1st August 1943

From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 396

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I have been considering the terms of the communiqué which I suggest should be issued immediately upon the arrival of the Quadrant party in Canada, and I should be glad to have your comments on the following text. I am also consulting MacKenzie King. There are two points I should mention in connection with it:

(A) On security grounds I have purposely not mentioned that our joint conference will be at Abraham, so as to avoid indicating your future movements.

(B) Anthony is coming over later by air, and his presence will be announced on his arrival.

Para 2. Text of draft communiqué. Begins:

The Prime Minister of Great Britain has arrived in Canada accompanied by Lord Leathers the Minister of War Transport of the United Kingdom and the British Chiefs of Staff.

Mr Churchill was received on arrival by Mr MacKenzie
King and during his stay in Canada will be the guest of the Canadian Government. Mr Churchill will have discussions with Mr MacKenzie King and thereafter will attend a conference with President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and United Kingdom.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: Military Attache London England
To: President of the United States

Number 397 2 August 1943

Former Naval Person to President personal.

Your number 338. Many thanks.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number 398, 3 August 1943

Formal Naval Person to President. Personal

War Cabinet think that the time for negotiating about Rome being an open city has passed. Surely there would be the utmost danger that any such bargain would encourage the Italians to make a try on for a neutralization of Italy itself. Anyhow, that is the way it would be viewed here.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 399, 3 August 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 399.

I am sorry not to have answered your number 321 in reply to my 373. I thought first that your proposed formula was rather chilling and would not end the agitation there is for recognition in both our countries. Meanwhile, events have moved in our favour. The Committee have felt acutely being ignored while the whole Italian problem is open. De Gaulle, I feel, has climbed down a good deal and is now more enclosed in the general body of the Committee. The arrangements for command also seem more satisfactory to us than the previous deadlock.

I have, therefore, asked the Foreign Office to suggest a certain modification in your formula designed to bring our two views into harmony. Please note especially the sentence "The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war." This gives us complete power to override or break with them in the event of bad faith or misconduct. Revised formula follows in my next. Please let me know what you think of it or how it could be improved. If we cannot agree we will talk it over at QUADRANT.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 400, 3 August 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 400.

Following is revised draft formula "Recognition" of the French Committee of National Liberation referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people in French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

"The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

"On this understanding the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement:

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. The two Governments also recognize the Committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war, within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation. They take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee
to be recognized as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this request in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

"In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United States or United Kingdom authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements: and the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation will remain in force as between the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation."

No Sig
3rd August 1943

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

No. Unnumbered  Filed 3/0901Z

Former Naval Person to President personal and unnumbered.

Following is amendment to Paragraph 1 of my number 400.

For "French people in French Territories," read "French People and French Territories."

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 401, 3 August 1943

Prime Minister to President. Personal and Number 401.

Your number 342. We have not yet received the proposed conditions and we ask that, as you assure us, we may be allowed to see them before decision is taken.

As at present informed we doubt the wisdom of declaring Rome an open city in the prevailing circumstance. We think piecemeal neutralization may be very dangerous at this juncture. We think it unwise to make things easier for the Italians before they have taken any decision to yield. Nor do we know, for instance, whether declaring Rome an open city now would preclude our using the communications through Rome, should it later fall into our possession, and thus destroy prospects of the campaign.

I must expect a serious reaction in British public opinion, and until we have seen the conditions, I beg that we may not be committed finally.

No Sig

REGRADED UNGRADED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Received 9:05 pm EWT August 3

0067
From: London England
To: The President of The United States
No. 402  Filed: 0825Z/4

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and not number 402.
Reference my 401.

I find we had already received the proposed terms but by an oversight they were not placed before me at the time of my telegraphing to you. They and the question of declaring Rome an Open City will be immediately considered by the Cabinet and I hope to send you a reply today.

No Sig

*See attached correction.*
From: London England
To: The President of the United States

No. Correction on 402 Filed: 0908Z/4

With reference to our last message number 402, will you please insert at the beginning of the message "Reference my 401".

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 403

Former Naval Person to President personal and

1. Your number 342. War Cabinet have now given most careful consideration to proposals to make Rome an open city on the conditions specified. We are sure that the effect on public opinion here would be most unfortunate. What will the Russians say? It would be taken as a proof that we were going to make a patched-up peace with the King and Badoglio and had abandoned the principle of unconditional surrender. It would be taken all over the world and throughout Italy as a success for the new Italian Government who would have rescued Rome from all further danger. No doubt their greatest hope is to have Italy recognized as a neutral area, and Rome would seem to be a first instalment. Considering that Badoglio, according to all our information and especially the most secret, is giving repeated assurances to Germany and Japan that they mean to carry on the war and be faithful to their engagements, and that they are even repeating this kind of statements on the radio, we do not think they should be given the slightest encouragement. Although in the interval it would be convenient to secure the conditions proposed for Rome, this advantage in our opinion is far outweighed by the political misunderstanding which would arise among our own people and the stimulus given to a hostile Italian Government.

2. We hope that in a few months Rome will be in our hands, and we shall need to use its facilities for the northward advance. If Rome has been declared an open city by us, it will be practically impossible for us to take away its status when we want to use it and its communications and airfields. The British
Chiefs of Staff say these "open city" conditions, applied to us, would paralyze the whole further campaign: and certainly the Germans would threaten Rome with bombardment if they were altered or broken. We think this a great danger.

3. In these circumstances would it not be better for us to talk the matter over when we meet? In the interest of putting the maximum political and military pressure on the Italian people and Government as well as for strictly military reasons we are most reluctant to interrupt such bombing of the marshalling yards, etc, as Eisenhower evidently thought desirable: but if you so desire it must be postponed until you and I have met.

4. Your number 343. On this ground also I am so glad that we are going to meet. Pressure is growing from all quarters in this country, from the Dominions, particularly from Canada, and from several of the United Nations Governments with which we are in touch to "recognize" the French National Committee. MacMillan reports that he and Murphy are agreed in favouring this and that extreme bitterness and resentment will be caused among all classes of Frenchmen by continued refusal. In accordance with your wishes however we shall take no step pending our meeting to which I am keenly looking forward for reasons far removed from all this tiresome business.

Prime
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 404, 4 August 1943
Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
and __St. Nr. 404.

Reference your telegram nr. 340. On sug-
gestion of Mr. MacKenzie King words "later on" will
be substituted for "thereafter" in last sentence
of proposed announcement and latter will not be
issued until after arrival at Abraham.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: MA London
To: The President of The United States

Nr: 405, 4 August, 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and nr 405.

The following story has been told to British Ambassador Campbell at Lisbon by newly arrived Italian Counsellor, Marquis Dayeta who had been sent to get into touch with him by the Badoglio Government with the knowledge of the King and the General Staff. I send it to you for what it is worth which is substantial. Ambassador Campbell was instructed to make no comment. It certainly seems to give inside information. Though I am starting now Anthony will be here and you can communicate both with him and me.

The King and the Army leaders have been preparing Coup D'Etat but this was precipitated (probably by a few days only) by the action of the Grand Fascist Council. Fascism in Italy is extinct.

Every vestige has been swept away. Italy turned Red overnight. In Turin and Milan there were Communist demonstrations which had to be put down by armed force. 20 years of Fascism has obliterated the middle class. There is nothing between the King and the patriots who have rallied round him and rampant Bolshevism (Corrupt passage). They are in complete control. They have an armoured division just outside Rome and will march in if there is any sign of Italians weakening. There are 10,000 scattered about inside Rome, mostly with machine guns. If we bomb Rome again there will be a popular rising and the Germans will
FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT PERSONAL

From: MA London
For: The President of The United States
Nr: 405, 4 August, 1943

then march in and slaughter everybody. They have actually threatened use of gas. As many Italian troops as possible have been concentrated round Rome but they have no stomach for fighting. They have practically no weapons and are no match for even 1 well equipped German division.

In these circumstances, the King and Badoglio whose first thought was to make peace have no alternative but to put up a show of going on with the fight. Guariglia is to meet Ribbentrop (Perhaps tomorrow) as a result of which there will be a communiqué stating in plainer terms than hitherto, that Italy is still the active ally of Germany. But this will be only pretence. The whole country is only longing for peace and above all to be rid of the Germans who are universally execrated.

If we cannot attack Germany immediately through the Balkans thus causing German withdrawal from Italy the sooner we land in Italy the better. The Germans, however, are resolved to defend it line by line. When we land in Italy we shall find little opposition and perhaps even active cooperation on the part of the Italians.

He never from start to finish made any mention of peace terms and his whole story as you will have observed was no more than a plea that we should save Italy from the Germans as well as from herself and do it as quickly as possible.

He expressed the hope that we should not heap abuse on the King and Badoglio (which would precipitate the blood bath) although a little of this would help them to keep up the pretence vis a vis the Germans.
August 5, 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 406 Filed: 0515072
Former Naval person to President personal and
Your number 331 and my numbers 391 and 395.

I have now consulted my colleagues who entirely agree with your suggested amendments on the paper which I called "The Fall of Mussolini", subject to the 2 following points:

(A) We feel that paragraph 11 as now drafted might seem to imply that we had not kept in touch with the Russian Government on our policy in regard to Italy. The Foreign Secretary has however informed the Russian Government of our general intentions in regard to the draft armistice terms and they have expressed themselves as satisfied. To cover this point we suggest the omission of the words "affecting the Balkans" in our paragraph 11.

(B) The point about paragraph 2 which I put to you in my number 395, suggesting "Namely the destruction of Hitler and the total defeat of Germany", which have a narrowing effect.

If you will let me know that you agree to these 2 further amendments, let us regard the document as amended as constituting a joint directive to the United Kingdom and United States Governments on the broad policy to be pursued.

No Sig
From: London Eng
To: The President of the United States

No. 406 Filed: 10342/6

Correction to Former Naval Person telegram to President number 406 of Aug 5th, 1943.

Please delete words "Which has a narrowing effect" at end of paragraph 1 (B) and insert words "Which have a narrowing effect" at end of paragraph 1 (A).

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 407, 11 August 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Confidential and personal.
Number 407.

I have just arrived after a most swift and agreeable journey on which it has been possible to work continuously. The Warden Family are looking forward keenly to their visit to Hyde Park where we propose to arrive the afternoon of the 12th. Are we right in thinking we should all bring our thinnest clothes?

I send you herewith (see my next telegram) the draft of the monthly announcement about U-boats which I have prepared in concert with the Admiralty. Let us discuss it when we meet and a day or two's delay beyond the 10th in its release is not important.

Warmest greetings to all.

No. Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London, England  
To: The President of the United States  

No. 408  
Filed: 11/07592  

Former Naval Person to President personal and  
Nr. 408. Following is draft referred to  
in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:  

During July the U boats have obtained very poor  
results for their widespread effort against Allied  
shipping. The steady flow of transatlantic supplies  
on the greatest scale has continued unmolested, and  
such sinkings as have taken place in distant areas have  
had but an insignificant effect on the conduct of the  
war by the Allies. In fact, July is probably our most  
successful month because the imports have been high,  
shipping losses moderate and U boat sinkings heavy.  

Before the descent upon Sicily an armada of war-  
ships, troop transports, supply ships and landing craft  
proceeded through Atlantic and Mediterranean waters  
with scarcely any interference from U boats. Large re-  
inforcements have also been landed in that island.  
Over 2,500 vessels were involved in these operations and  
the losses are only about 80,000 tons. On the other  
hand, the U boats which attempted to interfere with  
these operations suffered severe losses.  

Our offensive operations against Axis submarines  
continue to progress most favourably in all areas. And  
during May, June and July we have sunk at sea a total  
of over 90 U boats, which represents an average loss of  
nearly 1 U boat a day over the period.  

The decline in the effectiveness of the U boats  
is illustrated by the following figures. In the first
6 months of 1943 the number of ships sunk per U boat operating was only half that in the last 6 months of 1942 and only a quarter that in the first half of 1942.

The tonnage of shipping in the service of the United Nations continues to show a considerable net increase. During 1943 new ships completed by the Allies exceed all sinkings from all causes upwards of 3,000,000 tons.

In spite of this very favourable progress in the battle against the U boats, it must be remembered that the enemy still has large U boat reserves, completed and under construction. It is necessary therefore to prepare for intensification of the battle both at sea and in the shipyards and to use our shipping with utmost economy to strengthen and speed the general offensive of the United Nations. Continued success can only be expected if there is no relaxation of effort.

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0079
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 409, 11 August 1943  

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 409.

Eden suggests that our Tangier representative replies to Badoglio's Emissary Berio as follows: Begins:

"Badoglio must understand that we cannot negotiate but require unconditional surrender which means that the Italian Government should place themselves in hands of Allied Governments who will then state their terms. These will provide for an honourable capitulation."

The instructions would continue: begins:

"Badoglio's Emissary should be reminded at the same time that Prime Minister and President have already stated that we desire that in due course Italy should occupy a respected place in New Europe when peace has been reestablished and that General Eisenhower has announced that Italian prisoners taken in Tunisia and Sicily will be released providing all British and Allied prisoners now in Italian hands are released."

This is simply made up of our existing declarations. If you approve it in principle, please cable at once direct Eden at Foreign Office as I shall be on the move. If text does not meet your view, we can discuss it on arrival. I think Italians ought to have an answer as soon as possible. It will, at any rate, make it easier for them to decide who to double cross.

I have also received what follows in my next from U.J. You will see I am restored, if not to favour, at any rate to the court. I have sent reply which also follows.

It is quite cool here and very pleasant and everything is ready for you in Citadel which is admirably suited to our needs. It was indeed a happy inspiration which led you to suggest this particular rendezvous at this particular moment in Canadian politics.

No Sig

REGRARED UNECLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By: R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0080
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 410, 11 August 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
Message from Stalin delivered by Soviet Charge d’Affaires for
transmission to Prime Minister 10 August. Number 410.

Following is text referred to in Para 3 of my number 409.

Begins:

"I have just returned from the front and already had time
to become familiar with the message of the British Government
dated 7 August.

"I agree that a meeting of the Heads of three Governments
is absolutely desirable. Such a meeting must be realized at the
first opportunity having arranged with the President the place
and time of this meeting.

"At the same time, I ought to say that in the existing situ-
ation on the Soviet German Front, I, to my regret, have no
opportunity to absent myself and to leave the front even for one
week. Although recently we have had several successes on the
front, and extreme strain on the strength and exceptional watch-
fulness are required in regard to the new possible actions of the
enemy from the Soviet Troops and from the Soviet Command just now.
In connection with this, I have to visit the troops on that or
other parts of our front more often than usual. In the circu-
stances, at the present time I am not able to visit Scapa Flow
or any other distant point for a meeting with you and the President.

"Nevertheless, in order not to postpone an examination of the
questions which interest our countries, it would be expedient to
organize a meeting of the responsible representatives of our States
and we might come to an understanding in the nearest future con-
cerning the place and date of such a meeting.

"Moreover, it is necessary beforehand to agree on the scope
of the questions to be discussed and the drafts of the proposals
which have to be accepted. The meetings will hardly give any
tangible result without that.

"Taking this opportunity I congratulate the British Govern-
ment and the Anglo American troops on the occasion of their most
successful operations in Sicily which have already caused the
downfall of Mussolini and the break up of his gang."

For reply see my immediately following telegram.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 411, 12 August 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 411.

Following is reply being sent to message in my number 410 referred to in Para 3 of my number 409. Begins:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most secret and personal.

"Your telegram of August 9 gives me the opportunity to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on the recent most important victories gained by the Russian Armies at Orel and Byelorov opening the way to your further advances towards Bryansk and Kharkov. The defeats of the German Army on this front are milestones to our final victory.

"I have arrived at the Citadel, Quebec, and start this afternoon to meet the President at his private home. Meanwhile, the Staffs will be in conference here and the President and I will join them at the end of the week. I will show the President your telegram about meeting of our three States in the near future which certainly seems to be most desirable. I quite understand you cannot leave the front at this critical period when you are actually directing the victorious movement of your Armies.

"Thank you for your congratulations on our Sicilian success, which we shall endeavour to exploit to the full without prejudice to your lord. Certainly our affairs are much better in every quarter than when we met at Moscow exactly a year ago.

"I am sending you a small stereoscopic machine with a large number of photograph slides of the damage done by our bombing to German cities. They give one a much more vivid impression than anything that can be gained from photographs. I hope you will find half an hour in which to look at them. This we know for certain, eighty percent of the houses in Hamburg are down. It is only now a question of a short time before the nights lengthen and even greater destruction will be laid upon Berlin. This subject only to weather. This will be continued for several nights and days and will be the heaviest ever known.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0082
"Finally in the U-boat war we have in the months of May, June, and July destroyed U-boats at the rate almost of one a day, while our losses have been far less than we planned for. Our net gain in new tonnage is very great. All this will facilitate the establishment of the large scale Anglo American fronts against the Germans which I agree with you are indispensable to the shortening of the war."

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Correction to number 411 Filed 12/07242

Former Naval Person to President.

(Text of Prime Minister's reply to M Stalin) In para 2 for "3 Staffs" change to read "Responsible representatives".

no sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-89-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 412, 12 August 1943

Most immediate Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
and No. 412.

I am most sorry to say that Clemmie is so much exhausted
by the journey and sleeplessness that Moran feels she ought to
rest here for the next few days. This is a great disappointment
both to her and me, as I had so much wanted her to see you and
Mrs. Roosevelt in your beautiful home and she wanted so much to
come. I'm sure, however, that she must regather her strength.

Mary and I and the others will arrive as planned.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET
My dear Mr. President,

1. After pondering this morning I feel pretty sure that we ought to make a renewed final offer to U.J. to go to meet him at Fairbanks or at the farther point you had in mind as soon as this Military Conference is over. If he accepts it will be a very great advantage; if not, we shall be on very strong ground. We must mind the Japanese do not get us!

2. I am having a fair copy made of the Tube Alloy Memorandum ready for our respective initials. I am assuming that you would be agreeable to Howe being the Canadian representative on the General Policy Committee. Our two men would be Dill and Llewelin.

3. I will now take up with my Staffs the most important question of the Commands as we outlined them. I am sure the plan you have in mind is the best.

-1-
4. I was very favourably impressed with Gray's Irish message. The only amendment I suggest is to leave out any suggestion that we shall continue being nice to de Valera even if he won't play. The Irish are very practical people and if they don't have to do a thing they don't like, they don't do it. I should be glad if you could let me have a copy of the message when the State Department have seen it in order that I may put it before my Cabinet. I feel it is very important to try to get this additional security for the troops before the concentrations for OVERLORD become very large. It really is not fair that all your Divisions should be ticked off as they come.

5. You said we had dealt with half-a-dozen out of the dozen big points we were to talk over. Here is the fifth: The French Committee. I beg you to go as far as you can in your formula because however justly founded one's misgivings may be there is no use making a gesture of this kind in a grudging form. If you do not like our wording of the formula there seems to me no reason why we should
not have separate documents conveying our different shades of meaning provided they are both issued at the same time. Mackenzie King will have his own variant.

I did so enjoy my visit and my only regret is that Clemmie was not there to share it. This however perhaps you will allow us to repair.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

The President of the United States of America.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 413, 16 August 1943

Most immediate. Former Naval Person to President. Personal and No. 413.

First of all, the Governor General will meet you at a wayside station outside Quebec. MacKenzie King and I will also be there. The Governor General will drive you to the Citadel where a Guard of Honour will be paraded, and he would like to have a small reception immediately on your arrival where about forty principal persons could be presented to you. This can be cut out if you feel it would be tiring. In the evening, the Governor General will give a dinner in the Citadel to your personal party and mine to which MacKenzie King, the High Commissioner and one or two others will be asked - in all about twenty. I hope this will be agreeable to you. Anthony and Brendan will be there if they arrive in time.

No Sig
26 August 1943

From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States

No. 414 Filed 26/1418Z

Colonel Weden to President Roosevelt personal and most immediate.

Should like to arrive Washington Wednesday 1st in time for dinner instead of Monday 30th. Hope this will not be inconvenient to you. I feel I require a little more rest. Will this be all right.

No Sig
MOST IMMEDIATE

Following for immediate delivery to the President.

Begins.

Colonel Warden to President Roosevelt.

Personal and

Your No. 346. Thank you so much. Starting from Ottawa Tuesday 31st. Will reach you for dinner Wednesday. Subaltern and I have caught a few, and the change and air are doing us all good. Portal and Brooke have won great victories on the same front. Cabinet have cabled expressing pleasure at the satisfactory result of our conference and urging me to take a holiday as all is quiet in England.

2. U.J.'s last two telegrams have been distinctly more civil. I think we should agree both to the secondary meeting and to the setting up of the Commission, though not in Sicily. This is certainly the view of my Cabinet subject to settlement of details. Anthony is coming here to-night, and I shall be ready to settle the whole thing with you in detail when we meet.

3. If you think an interim message is required I suggest something on these lines:—

BEGIN. We are considering your proposals and have little doubt that plans satisfactory to all of us can be made both for the meeting on the Foreign Office level and for the Tripartite Commission. Prime Minister and I will be meeting again early next week and will telegraph you further. ENDS.

It may well be however that you will think no interim reply need be made.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
4. Mountbatten's appointment seems to have gone well.

5. Many congratulations on your splendid speech at Ottawa which delighted the whole Dominion. I have put off my broadcast till Tuesday.

Ends.
August 30, 1943

Message from Colonel Hadden to the President.

Clemmie has benefited by her rest up here and would very much like to come with us to Washington if you still have room. She would not be able to undertake any public engagements.

(For original of this message, see President's draft of Outgoing #350, August 30, 1943, filed in "Pres-PW Rough Draft File.")
DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

& PERSONAL

By

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 17th, 1943

[Redacted]

Dear Mr. President,

A telegram just received from Mr. Eden informs me that the Prime Minister before he left drafted a message to Marshal Stalin; a copy was left with you and it was not to be sent off until your concurrence was received. A further copy is enclosed for your convenience.

Meanwhile a further message has been received from Marshal Stalin addressed apparently both to yourself and to Mr. Churchill. A copy of this is also enclosed.

Mr. Eden has asked me to find out/

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.
out whether you wish to make any comment on the Prime Minister's draft message to Marshal Stalin, especially in view of Marshal Stalin's message since received.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

R. T. Campbell
Following is text of draft message from Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

Begins.

The President and I were both very glad to get your appreciative message of September 10th. We have a most intensive desire to help your grand efforts in every possible way.

We are each sending you our proposed agenda separately. We shall be very glad to have your list of subjects. Nothing should be barred out but some may be more suitable for verbal discussion when the heads of government meet.

The President seems to think that November 15th would be a good date to aim at for our personal meeting and I will of course conform to whatever arrangements are convenient to you two.

There appears to be a very real constitutional difficulty in the President going so far as Tehran and I still hope you will consider Egypt or perhaps a Syrian port like Beirut. One way of holding conference is for us each to have a ship and meet in one of the harbours of Egypt or Levant or possibly at Cyprus. If this idea attracts you we could place a fine ship entirely at your disposal and you could send on ahead all your advance party, cypher staff, etc. so as to be completely independent of us and at the same time in constant contact with your own war front. Wherever we go we think the press should be entirely banished and the whole place sealed off by an armed cordon so that we are not disturbed in any way in these conversations upon which, I repeat, the hope of the future world depends.
Following is text of Marshal Stalin's message.

Your messages of September 10th have been received.

As regards Politico-Military Commission question may be regarded as settled in essentials. We have appointed as Soviet plenipotentiary representative Deputy President of the Council of People's Commissars and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A. Y. Vyshinski who is known to you. A. S. Bogomolov, Ambassador of U.S.S.R. to Allied Embassies in London has been appointed as his deputy. A group of responsible military and political experts and a small technical group will be despatched with them.

I think commencement of work of Politico-Military Commission may be timed for September 25th - September 30th. I do not object to Commission beginning its work in Algiers so long as in future it decides for itself on expediency of moving to Sicily or some other place in Italy. I agree with the Prime Minister's considerations about Commission but I think in a short time, after considerable initial experience of Commission's work, we shall be able to define those functions more accurately both as regards Italy and in relation to other countries.

2. On the subject of meeting of three of our representatives I suggest that place of meeting be Moscow as well as time of meeting October 4th be considered as agreed as suggested by the President.

I still consider that for success of this conference it is necessary to know in advance of attending what...
what British and United States Government have for consideration at the conference of three representatives of which I wrote earlier. At the same time, however, I do not propose any limitations as regards agenda.

3. As regards meeting of three heads of Governments I do not object to Tehran as the meeting place as it seems to me more suitable than Egypt where Soviet Government still have no representative.

September 12th, 1943.
From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 415
Filed 18/10102
Prime Minister to President personal and
See foreign office telegrams to Washington number 6222 and number 6223. I agree generally with this argument and especially with paragraph 6 about SFORZA which might well suit you also.

H. M. Minister at Washington is being instructed to send you telegrams under reference.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 416, 18 September 1943  

Naval Person to President.  
Number 416.  

On Friday we are halfway through a suitable and uneventful voyage with many pleasant recollections of my visit. I feel easier about AVALANCHE than I did and trust the 8th Army will come into action from today on its southern flank. The quality of German resistance shows how hard we shall have to fight in OVERLORD. 

I am anxious to know your reactions to UJ’s telegram of Sept 12.  

Kindest regards to all. I trust Harry is progressing. 

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 417, 21 September 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
Number 417.

I send you in my immediately following message our
comments on Eisenhower's proposals for dealing with the
Badoglio Government. (NAF 409 of September 18)

If you agree, I hope you will instruct Eisenhower
accordingly.

I am informing the Soviet Government of the line I
propose we should take. If you agree, please back this up.
We cannot delay action or hamper Eisenhower in these critical
days.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
With reference to Block 6... the instructions to the Prime Minister were sent as directed.
From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 418

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Following are our comments referred to in my number 417 as sent to MacMillan. Begins following from Prime Minister to Resident Minister Algiers:

Para 1. After considering your telegram number 1812 and NAF 409 I and my colleagues in the War Cabinet have come to the following conclusions.

Para 2. It is vital to build up the authority of the King and the Brindisi Administration as a government and have unity of command throughout Italy. The way to do this is indicated in the Foreign Secretary's telegram number 1928. Despite Badoglio's broadcast tonight we still feel it is essential that the King should go to the microphone at Bari, tell the Italian people he is there and proclaim that Badoglio is carrying on the legitimate government of Italy under his authority. This is needed not only for the Italian people but for the Italian representatives and garrisons abroad.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972

0103
Para 3. The King and Badoglio should be told that they must build up the broadest based Anti Fascist coalition government possible. Any healthy elements that can deliver some good should be rallied in this crisis. These points should be made plain in the King's broadcast. It would be very useful if Count Sforza and the Professors who claim to represent the 6 parties were willing to join in the common effort.

Para 4. It must however be clearly understood that none of these provisional arrangements dictated by war needs, will stand in the way of the full choice by the Italian people of the form of Democratic Government which they prefer.

Para 5. The question of giving the Badoglio Government and Allied status does not come into our immediate programme. Cobelligerency is good enough. On this footing we should work for the gradual conversion of Italy into an effective national force against Germany, but, as we have said, she must work her passage. Useful service against the enemy will be recognized by us in the adjustment and working of the armistice terms.

Para 6. In return we expect Badoglio to continue to
work for the Allies on the basis of the armistice. Our principle will be payment by results.

Para 7. Badoglio should be free to declare war on Germany, and by so doing he would at once become, though not an Ally, a cobelligerent.

Para 8. Badoglio can be told that it is no part of our plan to install Allied Military Government everywhere. If he will cooperate we are ready to hand over territory to his government as quickly as it is free from the enemy. This offer applies to the historic mainland of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. The dealings of the United Nations with the Italian Government in the territories which they are allowed to administer will be carried out through a Control Commission.

Para 9. It would make it much easier for us all if the instrument of surrender even though somewhat superseded could now be signed. It is true that many of the clauses could not be operated by the Brindisi Administration in their present situation. But as we go up the Peninsula and turn over territory to the Italian Government, those questions will become real. We do not want to put ourselves in the position of having to haggle over every requirement with
the government. The longer we leave it, the more diffi-
cult it becomes to get the instrument signed, so I hope
Eisenhower will get Badoglio's signature to it as soon as
possible on the basis suggested in the Foreign Secretary's
telegrams (Nos 1905 to Algiers and 6275 to Washington).

Para 10. The stipulation about Mussolini was of
course governed by physical facts: but should certainly
stand for the record.

Para 11. This programme should be put to the King
and Badoglio at once. The first essential is that the King
should make the public announcement suggested. This should
not surely await final refinements of policy.

Para 12. I am asking the President, if he agrees with
this programme, to instruct Eisenhower accordingly. I am
also informing the Soviet Government. Meanwhile you should
without waiting urge the King to broadcast at once as pro-
posed in paras 2 and 3.

No Sig
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number 419, 22 September 1943

Prime Minister to President. Nr. 419.

Thank you for your Nr. 394 of Sept 21.

Our two messages do not seem to me to conflict on any important point, except the question of withholding the long terms. I defer to you on this. We will, therefore, accept yours as the directive but send also ours as amended, as commentary.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 420, 24 September 1943

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Number 420.

Following has just arrived from U. J. Please let me know what he has said to you or you to him.

It seems to me that the question of the longer terms might well be considered by the new commission.

Message from Stalin dated Sept 22 begins:

"I received your message of the 21st Sept.

"I agree with your proposal concerning the appeal by radio of the Italian King to the Italian people. But I consider it entirely necessary that, in the appeal of the King, it should be clearly stated that Italy, which capitulated to Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Union, will fight against Germany together with Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"I also agree with your proposal about the necessity of signing comprehensive armistice terms. In regard to your reservation that certain of these terms cannot be put into force at the present moment, I understand this reservation only in the sense that these terms cannot be realised now on the territory which so far is held by the Germans. In any case, I should like to receive confirmation or the necessary explanation from you on that point."

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-2828-94
By R. H. Parkes Date MAY 5, 1972

SECRET
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States

No. 421 Filed: 24/14302

Prime Minister to President personal and No. 421. By No. 420 of September 24th.

Macmillan now tells me that he is confident that Bedelio's signature can be obtained to the whole set of terms within the next few days and that the longer we leave it the more haggling there will be. It may be some time before the new commission can give their views and I should myself feel happier if we clinched the matter now. This might save us a good deal of trouble later on.

At Eisenhower's suggestion we have made the preambles less harsh. We have also provided that the armistice of September 3rd will remain operative.

See also U J Passim.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-20-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No.: 422    Filed: 25/15082
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt Personal number 422.

Para 1. I have not answered U.J.'s telegram in favour of backing up the King of Italy and also his remarks about the comprehensive terms because I do not know what line you are taking with him. You will no doubt have received my 420. Mac-Millan reports that there will be no difficulty in getting Badoglio to sign.

Para 2. Eden tells me Sforza plans to make a most helpful declaration, and surely we ought to promote the building up of a broad based Government including Sforza.

Para 3. I was so glad to hear from Harry on the telephone that there is a possibility of Hull coming to the Foreign Office conference. Do please consider favourably the half way house. It took me only 109 hours to cross the Atlantic in the Renown, and the voyage would surely be most restful to Hull. We should be delighted to see him here. The ease and speed of my homeward voyage makes me even wonder whether your own journey should not be by sea, at any rate to Gibraltar or Algiers. I received on the voyage five or six thousand words a day by wireless and was able to send replies every night by one or other of the escort vessels. Therefore, I was in full touch the whole time.

No Sig
MEMORANDUM ON MAURICE THOREZ

Maurice Thorez, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the French Communist Party, was born at Noyelles-Godault in the Department of the Pas-de-Calais on April 28, 1900. A coal-miner by trade, he associated himself with that branch of the Socialist Party which, in 1920, joined the Third International, and has been, in many respects, the outstanding member of that group ever since, and particularly during the last ten years.

Representing the 6th Circonscription of Sceaux, he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies on May 8, 1932 and re-elected in 1936. During the period between 1930 and 1934, he strongly advocated a United Front of the Socialist and Communist parties to fight against fascism and what the Communists termed "the two hundred families" and French reactionaries. During this period, he frequently visited Russia, and was considered a staunch supporter of every policy advocated by the Communist International. He participated with Marcel Cachin and Ercoli at the Seventh Congress of the International held in Moscow. It was here that he was granted a free hand by his Russian comrades to carry out the work of creating a United Front in France. He was loudly acclaimed at the Congress, where it was felt that his efforts and the efforts of the Communist Party in France had obtained more positive results than the
work of other branches of the International in foreign countries.

When in 1936 the Blum Government came into power, Thorez advocated wholehearted support of the Popular Front by the Communists, but prevented members of his party from joining the French Ministry. After the June strikes, when his group was accused by certain French groups, notably by Jacques Bardoux, of preparing a Communist coup d'etat, he solidly supported the workers in their right to strike, and remarked, in his Bastille Day speech, that the authorities had no right to attempt to put a forceful halt to these strikes.

Thorez at the time of the Nationalist insurrection in Spain immediately spoke before the Chamber and asked for French help for the Loyalists. When the Blum Government hesitated and, according to the Communists, prevented the sale of arms to the Spanish Government, Thorez violently denounced Blum and his "weakness when yielding to the British plutocrats". On the whole, Thorez supported the Socialists in their internal reforms, but contended that these reforms were totally insufficient. He denounced Blum's foreign policy.

Up to the eve of the German-Soviet pact, Thorez advocated a reduction in the period for French conscription, although supporting re-armament for a struggle against Fascism. However, he condemned the conferences at Munich in 1938. Yet, upon the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact of 1939, he and the entire Communist Party denounced the war as a "new imperialist conflict". After the outlawing of the Party by the Daladier
Government, Thorez went into hiding and was accused of deserting, as he disappeared a few days before he was called up. Together with a large group of other Communist Deputies, he was sentenced in absentia as a deserter and on a number of other charges in April, 1940. His whereabouts since 1939 have been unknown. He is rumored to have remained in France and to have played a large part in organizing the French Underground movement, but it is more likely that he has spent most of the time between 1939 and 1943 in Russia.

As a Communist he has always been considered a strong adherent to the International, and his own statements conform closely to the platform of the Communist International. He has, in the past, been the most militant member of that party in France, often considered more important than Marcel Cachin, who was merely the nominal head of the group. French Third Republic officials have often thought him the most dangerous revolutionist in France. In 1940, after the evacuation of Paris, he was rumored for a time to have set up a Communist Government in the evacuated city. His role in the future promises to be a prominent one, if the French Communist Party is officially revived, for he is an extremely clever and unscrupulous politician, though an ardent adherent to Moscow.

AJK

His present whereabouts are unknown.
From: London
To: President of the United States

Number 423  26 September 1943

Former Naval Person, to President Roosevelt
personal. Your number 359. I sent the following to
MacMillan yesterday:

1. The recognition of the French Committee by
HM and still more by the United States was based on the
dual presidency, and you should warn De Gaulle and all
our friends on the Committee that very grave danger would
be created by a fundamental change of the character.

2. What is the truth in the report that Thorez
the Communist has arrived in Algiers? Is De Gaulle
intriguing with him?

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. Rel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 424,

28 September 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal
and Br. Nr 424. Your Nr 360.

1. We agree that the long term surrender document
should be kept secret for the present. I have no doubt
U J will concur but it would be well if you told him our
views speaking for both of us.

2. We think it would be a mistake to talk about
making Rome an open city as it may hamper our forward
movement and will any way not bind the enemy. We should
prefer therefore to omit the words beginning "As an open
city" down to the words "Proposed by your government".

3. I am asking the Treasury about the exchange
rate and will cable you tomorrow. I agree with Eisenhower
that we should not treat the Italian population unfairly.

4. Your Nr 361. I am very glad about Sforza.
Badoglio would be very foolish not to embrace him after
his generous letter. A shotgun marriage will have to be
arranged if necessary.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Copy to Adolfo Scabby
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 425 Filed: 28/1153Z

Former Naval Person to President personal and Nr. 425.

1. My No 424 Para 4 referring to your No 361. According to reports here Sforza has been abusing and de-
riding the King of Italy in a public speech. Surely he should be cautioned that he must play with the team. We don't want him to do a balaam on us.

2. Your No 362. We think "not" must have been omitted in Para 4, but this will be cleared up by your action. We cannot be put in a position where our 2 Armies are doing all the fighting but the Russians have a veto and must be consulted upon any minor variation of the armistice terms which Eisenhower considers militarily essential. Unconditional surrender and the terms expressing it are the basic principle. The Commander in Chief must be free to apply it as, when and how he thinks most helpful.

3. The Russians have demanded the renewal of the Arctic convoys. We are looking into this and I hope something may be possible between now and Overlord. Most secret. We believe we have damaged Tirpitz and that she will have to go back to Germany for docking. If this should be so, it should give us 3 or 4 months easement in the north.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET
From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number 426  Filed: 29/0006Z

Former Naval Person to President personal. Reference last paragraph your number 360 and 3rd paragraph my number 424.

Treasury view is that there is no economic justification for reduction in the rate at this particular juncture. They think it more than likely in view of inflationary tendencies at present operating that even the existing rate may shortly be found to be too low. If the rate had meantime been reduced the ensuing deterioration would be the more disappointing to the Italians and we should certainly be exposed to embarrassing criticisms here.

Prime

Regarded UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel. 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
URGENT

30 September, 1943

From: LA London
To: The President of the United States

No. 427 30 September Filed 2050Z
Personal and Former Naval person to President. Your Nr 363.

I agree that we should make a joint announcement, but would it not be a good chance of getting U J in too? It is clear now, from the correction of Kolotov's message, that he does accept the Italians as co-belligerents.

It is true that we may lose a few days in communicating with Moscow, but this delay seems relatively unimportant compared with the value of Russian participation.

If you agree, would you put it to Stalin in the form that we wish an announcement of the kind made: will he join with us in making it, or would he prefer us to go ahead without him? Of course we should consider any drafting alterations he might wish to propose.

I myself would like to see several changes, and my imme-
mediately following telegram embodies these. If you see no ob-
jection to them, would you, if you agree to approach Stalin, put the text to him in this form.

No Sig
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 428, 30 September 1943  

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Secret. Nr. 428.

Following is amended text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

"The governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active cooperation of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since Sept 6th and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet governments will continue to work with the Italian government on that basis. The three governments acknowledge the Italian government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammeled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have.

"The relationship of co-belligerency between the governments of Italy and the United Nations governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause."

No Sig
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 429, 31 September 1943  

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and Nr. 429.

I send you herewith a telegram we have received from Molotov last week, and the answer I have now sent. The running of these four convoys will be a great strain to us and also a valuable boon to them. We therefore thought it right to put before him the ill usage of our people, only a few hundred during their stay in North Russia.

You will see that I have taken for granted the fact that you would wish to participate in the convoys, as so much of your stuff is waiting to be shipped and of your extreme regret at the time when we had to abandon the convoys.

Following is text of telegram from H M Ambassador, Moscow, referred to. Begins:

"M. Molotov sent for me on the evening of Sept 21st to hand me a long memorandum about convoys.

"After recapitulating the substance of M. Molotov's communication to Sir O. Sargent of Aug 25th and of reply sent to him on Sept 6th, the memorandum stated that the Soviet Government had naturally borne in mind the proviso contained in the Prime Minister's message of March 30th to Stalin, but that reasons given by His Majesty's Government for non resumption of convoys were not supported by facts. The Soviet Government wishes to remind His Majesty's Government:

(1) of the statement contained in joint message of Aug 19th from the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt about 'LIFEBELT' that the submarines of Germany abandoned the Northern Atlantic and were concentrating on the southern route; and

(2) of the claim in joint statement issued by MOI and United States Bureau of Military Information on Sept 11th regarding Naval losses in August that the enemy had not attempted to attack cargo ships in the northern part of the Atlantic and that the chances of attacks on submarines had been comparatively rare."
The facts prove that navigation conditions in the North Atlantic since May have not been dangerous for convoys proceeding to northern ports of Soviet Union.

This more favourable position, the increased Naval strength of the Allies and the elimination of the Italian fleet which allowed the convoys to pass through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape and thus set free escort ships for northern route, made a further postponement of convoys quite unjustifiable. The resumption was more necessary since the Soviet Union had this year received by the northern route less than one third of last year's supplies (249,097 tons as against 764,337 tons).

His Majesty's Government's references to the inadequate carrying capacity of Persian railways in northern zone only made resumption of convoys more necessary, as had been pointed out in Soviet memorandum of Aug 25th and the Soviet Government therefore maintained that in deciding the question of resumption of convoys, due weight should be given to this factor, which is of the greatest importance for the whole question of Soviet supplies.

In view of the above circumstances and of the fact that the Soviet armies were now for the third successive month undertaking wide and most strenuous offensive on almost the whole German front for the success of which every intensification and increase in supply of armaments and other material was important the Soviet Government insisted upon the urgent resumption of convoys and expected His Majesty Government to take all necessary measures within the next few days.

Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government attached very great importance to the matter and in handing me this memorandum he repeated orally all its arguments which I countered with the obvious replies, reminding him of the unhappy fate of our convoys last summer owing to the presence of German capital ships in Norwegian fjords. If we were able to dispose satisfactorily of German fleet, I said that I thought convoys would be resumed without delay." Ends.

Following is text of telegram I have just sent to Stalin. Begins:

"I have received your request for the reopening of the convoys to North Russia. I and all my colleagues are most anxious to help you and the valiant armies you lead to

0121
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 429, 31 September 1943

the utmost of our ability. I do not therefore reply to the various controversial points made in Monsieur Molotow's communication. Since June 22, 1941, we have always done our best in spite of our own heavy burdens to help you defend your own country against the cruel invasion of the Hitlerite gang, and we have never ceased to acknowledge and proclaim the great advantages that have come to us from the splendid victories you have won, and from the deadly blows you have dealt the German armies.

"For the last four days, I have been working with the Admiralty to make a plan for sending a few series of convoys to North Russia. This entails very great difficulties:

"First, the Battle of the Atlantic has begun again. The U-boats have set about us with a new kind of acoustic torpedo, which has proved effective against the escorting vessels when hunting U-boats.

"Secondly, we are at very full stretch in the Mediterranean, building up an army in Italy of about six hundred thousand men by the end of November, and also trying to take full advantage of the Italian collapse in the Aegean Islands and the Balkan Peninsula.

"Thirdly, we have to provide for our share of the war against Japan in which the United States are greatly interested, and whose people would be offended if we were lukewarm.

"Notwithstanding the above, it is a very great pleasure to me to tell you that we are planning to sail a series of four convoys to North Russia in November, December, January, and February, each of which will consist of approximately thirty five ships, British and American. Convoys may be to meet operational requirements. The first convoy will leave the United Kingdom about November 12, arriving North Russia ten days later, subsequent convoys at about twenty day intervals. We intend to withdraw as many as possible of the merchant vessels now in North Russia towards the end of October and the remainder with returning convoy escorts.

"However, I must put it on record that this is no contract or bargain, but rather a declaration of our solemn and earnest resolve. On this basis I have ordered the necessary measures to be taken for the sending of these four convoys of thirty five ships.

"The Foreign Office and the Admiralty however, request me to put before you for your personal attention, hoping indeed..."
that your own eye may look at it, the following representations about the difficulties we have experienced in North Russia.

"If we are to resume the convoys we shall have to reinforce our establishments in North Russia which have been reduced in numbers since last March. The present numbers of Naval personnel are below what is necessary, even for our present requirements, owing to men having to be sent home without relief. Your civil authorities have refused us all visas for men to go to North Russia even to relieve those who are seriously overdue for relief. Monsieur Molotov has pressed His Majesty's Government to agree that the number of British Service personnel in North Russia should not exceed that of the Soviet Service personnel and trade delegation in this country. We have been unable to accept this proposal since their work in quite dissimilar and the number of men needed for war operations cannot be determined in such an unpractical way. Secondly, as we have already informed the Soviet Government, we must ask to be the judges of the personnel required to carry out operations for which we are responsible; Mr. Eden has already given his assurance that the greatest care will be taken to limit the numbers strictly to the minimum.

"I must therefore ask you to agree to the immediate grants of visas for the additional personnel now required and for your assurance that you will not in future withhold visas when we find it necessary to ask for them in connection with the assistance that we are giving you in North Russia. I emphasize that of about one hundred seventy Naval personnel at present in the north over one hundred fifty should have been relieved some months ago but Soviet visas have been withheld. The state of health of these men who are unaccustomed to the climatic and other conditions make it very necessary to relieve them without further delay.

"We should also wish to send the small medical unit for ARCHANGEL to which your authorities agreed, but for which the necessary visas have not been granted. Please remember that we may have heavy casualties.

"I must also ask your help in remedying the conditions under which our service personnel and seamen at present find themselves in North Russia. These men are of course engaged in operations against the enemy in our joint interest and chiefly to bring Allied supplies to your country. They are,
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 429, 31 September 1943

I am sure you will admit, in a wholly different position
from ordinary individuals proceeding to Russian territory.
Yet, they are subjected to your authorities to the following
restrictions which seem to me inappropriate for men sent by
an Ally to carry out operations of the greatest interest to
the Soviet Union.

(A) No one may land from one of H M ships or from a
British merchant ship except by a Soviet boat in the presence
of a Soviet official and after examination of documents on
each occasion.

(B) No one from a British warship is allowed to proceed
alongside a British merchantman without the Soviet authorities
being informed beforehand. This even applies to the British
Admiral in charge.

(C) British officers and men are required to obtain
special passes before they can go from ship to shore or be-
tween 2 British shore stations. These passes are often much
delayed with consequent dislocation, of the work in hand.

(D) No stores, luggage or mail for this operational
force may be landed except in the presence of a Soviet offi-
cial and numerous formalities are required for the ship-
ment of all stores and mail.

(E) Private service mail is subjected to censorship, al-
though for an operational force of this kind censorship should,
in our view be left in the hands of British service authorities.

The imposition of these restrictions makes an impression
upon officers and men alike which is bad for Anglo Soviet re-
lations, and would be deeply injurious if Parliament got to
hear of it. The cumulative effect of these formalities has
been most hampering to the efficient performance of the men's
duties and on more than one occasion to urgent and important
operations. No such restrictions are placed upon Soviet per-
sonnel here.

We have already proposed to Monsieur Molotov that as
regards offences against Soviet law committed by personnel of
the services and of the ships of the convoys, they should be
handed over to the British service authorities to deal with.
There have been a few such cases, no doubt partially at any
rate due to the rigorous conditions of service in the north.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 429, 31 September 1943

I trust indeed, Monsieur Stalin, that you will find it possible to have these difficulties smoothed out in a friendly spirit so that we may each help each other, and the common cause, to the utmost of our strength.

No Sig