CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

have been removed from this file:

The following Office of Strategic Services document is closed:

G. Edward Buxton to Roosevelt, 7/17/43, attached to Roosevelt to Churchill, 7/22/43

Permission to examine classified documents must be obtained from the department or agency of origin. The reference archivist will advise you which department or agency has jurisdiction of classified documents in this file.
JULY 3, 1943

FROM: CPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT PERSONAL AND CORRECT NUMBER OF MY LAST MESSAGE WAS 300. THIS IS NUMBER 301.

I HAD NO THOUGHT OF FORCING GROUND OR AIR FORCES ON THE PORTUGUESE, BUT I THINK WE CAN TELL SALAZAR WHAT WE COULD SEND IF HE ASKS FOR THEM, POINTING OUT THAT THERE WILL BE OF NECESSITY A LITTLE DELAY IN GETTING THEM THERE. I HAVE A HUNCH THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN NON-AGGRESSION THEY WILL NOT ASK FOR ANY TROOPS OR PLANES, AND I AGREE WITH YOU THAT GERMANY WILL PROBABLY NOT DO ANY BOMBING. IF WE CAN PUT LIFEBOAT THROUGH THAT WILL BE A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AT THIS TIME.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1340 EWT, July 3, 1943

Boyce P. Price
1st Lieutenant, C.E.
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I had no thought of forcing ground or air forces on the Portuguese, but I think we can tell Salazar what we could send if he asks for them, pointing out that there will be of necessity a little delay in getting them there. I have a hunch that in order to maintain non-belligerency they will not ask for any troops or planes, and I agree with you that Germany will probably not do any bombing. If we can put Lifebelt through that will be a major accomplishment at this time.

ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1933.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

By direction of the President the Navy Code Room was informed that this message will ultimately be broadcast. The copy sent to the code room was classified "Confidential" so that it might be sent in a low code in order not to compromise the higher code.

C. H.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Oppen
To: Alusma, London

July 3, 1943.

Number 302 personal and [redacted] for the Former Naval Person from the President.

I am proposing to send and have broadcast on D-day the following message to the Italian people:

QUOTE. I am speaking to you, the Italian people. I am speaking to you as President of the United States of America, against whom, on December 11, 1941, your Government declared war.

At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain under the command of General Eisenhower are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime.

Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties.

Mussolini plunred you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world.

This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture--traditions to which we, the people of America, owe so much.

Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed.
and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cap Bon.

Today, Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. Germany is concentrating her depleted forces for her own defense. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United Nations. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of sea power the world has ever known.

The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany—power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race.

The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations.

If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of war home to the Italian people. But we are determined to destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have brought Italy to her present position.

Every moment that you resist the combined forces of the United Nations—every drop of blood that you sacrifice—can serve only one purpose; to give the Fascist and Nazi leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable consequences of their own crimes.

All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European nations.
The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler—or live for Italy, and for civilization. UNQUOTE.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1800, EST, July 3, 1943.

CICHER RAYMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
From Neal Purvis, from President:

I am preparing to send and have broadcast on Friday the following message to the Nation today.
July 4, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alsna, London

and personal from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 303.

I have received from Field Marshal Dill information as to your attitude toward bombing the Marshalling Yards in Rome and in regard to Eisenhower's proposal to use a black radio armistice proclamation.

It is my opinion that Eisenhower should be given full discretion as to the necessity from a military point of view of bombing the Marshalling Yards and should be given full discretion as to the time if and when he considers the attack advantageous.

Your concurrence in this is requested.

I am in agreement with your opinion that a black radio armistice proclamation should not repeat not be issued and I will so instruct Eisenhower.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, EWT, July 4, 1943.

CHESER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date OCT 29 1971
Presidential to Prime  

I have received from Field Marshal Doll  
information as to your attitude toward  
bombing the marshalling yards in Rome  
and in regard to Eisenhower's proposal  
to use a black radio armistice  
proclamation.  

It is my opinion that Eisenhower  
should be given wide discretion as to  
the necessity from a military point of  
view of bombing the marshalling yards  
and should be given wide discretion as  
to the time he considers the attack  
advantageous.  

Your concurrence in this is  
requested.  

I am in agreement with your  
opinion that a black radio armistice  
proclamation should not be issued, and I will so  

instruct Eisenhower.  

Roosevelt  

President approves by telephone  

2:46 p.m., July 4, 1943  

W.S.T.
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

July 6, 1943

To Former Naval Person from the President personal and Number 304.

I fully agree with your Number 344 and I was under the impression that you were getting out a message to the Italian people of import similar to mine.

What do you think of our doing it jointly under our two names. Also I think with you that it should not go out until after initial success is assured.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1236, July 6, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 29 1971

[Handwritten note on the page]

[Redacted text]

0981
VUPAS

Black #8 06/1563

I fully agree with your (White 17) and I was under the impression that you were putting out a message to the Italian people of import similar to mine. What do you think of our doing it jointly under your two names? Also I think with you that it should not go out until it is success assured.

Ravenel

Col. Lynch, Please have enclosed to Sec. State and Gen. Marshall I think the present joint in will taken. F. W. R.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

July 7, 1943

From: Oppav
To: Alusna, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret Number 306.
Your Number 340 I wholly agree.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1050, July 7, 1943.

George M. Elsey,
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Oct 29 1971
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opanv
To: Alusna, London

Personal and to the Prime Minister from the President, Number 306. Your number 348.

Following is paraphrase of message I have just sent to Eisenhower and Murphy:

Quote, From London it is reported that recognition of the French Committee is being considered by you and Murphy. You are not to recognize the committee under any condition without full consultation and approval of the President. Of course it will be necessary to have joint action by British and U.S. end quote.

Released from the White House Map Room
8 July 1943 at 1155 E.T.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date Oct 29 1971

Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aide.

0984
July 8, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 307 from the President to the Former Naval Person and personal.

Referring to your number 346 of July sixth I am in full agreement with your text of the joint message to the Italian people.

I suggest for your consideration that Eisenhower be charged with the delivery of the joint message and that he be given full discretion as to the time and method of delivery.

Upon receipt of your approval I will issue instructions to Eisenhower. He can decide on the day and hour of release and notify us so that we can then start the short wave people to work in England and America.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1450, EWT, July 8, 1943.

George W. Day

GEORGE W. BISEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W. Stuart
Date: 0985
Referring to your number 346 of July sixth I am in full agreement with your joint message to the Italian people, and with your proposed text of the message.

I suggest for your consideration that Eisenhower be charged with the delivery of the joint message and that he be given full discretion as to the time and method of delivery.

Upon receipt of your approval I will issue instructions to Eisenhower. He can decide on the day and hour of return and notify us so that we can then start the short naval parade to work in England and in America.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Date Oct 29 1971
President to Prime

Referring to your number 25 I am in full agreement with your idea of a joint message to the Syrian and Lebanese people and with your proposed text of the message.

I suggest in your consideration that it should be charged with the delivery of the joint message and that it be given full discretion as to the future and method of delivery.

Upon receipt of your approval I will issue instructions.
July 8, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

and personal from the President for the Former Naval
Person Number 308.

This refers to your 339, June 30, 1943, regarding
provision for refugees in North Africa.

I will set out the elements of the problem as I
understand them:

1. There are at present an estimated five or six
thousand stateless or enemy-nationality refugees in Spain
to be moved, largely of the Jewish race.

2. I am asking Generals Eisenhower and Giraud to
designate Mogador or some other place in French North
Africa as a place of temporary residence for these refugees
and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory
into Spain. They have already agreed in principle to the
establishment of such a place of temporary residence.

3. I will arrange for the transportation of these
refugees by land from Spain to the selected port in Portugal
for their embarkation.

4. You will arrange for their sea transportation
from Portugal to a port in North Africa.

5. I will

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Wernher
Date Oct 29 1971
5. I will request the American military authorities to make available cots and tents in sufficient number to meet the emergency needs of the refugees arriving at the temporary place of residence.

6. I will also arrange that preparations will be begun immediately for a temporary reception center of more substantial character where the refugees can be housed and cared for until subsequent arrangements are made for their disposition which should be at the earliest possible moment.

7. The costs of the refugees' transportation from Spain and their maintenance in the place of temporary residence until such time as a more permanent settlement is agreed upon will be borne equally by our two Governments.

8. The work of administration for the refugees at the temporary place of residence will be the responsibility of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations under Governor Lehman, with representatives of your Government cooperating and assisting.

9. I am in complete accord with the thought of the French military authorities in
that area that both for political and military reasons it is essential to transfer the refugees, after their arrival at the temporary place of residence, to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration. In this connection the Department of State has just been informed by your Embassy here in response to conversations Lord Halifax has had with Mr. Myron Taylor that certain places, among them Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Madagascar, are under active discussion and it appears not impossible that sites may be available there for the refugees. It is also my understanding that a limited number of the refugees may be admitted into Palestine.

10. The subsequent transportation of the refugees from the temporary place of residence to places of more permanent settlement and their continued care thereafter would be provided under the auspices and jurisdiction of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee, the costs thereof to be underwritten jointly by the British and American Governments.

I trust that you will let me know at the earliest convenient moment that we are in complete accord when I shall issue the necessary directives to complement those which you will issue.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

The President to the Former Naval Person and personal Number 309.

Your No. 352 proposed statement of anti submarine operations for June to be issued on July 10th meets with my approval except the reference to new weapons and devices (paragraph 4).

I am advised that all public reference to new weapons should be avoided.

I will arrange its release here to morning papers on the same date.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1630, EWT, July 8, 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.C. Stewart
Date: Oct. 29, 1971
July 8, 1943

The President to The Prime:

Your No. 352 proposed statement of anti-submarine operations for June to be issued on July 10th meets with my approval except the reference to new weapons and devices (paragraph 4).

I am advised that all public reference to new weapons should be avoided.

I will arrange its release hereon the same date.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Oct 29 1971
July 8, 1943

The President to The Prime:

Your No. 352 proposed statement of anti-submarine operations for June to be issued on July 10th meets with my approval. I will arrange its release here on the same date.

except the reference to new weapons and torpedoes (paragraph 4)
I am advised that all public reference to new weapons should be avoided.
President & Prime

Your message is approved statement

Regarding the submarine

problem as far as we can meet with

Declassified on July 10 or meets with

my appropriate

I will arrange its release here

on the same date.
July 9, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

The President to the Former Naval Person and personal Number 310.

With reference to your 332 and 345 and my 293 regarding Sholto Douglas:

General Eisenhower has not been involved in this matter and we are unaware of his opinion. I have been advised that a number of general officers who have been thrown in contact with Douglas all have gotten the same unfavorable reaction. The Burma problem will be one of exceeding difficulty not merely in the character of the fighting but more because of the complications and ramifications of the situation. It therefore requires, in our opinion, a man of unusual breadth of vision, moral courage, and personal characteristics that lend themselves to coordinating actions of diverse peoples. It was for that reason that I proposed, with complete and spontaneous unanimity of opinion on the part of all of my advisors, the name of Admiral Cunningham. He understands the complications of Allied command and has demonstrated outstanding ability to meet such complications as well as an unusual understanding of Americans. He enjoys our complete confidence. His opinion would not only carry the weight that should be given to that of a supreme commander in a theater but a con-
From the President to the Prime Minister Number 310.

confidence on our part that his view must be right.

This would not at all be the case, I believe, with Douglas. He would start with handicaps of lack of experience in Allied matters, in a most difficult theater, and with certain pre-judices against him to which I have referred above, whether or not they are justified.

I am particularly anxious to obtain for that command an officer of proved ability in combined allied operations, and with the fighting initiative that will insure an aggressive determined campaign against the Japanese in Burma.

The importance of Cunningham in the Mediterranean is fully realized, but I am hopeful that the situation will be so clarified navally in a short time that his services can be spared as well as some of his ships.

I will of course abide fully by your decisions and give unquestioned support to the carrying out of the task

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
1200 EWT 9 July 1943

[Signature]

Chester Harding
Lt. Colonel
Assistant to the President
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

PERSONAL

With reference to your 332 and 345 and my 293 regarding Sholto Douglas:

General Eisenhower has not been involved in this matter and we are unaware of his opinion. I have been advised that of a number of general officers who have been thrown in contact with Douglas all have gotten the same unfavorable reaction.

The Burma problem will be one of exceeding difficulty not merely in the character of the fighting but more because of the complications and ramifications of the situation. It therefore requires, in our opinion, a man of unusual breadth of vision, moral courage, and personal characteristics that lend themselves to coordinating actions of diverse peoples. It was for that reason that I proposed, with complete and spontaneous unanimity of opinion on the part of all of my advisors, the name of Admiral Cunningham.

He understands the complications of Allied command and has demonstrated outstanding ability to meet such complications as well as an unusual understanding of Americans. He enjoys our complete confidence. His opinion would not only carry the weight that should be given to that of a supreme commander in a theater but a confidence on our part that his view must be right.

This would not at all be the case, I believe, with Douglas. He would start with handicaps of lack of experience in Allied matters, in a most difficult theater, and with certain prejudices against him to which I have referred above, whether or not they
are justified.

I am particularly anxious to obtain for that command an officer of proved ability in combined allied operations, and with the fighting initiative that will insure an aggressive determined campaign against the Japanese in Burma.

The importance of Cunningham in the Mediterranean is fully realized, but I am hopeful that the situation will be so clarified navally in a short time that his services can be spared as well as some of his ships.

I will of course abide fully by your decision and for unquestioned support of the carrying out of the task.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 29 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I suggest the attached reply to the Prime Minister's number 345.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Prop. message from President to the Prime Minister

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700464
By Date MAY 1 1972
PERSONAL

With reference to your 332 and 345 and my 293 regarding Sholto Douglas, the following is a frank summary of views:

In the first place General Eisenhower has not been involved in this matter and we are unaware of his opinion. I have been advised that of a number of general officers who have been thrown in contact with Douglas all have gotten the same reaction, which is unfavorable to the prospect of success in Allied command. The Burma problem will be one of exceeding difficulty not merely in the character of the fighting but more because of the complications and ramifications of the situation. It therefore requires, in our opinion, a man of unusual breadth of vision, moral courage, and personal characteristics that lend themselves to coordinating actions of diverse peoples. It was for that reason that I proposed, with complete and spontaneous unanimity of opinion on the part of all of my advisors, the name of Admiral Cunningham. He understands the complications of Allied command and has demonstrated outstanding ability to meet such complications as well as an unusual understanding of Americans. He enjoys our complete confidence. His opinion would not only carry the weight that should be given to that of a supreme commander in a theater but a prejudiced view, in effect, on our part that his view must be right.

This would not at all be the case, I believe, with Douglas. He would start with handicaps of lack of experience in Allied matters, in a most difficult theater, and with certain prejudices against him to which I have referred above, justified or not.
I realize the importance of Cunningham in the Mediterranean but I am hopeful that the situation will be so clarified navally in a short time that his services can be spared as well as some of his ships.

I am particularly anxious to obtain for that command an officer of proved ability in combined Allied operations, and with the fighting initiative that will ensure an aggressive determined campaign against the Japanese in Burma.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 736464
By DATE MAY 1 1972
Number 511 from the President to the Former Naval Person

and personal.

In reply to your No. 542 July 3rd. Our agreement in maintaining
American deployment in the Southeast Asia Theater under Stilwell's
command should assist us in resolving the problem of securing Chinese
cooperation.

As to the relationship of the Supreme Commander of the Southeast
Asia Theater following the MacArthur rather than the Eisenhower pattern,
practical consideration of the entire deployment against Japan brings
me to the conclusion our solution should be the Eisenhower pattern.

Planned operations in the Southeast Asia Theater must be more
closely integrated with our efforts in the entire Pacific Theater as
the tempo of the war in the Pacific is stepped up. I can foresee that
centralization in Washington will eventually be required not only to
effect coordination but also to furnish the control necessary to prevent
undue lag in massing of our means to defeat Japan after Germany's
collapse.

To center in London on the one hand the major operational planning
and strategic control of the Southeast Asia command and direct from
Washington on the other the war in the Pacific would materially weaken
our combined efforts against Japan.

Another consideration we cannot overlook. The Generalissimo has
no representation on our combined staffs. Through the Pacific War
Council, also in Washington, where he is represented by Dr. Soong, we might be able to enhance our chances of securing cooperation from the Generalissimo.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, July 9, 1943.

CLESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE PRIME FROM THE PRESIDENT:

In reply to your No. 342 July 3rd, Our agreement in maintaining American deployment in the Southeast Asia Theater under Stilwell's command should assist us in resolving the problem of securing Chinese coordination.

As to the relationship of the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater following the MacArthur rather than the Eisenhower pattern, practical consideration of the entire deployment against Japan brings me to the conclusion our solution should be the Eisenhower pattern.

Planned operations in the Southeast Asia Theater must be more closely integrated with our efforts in the entire Pacific theater as the tempo of the war in the Pacific is stepped up. I can foresee that centralization in Washington will eventually be required not only to effect coordination but also to furnish the control necessary to prevent undue lag in massing of our means to defeat Japan after Germany's collapse.

To center in London on the one hand the major operational planning and strategic control of the Southeast Asia command and direct from Washington on the other the war in the Pacific...
would materially weaken our combined efforts against Japan.

Another consideration we cannot overlook. The Generalissimo
has no representation on our combined staffs. Through the
Pacific War Council, also in Washington, where he is represented
by Dr. Soong, we might be able to enhance our chances of
securing cooperation from the Generalissimo.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR AMPHIBIUS LEAHY

Attached is a true copy of message No. 342, dated 3 July 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President, together with a true copy of the President's message No. 298, referred to in the above message.

The President desires that this message No. 342 be furnished you to arrange for preparation of a reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant to the Military Aides.

2 Incls.
Incl. 1 - PM. No. 342, 3 July 1943.
Incl. 2 - Pres. No. 298, June 30, 1943.

To General Deane
Please return papers
with draft reply

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 6 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 342, 3 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. We have given earnest consideration to the plan set out in your number 298. The Chiefs of Staff had contemplated that General Stilwell (a) should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander; (b) should continue to have his direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo; (c) should be given the responsibility for the operation of the air route to China, and for the defence of its Indian terminal, having an American Air Commander in Chief under him for this purpose; (d) should control the discipline and administration of all American forces in the South East Asia command.

2. The Chiefs of Staff feel that, having regard to the above responsible and multifarious duties and to the fact that (b) may necessitate frequent visits to China, it would be very difficult for General Stilwell to exercise executive command over a part of the land forces and a part of the operational air force. Nevertheless, we will certainly try what you suggest. We can always make adjustments afterwards in the light of experience.

3. On the question of command relationship, we still think that the MacArthur pattern is the more appropriate to this theatre and I hope that you will be able to agree to it, subject to the modification that the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Command will be controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
4. I am sending you a separate telegram about a supreme commander.

No Sig.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Cnsav
To: Alliance, London.

June 30, 1943.

Number 298 from the President to the Former Naval Person and personal.

Regarding our messages on Supreme Command for South East Asia, I should like to ask your consideration of the following plan which appears to be in general accord with your ideas. The one point in which this plan differs from that set forth in your number 332, June 28th, lies in the method of integration of the Chinese effort.

General Stilwell, I feel, should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. His function as Deputy would be to command, under the Supreme Commander, all ground and air forces at present under him in the South East Asia Theater and such additional U.S. and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available. Furthermore he must continue to have certain direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo. Upon his relationship with the Generalissimo will depend the positive action by the Chinese in operations against Burma. To secure this cooperation, Stilwell should have under his immediate control the tangible means to give effect to his requests, including the control of all those U.S. forces which have been deployed for the purpose of making effective the U.S. aid to China.

The deployment of the 10th Air Force in India, as has been previously mentioned, was for the purpose of supporting China. Its offensive operations now and in the future against strategic targets in Burma and Thailand and in support of Chinese troops in the Assam-North Burma area, its operations in defense of the India-China air line, and its situation
Pres-PW #298, June 30, 1943.
Page 2.

as a strategic air reserve for the 14th Air Force are all bound up with our program of increasing aid to China. As regards the 14th Air Force, I am of the opinion that the Generalissimo would raise serious objection to subjecting Chennault's operations into Burma under any direct supreme command in India other than that provided by the channels already in existence.

I agree with your boundary for the South East Asia Theater. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham would be especially acceptable as supreme commander. Air Marshal Tedder is also favorably considered. In view of the established United States policy of aid to China, however, the more appropriate command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I could agree, therefore, only to this command relationship following the Eisenhower pattern, with the British Chiefs of Staff designated as the agency for the Combined Chiefs of Staff charged with the issue of instructions to the Supreme Commander.

A British Allied Naval Commander, RAF Commander, and a British Army Commander all would be selected by you.

I believe that the above plan will permit us to integrate the Chinese potential with operations against Burma from India.

Roosevelt
July 9, 1943.

From: [Redacted]
To: Alusa, London

Personal and [Redacted] from the President to the Former Naval Person No. 312.

Your No. 355.

I have today instructed General Eisenhower to be prepared to issue our joint statement at a time to be decided later by you and me.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1220, EWT, July 9, 1943.

CHESTER NAYLOR,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Redacted]
Date OCT 29 1971
I have been instructed

To

uate 10 pm.

pam & issue an

order slanting

at a time & h

clock at

you & me.
From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, London  

The President to the Former Naval Person [redacted] and personal  
Number 313.  

I am sending the following message to the Pope and feel that this  
should come from me instead of from both of us because of the large  
percentage of Catholics here, and because the Pope and I have a rather  
personal relationship, especially during the last few months.  

I know you will understand this and I hope the message will have  
a good effect.  

QUOTED: Draft of Message to Pope Pius XII from the President:  

By the time this message reaches Your Holiness a landing in force  
by American and British troops will have taken place on Italian soil.  
The soldiers of the United Nations have come to rid Italy of Fascism  
and all its unholy symbols, and to drive out the Nazi oppressors who  
are infesting her soil.  

There is no need for me to reaffirm that respect for religious  
beliefs and for the free exercise of religious worship is fundamental  
to our ideas. Churches and religious institutions will, to the extent  
that it is within our power, be spared the devastations of war during  
the struggle ahead. Throughout the period of operations the neutral  
status of Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy  
will be respected.  

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  

By W.Grant  
Date 06/29/1971
The President to the Former Naval Person Number 213.

I look forward, as does Your Holiness, to that bright day when the peace of God returns to the world. We are convinced that this will occur only when the forces of evil which now hold vast areas of Europe and Asia enslaved have been utterly destroyed. On that day we will joyfully turn our energies from the grim duties of war to the fruitful tasks of reconstruction. In common with all other nations and forces imbued with the spirit of good will toward men, and with the help of Almighty God, we will turn our hearts and our minds to the exacting task of building a just and enduring peace on earth.

UNQUOTE

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
1245, EWT, July 9, 1943

CHRISTIAN HARMON,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date OCT 29, 1971

SECRET
July 9, 1943

The PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME:

I am sending the following message to the Pope and feel that this should come from me instead of from both of us because of the large percentage of Catholics here, and because the Pope and I have a rather personal relationship, especially during the last few months.

I know you will understand this and I hope the message will have a good effect.

QUOTE: Draft of Message to Pope Pius XII from the President:

By the time this message reaches Your Holiness a landing in force by American and British troops will have taken place on Italian soil. The soldiers of the United Nations have come to rid Italy of Fascism and all its unhappy symbols, and to drive out the Nazi oppressors who are infesting her soil.

There is no need for me to reaffirm that respect for religious beliefs and for the free exercise of religious worship is fundamental to our ideas. Churches and religious institutions will, to the extent that it is within our power, be spared the devastations of war during the struggle ahead. Throughout the period of operations the neutral status of Vatican City as well as of the Papal domains throughout Italy will be respected.

I look forward, as does Your Holiness, to that bright day when the peace of God returns to the world. We are convinced that this will occur only when the forces of evil which now
hold vast areas of Europe and Asia enslaved have been utterly destroyed. On that day we will joyfully turn our energies from the grim duties of war to the fruitful tasks of reconstruction. In common with all other nations and forces imbued with the spirit of good will toward men, and with the help of Almighty God, we will turn our hearts and our minds to the exacting task of building a just and enduring peace on earth.

ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date OCT 29, 1971
President F. D. Roosevelt

I am sending the following message to the Pope and feel that this should come from me instead of from both of us: because of the change in attitude of the new President and because of the Pope and I have a rather personal relationship, especially during the last few months. I hope you will understand this and I hope the message will have a good effect.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
July 14, 1943.

From: Onnav
To: Alusma, London

Personal and for Former Naval Person from the President Number 314.

I am sorry about the two transports off the coast of Spain but it is fine that we are working so successfully on the U boats. More and better hunting. Our records now say seven U boats in the past few days.

I have no further word from U. J. Even if he is unable to get away, I think the time would be ripe for a Staff Conference of all of us in General Wolfe's stronghold around the first of September.

My Congress has retired for the night and I am still going strong.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1155, Eut., July 14, 1943.

Chester Bowdoin
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant Military Aide to the President.
July 14, 1943.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I am sorry about the two transports off the coast of Spain but it is fine that we are working so successfully on the U boats. More and better hunting.

I have no further word from U. J. Even if he is unable to get away, I think the time would be ripe for a Staff Conference of all of us in General Woolf's stronghold around the first of September.

My Congress has retired for the night and I am still going strong.

ROOSEVELT
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Aluza, London

July 14, 1943.

Number 315 from the President for the Former Naval Person and personal.

Referring to your 361 of July 13, Eisenhower recommends July 16 at eleven hours G.M.T. for release. I have approved Eisenhower’s recommendation and suggested the insertion of “Nazi” before “Germany” in paragraph eleven if practicable.

Will arrange for release to press here at same time.

Roosevelt

 Released from the White House Map Room at 1435, EWT, July 14, 1943.

CHESTER HARDWIG,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: LWP Steward
Date: OCT 29 1971
President to Prime.
Referring to your 36 of July 13, Eisenhower recommends July 16 at eleven hours G.M.T. for release. I have approved Eisenhower's recommendation and suggested the insertion of "Nazi" before Germany in paragraph eleven if practicable. I will arrange for release to press here at same time.

Roosevelt

#315
July 15, 1943.

From: Opanav
To: Alusma, London

The President to the Former Naval Person, and personal Number 316.
Your Number 386.
I am delighted with the progress in regard to LIFEBEET.

Roosevelt
Former Naval Person.

* I am delighted with the progress in regard to Six belt.

[Riviere's signature]

# 316

* "Your Number 364" added.
July 15, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 317 from the President to the Former Naval Person and personal.

I assume that the special release you suggest in your No. 365 is based on the idea that the news will tend to discourage the Axis, particularly Italy, at this most opportune time, and that it will raise the enthusiasm and morale of the associated powers. While I concur of course in the first idea, nevertheless, I feel that any possible advantages would be more than offset by any pronouncement such as this which would intensify the now unfortunate feeling in this country that victory is in sight. The wave of optimism that has followed recent successes and our latest release on the anti-submarine situation is definitely slowing down production. We cannot afford to further inflate this costly public disregard of the realities of the situation, and therefore I doubt the wisdom at this time of giving the cat another canary to swallow.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1545, EWT, July 15, 1943.

Owen Collins
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: W. H. Reinert

Date: Oct 29 1971

1024
UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As requested, I submit for your consideration the attached
draft of a proposed message to the Prime Minister in
reply to his No. 363 of 14 July.

[Signature]

[Pro-Prime # 317]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date- APR 11 1972
Signature-
To: Former Naval Person

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I assume that the special release proposed in your

No. 363 is motivated by the idea first that the news will
tend to discourage the Axis, particularly Italy, at this most
opportune time and second, that it will raise the enthusiasm
and morale of the associated powers. While I concur of course
in the first idea, nevertheless, I feel that any possible ad-

vantages would be more than offset by any pronouncement such
as this which would intensify the now unfortunate feeling in
this country that victory is in sight. The wave of optimism
that has followed recent successes and our latest release on
the anti-submarine situation is definitely slowing down pro-
duction. We cannot afford to further inflate this costly
public disregard of the realities of the situation, and therefore
strongly opposed to any special announcement concern-
ing the U-boat war.

I doubt the wisdom at this time of
giving the cat another
canary to swallow.

[Signature]

Punch
July 16, 1943.

From: Oprah
To: Alusun, London

Number 318 from the President to the Former Naval Person and personal.

I have still heard nothing from U.J. I wired him yesterday and should have an answer quickly. When I hear I will let you know at once about Abraham and I like your suggested time.

Roosevelt.
From President
To: Naval Person
I have still heard nothing
from U.S. I wired him
yesterday and should have
an answer quickly. When
I hear I will let you know
at once about Atkinson and
I like your suggested time.

Roosevelt

#318
July 19, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

I am forwarding to you Personal message Number 319 from the President to the Former Naval Person.

I like General Smuts' idea and I hope something of that kind can be undertaken. I think that Eisenhower and his staff are moving forward with similar thoughts. I suppose you have seen Eisenhower's message of yesterday.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1715, EWT, July 19, 1943.

CHESI:ER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By John W. Stewart
Date Oct 29 1971
FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

I like General Smuts' idea and I hope something of that kind can be undertaken. I think that Eisenhower and his Staff are moving forward with similar thoughts. I suppose you have seen Eisenhower's message of yesterday.

ROOSEVELT
July 21, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna London

Number 320 personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Referring to your numbers 371 and 372, in consideration of the fact that so far I have had no word from UJ though I have wired him, I am in agreement with your suggestion that the QUOTE Quadrant UNQUOTE conference be started about August fifteenth in the location of Montoicain.

Please inform me as early as possible of exact date of meeting that will suit your arrangements for transportation. If UJ moves I think August seventeenth would suit me better.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1830, EWT, July 21, 1943.

Boyce P. Price

1st Lt., C.B.
July 21, 1943.

From: Onhav
To: Alusna, London

Number 320 personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Referring to your numbers 371 and 372, in consideration of the fact that so far I have had no word from UJ though I have wired him, I am in agreement with your suggestion that the QUOTE Quadrant UNQUOTE conference be started about August fifteenth in the location of Montcalsm.

Please inform me as early as possible of exact date of meeting that will suit your arrangements for transportation. If UJ I think August seventeenth would suit me better.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1705, EWT, July 21, 1943.

CHESTER NASH, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.P. Stewart

Date Nov 1 1971
PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME.

Referring to your numbers 371 and 372, in consideration of the fact that I have had no word so far I have had no word for my proposed conference has yet been fixed. I am in agreement with your suggestion that the "quadrant" conference be started August fifteenth in the location mentioned in your of Montecalm.

Please inform me as early as possible of exact date of meeting that will suit your arrangements for transportation. I think August 17 would suit me better.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
President to Prime

Referring to your numbers 371 and 372.

On consideration of the fact that no date for my proposed US conference has yet been fixed, I am in agreement with your suggestion that the "Ocean" conference be started August sixteenth in the location mentioned in your 372.

Please inform me as early as possible of exact date of meeting that will suit your arrangements for transportation.
July 22, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alcena, London

Personal and confidential message Number 321 to the Former Naval Person from the President.

Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire.

Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces.

We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations.

The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution
of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it
being understood that as to matters of a military character the two
Governments will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the
French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by
the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination
of the enemy.

Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other
French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against
Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of
French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies
are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French
sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain have no justification
whatever. Appearances of unity within the Committee seem to me to be
still on the surface and at this time I must conclude that they are
continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each
other and on us jointly or severally.

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other
United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the
Committee, subject always to military requirements, but we should make
it clear that the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not (repeat not) think we should at any time use the word
"recognition" because this would be distorted to imply that we recognize
the Committee as the government of France as soon as we land on French
soil. Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local, civil
authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to
expressing my thought. We must, however, retain the right and continue
the present practice of dealing directly with local French officials in the colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example.

Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his Army with every North African convey.

As far as concerns the situation of the French Committee, what would you think of the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously to the French Committee on the part of the two Governments by MacMillan and Murphy?

"The Governments of the United States and Great Britain desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and territory from the oppressions of the enemy.

"Arrangements have been made with the French Commander-in-Chief in North and West Africa for continuing the cooperation of the French armed forces under his control. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function, on the principle of collective responsibility of all members of the Committee, for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements.

"They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions:

"(1) That the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves.

(2) That the relationship with the Committee will be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war."

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1226, EDT, July 22, 1943.

BOYER F. PRICE
1st Lieutenant, C.S.
FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire.

Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces.

We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations.
The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Governments will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy.

Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain have no justification whatever. Appearances of unity within the Committee seem to me to be still on the surface and at this time I must conclude that they are continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other and on us jointly or severally.

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee, subject always to
military requirements, but we should make it clear that
the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not (repeat not) think we should at any time
use the word "recognition" because this would be dis-
torted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the
government of France as soon as we land on French soil.
Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local,
civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis
comes nearer to expressing my thought. We must, however,
retain the right and continue the present practice of
dealing directly with local French officials in the
colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause
so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example.

Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept
it on a purely military basis and we are starting im-
mediately to send additional equipment for his Army with
every North African convoy.

As far as concerns the situation of the French
Committee, what would you think of the following propose
statement to be made simultaneously to the French Com-
mittee on the part of the two Governments by MacMillan
and Murphy?

"The Governments of the United States and
Great Britain desire again to make clear their
purpose of cooperating with all patriotic French-
men looking to the liberation of the French people

- 3 -
and territory from the oppressions of the enemy.

"Arrangements have been made with the French Commander-in-Chief in North and West Africa for continuing the cooperation of the French armed forces under his control. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function, on the principle of collective responsibility of all members of the Committee, for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements.

"They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions:

"1) That the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves.

"2) That the relationship with the Committee will be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war."
Bill:

I wanted to write this yesterday before I saw the President this morning. I haven't seen it, do you think it any good? Can you take this sight.

Ford
JOHN W. VANCE

PERSONAL AND

TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD USE THE WORD "RECOGNIZE" IN RELATION

TO THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. THIS WOULD BE DIS-

TORTED TO IMPLY THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE COMMITTEE AS THE GOVERNMENT OF

FRANCE AND WOULD RECOGNIZE THEM ACCORDINGLY AS SOON AS WE LAND ON

FRENCH SOIL. THE NEXT THING WE KNOW THE COMMITTEE WOULD WANT TO

EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITH US.

MY THOUGHT ABOUT THE COMMITTEE IS THIS. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED

GIRAUD AND DE GAULLE TO GET TOGETHER AND TO STOP THE EVERLASTING

BICKERING, BUT WE WANTED THEM TO GET TOGETHER FOR THE ONE PURPOSE OF

RALLYING ALL FRENCHMEN OUTSIDE OF FRANCE IN SUPPORT OF OUR MILITARY

PLANS TO THROW THE NAZIS OUT OF EUROPE. THE COMMITTEE, IN NO SENSE,

REPRESENTS FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY AND, AS SUCH, HAS NO CIVIL AUTHORITY

BEYOND THE SCOPE OF OUR MILITARY NECESSITY. AN HARMONIOUS COMMITTEE

HAS A USEFUL SUBSIDIARY FUNCTION OF DEALING WITH THE RESISTANCE OF

SOME OF THE FRENCH COLONIES WHICH HAVE BEEN LIBERATED BY US FROM THE

NAZI'S OVERPOWERING INFLUENCE. THE COMMITTEE, FOR INSTANCE, MAY WELL

HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NORTH AFRICA AND LITTLE, IF ANY,

IN MARTINIQUE. WE WOULD WELCOME AND, INDEED, ACTIVELY SEEK THE

COMMITTEE'S COOPERATION EVERYWHERE THEY COULD BE HELPFUL IN GAINING

A MILITARY VICTORY.

I AM MINDFUL OF THE FACT THAT THERE PROBABLY IS LITTLE REAL UNITY

IN THE COMMITTEE AND THAT SOME ELEMENTS HAVE ANIMOSITIES TOWARD THE

UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN. CERTAINLY, SOME OF THEM GIVE FAR MORE

THOUGHT TO THEIR FUTURE POLITICAL AMBITIONS THAN THEY DO TO THE LIBERATION

OF FRANCE BY THE FORCE OF ARMS.
THERE ARE STILL VISIBLE SIGNS OF BITTER PROPAGANDA AGAINST FRENCH ELEMENTS BY OTHER FRENCH GROUPS. APPEARANCES OF UNITY SEEM TO ME TO BE STILL ON THE SURFACE AND, AT THIS TIME, I MUST CONCLUDE THAT THEY ARE CONTINUING, OR READY AT ANY TIME TO CONTINUE BITTER ATTACKS ON EACH OTHER OR ON US JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY. IN SPITE OF THIS WE ARE PREPARED TO JOIN WITH YOU AND THE OTHER UNITED NATIONS TO MOVE ALONG THE LINE OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, SUBJECT TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, AT THE SAME TIME MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE INSIST ON A REAL UNITY WITHIN THE COMMITTEE'S MEMBERSHIP AND STAFF.

I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT THE WORD "RECOGNIZE" IS UNDESIRABLE, AND I SUGGEST THE WORD "ACCEPTANCE" IN ITS PLACE.

I AM GOING TO TRY MY HAND AT A FORMAL MEMORANDUM.

GIRAUD'S VISIT HERE WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL. WE KEPT IT ON A PURELY MILITARY BASIS AND WE ARE STARTING IMMEDIATELY TO SEND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE FRENCH ARMY WITH EVERY NORTH AFRICAN CONVOY.

BY-THE-WAY, MARTINIQUE AND GUADALOUPE BECAME RIPE AND FELL INTO OUR LAPS WITHOUT LOSS OF LIFE OR ANY SLOWING UP OF THE MAIN WAR EFFORT - ANOTHER CANARY FOR US PUSSYCATS!

DO LET ME HAVE YOUR SUGGESTIONS.
DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire.

Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces.

We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.L. Stewart
Date Nov. 1, 1971
The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Governments will deal directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy.

Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain are sheer fiction. Appearances of unity within the Committee seem to me to be still on the surface and at this time I must conclude that they are continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other and on us jointly or severally.

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee, subject always to military requirements, but we should make it clear that
the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not (repeat not) think we should at any time use the word "recognition" because this would be distorted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the government of France as soon as we land on French soil. Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local, civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to expressing my thought. We must, however, retain the right and continue the present practice of dealing directly with local French officials in the colonies whenever military advantage to the Allied cause so dictates. Martinique is an illustrative example.

Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his Army with every North African convoy.

As far as concerns the situation of the French Committee, what would you think of the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously to the French Committee on the part of the two Governments by MacMillan and Murphy?

"The Governments of the United States and Great Britain desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and territory from the oppressions of the enemy.

- 3 -
"Arrangements have been made with the French Commander-in-Chief in North and West Africa for continuing the cooperation of the French armed forces under his control. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function, on the principle of collective responsibility of all members of the Committee, for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements.

"They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions:

"1) That the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves.

"2) That the relationship with the Committee will be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. C. Hound
Date NOV 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the White House memorandum of July 19 transmitting a copy of proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister, attached is a suggested revision of such a message on the subject of relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

New language which has been added in this revision is underlined, and a textual suggested formula for communication to the French Committee is added at the end of the draft.

Attachment:

Suggested revision of message to the Prime Minister.
DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Various sources continue, though with less pressure, to ask recognition of the existing French Committee of National Liberation. Some people want to recognize it as the organization acting for French interests in all French territory, including France. Other people want to recognize it as acting for French interests only in former French Empire.

Most, not all, are willing to accept the Committee's authority subject to the military requirements of the British and American Forces.

We have been saying, first, that the military requirements are and will be paramount to all civil matters; second, that the French Committee of National Liberation has only begun to function and should give further and more satisfactory evidence of the complete and genuine unity of the Committee. This unity must eliminate hitherto French political or factional controversies designed to promote either group antagonisms or individual aspirations, and demonstrate a real purpose to unify itself and, behind it, all Frenchmen in support of the cooperative efforts of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, having in mind its single cause of the liberation of France and the success of the United Nations.

The French Committee was supposedly conceived on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and our relations with it should be kept on this basis, it being understood that as to matters of a military character the two Governments will deal directly.
directly with the French Commander-in-Chief of the French forces. French political questions must be left to solution by the people of France when they have been freed from the present domination of the enemy.

Visible signs of bitter propaganda against French elements by other French groups continue. This applies also to their attitude against Britain and the United States. Attempted claims of the exercise of French sovereignty by the Committee in the face of military exigencies are without basis and hence veiled references to invasion of French sovereignty by the United States and Great Britain are sheer piffle. Appearances of unity seem to me to be still on the surface and at this time I must conclude that they are continuing or are ready at any time to continue bitter attacks on each other and on us jointly or severally.

This Government is most anxious to join with you and the other United Nations to move along the line of limited acceptance of the Committee, subject always to military requirements, but we should make it clear that the plain conditions of French unity must be properly met.

I do not (repeat not) think we should at any time use the word "recognition" because this would be distorted to imply that we recognize the Committee as the government of France as soon as we land on French soil. Perhaps the word "acceptance" of the Committee's local, civil authority in various colonies on a temporary basis comes nearer to expressing my thought.

Giraud's
Giraud's visit here was very successful. We kept it on a purely military basis and we are starting immediately to send additional equipment for his Army with every North African convoy.

By the way, Martinique and Guadeloupe became ripe and fell into our laps without loss of life or any slowing up of the main war effort. Another canary for us puddy cats.

As far as concerns the situation of the French Committee, what would you think of the following proposed statement to be made simultaneously to the French Committee on the part of the two Governments by MacMillan and Murphy? When I receive your comments or if you approve I will take steps to ascertain through the Combined Chiefs of Staff whether this formula would be in line with Eisenhower's requirements as far as the military situation is concerned.

*The Governments of the United States and Great Britain desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and territory from the oppressions of the enemy.*

*Arrangements have been made for cooperation with the French armed forces in North and West Africa under the leadership of the French commander-in-chief for that region. The two Governments will cooperate with the French Committee of National Liberation on other matters of mutual interest on the understanding that the Committee was conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of individual Frenchmen for the prosecution of the war and not for the promotion of factional movements. They desire to make clear, however, the following two conditions:*

1) That
1) That the constitution and government to be established for France must be determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity freely to express themselves.

2) That the relationship with the Committee will be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war.
July 22, 1943.

Relative your number 368, State Department and Office of Strategic Services have given their opinions which I hereby summarize.

All three examples cited by you appear credible.

Italian morale is very low in Trieste--Zagreb--Ljubljana area.

Italians fear Slavs in this area and would prefer surrendering to Allies to a possible massacre of Italians by Slavs. Some Italians have been reported to have joined Slovene Partisans. There appear to be no German troops in this area to prevent Italian surrender.

Italian morale is low throughout Greece and particularly in Aegean Islands. Here also Italians would prefer surrender to Anglo-Americans than to be massacred by Greeks. In the Dobrogea, Chios, and Samos, Italians are nervous and have said in case of Allied attack they would resist "to some extent the French did in North Africa and no more." However the belief is that Italian commanders in Greece and Aegeans are unlikely to surrender until Allied forces actually arrive or more catastrophic events occur in metropolitan Italy.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Declassified at 1935, WET, July 22, 1943

Cedric S. Collings, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg), USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date, OCT 29 1971
My dear Mr. President:

I have Colonel Hammond's memorandum of July 16, 1943 enclosing a paraphrased copy of a message from Mr. Churchill concerning the morale of Italian troops in the Balkans and northeastern Italy.

While I have no information which refers specifically to the reports contained in the Prime Minister's telegram, the Department has considerable information which concerns the general thesis that the morale of Italian troops in Greece is low. Attached is a memorandum in which some examples of such information are summarized. Any confirmation of the reports contained in the Prime Minister's message which may be received from the field will be promptly forwarded to you.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

The President,  
The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO

Letter drafted 7-20-43

Addressed to

The President.
Information in the files of the Department does not specifically confirm the reports transmitted in the Prime Minister's message to the President, but it agrees that the morale of Italian troops in Greece is low and that relations between the Germans and Italians there are very bad. "Italian morale is low" appears like a refrain in every reliable report on the military situation in Greece and the Greek islands.

A few of the more striking examples are here summarized, in chronological order:

1. Despatch no. 227 from Istanbul, December 12, 1942. (File no. 868.00/1179), in summarizing the military situation in Greece during 1942, emphasizes the steady deterioration of the morale of Italian troops in Greece, due to Axis reverses and animosity against their German colleagues. The despatch notes, incidentally, that the Cuneo Division (referred to in the Prime Minister's telegram) was about to be sent from Samos to North Africa, when the British attacked at El Alamein, and that certain units even reached Crete before they were recalled to Samos.

2. Telegram no. 310 from Ankara, February 19, 1943, stated that recent visitors to the Dodecanese Islands had reported that the Italian garrisons were nervous, and that soldiers there and in Chios and Samos had said that in case of an Allied attack they would resist "to the same extent the French did in North Africa and no more".

3. Despatch no. 387 (R-359) from Istanbul, April 8, 1943. (File no. 868.20/111), reports that the allied victories in Libya had greatly affected the morale of occupation forces in Attica. Italian soldiers were said to be very low spirited, and to be making friends with Greek families, with the result that some soldiers had been imprisoned and executed.

4. Telegram no. 2803 from Bern (M.A. report), June 25, 1943, reports that the former Italian commander in Greece, General Geloso,
General Geloso, commanding General of the Ninth Army, with forty staff officers, was recalled to Italy at the end of May because he was too lenient and was involved in a black market scandal.

5. Telegram no. 3825 from Hern (I.A. report), June 28, 1943, recounts an unconfirmed but interesting report. Greek guerrillas so interfered with the operations of the Thessalian Railways (feeder lines to the German-operated Athens-Salonika line) that the Italians were forced to discontinue train service. When the local Greek population petitioned for resumption of the service, the Italians referred them to the guerilla authorities. The guerrillas agreed not to molest the trains provided they were not used by the Italians, but only by the Greeks. The Italians accepted this condition, and train service was resumed, according to the report.

6. Telegram no. 251 from Istanbul, July 20, 1943. Upon receipt of the White House memorandum under reference, the Department made specific inquiry of our Consul General in Istanbul on the subject. His reply, which has just been received, reports that no authoritative evidence of the readiness of Italian division commanders to surrender with their troops had been reported to him. He said, however, that a report had come to him the day before that Italian forces on Samos looked with particular alarm on the growing strength of guerrillas there and had made known their preference to surrender to the Allies than be annihilated by the Greeks.

The Consul General added that Italian morale, while low throughout Greece, was particularly bad in the Aegean Islands. He believes, however, that the Italian commanders are unlikely to take any action towards surrender until an Anglo-American expeditionary force arrives or until more catastrophic events occur in metropolitan Italy than have taken place up to now.
From: Comnav  
To: Alumna, London.

Number 323 for the Former Naval Person personal and from the President.

Referring to your Number 377 of 23 July, I can not look with favor on the attendance of Canadian Staff officers at plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quadrant Conference for the following reasons:

(1) Inclusion of the Canadian Staff in "Quadrant" will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil and China for membership on the Combined Staff in Washington.

(2) It will probably result in a similar demand from Mexico, our neighbor on the southern border, as Canada is on the northern border.

(3) We have until now succeeded in preventing the deterioration of our Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington into a debating society by refusing membership to representatives of other Allied Nations.

(4) It appears certain that inclusion of Canada in "Quadrant" with its unavoidable attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude from the Combined Chiefs of Staff representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations.

I had a long talk with Leighton McCarty yesterday and he went to Ottawa last night to explain the whole thing to Mackenzie King, who will, I think, understand. As you know, Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stennis
Date Nov 1 1971

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Pres-Prime #323,
July 24, 1943.

Rather than face the difficulties that would follow admitting the Canadian Staff to "Quadrant" I would prefer to have the meeting elsewhere - say Bermuda.

The seventeenth is the earliest day I can make it, so let us decide on that.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1206, EDT, July 24, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.
K-

I had a long talk with

Eugene McLeathy yesterday

and he went to Ottawa

last night to explain the

whole thing to Mackenzie

King who will I think

understand.
PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

Referring to your Number 377 of 23 July, I can not look with favor on the attendance of Canadian Staff officers at plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quadrant Conference for the following reasons:

(1) Inclusion of the Canadian Staff in "Quadrant" will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil and China for membership on the Combined Staff in Washington.

(2) It will probably result in a similar demand from Mexico, our neighbor on the southern border, as Canada is on the northern border.

(3) We have until now succeeded in preventing the deterioration of our Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington into a debating society by refusing membership to representatives of other Allied Nations.

(4) It appears certain that inclusion of Canada in "Quadrant" with its unavoidable attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude from the Combined Chiefs of Staff representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations.

I had a long talk with Leighton McCarthy yesterday and he went to Ottawa last night to explain the whole
thing to Mackenzie King, who will, I think, understand. As you know, Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends.

Rather than face the difficulties that would follow admitting the Canadian Staff to "Quadrant" I would prefer to have the meeting elsewhere - say Bermuda.

The seventeenth is the earliest day I can make it, so let us decide on that.

ROOSEVELT.
PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

Referring to your Number 377 of 23 July, I can not look with favor on the attendance of Canadian Staff officers at plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quadrant Conference for the following reasons:

(1) Inclusion of the Canadian Staff in "Quadrant" will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil and China for membership on the Combined Staff in Washington.

(2) It will probably result in a similar demand from Mexico, our neighbor on the southern border, as Canada is on the northern border.

(3) We have until now succeeded in preventing the deterioration of our Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington into a debating society by refusing membership to representatives of other Allied Nations.

(4) It appears certain that inclusion of Canada in "Quadrant" with its unavoidable attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude from the Combined Chiefs of Staff representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations.

I see no objection to permitting Mackenzie King himself, without his Chiefs of Staff, to attend all plenary meetings over which you and I preside and where Canadian...
forces are involved in the operations under discussion. The same right could be granted to the Heads of Government in other countries or dominions in which we might hold subsequent meetings of the Combined Staff.

Rather than face the difficulties that would follow admitting the Canadian Staff to "Quadrant" I would prefer to have the meeting elsewhere - Bermuda, Scape, England, or Washington are suggested as alternatives.

As you know Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends, and you will know that I will be very glad to make to him a personal explanation of my attitude in this matter.

B

This document is the earliest day
I can make it so let us decide on that.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.F. Stewart
Date: NOV 1 1971
President Prime,

Referring to your Memo No. 377 of 23 July, I cannot look with favor on the attendance of Canadian Staff Officers at Plenary Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quadrant Conference for the following reasons:

1. Inclusion of the Canadian Staff in "Quadrant" will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil for membership on the Combined Staff in Washington.

2. It will probably result in a similar demand from Mexico, our neighbor on the southern border as Canada is on the northern border.

3. We have until now succeeded in preventing the deterioration of our Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington into a détente society by refusing membership to representatives of other allied nations.

4. It appears certain that inclusion of Canada in Quadrant with
its unavoidable attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult if not impossible to exclude from this combined chiefs of staff representatives of the other dominions and the other allied nations.

I see no objection to permitting Mackenzie King to himself attend all plenary meetings of which you and I preside.

The same might be advantageous to the ideas of government in other countries as representatives in which we might hold subsequent meetings of the combined staff.

As you know Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends and if you wish me to do so I will be very glad to make to him a personal explanation of any attitude in this matter.

Rather than face the difficulties that would follow admitting the Canadian staff to Quadrant...
I would prefer to have this meeting elsewhere.

Demoda, Scapa, England, Africa, or Washington are suggested as alternatives.
The President has directed me to obtain through the J.C.S. a draft reply to the Prime Minister.

The President desires to have incorporated in the draft a statement that if Canadian staff officers participate in a Combined Staff meeting he believes that Brazil will at once demand representation on the Combined Staff and that Mexico will probably make a similar demand.

He wishes also to incorporate the following:

"As you know Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends and I will be very glad to make to him a personal explanation of my attitude in this matter.

"It appears certain that an expansion of the Combined Staff to include representatives of the Allied Nations would practically change our small staff into a debating society, and it appears certain the inclusion of Canada in "Quadrant" with its attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult to continue to exclude representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By: [Signature]
Date: [Nov 1971]
The President desires to have incorporated in the draft a statement that if Canadian staff officers participate in a Combined Staff Meeting he believes that British will at once demand representation on the Combined Staff as well and that similar will probably make a similar demand.

He wishes also to incorporate the following: "As you know, Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends and I wish to make a personal explanation of my attitude in this matter."

It appears certain that an expansion of the Combined Staff to include representatives of the Allied Nations would practically change...
our small state into a debating society, and it appears certain the inclusion of Canada in the "Quadrant" would upset its attendant publicity and make it extremely difficult to continue to exclude representatives of the other dominions and the other allied nations.
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

Number 324 from the President for the Former Naval Person personal

and

By coincidence I was again at Shangri La this afternoon when the news from Rome came, but this time it seems to be true. If any overtures come we must be certain of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the North and against the whole Balkan peninsula, as well as use of airfields of all kinds. It is my thought that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender followed by good treatment of the Italian populace. But I think also that the head devil should be surrendered together with his chief partners in crime. In no event should our officers in the field fix on any general terms without your approval and mine. Let me have your thoughts.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0051 WST, July 26, 1943

R. Myers
Lt (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

1073
From The President
To Former Naval Person

By coincidence I was again at Shanghi this afternoon when the news from Rome came, but this time it means a long time. If my conjectures come true we must be certain of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan Peninsula, as well as use of airfields of all kinds. It is my thought that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender, followed by good treatment of the Italian populace. But...
I think also that the bond due, I should be reconsidered. Together with his chief partners in crime. In no event should our officers in the field fix on any general terms without your approval and mine. Let me have your thoughts.

Pursuant.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of a message from the President to the Prime Minister, dated 25 July 1945, be furnished the Secretary of State for his information.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incl.
July 28, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral LeAHy

The President desires that the attached paraphrased copy of a message from the President to the Prime Minister, dated 25 July 1943, be shown by Admiral Leahy to General Marshall sometime this afternoon.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER NAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incrl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stewart
Dato NOV 1 1971
PARAPHRASE

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 324, July 28, 1943.

When the news from Rome came this afternoon, by coincidence I was at Shangri La again, but this time it seems to be true. In the event that overtures come we must be sure of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against the whole Balkan peninsula and the Germans in the north, as well as the use of all airfields. My thought is that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender followed by good treatment of the Italian people. Also, I believe the head devil together with his chief partners-in-crime should be surrendered. Our officers in the field should not in any event fix on any general terms without your approval and mine. I should like to have your thoughts on the matter.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
July 25

From: O'nav
To: Alusna, London.

Number 325 for the Former Naval Person from the President personal

and

I am perfectly delighted. I wish much that Lady Warden and her
daughter and the Colonel could come to Hyde Park on arrival as my wife
leaves on a months inspection trip on the Fifteenth. If they cannot come
then I would hope for a visit later in August.

The Staffs can begin their work at Abraham before the Seventeenth
and I will let you have a definite date shortly.

I hope to go on a short trip to fish and sleep next Saturday.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the Map Room White House
at 0105 WST, July 26, 1943

R Myers
Lt (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date: NOV 1 1971
The White House
Washington

From The President
To Former Naval Officer.

I am perfectly delighted. I wish much that Lady Ward and her daughter and the Colonel could come to Hyde Park on our arrival as my wife leaves on a
month's inspection trip on the fifteenth. If they cannot come then I would hope for a visit later in August.

Let the staffs begin their work at Abraham. Before the seventeenth and I will set you down a definite date shortly.

I hope to go on a short fishing trip to fish and stop next Saturday.

Rutland
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

What should I do about this and the reply to Churchill's wire?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

I think you made a firm commitment to Churchill in regard to this when he was here and there is nothing to do but go through with it.

H.L.H.

enclos.
File on tube alloys
July 20, 1943

Dear Van:

While the Prime Minister was here we discussed the whole question of exchange of information regarding tube alloys, including the building project.

While I am mindful of the vital necessity for security in regard to this, I feel that our understanding with the British encompasses the complete exchange of all information.

I wish, therefore, that you would renew, in an inclusive manner, the full exchange of information with the British Government regarding tube alloys.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Vannevar Bush,
Carnegie Institution,
1530 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
July 26, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

326th personal and message from the President for the
Former Naval Person.

In reply to your 354. I have arranged satisfactorily for
Tube Alloys. Unless you have the proper person in this country
now, it might be well if your top man in this enterprise comes over
to get full understanding from our people.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1736, EST, July 26, 1943.

Chester W. Faurot
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the
President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date: Nov 1, 1971

1084
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT

IN REPLY TO YOUR 354. I HAVE ARRANGED SATISFACTORILY FOR TUBE ALLOYS. UNLESS YOU HAVE THE PROPER PERSON IN THIS COUNTRY NOW, IT MIGHT BE WELL IF YOUR TOP MAN IN THIS ENTERPRISE COMES OVER TO GET FULL UNDERSTANDING FROM OUR PEOPLE.

JULY 26, 1943

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 1 1971
July 27, 1943.

From: Ognew
To: Alunan, London

Number Z27 personal and security

From the President for the Former

Naval Person.

The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff have approved the following statement to be made by General Eisenhower to the Italian people:

QUOTE. Message from Allied Headquarters to the Italian people.

We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately and peace under the honourable conditions which our Governments have already offered you.

We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily our occupation will be mild and beneficent. Your men will return to their normal life and their productive avocations and hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners now in our hands will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored. Signed Eisenhower. END OF QUOTE.
July 27, 1943.

If the above statement meets with your approval I will instruct General Eisenhower to issue it.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 12:30, EDT, July 27, 1943.

Rexford T. H.Starbuck
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date OCP 28 1971
The following announcement, to be made by General Eisenhower to the Italian people, is approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

"Message from Allied Headquarters to the Italian people.

We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately and peace under the honourable conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country.

If you do this we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily our occupation will be mild and beneficient. Your men will return to their normal life and their productive avocations and hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners now in our hands will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored.

Signed Eisenhower."
COPNAV

To: Admiral, London

and personal number 328 from the President to the Former
Naval Person for the King.

I accept with appreciation your invitation to occupy quarters
jointly with our friend during our scheduled conference. I well
remember a delightful visit there with Lord Tweedsmuir, but I hope
I will not have to make another speech in French.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1030, EWT, July 27, 1943.

J. H. Graham

D. C., BALANCED
24 Lb., A3D.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date

NOV 1 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To the Prime Minister,

I accept with
appreciation your invitation to occupy
quartier general with
our friend
during our scheduled
conference. I will
remember a delightful
visit there with Lord
Trencherman that I hope
I will not have to make
another speech in French.

Franklin D.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

July 28, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and [BLANK] for the Former Naval Person from the President Number 329.

Referring to your No. 384 of July 27 I have authorized Eisenhower to make an announcement to the Italian people incorporating therein your paragraph in regard to the return of Italians to their normal life, etc.

I am in agreement with you that Eisenhower's N.A.F. 302 of July 27 seems satisfactory and will appreciate early information as to the results of your further examination of his proposed conditions for an armistice.

It now appears possible that by skillful handling of the situation we may be able to get Italy out of the war without the sacrifice of large numbers of our soldiers and sailors.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1220, EWT, July 28, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date DECEMBER 28, 1971

-1-
July 28, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Referring to your No. 384 of July 27

I have authorized Eisenhower to make an announcement to the Italian people incorporating therein your paragraph in regard to the return of Italians to their normal life, etc.

I am in agreement with you that Eisenhower's N.A.F. 302 of July 27 seems satisfactory and will appreciate early information as to the results of your further examination of his proposed conditions for an armistice.

It now appears possible that by skillful handling of the situation we may be able to get Italy out of the war without the sacrifice of large numbers of our soldiers and sailors.

[Signature]
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

President's message No. 330 personal and for the Former
Naval Person.

Replying to your No. 387 of 29 July I am in agreement with the
opinion of your War Cabinet that Eisenhower should not broadcast armistice
terms to the enemy.

I am however convinced that it is necessary in order to avoid
unnecessary and possibly costly military action against Italy that
Eisenhower should be authorized to state conditions when and if the
Italian Government asks him for an armistice.

It is therefore suggested that you agree to authorizing Eisenhower
in order that he may act immediately upon the receipt of a request for
an armistice to use the announcement proposed by him in his N.A.F. 302
of July 27 with the elimination of the following words in his para-
graph five:

"on phase lines to be so prescribed by the Allied CINC that the
evacuation from all Italy will be completed within one month."

Eisenhower should be directed to not repeat not broadcast these
terms and he should be directed to inform the Italian Government that
details of the military and the civil requirements will at a later date
be discussed and settled by envoys appointed by the interested parties.
In any event Eisenhower should submit any change or changes in armistice
terms to you and me.

July 29, 1943

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

CHESTER HAMMOND
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
July 28, 1943.

#330

President to Prime

Replying to your No. 387 of 29 July I am in agreement with the opinion of your War Cabinet that Eisenhower should not broadcast armistice terms to the enemy.

I am however convinced that it is necessary in order to avoid unnecessary and possibly costly military action against Italy that Eisenhower should be authorized to state conditions when and if the Italian Government asks him for an armistice.

It is therefore suggested that you agree to authorizing Eisenhower in order that he may act immediately upon the receipt of a request for an armistice to use the announcement proposed by him in his N.A.F. 302 of July 27 with the elimination of the following words in his paragraph five:

"on phase lines to be so prescribed by the Allied CINC that the evacuation from all Italy will be completed within one month."

Eisenhower should be directed to not repeat not broadcast these terms and he should be directed to inform the Italian Government that details of the military and the civil requirements will at a later date be discussed and settled by envoys appointed by the interested parties.

Roosevelt
Prep 6

Replying to your No 387 of 29 July, I am in agreement with the opinion of your War Cabinet that Eisenhower should not broadcast armistice terms to the enemy.

I am however convinced that it is necessary in order to avoid unnecessary and possibly costly military action against Italy that Eisenhower should be authorized to state conditions which would be acceptable to the Italian government and ask him for an armistice.

It is therefore suggested that you agree to authorizing Eisenhower to use his proposed terms of armistice, proposed by him in his report of 30th July 27, with the elimination
of all of his paragraph 5

The following words in his paragraph 5:

"On these lines to be so
prescribed by the accused
that the evacuation from all
will be completed within one
month."


Eisenhower should be directed
to not repeat not broadcast
these terms and to should be
directed to inform the Italian
government that details of
the military and civil
requirements will be settled
and the government
appointed the American


at a later date
From: Opnav
To: Alusna London

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and Number 331.

Your message No. 385 dated 26 July 1943 expresses generally my thoughts of today on prospects and methods of handling the Italian situation with which we are now confronted.

In the following draft I have suggested for consideration certain minor changes, the reasons for which if they are not obvious we can discuss at our next meeting.

Para. 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

Para. 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.

Para. 3. The first of these is the control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds. This must include the surrender to our garrisons of Sardinia, the Dodecanese...
and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian
mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

Para. 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender
to the Allies of the Italian Fleet, or at least its effective demobil-
ization and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to
whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet
will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian
Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.

Para. 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate surrender or
withdrawal to Italy of all Italian forces wherever they may be outside
of Italy proper.

Para. 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which
there will be passionate feeling in this country and Britain is the
immediate liberation of all United Nations prisoners of war in Italian
hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the
Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. We regard
it as a matter of honor and humanity to get our own flesh and blood
back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of
incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

Para. 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly
of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the
Germans and the Italian army and population.

Para. 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further
view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to
get possession at the earliest moment of a safe and friendly area on
which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central
Germany and of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. This is a time to dare.

Para. 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population may now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then gone so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

Para. 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defenses in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are fifteen German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which ten are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Rum will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

Para. 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. They
may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of
Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on
Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this
Britain and the United States should if possible be joined or at least
supported by Russia. I believe that in any important negotiations
affecting the Balkans the concurrence of Russia should be obtained if
practicable.

Para. 12. It is my opinion that an effort to seize the "head
devil" in the early future would prejudice our primary objective which
is to get Italy out of the war. We can endeavor to secure the person
of the "head devil" and his assistants in due time, and to then
determine their individual degrees of guilt for which "the punishment
should fit the crime".

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1:15, EWT, July 30, 1945.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
Your message No. 383 dated 26 July 1943 expresses generally my thoughts of today on prospects and methods of handling the Italian situation with which we are now confronted.

In the following draft I have suggested for consideration certain minor changes, the reasons for which if they are not obvious we can discuss at our next meeting.

Para. 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

Para. 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.

Para. 3. The first of these is the control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds. This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardinia the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

Para. 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian Fleet, or at least its effective demobilization and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most
agreeable to the United States.

Para. 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate surrender or withdrawal to Italy of all Italian forces wherever they may be outside of Italy proper.

Para. 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all United Nations prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honor and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

Para. 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population.

Para. 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession at the earliest moment of a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany and of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. This is a time to dare.

Para. 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population may now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

Para. 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order
as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defenses in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

Para. 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia. I believe that any important negotiations affecting the Balkans the concurrence of Russia should be obtained if practicable.

Para. 12. It is my opinion that an effort to seize the "head devil" in the early future would prejudice our primary objective which is to get Italy out of the war. We can endeavor to secure the person of the "head devil" and his assistants in due time, and to then determine their individual degrees of guilt for which "the punishment should fit the crime".
MENORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Prime Minister's message No. 303 to the President dated 26 July 1943 meets with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendments shown below (words deleted have been lined out and words added have been underlined).

Para 1. Your 124. I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted them to the war cabinet obtaining their full approval.

Para 2. I don't think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any Non Fascist Government even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone I would deal with any Non Fascist Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues also agreed with this. Thoughts on the fall of Mussolini by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

Para 3. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a
separate arrangement with the Allies for an eventual peace. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

Para 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler and National socialism and next Germany. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.

Para 3. The first of these is in the President's words "The control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds." This must include the surrender to our GARRisons of Sardinia the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

Para 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian Fleet or at least its effective demobilization of the Italian Fleet and paralysis and...
the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender demobilization of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.

Para 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate withdrawal from the surrender of all to Italy of all Italian forces inCorsica the Riviera including Toulon and the Balkan Peninsula to wit in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.

Para 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all British United Nations prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honor and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the meagerless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

Para 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans...
and the Italian army and population. We should demand their surrender and that any Italian Government with whom we can reach a settlement shall do their utmost to procure this. It may be however that the German divisions will cut their way northward in spite of anything that the Italian armed forces are capable of doing. We should provoke this conflict as much as possible and should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians in procuring the surrender of the Germans south of Rome.

Para 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession at the earliest moment of a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany and of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. And this is a time to dare.

Para 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will aid our cause. The fury of the Italian population will now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought those miseries upon Italy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/4951 2 May 1972
By RHPA Date MAY 8 1972
and then come so exactly and gravely to her aid, we should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

Note: The last clause has been transferred to Paragraph 3.

Paragraph 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defenses in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain.

It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents commandoes and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia.

It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

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By Authority of JCS
927/495 1 May 1943
By RFR Date MAY 8 1944

-3-
Para 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States acting jointly or severally should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia.

Para 12. The surrender of the head devil together with his partners in crime must be considered an eminent object and one for which we should strive by all means in our power out of wrecking the former prospects which have been outlined in earlier paragraphs. It may be however that these criminals will flee into Germany or escape into Switzerland. On the other hand they may surrender themselves or be surrendered by the Italian Government. Should they fall into our hands we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and after agreement with them with the USSR that treatment should be meted out to them. One may prefer prompt execution without trial except for
Identification purposes. Others may prefer that they be kept in confinement
until the end of the war in Europe and their fate decided together with
that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly indifferent on
this matter provided always that no solid military advantages are
enshrined for the sake of immediate vengeance.

Important

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that in any
action or negotiation affecting the Balkan area Russia be consulted.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/495-12 May 1972
By RHEB Date MAY 8 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President directed that this copy of a message from the Prime Minister be given Admiral Leahy to discuss with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President noted that the Prime Minister made no reference to what should happen to the troops in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece; and he also noted that the Prime Minister made no reference to self-determination.

He wishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider his comments as well as the whole message.

/s/ CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incl.
PM-Pres. #383, 26 July 1943.
From: NA London
To: The President of the United States

26 July 1943

File 26/1825Z

Formor Naval Person to President personal and secret.

Para 1. Your 324. I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted them to the war cabinet obtaining their full approval.

Para 2. I don't think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any Non Fascist Government even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone I would deal with any Non Fascist Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues also agreed with this. Thoughts on the fall of Mussolini by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

Para 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist regime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

Para 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler, His State, and Germany. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.
Para 3. The first of these is in the President's words "The control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds." This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardinia the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

Para 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian fleet or at least its effective demobilization and paralysis and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.

Para 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate withdrawal from or surrender of all Italian forces in Corsica the Riviera including Toulon and the Balkan Peninsula to wit in Yugoslavia Albania and Greece.

Para 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honor and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

Para 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population. We
should demand their surrender and that any Italian Government with whom we can reach a settlement shall do their utmost to procure this. It may be however that the German divisions will cut their way northward in spite of anything that the Italian armed forces are capable of doing. We should provoke this conflict as much as possible and should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians in procuring the surrender of the Germans south of Rome.

Para 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. And this is a time to dare.

Para 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population will now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

Para 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defenses in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent, in the highest degree to get agents commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic
and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdrew or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

Para 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States acting jointly or severally should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia.

Para 12. The surrender of the President,"the head devil together with his partners in crime" must be considered an eminent object and one for which we should strive by all means in our power short of wrecking the immense prospects which have been outlined in earlier paragraphs. It may be however that these criminals will flee into Germany or escape into Switzerland. On the other hand they may surrender themselves or be surrendered by the Italian Government. Should they fall into our hands we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and after agreement with them with the USSR what treatment should be meted out to them. One may prefer prompt execution without trial except for identification purposes. Others may prefer that they be kept in confinement until the end of the war in Europe and their fate decided together with that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly indifferent on this matter provided always that no solid military advantages are sacrificed for the sake of immediate vengeance.

Para 13 should not enter into our arrangements in "making a deal with Italy".
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 332 from the President to the Former Naval Person and personal.

Referring to your No. 389 of July 30 I am in agreement that it is more likely Italy will negotiate for peace through neutral diplomatic channels but believe it necessary for Eisenhower to have precise terms of an armistice agreement which he may use in the event of his being suddenly approached by the Italian Government with a proposal to cease hostilities between the Italian forces and the United Nations forces.

I am agreeable to your proposed amendments to N.A.F. 302, and suggest that Eisenhower be authorized to make the following conditions in case the Italian Government asks him for an armistice, these conditions not repeat not to be made public:

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian Armed Forces.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.
5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military - naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German Forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian Armed Forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.
Prez-PW 5332,
July 30, 1943.

11. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

It is my opinion that the question of war criminals should not be brought up by General Eisenhower in a statement of his terms for an armistice.

The war criminal problem can be taken up later, and I believe that all demands by the Allied Nations that are not essential at the present time should be postponed with the purpose of getting Italy out of the war at the earliest possible date.

If the armistice terms proposed in this message are acceptable to you I will, immediately upon the receipt of your approval, send them to Eisenhower to be used when and if he receives from the Italian Government a request for a general armistice.

I am sending a copy of this message to Eisenhower for his information.

Roosevelt.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1755, EDT, July 30, 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
Referring to your No. 389 of July 30 I am in agreement that it is more likely Italy will negotiate for peace through neutral diplomatic channels but believe it necessary for Eisenhower to have precise terms of an armistice agreement which he may use in the event of his being suddenly approached by the Italian Government with a proposal to cease hostilities between the Italian forces and the United Nations forces.

I am agreeable to your proposed amendments to N.A.P. 302, and suggest that Eisenhower be authorized to:

The following conditions in case the Italian Government asks for an armistice, these conditions not repeat not to be made public:

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian Armed Forces.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military - naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1, 1971]
7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German Forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian Armed Forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

It is my opinion that the question of war criminals should not be brought up by General Eisenhower in a statement of his terms for an armistice.

The war criminal problem can be taken up later, and I believe that all demands by the Allied Nations that are not essential at the present time should be postponed with the purpose of getting Italy out of the war at the earliest possible date.
July 30, 1943.

If the armistice terms proposed in this message are acceptable to you I will, immediately upon the receipt of your approval, send them to Eisenhower to be used when and if he receives from the Italian Government a request for a general armistice.

I am sending a copy of this message to Eisenhower for his information.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
President to Prime

Referring your No. 389 of July 30, I am in agreement that it is more likely Italy will negotiate for peace through neutral diplomatic channels and that it may be necessary for them to have specific terms of an armistice agreement which he may use in the event of this being suddenly approached by the Italian Government with a proposal to cease hostilities between the Italian forces and the United Nations forces.

I am agreeable to your proposed amendments to A.E.F. 131, and suggest that Eisenhower be authorized to the following conditions: In case the Italian government asks for an armistice, these conditions not repeat but to be published to the people of Italy.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.

2. Italy will use her best endeavors to deny to the German specieities that might be used against the United
nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately returned to the Allied Command in Chief, and none of these may, from the beginning of these negotiations, be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet to such ports as may be designated by the Allied Command in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Command in Chief to meet the needs of his military- naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.
It is my opinion that the question of war criminals should not be discussed by any general unknown to an axis statement of terms for an armistice. This latter criminal problem can be taken up later, and I believe that all nations should be divided by the Allied nations that are not essential at the present time should be postponed until a purpose of getting Italy out of the war is the earliest possible date.

If the armistice terms proposed in this message are acceptable to you, I will immediately upon the receipt of your approval, send them to Eisenhowen to be used when and if he receives from the Italian government a request for a general armistice. I am sending a copy of this message to Eisenhowen for his information.
The Commander in Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measures which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces for the prosecution of the war. And the Italian government finds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require. And in particular the Commander in Chief will establish an Allied military government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11.8. The Commander in Chief of the Allied forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.
July 30, 1943.

From: Oppen
To: Alusna, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and
Number 333.

Your Number 365.

I have wired Harriman to come if possible. Lew Douglas will
be with us.

Delighted Leathers is coming.

We will be waiting for you and personal staff at H.P.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1715, EWT, July 30, 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#333

Former Naval Person

I have wired Mr. President to come if possible.

Washington will be with us.

Delighted others is coming.

We will be waiting for you and personal staff at HP.

Roosevelt
SECRET

July 30, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

From the President to the Former Naval Person [redacted] and personal Number 334.

There are some contentious people here who are getting ready to make a row if we seem to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio. They are the same element which made such a fuss over North Africa.

I told the press today that we have to treat with any person or persons in Italy who can best give us first disarmament and second assurance against chaos, and I think also that you and I after an armistice comes could say something about self determination in Italy at the proper time.

ROOSEVELT

RELEASED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE MAP ROOM
AT 1785, WHT, JULY 30, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By William H. Stewart
Date NOV 1, 1971
From President
To former Naval Person.

There are some contraband
people here who are getting ready
to make a row if we seem to
recognize the home of slavery
or Buddhism - they are the
same element which made
such a fuss over North Africa.
I told the press today that
we have to treat with any
Jesuit or persons in Italy who
can best give us first
disarmament and second
assurance against chaos.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

And I think also that you and I after an armistice comes could say something about self-determination in Italy at the proper time.

Roosevelt
30 July 1943

PRIORITY

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna, London

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal...

and Number 335

Your number 390.

Grand hunting in the Bay of Biscay. We got one too off Recife, Brazil. We still need Lifebelt nevertheless.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1930 EWT 30 July 1943

OGDEN KNIFFIN
Captain, CE