From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 366 from the President to the Former Naval Person, and personal.

I have sent the following to U.J. regarding Eisenhower's NAF 426:

"The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Area, Eisenhower, has recommended the following changes in the 'Instrument of Surrender of Italy':

1. Change the title to 'Additional conditions of the armistice with Italy.'

2. Change the last sentence of the preamble to read 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government'.

3. Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph one.

"General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress in defeating the German forces in Italy in that it will help to align the Italian Army, Navy, and civil population on our side.

"Eisenhower urgently requests that pending a decision on these recommendations secrecy in regard to the Terms of Surrender document is 'absolutely vital to our success in Italy'.

"I hope that these recommendations of General Eisenhower will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage to us.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. S. Stewart

Date Nov 1 1971
"Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date."

ROOSEVELT

 Released from the White House Map Room at 1210, EWT, 1 October 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
SECRET

September 1, 1943

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #366.

I have sent the following to U.J. regarding Eisenhower's NAF 426:

"The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Area Eisenhower has recommended the following changes in the "Instrument of Surrender of Italy":

1. Change the title to "Additional conditions of the armistice with Italy".

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"I believe that these recommendations of General Eisenhower will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage to us.

"Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date."
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

The President to the Former Naval Person, and personal, Number 367.

Your 427 and 428. Italy has not yet made a declaration of war against Germany.

I suggest that you endeavor to obtain from Stalin approval of your text of proposed joint statement by all three of us to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy.

Your text meets with my approval.

ROOSEVELT

1 October 1943
October 1, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #367

Your 427 and 428 Italy has not yet made a declaration of war against Germany.

I suggest that you endeavor to obtain from Stalin approval of your text of proposed joint statement by all three of us to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy.

Your text meets with my approval.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.L. Steward
Date Nov 1 1971
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 368 from the President to the Former Naval Person, and personal.

I have just received the following message from U.J.

"Today I have received your message of September 27th.

"I share your opinion regarding the desirability of the Secretary of State Mr. Hull's presence at the forthcoming conference of the representatives of the three governments.

"At the same time I have to inform you about great difficulties which could have appeared in case of change of the decision, previously agreed upon, regarding Moscow as the place of the forthcoming conference.

"The fact is that in case the conference would not be held in Moscow but in Britian, as you propose, Mr. V. M. Molotov could not have come to the conference at the appointed time, whose presence at the conference I consider to be necessary. Mr. V. M. Molotov's departure from the USSR, at least in the near future, is absolutely impossible, because as you know, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, will very soon go to Algiers.

"Besides, as it is known, the press in the United States and in Britian has already widely published the information that the forthcoming conference will take place not elsewhere but in Moscow, and, therefore, the choice of a new place for the conference could have caused undesirable perplexities.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

-1-
"I have no objections against October 15th as the date of the conference.

"It is assumed that by that time the questions to be discussed will be decided by the Governments."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2300, EWT, October 1, 1945.

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR
2 October 1943

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alcalza, London

Personal from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 369.

Your 451 in regard to Sforza, I am informed that he with his son and Carlos Almagia expects to arrive by airplane at Prestwick, Scotland, October third enroute to Marrakesh.

I hope you can effectively indoctrinate him during his stop in U.K.

I am this date sending the following to Eisenhower:

"Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this Government that Grandi's presence in Badoglio Government at this time would not be acceptable. Even though Grandi was perhaps chief figure in deposition of Mussolini, he had been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi Government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio Government should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this Government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian Government.

"The King's position on the question of declaration of war as stated in NAF 428 is unimpressive. Germany has already taken active belligerent steps against Italy and the chief strength of Badoglio's Government is its announced determination to rid Italy by force of the German invader. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to be given the status of a cobillegiant."

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1220, EWT, 2 October 1943.

ROBERT W. RYER,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
October 2, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #369

Your 431 in regard to Sforza, I am informed that he with his son and Carlos Almagia expects to arrive by airplane at Prestwick, Scotland October third enroute to Marrakech.

I hope you can effectively indoctrinate him during his stop in U.K.

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Prepared by Adonai Bech

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED by Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By [Signature]

[Stamps]
From: Opnav  
To: Aluana, London  

Number 370 from the President to the Former Naval Person. Personal and

Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27, 1943, I suggest following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with respect to two commissions now being set up in the Mediterranean Area.

"Message begins. To M. Molotov from the Secretary of State.

Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.

There appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political Commission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Control Commission set up by Para 37 of the long term Italian surrender document agreed to by the three governments.

The Control Commission acts directly under the Supreme Allied Commander to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated by Anglo-American armies. These are problems arising in any active military area under direct supervision of the Supreme Commander and so the commission must act under his direct control.

On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Mediterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of "considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves with Germany". Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By  
Date WNV 1 1971
The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Commander, he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore. End message.

I will await your reply before asking the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1310, EWT, 4 October 1943.

Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27, 1943, I suggest following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with respect to two commissions now being set up in the Mediterranean Area.

Message begins. To M. Molotov from the Secretary of State. Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.

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Chiefs of Staff.

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End message.

I will await your reply before directing the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

Written by Colonel Hammond  
(See "Recognition of Badoglio" folder)
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

Number 371, personal and confidential from the President to the Former Naval Person:

Reply to your 430.

The newspapers here, beginning with the Hearst, McCormick crowd, had a field day over General Marshall's duties. The drums were beaten rather loudly by the rest of the press for a few days but it is pretty much of a dead cat now.

It seems to me that if we are forced into making public statements about our military commands we will find ourselves with the newspapers running the war. I, therefore, hope that nothing will be said about the business until it is actually accomplished.

It may be that the situation, other than newspaper criticism by our political enemies, will warrant a joint announcement sooner than I have anticipated, but at the moment I earnestly urge that we say nothing.

I agree with you that at the appropriate time we must make an overall statement relative to commands and I fully appreciate your position at home, but I do not think that the difficulties about secondary commands throughout the world are adequate reasons for making the major announcement in regard to Marshall.

I will do what I can about Mountbatten because I realize that some of our press have been treating him very badly, although, on the whole,
he has come out of it very well. Certainly American public opinion thoroughly approves of his appointment.

I agree with you that we should not permit any undue optimism about this campaign either at home or abroad. Nevertheless there is a very proper feeling that Mountbatten will prosecute vigorously anything he is assigned to do.

I hope very much that you will agree that statement about Marshall need not be made at present.

The answer we got from Uncle Joe relative to the Moscow meeting was not unexpected so it seems there is nothing to do but take the trip there and we are organizing accordingly.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1340, EWT, 4 October 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1 October 1943

#371

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

The President asks that you talk to him about this message from the Prime Minister.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

*#430. Answer prepared by Mr. Hopkins and after correction by the President, sent as Case-PM #371.
OCTOBER 4, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT # 871

REPLY TO YOUR 430.

THE NEWSPAPERS HERE, BEGINNING WITH THE HEARST, MCCORMICK CROWD, HAD A FIELD DAY OVER GENERAL MARSHALL'S DUTIES. THE DRUMS WERE BEATEN RATHER LOUDLY BY THE REST OF THE PRESS FOR A FEW DAYS BUT IT IS PRETTY MUCH OF A DEAD CAT NOW.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE ARE FORCED INTO MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT OUR MILITARY COMMANDS WE WILL FIND OURSELVES WITH THE NEWSPAPERS RUNNING THE WAR. I, THEREFORE, HOPE THAT NOTHING WILL BE SAID ABOUT THE BUSINESS UNTIL IT IS ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED.

IT MAY BE THAT THE SITUATION, OTHER THAN NEWSPAPER CRITICISM BY OUR POLITICAL ENEMIES, WILL WARRANT A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT SOONER THAN I HAVE ANTICIPATED, BUT AT THE MOMENT I HONESTLY URGE THAT WE SAY NOTHING.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WE MUST MAKE AN OVERALL STATEMENT RELATIVE TO COMMANDS AND I FULLY APPRECIATE YOUR POSITION AT HOME, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT SECONDARY COMMANDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ARE ADEQUATE REASONS FOR MAKING THE MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT IN REGARD TO MARSHALL.

I WILL DO WHAT I CAN ABOUT MOUNTBATTEN BECAUSE I REALIZE THAT SOME OF OUR PRESS HAVE BEEN TREATING HIM VERY BADLY, ALTHOUGH, ON THE WHOLE, HE HAS COME OUT OF IT VERY WELL. CERTAINLY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION THOROUGHLY APPROVES OF HIS APPOINTMENT.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD NOT PERMIT ANY UNDUE OPTIMISM ABOUT THIS CAMPAIGN EITHER AT HOME OR ABROAD. NEVERTHELESS THERE
IS A VERY PEOPLIGHT FEELING THAT MOUNTBATTEN WILL PERSECUITE
VIGOROUSLY ANYTHING HE IS ASSIGNED TO DO.

I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT
STANDEMEEED NOT HE MADE AT PRESENT.

THE ANSWER WE GOT FROM UNCLE JOE RELATIVE TO THE MOSCOW
MEETING WAS NOT UNEXPECTED SO IT SEEMS THERE IS NOTHING TO
DO BUT TAKE THE Trip THERE AND WE ARE ORGANIZING ACCORDINGLY.

I'VE CALLED UNCLE JOE THIS MORNING AS FOLLOWS:

"I HAVE MORE BE ABOUT THE FIFTEENTH AND OUR INVESTIGATION
WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON THAT DATE.

THE VISITATION WILL BE MADE BY SECRETARY HULL AND WILL
INCLUDE OUR NEW AMBASSADOR. MR. AVERELL HARNDEN, MR. H. FREDER
HARRINGTON, BRIADIER GENERAL. H. DEANE, STAFFS AND A RAY
GROUPS OF STAFF WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH OUR MILITARY PLANS.
THEY WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SMALL STAFF."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Stuart
Date NOV 1 1971
4 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

Personal and secret from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 372.

The following message has been received from U.J. and is forwarded for your information. Eisenhower has been informed.

"To approval by the United States and Great Britain of General Eisenhower’s proposal to keep secret for the present the provisions of the long term surrender document after it is signed by the Italian Government, I have no objection."

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 1330, EWT, 4 October 1945.

CHESHER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

ß4/1905 NCR 4512
From: Opanav  
To: Alusna, London

Number 373, personal and ![ือ shortfall] for the Former Naval Person from the President.

On the front page of the Washington Post, dated Saturday morning, October 2, there appeared a story headlined as follows: "STALIN SAID TO HAVE REJECTED LONDON AS MEETING PLACE."

The article stated in substance that Russia had politely rejected a proposal made by me personally to change the location of the three-power conference from Moscow to London because the health of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, made the longer journey undesirable. In order to appear in this edition of the newspaper, the story had to be released actually many hours before I had personally received Stalin's reply stating that he did not care to change the location.

This article, written by Frederick Kuh and copyrighted by the Chicago Sun, appeared under a London date line. Since the Chicago Sun is a highly reputable paper and friendly to this administration it seems reasonable to conclude that the dateline was not faked and so the story did in fact originate in London. To my mind the mere fact that this story got into the newspapers in the first place indicates a dangerous leak somewhere, and further more, indicates a bad mistake on the part of some censor for passing the story for publication as he must have in this case.

Don't you think perhaps it would be beneficial to us both if this leak could be run down and so avoid another one in the future when there is more at stake.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1845, EDT, 4 October 1943.

ROBERT H. MYERS, Lt. (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
On the front page of the Washington Post, dated Saturday, October 2, there appeared a story headlined as follows: "STALIN SAID TO HAVE REJECTED LONDON AS MEETING PLACE."

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Don't you think perhaps it would be beneficial to us both if this leak could be run down and so avoid another one in the future when there is more at stake.

ROOSEVELT
Rejected London As Meeting Place

By Frederick Koh

Copyright by the Chicago Sun

London, Oct. 1.—Russia is reliably reported tonight to have positively rejected an American request to hold the three-power conference in London instead of in Moscow.

According to trustworthy American sources, President Roosevelt personally intervened in the preparations for the conference by calling Prime Minister Stalin and asking that the meeting place, already fixed as Moscow, be shifted to London. The reason the President gave was that the health of Secretary of State Cordell Hull made the longer journey undesirable.

Stalin's reply, while friendly and courteous, was stated to have said regretfully that a last-minute change of the scene would involve serious difficulty. The Soviet Premier made clear his government's
PRIORITY

4 October 1943

From: Opmav
To: Alusna, London

President to Former Naval Person, No. 374, personal and

I think your idea of enticing Uncle Joe to the Mediterranean

with the offer of the use of a ship is excellent, but I am not

sure whether or not I have told you this. In any case, I hope

that your efforts meet with success for reasons you well know.

Please let me know if you have any news on this matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1845, EWT, 4 October 1943.

Robert H. Myers

Robert H. Myers,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
I think your idea of enticing Uncle Joe to the Mediterranean with the offer of the use of a ship is excellent, but I am not sure whether or not I have told you this. In any case, I hope that your efforts meet with success for reasons you well know. Please let me know if you have any news on this matter.

ROOSEVELT
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

October 6, 1943

President to Former Naval Person, No. 375, personal and

1. In accordance with our agreement at Quebec initial entry of
the United States into the Azores will be by two or more United States
escort vessels from UGS-22, sailing on 25 October, 1943, and two aircraft
from a CVE. In addition to the convoy escorts, there will be at least
two others over and above those normally provided. The convoy will be
routed so as to pass the Azores on approximately 6 November and the
carrier will be within near aircraft range of Lajes Field, Terceira
Island, the afternoon of 6 November and the morning of 7 November.

2. Two escort vessels will proceed to Horta, Fayal, at time to
be designated by the Convoy Commander, for the purpose of fueling from
a British oiler stationed there; to remain not longer than 24 hours and
to rejoin convoy or carrier group after fueling.

3. At the discretion of the Convoy Commander, up to three more
escorts will be fueled at Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. This fueling will
be dependent upon the submarine situation as existing at the time and
the Convoy Commander's opinion whether the escorts may be spared long
enough to accomplish the fueling. It is expected this fueling will be
accomplished unless there is good reason to the contrary.

4. Dependent upon weather conditions, two carrier-borne aircraft
will be flown off the carrier when near Lajes Field the afternoon of
6 November, to remain there overnight, and after fueling, rejoin the carrier the following day. This date may be delayed if required by weather conditions.

5. The routing of the convoy and carrier, with due regard to the submarine situation, will be such as to make the above operations feasible.

6. Commanding Officers of ships and planes will have plausible reasons for entry. They will obtain such intelligence information as practicable in regard to reactions to their presence and facilities observed. The Convoy Commander will forward items of value if radio silence is broken for other reasons or upon arrival in port.

7. Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, will be charged with the further development and execution of this plan.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1210, EST, 6 October 1943.

CUSTER HAYWARD, Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. on 1 NOV 1977.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

6 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Initial Entry into the Azores.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the scope of our initial entry into the Azores in the light of their understanding of your arrangement with the Prime Minister. It is recommended that a message be sent to the Prime Minister along the lines of the draft message attached hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Encl.
Draft Message.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
927/4951 21 May 1972
By RHAB Date MAY 8 1972
From the President to the Prime Minister

Plan of entry of the U.S. into the Azores.

1. Initial entry of the United States into the Azores will be by two or more United States escort vessels from UGS-22, sailing on 25 October, 1943, and two aircraft from a CVE. In addition to the convoy escorts, there will be at least two others over and above those normally provided. The convoy will be routed so as to pass the Azores on approximately 6 November and the carrier will be within near aircraft range of Lagos Field, Terceira Island, the afternoon of 6 November and the morning of 7 November.

2. Two escort vessels will proceed to Horta, Fayal, at time to be designated by the Convoy Commander, for the purpose of fueling from a British oiler stationed there; to remain not longer than 24 hours and to rejoin convoy or carrier group after fueling.

3. At the discretion of the Convoy Commander, up to three more escorts will be fueled at Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. This fueling will be dependent upon the submarine situation as existing at the time and the Convoy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stuart
Date Nov 1 1971
Commander's opinion whether the escorts may be spared long enough to accomplish the fueling. It is expected this fueling will be accomplished unless there is good reason to the contrary.

4. Dependent upon weather conditions, two carrierborne aircraft will be flown off the carrier when near Lagens Field the afternoon of 6 November, to remain there overnight, and after fueling, rejoin the carrier the following day. This date may be delayed if required by weather conditions.

5. The routing of the convoy and carrier, with due regard to the submarine situation, will be such as to make the above operations feasible.

6. Commanding Officers of ships and planes will have plausible reasons for entry. They will obtain such intelligence information as practicable in regard to reactions to their presence and facilities observed. The Convoy Commander will forward items of value if radio silence is broken for other reasons or upon arrival in port.

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From: Cpnnav  
To: Alusma, London  
October 6, 1945

President to Former Naval Person, No. 376, personal and confidence

I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

a. Potential saving over the six months period (November 1943 - April 1944) of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.

b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.

c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.

d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty.
elsewhere.

This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operations will have to be lowered.

The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD buildup during the coming winter months.

We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lajes Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required. Unquote.

I agree that this is a very important matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1610 EWT October 31 1943

OGDEN KINNFIN
Captain, CE
To a former Naval Person

from The President

I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"I agree that this is a very important matter."

Roosevelt

#376
The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

a. Potential saving over the six months period (November 1943 - April 1944) of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.

b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.

c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.

d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere.

This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operation will have to be lowered.

The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.E. Stewart

Date, Nov 1 1971
the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD build-up during the coming winter months.

We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
FROM President
TO Prime Minister

SERIAL 376
DATE 6 October 1943

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 1540 VIA Admiral Brown

SUBJECT Importance of Azores as air transport and ferry route.

ACTION

Originated by Admiral Leahy, amended by President.

Answered by Prime at 444 8 Oct 43.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:
6 Oct 43

FILED: PM-Pres folder, 6 Oct 43.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 377, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM U. J.

"I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER FIRST ONLY TODAY, ON OCTOBER FIFTH.

"ON MY PART THERE ARE NO OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY YOU IN THE 'DOCUMENT OF THE CAPITULATION OF ITALY'".

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1730, EWT, 6 October 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
October 6, 1943.

I have just received the following from U. J.

"I have received your message of October first only today, on October fifth.

On my part there are no objections against the proposed by you changes in the 'Document of the Capitulation of Italy'.

ROOSEVELT
From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

Serial: 377
Date: 6 October 1943

Subject: Stalin's approval of changes in "Document of the Capitulation of Italy."

Action:

Forwards to the Prime Minister a message received from Marshal Stalin dated 5 October 1943.

General Eisenhower informed via War Department message by direction of the President.

Answered by Prime Minister in his #140, 7 October 1943 to President.

(See Sec. #366, PM's #433)

Declassified

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Nov 1 1971

Copies To:
Date:
By Direction Of:

Action Completed:
6 October 1943

Filed:
President-FW Folder, 6 Oct 1943.
(Also see "Background Folder".)
PRIORITY

From: 
To: Alusna, London

Number 378, from the President to the Former Naval Person, personal and

I fully agree with your 439 including the new heading. However, can it be proved that a larger number of U-boats were sunk than we lost in escort ships and merchant ships?

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1430, EDT, 7 October 1943.

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By 
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President
TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 378
DATE 7 October 1943

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 1420 VIA BLACK 1 from Hyde Park, 7 Oct.

SUBJECT Monthly statement on U-Boat warfare in September.

ACTION

Answers PM-Pres #439, which see.

For complete action on the dept sub warfare statement, see Tab "Dept" in the "Monthly Submarine Warfare Statement" folder.

See:
PM's #439
Pres #378
PM's #447

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 7 Oct 43

FILED: (Pres-PM Folder).
Copy: "Monthly Sub Statement Folder"
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 372, personal and secret from the President to the
Former Naval Person.

Reference your 438.

I do not want to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit the
prospects for the early successful development of the Italian operations
to a secure line north of Rome. I am opposed to any diversion which
will in Eisenhower's opinion jeopardize the security of his current
situation in Italy, the buildup of which is exceedingly slow considering
the well known characteristics of his opponent who enjoys a marked
superiority in ground troops and panzer divisions.

It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should
prejudice OVERLORD as planned.

The American Chiefs of Staff agree.

I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1628, EST, 7 October 1943.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1, 1971]
From: Admiral Leahy
To: The President

The following message is proposed in reply to Prime's 438:

"Reference your 438.

"I am unwilling to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit the prospects for the early successful development of the Italian operations to a secure line north of Rome. I am opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower's opinion jeopardize the security of his current situation in Italy, the buildup of which is exceedingly slow considering the well known characteristics of his opponent who enjoys a marked superiority in ground troops and panzer divisions.

"It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice OVERLORD as planned.

"The American Chiefs of Staff agree.

"I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower."

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: Nov 1, 1972
FROM The President
TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 379

DATE/TIME DATE 7 October 1943
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 1420 VIA Admiral Leahy

SUBJECT Situation developing in the Eastern Mediterranean - diversion of troops from OVERLORD.

ACTION

The President at 2215, 6 October, directed that Leahy should prepare answer to PM's 438, and send draft to Hyde Park for President's approval.

Leahy brought draft to Map Room at 1420, 7 Oct; sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 6; President corrected and approved as BLACK 2, which was received at 1605; released to Navy Code Room at 1625.

Copy sent to Eisenhower via War Department as War Dept. message by direction of the President.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:
7 October 1943

FILED: "Pres-PM Folder"
7 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and number 390, from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Reference your 440.

On October 5 I informed Eisenhower as follows:

"The President and Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible. There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied.

You will therefore put pressure on the Italian government for an early declaration of war without waiting for further successes."

Eisenhower informs me that he is using the above to reinforce his own efforts along this line.

We can arrange to synchronize the three announcements immediately when war is declared.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2000, October 7, 1943 by

F. H. GRAHAM, 1st Lt, AOG.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By [Signature]

Date: May 1 1971
8 October 1943

From: CPNAV
To: Adm. London.

From the President to the former Naval Person. 

I have received your Numbers 441 and 443 and given careful personal consideration to the points you make. I have given careful thought to them and so has the staff. I am concerned about the possibility of our armies suffering a reverse by the action of an enemy with superior forces except by air, under a commander of proved audacity and resourcefulness. This applies especially to the absolute safety to the line we hope to gain in Italy.

With a full understanding of your difficulties in the Eastern Mediterranean, my thought in sending No. 379 was that no diversion of force from Italy should be made that would jeopardize the security of the allied armies in Italy, and that no action toward any minor objective should prejudice the success of OVERLORD.

To have almost all the facts now at our disposal on which to judge the commitments probably involved in the Rhodes operation. As I see it, it is not merely the capture of Rhodes but it must mean of necessity and it must be apparent to the Germans, that we intend to go further. Otherwise Rhodes will be under the guns of both Corfu and Crete.

I was in accord with obtaining whatever hold we could in the Dodecanese without heavy commitments, but the present picture involves

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date: Nov 1, 1971
not only a well-organized, determined operation, but a necessary
follow-through. This in turn involves the necessity of drawing for
the means, largely shipping and air, not ground troops, from some other
source which inevitably must be Italy, OVERLORD, or possibly Mountbatten’s
amphibious operation. The problem then is are we now to enter into a
Balkan campaign starting with the southern tip, or is there more to be
gained, and with security, by pushing rapidly to the agreed upon position
north of Rome. It appears to me that a greater Allied threat against
the Balkans is implied in this than by a necessarily precarious amphibious
operation against Rhodes with a lack evident to the enemy of the necessary
means for the follow-through. Strategically, if we get the Aegean
islands, I ask myself where do we go from there and vice versa where
would the Germans go if for some time they retain possession of the
islands.

As to the meeting you propose for Sunday in Africa, this would be
in effect another meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff necessarily
only involving a partial representation and in which I cannot participate.
Frankly I am not in sympathy with this procedure under the circumstances.
It seems to me the issue under discussion can best be adjusted by us
through our C.O.S. set up in better perspective than by the method you
propose. We have most of the facts and will soon have the results of
the conference scheduled for tomorrow in Tunis.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Van Room
at 2015, W.W., 8 October 1943 by

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date

- 2 -
FROM President

TO Prime

SERIAL 381

DATE 8 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OS0030Z SCR 5440

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM OS0043Q VIA Black 11

SUBJECT Operations in Eastern Mediterranean

ACTION

Answers PRIME's 3441 and 443. For complete action on this dispatch, see PRIME's 443.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

8 Oct 43 Press-FM Folder.
9 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

President to Former Naval Person, Number 382, personal and
State Department has sent to Molotov message in my Number 370 to
you.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0835, EWT, 9 October 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: Nov 1 1977

SECRET
-1-
From the President to Admiral Leahy:

Please ask State Department to send the message proposed in White 15 to Mr. Molotov.

Will you or Marshall ask Eisenhower to submit a scheme for consideration?

Will you send the gist of these two to Churchill?

Note to Map Room: Please cancel Black Seven.

St. Pres. to Prime
State Department has sent
message in my
370 to you.
President

TO Prime Minister

SERIAL #382

DATE 9 October 43

DATE/TIME

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Military-Political Commission and Control Commission in Mediterranean.

ACTION

PRESIDENT in BLACK, 8 Oct 43, requested Leahy to have State Dept sent to Molotov the message proposed in the PRESIDENT'S #370, 8 Oct 43, and approved by the PRIME MINISTER in his #442, 8 Oct 43; also that gist be sent to PRIME MINISTER.

Message sent to Molotov by State Department; PRESIDENT'S #382 is gist to PRIME MINISTER. (Prepared by Admiral Leahy)

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 9 Oct 43

FILED: Pres-PM Folder
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

Number 383, personal and for the Former Naval Person from the President.

Your 445, the following message has been sent to Eisenhower:

"The Prime Minister in a message to the President expresses the fear that the repetition to you of the President's Message No. 379 of 7 October to the Prime Minister would be taken as an order from the President and as closing the subject finally. The Prime Minister desires that it be made clear to you that the conference scheduled for today in Tunis is free to examine the whole question in all its bearings and should report their (your and General Wilson's) conclusions to the President and the Prime Minister through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister asks that the conference shall give full, free, patient and unprejudicial consideration to the whole question after having heard the Middle East point of view put forward by its representative.

"The President directs that the foregoing desire expressed by the Prime Minister be accepted for your guidance."

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1700, EWT, 9 October 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. S. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1974
FROM: President  
TO: Prime Minister  

SERIAL: #383  
DATE: Oct 9, 43.  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 092153Z MCR 5440  
TOR MAP ROOM: 092007Z  
VIA: WITE 34, BLACK 14  

SUBJECT: Quote of message to Eisenhower re operations in Eastern Mediterranean.  

ACTION:  
Answers PM's #445, 9 Oct 43, which was sent to HP as WITE 28,  
9 Oct 43 (1040Q).  

PRESIDENT, in BLACK 13, 9 Oct 43 (1208Q) requested Hopkins and  
Leahy to prepare reply to EISENHOWER.  

Proposed draft to EISENHOWER and PM sent to PRESIDENT  
as WITE 34, 9 Oct 43 (1410Q).  

PRESIDENT approved in BLACK 14, 9 Oct 43 (1607Q)  

Sent to EISENHOWER via War Department as Freedom #9763 (2128Q)  

Sent to PM as #383, 9 Oct 43 (1753Q)  

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  
9 October 43  
FILED: Pres-PM Folder
From: Oonav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and Number 384 from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Replying to your 444, I am delighted with arrangements to provide in the Azores facilities for our ferry service as pointed out in my 376. The improvement in efficiency of the Allied war effort by directing our ferry service via the islands is so valuable as to justify its commencement at the earliest practicable date.

I hope you will succeed in convincing Salazar of the value to Portugal that will result from his taking with us an active part in the war.

He may be assured that the United States has no desire to remain after the war in any Portuguese territory, and that we will welcome him as a belligerent on our side.

The first temporary visit of escort vessels and two aircraft will be made approximately on 6 November as stated in detail in my 375.

It is good to know that the landings are going forward so well.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 17:05, GMT, 9 October 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
FROM  The President              TO  The Prime Minister

SERIAL  #384.                DATE  9 Oct 43

DATE/TIME                  OR FILE NUMBER  092215  MCR 5441

TOR MAP ROOM  0920C07Z         VIA BLACK 16, WHITE 35.

SUBJECT  Use of Azores facilities by U.S.

ACTION

Answers PM's #444.

PRESIDENT, in BLACK 12 8 Oct 43, requests Adm Leahy and JCS to prepare reply.

Leahy's draft of reply sent to HP as WHITE 35, 9 Oct 43.

Corrected and approved by PRESIDENT in BLACK 16, 9 Oct 43; Adm Leahy notified.

This message, PRESIDENT'S #384, sent at 092100Z.

Chorological order of messages on this subject:

- Pres. #376, 6 Oct 43
- PM #444, 8 Oct 43
- Pres. #379, 9 Oct 43
- PM #446, 19 Oct 43

ACTION COMPLETED:  9 Oct 43

FILED:  Pres-PM Folder
12 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: OPMAY
TO: ALUSHA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND PRIORITY NUMBER 385, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

WE HAVE RECEIVED FANTASTIC REPORTS REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES
OF GENERAL VON FALKENHAUSEN NOW IN PORTUGAL.

HAVE YOU ANYTHING IN REGARD TO THIS AND IF SO WHY NOT SEND
IT OVER HERE BY COURIER.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1155, EWT, 12 October 1943.

Robert H. Myers
ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: LG Stovent
Date: NOV 1 1974
President to Prime #385

We have received fantastic reports regarding the activities of General von Falkenhagen in Portugal.

Have you anything in regard to this and if so why not send it over here by Consul?
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<th>FROM</th>
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<td>Admiral Leahy</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Activities of General Von Falkenhausen in Portugal</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

Admiral Leahy wrote dispatch in Map Room at 12/1166Q, after telephone conversation with Admiral King in the Navy Department.

**ACTION COMPLETED:** 12 October 45

**FILED:** Press-PM Folder

[Redacted]
14 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 386, personal and confidential from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your Number 452.

After consultation with General Eisenhower, I suggest that we approve the protocol proposed by him for the reason that it will meet the points raised in your No. 452 and will protect the right of the United Nations to dispose of the Italian naval vessels and merchant ships as the needs of the United Nations may demand.

The following is the text of the above mentioned proposed protocol:

"It is agreed that the title of the document signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief Allied Force, at Malta on September 29, 1943, should be changed to 'ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WITH ITALY'. The following further amendments to this document are also agreed: the word unconditionally in Article 1 (A) to be deleted from that article and inserted after the word accepted in clause 6 of the preamble.

"The clauses in question, therefore, would read as follows:

"Preamble Clause 6: 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government'.

"Article 1 (A): 'The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender.""

ROOSEVELT
PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Your Number 482.

After consultation with General Eisenhower, I suggest that we approve the protocol proposed by him for the reason that it will meet the points raised in your No. 482 and will protect the right of the United Nations to dispose of the Italian naval vessels and merchant ships as the needs of the United Nations may demand.

The following is the text of the above mentioned proposed protocol:

"It is agreed that the title of the document signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief Allied Force, at Malta on September 29, 1943, should be changed to: 'ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WITH ITALY'. The following further amendments to this document are also agreed: the word unconditionally in Article 1 (A) to be deleted from that article and inserted after the word accepted in clause 6 of the preamble.

"The clauses in question, therefore, would read as follows:

"Preamble Clause 6: 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government'.

"Article 1 (A): 'The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender.'"

ROOSEVELT
FROM: The President  TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL $386  DATE: 14 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 14/1618Z

TOR MAP ROOM 14/1130, EWT VIA Admiral Leahy

SUBJECT: Suggested revision of Italian Surrender terms.

ACTION:

Answers PM's No's. 440 and 452; $452 was referred to General Eisenhower for recommendation: as FREEDOM #9919, 12 Oct; Eisenhower replied with his #2374, 13 Oct 43 (CM-IN-7694 13 Oct).

Proposed message to PM incorporating Eisenhower's suggestions prepared by Colonel Hammond; sent to Admiral Leahy evening of 13 Oct; taken by Leahy to President for approval morning of 14th Oct; President approved; returned by Leahy to Map Room at 1130 EWT, 13 Oct; sent to PM as #386, 14/1618Z.

Answered by Prime on his #462, 14 Oct. (See also Note's #395, 23 Oct

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 14 October 43 FILED: Pres-PM File.

0186
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

To the Former Naval Person from the President. and personal,
Number 357.

You will recall agreement, made during your recent Portuguese
negotiations, that any direct approach by U.S. Government to Portuguese
Government would be suspended until those negotiations were concluded.
Those negotiations were, as you know, concluded on 17 August with signing
of INGOT agreement.

It was not practicable, however, to have included in that agreement
adequate provision for U. S. Navy facilities in Azores, or any provision
whatever for facilities for U. S. air transport and air ferrying
operations.

We both fully realize the tremendous importance to combined war
effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport and ferry route
via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of gallons of high octane
gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours per month.

We have received information from Lisbon that the Portuguese
Government would not object to direct negotiations with the United States
looking toward the use by U. S. airplanes of the islands, and I should
like to suggest for your consideration that the U. S. State Department
be directed by me to make a direct approach to the Government of
Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement to permit us to provide
aviation facilities in the Azores and to use such facilities for our

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By [Signature]

Date [Date]
combatant and transport airplanes in the furtherance of the Allied war effort.

I hope you will agree to this line of approach to our common problem and that if practicable your Representatives in Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1435 EWT, 14 October 1943 by

F. H. GRAHAM
F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Freund
Date NOV 1 1971
You will recall agreement, made during your recent
Portuguese negotiations, that any direct approach by U. S.
Government to Portuguese Government would be suspended until those
negotiations were concluded. Those negotiations were, as you know,
concluded on 17 August with signing of INGOT Agreement.

It was not practicable, however, to have included in
that agreement adequate provision for U. S. Navy facilities in
Azores, or any provision whatever for facilities for U. S. air
transport and air ferrying operations.

We both fully realize the tremendous importance to
combined war effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport
and ferry route via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of
high octane gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours
per month.

We have received information from Lisbon that the
Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with
the United States looking toward the use by U. S. airplanes of the
islands, and I should like to suggest for your consideration that
the U. S. State Department be directed by me to make a direct approach
to the Government of Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement
to permit us to provide aviation facilities in the Azores and to
use such facilities for our combatant and transport airplanes in
the furtherance of the Allied war effort.

I hope you will agree to this line of approach to
our common problem and that if practicable your Representatives in
Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions.
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>Number 387</td>
<td>DATE</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Navy Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Use of Azores by U.S. planes</td>
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**ACTION**
Prepared by Admiral Leahy. Corrected and signed by the PRESIDENT; brought to the Map Room by Admiral Leahy at 1440; sent as #387.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**
14 October 1943

**FILED:** Pres-PW Folder
(See "Background Folder")
14 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

Personal and \textbf{from the President to the Former Naval Person, Number 388.}

I have finally sent the following telegram to U. J. and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter sometimes had real inspirations. I like the idea of three tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend Chiang.

\textbf{QUOTE.}

"The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New Laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountain -- first, east bound and then west bound -- is insurmountable. We know from experience that planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days."

"I do not think that any one of us will need Legation facilities, as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations."

\textbf{DECLASSIFIED}

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

\textbf{By} \textbf{Nov 1 1977}
"In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated.

"Asmara, the former Italian Capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field -- good at all times.

"Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent of us and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front.

"Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering.

"In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way.

"What would you think of November twentieth or November twenty-fifth as the date of the meeting?

"I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend.

"Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of us."

UNQUOTE.
October 14, 1943.

I have finally sent the following telegram to U. J.

and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter

sometimes had real inspirations. I like the idea of three

tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend

Chiang.

NOTE: The problem of my going to the place you

suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell

you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take

the risk. The Congress will be in session. New laws and

resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and

must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days

have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable.

The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the

requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in

getting over the mountain -- first, east bound and then west

bound -- is insurmountable. We know from experience that
planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days.

I do not think that any one of us will need Legation facilities, as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations.

In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated.

Asmara, the former Italian Capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field -- good at all times.

Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent of us and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front.
Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Baghdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering.

In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way.

What would you think of November twentieth or November twenty-fifth as the date of the meeting?

I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend.

Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of us. UNQUOTE

ROOSEVELT

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
The White House
Washington

This was not answered promptly
until 1st Oct.

It is understood that several messengers were carried by
various officials to

England—Herman

File

W.R.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>388</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>14 Oct 43</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>14/1810 EWT</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Admiral Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Quotes message to Marshal Stalin on 3 power conference meeting place.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Brought to the Map Room by Admiral Brown. Released to the Code Room at 1930 EWT. Message was sent to Marshal Stalin, with NAVY TDO 142321-38-45 NCR 6323-24-25. (See also PM's 437, 456 + 457.)</td>
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<td>ACTION COMPLETED:</td>
<td>14 Oct 43</td>
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<td>Pres-PM Folder (See Background Folder)</td>
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PRIORITY

16 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

NUMBER 389.

I AM DISTURBED ABOUT THE BUILD UP OF OUR AIR FACILITIES AT ASSAM.

THE DETERMINATION OF THE SUPPLIES THAT GO OVER THE RAILROAD FROM CALCUTTA TO ASSAM IS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL.

THE AMOUNT OF TONNAGE FLOWN OVER THE MOUNTAINS TO CHENNAULT'S

AIR FORCE HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING TO ME. CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE

CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT THE SUPPLIES AND HIS STRIKING FORCE IS THE ONE

SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE IN CHINA PROPER BY US DURING

THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

OUR OWN TRANSPORT PLANES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

I WISH YOU WOULD TAKE A PERSONAL PART IN THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE

I AM A BIT APPREHENSIVE THAT WITH OUR NEW PROJECT IN BURMA OUR AIR

FORCE IN CHINA WILL BE FORGOTTEN AND I THINK THAT IS A GREAT MISTAKE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0955, EWT, 16 October 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1, 1971]
16 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL SEXTON

Attached herewith is a copy of the President's message to the former Naval Person which you requested over the phone, stating that it was inadvertently not attached to the President's memorandum to General Marshall making reference to it.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

1 Incl.
POTUS-PM #389.
OCTOBER 15, 1943

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL

I AM DISTURBED ABOUT THE BUILD UP OF OUR AIR FACILITIES AT ASSAM. THE DETERMINATION OF THE SUPPLIES THAT GO OVER THE RAILROAD FROM CALCUTTA TO ASSAM IS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL.

THE AMOUNT OF TONNAGE FLOWN OVER THE MOUNTAINS TO CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING TO ME. CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT THE SUPPLIES AND HIS STRIKING FORCE IS THE ONE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE IN CHINA PROPER BY US DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

OUR OWN TRANSPORT PLANES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

I WISH YOU COULD TAKE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE I AM A BIT APPREHENSIVE THAT WITH OUR NEW PROJECT IN BURMA OUR AIR FORCE IN CHINA WILL BE FORGOTTEN AND I THINK THAT IS A GREAT MISTAKE.

P.S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1977

SECRET
Brought to the Map Room by Mr. Harry Hopkins at 0930 EWT after approval by President. Sent to NCR at 0955 Q.

Colonel Sexton called Colonel Hammond saying that the President had inadvertently omitted this message as an enclosure to a memorandum to General Marshall, and requested a copy.

Answered by Col. McE. 165, 19 Oct 43.
FROM: OPMAY
TO: AUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND

PERSON NUMBER 690.

YOUR 465. THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A MESSAGE TODAY
SENT TO MARSHAL STALIN.

"IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO REPRE-
SENTATION ON THE POLITICAL MILITARY COMMISSION, AND IN VIEW OF MR.
MOLOTOV'S OCTOBER 14 NOTE TO THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, I THINK
I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, AS INDICATED IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF
SEPTEMBER 8, I FEEL THAT FRENCH REPRESENTATION SHOULD BE RESTRICTED
TO MATTERS OTHER THAN THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF ITALY, IN WHICH
THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION DECIDE THAT
FRANCE HAS A DIRECT INTEREST. IN THIS REGARD I FEEL, AS I SUGGESTED
IN MY MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 13, THAT FRENCH REPRESENTATION SHOULD
CORRESPOND TO THAT ACCORDED TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA,
GREECE, BRAZIL, OR TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WHICH BY MUTUAL AGREE-
MENT MAY BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE. THAT THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION SHOULD ENTER INTO ITS DELIBERATIONS ON ALL
SUBJECTS OR SHOULD FUNCTION ON THE SAME PLANE AS THE GOVERNMENTS
OF THE SOVIET UNION, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES WAS NEVER
MY INTENTION!"
Control Commission - French participation in. Molotov's proposed amendment.

ACTION

Molotov, on 16 Oct 43 proposed that French be invited to participate in work of Control Commission. This was transmitted to Hyde Park as White 2, with a suggested reply to Stalin and a note by Mr. Hopkins requesting that it also be sent to the PM. Admiral Brown phoned the Map Room saying that the President approved WHITE 2.

Sent to Stalin on 16 Oct 43; sent to PM as #380. Also see "Control Commission" folder for Molotov's message.

October 21, 1943.

From: [Name]
To: Aliusa, London

Personal and Confidential

Last night I received the following from U. J.:

"Concerning the location for the forthcoming conference of the leaders of the three governments, I desire to convey the following information to you."

"Unfortunately, not one of the places proposed instead of Tehran by you for the meeting is suitable to me."

"It became clear, during the course of operations of the Soviet forces in the summer and fall of this year, that the summer campaign may overgrow into a winter one and that our troops can continue their offensive operations against the German Army."

"It is considered by all my colleagues that these operations demand my personal contact with the Command and daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command. Conditions..."
are better in Teheran, because wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow exist there. This cannot be said about the other locations. My colleagues insist on Teheran as the place of the meeting for this reason.

I accept your suggestion to designate November 20th or 25th as a possible date for the conference, and I also agree that representatives of the press should be excluded from the meeting.

I hope that a great deal of good will be accomplished by the direct participation in the Moscow meeting of Mr. Hull, who has arrived safely in Moscow UNQUOTE.

I am asking Hull to deliver the following to U. J. at once:

QUOT I am deeply disappointed in your message received today in regard to our meeting.
Please accept my assurance that I fully appreciate and understand your reason for requiring daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command and your personal contact with the command which is bringing such outstanding results. This is of high importance.

And I wish you would realize that there are other vital matters which, in this constitutional American government, represent fixed obligations on my part which I cannot change. Our Constitution calls for action by the President on legislation within ten days of the passage of such legislation. That means that the President must receive and return to the Congress, with his written approval or his veto, physical documents in that period. I cannot act by cable or radio, as I have told you before.

The trouble with Teheran is the simple fact that the approaches to that city over the mountain often make flying an impossibility for several days at a time. This is a double
risk; first, for the plane delivering documents from Washington and, second, for the plane returning these documents to the Congress. I regret to say that as head of the Nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where I cannot fulfill my constitutional obligations.

I can assume the flying risks for documents up to and including the Low Country as far as the Persian Gulf, through a relay system of planes, but I cannot assume the delays attending flights in both directions into the saucer over the mountains in which Teheran lies. Therefore, with much regret I must tell you that I cannot go to Teheran and in this my Cabinet members and the Legislative Leaders are in complete agreement.

Therefore, I can make one last practical suggestion. That is that all three of us should go to Hasra where we shall be perfectly protected in three camps, to be established and guarded by our respective national troops. As you know, you can easily have a special telephone, under your own
control, laid from Basra to Teheran where you will reach your own line into Russia. Such a wire service should meet all your needs, and by plane you will only be a little further off from Russia than in Teheran itself.

I am not in any way considering the fact that from United States territory I would have to travel six thousand miles and you would only have to travel six hundred miles from Russian territory.

I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you were it not for the fact that I must carry on a constitutional government more than one hundred and fifty years old.

You have a great obligation to your people to carry on the defeat of our common enemy, but I am begging you to remember that I also have a great obligation to the American government and to maintain the full American war effort.

As I have said to you before, I regard the meeting of the three of us as of the greatest possible importance, not only to our peoples as of today, but also to our peoples in relation to a peaceful world for generations to come.
It would be regarded as a tragedy by future generations if you and I and Mr. Churchill failed today because of a few hundred miles.

I repeat that I would gladly go to Teheran were I not prevented from doing so because of limitations over which I have no control.

I am suggesting Basra because of your communications problems.

If you do not like this I deeply hope you will reconsider Bagdad or Asmara or even Ankara in Turkey. The latter place is neutral territory, but I think it is worth considering and that the Turks might welcome the idea of being hosts though, of course, I have not mentioned this to them or anybody else.

Please do not fail me in this crisis UNQUOTE

The possibility of Teheran is out because I find the time risks are flatly impossible to take. I hope you can find some way of having Eden back this up.

 Released from the White House Map Room at 1850, EWT, 21 October 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
FROM | PRESIDENT | TO | PRIME MINISTER
--- | --- | --- | ---
SERIAL | #391 | DATE | 21 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM | 1680 | VIA | Admiral Brown
SUBJECT | "Eureka"

**ACTION**

Quotes paraphrase of message of 20 Oct 43 from Stalin, and message sent to Hull for Stalin, 21 Oct 43.

Prepared by Miss Tully at direction of the President.

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
21 Oct 43.

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON #392

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL NUMBER 392.

YOUR 453 WAS TRANSMITTED ON 18 OCTOBER TO SECRETARY HULL WITH A REQUEST THAT IT BE CONSIDERED BY THE CONFERENCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1805, EWT, 21 October 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

ROBERT BOGUE,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

Date NOV 1 1971
22 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 393, personal and from the President for the
Former Naval Person.

The chaotic condition developing in the Balkans causes me concern.
I am sure you are also worried. In both Yugoslavia and Greece the
guerrilla forces appear to be engaged largely in fighting each other
and not the Germans. If these forces could be united and directed to-
ward a common end they would be very effective. In the present con-
fused condition the only hope I see for immediate favorable action is
the presence of an aggressive and qualified officer. The only man I can
think of now who might have a chance of success is Donovan. I do not
believe he can do any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character
he might do much good. He was there before and is given some credit
for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. If we decide to
send him all agencies of ours now working in the Balkans should be placed
under his direction and the resources we put into this effort should be
at his disposal. I understand that your General Gubbins is now in the
Middle East. Donovan could consult with him enroute.

I feel this is an urgent matter. If you are inclined to agree to
my idea I will discuss the possibilities with Donovan at once.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1100, EWT, 22 October 1943.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971
The chaotic condition developing in the Balkans causes concern. I am sure you are also worried. In both Yugoslavia and Greece the guerrilla forces appear to be engaged largely in fighting each other and not the Germans. If these forces could be united and directed toward a common end they would be very effective. In the present confused condition the only hope I see for immediate favorable action is the presence of an aggressive and qualified officer. The only man I can think of now who might have a chance of success is Donovan. I do not believe he can do any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character he might do much good. He was there before and is given some credit for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. If we decide to send him all agencies of ours now working in the Balkans should be placed under his direction and the resources we put into this effort should be at his disposal. I understand that your General Gubbins is now in the Middle East. Donovan could consult with him enroute.

I feel this is an urgent matter. If you are inclined to agree to my idea I will discuss the possibilities with Donovan at once.
PM replied in his #470, 23 Oct 43. President remarked to Admiral Brown, upon reading, that General Donovan should proceed to General Wilson's headquarters to ascertain if he could be of any assistance. Memo to Admiral Leahy 25 Oct 43.
To the Former Naval Person from the President, personal and Number 394.

With reference to your Number 467 regarding another full conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in November, it appears to me that there are several matters which should first be resolved before we meet.

1. There should be sufficient time allowed to analyze the results of the current Moscow conference and also I think the subsequent conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow conference is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavorable results in Russia.

2. Combined planning teams are now planning an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. It is important that this work be completed and that the respective Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to study it before a general meeting.

3. Certain outline plans from Eisenhower and commanders in the Pacific covering operations approved at QUADRANT are to be submitted on November 1, and these should receive some consideration before we arrive at the moment for a combined meeting.

It would be advantageous to our advance preparations for the conference to be informed as to the subjects which you think we should discuss.

At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special conference with U.J. would be in order rather than one in early November. ANFA would be good.
October 22, 1943.

With reference to your Number 467 regarding another full conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in November, it appears to me that there are several matters which should first be resolved before we meet.

1. There should be sufficient time allowed to analyze the results of the current Moscow conference and also I think the subsequent conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow conference is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavorable results in Russia.

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It would be advantageous to our advance preparations for the conference to be informed as to the subjects which you think we should discuss.

At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special conference with U.S. would be in order rather than one in early November.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 20, 1943.

SECRET

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Your No. 467, it appears difficult if not impossible for American Staff to be prepared and arrive in Africa by November tenth.

It is impossible for me to arrive by that time and later meet U.J.

In order that our preparations may be expedited please inform me by telegraph subjects that you contemplate considering at meeting of full conference.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.J. Skurzynski
Date Nov 1, 1971

First draft of # 394.
Not sent. See revised
# 394.
**FROM** POTUS  
**TO** PRIME  
**SERIAL** 394  
**DATE** 22 Oct 43  
**OR FILE NUMBER**  
**DATE/TIME**  
**TOR MAP ROOM** 22/1050Q  
**VIA** Admiral Leahy  
**SUBJECT** Proposed meeting of Combined Staffs early in November, 43.  

**ACTION**  
Answers PM's #467.  
Prepared by Admiral Leahy; minor additions made by the Pres.  
PM replied in his #471, 23 Oct 43, which the President directed be sent to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**  
**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
**FILED:** 25 Oct 43
Number 595, personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person.

This is in reply to your cable Number 462 to me dated 16 October 1943. I recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be instructed to transmit to General Eisenhower the following cable for his comment or accomplishment. The suggested cable follows:

MESSAGE BEGINS,

Para 1. The modifications in the Long Terms of Surrender as proposed in your cable W-2378, 13 October 1943, were referred to the Soviet Government which agreed to the changes recommended by you and suggested additional changes. The British recommend that the proposed amendments of General Badoglio and the suggestions of the Soviet be embodied into one protocol. However, the British do not intend to concur in the protocol embodying the accepted two sets of amendments to the Long Terms of Surrender unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended as follows:

1. The following clause to be added to the preamble to the agreement reported in NAF 381. QUOTE. It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to the immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of the United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time. UNQUOTE.

2. Final sentence of last paragraph of the Cunningham Agreement
be amended to read. QUOTE. Will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag. UNQUOTE.

Para 2. Soviet modifications of the Long Terms of Surrender should be incorporated into the text of your suggested protocol as follows COLON

1. The preamble should be amended to read as follows.

QUOTE. Whereas, in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1945, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand . . . UNQUOTE. It is to be noted that between QUOTE Governments UNQUOTE and QUOTE on the one hand UNQUOTE the words QUOTE acting in the interests of all the United Nations UNQUOTE have been added.

2. In the paragraph of the preamble beginning QUOTE The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943 UNQUOTE the words QUOTE and Soviet UNQUOTE are to be added between QUOTE United Kingdom UNQUOTE and QUOTE Governments UNQUOTE and the word QUOTE and UNQUOTE between QUOTE United States UNQUOTE and QUOTE United Kingdom UNQUOTE be deleted so that the text of the paragraph would read as follows. QUOTE The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments acting on . . . . UNQUOTE.

Para 3. Article 29 of the Long Terms of Surrender be amended to read as follows COLON
QUOTE. Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations, and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Government of Marshal Badoglio will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with. UNQUOTE.

Para 4. In the event that the amendments proposed by the Soviets and the British proposal for the modification of the Cunningham Agreement are acceptable to you, then you will incorporate into one protocol suggestions in your W-2378 and the Soviet amendments. The Italians will execute simultaneously the amendments to the Cunningham Agreement and the single protocol. MESSAGE ENDS.

ROOSEVELT

Released by the White House Map Room at 1135, EWT, 23 October 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Changes in the long term armistice agreement with Italy.

Enclosure: Draft Message.

By memorandum dated 16 October 1943 a paraphrase copy of Message No. 462 from the Prime Minister to you was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and recommendation.

The message of the Prime Minister has been carefully considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and they recommend a reply to the Prime Minister along the lines of the draft message attached hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.
SUGGESTED REPLY BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER 

This is in reply to your cable number 462 to me dated 16 October 1943. I recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be instructed to transmit to General Eisenhower the following cable for his comment or accomplishment. The suggested cable follows:

The modifications in the Long Terms of Surrender as proposed in your cable W-2378, 13 October 1943, were referred to the Soviet Government which agreed to the changes recommended by you and suggested additional changes. The British recommend that the proposed amendments of General Badoglio and the suggestions of the Soviet be embodied into one protocol. However, the British do not intend to concur in the protocol embodying the accepted two sets of amendments to the Long Terms of Surrender unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended as follows:

1. The following clause to be added to the preamble to the agreement reported in NAF 381: "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to the immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of the United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time."
Agreement be amended to read. "Will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag."

Part 2. Soviet modifications of the Long Terms of Surrender should be incorporated into the text of your suggested protocol as follows:

one. The preamble should be amended to read as follows. 
"Whereas, in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand..." It is to be noted that between "Governments" and "on the one hand" the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" have been added.

two. In the paragraph of the preamble beginning "The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943."
the words "and Soviet" are to be added between "United Kingdom" and "Governments" and the word "and" between "United States" and "United Kingdom" be deleted so that the text of the paragraph would read as follows. "The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments acting on..."

Part 3. Article 29 of the Long Terms of Surrender be amended to read as follows:

Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or..."
analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations, and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Government of Marshal Badoglio will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

In the event that the amendments proposed by the Soviets and the British proposal for the modification of the Cunningham Agreement are acceptable to you, then you will incorporate into one protocol suggestions in your W-2378 and the Soviet amendments. The Italians will execute simultaneously the amendments to the Cunningham Agreement and the single protocol.

P.S. The Italians will execute simultaneously the amendments to the Cunningham Agreement and the single protocol.
FROM President TO Prime Minister

SERIAL #395 DATE 23 October 1943

VIA Admiral Brown

SUBJECT Amendments to Italian Surrender Terms.

ACTION Answers PM's #462, which the President sent to JSC and State Dept for consideration and recommendation, 16 Oct 43.

Captain Royal personally delivered to Admiral Brown, 23 Oct 43, the JCS suggested reply to PM, which embodied a suggested message to Eisenhower. Approved by President and sent to CR at 23/1135 Oct.

See PM's #473, 24 Oct, which says "Thank you so much."

(Finished by Combined Chiefs of Staff action per Admiral Leahy 4 Nov. FAN 268.

Act 1612 of 4 Nov.

See NAFS24 of 21 November for final action.

ACTION COMPLETED: 23 Oct 43
26 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 396, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

IT IS A NUISANCE TO HAVE THE INFLUENZA. MEINTIRE SAYS I NEED A SEA VOYAGE.

NO WORD FROM U. J. YET.

IF HE IS ADAMANT, WHAT WOULD YOU THINK OF YOU AND ME MEETING, WITH SMALL STAFFS, IN NORTH AFRICA OR EVEN AT THE PYRAMIDS, AND TOWARD THE CLOSE OF OUR TALKS GET THE GENERALISSIMO TO JOIN US FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS? AT THE SAME TIME, WE COULD ASK U. J. TO SEND MOLOTOV TO THE MEETING WITH YOU AND ME. OUR PEOPLE PROPOSE NOVEMBER 20.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1815, EWT, 26 October 1943.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date
NOV 1 1971

252233
NCR 8180

0227
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

It is a nuisance to have the influenza. McIntire says I need a sea voyage.

No word from U. J. yet.

If he is adamant, what would you think of you and me meeting, with small staffs, in North Africa or even at the Pyramids, and toward the close of our talks get the Generalissimo to join us for two or three days? At the same time, we could ask U. J. to send Molotov to the meeting with you and me.

Nov 20.

ROOSEVELT
FROM  POTUS  TO  PRIME

SERIAL  396  DATE  25 October 1943

DATE/TIME  252233  NCR  8180
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM  1810, EWT  VIA  Admiral Brown

SUBJECT  Combined Staffs meeting.

ACTION  Dictated to Miss Tully by the President.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:  25 Oct 43
26 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 397, personal and secret, from the President for the
Former Naval Person.

The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning
of British-Russian-U.S. collaboration which should lead to the early
defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and
particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of
our intentions it is suggested that immediately upon our receipt of
information if it turns out that he is unable to meet with us at Basra
or other place that is acceptable to both of us, we jointly transmit
some such message as the following to him:

QUOTE. Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our
combined British-American military staff conferences. You may feel
that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in
at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British-American
operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such
comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford
you and your staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of
the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been deter-
mined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no im-
plcation of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as
your representative might be instructed to present. UNQUOTE.
If he does agree to meet us at Basra, we can discuss this matter with him at that time.

ROOSEVELT.
The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British - Russian - U. S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that immediately upon our receipt of information that he is unable to meet with us at Basra or other place that is acceptable to both of us, we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

"Hitherto we have informed you of the results of our combined British - American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British - American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

"If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present."

If he does agree to meet us at Basra, we can discuss this matter with him at that time.


MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The following is a first trial at a draft of a message regarding the subject of Russian participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff conferences. You will recall that the other day I was opposed to a formal joining up by the Russians with our Chiefs of Staff organization, first, because I felt certain the Russians would feel that we were endeavoring to penetrate their strategic and operational plans, and further, that it would be next to impossible to reach final decisions with such a variegated group. My view is to make a small beginning, and very definitely on the basis that we are not asking for anything from the Russians in the way of information but are offering them virtually a complete insight into all of our strategic and logistical doings.

The following is the proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister:

"The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British - Russian - U.S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that we immediately return our receipt of information that he is unable to meet with us jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

'I therefore have informed you of the results of our combined British - American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British - American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your
staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present."

"If he does agree to meet us at Bagra we can discuss this matter with him at that time.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff.

[Handwritten note]

"King obtained same on 26th at This Judge friend coordination. GCM.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of SEC ARMY

By TAG PR 7/05/72

[Handwritten date]

MAY 2 1972
ACTION

Admiral Leahy prepared from a proposed draft message by Gen. Marshall. President approved, sent out at 1710, EWT, 26 Oct 43.

Answered by PM in his 476, 27 Oct 43 — Crime disapproves Russian representative in future combined staff conferences.
From: Onnav
To: Aluana, London

Number 396 for the Former Naval Person from the President, 

and personal.

In view of the high importance of using the Azores as a landing 

for American transport planes, it is suggested that you authorize 

the utilization of American engineers and American facilities under 

British Command to construct quickly airfields to accommodate transport 

planes in those Azores Islands now occupied by British forces. This 

will quiet many of my troubles.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room 
at 1715, EWT, 26 October 1943.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Caret, C.E.
October 26, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #398

In view of the high importance of using the Azores as a landing for American transport planes, it is suggested that you authorize the utilization of American engineers and American facilities under British Command to construct quickly airfields to accommodate transport planes in those Azores Islands now occupied by British forces. This will quiet many of my troubles.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D.S. Stewart
Date Nov 1977
Construction of air facilities in the Azores by American engineers and equipment under British command.

Prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President with minor changes, sent to code room at 1715, EWT, 26 Oct 43.

Answered by PM in his 483, 1 Nov 43.
SECRET
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

29 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusana, London

Number 599, personal and secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President.
Your 466.

Our Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon, on October 21, was instructed as follows:

QUOTE. It is desired that the Legation take no comprehensive action at the present time on our request for air facilities in the Azores, but the Legation should keep in mind that we must have the use of some air facilities there as soon as possible.

The Legation should, therefore, make as much progress toward that end as appears practicable from the Lisbon point of view and should keep us fully informed. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1655, EWT, 29 October 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date
NOV 1 1971

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
From: CptNAV  
To: Adama, London.  

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 400.

PERSONAL.

Your 477. I must eliminate Anfa because I draw too much water.
I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or
Alexandria on the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me
there at that time. If UJ is willing to come to Basra we can move on
there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go
there with small staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and
plead with UJ to come there if only for one day. I still think it vital
that we see him, but I simply cannot get out of constitutional communication
with my Congress. I too am most anxious that you and I get away from this
despach despatch method of talking.

As a corollary of above and in view of overloading transportation
facilities, the Combined Staffs could make their headquarters in Algiers
or Tunis and you and I could meet them there on the 19th. This is not
so good however, because we would want the six top men with us in Egypt
or Basra.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1925, EWT, October 29, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

0240
Your 477. I must eliminate Anfa because I draw too much water.

I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or Alexandria on the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me there at that time. If UJ is willing to come to Basra we can move on there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go there with small staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and plead with UJ to come there if only for one day. I still think it vital that we see him, but I simply cannot get out of constitutional communication with my Congress. I too am most anxious that you and I get away from this despatch method of talking.

As a corollary of above and in view of overloading transportation facilities, the Combined Staffs could make their headquarters in Algiers or Tunis and you and I could meet them there on the 19th. This is not so good however, because we would want the six top men with us in Egypt or Basra.

ROOSEVELT
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
PRESIDENT TO PRIME
By W. J. BURKE
Date NOV 1 1941

Your 477.

If you agree I will meet you at ANFA by November 20. Staff
meeting can be started there November 20 and if U.J. accepts our
invitation you and I could leave ANFA with a very small staff for
long enough to confer with him at Alexandria or Basra.

If U.J. declines I propose to ask him to come to Basra for a
single day and to leave Molotov for a longer period.

ROOSEVELT

#400, 29 Oct 43.

I must eliminate Tunny because I

draw too much water. I want two

or three days in North Africa before

getting to Cairo in Alexandria from the

20— I suggest the Combined Staffs

meet you and me there at that time.

If U.J. is willing to come to Basra we can

move on there at any later date.

If he declines Basra I propose we go

there with small staffs and meet

Molotov and a small Russian staff

and stand with U.J. to come there if only
for me day. I still think it would
that we see him, but I simply
cannot get out of constant
communication with my parleys
I too him much more that you
and I get away from this old fashioned
method of talking.

Read all

The a matter of expense or in
mind of over road any one. You
then convey shift which make
headquarter in Belgium or I wish
at your own it could must than them
in 

This is not the
good manner because we would want
the cleft with me in Egypt or Parma
FROM: PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

SERIAL: 400
DATE: 29 Oct 43

DATE/TIME
OR FILE NUMBER: 300017, NCR 8995

TOR MAP ROOM: 1910 EWT
VIA: Admiral Brown

SUBJECT: Sextant conference.

ACTION
Answers Prime's No. 477. The answer was first prepared by Admiral Leahy, together with Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Brown, in the Map Room. It was rewritten by the President in the Doctor's office.

Sent to Navy Code Room at 29/1925Q. To PM as 300017, NCR 8995.

Answered by PM in his 479.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

ACTION COMPLETED: 

FILMED: 30 Oct 43
29 October 1943

From: Oppav
To: Alusna, London.

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 401
and PERSONAL.

My immediately preceding message. Code word SEKTANT is accepted.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1925, WST, October 29, 1943.

OGDEN KNIFIN,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1 1971]
My immediately preceding message. Code word SEXTANT is accepted.

Rusheh
Mrs. L. Paine,

My immediately preceding message code word Sanctum
is acceptable accepted.

"Leaky's draft"
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
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<td>1900, Q</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Admiral Brown.</td>
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<td>Code word SEKTANT is approved.</td>
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**ACTION**

Prepared by Admiral Leahy in the Map Room, p.m., 29 Oct. Taken to President. President approved; returned to Map Room for sending by Admiral Brown. (This is continuation of Pres' #400.)

Additional documentation is void with respect to this document due to lack of data.

No answer.

---

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**  

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
**FILED:**
From: Opnav.
To: Alusma, London.

PRIORITY

PERSONAL and FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Number 402.

In order that we may not be rushed at the last minute I have directed our OWI to send to Bracken early next week our suggestion for the October Joint Anti Submarine Statement. I will appreciate an agreement on the statement well before the date of issue.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1925, EWT, October 29, 1943.

CODEN KNIPPING
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By 1-1-1974

Date 1974 1 1
DRAFT

From: Oney
To: Alliance London (40v)
29 Oct 43.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

IN ORDER THAT WE MAY NOT BE HURLED AT THE LAST MINUTE I HAVE DIRECTED OUR OWI TO SEND TO BRACKEN EARLY NEXT WEEK OUR SUGGESTION FOR THE OCTOBER JOINT ANTI-SUBMARINE STATEMENT. I WILL APPRECIATE AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATEMENT WELL BEFORE THE DATE OF ISSUE.

Roosevelt

(Copy - paraphrase - to Mr. Elmer Davis
Coninck

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By leg Stewart
Date: Nov 1 1971
ACTION

Paraphrased copies sent to Admiral King and Elmer Davis by memorandum signed by Lieutenant Elsey, a.m., 30 Oct.

Prime replied in his #480, 30 Oct 43, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 10, 30/1216Z.
30 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: CPHAY
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 403, PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

PREPARATIONS FOR OVERLORD SEEM TO HAVE REACHED A STAGE FROM WHICH PROGRESS IS DIFFICULT UNLESS AND UNTIL COMMANDER IS APPOINTED. AS YOU KNOW, I CANNOT MAKE MARSHALL AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY. I AM NONETHELESS ANXIOUS THAT PREPARATIONS PROCEED ON SCHEDULE AGREED AT QUADRANT WITH TARGET DATE MAY FIRST. I SUGGEST YOU MAY CARE TO CONSIDER EARLY APPOINTMENT OF BRITISH DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER FOR OVERLORD WHO IN RECEIPT OF PRECISELY THE SAME MEASURE OF SUPPORT AS WILL EVENTUALLY BE ACCORDED TO MARSHALL COULD WELL CARRY THE WORK FORWARD. IF I MAY MAKE PROPOSAL, I SUGGEST APPOINTMENT OF DILL, PORTAL, OR BROOKE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1600, EST, 30 October 1943.

ROBERT W. BOGUE, Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D.G. Stewart
Date Dec 1 1971

SECRET
ACTION

Dispatch first suggested by General Morgan in memorandum to the President, 27 Oct 43. Proposed dispatch to PM rewritten by Admiral Leahy and sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 2.

President approved in his BLACK 1, 301940Z, and message sent to Navy Code Room as 403 at 1600Q.

Came around in his at 161, 31 Oct 43.

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME

SERIAL 403 DATE 30 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM -- VIA --

SUBJECT High Command of OVERLAND.

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: 30 Oct 43
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSSA LONDON

Number 404. Personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 479. Hull's departure from Moscow has meant two day delay in his getting home. It is essential I see him before I myself leave, as you can readily understand. I had hoped to get three days in North Africa before reaching Cairo. I can, however, do some of the North African and Italian business on the way back. Therefore, I still hope to arrive Cairo by the twentieth by flying there directly I reach the harbor. But, if wind and weather are bad, I might not make Cairo until the twenty-second. I think my ship repeat ship will take me to Oran.

Ever so many thanks for offering to make arrangements at Cairo, which we accept with pleasure. If any hitch develops there we can, of course, meet in Alexandria, the staff living ashore and we on our respective ships.

I am wiring Generalissimo to prepare to meet us in the general neighborhood of Cairo about November twenty-fifth.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2300 EWT 30 October 1943

CAPTAIN KHIFIN

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date: Nov 7, 1974

SECURITY

310415
NCR 9203
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<td>NCR 9203</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers PM's message, which was sent to President at Hyde-Park as WHITE 9.

Admiral Leahy in WHITE 14 to the President (30/22202) submitted a proposed reply to the PM. President sent back reply to PM in his BLACK 4 (this was different from Leahy's proposed message). Sent to the PM as 404, (310415 NCR 9203).

ACTION COMPLETED: 31 Oct 43