing Rome, and we are quite prepared for retaliation on Cairo.

5. I put these matters to the Cabinet today, and they had no hesitation in supporting the proposal that General Eisenhower should be empowered to take action against these Marshalling Yards at the moment he thinks best for the successful prosecution of HUSKY.

6. If you agree, I suggest that the decision should be conveyed to General Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the name of the 2 Governments.

PRIME
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11 June 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

President directs that the attached message to the President from the Prime Minister dated June 10, 1943 be furnished Admiral Leahy for his information and to show to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Signature]

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt Col, USAF

[Handwritten note:]

Prepare reply suggesting the same type of arrangement that has been approved for Italy.
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 303, 10 June, 1943

Former Naval Person to President most secret and personal. No. 303.

I send you in my immediately following a note which has been prepared here about procedure in "Huskyland." It seems to me that there is a certain amount of heavy weather being made unnecessarily about two points which will settle themselves quite simply if left to Eisenhower and to the people on the spot.

First, about Mackilland. He is my personal representative just as Murphy is yours. Both get along perfectly well with Eisenhower and with each other in all matters relating to the "Torch" area. I cannot see why exactly the same relationship should not continue in the "Husky" period and should not apply to the wider areas which may be brought under our joint control. Orders and formal correspondence would go through the Combined Staffs, but it is necessary that the heads of governments should have early and intimate information about what happens in the civil and political sphere. All this is working quite smoothly and easily at the present time, and all that is necessary is a ruling from you and me that the present relationship of our representatives to the Supreme Commander will cover the new acquisitions of territory and will not be altered thereby. I certainly left under the impression that this would be quite agreeable to Eisenhower.

The second point is about the degree of British and American control and administration which should be imposed upon any newly conquered regions. It would certainly seem wise to make them run themselves as much as possible. Prominent or malignant Fascists should be removed and we must be ready to supply trustworthy administrators in their place, insofar...
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 303, 10 June, 1943

as these cannot be found for our purposes from the local population. It would, I feel sure, be a mistake to flood out all these places with many hundreds of British and American gauleiters, however well trained or well meaning they may be.

However, it is quite impossible to foresee in advance what the local conditions or temper of the people in the conquered regions will be. It should surely be left to the Supreme Commander to propose to our two Governments what British and American officers he wants and the degree of their infusion into the local life. My own feelings are that he would want to interfere as little as possible and make things run themselves, subject to the paramount interests of the armies and of the operations.

No Sig
June 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

LT. COLONEL T. W. HAMMOND, JR.

Attached are paraphrased copies of two messages between the President and the Prime Minister (Incoming No. 303 and Outgoing No. 266), which are furnished for the information of General Hilldring in accordance with your request.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls.
Incl.1 - PM-Pres. #303, June 10, 1943.
Incl.2 - Pres-PM. #266, June 14, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5, 1972
June 10, 1943.

From the Prime Minister to the President No. 303.

Procedure in "HUSKYLAND" is the subject of my immediately following message. It strikes me that there is unnecessary concern over two points which will settle themselves quite simply if left to General Eisenhower and the others on the spot.

The first point is about MacMillan. He is my personal representative just as Murphy is yours. They get on well with each other and with General Eisenhower in all subjects relating to the "TORCH" area. I see no reason why precisely the same relationship should not continue in the "HUSKY" period nor why it should not apply to the larger areas which may come under our joint control. Formal correspondence and orders would go through the Combined Staffs, but it is essential that the heads of governments have immediate and intimate information about events in the civil and political sphere. All this is working easily and smoothly now and all that is necessary is a statement from you and me that the present relationship of our representatives to the Supreme Commander will not be altered by new acquisitions of territory and will cover that territory. I have the definite impression that this will be agreeable to Eisenhower.

The second point is the degree of American and British administration and control which should be imposed on newly conquered regions. It seems wise to make them run themselves as much as possible. Malignant or prominent Fascists must be removed and we should be prepared to replace them with trustworthy administrators to the extent that these cannot be found for our purposes from the local population. I am sure that it
would be a mistake to flood all these places with hundreds of British and American guleiters, however well meaning and well trained they may be.

Of course, it is impossible to foresee in advance the nature of local conditions or the temper of the people in the conquered regions. It should be left to the Supreme Commander to propose to our Governments what British and American officers he wants and the degree of infusion into local life. My personal feelings are that he should wish to interfere as little as possible and allow things to run themselves, subject always to the paramount interests of armies and operations.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 304, 10 June, 1943

Former Naval Person to President No. 304.

Following is note referred to in immediately preceding telegram being draft personal message from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

In Algiers I handed the Commander in Chief on June 2nd a memorandum on certain points outstanding in connection with the administration of "Huskyland" which I later discussed with him, Marshall and Eden. I should like to take up one of these points, which I believe Harry Hopkins may have mentioned to you towards the end of my Washington visit. It concerns the channel of communication between General Eisenhower and the United States and British Governments and the function of the Resident Minister.

I said in my memorandum to General Eisenhower "It is clear that all official communications from General Eisenhower to the United States and British Governments and vice versa should pass through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. But incidents may arise and be given publicity in the Press, on which it may be necessary to take rapid political decisions on the highest level. So far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, the present practice is entirely satisfactory, and it is suggested that the directive should state simply that 'The position at Allied Force Headquarters of the British Minister Resident remains unchanged.' It will be recalled that Mr. MacMillan as Minister Resident reports direct to the Prime Minister."

I very much hope that you will be able to accept this proposal which I am sure would make for the smooth and efficient working of the machinery.

No Sig

*SEE CORRECTION ATTACHED
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No/ 12, June 12, 1943

Former Naval Person to President

And personal.

Correction to telegram No. 304 last paragraph should read "I very much hope that you will be able to accept this proposal which I am sure would make for the smooth and efficient working of the machinery."

Prime
June 11, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States

File No. 305  Filed 11/112CZ

Former Naval Person to President. Most secret and personal. No 305.

In accordance with the decisions reached at "Trident", plans and preparations for capturing the Azores are being pushed on as fast as possible. My "military" advisers are, however, emphasising that it is impossible to mount a full-scale operation before the end of August without impinging upon operations in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon has reported a conversation with Dr. Salazar on 6th June, the gist of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. Dr. Salazar has asked for a renewal of our staff conversations, about which I have informed you in the past, having regard to the changed military prospects of the Axis and the United Nations. His Majesty's Ambassador reports that Dr. Salazar may well be considering the advantages of associating Portugal with the United Nations before this is too late, and that he a year no longer to fear German military reactions as he has done hitherto.

It seems to us that Dr. Salazar's approach provides us with a good opportunity to ask immediately for the facilities which we require in the Azores.
If he agrees, we will at once move in with a brigade which is being specially prepared for immediate dispatch, and we shall thus be saved all the trouble and expense of mounting a considerable expedition and any stultification that may attach to threatening or using force against our oldest ally. If he refuses and we apparently acquiesce, and nothing happens for some months, we are of the opinion, in which our military advisers concur, that no great harm will have been done. Meanwhile full military preparations to occupy the islands at the end of August will continue. The War Cabinet are agreed that if we have invoked the alliance in vain on the present occasion, and if all other means fail, we should not in August hesitate to use all necessary force, after then making the last-minute appeal to Dr. Salazar at least to avert bloodshed by yielding under protest.

I therefore propose, if you agree, to instruct His Majesty’s Ambassador to make an immediate approach to Dr. Salazar, invoking the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. We shall provide Sir H. Campbell with strong arguments regarding the improbability of a German invasion of Portugal or of adverse Spanish reactions. We cannot, however, meet Dr. Salazar’s obvious desire for adequate military assistance on the Portuguese mainland. We can however offer now

(1) A measure of assistance against the possibility of German air attacks on Lisbon, and

(2) The protection of Portuguese seaborne commerce and the replacement of Portuguese ships sunk by the enemy.

To these we would add assurances regarding the maintenance or restoration of Portuguese sovereignty over the whole of her colonial empire, including of course the Azores, after the war. We can offer him a lease arrangement, if this appeals to him, and the free enjoyment after the war of any improvements on the islands effected by us.

We have carefully considered your suggestion of using the influence of Brazil, but we think that in the first instance it would be best to rely on
the undoubted force and validity of our 600-year-old Alliance. Our requests and assurances would of course be much more effective if I could have your authority to associate the United States Government with them. If this should fail or hang in the balance, then might well be the moment when you should come into action and the United States Ambassador should make a separate, joint or anyhow additional request, using the Brazil argument to the full. If all fails, then we shall have to wait till August.

I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you agree with an approach on the above lines and whether you will authorize me to associate the United States Government with the above assurances regarding the Portuguese colonies.

I am asking Smuts to agree to endorse our assurances regarding the Portuguese Colonial Empire.

no sig
June 11, 1943

From: M.A. London
To: The President of the United States

No. 306

Former Naval Person to President and personal.

Your no 281.

His Majesty's government are in full agreement with you on all points, and we are instructing MacMillan accordingly.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Sec., 8-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
June 11, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 307 Filed 11/1136Z

Former Naval Person to President. No 307.

Message en clair from Pantelleria to Malta just intercepted begins "Beg to surrender owing to lack of water."

no sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. No. 3-2-5-76
By R. H. Purde Date: MAY 5 1972

0901
June 11, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 308 Filed 11/17/62

Former Naval Person to President and personal. No 308.

My telegram 305. Following is gist of conversation referred to. Begins.

Dr Salazar informed US Ambassador at Lisbon that he thought that the time had perhaps come when our two governments should review the conclusion reached in the London conversations which had been based on the premise that Germany could and might invade the Peninsula and that Great Britain was not then strong enough to meet that threat. These premises said Salazar no longer held good. Since the occupation of North Africa Germany, even if she were in a position to attempt the operation, could hardly hope to establish a footing on the Straits of Gibraltar whilst Great Britain on the other hand was now immeasurably stronger in every way. It was therefore for consideration whether the decision that Portugal should only put up a token fight on the mainland and that a centre of resistance should be established in the islands, any longer corresponded to the circumstances of the hour.

In this connection you will remember that as a result of our staff conversations with the Portuguese it was agreed with Portugal that in the event of a German invasion a token resistance only should be offered on the mainland and that the government should retire to the Azores to carry on the fight.
HM Ambassador comments are as follows. 
Dr Salazar is obviously worried about relations with Brazil and disappointed in his hopes of a Latin Bloc. He is anxious about possible changes in Spain which affect his own regime in Portugal and no longer puts much confidence in the Iberian Bloc. He therefore seems to be turning to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as his best security and to be considering whether he would not be well advised to honour the alliance whilst he can still render valuable services to the United Nations. But he would obviously prefer that the appeal should come from us rather than from him.

no sig

RECEIVED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By B. H. Parks Date: MAY 5 1972

0903
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 309, 12 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt and personal. No. 309.

The castigation we have both received from Uncle Joe under date of June 11th was naturally to be expected in view of the inevitable course of events governing our decisions. In my opinion the best answer will be to knock Italy out of the war and let him feel the relief which will come to him thereby. I quite understand their vexation, though they cannot understand the facts that dominate our action. Any answer I may make will be entirely good-tempered and I will show it to you first.

The last paragraph, about his not participating or "any attempt to consider together etc" is the limit in view of the efforts we have made to bring about a tripartite conference. All this makes me anxious to know anything you care to tell me about your letter sent to him by Mr. Davis and the answer which has been received from him.

I will of course come anywhere you wish to a rendezvous and I am practising every day with my pistol to make head against the mosquitoes. Nevertheless, I once again beg you to consider Scapa Flow, which is safe, secret and quite agreeable in July and August. If you could come there in a battleship I do not think it would be difficult for him to join us. Every kind of convenient arrangement could be made for you in Scotland, should you wish to go there. Of course, I should try to lure you farther south, but you would remain as usual master of the situation. The King, who has now safely arrived in "Torch" area, is very keen on your coming and will, of course, welcome you either secretly or publicly as you may decide. At any rate, it seems to me that this is the moment to make such a suggestion to U. J. If you have any better idea, pray share it with me. He ought I think at least to have an offer.

No Sig
No. 509 Prime to President, and personal.

In view of the inevitable course of events governing our decision, the castigation we have both received from Uncle Joe Stalin (dated June 11) was naturally to be expected. The best answer in my opinion will be to knock Italy out of the fight and let him fall the relief which will thereby come to him. Though they can't understand the facts that dominate our action, I quite understand their vexation. Any answer I make I will show to you first and it will be entirely good-tempered.

In the final paragraph about his not participating or "any attempt to consider together etc" if the limit considering the efforts we have made to bring about a tripartite conference. This all makes me anxious to know anything you would like to tell me about the letter carried to him by Mr. Davis and the answer he sent to you.

Of course, I will come wherever you wish to a rendezvous and I am practising every day with my pistol to make head against the mosquitoes. I once again nevertheless beg you to consider Scapa Flow, which is secret, safe, and quite agreeable in August and July. I do not think it would be difficult for him to join us if you would come there in a battleship. In Scotland, should you wish to go there, every kind of convenient arrangement could be made for you. I should try of course to lure you farther south, but as usual you would remain master of the situation. Now safely arrived in the Torch area is the King who is very keen on your coming and of course will welcome you either publicly or secretly as you decide. It seems to me at any rate that this is the time to suggest this to Uncle Joe. Please share with me any better idea which you may have. I think he should at least have an offer.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 310, 13 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President

This is what I propose to send to Joe. I should be very glad to know what you think of it before it goes. You will no doubt send your own message, which I should also like to see. Begins:

"I have received a copy of your telegram of about June 11 to the President. I quite understand your disappointment but I am sure we are doing not only the right thing but the only thing that is physically possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-channel attack such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under present conditions and with forces too weak to exploit any success that might be gained at very heavy cost. In my view and that of all my expert military advisers, we should, even if we got ashore, be driven into the sea, as the Germans have forces already in France superior to any we could put there this year, and can reinforce far more quickly across the main lateral railways of Europe than we could do over the beaches or through any of the destroyed channel ports we might seize. I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet armies. It might, however, cause the utmost ill feeling here if it were thought it had been incurred against the advice of our military experts and under pressure from you. You will remember that I have always made it clear in my telegrams to you that I would never authorize any cross-channel attack which I believed would lead only to useless massacre.

"The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not by losing them. If we can knock Italy out of the war this year, as is my earnest and sober hope, we shall draw far more Germans off your front than by any other means open. The great attack which is now not far off will absorb the capacities of every port under our control in the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to Port Said inclusive. If Italy should be forced out of the war, the Germans will have to occupy the Riviera front, make a
new front either on the Alps or the Po, and above all provide for the replacement of the numerous Italian divisions now in the Balkans. The moment for inviting Turkish participation in the war, active or passive, will then arrive. The bombing of the Rumanian oil fields can be carried through on a decisive scale. Already we are holding in the west or south of Europe the larger part of the German Air Force, and our superiority will increase continually.

"We are also ruining a large part of the cities and munition centres of Germany. If the favourable trend of the anti-U-boat warfare in the last few months continues, it will quicken and increase the movement of United States forces to Europe, which is being pressed to the full limit of the available shipping. No one has paid more tributes than I have to the immense contribution of the Soviet Government to the common victory, and I thank you also for the recognition which you have lately given to the exertions of your two Western Allies. It is my firm belief that we shall confront you before the end of the year with results which will give you substantial relief and satisfaction.

"I have never asked you for detailed information about the strength and dispositions of the Russian armies because you have been and are still bearing the brunt on land. I should, however, be glad to have your appreciation of the situation and immediate prospects on the Russian front and whether you think a German attack is imminent. We are already again at the middle of June and no attack has been launched. Surely this is a favourable factor. Our information about German intentions is conflicting. On the balance I think Hitler will attack you again, probably in the Kursk Salient, and that he will cut his losses in Italy. On the other hand, our Intelligence reports show that the Japanese are urging him not to make a third attack on Russia but to turn his forces against the United States and Great Britain.

"At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khartoum, whither we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to relinquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious campaign. Nevertheless, the need and advantages of a meeting are very great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No. 310, 13 June 1943

agree upon. I personally believe that Scapa Flow, our main naval
harbour in the North of Scotland, would be the most convenient, the
safest and, if desired, the most secret. I have again suggested
this to the President. If you could come there by air at any time
in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement would be made
to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome from
your British and American comrades.”

No Sig
White 10, June 13, 1943.

Folows paraphrase of Number 311 from Naval Person to Hudson (The President) and personal.

It occurred to me you would want to know what I have been thinking about the Japan or South East Asia front.

(A) I plan to offer the Viceroyalty to Wavell to succeed Linlithgow. Of course he will operate in a purely civilian capacity.

(B) The position of statutory C in C in India. I propose to offer to Auchinleck. In his functions he will be limited to the administration, discipline, and training of British troops in India and the Indian army and the defense of India proper. The growth of the Indian Army has been from 180,000 at the outbreak of war to nearly ten times that number. On account of the shortage of officers speaking the native language and for many other reasons inseparable from so vast and swift an expansion, it requires constant care and attention. Auchinleck's knowledge of and reputation with Indian troops is without a doubt unrivaled.

In order to secure the prosecution of the war against Japan with the utmost rigor, I propose to create a new command for the South East Asia (or Japan) front. Whether it shall be a tripple command of the 3 services (such as has worked well with us in the Middle East) or whether for the the 3 services we shall set up a supreme commander (like Eisenhower and MacArthur) it is not yet decided. My mind is turning to the latter, and I should hope it would be possible to the new organization inter allied with a U.S. deputy commander-in-chief and joint staffs on the model of North Africa. We are at present both using a whole set of duplicated services, BNE, OSS, ONI, and FOC, and the same overcrowded lines of communication. In about a fortnight I hope to have definite proposals to make. Meanwhile if you would keep this matter to yourself I should be grateful. But if you have ideas please give them to me.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 311 Filed 13/7/42

Former Naval Person to President. Most secret and personal. No 311.

I thought you would like to know the way in which my mind has moved about the South East Asia (or Japan) front.

(A) I propose to offer Wavell the viceroyalty in succession to Linlithgow, he will act of course in a purely civilan capacity.

(C) I propose to offer Auchinleck the position of Statutory Commander in Chief in India. His functions will be limited to the discipline, administration and training of the Indian Army and British troops in India and defence of India proper. The Indian Army has grown from 100,000 at the outbreak of war to nearly ten times that number, and it requires constant care and attention on account of the shortage of officers speaking the native languages and for many other reasons inseparable from so vast and swift an expansion. There is no doubt that Auchinleck's knowledge of and reputation with the Indian troops is unrivalled.

(C) I propose to create a new command for the South East Asia (or Japan) front in order to secure the prosecution of the war against Japan.
with the utmost vigour. It is not yet decided whether this shall be a triple command of the three services such as has worked well with us in the Middle East, or whether we shall set up a supreme commander for the three services, like Eisenhower and Radegast. My mind is turning to the latter, and I should hope it would be possible to the new organization inter alia with a United States Deputy Commander in Chief and Joint Staffs on the North African model. At present we are both using the same overcrowded line of communications, and a whole set of duplicated services, OSS, MI, etc, and SE is springing into existence. I hope to have definite proposals to make in about a fortnight. Meanwhile, I should be grateful if you would keep this matter to yourself. But please give me your ideas.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 312, 13 June, 1943
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Number 312.

I send you herewith a paraphrase of a telegram just received from Lisbon which bears on my 308. Begins:

His Majesty Ambassador in Lisbon had thought that we should probably decide to answer Dr. Salazar's approach by suggesting renewal of conversations in London and that at an early stage we would enlarge their scope to embrace complete review of Portugal's position in regard to the war. Not being absolutely sure that Dr. Salazar has so rapidly and so completely changed his mind as actually to be anxious to come into the war at comparatively early date, Sir R. Campbell thought this method would have the advantage of being less abrupt.

Sir R. Campbell thinks there is perhaps, however, not much in it worth while and sees no objection to making the approach forthwith and in the more direct manner proposed if we prefer that method as being more expeditious.

As regards manner of approach, he has only the following comments to offer. It may be that for reasons of national pride Dr. Salazar would prefer that Portugal should give the appearance of collaborating as a full ally rather than hand over the Islands to us on the basis of a commercial arrangement on the West Indies analogy. Presumably local civil administration would remain but Sir R. Campbell asks if it was our idea that Portuguese troops should be withdrawn. If so, he thinks this would be regarded as humiliating and possibly therefore affect Dr. Salazar's decision. No doubt he would be willing even anxious to reduce their number considerably but the Army would certainly be mortified if it were to have no opportunity of seeing some active service. On the other hand, Dr. Salazar might think complete withdrawal of Portuguese forces might reduce the probability or severity of Axis counteraction. Sir R. Campbell inclines, however, to the view that the other consideration would predominate and that Dr. Salazar would be likely to insist on Portuguese collaboration.
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
No. 312, 13 June 1943

He asks if we would see any objection to expressing the hope that this will be forthcoming in conditions to be agreed and then going on to say (more in the nature of an afterthought) that of course if Dr. Salazar preferred to lease the Islands on the West Indies analogy, his Majesty's Government would agree.

Sir R. Campbell asks whether the answer is in the affirmative, if Dr. Salazar says interrogatively that he assumes assurances in regard to Portuguese Colonial Empire include Timor and Macao.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 313, 15 June 1943

I have now had a reply from Smuts agreeing with
our method of approach to the Portuguese about "Lifebelt". Smuts considers that the association of the United States with the approach will carry great weight with the Portuguese Government. If the Portuguese accept our proposals he agrees that the Union Government should be associated with the assurances about the Portuguese East and West African Colonies. Smuts feels that the fear of what may happen to his African Colonies and to the Azores may be a powerful factor influencing Salazar in favour of accepting our proposals.

If the Portuguese Government reject our proposals the Union Government wish however to remain free to shape their policy as union interests may dictate.

Prime
From: MA London England
To: President of the United States

Number 314 16 June 1943

From former Naval person to President personal. Thank you for your telegram number 282. You will have seen from my telegram number 313 that Smuts is also in agreement with our proposed approach. We have accordingly sent instructions to HM Ambassador, Lisbon, to make an immediate approach to Dr Salazar.

No Sig
From: London
To: President of the United States

No 315 June 16, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal

Thank you so much for your kindness in meeting my wishes by giving additional help to the Australian Air Force. I know this decision of yours will give most lively pleasure in Australia, and I am sure the aircraft will be put to good advantage.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By N. H. Parkes Date MAY 5 1972
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 316  
Filed 1459 Z  

Former Naval Person to President personal. No. 316.  
Your No. 288.  

1. It is imperative that the French Army in North West Africa should be in loyal and trustworthy hands, especially on the eve of the great operations which impend. I agree with you that no confidence can be placed in De Gaulle's friendship for the Allies, and I could not myself be responsible to the British nation whose Armies have been placed under Eisenhower's command in North Africa if our bases and lines of communication were disturbed or endangered through the existence of a French Army under potentially hostile control and not properly subordinated to the Supreme Commander. I am glad therefore to learn the clear instructions you have given General Eisenhower not to "Permit De Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans of any committee the African French Army, either in the field of supplies, training or operations".

2. I am not in favor at this moment of breaking up the committee of 7 or forbidding it to meet. I should prefer that General Eisenhower should take your instructions as his directive, and that Murphy and MacMillan should work towards its fulfilment by whatever means they find most appropriate. HM Government will associate themselves with this policy.
3. The committee will then be confronted with a choice of either accepting our decision by a majority or definite opposition to the two rescuing powers. If as I deem probable they accept the decision by a majority, it will be for De Gaulle to decide whether he and other dissentients will submit or resign. If De Gaulle resigns he will put himself in the wrong with public opinion and the necessary measures must be taken to prevent him from creating a disturbance. If he submits we shall probably have further trouble in the future, but this will be better than our sweeping away a committee on which many hopes are founded among the United Nations as well as in France. We should prescribe the conditions essential for the safety of our forces and place the onus on De Gaulle. At any rate it would be wise to try this first.

4. I have already notified Massigli through Macmillan that no further payments will be made from British funds to the French National Committee in London and that any further payments will only be made to the new committee of 7 acting by a majority. I have received from Macmillan the following paraphrased message: begins I take the right interpretation of your wishes to be full support of General Eisenhower in order to ensure that Giraud remains in effective command of French Forces. This must include measures to ensure that reorganization of personnel and appointments only take place with his concurrence. If this can be achieved while French unity is preserved, and De Gaulle remains on the committee, well and good. Failing this our first requirement must be military security. Ends.

5. In view of the situation that has now developed "The measures to secure that any reorganization of personnel and appointments should have his (Giraud's) concurrence" would not be satisfied by any division of military control between Giraud as Commander in Chief and De Gaulle as Minister of Defence. This last office should be put in the hands of General Georges or some other officer equally acceptable to the rescuing powers.
June 18, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number: 317 filed 15102

Former Naval Person to President.

As I understand you are not inclined to send a reasoned reply to Stalin, I shall send off my telegram tomorrow unless I hear from you to the contrary. The Chiefs of the Staff have made a few additions to it which in no way alter the sense but make our case a little stronger. I do not need to trouble you with these unless you desire it. The telegram will of course be from me alone.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 318  Filed 18/19504
Former Naval Person to President. Personal and secret. No 318.

Further to your number 288. Some of my colleagues have questioned your sentence "I agree with you that the time has arrived when we must break with him". As you will remember, I sent a telegram from the White House when we were together, but, as I told you at the time, the Cabinet did not accept this view because, inter alia, this was a new fact to me and we were all inclined to give the meeting a fair chance. Since then we have been watching their manoeuvres with growing dissatisfaction. It would not, however, be right to say that we have decided "That the time has arrived when we must break with him". This may come but it would come as the result of his refusing to accept the necessary military conditions to ensure that the French Army remains in trustworthy hands on which full agreement exists between our two Governments.

Will you very kindly read this message in conjunction with my number 316?

no sig
June 19, 1943

From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 319, June 19, 1943 Filed 15492/19 June

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. Pursuant to what we have agreed, Ambassador
Campbell yesterday spoke to Salazar about "Lifebelt". He reports that although Salazar showed no great surprise he was evidently not expecting an appeal to the alliance. He took it calmly but declined to be drawn. He said that the communication would require very careful consideration. When Campbell asked if Salazar would authorize him to say that it would receive sympathetic consideration, Salazar replied "Yes of course". The Ambassador says further "On a first approach I think that the omens are not too bad".

2. At the same time the Foreign Secretary saw
Monteiro, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, and opened the same matter to him. Monteiro is very friendly to the alliance and of considerable influence in Portugal. He said frankly he had been expecting something of the kind and seemed ready to help in every way. He may go back

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 5, 1972

0921
From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 319, June 19, 1943

Portugal by air. He attaches the greatest importance first to the alliance and secondly to the guarantee of the future of the Portuguese Colonial Empire and was further fortified by the fact that Smuts was a party to the demarche and undertakings.

3. On the whole things have moved more favourably than I expected when I was with you in Washington. Meanwhile all the necessary preparations are going ahead and, if permission is granted, will operate before the end of the month.

No Sig
June 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Attached is a message from the President to General Marshall, dated June 21, 1943, re the Prime Minister's message No. 320 of the 19th of June.

Admiral Leahy informs me that this morning he showed a copy of the above mentioned Prime Minister dispatch to General Marshall and that the matter is now being handled. Accordingly, no copy is attached at this time.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Inc.
June 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

"Please recommend reply to Prime's Number 320 of Nineteenth of June, after discussing with Joint Staff, and start it with sentence, 'Your India appointments have met with general approval in this country'."

Roosevelt

Transmitted from Hyde Park to the White House as Map Black No. 8, June 21, 1943.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 320, 19 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President.

and personal. Number 320.

Reference paragraph 3 of my telegram no. 311 of June 13, I have together with my advisers given a great deal of consideration to the creation of the new command for East Asia. The choice lay between a tripartite command such as we have used in the Middle East, and a unified command on the American model such as exists in North West Africa and South West Pacific. We have reached the conclusion that the latter form is the better for East Asia.

I, therefore, propose, subject to your wishes, that we should appoint an Allied Supreme Commander in Chief, who will be responsible for the conduct of operations against Japan in East Asia, and for the development of the air route to China. The man whom I have in mind for this appointment is Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, who has considerable experience of the cooperation of all three services and of combined operations. I propose that there should be a Deputy Supreme Commander, who would be a United States officer of your choosing like Stilwell, and a combined Anglo American staff on the model that has worked so smoothly and successfully in North West Africa.

Under the Supreme Commander there would be a Naval Commander in Chief, an Army Commander in Chief, two Air Commanders in Chief, and a principal administrative officer to coordinate all the administrative arrangements.

Naval Commander in Chief. I think that Admiral Sir James Somerville should remain Commander in Chief of the Eastern Fleet, which of course has some responsibilities wider than those comprised with the East Asia Command, and that his relationship to the
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
18 June, 1943  
No. 280

Supreme Commander should be the same as that which Admiral Cunningham bears to General Eisenhower.

Army Commander in Chief. I have not yet made a final selection for the Army command; but since no American land forces will be engaged in this part of the world, I am sure that you will agree that it should be a British appointment.

Air Commanders in Chief. I propose that there should be two Air Commanders in Chief: one responsible for the air war against Japan, and the other for the operation of the air route to China and for the defence of its Indian terminal. Each would have direct responsibility to the Supreme Commander within their respective spheres. To command the fighting air forces which will be predominantly British, I should select Air Marshal Sir Keith Park, who has done so splendidly in Malta and was responsible for the defence of London and Southern England in the Battle of Britain. I hope you would agree to give him an American deputy. The air route and the defence of its Indian terminal would naturally fall to an American Air Commander owing to the predominance of the American resources engaged. His deputy would be American or British as you prefer. I would not propose to disturb the present arrangement under which General Chennault, of whom we have the highest opinion and with whom we know that we can work in concert, is responsible through American channels to the Generalsissimo. His air forces, American and Chinese, would for the most part be operating to the eastward, but when weather is bad in Eastern China and good in Burma it should not be difficult for General Chennault to combine his operations with those of both the air commanders in the East Asia theatre.

The Commander in Chief in India and the Supreme Commander, East Asia, will be independent of each other and co-equal. But it is proposed to lay it down definitely that for operational purposes outside India, the Commander in Chief, India, will meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander.
From: London
For: The President of the United States
19 June, 1943 No. 320

I suggest that the relationship of the Supreme Commander, East Asia, to the higher command should follow as closely as possible, mutatis mutandis, the MacArthur model. Under this arrangement, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over such relating factors as are necessary for proper implementation of that policy including the allocation of forces and war materials: while the British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy and all instructions to the Supreme Commander would be issued through them.

I do not think that you would wish to be troubled at this stage with details of the exact frontiers of the new command, or of the location of command headquarters, or of the means by which the administrative arrangements between the new command and India will be coordinated, or of the manner in which OSS, OWI, FCC, and BEW will be integrated with our own comparable organizations. If you and I are agreed on general principles, all these matters can be thrashed out by our staffs.

I should be grateful if you would let me have your ideas as soon as you can, since I have undertaken to make an early announcement on the subject.
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  

No. 321, 19 June 1943  

Former Naval Person to President. Number 321.  

I have sent the Pope a message as suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram number 285 of June 14.  

In your telegram number 287 of June 16, you mention the churches outside the Vatican. I think we ought to instruct our pilots to observe all possible care in order to avoid hitting any of the Papal buildings in the city of Rome listed in Article 13 of Lateran Treaty, especially St. John Lateran.  

No Sig  

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72  
By R. H. Parks  
Date MAY 5 1972  

Annexed by No. 291.  

0928
June 21, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Attached is a message from the President to General Marshall, dated June 21, 1945, re the Prime Minister's No. 321 of the 19th of June, a copy of which is attached.

For your information, the President has already been informed of the substance of secret War Department outgoing message, CM-GUT-8201-8202, 19 June 1945.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

June 21, 1943.

"Please read Prime Minister's Number 321 of the Nineteenth of June. I have replied accepting the suggestion. Please issue instructions along this line in regard to indoctrinating our pilots."

Roosevelt

Transmitted from Hyde Park to the White House as Map Black No. 8, June 21, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a message No. 322, dated June 20, 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President, quoting the Prime Minister's message to Marshal Stalin in its final form as it was actually sent.

The original draft of this message was sent to the President in the Prime Minister's message No. 310, June 13, 1943, which the President has read. The attached message is practically the same as the original draft; the added remarks are enclosed in penciled brackets.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By K. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 322, June 20, 1943.

15452/20 June, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
personal and secret No. 322. I send you the
telegram to Stalin in the final form in which it went.
Telegram begins: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin
personal and most secret.

1. I have received a copy of your telegram of
about 11th June to the President. I quite understand
your disappointment but I am sure we are doing not only
the right thing but the only thing that is physically
possible in the circumstances. It would be no help to
Russia if we threw away 100,000 men in a disastrous
cross channel attack such as would, in my opinion, cer-
tainly occur if we tried under present conditions and
with forces too weak to exploit any success that might
be gained at very heavy cost. In my view and that of all
my expert military advisers, we should, even if we got
ashore, be driven into the sea, as the Germans have forces

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date

0932
From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 322, June 20, 1943.

already in France superior to any we could put there this year, and can reinforce far more quickly across the main lateral railways of Europe than we could do over the beaches or through any of the destroyed channel ports we might seize. I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet Armies. It might, however, cause the utmost ill feeling here if it were thought it had been incurred against the advice of our military experts and under pressure from you. You will remember that I have always made it clear in my telegrams to you that I would never authorize any cross channel attack which I believed would lead only to useless massacre.

2. The best way for us to help you is by winning battles and not by losing them. This we have done in Tunisia, where the long arm of British and United States sea power has reached across the Atlantic and 10,000 miles around the Cape and helped us to annihilate great Axis land and air forces. The threat immediately resulting to the whole Axis defensive system in the Mediterranean has already forced the Germans to reinforce Italy, the Mediterranean Islands, the Balkans and Southern France.
From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 222, June 26, 1943.

It is my earnest and sober hope that we can knock Italy out of the war this year, and by doing so we shall draw far more Germans off your front than by any other means open. The great attack that is now not far off will absorb the capacities of every port under our control in the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Port Said inclusive. After Italy has been forced out of the war, the Germans will have to occupy the Riviera, make a new front either on the Alps or the Po, and above all, provide for the replacement of the 32 Italian divisions now in the Balkans. The moment for inviting Turkish participation in the war, active or passive, will then arrive. The bombing of the Rumanian oil fields can be carried through on a decisive scale. Already we are holding in the west and south of Europe the larger part of the German air forces and our superiority will increase continually. Out of a first line operational strength of between 4800 and 4900 aircraft Germany according to our information has today on the Russian front some 8,000 compared with some 2,500 this time last year.

We are also ruining a large part of the cities and munitions
From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 322, June 20, 1943.

Centres of Germany, which may well have a decisive effect by sapping German resistance on all fronts. By this coming autumn this great air offensive should have produced a massive return. If the favourable trend of the anti U-boat warfare of the last few months continues, it will quicken and increase the movement of the United States forces to Europe which is being pressed to the full limit of the available shipping. No one has paid more tributes than I have to the immense contribution of the Soviet Government to the common victory, and I thank you also for the recognition which you have lately given to the exertions of your two western allies. It is my firm belief that we shall present you before the end of the year with results which will give you substantial relief and satisfaction.

3. I have never asked you for detailed information about the strength and dispositions of the Russian armies because you have been, and are still, bearing the brunt on land. I should however be glad to have your appreciation of the situation and immediate prospects on the Russian front and whether you think a German attack...
From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 322, June 20, 1943.

is imminent. We are already again in the middle of June and no attack has been launched. We have some reason to believe that the unexpectedly rapid defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa has dislocated German strategy, and that the consequent threat to southern Europe has been an important factor in causing Hitler to hesitate and to delay his plans for a large scale offensive against Russia this summer. It is no doubt too soon to pronounce decidedly on all this, but we should be very glad to hear what you think about it.

4. At the end of your message you complain that Russia has not been consulted in our recent decisions. I fully understand the reasons which prevented you from meeting the President and me at Khartoum, whether we would have gone in January, and I am sure you were right not to relinquish even for a week the direction of your immense and victorious campaign. Nevertheless the need and advantages of a meeting are very great. I can only say that I will go at any risk to any place that you and the President may agree upon. I and my advisers believe that
From: London
To: The President of United States
No. 322, 20 June, 1943.

Scapa Flow, our main naval harbour in the north of Scotland would be the most convenient, the safest and if secrecy be desired probably the most secret. I have again suggested this to the President. If you could come there by air at any time in the summer you may be sure that every arrangement would be made to suit your wishes, and you would have a most hearty welcome from your British and American comrades.

No Sig

MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 323, 22 June 1943

From Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Confidential. Number 323.

We were delighted to hear from Halifax the other day that Mr. Hull had some hope that he might be able to accept Anthony's invitation to pay us a visit here. After all the visits we have inflicted upon you, I really think it is time we played the hosts and, short of yourself, there is certainly no one whose visit would be more welcome to the public or more valuable to us than Mr. Hull.

Perhaps you cannot spare him or feel that he should not be pressed, but if the idea appeals to you too, I hope very much you will be able to give him any encouragement you may think he needs. I can well imagine how hard it must be for him to see far ahead, but he would be very welcome in the late summer or autumn, and he could no doubt come by sea if he so preferred.

No Sig
THE SECRETARY

July 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached, I felt obliged to send a message to Mr. Eden as per copy enclosed.
July 7, 1943

The Right Honorable
Anthony Eden,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.

Again may I say how deeply grateful I am for your invitation, seconded by the Prime Minister, to visit London during the late summer. I have delayed final reply in violation of propriety in an anxious effort to see my way clear to accept. It is with the profoundest regret that I now find I am virtually unable to avail myself of your cordial invitation.

My warmest regards to the Prime Minister and yourself.

CORDELL HULL
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 324, 22 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and confidential. Number 324.

Many thanks for your 256 of June 14. What you say about Macmillan's position exactly meets me.

As regards the degree of British and American control and administration which should be imposed upon any newly conquered regions, I am glad that you agree that it is for the Supreme Commander to inform our two governments what British and American officials he wants. In the case of "Horrified", I feel that it would be helpful for Eisenhower to know from us at the outset the principles on which he should work in framing his requests for the supply of British and American Civil Administrators. I suggest the following formula, which seems to me to meet the case:

The replacement of any prefects and mayors of important communities who may be removed will rest with the Military Commander. He will decide whether the functioning of the Military Government is better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials. No actual appointment of Italians to important posts, as distinct from their temporary use, will be made until it has been approved by the two governments.

It shall be made clear to any Italians who may eventually be appointed to important posts and to all other governmental officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of satisfactory cooperation, performance and behaviour.

No Sig
June 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

Captain Royal:

Admiral Leahy desires that
the attached Memorandum be distributed
to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

Respectfully,

W. L. Preseman,
Commander, U.S.Navy
June 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Following is a paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to the President dated 22 June 1943:

Regarding the degree of control and administration which should be imposed by British and Americans upon newly occupied regions, I am pleased to be in agreement that the Supreme Commander should inform the two governments as to the British and American officials that he needs for the purpose.

Regarding "HORRIFIED" it would be helpful if we should give prior information to Eisenhower as to the principles upon which he should base his requests for civil administrators, British and American.

The following instructions are suggested as satisfactory:

The replacement of any prefects and mayors of important communities who may be removed will rest with the Military Commander. He will decide whether the functioning of the Military Government is better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials. No actual appointment of Italians to important posts, as distinct from their temporary use, will be made until it has been approved by the two governments.

It shall be made clear to any Italians who may eventually be appointed to important posts and to all other governmental officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of satisfactory cooperation, performance and behaviour.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ART CHUXT

ANALYST: ASIALIC AFFAIRS 4/11/72

By, PHCB Date MAY 1, 1972
From: American Embassy London
To: President Roosevelt
No. 325, 23 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
personal and Number 325, Your 290.

I told Parliament on June 8 that the formation of the new Algiers committee of 7 (To wit: Giraud, DeGaulle, Georges, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet and Philippe) marked the end of my relations with DeGaulle as defined by the letters exchanged in 1942 and that our dealings would henceforward be with the committee of 7. Like you, I was surprised when these 7 suddenly sprouted out into 14. However, I thought at first that it was a War Cabinet with other members attending its meetings. Presently it appeared that all the members had equal status, and therefore like you I feared that DeGaulle would have a clear working majority. This not certain but if true would I am sure lead to nothing but trouble.

Accordingly I have now made it clear to MacMillan that His Majesty's Government can at present deal only with the committee of 7 in its collective capacity expressed by a majority. Our July payments will soon be due and these will have to be signed for by a majority of the 7; otherwise no payments will be made. I am not, however, sure how much money the large committee as a whole can draw from the revenues of French Northwest Africa which are of course much increased by the heavy United States and British expenditure there, or how much they can draw from other
parts of the French Empire. The committee of 7 are floating a loan, to which there may be considerable response. DeGaulle has also a private fund of perhaps 150,000 pounds drawn from his partisans and admirers. We should in any case, have to pay French soldiers and sailors who are serving locally with us in different parts of the world through the local paymasters A Modus Vivendi. It is therefore likely that the committee may be able to get on without the payments hitherto made to DeGaulle from the British Exchequer.

We have also made trade arrangements with the various French Colonies, who joined DeGaulle, which are serviceable to us and vital to them, and in addition we have guaranteed the pay and pensions of all French officials who renounced Vichy and gave us their allegiance in these places. Should DeGaulle break with the committee of 7 and go off into the wilderness, I should consider that the discharge of these obligations would depend on our relations not with him any more, but only with the majority of the committee of 7. This would be a very much more powerful lever of control.

You will no doubt regulate your issue of arms and ammunition to the French North African Army in accordance with the confidence which you have in the authorities controlling it, and we should both supply goods and shipping to the other French Colonies only on the same basis.

On quite a different plane is the question of the recognition of this committee of 7, which they will certainly demand, as representative of France in some degree or other. Here I feel with you that it would be most unwise to commit ourselves until we know much more clearly than we do now how they are going to behave. In this connection I send in my immediately following telegram you a paraphrase of the message which is being sent to Stalin. The United Nations must certainly try to act together on this larger question also.

Prime
From: American Embassy London
To: President Roosevelt
No. 326, 23 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
No. 326 and Personal. Following is paraphrase of my message to Premier Stalin mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:

I have heard with concern, through Monsieur Molotov, that recognition of the French National Committee of Liberation, recently set up at Algiers, is in your mind. It is unlikely that the British, and still more, the United States Governments will recognize this committee for some time, and then, only after they have had reasonable proof that its character and action will be satisfactory to the interests of the Allied cause.

Since he arrived at Algiers, General De Gaulle has been struggling to obtain effective control of the French Army. One cannot be sure of what he will do or of his friendly feelings towards us if he obtained mastery. President Roosevelt and I are in entire agreement in feeling that De Gaulle might endanger the base and communications of the Armies about to operate in "HUSKY". We cannot run any risk of this, as it would affect the lives of our soldiers and hamper the prosecution of the war.
Originally there were 7 members of the committee but the number has now been expanded to 14, and we cannot be sure of its action. General Eisenhower has therefore in the name of both United States' and British Governments notified the committee that General Giraud must remain the Commander In Chief of the French Army and have effective power over its character and organization. Undoubtedly this will cause discussion in the House of Commons, as well as in the United States, and the President and I will have to give reasons, of which there are plenty, for the course we have taken. If the Soviet Government had already recognized the committee, the mere giving of these reasons and explanations would reveal a difference of view between the Soviet and the Western Allies, which would be most regrettable.

We are very anxious to find a French authority to which all Frenchmen will rally, and we still hope that from the discussions now proceeding at Algiers one may emerge. At present it seems to us far too soon to decide upon this.

Prime
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 327, 23/6/43

I have just received the text of the so called decree of the French Committee in Algiers. I am very doubtful whether it will work or last. Since, however, our military security in North West Africa is safeguarded by the French Army there remaining in trustworthy hands, I do not see that any action is called for from the British or the United States governments. We are not called upon to endorse the arrangements which the French Committee have made among themselves. We must see how they conduct themselves before any question of recognition can arise. As none of their troops will be engaged in the forthcoming operations, the claim made in Article 7 of the decree has no present urgency.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-89-72
By R. H. Parkes Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No. 328, 25 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 328,

Averell told me last night of your wish for a meeting with U. J. in Alaska a deux.

The whole world is expecting and all our side are desiring a meeting of the three great powers at which, not only the political chiefs, but the military staffs would be present in order to plan the future war moves and, of course, search for the foundations of post war settlement. It would seem a pity to draw U. J. 7000 miles from Moscow for anything less than this.

Should HUSKY prosper and the German offensive not occur the end of July or beginning of August will be the moment to make sure that U. J. attacks himself with full strength in October. We shall probably be able to show that our Mediterranean strategy of which he approved, has, in fact, gained Russia the respite of this summer and has, in fact, achieved all he hoped for from a cross-channel second front. This is, therefore one of the cardinal moments.

I consider that a tripartite meeting at Scapa Flow or anywhere else on the globe that can be agreed not only of us three but also of the staffs, who will come together for the first time, would be one of the milestones of history. If this is lost, much is lost.

You must excuse me expressing myself with all the frankness that our friendship and the gravity of the issue warrant. I do not underrate the use that enemy propaganda would make of a meeting between the heads of Soviet Russia and the United States at this juncture with the British Commonwealth and Empire excluded. It would be serious and vexatious, and many would be bewildered and alarmed thereby. My journey to Moscow with Averell in August 1942 was on altogether a lower level, and at a stage in the war when we had only to explain why no second front. Nevertheless, whatever you decide, I shall sustain to the best of my ability here.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 329  Filed 1214 Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal

and

I am somewhat concerned at Giraud leaving Algiers at this juncture on a visit to you. If both were invited it would be all right, but I think it dangerous to leave the field open to DeGaulle, especially while the position of Boisson is so uncertain. While the mouse is away the cat will play two groups undecipherable.

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972

Answered by 295
URGENT

From: London, England
To: The President of The United States

No. 330 June 26, 1943

Former Naval person to President personal end

No. 330.

On reflection, I thought SOAPSUDS was inappropriate for an operation in which so many brave Americans would risk or lose their lives. I do not think it is good for morale to affix disparaging labels to daring feats of arms. I am very glad that the United States Chiefs of the Staff have agreed with ours to substitute TIDAL WAVE for SOAPSUDS. I wish all our problems were as simply settled.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0951
From: Amon Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
No. 331 Filed 27/1310Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

Your telegram No. 292 of June 22nd.

I agree that questions of Timor and Macao can
well be left until after the war. Meanwhile we have
told the Portuguese that if they help us now we are
ready to give them assurances regarding maintenance
of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies.
In reply to their enquiry we told them that this
assurance covered Timor and Macao. The Portuguese
would therefore probably resent any early suggestions
concerning the disposal of Timor and we shall have to
tread warily. They are particularly touchy about
Timor in view of Allied military occupation without
prior agreement in December 1941 which imposed a
severe strain upon our relations with Portugal.

No Sig
28 June 1943

From: American Embassy London  
To: The President of the United States  

No. 332  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt  

personal and confidential.  

Your No. 293 of 25th June. I think that you would wish to have the following comments on your telegram when considering the proposals which your staff are preparing for you.

I did not for a moment intend to disturb the arrangement whereby the Generalissimo commands the China Theatre. The eastern boundary which I have in mind for the new command is as follows: - "The frontier between China and Burma and between China and Indo China to the Gulf of Tonkin, thence southwards along the coasts of Indo China, Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the north coast of Sumatra; thence round the east coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees east; thence south to latitude 06 degrees south; thence south easterly towards Canslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees east, due south along that meridian".

Perhaps it would be advisable to give the new command the title of "South East Asia" instead of "East Asia"?

It seems to us essential that all troops, whatever their nationality, operating within the boundaries of the new command, should be under the Supreme Commander. If this is agreed, the Chinese forces operating along the Ledo Road would come under the Supreme Commander from the date he takes up his appointment, while the Chinese divisions operating from Yunnan would come under his command when they crossed the
Chinese-Burma frontier. It is suggested that the objections which Chiang Kai Shek may raise to this arrangement might be overcome by giving General Stilwell dual responsibility to the Generalissimo on the one hand and to the Supreme Commander on the other. This would enable him to co-ordinate the action of the Chinese Yunnan forces with that of the remainder of the forces under the Supreme Commander.

It also seems to us essential that the Supreme Commander should have control of all the Air Forces located in his area and of all the air operations into and from that area. This was the control given to General Eisenhower, even though a large part of the Air Force concerned was outside his theatre.

I am sending you a separate telegram later about the selection for a Supreme Commander.

Prime
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 333, 28 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 333.

Your 296, Have already seen Devers and think him first rate. I shall keep in touch with him.

No Sig

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copy to General Marshall.
June 29, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL.

Attached is a copy of message No. 355, dated 28 June 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President, which is furnished for your information.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 incl.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 334, 28 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and No. 334.

I send you first of all the very unpleasant reply I have received from U. J. and my rejoinder. This certainly has its bearing on your proposal to meet him alone and I shall not seek to deter you if you can get him to come.

It is curious that he should have recalled Litvinov Bogomolov and now Maisky to Moscow. There is also the cessation of the German offensive on the Russian Front which is not necessarily due only to our Mediterranean activities. Anthony and his Foreign Office are definitely of opinion that no decisive Volte-face is impending in U. Russia. Myself, I do not see how they could do it having regard to the deeds done between the German and Russian masses and to what would appear to be the Russian interest in the future world.

I also send you the answer I have received to the telegram I sent U. J. asking him to delay recognition of the Algiers Committee. It is not particularly gracious but he consents. Eden has suggested to Winant that we should depurate Bogomolov looking in at Algiers on his way back to Russia. We are agreed it would be better this visit should be deferred till after Husky on which all our hopes are centered and which is now near.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 335, 29 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
No. 335.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Reference Para 1. Following is text of Stalin's telegram to me.

"I received your message of the 19th June.

"I fully realise all the complexities involved in the organisation of the Anglo American invasion of Western Europe, particularly in bringing of troops across the channel. These complexities were obvious from your messages.

"Indeed in reading your messages received by me in the course of 1942 and 1943, I was sure that you and President had the full understanding of the difficulties involved in such operations. I was sure, also, that you and President in making preparations for invasion were taking into account all these difficulties and all the efforts necessary for overcoming the difficulties. Last year you informed me that the landing of the Anglo American troops in Europe on a grand scale will take place in 1943. In your memorandum delivered to V. M. Molotov on the 10th June, 1942 you stated: 'Finally, and most important of all we are concentrating our maximum effort on the organization and preparation of all large scale invasion of the continent of Europe by British and American forces in 1943. We are setting no limit to the scope and objectives of this campaign, which will be carried out in the first instance by over a million men, British and American, with Air Forces of appropriate strength.'

"At the beginning of this year you told me twice, on behalf of yourself and President, on your decisions concerning invasion of Europe by Anglo American troops with a view 'to divert strong German land and Air Forces from the Russian Front.' At the same time, you had in mind to 'bring Germany to her knees in 1943', and fix the moment of invasion as not later than September. In your message of the 26th January, 1943 you said: 'We have been in conference with our military advisers and have decided on the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first 9 months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We believe that these operations together with your powerful offensive may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943.'

RECLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-20-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0958
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
No. 335, 29 June 1943

"In your next message received by me on the 12th February, you fixed more exactly the time of invasion and in this connection stated: 'We are also pushing preparations to the limit of our resources for a cross-channel operation in August in which both British and United States units would participate. Here again shipping and assault landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September.'

"In February when you were writing about the plans and timetable of invasion of Europe, the difficulties of the operation in question were more considerable. Since that time, the Germans suffered a number of defeats: they were pushed back and had heavy losses on our front in the south; they were beaten and ejected from North Africa as the result of the Anglo American action; in the U-boat war they experienced far greater difficulties than ever before while the Anglo American preponderance has considerably increased. It is well known also that the Anglo American aviation dominates now the sky of Europe and that the Navies and Mercantile Marine of Great Britain and the United States are at present stronger than hitherto.

"Thus all the conditions necessary for the opening of the second front in Western Europe in the course of 1943 not only deteriorated but on the contrary considerably improved.

"Under such circumstances the Soviet Government could not think that the British and American Governments will change the decision on the invasion of Europe in 1943 taken at the beginning of this year. On the contrary, the Soviet Government had every reason to expect that the Anglo American decision will materialize, that the necessary preparations were being carried out and that the second front in Western Europe at last will be opened in 1943.

"Therefore, when you are writing now that 'It would be no help to Russia if we threw away hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-channel attack,' I have only to remind you on the following: 1st, on your memorandum of June 1942 in which you talked of the preparation of invasion involving not hundred thousand but one million men in the first instance; 2nd, on your February message in which you mention the great preparatory measures for invasion of Western Europe in August-September of this year. It seemed obvious that this operation had to be carried out not with hundred thousand men, but with an adequate number of troops.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 335, 29th June, 1943

"When now you say 'I cannot see how a great British defeat and slaughter would aid the Soviet Armies' - is it not clear that such statement is groundless as far as the Soviet Union is concerned? Is it not clear also that it is in contradiction to the above mentioned responsible decisions concerning the energetic preparations for the Anglo American invasion in 1943 on which the success of the whole operation should solely depend?

"I do not desire to dwell on the fact that your last responsible decision on the cancellation of your former decisions concerning invasion of Western Europe was taken by you and President without participation of the Soviet Government and without any attempt to invite its representatives for talks in Washington although you could not be unaware of the fact that the role which the Soviet Union is playing in the war against Germany and its interest in the question of the 2nd front are not inconsiderable.

"It goes without saying that the Soviet Government cannot put up with such disregard of the most vital Soviet interests in the war against the common enemy.

"You are writing that you fully understand my disappointment. I must say: here is not simply the question of disappointment on the part of the Soviet Government, here is the question of its confidence in the Allies which is severely tried by the above happenings. One should not forget that on all this depends the possibility to save millions of lives in the occupied regions of Western Europe and Russia and reduce the colossal sacrifices of the Soviet Armies in comparison with which the losses of the Anglo American troops could be considered as modest".

"Following is my reply. I am sorry to receive your message of the 24th. At every stage the information I have given you as to our future intentions has been based upon the recorded advice of the British and American Staffs, and I have at all times been sincere in my relations with you. Although until June 22nd, 1941, we British were left alone to face the worst that Nazi Germany could do to us, I instantly began to aid Soviet Russia to the best of our limited means from the moment that she was herself attacked by Hitler. I am satisfied that I have done everything in human power to help you. Therefore the reproaches which you now cast upon your Western Allies leave me unmoved. Nor, apart from the damage to our military interests, should I have any difficulty in presenting my case to the
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
No: 365, 29th June, 1943

"The views of our Staffs, which I have shared at every stage, have been continually modified by the course of events. In the first place, although all shipping has been fully occupied, it has not been possible to transport the American Army to Britain according to the programme proposed in June 1942. Whereas it was then hoped that 27 American Divisions would be in Great Britain by April 1943, in fact there is now, in June 1943, only 1, and there will be August only 5. This is due to the demands of the war against Japan, the shipping shortage and above all to the expansion of the campaign in North Africa, into which powerful Nazi forces were drawn. Moreover, the landing craft which in January of this year we proposed to make available for a cross channel enterprise, have either not fully materialized up to date or have all been drawn into the great operation now impending in the Mediterranean. The enemy's uncertainty as to where the blow will fall and what its weight will be has already, in the opinion of my expert advisers, lead to the delaying of Hitler's 3rd attack upon Russia, for which it seemed great preparations were in existence 6 weeks ago. It may even prove that you will not be heavily attacked this summer. If that were so, it would vindicate decisively what you once called the 'military correctness' of our Mediterranean strategy. However, in these matters we must await the unfolding of events."
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 335, 29 June 1943

"Thus not only on the one hand have the difficulties of the cross channel attack continually seemed greater to us and the resources available have not been forthcoming, but a more hopeful and fruitful strategic policy has opened to us in another theatre, and we have the right and duty to act in accordance with our convictions, informing you at every stage of the changes in our views imposed by the vast movement of the war."

Reference para 3. Following is text of Stalins telegram about recognition of Algiers committee.

"I received your message of the 23rd June in which you state that the governments of Great Britain and the USA intend to refrain for the time being from the recognition of the French committee of National Liberation created in Algiers. In explanation you say that the high command can not be sure either of actions of General De Gaulle or of his feelings toward the Allies. It seemed to us that the British Government so far was interested in General De Gaulle. Such interest appeared to be quite natural as after the capitulation of France General De Gaulle headed all the French Anti Hitler Forces and led the struggle of the French patriots united round the Fighting France.

The subsequent events in North Africa since November of 1942 as well as participation of the French Military Forces under Generals Giraud and De Gaulle in the Anglo American operations created conditions for their unity. Such unity was considered reasonable by all the Allies and there was no doubt about it. The recognition of the French committee-the expression of this unity-should be the consequence of aspirations and efforts involved in that. Therefore when Giraud and De Gaulle on behalf of the French committee of National Liberation asked the Allies for recognition the Soviet government thought the French opinion would be unable to understand any refusal to accord such recognition.

The Soviet Government has no information which would confirm the present attitude of the British Government to the French Committee of National Liberation and more particularly to General De Gaulle. Insofar..."
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 335 29 June 1943

the British Government requests to postpone the recognition of the French Committee and through its Ambassador gave assurance to do nothing in this matter without consultation of the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government is ready to meet the wish of the British Government.

"I hope that you will take into account interest of the Soviet Union in French affairs and will not refuse to supply the Soviet government with timely information necessary to take the appropriate decisions?"

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0963
29 June, 1943

From: London
To: President of the United States
Sr. 336, 29 June, 1943

To President from former Naval person personal and Number 336.

I have now received your 287 and I repeat what I said in my 334 that if you and Uncle J. can fix a meeting together I should no longer depredate it. On the contrary in view of his attitude I think it important that this contact should be established.

I should be very glad to arrange for a meeting between us and our staffs about the end of August in Quebec which I am sure 1 McKenzie King would welcome. Later on I will put the point to him.

Many thanks for your very full message.

No Sig.

RSPACED DECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-39-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: American Embassy London
To: The President of The United States

File: 29/1338Z

Triple X C 414 29th June in paragraph 1 change "Your 328" to read "Your 297".

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: Milattache, London
To: The President of The United States
No. 337  Filed: 1505/29

Former Naval Person to President private and.

I have been so much distressed and angered to see the way you are being harried. Knowing what war burdens are, I greatly admire the splendid calm and buoyancy with which you bear them amidst so much clatter.

Prime
29 June 1943

From: MilAttache, London
To: The President of the United States

No. 338   Filed 29/1508Z

Former Naval Person to President private.

Will you kindly fly a short-shorter dollar bill signed by yourself and Harry over here to me at earliest convenience for the King to join the Club upon? Repayment and subscription will be made in due course apart from Lend-Lease.

Prime
June 30, 1943

From: London
To: President Of The United States
Nr: 339, 30 June 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal and number 339.

The need for assistance to refugees, in particular Jewish refugees, has not grown less since we discussed the question, and all possible outlets need to be kept open. Of these the most practical still is North Africa, and I hope that the difficulties over the proposed refugee camp there have now been cleared up, and that an early practical decision is now possible. Our immediate facilities for helping the victims of Hitler's Anti Jewish drive are so limited at present that the opening of the small camp proposed for the purpose of removing some of them to safety seems all the more incumbent on us, and I should be grateful if you could let me know whether it has been found possible to bring the scheme into operation. General Giraud has given the project his general approval.

No Sig.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

July 1, 1943.

The President has directed the attached
paraphrased copy of a message from the Prime
Minister to the President, No. 339 of 30 June
1943, be furnished the Secretary of State, and
also requests a suggested reply.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incl.
June 30, 1943.

Paraphrase of message from Prime Minister to the President
Number 339.

Since we discussed the matter, the need for aid to refugees, particularly Jewish, has not abated; and every outlet should be kept open. North Africa remains the best outlet and the difficulties in connection with the proposed refugee camps there have been cleaned up, and there is now possible an early practical decision. At present our immediate facilities for aiding the victims of Hitler's anti-Jewish campaign are so limited that it seems all the more incumbent on us to open the small camp proposed for the purpose of removing some of them to safety, and I should be grateful if you could let me know if it has been found possible to bring this scheme into operation. General approval of this project has been given by General Giraud.