

National Archives and Records Service
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL
OCTOBER 1943

Microfilmed at The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York

~~SECRET~~

1 October 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 366 from the President to the Former Naval Person, [redacted] and personal.

I have sent the following to U.J. regarding Eisenhower's NAF 426:

"The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Area, Eisenhower, has recommended the following changes in the 'Instrument of Surrender of Italy':

"1. Change the title to 'Additional conditions of the armistice with Italy.'

"2. Change the last sentence of the preamble to read 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government'.

"3. Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph one.

"General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress in defeating the German forces in Italy in that it will help to align the Italian Army, Navy, and civil population on our side.

"Eisenhower urgently requests that pending a decision on these recommendations secrecy in regard to the Terms of Surrender document is 'absolutely vital to our success in Italy'.

"I hope that these recommendations of General Eisenhower will be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage to us.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971


- 1 -

0126

"Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1210, EWT, 1 October 1945.


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

Oct 1
September 1, 1943

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #366.

I have sent the following to U.J. regarding Eisenhower's NAF 426:

"The Allied Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean Area Eisenhower has recommended the following changes in the "Instrument of Surrender of Italy":

- "1. Change the title to "Additional conditions of the armistice with Italy".
- "2. Change the last sentence of the preamble to read "and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government".
- "3. Omit the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph one.

"General Eisenhower and all of his senior commanders concur in this recommendation as highly advantageous to our progress in defeating the German forces in Italy in that it will help to align the Italian Army, Navy, and civil population on our side.

"Eisenhower urgently requests that pending a decision on these recommendations secrecy in regard to the Terms of Surrender document is "absolutely vital to our success in Italy".

"I ^{hope} ~~trust~~ _{will} that these recommendations of General Eisenhower be approved by the Allied Powers because they are highly advantageous to our war effort and can be of no disadvantage to us.

"Your concurrence is requested by telegraph at the earliest practicable date."

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W.F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

1 October 1943

From: Opnev
To: Alusna, London

The President to the Former Naval Person, ~~SECRET~~ and personal,
Number 367.


Your 427 and 428. Italy has not yet made a declaration of war
against Germany.

I suggest that you endeavor to obtain from Stalin approval of
your text of proposed joint statement by all three of us to be made
public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany
by Italy.

Your text meets with my approval.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1215, EWT, 1 October 1943.


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~
- 1 -

0129

WJZ

October 1, 1943.

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #367

Your 427 and 428 Italy has not yet made a declaration of war against Germany.

I suggest that you endeavor to obtain from Stalin approval of your text of proposed joint statement by all three of us to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy.

Your text meets with my approval.

Roosevelt

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. P. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

Prepared by Actm. Leahy

0130

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

October 1, 1943

From: Opnav
To : Alusna, London

Number 368 from the President to the Former Naval Person, [REDACTED] and personal.

I have just received the following message from U.J.

"Today I have received your message of September 27th.

"I share your opinion regarding the desirability of the Secretary of State Mr. Hull's presence at the forthcoming conference of the representatives of the three governments.

"At the same time I have to inform you about great difficulties which could have appeared in case of change of the decision, previously agreed upon, regarding Moscow as the place of the forthcoming conference.

"The fact is that in case the conference would not be held in Moscow but in Britian, as you propose, Mr. V. M. Molotov could not have come to the conference at the appointed time, whose presence at the conference I consider to be necessary. Mr. V. M. Molotov's departure from the USSR, at least in the near future, is absolutely impossible, because as you know, Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, the Deputy Commisar for Foreign Affairs, will very soon go to Algiers.

"Besides, as it is known, the press in the United States and in Britian has already widely published the information that the forthcoming conference will take place not elsewhere but in Moscow, and, therefore, the choice of a new place for the conference could have caused undesirable perplexities.

-1-

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

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~~SECRET~~

"I have no objections against October 15th as the date of the conference.

"It is assumed that by that time the questions to be discussed will be decided by the Governments."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2300, EWT, October 1, 1943.

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

-2-

~~SECRET~~

0132

██████████
██████████
2 October 1943

PRIORITY

FROM: Opanv
TO: Aluma, London

Personal from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 369.

Your 431 in regard to Sforza, I am informed that he with his son and Carlos Almagia expects to arrive by airplane at Prestwick, Scotland, October third enroute to Marrakech.

I hope you can effectively indoctrinate him during his stop in U.K.

I am this date sending the following to Eisenhower:

"Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this Government that Grandi's presence in Badoglio Government at this time would not be acceptable. Even though Grandi was perhaps chief figure in deposition of Mussolini, he had been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi Government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio Government should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this Government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian Government.

"The King's position on the question of declaration of war as stated in MAP 426 is unimpressive. Germany has already taken active belligerent steps against Italy and the chief strength of Badoglio's Government is its announced determination to rid Italy by force of the German invader. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to be given the status of a cobelligerent."

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1220, EWT, 2 October 1943.

Robert H. Myers
ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

██████████
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W. S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0133

~~SECRET~~

October 2, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #369

Your 431 in regard to Sforza, I am informed that he with his son and Carlos Almagia expects to arrive by airplane at Prestwick, Scotland October third enroute to Marrakech.

I hope you can effectively indoctrinate him during his stop in U.K.

I am this date sending the following to Eisenhower:

"Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this Government that Grandi's presence in Badoglio Government at this time would not be acceptable. Even though Grandi was perhaps chief figure in deposition of Mussolini, he had been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi Government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio Government should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this Government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian Government.

"The King's position on the question of declaration of war as stated in NAF 428 is unimpressive. Germany has already taken active belligerent steps against Italy and the chief strength of Badoglio's Government is its announced determination to rid Italy by force of the German invader. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to be given the status of a cobelligerent."

Roosevelt
W.A.L.

Prepared by Adm Leahy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W. P. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

4 OCTOBER 1943

From: Opnav .
To: Alusna, London

Number 370 from the President to the Former Naval Person. Personal
and ~~SECRET~~

Reference Para 3 of my 362 to you, dated September 27, 1943, I suggest
following message be sent to Molotov to clarify Russian position with
respect to two commissions now being set up in the Mediterranean Area.

Message begins. To M. Molotov from the Secretary of State.

Reference Para 3 of your message to me dated 26 September 1943.

There appears to be no conflict between the Military-Political
Commission envisaged by the three governments of Great Britain, the
United States, and the Soviet Union, and the Control Commission set up
by Para 37 of the long term Italian surrender document agreed to by the
three governments.

The Control Commission acts directly under the Supreme Allied Com-
mander to deal with specific problems arising in areas of Italy liberated
by Anglo-American armies. These are problems arising in any active
military area under direct supervision of the Supreme Commander and so
the commission must act under his direct control.

On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Med-
iterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of
"considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different
governments disassociating themselves with Germany". Thus it will deal
with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary
powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NTV 1 1971

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
The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Commander, he will be informed of it through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

" Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore. End message.

" I will await your reply before asking the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1310, EWT, 4 October 1943.


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

041855 NCR 4310
NCR 4311

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

October 4, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME # 370

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On the contrary, the Military-Political Commission for the Mediterranean Basin will have the purpose, as Marshal Stalin says, of "considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different governments disassociating themselves with Germany". Thus it will deal with the broad overall picture in this area. It will not have plenary powers. Its members will study the problems and advise their governments. The governments will then consult each other and reach a decision. If such decision affects the Supreme Allied Commander, he will be informed of it through the Combined

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

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~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT TO PRIME (Cont'd)

October 4, 1943.

Chiefs of Staff.

Now that the members of this Military-Political Commission have been appointed and it will meet soon, I feel the policies of our three governments in the Mediterranean area will be harmonized more effectively and quickly than heretofore. End message.

I will await your reply before ^{asking}~~directing~~ the Secretary of State to send above message. I feel it important to straighten out this matter now as it will set the precedent for all such future activities in the war.

Roosevelt

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

*Written by Colonel Hammond
(See "Recognition of Badoglio"
folder)*

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

4 October 1943

WHL

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 371, personal and ~~SECRET~~ from the President to the Former Naval Person:

Reply to your 430.

The newspapers here, beginning with the Hearst, McCormack crowd, had a field day over General Marshall's duties. The drums were beaten rather loudly by the rest of the press for a few days but it is pretty much of a dead cat now.

It seems to me that if we are forced into making public statements about our military commands we will find ourselves with the newspapers running the war. I, therefore, hope that nothing will be said about the business until it is actually accomplished.

It may be that the situation, other than newspaper criticism by our political enemies, will warrant a joint announcement sooner than I have anticipated, but at the moment I earnestly urge that we say nothing.

I agree with you that at the appropriate time we must make an overall statement relative to commands and I fully appreciate your position at home, but I do not think that the difficulties about secondary commands throughout the world are adequate reasons for making the major announcement in regard to Marshall.

I will do what I can about Mountbatten because I realize that some of our press have been treating him very badly, although, on the whole,

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

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he has come out of it very well. Certainly American public opinion thoroughly approves of his appointment.


I agree with you that we should not permit any undue optimism about this campaign either at home or abroad. Nevertheless there is a very proper feeling that Mountbatten will prosecute vigorously anything he is assigned to do.

I hope very much that you will agree that statement about Marshall need not be made at present.

The answer we got from Uncle Joe relative to the Moscow meeting was not unexpected so it seems there is nothing to do but take the trip there and we are organizing accordingly.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1340, EWT, 4 October 1943.



CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

091920 WCR 4313
WCR 4314

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1978

~~SECRET~~

0140

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1 October 1943

#371

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

The President asks that you
talk to him about this message* from the
Prime Minister.

Respectfully,

G. M. Elsey

*#430. Answer prepared by
Mr. Hopkins and after cor-
rection by the President,
sent as Pres-PM # 371.

0141

[REDACTED]

OCTOBER 4, 1943

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT # 871

REPLY TO YOUR 430.

THE NEWSPAPERS HERE, BEGINNING WITH THE HEARST, MCCORMICK
CROWD, HAD A FIELD DAY OVER GENERAL MARSHALL'S DUTIES. THE
DRUMS WERE BEATEN RATHER LOUDLY BY THE REST OF THE PRESS FOR A
FEW DAYS BUT IT IS PRETTY MUCH OF A DEAD CAT NOW.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE ARE FORCED INTO MAKING PUBLIC
STATEMENTS ABOUT OUR MILITARY COMMANDS WE WILL FIND OURSELVES
WITH THE NEWSPAPERS RUNNING THE WAR. I, THEREFORE, HOPE THAT
NOTHING WILL BE SAID ABOUT THE BUSINESS UNTIL IT IS ACTUALLY
ACCOMPLISHED.

IT MAY BE THAT THE SITUATION, OTHER THAN NEWSPAPER CRITICISM
BY OUR POLITICAL ENEMIES, WILL WARRANT A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT SOONER
THAN I HAVE ANTICIPATED, BUT AT THE MOMENT I BARNESTLY URGE THAT
WE SAY NOTHING.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WE MUST MAKE
AN OVERALL STATEMENT RELATIVE TO COMMANDS AND I FULLY APPRECIATE
YOUR POSITION AT HOME, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THE DIFFICULTIES
ABOUT SECONDARY COMMANDS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ARE ADEQUATE REASONS
FOR MAKING THE MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT IN REGARD TO MARSHALL.

I WILL DO WHAT I CAN ABOUT MOUNTBATTEN BECAUSE I REALIZE THAT
SOME OF OUR PRESS HAVE BEEN TREATING HIM ~~rather~~^{very} BADLY, ALTHOUGH, ON
THE WHOLE, HE HAS COME OUT OF IT VERY WELL. CERTAINLY AMERICAN
PUBLIC OPINION THOROUGHLY APPROVES OF HIS APPOINTMENT.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD NOT PERMIT ANY UNDUE OPTIMISM
ABOUT THIS CAMPAIGN EITHER AT HOME OR ABROAD. NEVERTHELESS THERE

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

W. J. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

0142

-2-

IS A VERY PROPER FEELING THAT MOUNTBATTEN WILL PROSECUTE VIGOROUSLY ANYTHING HE IS ASSIGNED TO DO.

I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT ~~no~~^{about Marshall} STATEMENT NEED NOT BE MADE AT PRESENT.

THE ANSWER WE GOT FROM UNCLE JOE RELATIVE TO THE MOSCOW GETTING WAS NOT UNEXPECTED SO IT SEEMS THERE IS NOTHING TO DO BUT TAKE THE TRIP THERE AND WE ARE ORGANIZING ACCORDINGLY. ~~THE~~ ~~1942~~ ~~OCTOBER~~ ~~FIFTEENTH~~ ~~IS~~ ~~ALL~~ ~~RIGHT~~ ~~WITH~~ ~~ANTHONY~~. ~~I~~ ~~HAVE~~ ~~CALLED~~ ~~UNCLE~~ ~~JOE~~ ~~THIS~~ ~~MORNING~~ ~~AS~~ ~~FOLLOWS~~:

"I HAVE YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE FIFTEENTH AND OUR DEPARTURE WILL BE IN MOSCOW ON THAT DATE.

THE DELEGATION WILL BE HEADED BY SECRETARY HULL AND WILL INCLUDE OUR NEW AMBASSADOR MR. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, MRS. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, BRIGADIER GENERAL J. R. DEANE, SECRETARY OF OUR STAFF CHIEFS OF STAFF WHO IS ACQUAINTED WITH ALL OUR MILITARY PLANS. THEY WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SMALL STAFF."

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0143

~~SECRET~~

4 October 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and [redacted] t from the President to the Former Naval Person
Number 372.

The following message has been received from U.J. and is forwarded
for your information. Eisenhower has been informed.

"To approval by the United States and Great Britain of
General Eisenhower's proposal to keep secret for the present
the provisions of the long term surrender document after it
is signed by the Italian Government, I have no objection."

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1330, EWT, 4 October 1945


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

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0144

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

4 October 1943

WHL

From: Opanav
To: Alusna, London

Number 373, personal and [redacted] for the Former Naval Person from the President.

On the front page of the Washington Post, dated Saturday morning, October 2, there appeared a story headlined as follows: "STALIN SAID TO HAVE REJECTED LONDON AS MEETING PLACE."

The article stated in substance that Russia had politely rejected a proposal made by me personally to change the location of the three-power conference from Moscow to London because the health of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, made the longer journey undesirable. In order to appear in this edition of the newspaper, the story had to be released actually many hours before I had personally received Stalin's reply stating that he did not care to change the location.

This article, written by Frederick Kuh and copyrighted by the Chicago Sun, appeared under a London date line. Since the Chicago Sun is a highly reputable paper and friendly to this administration it seems reasonable to conclude that the dateline was not faked and so the story did in fact originate in London. To my mind the mere fact that this story got into the newspapers in the first place indicates a dangerous leak somewhere, and further more, indicates a bad mistake on the part of some censor for passing the story for publication as he must have in this case.

Don't you think perhaps it would be beneficial to us both if this leak could be run down and so avoid another one in the future when there is more at stake.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1845, EWT, 4 October 1943.

Robert H. Myers
ROBERT H. MYERS, Lt. (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

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4412

0145

DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER #373

On the front page of the Washington Post, dated Saturday ^{morning} October 2, there appeared a story headlined as follows: "STALIN SAID TO HAVE REJECTED LONDON AS MEETING PLACE."

The article stated in substance that Russia had politely rejected a proposal made by me personally to change the location of the three-power conference from Moscow to London because the health of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, made the longer journey undesirable. In order to appear in this edition of the newspaper, the story had to be released actually many hours before I had personally received Stalin's reply stating that he did not care to change the location.

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Don't you think perhaps it would be beneficial to us both if this leak could be run down and so avoid another one in the future when there is more at stake.

ROOSEVELT



Rejected London As Meeting Place

By Frederick Kuh

Copyright by the Chicago Sun

London, Oct. 1.—Russia is reliably reported tonight to have possibly rejected an American request to hold the three-power conference in London instead of in Moscow.

According to trustworthy American sources, President Roosevelt personally intervened in the preparations for the conference by cabling Premier Stalin and asking that the meeting place, already fixed as Moscow, be shifted to London. The reason the President gave was that the health of Secretary of State Cordell Hull made the longer journey undesirable.

Stalin's reply, while friendly and courteous, was stated to have said regretfully that a last-minute change of the scene would involve serious difficulty. The Soviet Premier made clear his government's

WAT

~~SECRET~~
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PRIORITY

4 October 1943

From: Opanav
To: Alusna, London

President to Former Naval Person, No. 374, personal and ~~SECRET~~

I think your idea of enticing Uncle Joe to the Mediterranean with the offer of the use of a ship is excellent, but I am not sure whether or not I have told you this. In any case, I hope that your efforts meet with success for reasons you well know. Please let me know if you have any news on this matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1845, EWT, 4 October 1943.

Robert H. Myers

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *Carl Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1971*

042337
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- 1 -

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OK
WB

DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER #374

I think your idea of enticing Uncle Joe to the Mediterranean with the offer of the use of a ship is excellent, but I am not sure whether or not I have told you this. In any case, I hope that your efforts meet with success for reasons you well know. Please let me know if you have any news on this matter.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.P. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

0149

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

October 6, 1943

President to Former Naval Person, No. 375, personal and ~~SECRET~~

1. In accordance with our agreement at Quebec initial entry of the United States into the Azores will be by two or more United States escort vessels from UGS-22, sailing on 25 October, 1943, and two aircraft from a CVE. In addition to the convoy escorts, there will be at least two others over and above those normally provided. The convoy will be routed so as to pass the Azores on approximately 6 November and the carrier will be within near aircraft range of Lagens Field, Terceira Island, the afternoon of 6 November and the morning of 7 November.

2. Two escort vessels will proceed to Horta, Fayal, at time to be designated by the Convoy Commander, for the purpose of fueling from a British oiler stationed there; to remain not longer than 24 hours and to rejoin convoy or carrier group after fueling.

3. At the discretion of the Convoy Commander, up to three more escorts will be fueled at Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. This fueling will be dependent upon the submarine situation as existing at the time and the Convoy Commander's opinion whether the escorts may be spared long enough to accomplish the fueling. It is expected this fueling will be accomplished unless there is good reason to the contrary.

4. Dependent upon weather conditions, two carrier-borne aircraft will be flown off the carrier when near Lagens Field the afternoon of

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

' 6 November, to remain there overnight, and after fueling, rejoin the carrier the following day. This date may be delayed if required by weather conditions.

5. The routing of the convoy and carrier, with due regard to the submarine situation, will be such as to make the above operations feasible.

6. Commanding Officers of ships and planes will have plausible reasons for entry. They will obtain such intelligence information as practicable in regard to reactions to their presence and facilities observed. The Convoy Commander will forward items of value if radio silence is broken for other reasons or upon arrival in port.

7. Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, will be charged with the further development and execution of this plan.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1210, EST, 6 October 1941.



CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
6 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Initial Entry into the
Azores.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the scope of our initial entry into the Azores in the light of their understanding of your arrangement with the Prime Minister. It is recommended that a message be sent to the Prime Minister along the lines of the draft message attached hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Encl.
Draft Message.

375



DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

927/495-1 2 May 1972

By RHPB Date MAY 8 1972

[REDACTED]
0152

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
DRAFT MESSAGE

#375

From the President to the Prime Minister

Plan of entry of the U. S. into the Azores.

In accordance with our agreement at Quebec

1. Initial entry of the United States into the Azores will be by two or more United States escort vessels from UGS-22, sailing on 25 October, 1943, and two aircraft from a CVE. In addition to the convoy escorts, there will be at least two others over and above those normally provided. The convoy will be routed so as to pass the Azores on approximately 6 November and the carrier will be within near aircraft range of Lagens Field, Terceira Island, the afternoon of 6 November and the morning of 7 November.
2. Two escort vessels will proceed to Horta, Fayal, at time to be designated by the Convoy Commander, for the purpose of fueling from a British oiler stationed there; to remain not longer than 24 hours and to rejoin convoy or carrier group after fueling.
3. At the discretion of the Convoy Commander, up to three more escorts will be fueled at Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. This fueling will be dependent upon the submarine situation as existing at the time and the Convoy

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

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0153

~~SECRET~~

Commander's opinion whether the escorts may be spared long enough to accomplish the fueling. It is expected this fueling will be accomplished unless there is good reason to the contrary.

4. Dependent upon weather conditions, two carrier-borne aircraft will be flown off the carrier when near Lagens Field the afternoon of 6 November, to remain there overnight, and after fueling, rejoin the carrier the following day. This date may be delayed if required by weather conditions.

5. The routing of the convoy and carrier, with due regard to the submarine situation, will be such as to make the above operations feasible.

6. Commanding Officers of ships and planes will have plausible reasons for entry. They will obtain such intelligence information as practicable in regard to reactions to their presence and facilities observed. The Convoy Commander will forward items of value if radio silence is broken for other reasons or upon arrival in port.

7. Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, will be charged with the further development and execution of this plan.

Rosen

- 2 -

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.S. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

0154

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL 375	DATE 6 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 061638 NCR 4687	
TOR MAP ROOM 071145	VIA Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Aircraft fueling in Azores.	

ACTION

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: Pres-PM Folder
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~~SECRET~~

WHL

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To : Alusna, London

October 6, 1943

President to Former Naval Person, No. 376, personal and ~~SECRET~~

I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff quote:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

a. Potential saving over the six months period (November 1943 - April 1944) of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.

b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.

c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.

d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty

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By W.S. Steudt

Date NOV 1 1977

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0156

~~SECRET~~

elsewhere.

This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operations will have to be lowered.

The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD build-up during the coming winter months.

We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required. Unquote.

I agree that this is a very important matter.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1610 EWT October 6, 1943

Ogden Kniffin
OGDEN KNIFFIN
Captain, CE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0157

Admiral Brown

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★
FROM THE DESK OF Franklin D. Roosevelt
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

376

For Former Naval Person
from The President

I have just received the
following recommendation from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Quota ""
Unquota

I agree that this is a
very important matter
Roosevelt



★ BUY ★
DEFENSE
STAMPS

0158

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

// The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

- a. Potential saving over the six months period (November 1943 - April 1944) of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.
- b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.
- c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.
- d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere.

This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operation will have to be lowered.

The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY~~

the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD build-up during the coming winter months.

We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required. ♣

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By _____
Date NOV 1 1977

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- 2 -
~~SECURITY~~

0160

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

6 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 377, PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM U. J.

"I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER FIRST ONLY TODAY, ON
OCTOBER FIFTH.

"ON MY PART THERE ARE NO OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CHANGES PROPOSED
BY YOU IN THE 'DOCUMENT OF THE CAPITULATION OF ITALY'".

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1730, EWT, 6 October 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. J. Bennett*
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

October 6, 1943.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON # 377

I have just received the following from U. J.

"I have received your message of October first only today, on October fifth.

On my part there are no objections against the proposed by you changes in the 'Document of the Capitulation of Italy'".

ROOSEVELT

0163

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL 377	DATE 6 October 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 061725Q	VIA Admiral Brown
SUBJECT Stalin's approval of changes in "Document of the Capitulation of Italy."	

ACTION

Forwards to the Prime Minister a message received from Marshal Stalin dated 5 October 1943.

General Eisenhower informed via War Department message by direction of the President.

Answered by Prime Minister in his #440 7 October 1943, to President.

(See Pres' #366, PM's #433)

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~~SECRET~~ By *W.J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 6 October 1943	FILED: President-PM Folder 6 Oct 1943. (Also see "Background Folder")
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WHL

██████████
PRIORITY

7 October 1943

From: Ocnav
To : Alusna, London

Number 378 from the President to the Former Naval Person, personal
and ██████████

I fully agree with your 439 including the new heading. However,
can it be proved that a larger number of U-boats were sunk than we
lost in escort ships and merchant ships?

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1430, EDT, 7 October 1943.

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.P. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL 378	DATE 7 October 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 1420	VIA BLACK 1 from Hyde Park, 7 Oct.
SUBJECT Monthly statement on U-Boat warfare in September.	

ACTION

Answers PM-Pres #439, which see.

For complete action on the Sept sub warfare statement, see Tab "Sept" in the "Monthly Submarine Warfare Statement" folder.

- See:*
 PM's # 439
 Pres' # 378
 PM's # 447.

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ACTION COMPLETED: 7 Oct 43	FILED: (Pres-PM Folder). Copy: "Monthly Sub Statement Folder"
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0166

~~SECRET~~

WHL

7 October 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 379, personal and [redacted] from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Reference your 438.

I do not want to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit the prospects for the early successful development of the Italian operations to a secure line north of Rome. I am opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower's opinion jeopardize the security of his current situation in Italy, the buildup of which is exceedingly slow considering the well known characteristics of his opponent who enjoys a marked superiority in ground troops and panzer divisions.

It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice OVERLORD as planned.

The American Chiefs of Staff agree.

I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1825, EST, 7 October 1943.

George M. Wise
GEORGE M. WISE,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

white 6

October 7, 1943.

From: Admiral Leahy #379
To: The President

The following message is proposed in reply to
Prime's 438:

"Reference your 438.

"I (am unwilling to) ^{*}force on Eisenhower diversions which
limit the prospects for the early successful development of
the Italian operations to a secure line north of Rome. I am
opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower's opinion
jeopardize the security of his current situation in Italy, the
buildup of which is exceedingly slow considering the well known
characteristics of his opponent who enjoys a marked superiority
in ground troops and panzar divisions.

"It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment
should prejudice OVERLORD as planned.

"The American Chiefs of Staff agree.

"I am transmitting a copy of this message to Eisenhower."

WAL

*Corrected by Black 2 to
"do not want to".*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Staud
Date NOV 1 1971

0168

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL 379	DATE 7 October 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 1420	VIA Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Situation developing in the Eastern Mediterranean - diversion of troops from OVEFLORD.	

ACTION

The President at 2215, 6 October, directed that Leahy should prepare answer to PM's 438, and send draft to Hyde Park for President's approval.

Leahy brought draft to Map Room at 1420, 7 Oct; sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 6; President corrected and approved as BLACK 2, which was received at 1605; released to Navy Code Room at 1625.

Copy sent to Eisenhower via War Department as War Dept. message by direction of the President.

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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: "Pres-PM Folder"	
7 October 1943		

0169

~~SECRET~~

7 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ number 390, from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Reference your 440.

On October 5 I informed Eisenhower as follows:

"The President and Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible. There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied. You will therefore put pressure on the Italian government for an early declaration of war without waiting for further successes."

Eisenhower informs me that he is using the above to reinforce his own efforts along this line.

We can arrange to synchronize the three announcements immediately when war is declared.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2000, October 7, 1943 by

F. H. Graham
F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGD.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

0170

~~SECRET~~

with

8 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PROSPT

From: Cpnay
To: Alusna, London.

From the President to the Former Naval Person, ~~SECRET~~ and personal,
Number 391.

I have received your Numbers 441 and 443 and given careful personal consideration to the points you make. I have given careful thought to them and so has the staff. I am concerned about the possibility of our armies suffering a reverse by the action of an enemy with superior forces except by air, under a Commander of proved audacity and resourcefulness. This applies especially to the absolute safety to the line we hope to gain in Italy.

With a full understanding of your difficulties in the Eastern Mediterranean, my thought in sending No. 379 was that no diversion of force from Italy should be made that would jeopardize the security of the allied armies in Italy, and that no action toward any minor objective should prejudice the success of OVERLORD.

We have almost all the facts now at our disposal on which to judge the commitments probably involved in the Rhodes operation. As I see it, it is not merely the capture of Rhodes but it must mean of necessity and it must be apparent to the Germans, that we intend to go further. Otherwise Rhodes will be under the guns of both Cos and Crete.

I was in accord with obtaining whatever help we could in the Dodecanese without heavy commitments, but the present picture involves

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By *W.J. Stewart*

Date *NOV 1 1971*

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- 1 -

0171

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

not only a well-organized, determined operation, but a necessary follow-through. This in turn involves the necessity of drawing for the means, largely shipping and air, not ground troops, from some other source which inevitably must be Italy, OVERLORD, or possibly Mountbatten's amphibious operation. The problem then is are we now to enter into a Balkan campaign starting with the southern tip, or is there more to be gained, and with security, by pushing rapidly to the agreed upon position north of Rome. It appears to me that a greater Allied threat against the Balkans is implied in this than by a necessarily precarious amphibious operation against Rhodes with a lack evident to the enemy of the necessary means for the follow-through. Strategically, if we eat the Aegean Islands, I ask myself where do we go from there and vice versa where would the Germans go if for some time they retain possession of the Islands.

As to the meeting you propose for Sunday in Africa, this would be in effect another meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff necessarily only involving a partial representation and in which I cannot participate. Frankly I am not in sympathy with this procedure under the circumstances. It seems to me the issue under discussion can best be adjusted by us through our C.C.S. set up in better perspective than by the method you propose. We have most of the facts and will soon have the results of the conference scheduled for tomorrow in Tunis.

FOCUSVX17

Released from the White House Man Room
at 2015, WHT, on October 1943 by

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

G. H. Graham
F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGO.

By *W. P. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

0172

FROM	President	TO	Prime
SERIAL	#381	DATE	8 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	090030Z NCR 5440		
TOR MAP ROOM	082020Q	VIA	Black 11
SUBJECT	Operations in Eastern Mediterranean		

ACTION

Answers PRIME's #441 and 443. For complete action on this dispatch, see PRIME's 443.

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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
8 Oct 43	Pres-FX Folder.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

0173

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

9 October 1943

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London

President to Former Naval Person, Number 362, personal and [REDACTED]
State Department has sent to Molotov message in my Number 370 to
you.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0635, EDT, 9 October 1943.


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0174

~~SECRET~~
BLACK 10

8 October 1943, Received 081745Z

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ADMIRAL LEAHY.

PLEASE ASK STATE DEPARTMENT TO SEND THE MESSAGE PROPOSED IN
WHITE 15 TO MR. MOLOTOV.

WILL YOU OR MARSHALL ASK EISENHOWER TO SUBMIT A SCHEME FOR
CONSIDERATION?

- WILL YOU SEND THE GIST OF THESE TWO TO CHURCHILL?

NOTE TO MAP ROOM: PLEASE CANCEL BLACK SEVEN.

*Chart room
Prep an message*

*1st. Pres. to Prime
State Department has sent
to molotov message in my
370 to you.*

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

#382

0175

FROM President	TO Prime Minister
SERIAL #382	DATE 9 October 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
FOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Military-Political Commission and Control Commission in Mediterranean.	

ACTION

PRESIDENT in BLACK 10, 8 Oct 43, requested Leahy to have State Dept sent to Molotov the message proposed in the PRESIDENT'S #370, 5 Oct 43, and approved by the PRIME MINISTER in his #442, 8 Oct 43; also that gist be sent to PRIME MINISTER.

Message sent to Molotov by State Department; PRESIDENT'S #382 is gist to PRIME MINISTER. (Prepared by Admiral Leahy)

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ACTION COMPLETED: 9 Oct 43	FILED: Pres-PK Folder
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0176

~~SECRET~~

9 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 383, personal and ~~SECRET~~ for the Former Naval Person from the President.

Your 445, the following message has been sent to Eisenhower:

"The Prime Minister in a message to the President expresses the fear that the repetition to you of the President's Message No. 379 of 7 October to the Prime Minister would be taken as an order from the President and as closing the subject finally. The Prime Minister desires that it be made clear to you that the conference scheduled for today in Tunis is free to examine the whole question in all its bearings and should report their (your and General Wilson's) conclusions to the President and the Prime Minister through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Prime Minister asks that the conference shall give full, free, patient and unprejudicial consideration to the whole question after having heard the Middle East point of view put forward by its representative.

"The President directs that the foregoing desire expressed by the Prime Minister be accepted for your guidance."

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1700, EWT, 9 October 1943.

C. S. Hammond
CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. S. Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1971*

0177

FROM President	TO Prime Minister
SERIAL #383	DATE Oct 9, 43.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 092153Z NCR 5440	
TOR MAP ROOM 092007Z	VIA WHITE 34, BLACK 14
SUBJECT Quote of message to Eisenhower re operations in Eastern Mediterranean.	

ACTION

Answers PM's #445, 9 Oct 43, which was sent to HP as WHITE 28, 9 Oct 43 (1040Q)

PRESIDENT, in BLACK 13, 9 Oct 43 (1208Q) requested Hopkins and Leahy to prepare reply to EISENHOWER.

Proposed draft to EISENHOWER and PRIME MINISTER sent to PRESIDENT as WHITE 34, 9 Oct 43 (1410Q).

PRESIDENT approved in BLACK 14, 9 Oct 43 (1607Q)

Sent to EISENHOWER via War Department as Freedom #9763 (2128Q)

Sent to PRIME MINISTER as #383, 9 Oct 43 (1753Q)

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ACTION COMPLETED: 9 October 43	FILED: Pres-PM Folder
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0178

~~SECRET~~

9 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Ocnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ Number 384 from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Replying to your 444, I am delighted with arrangements to provide in the Azores facilities for our ferry service as pointed out in my 376. The improvement in efficiency of the Allied war effort by directing our ferry service via the islands is so valuable as to justify its commencement at the earliest practicable date.

I hope you will succeed in convincing Salazar of the value to Portugal that will result from his taking with us an active part in the war.

He may be assured that the United States has no desire to remain after the war in any Portuguese territory, and that we will welcome him as a belligerent on our side.

The first temporary visit of escort vessels and two aircraft will be made approximately on 6 November as stated in detail in my 375.

It is good to know that the landings are going forward so well.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1705, EWT, 9 October 1945.


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1977

- 1 -

0179

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL #384.	DATE 9 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 092215 NCR 5441	
TOR MAP ROOM 092007Z	VIA BLACK 16, WHITE 35.
SUBJECT Use of Azores facilities by U.S.	

ACTION

Answers PM's #444.

PRESIDENT, in BLACK 12 8 Oct 43, requests Adm Leahy and JCS to prepare reply.

Leahy's draft of reply sent to HP as WHITE 35, 9 Oct 43.

Corrected and approved by PRESIDENT in BLACK 16, 9 Oct 43; Adm Leahy notified.

This message, PRESIDENT'S #384, sent at 092100Z.

Chronological order of messages on this subject:

*Pres' # 376, 6 Oct 43.
PM's # 444, 8 Oct 43
Pres' # 384, 9 Oct 43
Pres' # 387, 14 Oct 43*

*Preses' 458, 15 Oct 43.
Preses' 466, 19 Oct 43*

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ACTION COMPLETED: 9 Oct 43	FILED: Pres-PM Folder	

0180

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

12 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] NUMBER 385, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

WE HAVE RECEIVED FANTASTIC REPORTS REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES
OF GENERAL VON FALKENHAUSEN NOW IN PORTUGAL.

HAVE YOU ANYTHING IN REGARD TO THIS AND IF SO WHY NOT SEND
IT OVER HERE BY COURIER.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1155, EWT, 12 October 1943.

Robert H Myers

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1974

121623
NCR 5793

[REDACTED]

0181

President to Prime #315

We have received fantastic reports
regarding the activities of General
Von Falkenhansen ^{now} in Portugal

Have you anything in regard
to this and if so why not
send it over here by Crossbill

Roosevelt
WRB

FROM the President	TO the Prime Minister
SERIAL 385	DATE 12 October 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 12/1155Q	VIA Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Activities of General Von Falkenhausen in Portugal	

ACTION

Admiral Leahy wrote dispatch in Map Room at 12/1155Q, after telephone conversation with Admiral King in the Navy Department.

Answered by PM's #54.

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ACTION COMPLETED: 12 October 43	FILED: Pres-PM Folder (See "background folder")
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0183

~~SECRET~~
~~██████████~~
~~██████████~~
PRIORITY

14 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 386, personal and ~~██████████~~ from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your Number 452.

After consultation with General Eisenhower, I suggest that we approve the protocol proposed by him for the reason that it will meet the points raised in your No. 452 and will protect the right of the United Nations to dispose of the Italian naval vessels and merchant ships as the needs of the United Nations may demand.

The following is the text of the above mentioned proposed protocol:

"It is agreed that the title of the document signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief Allied Force, at Malta on September 29, 1943, should be changed to: 'ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WITH ITALY'. The following further amendments to this document are also agreed: the word unconditionally in Article 1 (A) to be deleted from that article and inserted after the word accepted in clause 6 of the preamble.

"The clauses in question, therefore, would read as follows:

"Preamble Clause 6: 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government'.

"Article 1 (A): 'The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender.'"

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1145, EWT, 14 October 1943

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

141618
NCR 6159

George M. Elsey
~~SECRET~~
GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

By *W.J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

0184

~~SECRET~~ 0

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER # 386.

Your Number 452.

After consultation with General Eisenhower, I suggest that we approve the protocol proposed by him for the reason that it will meet the points raised in your No. 452 and will protect the right of the United Nations to dispose of the Italian naval vessels and merchant ships as the needs of the United Nations may demand.

The following is the text of the above mentioned proposed protocol:

"It is agreed that the title of the document signed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief Allied Force, at Malta on September 29, 1943, should be changed to: 'ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WITH ITALY'. The following further amendments to this document are also agreed: the word unconditionally in Article 1 (A) to be deleted from that article and inserted after the word accepted in clause 6 of the preamble.

"The clauses in question, therefore, would read as follows:

"Preamble Clause 6: 'and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian Government'.

"Article 1 (A): 'The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender.'"

ROOSEVELT

RRP
~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0185

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL #386	DATE 14 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 14/1618Z	
TCR MAP ROOM 14/1130, EWT	VIA Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Suggested revival of Italian Surrender terms.	

ACTION

Answers PM's No's. 440 and 452; #452 was referred to General Eisenhower for recommendation: as FREEDOM #9919, 12 Oct; Eisenhower replied with his #2378, 13 Oct 43 (CM-IN-7694 13 Oct).

Proposed message to PM incorporating Eisenhower's suggestions prepared by Colonel Hammond; sent to Admiral Leahy evening of 13 Oct; taken by Leahy to President for approval morning of 14th Oct; President approved; returned by Leahy to Map Room at 1130 EWT, 13 Oct; sent to PM as #386, 14/1618Z.

*Answered by Prime in his #462, 16 Oct. (See also
Order #395, 23 Oct.)*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: 14 October 43	FILED: Pres-PM File.
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0186

~~SECRET~~

14 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

WAL

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

To the Former Naval Person from the President. ~~SECRET~~ and personal, Number 387.

You will recall agreement, made during your recent Portuguese negotiations, that any direct approach by U.S. Government to Portuguese Government would be suspended until those negotiations were concluded. Those negotiations were, as you know, concluded on 17 August with signing of INGOT agreement.

It was not practicable, however, to have included in that agreement adequate provision for U. S. Navy facilities in Azores, or any provision whatever for facilities for U. S. air transport and air ferrying operations.

We both fully realize the tremendous importance to combined war effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport and ferry route via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of gallons of high octane gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours per month.

We have received information from Lisbon that the Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with the United States looking toward the use by U. S. airplanes of the islands, and I should like to suggest for your consideration that the U. S. State Department be directed by me to make a direct approach to the Government of Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement to permit us to provide aviation facilities in the Azores and to use such facilities for our

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By *W.J. Stewart*

Date NOV 1 1971

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

141906 NCR 6198

0187

Number 387 Cont'd.

combatant and transport airplanes in the furtherance of the Allied war effort.

I hope you will agree to this line of approach to our common problem and that if practicable your Representatives in Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1435 EWT, 14 October 1943 by

F. H. Graham
F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. J. [Signature]*
Date NOV 1 1971

PROPOSED MESSAGE

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #387

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

by W. S. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

You will recall agreement, made during your recent Portuguese negotiations, that any direct approach by U. S. Government to Portuguese Government would be suspended until those negotiations were concluded. Those negotiations were, as you know, concluded on 17 August with signing of INGOT Agreement.

It was not practicable, however, to have included in that agreement adequate provision for U. S. Navy facilities in Azores, or any provision whatever for facilities for U. S. air transport and air ferrying operations.

We both fully realize the tremendous importance to combined war effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport and ferry route via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of *gallons of* high octane gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours per month.

We have received information from Lisbon that the Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with the United States looking toward the use by U. S. airplanes of the islands, and I should like to suggest for your consideration that the U. S. State Department be directed by me to make a direct approach to the Government of Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement to permit us to provide aviation facilities in the Azores and to use such facilities for our combatant and transport airplanes in the furtherance of the Allied war effort.

I hope you will agree to this line of approach to our common problem and that if practicable your Representatives in Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions.

Parsons

0189

FROM The President	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL Number 387	DATE 14 Oct '43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 141430Q	VIA Navy Code Room
SUBJECT Use of Azores by U.S. planes	

ACTION

Prepared by Admiral Leahy. Corrected and signed by the PRES-
IDENT; brought to the Map Room by Admiral Leahy at 1440; sent as
#387.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED: 14 October 1943	FILED: Pres-FM Folder (See "Background Folder")
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0190

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

WSE

14 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and ~~SECRET~~ from the President to the Former Naval Person, Number 388.

I have finally sent the following telegram to U. J. and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter sometimes had real inspirations. I like the idea of three tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend Chiang.

QUOTE.

"The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New Laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountain -- first, east bound and then west bound -- is insurmountable. We know from experience that planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days.

"I do not think that any one of us will need Legation facilities, as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

~~SECRET~~ By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1977

0191

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

"In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated.

"Asmara, the former Italian Capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field -- good at all times.

"Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent of us and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front.

"Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering.

"In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way.

"What would you think of November twentieth or November twenty-fifth as the date of the meeting?

"I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend.

"Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of us." UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1930, EWT, 14 October 1943.

Boyer P. Price
Boyer P. Price,
CAPTAIN, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~
- 2 -

0192

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1943.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON #388.

I have finally sent the following telegram to U. J. and I think your idea is an excellent one. St. Peter sometimes had real inspirations. I like the idea of three tabernacles. We can add one later for your old friend Chiang.

QUOTE The problem of my going to the place you suggested is becoming so acute that I feel I should tell you frankly that, for constitutional reasons, I cannot take the risk. The Congress will be in session. New laws and resolutions must be acted on by me after their receipt and must be returned to the Congress physically before ten days have elapsed. None of this can be done by radio or cable. The place you mentioned is too far to be sure that the requirements are fulfilled. The possibility of delay in getting over the mountain -- first, east bound and then west bound -- is insurmountable. We know from experience that

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1977

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

0193

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

-2-

planes in either direction are often held up for three or four days.

I do not think that any one of us will need Legation facilities, as each of us can have adequate personal and technical staffs. I venture, therefore, to make some other suggestions and I hope you will consider them or suggest any other place where I can be assured of meeting my constitutional obligations.

In many ways Cairo is attractive, and I understand there is a hotel and some villas out near the pyramids which could be completely segregated.

Asmara, the former Italian Capital of Eritrea, is said to have excellent buildings and a landing field -- good at all times.

Then there is the possibility of meeting at some port in the Eastern Mediterranean, each one of us to have a ship. If this idea attracts you we could easily place a fine ship entirely at your disposal for you and your party so that you would be completely independent of us and, at the same time, be in constant contact with your own war front.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0194

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

-3-

Another suggestion is in the neighborhood of Bagdad where we could have three comfortable camps with adequate Russian, British and American guards. This last idea seems worth considering.

In any event, I think the Press should be entirely banished, and the whole place surrounded by a cordon so that we would not be disturbed in any way.

What would you think of November twentieth or November twenty-fifth as the date of the meeting?

I am placing a very great importance on the personal and intimate conversations which you and Churchill and I will have, for on them the hope of the future world will greatly depend.

Your continuing initiative along your whole front heartens all of us. UNQUOTE

Roosevelt

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

0195

16 Oct 49

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This was not
answered formally
until 1st Oct.
It is understood
that several messages
were carried by
various visitors to
England - Harriman
etc. File
W.F.

FROM The President

TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 388

DATE 14 Oct 43

DATE/TIME
OR FILE NUMBER

TO: MAP ROOM 14/1810 EWT

VIA Admiral Brown

SUBJECT Quotes message to Marshal Stalin on 3 power conference meeting place.

ACTION

Brought to the Map Room by Admiral Brown. Released to the Code Room at 1930 EWT.

Message was sent to Marshal Stalin, with NAVY TDG 142321-38-45 NCR 6323-24-25.

(See also PM's # 437, 456 + 457.)

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:
14 Oct 43

FILED: Pres-PM Folder
(See Background Folder)

0197

~~SECRET~~

16 OCTOBER 1943

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON NUMBER 389.

I AM DISTURBED ABOUT THE BUILD UP OF OUR AIR FACILITIES AT ASSAM. THE DETERMINATION OF THE SUPPLIES THAT GO OVER THE RAILROAD FROM CALCUTTA TO ASSAM IS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL.

THE AMOUNT OF TONNAGE PLOWN OVER THE MOUNTAINS TO CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING TO ME. CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT THE SUPPLIES AND HIS STRIKING FORCE IS THE ONE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE IN CHINA PROPER BY US DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

OUR OWN TRANSPORT PLANES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

I WISH YOU WOULD TAKE A PERSONAL PART IN THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE I AM A BIT APPREHENSIVE THAT WITH OUR NEW PROJECT IN BURMA OUR AIR FORCE IN CHINA WILL BE FORGOTTEN AND I THINK THAT IS A GREAT MISTAKE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0955, EWT, 16 October 1943.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

161419
NCR 6564

0198

16 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL SEXTON

Attached herewith is a copy of the President's message to the Former Naval Person which you requested over the phone, stating that it was inadvertently not attached to the President's memorandum to General Marshall making reference to it.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.
POTUS-PM #389.

OCTOBER 15, 1943

#389

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I AM DISTURBED ABOUT THE BUILD UP OF OUR ~~ARMY~~^{AIR} FACILITIES AT ASSAM. THE DETERMINATION OF THE SUPPLIES THAT GO OVER THE RAILROAD FROM CALCUTTA TO ASSAM IS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL.

THE AMOUNT OF TONNAGE FLOWN OVER THE MOUNTAINS TO CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE HAS BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTING TO ME. CHENNAULT'S AIR FORCE CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT THE SUPPLIES AND HIS STRIKING FORCE IS THE ONE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION THAT CAN BE MADE IN CHINA PROPER BY US DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

OUR OWN TRANSPORT PLANES HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING.

I WISH YOU ^W COULD TAKE A PERSONAL ~~INTEREST~~^{part} IN THIS BUSINESS BECAUSE I AM A BIT APPREHENSIVE THAT WITH OUR NEW PROJECT IN BURMA OUR AIR FORCE IN CHINA WILL BE FORGOTTEN AND I THINK THAT IS A GREAT MISTAKE.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.P. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

SECRET

0200

FROM	POTUS	TO	PM
SERIAL	389	DATE	16 October 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	161419Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	0930 EWT	VIA	Mr. Harry Hopkins
SUBJECT	Build-up of air facilities at Assam.		

ACTION

Brought to the Map Room by Mr. Harry Hopkins at 0930 EWT after approval by President. Sent to NCR at 0955 Q.

Colonel Sexton called Colonel Hammond saying that the President had inadvertently omitted this message as an inclosure to a memorandum to General Marshall, and requested a copy.

Answered by Prime in his # 465, 19 Oct 43.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Colonel Sexton	16 Oct 43	Colonel Hammond
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
16 Oct 43	Pres-PM File	

0201

whI
44

[REDACTED]

16 OCTOBER 1943

[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON NUMBER 390.

YOUR 463. THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A MESSAGE TODAY
SENT TO MARSHAL STALIN.

" IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL MILITARY COMMISSION, AND IN VIEW OF MR. MOLOTOV'S OCTOBER 14 NOTE TO THE AMERICAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, I THINK I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, AS INDICATED IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF SEPTEMBER 5, I FEEL THAT FRENCH REPRESENTATION SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO MATTERS OTHER THAN THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF ITALY, IN WHICH THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHING THE COMMISSION DECIDE THAT FRANCE HAS A DIRECT INTEREST. IN THIS REGARD I FEEL, AS I SUGGESTED IN MY MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 13, THAT FRENCH REPRESENTATION SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THAT ACCORDED TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, BRAZIL, OR TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WHICH BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT MAY BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE. THAT THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION SHOULD ENTER INTO ITS DELIBERATIONS ON ALL SUBJECTS OR SHOULD FUNCTION ON THE SAME PLANE AS THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES WAS NEVER MY INTENTION!"

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2020 EWT, 16 October 1943

Robert W. Bogue
Robert W. Bogue
Lt(jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By *W. J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

[REDACTED]

0202

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	390	DATE	16 Oct 43.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	--	VIA	--
SUBJECT Control Commission - French participation in. Molotov's proposed amendment.			

ACTION Answers PM 463.

Molotov, on 16 Oct 43 proposed that French be invited to participate in work of Control Commission. This was transmitted to Hyde Park as White 2, with a suggested reply to Stalin and a note by Mr. Hopkins requesting that it also be sent to the PM. Admiral Brown phoned the Map Room saying that the President approved WHITE 2.

Sent to Stalin on 16 Oct 43; sent to PM as #390. "Iso see "Control Commission" folder for Molotov's message.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

25 Oct 43.

0203

██████████
PRIORITY

October 21, 1943.

W. B.
WAC

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and ██████████ Number 391, from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Last night I received the following from U. J.:

QUOTE Concerning the location for the forthcoming conference of the leaders of the three governments, I desire to convey the following information to you.

Unfortunately, not one of the places proposed instead of Reheran by you for the meeting is suitable to me.

It became clear, during the course of operations of the soviet forces in the summer and fall of this year, that the summer campaign may overgrow into a winter one and that our troops can continue their offensive operations against the German Army.

It is considered by all my colleagues that these operations demand my personal contact with the Command and daily guidance on the part of the Supreme Command. Conditions

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0204

are better in Teheran, because wire telegraph and telephone communications with Moscow exist there. This cannot be said about the other locations. My colleagues insist on Teheran as the place of the meeting for this reason.

I accept your suggestion to designate November 20th or 25th as a possible date for the conference, and I also agree that representatives of the press should be excluded from the meeting.

I hope that a great deal of good will be accomplished by the direct participation in the Moscow meeting of Mr. Hull, who has arrived safely in Moscow UNQUOTE

I am asking Hull to deliver the following to U. J. at once:

QUOTE I am deeply disappointed in your message received today in regard to our meeting.

0205

Please accept my assurance that i fully appreciate and understand your reason for requiring daily guidance on the part of the supreme Command and your personal contact with the Command which is bringing such outstanding results. This is of high importance.

And i wish you would realize that there are other vital matters which, in this constitutional American government, represent fixed obligations on my part which i cannot change. Our Constitution calls for action by the President on legislation within ten days of the passage of such legislation. That means that the President must receive and return to the Congress, with his written approval or his veto, physical documents in that period. I cannot act by cable or radio, as i have told you before.

The trouble with Teheran is the simple fact that the approaches to that city over the mountain often make flying an impossibility for several days at a time. This is a double

risk; first, for the plane delivering documents from Washington and, second, for the plane returning these documents to the Congress. I regret to say that as head of the Nation, it is impossible for me to go to a place where I cannot fulfill my constitutional obligations.

I can assume the flying risks for documents up to and including the Low Country as far as the Persian Gulf, through a relay system of planes, but I cannot assume the delays attending flights in both directions into the saucer over the mountains in which Teheran lies. Therefore, with much regret I must tell you that I cannot go to Teheran and in this my Cabinet members and the Legislative Leaders are in complete agreement.

Therefore, I can make one last practical suggestion. That is that all three of us should go to Basra where we shall be perfectly protected in three camps, to be established and guarded by our respective national troops. As you know, you can easily have a special telephone, under your own

control, laid from Basra to Teheran where you will reach your own line into Russia. Such a wire service should meet all your needs, and by plane you will only be a little further off from Russia than in Teheran itself.

I am not in any way considering the fact that from United States territory I would have to travel ~~six~~ thousand miles and you would only have to travel ~~six~~ hundred miles from Russian territory.

I would gladly go ten times the distance to meet you were it not for the fact that I must carry on a constitutional government more than one hundred and fifty years old.

You have a great obligation to your people to carry on the defeat of our common enemy, but I am begging you to remember that I also have a great obligation to the American government and to maintain the full American war effort.

As I have said to you before, I regard the meeting of the three of us as of the greatest possible importance, not only to our peoples as of today, but also to our peoples in relation to a peaceful world for generations to come.

it would be regarded as a tragedy by future generations if you and I and Mr. Churchill failed today because of a few hundred miles.

I repeat that I would gladly go to Teheran were I not prevented from doing so because of limitations over which I have no control.

I am suggesting Basra because of your communications problems.

If you do not like this I deeply hope you will reconsider Bagdad or Asmara or even Ankara in Turkey. The latter place is neutral territory, but I think it is worth considering and that the Turks might welcome the idea of being hosts though, of course, I have not mentioned this to them or anybody else.

Please do not fail me in this crisis UNQUOTE

The possibility of Teheran is out because I find the time risks are flatly impossible to take. I hope you can find some way of having Eden back this up.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1650, EWT, 21 October 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

HOOVEREVALT

0209

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME MINISTER
SERIAL	#591	DATE	21 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	1650	VIA	Admiral Brown
SUBJECT			
"EUREKA"			

ACTION Quotes paraphrase of message of 20 Oct 43 from Stalin, and message sent to Hull for Stalin, 21 Oct 43.

Prepared by Miss Tully at direction of the President.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
_____	_____	

0210

~~SECRET~~

WLT
W

21 Oct 43.

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON # 392

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON. NUMBER 392.

YOUR 453 WAS TRANSMITTED ON 18 OCTOBER TO SECRETARY HULL WITH
A REQUEST THAT IT BE CONSIDERED BY THE CONFERENCE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1805, EWT, 21 October 1943.

ROBERT BOGUE,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0211

22 October 1943

██████████
PRIORITY

From: Opanav
To: Alusna, London

Number 393, personal and ██████████ from the President for the Former Naval Person.

The chaotic condition developing in the Balkans causes me concern. I am sure you are also worried. In both Yugoslavia and Greece the guerrilla forces appear to be engaged largely in fighting each other and not the Germans. If these forces could be united and directed toward a common end they would be very effective. In the present confused condition the only hope I see for immediate favorable action is the presence of an aggressive and qualified officer. The only man I can think of now who might have a chance of success is Donovan. I do not believe he can do any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character he might do much good. He was there before and is given some credit for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. If we decide to send him all agencies of ours now working in the Balkans should be placed under his direction and the resources we put into this effort should be at his disposal. I understand that your General Gubbins is now in the Middle East. Donovan could consult with him enroute.

I feel this is an urgent matter. If you are inclined to agree to my idea I will discuss the possibilities with Donovan at once.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1100, EWT, 22 October 1943.

Franklin H. Graham
FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

October 22, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #393

The chaotic condition developing in the Balkans causes me concern. I am sure you are also worried. In both Yugoslavia and Greece the guerrilla forces appear to be engaged largely in fighting each other and not the Germans. If these forces could be united and directed toward a common end they would be very effective. In the present confused condition the only hope I see for immediate favorable action is the presence of an aggressive and qualified officer. The only man I can think of now who might have a chance of success is Donovan. I do not believe he can do any harm and being a fearless and aggressive character he might do much good. He was there before and is given some credit for the Yugoslavs entering the war against the Germans. If we decide to send him ~~to~~ all agencies of ours now working in the Balkans should be placed under his direction and the resources we put into this effort should be at his disposal. I understand that your General Gubbins is now in the Middle East. Donovan could consult with him enroute.

I feel this is an urgent matter. If you are inclined to agree to my idea I will discuss the possibilities with Donovan at once.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By WJ Stewart
Date: NOV 1 1971

0213

FROM POTUS	TO PRIME
SERIAL 393	DATE 22 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER --	
TOR MAP ROOM 22/1050 EWT	VIA Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Sending Donovan to the Balkans.	

ACTION

Prepared by Admiral Leahy.

PM replied in his #470, 23 Oct 43. President remarked to Admiral Brown, upon reading, that General Donovan should proceed to General Wilson's headquarters to ascertain if he could be of any assistance. Memo to Admiral Leahy 25 Oct 43.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED: 25 Oct 43	FILED: 25 Oct 43	

0214

██████████, PRIORITY

22 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

To the Former Naval Person from the President, personal and ██████████
Number 394.

With reference to your Number 467 regarding another full conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in November, it appears to me that there are several matters which should first be resolved before we meet.

1. There should be sufficient time allowed to analyze the results of the current Moscow conference and also I think the subsequent conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow conference is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavorable results in Russia.

2. Combined planning teams are now planning an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. It is important that this work be completed and that the respective Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to study it before a general meeting.

3. Certain outline plans from Eisenhower and commanders in the Pacific covering operations approved at QUADRANT are to be submitted on November 1, and these should receive some consideration before we arrive at the moment for a combined meeting.

It would be advantageous to our advance preparations for the conference to be informed as to the subjects which you think we should discuss.

At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special conference with U.J. would be in order rather than one in early November. ANFA would be good.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1110, EWT, 22 October 1943.

Franklin H. Graham
FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM, 1st Lt., AGD. Date

Roosevelt DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.S. Stewart*
NOV 1 1971

0215

October 22, 1943.

~~SECRET~~
PRESIDENT TO PRIME # 394

With reference to your Number 467 regarding another full conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in November, it appears to me that there are several matters which should first be resolved before we meet.

1. There should be sufficient time allowed to analyze the results of the current Moscow conference and also I think the subsequent conference we have in mind. For us to stage a meeting while the Moscow conference is in progress or at least before its results can be carefully considered, probably would have unfavorable results in Russia.

2. Combined planning teams are now planning an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. It is important that this work be completed and that the respective Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to study it before a general meeting.

3. Certain outline plans from Eisenhower and commanders in the Pacific covering operations approved at QUADRANT are to be submitted on November 1, and these should receive some consideration before we arrive at the moment for a combined meeting.

It would be advantageous to our advance preparations for the conference to be informed as to the subjects which you think we should discuss.

At the moment it seems to me that consideration of our relations with Russia is of paramount importance and that a meeting after our special conference with U.J. would be in order rather than one in early November.

Good
W. P. Stewart

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

394.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1943.

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Your No. 467, it appears difficult if not impossible for American Staff to be prepared and arrive in Africa by November tenth.

It is impossible for me to arrive by that time and later meet U.J.

In order that our ^{Staff} preparations may be expedited please inform me by telegraph subjects that you contemplate considering at meeting of full conference.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

First draft of # 394.
Not sent. See revised
394.

0217

FROM	POTUS	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	394	DATE	22 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	22/1050Q	VIA	Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Proposed meeting of Combined Staffs early in November, 43.			

ACTION

Answers PM's #467.

Prepared by Admiral Leahy; minor additions made by the Pres.

PM replied in his #471, 23 Oct 43, which the President directed
be sent to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Admiral Leahy	23 Oct 43	The President

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 25 Oct 43
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~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

443

PRIORITY

23 October 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 395, personal and [redacted] from the President for the Former Naval Person.

This is in reply to your cable Number 462 to me dated 16 October 1943. I recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be instructed to transmit to General Eisenhower the following cable for his comment or accomplishment. The suggested cable follows:

MESSAGE BEGINS.

Para 1. The modifications in the Long Terms of Surrender as proposed in your cable W-2378, 13 October 1943, were referred to the Soviet Government which agreed to the changes recommended by you and suggested additional changes. The British recommend that the proposed amendments of General Badoglio and the suggestions of the Soviet be embodied into one protocol. However, the British do not intend to concur in the protocol embodying the accepted two sets of amendments to the Long Terms of Surrender unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended as follows COLON

1. The following clause to be added to the preamble to the agreement reported in NAF 381. QUOTE. It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to the immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of the United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time. UNQUOTE.

2. Final sentence of last paragraph of the Cunningham Agreement

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.F. Stewart
NOV 1 1974

~~SECRET~~

be amended to read. QUOTE. Will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag. UNQUOTE.

Para 2. Soviet modifications of the Long Terms of Surrender should be incorporated into the text of your suggested protocol as follows COLON

1. The preamble should be amended to read as follows.

QUOTE. Whereas, in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand . . . UNQUOTE. It is to be noted that between QUOTE Governments UNQUOTE and QUOTE on the one hand UNQUOTE the words QUOTE acting in the interests of all the United Nations UNQUOTE have been added.

2. In the paragraph of the preamble beginning QUOTE The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943 UNQUOTE the words QUOTE and Soviet UNQUOTE are to be added between QUOTE United Kingdom UNQUOTE and QUOTE Governments UNQUOTE and the word QUOTE and UNQUOTE between QUOTE United States UNQUOTE and QUOTE United Kingdom UNQUOTE be deleted so that the text of the paragraph would read as follows. QUOTE The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments acting on . . . UNQUOTE.

Para 3. Article 29 of the Long Terms of Surrender be amended to read as follows COLON

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

W. J. Stewart

Date

NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

0220

SECRET

QUOTE. Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations, and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Government of Marshal Badoglio will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with. UNQUOTE.

Para 4. In the event that the amendments proposed by the Soviets and the British proposal for the modification of the Cunningham Agreement are acceptable to you, then you will incorporate into one protocol suggestions in your W-2378 and the Soviet amendments. The Italians will execute simultaneously the amendments to the Cunningham Agreement and the single protocol. MESSAGE ENDS.

ROOSEVELT

Released by the White House Map Room
at 1135, EWT, 23 October 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By *W.J. Stewart*

Date NOV 1 1971

SECRET

- 3 -

0221

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 October 1943.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Changes in the long term
armistice agreement with
Italy.

Enclosure: Draft Message.

By memorandum dated 16 October 1943 a
paraphrase copy of Message No. 462 from the Prime
Minister to you was referred to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for their consideration and recommendation.

The message of the Prime Minister has
been carefully considered by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and they recommend a reply to the Prime
Minister along the lines of the draft message
attached hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Handwritten Signature]
Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

927/495-1 22 Feb 1972

By RMEB Date APR 10 1972

~~SECRET~~



0222

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED REPLY BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER #395

This is in reply to your cable number 462 to me dated 16 October 1943. I recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be instructed to transmit to General Eisenhower the following cable for his comment or accomplishment. The suggested cable follows: *Message Begins*

Para 1 The modifications in the Long Terms of Surrender as proposed in your cable W-2378, 13 October 1943, were referred to the Soviet Government which agreed to the changes recommended by you and suggested additional changes. The British recommend that the proposed amendments of General Badoglio and the suggestions of the Soviet be embodied into one protocol. However, the British do not intend to concur in the protocol embodying the accepted two sets of amendments to the Long Terms of Surrender unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended as follows: *edit*

one The following clause to be added to the preamble to the agreement reported in NAF 381. *quote* "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to the immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of the United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time." *unquote*

two Final sentence of last paragraph of the Cunningham

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By *W.S. Stewart*

Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

0223

Agreement be amended to read. ^{quote} "Will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag." ^{insert}

Part 2 Soviet modifications of the Long Terms of Surrender should be incorporated into the text of your suggested protocol as follows.

^{one} The preamble should be amended to read as follows.
^{quote} "Whereas, in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand... ^{insert} It is to be noted that between ^{insert} Governments ^{insert} and ^{insert} on the one hand ^{insert} the words ^{insert} acting in the interests of all the United Nations ^{insert} have been added.

^{two} In the paragraph of the preamble beginning ^{quote} "The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943. ^{insert} the words ^{insert} and Soviet ^{insert} are to be added between ^{insert} United Kingdom ^{insert} and ^{insert} Governments ^{insert} and the word ^{insert} and ^{insert} between ^{insert} United States ^{insert} and ^{insert} United Kingdom ^{insert} be deleted so that the text of the paragraph would read as follows. ^{quote} "The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments acting on... ^{insert}

Part 3 Article 29 of the Long Terms of Surrender be amended to read as follows:

^{quote} Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or

of Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. F. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations, and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Government of Marshal Badoglio will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with. *in part*

Para 4 In the event that the amendments proposed by the Soviets and the British proposal for the modification of the Cunningham Agreement are acceptable to you, then you will incorporate into one protocol suggestions in your W-2378 and the Soviet amendments. The Italians will execute simultaneously the amendments to the Cunningham Agreement and the single protocol.

Message ends

Rosen

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~
- 3 -

0225

FROM President	TO Prime Minister
SERIAL #395	DATE 23 October 1943
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 231115, EWT	VIA Admiral Brown
SUBJECT Amendments to Italian Surrender Terms.	

ACTION Answers PM's #462, which the President sent to JSC and State Dept for consideration and recommendation, 16 Oct 43.

Captain Royal personally delivered to Admiral Brown, 23 Oct 43, the JCS suggested reply to PM, which embodied a suggested message to Eisenhower. Approved by President and sent to CR at 23/1135 Oct.

See PM's #473, 24 Oct, which says "Thank you so much."

(Finished by Combined Chiefs of Staff action [per Admiral Leahy.] of 4 November. FAN 268.

Com act 1612 of 4 Nov.

See NAF 524 of 21 November for final action.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
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_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 23 Oct 43
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0226

~~SECRET~~

WAZ

25 OCTOBER 1943

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 396, PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

IT IS A NUISENZA TO HAVE THE INFLUENZA. McINTIRE SAYS I NEED
A SEA VOYAGE.

NO WORD FROM U. J. YET.

IF HE IS ADAMANT, WHAT WOULD YOU THINK OF YOU AND ME MEETING,
WITH SMALL STAFFS, IN NORTH AFRICA OR EVEN AT THE PYRAMIDS, AND TOWARD
THE CLOSE OF OUR TALKS GET THE GENERALISSIMO TO JOIN US FOR TWO OR
THREE DAYS? AT THE SAME TIME, WE COULD ASK U. J. TO SEND MOLOTOV TO
THE MEETING WITH YOU AND ME. OUR PEOPLE PROPOSE NOVEMBER 20.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1815, EWT, 25 October 1943.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *Log Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1977*

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

252233
NCR 8140

0227

~~SECRET~~

October 25, 1943.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT #396

It is a nuisance to have the influenza. McIntire says I need a sea voyage.

No word from U. J. yet.

If he is adamant, what would you think of you and me meeting, with small staffs, in North Africa or even at the Pyramids, and toward the close of our talks get the Generalissimo to join us for two or three days? At the same time, we could ask U. J. to send Molotov to the meeting with you and me. *Our people propose Nov. 20.*

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.S. Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1971*

~~SECRET~~

0228

FROM POTUS	TO PRIME
SERIAL 396	DATE 25 October 1943
DATE/TIME 252233 NCR 8180	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOP MAP ROOM 1810, EWT	VIA Admiral Brown
SUBJECT Combined Staffs meeting.	

ACTION Dictated to Miss Tully by the President.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 25 Oct 43
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~~SECRET~~

26 October 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

WST

Number 397, personal and , from the President for the Former Naval Person.

The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British-Russian-U.S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that immediately upon our receipt of information if it turns out that he is unable to meet with us at Basra or other place that is acceptable to both of us, we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

QUOTE. Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our combined British-American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British-American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present. UNQUOTE.

262212 NCR 8374

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0230

~~SECRET~~

If he does agree to meet us at Basra, we can discuss this matter with him at that time.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1710, EWT, 26 October 1945.

Boyce P. Price

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *WJ Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1971*

~~SECRET~~

WAL

October 26, 1943.

~~SECRET~~
PRESIDENT TO PRIME # 397

The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British - Russian - U. S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that immediately upon our receipt of information that he is unable to meet with us at Basra or other place that is acceptable to both of us, we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

if it turns out

"Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our combined British - American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British - American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

"If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present."

If he does agree to meet us at Basra, we can discuss this matter with him at that time.

Russell

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER 720514

By PLA Date MAY 6 1972

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

*Tell him that
Stalin comes to
to 25 October 1943
Sends to a military
in a meeting
U.S. of War
PLA*

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The following is a first trial at a draft of a message regarding the subject of Russian participation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff conferences. You will recall that the other day I was opposed to a formal joining up by the Russians with our Chiefs of Staff organization, first, because I felt certain the Russians would feel that we were endeavoring to penetrate their strategical and operational plans, and further, that it would be next to impossible to reach final decisions with such a variegated group. My view is to make a small beginning, and very definitely on the basis that we are not asking for anything from the Russians in the way of information but are offering them virtually a complete insight into all of our strategical and logistical doings.

The following is the proposed message from the President to the Prime Minister:

"The present Moscow conference appears to be a genuine beginning of British - Russian - U.S. collaboration which should lead to the early defeat of Hitler. In order to further stimulate this cooperation and particularly to increase the confidence

immediately upon our receipt of information that he is unable to meet with us at Basra or other place that is acceptable to both of us

of Stalin in the sincerity of our intentions it is suggested that we jointly transmit some such message as the following to him:

Heretofore we have informed you of the results of our combined British - American military staff conferences. You may feel that it would be better to have a Russian military representative sit in at such meetings to listen to the discussions regarding British - American operations and take note of the decisions. He would be free to make such comments and proposals as you might desire. This arrangement would afford you and your

*File
KAM*

staff an intimate and prompt report of these meetings.

If you favorably consider such an arrangement we shall advise you of the date and place of the next conference as soon as they have been determined. It would be understood that the procedure outlined carried no implication of discussion of plans for purely Russian operations except as your representative might be instructed to present."

P If he does agree to meet us at Basra we can discuss this matter with him at that time.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

King should have a shot at this before final consideration. DCW.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of SEC ARMY

By TAG PER 770514

By PAK Date MAY 6 1972

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	397	DATE	26 October 1943
DATE/TIME	26/2212 NCR 8374		
OR FILE NUMBER	26/1700 ENT		
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA		Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Russian representative on Anglo-American Staff conferences.			

ACTION

Admiral Leahy prepared from a proposed draft message by Gen. Marshall. President approved, sent out at 1710, ENT, 26 Oct 43.

*Answered by PM in his 476, 27 Oct 43 - Prime dis-
approval of Russian representative in future combined staff
conferences.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:	27 Oct 43.

0235

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

26 October 1943

WAL

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 398 for the Former Naval Person from the President, [REDACTED] and personal.

In view of the high importance of using the Azores as a landing for American transport planes, it is suggested that you authorize the utilization of American engineers and American facilities under British Command to construct quickly airfields to accommodate transport planes in those Azores Islands now occupied by British forces. This will quiet many of my troubles.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1715, EWT, 26 October 1943.

Boyce P. Price

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.G. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

262150
NCR 8373

0236

WDR

October 26, 1943.

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #398

In view of the high importance of using the Azores as a landing for American transport planes, it is suggested that you authorize the utilization of American engineers and American facilities under British Command to construct quickly airfields to accommodate transport planes in those Azores Islands now occupied by British forces. *This will quiet many*

of my troubles

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0237

FROM PRESIDENT	TO PRIME
SERIAL 398	DATE 26 Oct 43.
DATE/TIME 262150 NCR 8373	
OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 26/1700 EWT	VIA Admiral Leahy
SUBJECT Construction of air facilities in the Azores by American engineers and equipment under British command.	

ACTION

Prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by the President with minor changes, sent to code room at 1715, EWT, 26 Oct 43.

Answered by PM in his # 483, 1 Nov 43.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 26 Oct 43.	

0238

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

29 October 1943

WAT
WAL

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 399, personal and secret, for the Former Naval Person from the President.

Your 466.

Our Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon, on October 21, was instructed as follows:

QUOTE. It is desired that the Legation take no comprehensive action at the present time on our request for air facilities in the Azores, but the Legation should keep in mind that we must have the use of some air facilities there as soon as possible.

The Legation should, therefore, make as much progress toward that end as appears practicable from the Lisbon point of view and should keep us fully informed. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

FR

Released from the White House Map Room at 1655, EWT, 29 October 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By log. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

29 October 1943

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London.

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 400.

~~SECRET~~ and PERSONAL.

Your 477. I must eliminate Anfa because I draw too much water. I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or Alexandria on the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me there at that time. If UJ is willing to come to Basra we can move on there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go there with small staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and plead with UJ to come there if only for one day. I still think it vital that we see him, but I simply cannot get out of constitutional communication with my Congress. I too am most anxious that you and I get away from this despatch method of talking.

As a corollary of above and in view of overloading transportation facilities, the Combined Staffs could make their headquarters in Algiers or Tunis and you and I could meet them there on the 19th. This is not so good however, because we would want the six top men with us in Egypt or Basra.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1925, EWT, October 29, 1943.

Ogden Kniffin
OGDEN KNIPPIN
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.S. Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1977*

0240

400

W.R.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME #400 29, Oct 43.

W.R.

Your 477. I must eliminate Anfa because I draw too much water. I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or Alexandria on the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me there at that time. If UJ is willing to come to Basra we can move on there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go there with small staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and plead with UJ to come there if only for one day. I still think it vital that we see him, but I simply cannot get out of constitutional communication with my Congress. I too am most anxious that you and I get away from this despatch method of talking.

As a corollary of above and in view of overloading transportation facilities, the Combined Staffs could make their headquarters in Algiers or Tunis and you and I could meet them there on the 19th. This is not so good however, because we would want the six top men with us in Egypt or Basra.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

W. J. Stewart

Date

NOV 1 1971

WJL

Your 477.

If you agree I will meet you at ANFA by November 20. ^{Combined} Staff meeting can be started there November 20 and if U.J. accepts our invitation you and I could leave ANFA with a very small staff for long enough to confer with him at Alexandria or Basra.

If U.J. declines I propose to ask him to come to Basra for a single day and to leave Molotov for a longer period.

#400., 29 Oct 43.

ROOSEVELT

I must eliminate conference because I draw too much water. I want two or three days in North Africa before getting to Cairo or Alexandria by the 20th. I suggest the Combined Staffs meet you and me there at that time. If U.J. is willing to come to Basra we can make an there at any date he wants. If he declines Basra I propose we go there with small Staffs and meet Molotov and a small Russian Staff and deal with U.J. to some there if only

~~SECRET~~

0242

for one day. I still think it vital
that we see him, but I simply
cannot get out of constitutional
communication with my Congress
I too am most anxious that you
and I get away from this despatch
method of talking

→
Pursuit

It is a matter of course & in
view of over load my hands for
the combined staff would make
headquarters in Belgium or Tunis
& you & I could meet them there
on the 19th. This is not so
good however because we would want
the staff with us in Egypt & Paris

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	400	DATE	29 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	300017, NCR 8995		
TOR MAP ROOM	1910 ENT	VIA	Admiral Brown
SUBJECT	SEXTANT conference.		

ACTION

Answers Prime's No. 477. The answer was first prepared by Admiral Leahy, together with Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Brown, in the Map Room. It was rewritten by the President in the Doctor's office.

Sent to Navy Code Room at 29/1925Q. To PM as 300017, NCR 8995.

Answered by PM in his 479.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
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ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 30 Oct 43		

0244

29 October 1943 *WAT*

[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

To the Former Naval Person from the President, Number 401 ~~with the~~

[REDACTED] and PERSONAL.

My immediately preceding message. Code word SEXTANT is accepted.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room

at 1925, EWT, October 29, 1943.

Ogden Kniffin
OGDEN KNIPPIN,
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.S. August*
Date NOV 1 1971

0245

401

WST

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT TO PRIME 401

29 Oct 43.

My immediately preceding message. Code word SEXTANT is accepted.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

~~SECRET~~

0246

Plus to Prime

my immediately preceding
message code word Sextant
is ~~acceptable~~ accepted

"Seahy's draft"

NSZ

29 October 1943

PRIORITY

From: Opnav.
To: Alusna, London.

PERSONAL and [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.
Number 402.

In order that we may not be rushed at the last minute I have directed our OWI to send to Bracken early next week our suggestion for the October Joint Anti Submarine Statement. I will appreciate an agreement on the statement well before the date of issue.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1925, EWT, October 29, 1943.

Ogden Kniffin
OGDEN KNIFFIN
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W. J. Stewart*
Date *NOV 1 1971*

0249

402

NA
WST

DRAFT

From: Osnay
To : Alusna London #402 29 Oct 43.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON.

IN ORDER THAT WE MAY NOT BE RUSHED AT THE LAST MINUTE I HAVE
DIRECTED OUR OWI TO SEND TO BRACKEN EARLY NEXT WEEK OUR SUGGESTION
FOR THE OCTOBER JOINT ANTI-SUBMARINE STATEMENT. I WILL APPRECIATE
AN AGREEMENT ON THE STATEMENT WILL BEFORE THE DATE OF ISSUE.

Roosevelt

5

(Copy - paraphrase - to
Mr. Elmer Davis
Cominch

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

0250

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	402	DATE	29 Oct 43.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	29/1900	VIA	Admiral Brown
SUBJECT October Anti-submarine statement.			

ACTION Prepared by Admiral Brown. Sent to Code Room at 1925Q.

Paraphrased copies sent to Admiral King and Elmer Davis by memorandum signed by Lieutenant Elsey, a.m., 30 Oct.

Prime replied in his #480, 30 Oct 43, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 10, 30/1215Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Admiral King	30 Oct 43	Admiral Brown
Elmer Davis	30 Oct 43	Admiral Brown
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	30 Oct 43

0251

~~SECRET~~

30 OCTOBER 1943

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 403, PERSONAL AND [REDACTED] FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

PREPARATIONS FOR OVERLORD SEEM TO HAVE REACHED A STAGE FROM
WHICH PROGRESS IS DIFFICULT UNLESS AND UNTIL COMMANDER IS APPOINTED.
AS YOU KNOW, I CANNOT MAKE MARSHALL AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY. I AM
NONETHELESS ANXIOUS THAT PREPARATIONS PROCEED ON SCHEDULE AGREED AT
QUADRANT WITH TARGET DATE MAY FIRST. I SUGGEST YOU MAY CARE TO CON-
SIDER EARLY APPOINTMENT OF BRITISH DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER FOR OVER-
LORD WHO IN RECEIPT OF PRECISELY THE SAME MEASURE OF SUPPORT AS WILL
EVENTUALLY BE ACCORDED TO MARSHALL COULD WELL CARRY THE WORK FORWARD.
IF I MAY MAKE PROPOSAL, I SUGGEST APPOINTMENT OF DILL, PORTAL, OR
BROOKE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1600, EWT, 30 October 1943.

Robert W. Bogue
ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.J. Stewart*
Date *WGV 1 1971*

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

0252

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	403	DATE	30 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
FOR MAP ROOM	--	VIA	--
SUBJECT High Command of OVERLORD.			

ACTION

Dispatch first suggested by General Morgan in memorandum to the President, 27 Oct 43. Proposed dispatch to FM rewritten by Admiral Leahy and sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 2.

President approved in his BLACK 1, 301940Z, and message sent to Navy Code Room as 403 at 1600Q.

Crime assessed in his # 481, 31 Oct 43.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 30 Oct 43	

0253

WJL

30 October 1943

[REDACTED]
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

Number 404. Personal and **[REDACTED]** from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 479. Hull's departure from Moscow has meant two day delay in his getting home. It is essential I see him before I myself leave, as you can readily understand. I had hoped to get three days in North Africa before reaching Cairo. I can, however, do some of the North African and Italian business on the way back. Therefore, I still hope to arrive Cairo by the twentieth by flying there directly I reach the harbor. But, if wind and weather are bad, I might not make Cairp until the twenty-second. I think my ship repeat ship will take me to Oran.

Ever so many thanks for offering to make arrangements at Cairo, which we accept with pleasure. If any hitch develops there we can, of course, meet in Alexandria, the staff living ashore and we on our respective ships.

I am wiring Generalissimo to prepare to meet us in the general neighborhood of Cairo about November twenty-fifth.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2300 EWT 30 October 1943

Eden Kniffin
EDEN KNIPPIN
Captain CE

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By *W.J. Stewart*
Date NOV 1 1971

[REDACTED]
SECRET

310415
NCR 9203

0254

FROM	PRESIDENT	TO	PRIME
SERIAL	404	DATE	30 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER		310415 NCR 9203	
FOR MAP ROOM	----	VIA	BLACK 4
SUBJECT SEXTANT conference - delay of 2 days.			

ACTION

Answers PM's 475, which was sent to President at Hyde-Park as WHITE 9.

Admiral Leahy in WHITE 14 to the President (30/2220Z) submitted proposed reply to the PM. President sent back reply to PM in his BLACK 4 (this was different from Leahy's proposed message). Sent to the PM as 404, (310415 NCR 9203).

See 7MP 1/24.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED: 31 Oct 43.
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0255