August 1, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

From President for Former Naval Person personal and Number 336.
Your 392. I agree.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1056, EWT, August 1, 1943.

George W. Elsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
1 August 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna London

Former Naval Person from the President personal and number 337.

Before departing please see Eden in regard to a message from Secretary of State to Winant regarding Russian interest in our prospective attitude toward Italy.

Roosevelt

Released from Map Room at 10:25 EWT 1 August 1943

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (jg) U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971
August 1, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

President to Former Naval Person. Personal and

Referring to your 393 of 31 July, I have authorized Eisenhower
to prescribe the conditions of armistice exactly as stated by you
in 393 and in the event of a request from the Italian Government.

Referring to your proposed "Instrument of Surrender" which is
now being studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Department
of State in Washington, I am in general agreement therewith but must
have further advice from the above mentioned agencies of this
Government before acting thereon. I am directing the Joint Staff
and the State Department to report to me on this document at the
earliest possible date.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1405, EWT, August 1, 1943.

BOYCE P. PRICE
1st Lieutenant, C.S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0003
August 2, 1943.

From: Oppay
To: Alusna, London

President to Former Naval Person. Number 339, personal and

I have read instrument of surrender, and while the language
seems on the whole good, I seriously doubt advisability of using
it at all. After all, the terms of surrender already approved and
sent to Eisenhower ought to be all that is necessary. Why tie his
hands by an instrument that may be oversufficient or insufficient?
Why not let him act to meet situations as they arise?

You and I can discuss this matter at "QUADRANT".

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1735, EWT, August 2, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt./Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.G. Stewart
Date: Nov. 1 1971
August 2, 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 340 from the President to the Former Naval Person. Personal and

I fully approve of the text of your proposed announcement upon
arrival of "QUADRANT" party as given in your 396.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1830, EWT, August 2, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date Nov 1 1971
SECRET

August 3, 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

Former Naval Person from the President, Number 341, and personal.

Receipt is acknowledged of your message 398.

I consider it unwise in the time available to interfere with the military plans of General Eisenhower to attack with bombs today the Marshaling Yards and airfields in Rome.

However, I believe further raids should not continue pending outcome of Vatican efforts.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 0935, EWT, August 3, 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND, Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By______.
Date______.
3 August 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Matter and personal from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 342.

I think we would be in a difficult position if we were to turn down the plea to make Rome an open city. I have just received from Washington the proposed conditions and given my approval in principle but I think we must be very sure of the inspection if the terms are accepted by Italy.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1445, EWT, 3 August 1943.

OGDEN COLLINS, Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
SECRET

PRIORITY

5 August 1943

From: Opnav

To: Aluana, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President, and personal, Number 343.

Referring to your numbers 399 and 400, I earnestly hope that nothing will be done in the matter of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation until we have an opportunity to talk it over together.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 0220, EDT, 4 August 1943.

Boyce F. Price
1st Lieutenant, C. E.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

(*) By direction of the President, the attached messages are forwarded for your information.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.,
Assistant to the Naval Aide

3 Incls.-- (**)
Incl 1 - PM-Pres 4401, 3 Aug 1943.
Incl 2 - PM-Pres 4402, 4 Aug 1943.
Incl 3 - PM-Pres 4403, 4 Aug 1943.

(*) 4401 and 402 authorized by telephone from Major Greer; 4403 by BLACK 17, August 4, 1943.

(un paraphrased)

(**) Original messages sent to General Marshall.
August 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President, the attached messages are forwarded for your information.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. BILSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.,
Assistant to the Naval Aide.

5 Incls:—
Incl 1 = PM-Pres 4401, 5 Aug 1943.
Incl 2 = PM-Pres 4402, 6 Aug 1943.
Incl 3 = PM-Pres 4403, 7 Aug 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
PARAPHRASE

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President of the United States

No. 401, August 3, 1943

As yet, we have not received the proposed conditions. Before decision is taken we ask that, as you assure us, we be allowed to see them.

We doubt the wisdom of declaring Rome an open city in the existing circumstance, as at present informed. Pliemeeal neutralization may be very dangerous at this point, we think. Before they have taken any decision to yield we feel it unwise to make things simpler for the Italians. For example we do not know whether declaring Rome an open city now would preclude our using the communications through Rome, if it later falls into our hands, and thus destroy prospects of the campaign.

Until we have seen the conditions, I beg we may not be committed finally, as I must expect a serious reaction in British public opinion.
PARAPHRASE

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President of the United States
No. 402, August 4, 1943.

Reference my 401.

At the time I telegraphed you, through oversight the proposed terms were not before me although we had already received them. The question of declaring Rome an Open City and the terms will be considered immediately by the cabinet. I shall send you a reply today.
PARAPHRASE

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President of the United States

No. 408, August 4, 1943.

1. Proposals to make Rome an open city on the conditions specified have been given careful consideration by the War Cabinet. The effect on public opinion here, we feel, would be most unfortunate. What will the Russians say? It would be taken as proof that we had abandoned the principle of unconditional surrender and were intending to make a patched-up peace with the King and Badoglio. Throughout Italy and all over the world it would be considered a success for the new Italian Government which would have rescued Rome from all further danger. Rome would appear to be instalment one since undoubtedly their highest hope is to have Italy recognized as a neutral area. We do not think they should be given the slightest encouragement, considering that Badoglio, according to all our information and especially the most secret, is giving repeated assurances to Germany and Japan that they intend to carry on the war and be faithful to their commitments, and that they are even repeating this sort of statement on the radio. Even though it would be convenient to secure the conditions proposed for Rome in the interval, in our opinion this advantage is far outweighed by the stimulus given to a hostile Italian Government and the political misunderstandings which would arise among our own people.

2. In a few months we hope that Rome will be in our hands, and our northward advance will necessitate using its facilities. Should we declare Rome an open city, we will find it almost impossible to take away this status when we desire to use it, its airfields and its communications. These "open city" conditions, applied to us, would paralyze the entire further campaign according to the British Chiefs of Staff, and if they were altered or broken the Germans would certainly threaten Rome with bombardment. In our opinion this is a grave danger.

3. Under these circumstances might it not be better for us to consider the matter when we meet? We are most reluctant to interrupt such bombing of the marshalling yards etc., as Eisenhower evidently thought desirable, both in the interest of putting the maximum political and military pressure on the Italian people and Government as well as for strictly military reasons. It must be postponed until you and I have met, if you so desire.

RESUMED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. N. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

No. 344.

Your number 407.

Regret delay in replying. Suggest thin clothes but be prepared for a variety of weather. Delighted to see you in any costume.

Roosevelt

11 August 1943.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1720, EWT, 11 August 1943.

George M. Elsey
Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date: Nov 1 1971

Original delivered to British Joint Staff Mission for transmission to the Prime Minister.
No. 345.

Personal and secret for the Former Naval Person. Number 345.

Reference your 413. Delighted with arrangements. Things are progressing everywhere.

ROOSEVELT

NOTE: This was sent as WHITE 89 (through the telegrapher's office to Major Greer in Quebec).

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date: NOV 1 1977
26 August 1943

From: The President

To: Colonel Warden, Personal and

Number 346. Your number 414. Wednesday, the First, is
all right in every way. If the Subaltern wants to go to Oglethorpe
it would give her more time in Washington if she were to come down
a day or two ahead.

I hope Lady Warden is getting a real rest and that you
are too. Also I hope that you have gone to one of the lakes. Be
sure to have the big one weighed and verified by MacKenzie.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. S. Stimp
Date NOV 1 1977

Released from the White House Map Room
1645 EWT, 26 August 1948.

Chester Hammond, Lt. Colonel, OBC
August 26, 1943

From: The President
To: Colonel Warden, Personal and (Thru BAD)

Number 347.

I hope you have seen Uncle Joe's new message which is greatly improved in its tone. As you and he know, I am lost until Monday and I would let a few days go by till we answer him.

However, my first feeling is that he has come around to our secondary meeting and that it should be held very soon.

Released from the White House Map Room
2230, ENT, August 26, 1943

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.,
Lt. (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
From: The President
To: Colonel Warden

Personal and Number 348.

It is a coincidence that I was on the point of sending you a suggestion for an interim message to Uncle Joe when yours came this morning. Therefore, I am sending the one you suggest via the Russian Embassy in Washington.

I am delighted, as Quebec papers say, you are teasing the trout, but I do not believe New York newspaper accounts that you have landed a five pounder. I shall require sworn verification.

We are looking forward to your arrival Wednesday evening.

Am checking with Dr. Conant in regard to degree and will let you know.

We will be listening to you on the air on Tuesday.
From The President

To The Prime Minister, Quadrant

Number 349

In response to Eisenhower's NAF342 (Copy of which has been sent to you by British Staff Mission) I have sent him a message authorizing him to proceed with military terms, obtain signature, and then give Italian representative the comprehensive terms. I have taken this action because time is of the essence.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 1925, EWT, August 29, 1943

Herman Shall
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
From: The President
To: Col. Warden

Number 350

Perfectly delighted that Lady Warden can come too.

We will have a quiet family party. Elliot and Ruth will be here and Margaret Suckley and no one else. The Marvelous big fish dropped out of the clouds and we had two for supper.

No sig

Released from White House Map Room at 2231, ENT, August 30, 1943

Herman Shall
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
#350, Aug 30.

Cpl. Wardrope

Perfectly delighted that Lucy Wardrope came too. We will have a quiet family party. Moffet, Rutt will be here and Margaret Wirth and woman here. The marbles big fish dropped out of the clouds and we had 2 for supper. No sign.
Message from Colonel Warden to the President.

Clemmie has benefited by her rest up here and would very much like to come with us to Washington if you still have room. She would not be able to undertake any public engagements.
19 September 1943

PRIORITIZE

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and to the Former Naval Person from the President. No. 351.

Delighted you are all safely home, and I hope you had a smooth run. All is quiet here. Congress has been here for a week and it is still quiet. My best to all three of you.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1908 EWT, 19 September 1943

B. P. Price

B. P. PRICE,
Captain, CE.
20 September 1943

URGENT
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President to the Former Naval Person. Personal and

Number 352.

I will send the following message to General Eisenhower
immediately upon your concurrence.

In view of the existing situation in Italy the earliest
practicable action is important.

Message begins:

1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions
pending further instructions.

2. On the basis of military necessity, you are em-
powered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the
provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians,
within the limit of their capacities, to wage war against Germany.

3. On condition that it declare war on Germany, the
present government of Italy be permitted, subject to the provisions
of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the government of Italy
and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against
Germany. Such relationship to be based on the clear understanding
that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammelled right of
the people of Italy to decide on the form of government they will

-1-
eventually have; that no final form of the government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission/under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.

5. You will encourage, in all practicable ways, the vigorous use, under your direction, of the Italian armed forces against Germany.

6. You are authorized to inform the French military authorities of the above to the extent that you deem advisable.

(*) Add: "will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission". Correction sent to London as PRES-PM #353.

Released from the White House Map Room at 2149 EWT, 20 September 1943 by

F. H. ORRHAM
1st Lt, AGD.
From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, London  

PRIORITY  

September 21, 1943  

Personal and secret from the President for the Former Naval Person Number 353.  

Please make following correction in my Number 352 of September 20:  

In paragraph four of proposed message to Eisenhower please insert QUOTE will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission UNQUOTE between QUOTE contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission UNQUOTE and QUOTE under the Allied Commander in Chief UNQUOTE so that now the sentence will read QUOTE The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters. UNQUOTE. QUOTE  

Roosevelt  

Released from the White House Map Room at 1055, EWT, Sept 21, 1943.  

DECLASSIFIED  

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  

By  

Date  

CHESTER HAMMOND,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

21 September 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 354 from the President to the Former Naval Person. and personal.

Receipt is acknowledged of your No. 418 of September 21 suggesting a reply to Eisenhower's No. 409.

My No. 352, which was also sent to Moscow, evidently crossed your No. 418.

On the whole I very much prefer my No. 352 as instructions to Eisenhower and I will await a reply from you before taking further action.

I have no objection to the King's making an address but from things I hear I do not know how effective he might be.

I think we can safely leave this to Eisenhower.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1130, EWT, 21 Sept 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
Receipt is acknowledged of your No 418 of September 21 suggesting a reply to Eisenhower's No 409.

My Number 352, which was also sent to Moscow, evidently crossed your No 418.

On the whole I very much prefer my No 352 as my otps to Eisenhower and I will await a reply from you before taking further action.

I have no objection to the King's making an address but from things 4 years ago I do not know how effective he might be.

I think we can safely leave this to Eisenhower.
23 September 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President to the Former Naval Person Number 356.

Personal and

Your number 419.

I have sent to General Eisenhower as a directive agreed upon by both of us my message as sent to you in my 352.

I also sent him your message to me number 418 as commentary.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.G. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1974

Released from the White House Map Room at 1230, EWT, 23 September 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

231765
VER 3457

- 1 -
23 September 1943

From the President to the Former Naval Person Number 355.

Personal and

Your Number 419.

I have sent to General Eisenhower as a directive agreed upon
by us my message as sent to you in my 352.

I also sent him your message to me Number 416 as commentary.

ROOSEVELT
25 September 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna London

To the Former Naval Person from the President. Number 356. Personal and Your number 421.

I go along with your thought about the long set of terms if signature can be obtained quickly and I am so advising Eisenhower.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date

Released from the White House Map Room at 1245, EWT, 25 September 1943 by

G. M. EISEY,
Lt (J.g.) U.S.N.R.
Prime Minister to President personal and number 421.

My number 420 of September 24th.

MacMillan now tells me that he is confident that Badoglio’s signature can be obtained to the whole set of terms within the next few days and that the longer we leave it the more haggling there will be. It may be some time before the new commission can give their views and I should myself feel happier if we clinched the matter now. This might save us a good deal of trouble later on.

At Eisenhower’s suggestion we have made the preamble less harsh. We have also provided that the armistice of September 3rd will remain operative.

See also U. J. Passim.

By R. E. Parks Date May 5 1972
To Former Vocal Person: #356.

Your reply I go along with your thought about the long set of terms of signature can be obtained quickly and I am so referring.

Freundheimer

[Signature]

Reported

[Signature]

Copy to Freundheimer
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 357, personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person.

I have just sent the following message to Marshal Stalin:

"I regret that I feel it necessary to reopen the question of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, but on further consideration I am most anxious that Secretary Hull attend in person in the meeting with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden.

"Mr. Hull would find the long flight to Moscow extremely difficult for physical reasons. Would it be possible therefore for the conference to be held in England? It would, I believe, be a great advantage to all of us if Mr. Hull could personally attend the conference.

"I feel sure the British would be willing to make the change. Could the date be made October 15 for the opening session?"

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1240, EWT, 25 Sept 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

From the President to the Former Naval Person. Number 358.

Prior to the receipt of your 422 the Secretary of War asked General Eisenhower to express his opinion and make recommendation on the letter addressed to me by the King of Italy.

Upon receipt of a reply from Eisenhower I will communicate further with you.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1535, EDT, 28 September 1945.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By U.G. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
To Prime from President
Prime to the receipt of your

422 the Secretary of War

has asked General Eisenhower
to express his opinion and
make recommendation on
the letter addressed to
me by the King of Italy.
Upon receipt of a
reply from Eisenhower
well communicate with
you.

Roosevelt

#358
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
25 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Admiral Brown wondered if you think that the President should reply to the attached message from the King of Italy.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

1 Inc.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
25 September 1943

SECRET

From: Ogden
To: Alusa, London

Secret and personal from the President for the Former Naval Person Number 359.

Murphy reports the following in relation to Corsican expedition by Giraud's forces:

"This expedition by French forces has given rise to further discussion with respect to status of CINC in the Committee.

"Last Saturday a dispute took place in a meeting which resulted in the abrupt departure of De Gaulle. I was informed by Giraud that in agreement with allied CINC and for reasons of military security he had not divulged to the Committee the preparations which led to the Corsican expedition. Then, twelve hours before departure he had personally informed De Gaulle, who expressed full approval. However, after reflection, De Gaulle apparently lost his temper at the meeting on September 18th and protested against the manner in which preparations had been held secret by the military. He particularly protested against installation of state of siege which puts Corsica directly under the jurisdiction of CINC. As political leader of the Committee, De Gaulle claims he should similarly exercise control.

"At the moment the situation is somewhat tense, but Giraud refused to take the matter seriously. He has left secretly for Corsica where he will assume command. This latter move has brought about the charge by some members of the Committee that he is acting without the Committee's
authority.

"Now General De Gaulle is taking advantage of this discussion to bring up the issue again regarding the CINC, somewhat in the same manner as his proposal referred to in my 1626 of 3 September. He is reviving appointment of a Defense Commissioner and the single presidency of the Committee.

"In today's meeting the discussions were acrimonious but it was decided to delay the issue until September 24 when Giraud returns."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1850, EWT, 25 September 1943.

ROYCE F. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.
27 September 1943

From: Oppen
To: Alusna, London

Number 360 from the President to the Former Naval Person.

and personal.

General Eisenhower has recommended that the long term surrender
document, when it is signed by the Italian Government, should be
kept confidential because of a continuing attack on all armistice terms
by the Italian Fascist group in Rome.

I am in agreement with this recommendation of Eisenhower and will
await your reaction thereto.

It is my present thought that my reply to the King's letter should
be as follows:

"It is the intention of the Allied Governments to obtain
control of Rome at the earliest practicable date, as an open
city if practicable and if the enemy will agree that it is an
open city under the conditions originally proposed by your Govern-
ment.

"It is my desire that civil government in the recovered areas
in Italy shall be administered by the Italian Government insofar
as is permitted by military considerations and under the super-
vision of the Allied Supreme Commander.

"Consideration is now being given to arranging a more favor-
able exchange for the lira."

Eisenhower suggests that an exchange rate of 80 lira to the dollar
and 320 to the pound would have the desired effect and would not work a
hardship on our troops.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date: NOV 1 1972
If it is practicable I should like to have your advice on all of this in time to instruct Eisenhower by September 29 when he will confer with Radoglio. I have not yet received the U.S. Treasury's recommendation.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1205, EWT, 27 September 1945.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
September 27, 1943.

SECRET

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #360

General Eisenhower has recommended that the long term surrender document, when it is signed by the Italian Government, should be kept confidential because of a continuing attack on all armistice terms by the Italian Fascist group in Rome.

I am in agreement with this recommendation of Eisenhower and will await your reaction thereto.

It is my present thought that my reply to the King's letter should be as follows:

"It is the intention of the Allied Governments to obtain control of Rome at the earliest practicable date as an open city if the enemy will agree that it is an open city under the conditions originally proposed by your Government.

"It is my desire that civil government in the recovered areas in Italy shall be administered by the Italian Government in so far as is permitted by military considerations and under the supervision of the Allied Supreme Commander.

"Consideration is now being given to arranging a more favorable exchange for the lira."

Eisenhower suggests that an exchange rate of 80 lira to the dollar and 320 to the pound would have the desired effect and would not work a hardship on our troops.

If it is practicable I should like to have your advice on all of this in time to instruct Eisenhower by September 29 when he will confer with Badoglio.
FROM: OCMAY
TO: ALASKA, LONDON

THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 361. AND PERSONAL.

I HAVE LEARNED THAT SPORSA WILL DEPART AS SOON AS NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE. THIS SHOULD BE NOT LATER THAN OCTOBER SECOND AND POSSIBLY ON SEPTEMBER THIRTIETH.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1435, EWT, 27 September 1943.

Franklin H. Graham
1st Lieutenant, AGD

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
September 27, 1943.

I have learned that Sforza will depart as soon as necessary arrangements can be made. This should be not later than October second and possibly on September thirtieth.

ROOSEVELT,

W.D.L.
To the Former Naval Person from the President personal and Number 362.

I am sending you for your information a message I have just received from Molotov. You will notice that Paragraph 4 is exactly the opposite of the view expressed by Uncle Joe in his message to you which you passed on to me in your No. 420. I am having the State Department check Paragraph 4 to see if it is an error in coding or transmission, and if necessary, to go to Molotov to see if it is an error originating in the Soviet Foreign Office.

Message for the Secretary of State from Moscow dated September 26 begins:

"A secret message dated September 25 was delivered at the Embassy this morning, addressed to the Secretary of State and signed by Molotov. As translated by an officer of the Embassy, the message reads as follows:

"Having considered your letter of September 22, 1943, which gives the contents of the President's proposed message to General Eisenhower concerning Italy, it is considered necessary by the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government of the following:

"One. In view of the situation existing in Italy at the present time, the Soviet Government considers it particularly necessary to expedite the signature with Italy of detailed armistice terms.

"Two. Obviously, the Allies must be concerned with the strict execution by Italy, under Allied control, of the detailed terms of the armistice ratified and agreed upon by them. The Soviet Government..."
therefore, sees no reason, as is proposed in point two of the message, for giving instructions dealing with the lightening of the terms of the military armistice for Italy, especially since from the contents of point two, it is not exactly clear what lightening of the terms is being considered. It should also be borne in mind that a change in the provisions ratified by the Allied Governments can take place obviously only with the agreement of the Governments concerned.

"Three. It is considered by the Soviet Government that the establishment of an Allied Commission with the powers and functions described in point four of the message is not necessary. As is well known, the Military Political Commission was established by decision of the three Governments, after the ratification of the detailed armistice terms. As a result of this, a controlled commission as proposed in article 37 of the detailed terms should not be needed. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, therefore, the work of the Military Political Commission should include the direction and coordination of the activities of all military bodies organizing conquered enemy territory and of any Allied civil authorities concerned with the armistice and control over execution of the armistice terms. Consequently, in the functions of the Military Political Commission, there should be included the issuance from time to time of directives and instructions on military, administrative and political questions for the Nadoglio Government. Operational military questions should remain entirely under the Allied Commander in Chief's direction.

"Therefore, the Soviet Government sees no reason to establish an Allied Commission with the above mentioned functions under the direction of General Eisenhower.
"Four. The Soviet Government is opposed to Italy fighting together with the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union against Germany.

"Five. The inalienable right of the Italian People, as expressed in point three of the message, to decide the form of government which they will adopt eventually is agreed upon by the Soviet Government, as are points five and six of the proposed statement."

End of message from Molotov.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2110, EWT, September 27, 1943

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am sending you for your information a message I have just received from Molotov. You will notice that Paragraph 4 is exactly the opposite of the view expressed by Uncle Joe in his message to you which you passed on to me in your No. 420. I am having the State Department check Paragraph 4 to see if it is an error in coding or transmission, and if necessary go to Molotov to see if it is an error originating in the Soviet Foreign Office.

Message Begins:

Paraphrase of message.

Message Ends.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov. 1 1974
PRIORITY

29 September 1943.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

The President to Former Naval Person Number 363. Personal and

The following message is received from General Eisenhower:

"In order to insure maximum effect and clearly define Italian position consider it most desirable that joint announce-
ment by Prime Minister and President be made explaining co-bellig-
erent status. Announcement to follow immediately after release of Italian declaration war on Germany. Suggest simultaneous release London and Washington.

"Please say if this recommendation is approved."

The following is submitted for your consideration as a suitable joint statement from both of us:

"The governments of Great Britain and the United States acknowledge the position of the Italian government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept with appreciation the active cooperation of the Italian government and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8 culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have, in fact, made Italy a co-belligerent and the American and British governments will continue to treat with the Italian government on that basis (add the Soviet government if concurrence is received). The two governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.G. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971

0049
submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy and emphasize that the relationship which has developed between the government of Italy and the governments of the United Nations is based on the clear understanding that it will not in any way prejudice the military interests of the United Nations or the absolute and untrammeled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have."

I will await your reply.

Roosevelt
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I will await your reply.

[Handwritten signature]

PRESIDENT TO PRIME (Cont'd) September 27, 1943

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Brumfield
Date Nov 1 1977

-2-
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Provided Marshal Badoglio's government declares war on Germany and states that when the German invader is driven from the soil of Italy Marshal Badoglio will turn over the government to a successor constitutionally and freely elected by the Italian people, the President and Prime Minister jointly issue a statement substantially as follows:

"The governments of Great Britain and the United States acknowledge the position of the Italian government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept with appreciation the active cooperation of the Italian government and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8 culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have, in fact, made Italy a co-belligerent and the American and British governments will continue to treat with the Italian government on that basis (add the Soviet government if concurrence is received.) The two governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy and emphasize that the relationship which has developed between the government of Italy and the governments of the..."
United Nations is based on the clear understanding that it will not in any way prejudice the military interests of the United Nations or the absolute and untrammeled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have."

This draft has also been approved by the State, War and Navy Departments.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of SEC ARMY
BY TAG PER 720514
By RAL Date MAY 6 1972
29 September 1943

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA

NUMBER 364 FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PERSONAL.

REFERENCE MY NUMBER 362 TO YOU DATED 27 SEPTEMBER.

WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD THAT THERE WAS AN ERROR IN TRANSLATION IN THE MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW. THE CORRECTION NOW MAKES PARAGRAPH FOUR READ:

"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOT OPPOSED TO ITALY'S FIGHTING TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST GERMANY."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1900, EWT, 29 September 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.A.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1977
PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST GERMANY."

ROOSEVELT
30 September 1943

From: Opnav
To: Ahusa, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 365.

Referring to your 425 in regard to Sforza playing with the team. His public speech was to say the least not complimentary to the King of Italy.

I find, however, in a recording of his September 26th speech the following extracts which indicate that he may be useful to our war effort.

"With the present leaders of Italy, if they behave well, if they wage a war well, our duty is to go to war all of us and to oust the Germans out of Italy."

"I say so out of my only main desire to do a thing which helps victory - we may rally around any government which enjoys the confidence of the Allies if this government for the time being proves that it is able to wage a war and to oust the Germans out of Italy."

"If I had to proclaim a republic tomorrow, I would say No - First of all we must oust the Germans out of Italy. This is what the Italians want but, when Italy is free, the Italians will decide."

I am delighted with your news of the TIRPITZ and I hope the damage was effective.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1205, EWT, September 30, 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.Navy
September 29, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO Prime # 365

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[Signature]