CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT

July 1943
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 340, 1 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
No. 340.

My personal telegram no. 299 of 5th June.

I propose that Admiralty should draft such a statement monthly, which would be in general terms, and send it via B. A. D. Washington and U. S. Navy Department for your concurrence or amendment about the 5th of each month, the agreed version to be issued jointly on the 10th day of each month.

I agree that all other statements by persons holding official positions should be prohibited, save those made personally by either of us or those which either of us may specifically authorize from time to time, including on this side statements in Parliament.

I also agree that carefully censored combat stories may be released from time to time after at least a month's delay in each case.

No Sig

REGRAD ED UNCLASSIFIED: By British Govt. State Dept. tel. 5-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FIRST
MR. FRANK DAVIS

On July 7 the President agreed to the Prime Minister's proposal of July 1 concerning a joint statement on submarine warfare.

A paraphrase of the Prime Minister's message is quoted for your information.

"London,
July 1, 1943.

"I propose that the Admiralty draft a statement monthly in general terms, and send it for your concurrence or amendment about the 5th of each month via the Navy Department or the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington. The agreed text is to be issued jointly on the 10th of each month.

"I agree to the prohibition of all other statements by persons holding official positions, the only exceptions being statements made personally by either of us or which we may specifically authorize from time to time, including over here those in Parliament.

"I am in agreement also that combat stories may be released from time to time after at least one month's delay and careful censoring in each case.

Churchill"

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
From: MA London, England
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 341 July 3, 1943

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt personal and [redacted]. No. 341.

Thank you very much for your No. 299, which we have deeply considered.

Our discussions with Salazar about "Lifebelt" are proceeding on the basis that Portugal maintains non-belligerency. We know this is what Salazar wants. If successful, which is far from certain, we shall secure "Lifebelt" islands without deranging our present agreed strategy in the European and Mediterranean theatres. We do not believe that the Portuguese desire Allied Ground Forces on their mainland, and sending them might increase the risk of a German invasion. We share your view that our occupation of "Lifebelt" will not, by itself, be likely to bring on a German ground invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Anyhow the Spaniards are more likely to resist such invasion if we have not provoked it by landing troops.

Apart from a serious ground invasion, it would hardly pay the Germans to bomb Lisbon and Oporto. By so doing, they would only blot out a valuable listening post and enable us to base air squadrons in Portugal.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

sent to Pres. at White 3 July 3, '43
From: MA London, England
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 341 July 3, 1943

which would, Inter Alia, protect our convoys from German air attack and also strengthen the bay patrol. They would also lose their vital Wolfram. If, therefore, we are right in thinking the Germans will not attack by ground forces, they are also unlikely to attack by air merely out of spite.

We have got ready to send simultaneously with the dispatch of the "Lifebelt" Brigade about a hundred Ack Ack guns as part of the local defences of Lisbon and Oporto, as well as 2 day and 1 night fighter squadrons which Portal considers sufficient to deal with any bomber attack the Germans could make at this present time. We do not yet know what the Portuguese will ask for. They may be shy even of taking the forces aforesaid, lest it prejudice their non-belligerency.

Should, per Contra, the Portuguese make our sending of ground forces a condition of granting "Lifebelt", we must discuss with you what this would mean to our whole strategy.

We can, in any case, afford to await the outcome of "Husky", by which time we shall have learnt the extent and character of the Portuguese demands.

No Sig
Personal and from Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Number 341.

Thank you very much for your Number 299, which we have deeply considered.

Out "Lifebelt" discussions with Salazar are being conducted on the theory that Portugal maintains non-belligerency which we know is wanted by Salazar. Agreed strategy in the Mediterranean and Europe will not be affected by the occupation of "Lifebelt" Islands if we are successful, but success is far from certain. Sending ground forces to the mainland might increase the hazard of German invasion, and we do not believe such action is desired by Portugal. That German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula is not likely to be caused by securing "Lifebelt" is a view we share with you. Moreover, such invasion is more apt to be resisted by Spain if the landing of our troops has not provoked it.

Bombing of Lisbon and Oporto would hardly pay Germany except in conjunction with serious ground invasion because she would thereby eliminate a listening post of value and enable us to base air squadrons in Portugal which would, among other things, strengthen the bay patrol and provide protection to our convoys from German air attack. Also, their vital Wolfen would be lost. Therefore, the Germans are unlikely to conduct air attacks merely from spite, if we are correct in assume they will not attack with ground forces. (End part 1)

About a hundred Ack Ack guns have been made ready to dispatch simultaneously with the "Lifebelt brigade" as part of the local defenses of Lisbon and Oporto. Similar preparations have been made for two day and one night fighter squadrons which Portal thinks sufficient to handle any bomber attack the Germans could now make. What the Portuguese will ask for is still uncertain, and they may shy even of taking the forces mentioned lest it prejudice their non-belligerency.

On the other hand, if the dispatch of ground forces is made by the Portuguese a condition of granting "Lifebelt", we must discuss with you what this would mean to our whole strategy.

In any case, we can afford to await the outcome of "Husky".

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 342, 3 July 1943 0326452

Former Naval Person to President, personal and

1. We have given earnest consideration to the plan set out in your number 298. The Chiefs of Staff had contemplated that General Stilwell (a) should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander: (b) should continue to have his direct responsibilities to the Generalissimo: (c) should be given the responsibility for the operation of the air route to China, and for the defence of its Indian terminal, having an American Air Commander in Chief under him for this purpose: (d) should control the discipline and administration of all American forces in the South East Asia Command.

2. The Chiefs of Staff feel that, having regard to the above responsible and multifarious duties and to the fact that (b) may necessitate frequent visits to China, it would be very difficult for General Stilwell to exercise executive command over a part of the land forces and a part of the operational air force. Nevertheless, we will certainly try what you suggest. We can always make adjustments afterwards in the light of experience.
3. On the question of command relationship, we still think that the MacArthur pattern is the more appropriate to this theatre and I hope that you will be able to agree to it, subject to the modification that the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theatre and the South East Asia Command will be controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. I am sending you a separate telegram about a supreme commander.

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-28-72
By H. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972
July 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR AMPHIBIAN LEHAR

Attached is a true copy of message No. 342, dated 5 July 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President, together with a true copy of the President's message No. 296, referred to in the above message.

The President desires that this message No. 342 be furnished you to arrange for preparation of a reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

2 Incls.
Incl. 1 = PM No. 342, 5 July 1943.
Incl. 2 = Pres. No. 296, June 30, 1943.

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 343, 4 July 1943

President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person. Secret and personal. Number 343.

Your number 301.

I thank you very much. We will certainly do as you suggest if Salazar raises the point. I agree with you that we could not get them into trouble and do nothing to help them afterwards. I do not think they will get into trouble if they agree, but at present I am far from sure they will be so obliging. At any rate, they will probably spin things out.

No Sig
July 5, 1943

From: HA London
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 344 Filed 5/1953 2

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt
personal. Your No. 302.

Your War Cabinet had contemplated a joint
declaration to the Italian people in the name of
both our countries. Whereas Torch was by agree-
ment planned as an American expedition with a
British contingent and I have acted as your Lieut-
enant throughout, we consider Husky and Post-Husky
as joint undertakings in which we are equal part-
ners. This would certainly seem justified by the
proportion of troops, Naval forces, shipping and
aircraft involved. I fully accepted your dictum
that "there should be no senior partner".

However since we have been longer in quarrel or
war with Italy than you, and also since a document
of this character written by one man in its integrity
is better than a joint production, we are ready that
you should speak at this juncture to the Italian
people on behalf of both our countries and in the
interests of the common cause.

There are a few amendments which I venture to
suggest to you in all the frankness of our friend-
ship. They are of importance because without them
untoward reactions might grow among the British
people and their forces that their contribution had
not received equal or sufficient recognition. In
fact they are only mentioned once, and all else is
either United States or United Nations.
From: LA London
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 344 5 July, 1943

The amendments are as follow:

(A). After the words "Against whom on December 11, 1941, your government declared war" insert "I speak also on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government and in their name".

(B). After the words "Under the command of General Eisenhower" insert "And his Deputy General Alexander".

(C). The end of the sentence "The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United Nations" should read "Of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of the British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean."

(I am sure you will see the justice of this, as after all it is the United States and Great Britain who are doing virtually the whole thing.)

Finally we think that the message to the Italian people would seem to come better after an initial success in Husky has been achieved, because a repulse would make it somewhat inappropriate. It would anyhow be lost to the world in the cannonade and will hardly get through to the Axis fighting troops in time to influence the crunch.

Your No. 303 about bombing the Marshalling Yards in Rome. We concur.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 345, 6 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 345.

Further to my No. 332, in reply to your No. 293, I feel that Tedder ought not to leave the Mediterranean theatre where he has all the strings in his hands and is working in such complete harmony with the Supreme Commander. The same is also true about Admiral Cunningham who, I am sure, a very great help to Eisenhower in every kind of way.

In your No. 293, you demur to Sholto Douglas and say you would like me to propose some additional names. Before doing this, I should like to impress upon you the very strong view which our three Chiefs of Staff all have about Sholto Douglas' qualifications. Both Brooke and Pound assure me that there is no British officer available to whom they would more readily confide the Naval and Military forces involved and Portal is all for him. He is a man of exceptional physical energy and vigour of mind. I can myself testify to his very high mental ability because as head of Fighter Command, he worked on the Night Air Defence Committee over whose meetings I preside myself. I have also seen a good deal of him personally because his headquarters were then only half an hour from Chequers. His record as an airman is extremely good. He was for 2 years an instructor at the Imperial Defence College, an institution which after ten years work I got set up in 1929 for the express purpose of bringing the three services together in the study of war as a whole. Here it was that he met Brooke and convinced him and other soldiers of his general military knowledge and grasp of strategic problems.

I thought there was a certain fitness in choosing an airman for this great command because of all the business of contact with China by air and the great part the air must play both in the supply and support of troops in the Burma jungles and in the amphibious operations along the coast, or later across the bay towards the Kra Isthmus or Sumatra Tip or whereabouts. Sholto Douglas certainly has held great

REGRADDED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Government Department 8-80-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

1142
commands and has, as deputy C. A. S. at the beginning of the war and later as C in C Fighter Command, been in or near the central circle here for three years of war. He is thus accustomed to dealing with large issues and high authorities. This is of importance because of the necessarily complex relations arising between the new Supreme Command, South-East Asia and the Commander in Chief, India, and the Viceroy and Government of India. Finally, I may say that if anything happened to Portal, he would be my first choice for C. A. S., although, of course, Tedder's growing reputation tends to affect this view.

Now I have put all my reasons before you. Of course, in proposing an inter-Allied commander, we all of us here feel a special responsibility, and would doubly regret making a mistake. We have, therefore, given the most earnest thought to this matter, especially in view of your query. I have been wondering why it is you have these doubts about him, and I should be grateful if you would let me know from what they spring. The only thing I can think of is that he sat on a very large committee under Eisenhower in the early days of "Bolero" before "Torch" was settled, and perhaps he could not do himself full justice there. I am sure he is animsted by the most friendly feelings towards your people and that he has tact and savoir faire.

Supposing, however, that you are still unconvinced, I could make, as a first step, a unified new British Joint South-East Asia Command under Douglas with a thoroughly good liaison with Stilwell and work up to the combined Supreme Command in two stages as confidence grew. Pray tell me with the utmost plainness what you feel.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 346, 6 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and No. 346.

Your 304.

It is lovely working with you. Everyone here would like a joint message and as neither of us is going to read it out, this should be easy.

There are only two consequential alterations namely:

(A). Omit the opening sentence and begin at the words "At this moment the combined armed forces", also

(B). At "This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture - traditions to which" insert the words "The peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much."

The message could then be signed by both of us and loosed off by leaflet and radio from whatever moment is judged advantageous. I gather that Eisenhower is thinking in terms of five or six days after we get ashore, so that we can judge as things go on. Alexander says that all arrangements are complete up to time and running smoothly and everyone is in great heart and very hopeful.

For convenience, I send you the text as I now suggest it should read. Begins:

"This is a message to the Italian people from the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

At this moment the combined armed forces of the United States and Great Britain under the command of General Eisenhower and his Deputy General Alexander are carrying the war deep into the territory of your country. This is the direct consequence of the shameful leadership to which you have been
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 346, 6 July 1943

subjected by Mussolini and his Fascist regime.

`Mussolini carried you into this war as the satellite of a brutal destroyer of peoples and liberties.

`Mussolini plunged you into a war which he thought Hitler had already won. In spite of Italy's great vulnerability to attack by air and sea, your Fascist leaders sent your sons, your ships, your air forces, to distant battlefields to aid Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world.

`This association with the designs of Nazi-controlled Germany was unworthy of Italy's ancient traditions of freedom and culture - traditions to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

`Your soldiers have fought not in the interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but they have been betrayed and abandoned by the Germans on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon.

`Today, Germany's hopes for world conquest have been blasted on all fronts. The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United States and Great Britain. Italy's sea coasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.

`The forces now opposed to you are pledged to destroy the power of Nazi Germany - power which has ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, destruction and death on all those who refuse to recognize the Germans as the master race.

`The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honourable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations.

`If you continue to tolerate the Fascist regime which serves the evil power of the Nazis, you must suffer the consequences of your own choice. We take no satisfaction in invading Italian soil and bringing the tragic devastation of
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 345, 6 July 1943

War home to the Italian people. But we are determined to
destroy the false leaders and their doctrines which have
brought Italy to her present position.

'Every moment that you resist the combined forces of
the United Nations - every drop of blood that you sacrifice -
can serve only one purpose; to give the Fascist and Nazi
leaders a little more time to escape from the inevitable
consequences of their own crimes.

'All your interests and all your traditions have been
betrayed by Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders;
it is only by disavowing both that a reconstituted Italy can
hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European
Nations.

'The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to
consult your own self-respect and your own interests and your
own desire for a restoration of national dignity, security
and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether
Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler - or live for
Italy, and for civilization.' Signed Roosevelt, Churchill.'

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 347, 6 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and personal. No. 347.

I have asked Winant to send you the enclosed about Lifebelt as it is the best we have had so far. The enemy already know something is afoot and we are making all possible haste. Following from Medhurst. Begins:

"We had our first meeting this afternoon in a private house in an atmosphere of genuine cordiality. After a welcoming speech by the Major General of the Armada to which I replied, I made a statement on the general strategical situation on land and in the air followed by Admiral Servaes on the war at sea.

"A discussion then followed on future procedure from which it seemed clear that the Portuguese representatives had been instructed not to waste time on fruitless side issues. Before any further progress could be made, they wished to know in as much detail as possible exactly what our use of the Azores would mean in men facilities and installations and how our garrison would be disposed. Provided with these details they could then assess what the Axis reactions were likely to be and what they would want from us in the way of material.

"Our statement is now being prepared and will be handed over at 900 hours July 6th and the next meeting will be at 16 hours the same day.

"Our first impressions are that the Portuguese are willing and even anxious to give us what facilities we want. They are in hopes, however, that our demands will be so moderate that the Germans may take some time before they realize what is happening. Meantime, they would have the opportunity to prepare themselves with our material assistance against retaliation.

"We do not of course intend to be deterred from stating our full requirements."

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No: 348, 9 July 1943

File: 11112

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

1. I hear from MacMillan that Eisenhower and Murphy propose immediate recognition of French Committee. This is rather sudden. I should like to know your reactions. Our Foreign Office would also like to go ahead and recognise. My chief desire in this business has been to keep in step with you.

2. It is, however, essential that we should act together and that we should agree the extent and moment of our recognition. My immediately following telegram contains formula for recognition suggested by Foreign Office.

No Sig

REGRADED

UNCLASSIFIED
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 349, 8 July 1943

President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person. Personal and My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is formula for recognition of French Committee suggested by Foreign Office.

His Majesty's Government are happy to recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those parts of the French Overseas Empire which acknowledge their authority, and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. They also recognise it as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of Inter-Allied cooperation as well as, in principle, the administration and defence of French interests. The practical application of this principle to the different categories of French interests must be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

His Majesty's Government have taken note of the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French
and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. They count on the Committee to afford such facilities in the military and economic sphere in the territories under their administration as may be required by the governments of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war. In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the British or United States authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements, and pending their revision all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, will remain in force.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 350, 8 July 1943
Filed: 1550Z

President Roosevelt from former naval personnel and personal.

Initiation ceremony took place last night and new member has been duly warned of his new risks and responsibilities. He brought $300 which I now send you in cash. We duly noted the eminently desirable object to which you propose to devote them.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No: 351, 8 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

1. Your number 395. Admiralty have prepared the following for the first of our monthly statements on U boat war. Will you let me know whether your people have any amendments or additions to make, and also, assuming text is agreeable, what arrangements should be made for simultaneous release on Saturday.

2. I also propose a communiqué to you on the following lines. Begins. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been concerned at the number of statements which are being made from time to time by public persons and in the press on both sides of the Atlantic, about the anti U boat war and the methods and devices employed in it. The enemy, by piecing together portions of these statements, may glean more information than is desirable about these affairs. It has therefore been decided that a monthly statement approved by the President and the Prime Minister shall be issued on the 10th of every month, and that, apart from specially authorized
announcements or statements by the President or Prime Minis-
ter or duly censored accounts of particular incidents and
actions, this monthly statement will be the only one to be
made on behalf of the British and American governments.
All departments have been so instructed. It is hoped that
the press will, so far as possible, cooperate in keeping
the technical discussions of U boat warfare within the
limits of the official announcements and generally leave
the enemy in his present state of doubt and anxiety upon
this most important aspect of our successful warfare at
sea.

No Sig
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
No. 352

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

Following is admiral statement referred to in
my immediately preceding telegram begins

The following statement of anti submarine oper-
ations for the month of June is issued jointly by the
British and United States governments.

1. In June the losses of Allied and neutral merchant
ships from submarine attacks were the lowest since the
USA entered the war. The losses from all forms of en-
emy action were the second lowest recorded since the
war between Britain and Germany began.

2. The number of targets offered to the anti submarine
vessels and aircraft of the United Nations was not as
great in June as previously, but the sinkings of Axis
submarines were substantial and satisfactory.

3. The heavy toll taken of the U boats in May showed
its effect in June in that the main trans Atlantic con-
voys were practically un molested, and the U boat attacks

8 July 1943
on our shipping were in widely separated areas. However, every opportunity was taken of attacking U boats leaving and returning to their bases on the west coast of France.

4. New weapons and devices have achieved a good measure of success and are constantly being improved.

5. The merchant shipping tonnage of the United Nations has shown a large net increase every month this year. Anti-submarine vessels and aircraft are coming into service in considerable numbers.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 353, 8 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
No. 353.

Reference your no. 307.

I should prefer that you and I should judge the
political moment on the military situation disclosed
by Eisenhower's reports. Let us call it PQ and we
can then talk about it on the telephone at any time.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. 354 9 July 1943

Former naval person to President Roosevelt
personal and [redacted]. Number 354.

Since Harry's telegram of 17th June I have
been anxiously awaiting further news about Tube Alloys.

My experts are standing by and I find it increasingly
difficult to explain delay. If difficulties have arisen, I beg you to let me know at once what they are
in case we may be able to help in solving them.

No Sig

REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MORTON

The President wishes you to prepare an answer
to the attached message to-day.

Respectfully,

Chester Hammond
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 355, 9 July 1943 Filed: 1635 Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and ________.

I am thinking a great deal of our partnership and friendship now that our second great venture is launched.

No Sig
From: London, England
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 356 10 July 1943

Former Naval person to President Personal and

I am very glad you have sent your message to
the Pope.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., S-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: Lilatche London
To: The President of the United States
No. 357

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I am most grateful to you for your Nr 308.
I am in complete accord with your suggestions
which will provide a solution for our difficulties
in Spain. As soon as I hear from you that you have
issued the directives to Generals Eisenhower and
Giraud, and to the American Ambassadors in Madrid
and Lisbon, I will give the complementary instruc-
tions to our authorities.

No Sig

DEPARTMENT

10 July 1943

10/13352

FILED

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I am most grateful to you for your Nr 308.

I am in complete accord with your suggestions

which will provide a solution for our difficulties

in Spain. As soon as I hear from you that you have

issued the directives to Generals Eisenhower and

Giraud, and to the American Ambassadors in Madrid

and Lisbon, I will give the complementary instruc-
tions to our authorities.

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks

MAY 5, 1972
July 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 357 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 10 July 1945, be furnished the Secretary of State for preparation of a reply.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: May 5, 1972
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President of the United States
No: 357, 10 July 1943.

For your message Number 308, I am most grateful.

I agree completely with your suggestions which will provide a solution for our difficulties in Spain. I will give the complementary instructions to our authorities as soon as I hear from you that you have issued the directives to General Eisenhower and Giraud, and to the American Ambassadors in Madrid and Lisbon.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 358, 10 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 358.

I have sent the following message to Mackenzie King and I send it to you for your information. Begins:

"I fear it might be resented by the other dominions if one alone were associated with a document of this character. It seems to me that if any of the dominions are in, all should be in. Time does not permit of this. It is, therefore, with great regret that I am unable to agree to alter the form of the appeal which has been concerted with much thought between the British and the United States Governments and has received the sanction of the War Cabinet."

No Sig

REGARDED AS CLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Tel., 8-26-72
By R. H. Parker Date MAY 5 1972

white 4.
From: London, England
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 359 11 July 1943

Former Naval person to President personal number 359. Thank you so much for the photographs which are a charming souvenir of Shangri-La.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. 26-29-73
By H. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
13 July, 1943

URGENT

From: London
To: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 360  Filed 13/1050Z

Former Naval Person to President personal.

Don't you think the time has very nearly come when we might let P. Q. out of the bag? Otherwise we may lose the psychological effect.

No Sig

Hopkins-Prime, 13 July 1943, filed "100 Hopkins".

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date  MAY 5 1972
From: Milattache London
To: President of the United States

No 361 13 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President personal.

1. Canadian Government suggest addition of word "Nazi" before "Germany" in paragraph 11 of P. Q. in order to bring this paragraph into conformity with paragraph 7.

I think this is an improvement and we will insert it if you agree.

2. Progress seems so good that I think we ought to loose it off on Thursday.

Prime
URGENT

From: Military Attache London, England
To: President of the United States
Number 362 13 July 1943

Former Naval person to President personal.
Admiralty report 5 U boats destroyed by our joint forces in the last 24 hours. This is an all time world high.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
14 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

Attached is a paraphrased copy of message no. 363 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 14 July 1943.

The President requests that this copy be furnished Admiral King for his comment and recommendation.

Very respectfully,

ODGEN KNIFFIN
Captain, Corps of Engineers
White House Map Room
14 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ELMER DAVIS

Attached is a paraphrased copy of message no. 563 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 14 July 1943.

The President requests that this copy be furnished Mr. Davis for his comment and recommendation.

Very respectfully

ODOH KIRKPIN
Captain, Corps of Engineers
White House Map Room
14 July 1943

From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 363

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

I was wrong when I said 5 U boats in 24 hours.
It is 7 in 36. In these circumstances I suggest we re-
lease at a concerted moment the following: Begins:
The President of the United States and the Prime Minister
of Great Britain announce that in the 36 hours ending
noon July 13th 7 U boats were destroyed in the Med-
iterranean and in the Atlantic by British and American
naval and air forces. This is the record killing of U
boats ever yet achieved in so short a time, and is there-
fore made the subject of a special announcement under
the new system of monthly statements on the anti U boat
war.

No Sig

SECRET

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 364 Filed: 0730Z/15

Former Naval person to President personal and

I have had the following digest of the Portuguese negotiations about "Lifebelt" prepared for you and your staffs. You will see we have decided to insert the thin end of the wedge. I am more than pleased with the way in which the Portuguese have responded to the invocation of our ancient alliance. The plan is, no publicity and a gradual build-up. We are hoping to dispatch our occupation guests and some Hudson squadrons within a week. Mums the word.

Digest begins-The Negotiations with the Portuguese.

The following is a summary of the progress reached in the negotiations with the Portuguese.

The Portuguese consider that they can offer us facilities in Terceira and Fayal but that any further facilities in San Miguel would amount to a definite participation in the war. Their idea seems to be that having granted us the initial facilities in Terceira and Fayal, they would then see what the effect is on Spain and the Axis. If little happens, we have no doubt that they will gradually give us more and more until we have everything we want. Facilities offered.

The facilities which the Portuguese are in principle ready to concede are as follows:

(A) Unrestricted use of the Port of Horta.
(B) Such facilities in the harbour of Ponta Delgada as a neutral is permitted to accord to a belligerent under international law. If we accept the Portuguese interpretation of this, it means that any individual warship can only visit the harbour once in 3 months for a period not exceeding 24 hours, and that warning of the visit must be given in advance.
(C) Full use of Lagena Airfield on Terceira,
(D) "Harbours" in Terceira to be available to us for the supply and maintenance of Lagena. As large a volume of supplies as possible to be put in during the summer months to avoid the bad weather in the winter.
(E) The airfields at Rabo De Peixe to be available only as an emergency landing ground, i.e. for forced landings, refueling, etc.
(F) Land, sea and air defense of the islands to remain a Portuguese responsibility, except that local defense of the airfield at Lagena would be a British responsibility.
(G) The Portuguese to continue to take special precautions for the security of the cable station in Fayal.
(H) The Portuguese to be responsible for protection by sea patrol while in territorial waters of the first British supply ship to come to the islands. Further air protection of supply ships to be provided by the British from their resources at Lagena, once we are established.

Given the unrestricted use of Horta and the harbours of Terceira, we shall, in fact, have all we want for naval and maintenance purposes. Our delegation in Lisbon feel strongly that we should clinch with the Portuguese offer and consider that it would only be a question of time before we get our full requirements.

We are telling our delegation that we agree with their view, subject to the following points on which they must insist:-

(A) That the sea protection of our shipping while it is unloading at Terceira will be a British responsibility, and
(B) That the control of the signal traffic passing through the cable station at Horta will be in British hands.

The delegation have been told to make it clear that we regard these facilities as being the first step towards our full requirements. We are not however imposing any time limit on the Portuguese for meeting us in full.
Consequent upon the above we are dismounting the assault force which was being prepared in case the negotiations broke down and reconstituting the expedition which is now quite small for organizing the facilities which the Portuguese appear likely to concede to us. We are moreover keeping going with our preparations for sending some day and night fighter squadrons and anti aircraft guns for the defense of Lisbon and Oporto in case the Portuguese ask us to help them with protection against air attack.

No Sig
July 15, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 365 09022/15

Former Naval person to President personal and most immediate reference your number 315.

Eisenhower is being informed that I concur in his proposed time for release. Arrangements are being made here accordingly.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 366  Filed: 16/02082

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I like very much the plan of our meeting in Canada and think the Heights of Abraham most attractive. We think it most important to have the meeting earlier than September 1. The Combined Staffs at Washington agreed to meet again at the end of July or the beginning of August. We could come with our outfit by the same method as last time arriving at the very spot between the 12th and 15th of August. If this is agreeable to you, I will open the matter to MacKenzie King in the greatest secrecy.

Events in HUSKY are moving so fast and the degeneration of Italian resistance is so marked that decisions about the Toe, Ball and Heel, which were regarded as a part of HUSKY, will almost certainly have to be taken before we meet. We shall, however, need to meet together to settle the larger issues which the brilliant victories of our Forces are thrusting upon us about Italy as a whole. Mid August will only just be in time for this work. This, also, will be the time to check up intimately upon De Gaulle, UJ and other equally agreeable topics. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to give me this date.

Prime

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

1177
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 367

Filed: 16/02082

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Official.

Your number 317.

My cat likes canaries and her appetite grows with eating. However, news is now outdated as we have altogether 18 canaries this month.

Prime

MAY 5 1972
July 17, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Please take this up with the Joint Staffs and prepare reply. I am wondering whether we should not, at once, arrange to have an American or two from Army and Navy Air go in with the British; and also whether we ourselves would require any special equipment immediately after the D Day. All of this should be kept very secret. Please prepare reply from me to the Prime Minister.

F.D.R.
July 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
General Marshall:

The attached original from Prime No. 369 is forwarded by direction of the President for preparation of a draft reply.

Please return original of message.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5, 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 368 Filed: 16/0208Z

Former Naval Person to President.

You will wish to have the following paraphrase of telegram just received from Commanders in Chief, Middle East.

Paraphrase begins:

Italian morale. Information received during past few weeks from Greece and Balkans points to growing disintegration of morale of Italian troops there. British SOE officer reports from Acharniana that Commander Casale Division has made approach through Mayor of Agrinio offering surrender his Division to British Forces only. Following are examples of other similar offers on different levels through SOE channels:

(I) Covering Italian Troops in areas Trieste, Gorizia and Ljubljana, General Gambarra (XI Corps) and General Roberti (II Army)

(II) Area Jannina, through Greek Bishop of Jannina, General Delabona (XXVI Corps).

(III) On behalf Commander Cuneo Division at Samos through Harbour Master Fort Vathy.

Low and falling morale of Italian Troops in Balkans, Greece and Aegean has been confirmed by information received for some time past. Above feelers, though received through unorthodox channels, are therefore considered to be probably quite genuine. Indications that Germans are aware of danger and making dispositions accordingly are shown by recent troop movements and reinforcement particularly of southern Greece. It is doubtful whether forces available would be adequate from German point of view, both for occupation and defence against invasion, in event of general Italian collapse. Paraphrase ends.

We must certainly keep this from both cats and enjoy it ourselves.

No Sig
July 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BRIG. GENERAL WM. J. DONOVAN

Attached is a paraphrased copy of message No. 388, dated 16 July 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President.

The President requests that General Donovan furnish him with any information that the Office of Strategic Services has which might support or contradict the information in the attached message.

It is requested that General Donovan address his reply to The President, The White House Map Room.

CHESTER HARMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. F. Sweeney Date: MAY 5 1972
July 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attached is a paraphrased copy of message No. 568, dated 16 July 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President.

The President requests that the Secretary of State furnish him with any information that the State Department has which might support or contradict the information in the attached message.

It is requested that the Secretary of State address his reply to the President, The White House Map Room.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff, Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date: MAY 5 1972
From: The Prime Minister.
To: The President.

No.: 368, 16 July 1943.

Commanders in Chief, Middle East, report that recent information from the Balkans and Greece indicates increasing disintegration of Italian troops' morale. The Commander Casale Division, according to the British SOE officer at Acharnania, has offered to surrender his division, but only to British. The offer was made through the Mayor of Agrinio.

Other similar offers reported through SOE include those made by the following: (A) General Gambarra (XI Corps) and General Roberti (II Army), commanding Italian troops in Trieste, Gorizia and Ljubljana; (B) General Delabona (XXVI Corps), commanding in the Jannina area, made offer through the Greek Bishop of Jannina; (C) Commander of the Cuneo Division at Samos made an offer through the Harbour Master at Port Vathy.

Much information received previously confirms this collapse of Italian military morale in Greece, the Balkans, and the Aegean. For this reason the above peace feelers, although received through unusual channels, are probably genuine. Recent German troop movements and reinforcements, particularly in Greece, prove they are cognizant of the danger. In case of general Italian collapse, however, German forces adequate for both occupation and defense are probably not available.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 369  Filed 1451Z/16

Former Naval Person to the President.
Personal and Number 369.

You may like to know the types of aircraft we intend putting into the Azores.

We propose to begin with a flight of Hudsons at Lagos in Terceira to protect the initial convoy while it unloads. They will be drawn from Gibraltar and should be operating a few days after arrival of the convoy. Hudsons are comparatively light aircraft and should be able to use the airfield without any work being done on it; their range is however only 450 miles and they must therefore be replaced by aircraft with longer range.

The ground personnel and equipment of two squadrons of Fortresses will be sent out in the ships, and the aircraft (30 in all) will be flown out to replace the Hudsons as soon as we are satisfied that the airfield is fit for them.
Later on we hope to send Liberators since their longer range will make them even more useful than the Fortresses. Some work on the runways is sure to be needed before we can do this, and the necessary construction personnel are being sent in the convoy.

no sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 370

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and . . . . . . . . Number 370.

I thought you would be interested to see the following paraphrase of most secret and personal message I have received from General Smuts. Begins:

I send you my congratulations on the auspicious start of the Sicilian expedition. Following on North Africa in the next month or two Sicily may prove another trap for the Axis and the question arises, what next? Should not the answer be Rome? I suggest this as a military problem for the serious consideration of your staff.

We should attempt only vital blows at this stage of the war and side shows should be avoided. If we capture Rome, this would be a mortal blow, severing Italian communications, isolating the south of Italy, probably sweeping away the Royal House and Mussolini and securing the Pope who is the only real force left in Italy. Thus we should knock Italy out of the war this summer and new bases could be created for our offensives northward as well as eastward to the Balkans.
and Black Sea and westwards towards France. If Rome is militarily a feasible proposition there would be no less important political results for our war strategy.

I am inclined to doubt whether if the defense of Rome has been decided upon, it would be more than half hearted in view of the Italian fear of its destruction in a regular siege.

To conclude, Rome may mean virtually Italy and its possession may mean this year a transformation of the whole war situation and next year the chance of finishing it. If therefore the suggestion has not been explored and rejected already I venture to commend it to your consideration.

no sig
Most secret and personal Number three seven zero from the
Former Naval Person paraphrased. (White 2).

I am sending you a paraphrase of a personal message I have recently
received from General Smuts which I think will interest you.

BEGIN. I send you congratulations on the auspicious opening of
the Sicilian campaign. Sicily in the next month or so may prove to be
another trap for the Axis and the problem then arises "what next?"
Should not the answer be Rome? I recommend this as a military problem
for the serious consideration of your staff.

At this stage of the war side-shows must be avoided and we must
deliver only vital blows. The capture of Rome would be a mortal stroke,
isolating southern Italy, severing Italian communications, probably
sweeping away Mussolini and the Royal House and securing the Pope who
is the only potent force left in Italy. In this manner we could knock
Italy out of the war this summer and we could obtain new bases for our
offensives northward as well as westward towards France and eastward
to the Balkans and the Black Sea. If Rome is a feasible military
objective, there would be no less important political results for our
war strategy.

If the defense of Rome has been decided upon I doubt if it would
be other than halfhearted, in view of the Italian fear of its destruction
in a regular siege.

In conclusion Rome may mean virtually Italy. Its capture may
transform the whole war situation this year, with the chance of finishing
the war next year.

I venture to commend this suggestion to you if it has not already
been examined and rejected. END.

REGREDAED UHCLASSIFTE by British
Govt., State Dept. Sec., 3-28-72
By L. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
19 July 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 371

Filed 19/1550Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and Most immediate.

Should be most grateful to know at earliest moment whether your UJ plan is on. Meanwhile I am setting everything in train that can be done most secretly for our rendezvous on 15th. The development of post "HUSKY" seems to render this all the more urgent. Moreover I am most anxious to learn from you how we are to finish up Japan and what is the best plan. You will readily understand that enormous preparations, moral, political and material, have to be made in this country in order that our power may be fully transferred to the Far East when the time comes. We cannot too early begin these studies. We will finish your staffs with a synopsis of points for discussion before we set out.

No Sig

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

1190
From: M.A. London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 372  

Former Naval Person to President personal private and 

I have just heard from MacKenzie King that nothing could afford him more pleasure personally or be more welcome to the Canadian Government and people than a meeting any time during August between us and our staffs at the place mentioned and that we can count on everything in the way of accommodation and hospitality being provided.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
From: Ma London, England
To: The President of the United States

No. 373  Filed: 20/2358Z

Former Naval Person to President personal and No. 373.

Please see my No. 346 of the 8th instant.

It seems to me that something has got to be done about this. I am under considerable pressure from the Foreign Office, from my Cabinet Colleagues, and also from the force of circumstances to "Recognize" the National Committee of Liberation in Algiers. What does recognition mean? One can recognize a man as an emperor or as a grocer. Recognition is meaningless without defining formula. We submitted to you our formula which would meet our daily practical needs. These cannot be overlooked. Until De Gaulle went to North West Africa and the new Committee was formed, all our relations were with him and his committee. I stated to Parliament on June 8 that "The formation of this committee with its collective responsibility supersedes the situation created by the correspondence between General De Gaulle and myself in 1940. Our dealings, financial and otherwise, will henceforward be with the committee as a whole". I was glad to do this because I would rather deal with the committee collectively than with De Gaulle alone. I had in fact for many months been working to induce or compel De Gaulle to "Put himself in commission". This seemed to be largely achieved by the new arrangement.

Since then we have been dealing with the new committee on a de facto basis. We are now discussing the problems of Syria (where there is much friction) with Monsieur Massigli, and are getting a good deal of help from him. The Minister of State (Casey) and General Spears are stopping off at Algiers on their way back to the Middle East in order to carry these dis-
cussions further. General Catroux has returned from Syria to Algiers and also shows a disposition to be helpful. He is a level headed man and by no means in the pocket of De Gaulle. Neither I am sure is Massigli. I am certain we shall have a smoother course in Syria, which is full of dangerous possibilities, by dealing with the committee collectively than with De Gaulle personally. Yet that is the only alternative.

Very soon will come here Monsieur Couve de Murville to wind up our financial arrangements with De Gaulle and transfer them in so far as transference is required to the new committee. What other choice have I but to do this?

A third instance is supplied by the fact that there are a number of Free French troops and establishments here and about 50 Free French vessels which are doing very useful work and all of which have to be kept under military discipline. For this purpose an act of Parliament was passed in 1940 vesting the powers of discipline for such forces in General De Gaulle. I wish to transfer this to the committee and I shall have presently to submit an amending bill to Parliament.

Besides all this there are the numerous colonies of the French Empire which came over to us or were brought over forcibly, including Madagascar, Jibouti, and the French West African and Central African colonies. With all of these we have a varying flow of business and trade to do, and at present all this is formally focused on the person of De Gaulle. I would much prefer it to be transacted with the Committee and with the particular member of the Committee charged with the administration of colonial affairs. In fact from day to day we have been inevitably drawn to recognize the Committee in the sense of doing business with it.

MacMillan tells us repeatedly that the, Committee is acquiring a collective authority and that De Gaulle is by no means its master. He tells us further that if the Committee breaks down, as it may do if left utterly without support, De Gaulle will become once again the sole personality in control of everything except the powers exercised by Giraud under the armed force of the United States in North West Africa and Dakar. He strongly recommends a measure of recognition. He reports that Eisenhower and Murphy both agree with this.

I am therefore reaching the point where it may be necessary for me to take this step so far as Great
Britain and the Anglo French interests set out above are concerned. If I do, Russia will certainly recognize, and I fear lest this might be embarrassing to you.

I do hope therefore that you will let me know

(A) Whether you could subscribe to our formula or something like it or

(B) Whether you would mind if His Majesty’s Government took that step separately themselves.

There is no doubt whatever in my mind that the former would be far the better. There are a lot of good men on the Committee, Catroux, Massigli, Monnet, Georges and, of course, Giraud who arrived here yesterday. He will certainly raise all this and bring it to a head.

As you know I have always taken the view that De Gaulle should be made to settle down to honest teamwork. I am no more enamoured of him than you are, but I would rather have him on the Committee than strutting about as a combination of Joan of Arc and Clemenceau. Pray therefore let me know your wishes, for I try above all things to walk in step with you and the advantages of our joint action in this affair are especially obvious.
PARAPHRASE

To: The President
No.: 375

Personal and No. 375 to the President from Former

Naval Person.

Kindly refer to my No. 348 of July 8th.

It is my opinion that action must be taken on this matter. My
Cabinet colleagues, the Foreign Office, and the force of circumstances
are putting considerable pressure on me to "recognize" the National
Committee of Liberation in Algiers. What does recognition mean? A
man can be recognized as a grocer or as an emperor. Without a
defining formula, recognition is meaningless. We have submitted
to you a formula which would fit our daily practical needs. We
cannot overlook these. All our relations were with DeGaulle and his
committee, until he went to North Africa and the new committee was
formed. On June 8 I reported to Parliament that "The formation of
this committee with its collective responsibility supersedes the
situation created by the correspondence between General DeGaulle and
myself in 1940. Henceforward, our dealings, financial and otherwise,
will be with the committee as a whole." Since I would rather deal with
the committee collectively than with DeGaulle alone, I was glad to do
this. In fact, I had been working for many months to compel or induce
DeGaulle to "put himself in commission." The new arrangement seems
largely to have achieved this.

We have been dealing since then on a de facto basis with the new
committee. The problems of Syria (where there is much friction) are
now being discussed with Monsieur Massigli, and he is giving us a good
deal of help. In order to carry these discussions further, the Minister
of State (Casey) and General Spears are stopping off at Algiers on their
way back to the Middle East. General Catroux has returned to Algiers from
Syria and is inclined to be helpful. He is by no means in the pocket
of DeGaulle and is a level headed man. I am sure Massigli is not either.
By dealing with the committee collectively rather than with DeGaulle per-
sonally, I am positive we shall have a smoother course in Syria, which
is full of dangerous possibilities. That, however, is the only other
choice.

Monsieur Couve De Murville will come here very soon to wind up
our financial arrangements with DeGaulle, and, as far as transference
is required, transfer them to the new committee. What other choice but
to do this have I?

The fact that there are a number of Free French establishments
and troops here, plus nearly 50 Free French vessels which are doing good
good work and all of which must be kept under military discipline, supplies a third instance. An act of Parliament was passed in 1940 vesting the powers of discipline for such forces in General DeGaulle. I shall have presently to submit an amending bill to Parliament since I wish to transfer this power to the Committee.

There are, in addition, numerous colonies of the empire of France which were brought over forcibly, or came over freely, including the French West African and Central African colonies, Madagascar, and Jibouti. We have a varying flow of trade and business to do with all of these, and at present all this is formally focused on the person of DeGaulle. That it be transacted with the committee and with the particular member of the committee charged with the administration of colonial affairs, I would much prefer. From day to day, in fact, we have been drawn inevitably to recognize the committee in the sense of doing business with it.

Repeatedly we are told by MacMillan that a collective authority is being acquired by the committee. Further, he tells us that if the committee breaks down—as it might do if left without support—DeGaulle will again become the sole personality in charge of all things except those powers Giraud exercises under the United States armed forces in Dakar and North West Africa. A measure of recognition he strongly recommends and reports that Murphy and Eisenhower agree.

Therefore I am reaching the point where it may be necessary for me to take this step so far as Great Britain and the Anglo French interests are concerned as set out above.

Russia will certainly recognize if I do, and I am afraid lest this might embarrass you.

I hope you will let me know

(1) If you subscribe to our formula or something similar to it.

(2) If you would mind if that step were taken separately by his Majesty's Government.

That the former would be better, there is no doubt in my mind. On the committee there are a lot of good men, such as Giraud (who arrived yesterday), Georges, Monnet, Massigli, and Catroux. Giraud will raise all this certainly and bring it to a head.

I have always taken the view, as you know, that DeGaulle should be made to settle down to honest team work. I like him no better than you, but I would rather have him on the committee than strutting about as a combination of Clemenceau and Joan of Arc. Please, then, let me know what you want because above all things I try to walk in step with you and, in this affair especially, the advantages of our joint action are obvious.
From: Milattache London
To: President of the United States

No 374 21 July, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Personal.

Planning arrive Abraham 11. For code name see my immediately following.

PRIME
From: Milattache London
To: President of the United States
No 375, 21 July, 1943.
Former Naval Person to President Personal.
Quadrant.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
22 July 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 376

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Para 1. Your number 320 we can make any date you like from 10th inclusive to 17th or even later, but on military grounds we think the sooner the better.

Para 2. I send you in my immediately following a telegram from the High Commissioner about the Canadian position and my reply, with which I hope you will be in agreement. If not, let me know.

Para 3. As soon as I have your final date, I will tell MacKenzie King, as local preparations should not be begun till we are on the way.

No Sig

REGRADE
UNCLASSIFIED
From: London

To: The President of the United States

Number 377 Filed 23/1009Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal
and

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is telegram from the High Commissioner Canada
and my reply.

High Commissioner Canada to Prime Minister number 1779.
21st July 1943.

I know that MacKenzie King is assuming that in any
meeting on Canadian soil he would be present throughout as
host and that he would be also a party in the discussions.
He realizes, of course, that the President and the Prime
Minister will wish to have a great deal of talk between
themselves or with their staffs and every arrangement would
be made for this. He also realizes that he could not be a
full partner in the discussions without creating awkward (?)
problems about the position of other Dominion Prime Ministers.
At the same time it would be extremely embarrassing politi-
cally to the Government here if the Canadian Prime Minister
seemed to be less than a fairly full partner in a meeting in
Canada and would cause undesirable comment from general point
of view in Quebec and everywhere in Canada. On the other
hand, a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister
in Quebec with the Canadian Prime Minister attending would,
of course, delight everyone here and do much solid good.

Prime Minister to High Commissioner Canada 23 July 1943.
Your number 1779.

I do not anticipate any difficulty in arranging for
MacKenzie King and his principal military advisers to be
adequately associated with the conference. My idea is that
MacKenzie King himself, together with the Canadian Chiefs of
Staff, should attend all plenary meetings over which the
President and I preside and that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff should attend all plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

2. These arrangements will not, of course, prevent my having private and off the record discussions alone with the President whenever he or I may think it necessary; nor will they prevent the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee (which consists of the American and British Chiefs of Staff) from meeting alone and in camera whenever the nature of the discussion renders this desirable.

3. The above is, of course, business only and apart from all social and personal meetings between hosts and guests and special Anglo-Canadian discussions to which I am looking forward.

4. Pray sound Mackenzie King on the above proposals and say that if they are agreeable to him I will seek the President's approval.

Prime
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 378 Filed 25/1152Z

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Para 1. Operation quadrant. As Colonel Warden (see my immediately following) is going by the same method as last time, he will have to arrive at "Abraham" during the 10th and will await you there. I should be glad to know if your delay till the 17th means that you are going to meet UJ. If this is so and you are not taking your staff with you, it has occurred to me that perhaps these might come to "Abraham" a few days earlier so as to begin the discussions, which are always lengthy, with their opposite number. On military grounds, we are very anxious that the staffs should be in contact as soon as possible.

Para 2. Your 323. I quite understand your position and am supporting it by a message to MacKenzie King, which I am repeating to you. I expect that McCarthy will be able to convince him, as he is very
keen on the project.

Para 3. Colonel Warden is bringing Mrs Warden with him as you have several times kindly suggested, also Lieutenant Mary Warden as aide de camp. All three members of the Warden family are greatly looking forward to the trip.

Para 4. The "HUSKY" news is very good and will be better. I trust we can keep all important options in this theatre open until we meet. I hope you are not too lonely now that Congress has departed. Up to date in July, we have caught 26 canaries, which is good for 25 days. There should be quite a good meal for our cats when the time comes.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

No. 379 Filed 25/11562

Former Naval Person to President.
Personal and No. 379.

My immediately preceding telegram.
Me. Beware of spurious imitations VIDE mission to Moscow.

no sig

25 July 1943
From: London

To: The President of the United States

No. 360  Filed 25/14262

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and [Redacted]. Number 360.

Following is paraphrase of message to Mackenzie King referred to in paragraph 2 of my number 376. Paraphrase begins:

My telegram number 1783 for High Commissioner Canada (second telegram contained in Former Naval Person telegram number 377 to President) was submitted by me to the President. Insuperable difficulties are seen by him in the Canadian Chiefs of Staff attending plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. President points out that this will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from both Brazil and China for membership of the Combined Staffs in Washington, also from Mexico. And from other British Dominions and allied nations as well. McCarthy so President tells me has left for Ottawa to explain the position to you.

I must say I see the difficulties as very little business can of course be done when large numbers are present. It therefore seems to me.
that the British and Canadian staffs should confer together as may be necessary but that at the combined meetings of the two principal Allies, the British alone should be represented.

As he is coming by the same method as last time and runs on schedule Colonel Warden and the whole party will arrive on the 10th at "Abraham". He hopes no preparations or plans of any kind will be made until he is well away. The British-Canadian staffs discussions can take place while awaiting the arrival of PQ and we can formally confer on various outstanding important imperial questions.

For meaning of PQ see my immediately following.

no sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 361 Filed 25/1/29

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 361.

My immediately preceding telegram yourself.

no sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 382, 25 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and secret.
Number 382.

Changes announced in Italy probably portend peace proposals. Let us consult together so as to take joint action. The present stage may only be transition. But anyhow, Hitler will feel very lonely when Mussolini is down and out. No one can be quite sure this may not go farther.

WSC

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 5 1972

1208
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 383

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Para 1. Your 324. I send you my thoughts in
the form in which I submitted them to the war cabinet
obtaining their full approval.

Para 2. I don't think myself that we should be
too particular in dealing with any Non Fascist Govern-
ment even if it is not all we should like. Now
Mussolini is gone I would deal with any Non Fascist
Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The
goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues
also agreed with this. Thoughts on the fall of Mussolini
by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

Para 1. It seems highly probable that the fall of
Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist
Regime and that the new government of the King and Bad-
oglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with
the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be
the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds
first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the
measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

Para 2. At this moment above all others our thoughts
must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the de-
struction of Hitler Hitlerism and next Germany. Every
military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy
(should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.

Para 3. The first of these is in the Presidents
words "The control of all Italian territory and trans-
portation against the Germans in the north and against
the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of air-
fields of all kinds." This must include the surrender to our Garrisons of Sardinia the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

Para 4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian fleet or at least its effective demobilization and paralysis and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to whatever extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.

Para 5. Also of equal consequence the immediate withdrawal from or surrender of all Italian forces in Corsica the Riviera including Toulon and the Balkan Peninsula to within Yugoslavia Albania and Greece.

Para 6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country is the immediate liberation of all British prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. I regard it as a matter of honour and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

Para 7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population. We should demand their surrender and that any Italian Government with whom we can reach a settlement shall do their utmost to procure this. It may be however that the German divisions will cut their way northward in spite of anything that the Italian armed forces are capable of doing. We should provoke this conflict as much as possible and should not hesitate to send troops and air support to assist the Italians in procuring the surrender of the Germans south of Rome.

Para 8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of
Rome. We should however try to get possession of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. And this is a time to dare.

Para 9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population will now be turned against the German intruders who have as they will feel brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

Para 10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defences in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are 15 German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which 10 are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

Para 11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolinis fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States acting jointly or severally should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia.

Para 12. The surrender of to "The President" "the head devil together with his partners in crime" must be
considered an eminent object and one for which we should strive by all means in our power short of wrecking the immense prospects which have been outlined in earlier paragraphs. It may be however that these criminals will flee into Germany or escape into Switzerland. On the other hand they may surrender themselves or be surrendered by the Italian Government. Should they fall into our hands we ought now to decide in consultation with the United States and after agreement with them with the USSR what treatment should be meted out to them. One may prefer prompt execution without trial except for identification purposes. Others may prefer that they be kept in confinement until the end of the war in Europe and their fate decided together with that of other war criminals. Personally I am fairly indifferent on this matter provided always that no solid military advantages are sacrificed for the sake of immediate vengeance.
July 27, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President directed that this copy of a message from the Prime Minister be given Admiral Leahy to discuss with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President noted that the Prime Minister made no reference to what should happen to the troops in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece; and he also noted that the Prime Minister made no reference to self-determination.

He wishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider his comments as well as the whole message.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incel.
Encl. Pres. 3383, 26 July 1943.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 384, 27 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 384.

We have 74,000 British prisoners in Italy and there are also about 30,000 Yugoslavs and Greeks. We cannot agree to any promise to release "hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners now in our hands" unless our men and Allied men are saved from the horrors of German captivity and restored to us.

Moreover, apart from Italian prisoners taken in Tunis and Sicily, we have at least a quarter of a million Italians captured by Wavell two years ago and parked about the world. We think it is too much to offer the return of such a large plurality of prisoners arising from earlier phases of the war, nor do we think it necessary. We are ready, however, to agree to all Italian prisoners taken in Tunis and taken or to be taken in Sicily being traded against the British and Allied prisoners mentioned above.

Accordingly, we suggest that Eisenhower's message at this point should read as follows: Begins:

"Your men will return to their normal life and to their productive vocations and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them, etc." Ends.

Otherwise, we cordially agree with the message and to save time, I am repeating this telegram to Eisenhower, making it clear that he should not act till he has your okay.

Since writing the above, I have received Eisenhower's NAP 302 of July 27, setting forth proposed armistice terms.
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No. 384, 27 July 1943

This meets our point about prisoners and seems otherwise satisfactory to us. It is being immediately examined. The broadcast, however, which is coming out before they have asked for an armistice, should still surely be amended as suggested above.

No Sig
From: M A London
To: The President of the United States
No. 385

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
personal and .

Para 1. Colonel and Mrs Warden with Lieut M Warden would like to spend the night of the 10th at Abraham to arrange things, and could reach you evening of 12th. They are all looking forward very much to this.

Para 2. Anthony will fly over to join me at Abraham in time for our general meeting there. I am bringing Leathers who wants to contact Lew Douglas and also would like Averell to come too if you approve.

Para 3. Looking forward much to hearing you tonight. I was delighted at your rebuke to the foolish broadcast against the King of Italy.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 386, 28 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President, Personal, No. 386.

Following for President Roosevelt from Treasurer of Grey's Inn.

"The Treasurer and Masters of the Bench of Grey's Inn, including Master Winston Churchill, recall with lively pleasure your dining with them in the summer of 1918 and your speech on that occasion: and from their ruined hall send you their most respectful greetings."

Signed Macaskie, Treasurer of Gray's Inn.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
PA

To find out from the British Embassy what the full name and title of the Treasurer of Gray's Inn is. I want to thank him.

F. D. R.

Nicholas Macashie K.C.
Treasurer, Gray's Inn
London, W.C.1
Nicholas Macaskie, K.C.
Treasurer, Grays Inn,
London, W. C. 1
August 15, 1943.

My dear Mr. Macaskie:

Your telegram gave me the greatest of pleasure. I shall never forget that most interesting dinner in the summer of 1918. The Ambassador, most fortunately for me, had a bad cold and asked me to go in his place. Perhaps you will remember that my old friend, F. F. Smith, broke another precedent of Gray's Inn when he called on the Italian Ambassador and myself at the end of the speeches to say a few words without warning. For the Italian Ambassador it was easy for he spoke rapidly in Italian and was understood by few — but my problem was far worse. Fortunately, I was able to announce the landing of 200,000 American troops in France during the previous week.

I have thought much of your wonderful great hall, and I greatly hope you will be able to restore it and that enough of the walls and woodwork remain to make that possible.

I told the Prime Minister when he was with me at Hyde Park the other day that I also hoped some of the vintage pepper had been saved.

Please give my regards and thanks to your masters of the bench.

Very sincerely yours,

Nicholas Macaskie, Esq., K.C.
Treasurer, Gray's Inn,
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 387, 29 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. No. 387.

I was so glad to hear your voice again and that you were in such good spirits, and also that you like our plans for "QUADRANT" to which we are all ardently looking forward.

I have told Eisenhower that we fully agree to his releasing the proclamation with our amendment inserted about British and Allied prisoners.

Discarding etiquette, I have sent a direct message to the King of Italy through Switzerland emphasizing our vehement and savage interest in this matter. I am most grateful for your promise to put the screw on through the Pope or any other convenient channel. If the King and Badoglio allow our prisoners and key men to be carried off by the Huns without doing their utmost to stop it, by which I mean using physical force, the feeling here would be such that no negotiations with that Government would stand a chance in public opinion.

Armistice terms: The War Cabinet are quite clear that we ought not to broadcast armistice terms to the enemy. It is for their responsible government to ask formally for an armistice on the basis of our principle of unconditional surrender. Then I suppose envoys would be appointed and a rendezvous fixed. Our version is already in your hands. As you will see, it follows the main lines of Eisenhower's draft, but is more precise and is cast in a form suited to discussion between plenipotentiaries rather than a popular appeal. There are great dangers in trying to dispel this sort of dose up with jam for the patient.

We also think that the terms should cover civil as well as military requirements, and that it would be much better for them to be settled by envoys appointed by our two governments than by the general commanding in the field. He can of course deal with any proposals coming from the troops on his immediate front for a local surrender.
Finally, all our thoughts are concentrated upon the great battle about to be fought by the British 8th and United States 7th Armies against the 65,000 Germans cornered in the eastern Sicilian tip. The destruction of these rascals could not come at a better time to influence events, not only in Italy but throughout the world. It is grand to think of our soldiers advancing side by side like brothers and with good prospects of victory ahead.

No Sig
29 July 1943

From: American Embassy London
To: The President of The United States

No. 388 Filed: 292217Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. No 388.

Your No. 326. I am most grateful to you for your news. The Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson, has been responsible for handling this matter on our account for the last 2 years. I am sending him over by air immediately. He should arrive in Washington on Monday or Tuesday. He will make contact with our technical expert, Akers, and thereafter be at your disposal to discuss with anyone you wish. He will endeavour to meet Colonel Warden at Abraham on August 10 or 11 on his way home.

Prime

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
From: American Embassy London
To: The President of The United States
No. 389  Filed: 3001402
Former Naval Person to President personal and Number 389.

Your 330. I do not know why we should assume that any proposal for armistice will necessarily be made to Eisenhower, none of whose forces are in contact with the enemy except in Sicily and then with Germans only. It would seem more likely that the Italian Government will negotiate through the Vatican, the Turks or the Swiss. You may have information which has not yet reached me.

If, however, Eisenhower is suddenly approached by an envoy, I agree that he should have precise terms embodying the principle of unconditional surrender which he could immediately use as the basis for granting an armistice.

We have examined the form proposed by him for this purpose in N.A.F. 302 and propose that it should be accepted subject to the following amendments in addition to that proposed by you in his paragraph 5.

(1) Omit all reference in the articles as drafted to German Forces and add one general paragraph providing that Italians will use their best endeavours to deny to the Germans facilities which might be used against us. This is necessary because of the practical impossibility of enforcing precise guarantees on this matter now embodied in the articles.

(2) Substitute for paragraph 7 the following: "The Commander in Chief reserves himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief..."

30 July 1943
From: American Embassy London
To: The President of The United States

No. 389  Filed: 3001402

may require. And in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the Military interests of the Allied Nations." This is intended to establish authority of Commander in Chief over existing Italian agencies apart from the establishment of Military Government.

(3) Provision should be added for (A) Our full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilisation and demilitarisation (B) The handing over of war criminals (C) The disposal of Italian merchant shipping. These are of sufficient importance to be specifically mentioned.

In the event, however, of the negotiations taking the other course suggested in paragraph 1 or if there is time as seems probable we should be grateful if you would consider our most carefully drafted terms of surrender which we sent a fortnight ago and let us know what you think of them and what amendments you desire.

I am so glad you agree that the terms in either version should not be broadcast before an armistice has been requested or even immediately afterwards. They would certainly shock the Italian people and would give the Germans full information on which to act.

To save time I am repeating this telegram to General Eisenhower minus paragraphs 5 and 6.

Primo

MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number 390, 30 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and

Another remarkable day with the U boats. Following
report just received from Admiralty. Begin.

"The result of the attack on U boats in the Bay of
Biscay is now known. A signal has been received from the

group of ships making the attack to say that three U boats
have been sunk. One was sunk by aircraft and the survivors
are on board HMS Woodpecker. Another was damaged by air-
craft and finally sunk by a ship and the survivors are on
board HMS Kite. And the third U boat was sunk by a ship
with no survivors but a lot of wreckage and human remains.
It is believed that two of these U boats were supply U boats."

No Sig

(your number 390)

Brand hunting in the Bay of Biscay,
We got one two off Pelifia Brigel
We still need lifebulb weather too.
From: MA London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. 391  31 July 1943

Prime Minister to President personal and number 391.

Your 391.

I have not had time to consult my colleagues but I have no doubt whatever that our joint draft as amended expresses in perfect harmony the minds of our 2 governments on the broad policy to be pursued. It seems to be a case of "Two hearts that beat as one".

I suggest if you agree that in Paragraph 6 last sentence "We" should be substituted for "I" and that the document becomes a joint directive conveying the instructions of our 2 governments to all authorities charged with their execution.

No Sig

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
From: London
To: President of the United States

No 392 31 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President.

The July canaries to date number 35 making a total of 85 in the 91 days since May 1. Good hunting. Instead of making any announcement as agreed on August 10 let us settle together on the 12th what food our cats are to have.

Prime

UNCLASSIFIED
From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States
No. 393  
Former Naval Person to President personal and
Your number 332.

We agree that Eisenhower be authorized to prescribe the conditions contained in your Paragraphs 1 to 11 inclusive in case the Italian government ask him for an armistice. These conditions should not be made public without the prior approval of our two governments.

Para 2. We suggest, if there is time as there probably will be, he should add in Paragraph 4, after the words "The Italian fleet" the words "And Italian aircraft".

Para 3. We also agree that the war criminal problem can be taken up later.

Para 4. So much for the immediate emergency. We hope however that you will also urgently have our instrument of surrender examined, so that we reach full agreement on it. There are several points in this not
dealt with in the emergency terms, and it is couched in a precise, formal and legal vein, on which much thought has been bestowed here. We are rather puzzled to know why you never refer to this document, as it seems to us to be in fact only a more careful and comprehensive version of the emergency armistice terms. We should be very grateful if you would let us know how you feel about it. We ought certainly to have it, or something like it, ready as soon as possible.

Para 5. To save time, I am repeating this present message to Eisenhower, who will thus be fully empowered to act should a sudden emergency occur.

No Sig
From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States
No. 394

Former Naval Person to President personal and official

My position is that once Mussolini and the Fascists are gone, I will deal with any Italian authority which can deliver the goods. I am not in the least afraid for this purpose of seeming to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio, provided they are the ones who can make the Italians do what we need for our war purposes. Those purposes would certainly be hindered by chaos, bolshevisation or civil war. We have no right to lay undue burdens on our troops. It may well be that after the armistice terms have been accepted, both the King and Badoglio will sink under the odium of surrender and that the Crown Prince and a new Prime Minister may be chosen.

I should deprecate any pronouncement about self determination at the present time, beyond what is implicit in the Atlantic charter. I agree with you that

31st July 1943
we must be very careful not to throw everything into the melting pot.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 94, 31 July 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
Your number 331.

It occurs to me on reflection that your proposed omission
of "Nazi Germany" might be misunderstood. It might mean that
if the Germans did what the Italians have done we should have
no further quarrel with them. I, therefore, suggest that
Paragraph 2 should read "namely, the destruction of Hitler
and the total defeat of Germany."

No Sig

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

1233