CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
OCTOBER 1943
01 October 1943

From: Lilattache London
To: The President of the United States

No. 430 Filed 01/11312

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

Para 1. I am somewhat worried by the way in which our great changes in the High Commands are being broken to the public. So far nothing has been said here but almost every day some statement is made in the United States about Marshall, and I shall certainly be asked questions when Parliament meets on Tuesday the 12th. Moreover it would be difficult for me if Marshall's appointment to the Chief Command in Britain were to be announced apart from Alexander's succession in the Mediterranean. Rumour runs riot and is fed by carefully balanced and guarded statements such as that made by Stimson reported in today's papers. An impression of mystery and of something to be concealed is given. This is a fine field for malicious people. All this would be blown away by publication of the clear-cut decisions to which we have come. In all the circumstances I hope you will see your way to a simultaneous announcement by us both of the changes, coupled with a statement that they will be brought into effect as soon as convenient to the military situation.

Para 2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for deputy or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in OVERLORD. This would entail my clearing the Home Command here now held by General Paget. An opportunity is now open for this as General Fownall who was formerly C in C Iraq and Persia goes with Mountbatten to India as Chief of Staff, and I can post Paget to Iraq and Persia. It is difficult and also harmful to leave these commands vacant for long.

Para 3. Some of the United States papers seem to have begun attacking Mountbatten bitterly, and he has been affected by accounts telegraphed here describing him as "The British Princeling and Glamour Boy who has ousted the proved veteran MacArthur from his rightful sphere", or words to that effect. The prominence given to the Indian Front Com-
mand by these controversies is of course leading the Japanese to reinforce in that quarter and intelligence to this effect has already been received. We are told that a large number of correspondents are proceeding or trying to proceed from the United States to Delhi and that expectation is rife of an early beginning of the campaign. On the other hand the floods and the monsoon rains will of course prevent any decisive action till the New Year. But this cannot be stated publicly without relieving any anxieties of the Japanese. The prospect of having a formidable band of correspondents champing their bits in Delhi is not a pleasant one, and it would help our fighting chances if everything possible could be done to damp down controversy and publicity in this area.

Para 4. In these circumstances a plain statement of what we have settled for all theatres, including Commanders, their Chiefs of Staff and one or two of their principal officers, all brought out together would in my opinion be a great advantage. I could if you desire draft such a statement and submit it to you.

No Sig
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 431 Filed: 01/1650 Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and number 431.

Your number 365 about Sforza. He seems to be saying all sorts of things many very different to what he wrote to Berle. He really should make up his mind whether he is going to try to help the Royal Badoglio Government or try to discredit it. We ought to know where we are before we build him up. Would it not be a good thing for you to route him to Italy via the United Kingdom and let us give him further friendly treatment here. I don't see much use in having him go to Italy merely to undermine whatever small fighting head against Fascism and the Germans Eisenhower has been able to produce out of the Italians.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. J. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 432, 2 October 1943

Prime Minister to President. Personal and Number 432, 2 October 1943.

Your 366 and 367 we entirely agree. I have telegraphed to Stalin as follows:

"His Majesty's Government are in full agreement with the proposals of General Eisenhower telegraphed to you by the President on this first day of October and hope you will concur.

"We also hope that you will join with the President and me in the threefold declaration to be made public immediately following a declaration of war against Germany by Italy."

No Sig

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 433

Prime Minister to President personal. Your number 369.

1. We will try to indoctrinate the party you mention.
I hope to see him Monday.

2. We entirely agree with you about Grandi.

3. I am sure they should be made to declare war at
once.

Prime

2 October 1943

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Data 0222152

0260
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 434  
Filed: 040122Z  

Prime Minister to President personal.

I have just received the following from Stalin. Please note what he says about not having received your telegram about Eisenhower's verbal modification. Message begins.

I have received your message of October 2nd.

The Soviet Government is ready to participate in the Tripartite declaration to be published immediately after Italy has declared war on Germany. The text of the declaration proposed by you, I consider acceptable. On my part, I suggest to publish the declaration simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington.

I would like to inform you that I have not yet received the telegram from the President with the proposals of General Eisenhower sent to me, as you wrote, on October 1st.

Prime

Proposals of General Eisenhower were sent to Stalin as Opnav O1640. Acknowledgement of receipt has not yet been received.
From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States

Filed 04/2335Z

Former Naval Person to President personal and

Now that U J has come in with us about the Italian declaration (See my Nr 428) it appears of the highest importance to compel the King to declare war as soon as possible. This is, as I know, your view. I suggest that instructions are given to Eisenhower to put the fullest pressure upon him. There should be no nonsense about waiting until Rome is taken. It seems to us high time that the Italians began to work their passage. If you are in agreement, pray give the necessary orders without further reference to us.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt. State Dept. tel., 6-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States

Now that U J has come in with us about the Italian declaration (See my Nr 428) it appears of the highest importance to compel the King to declare war as soon as possible. This is, as I know, your view. I suggest that instructions are given to Eisenhower to put the fullest pressure upon him. There should be no nonsense about waiting until Rome is taken. It seems to us high time that the Italians began to work their passage. If you are in agreement, pray give the necessary orders without further reference to us.

No Sig
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 436, 5 October 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and

No. 436.

1. Your number 371. I can of course wait for the announcement about Marshall till you find it convenient on your side.

2. Your number 372. This is good. It will be very advantageous to our policy to publish the agreed declaration about the Badoglio Government over our three signatures. But this can only be done when the King of Italy has declared war.

3. Your number 373. I will have an immediate enquiry made into the possible leakage.

4. Your number 374. Not hearing from you, I did not persist in the ship enticing idea but I don't think it would have been accepted by Uncle Joe anyhow. On September 25, I sent him the telegram contained in my immediately following and received last night his reply. I hope you will approve of all this as good and careful arrangements should be made. This plan would be convenient if you still want to invite the Generalissimo to meet you in Cairo on our return from Cairo 3. I do not think you will find the journey from Cairo to Cairo 3 a burden. It is only about six hours. It would be a convenience if one of your security authorities came over here to work up the whole cover plan. I expect to start from here about the end of October and will meet you with the greatest pleasure in Cairo or at any other point you fix. May I advise your considering seriously coming across in a fast cruiser and only using the air for the various hops across Africa. I shall be moving about among the armies till you arrive.

Prime
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 437, 5 October 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and __________. Number 437.

The text of the telegram referred to in my
436 is as follows:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal
and __________. For your eye alone Sept 25, 1943.

"I have been pondering about our meeting of
heads of governments at Teheran. Good arrangements
must be made for security in this somewhat loosely
controlled area. Accordingly, I suggest for your
consideration that I make preparations at Cairo in
regard to accommodation, security, etc., which are
bound to be noticed in spite of all praiseworthy
efforts to keep them secret. Then perhaps only two
or three days before our meeting, we should throw
a British and a Russian brigade around a suitable
area in Teheran including the airfield and keep an
absolute cordon till we have finished our talks. We
would not tell the Persian Government nor make any
arrangements for our accommodation until this moment
comes. We should of course have to control absolu-
tely all out-going messages. Thus we shall have an
effective blind for the world press and also for any
unpleasant people who might not be as fond of us as
they ought.

"I suggest also that in all future correspon-
dence on this subject we use the expression ("Cairo
3") instead of Teheran which should be buried and
also that the code name for the operation should be
("EUREKA") which I believe is Ancient Greek. If
you have other ideas let me know and we can then put
them to the President. I have not said anything to
him about this aspect yet."

REGRADED
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 437, 5 October 1943

"Kremlin Oct 3, 1943. Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill. Personal and

"I received your message of the 27th Sept concerning the forthcoming meeting of the three heads of governments. I have no objection to the diverting preparations which you intend to carry out in Cairo. Regarding your proposal to throw British and Russian brigades into the region of Cairo 3 several days before our meeting in that city, I find this measure inexpedient as it would cause an unnecessary sensation and would decamouflage the preparations. I suggest that each of us should take with him a sufficient police guard. In my opinion, this would be enough to secure our safety.

"I have no objection to your other proposals relating to the forthcoming meeting and I agree with those conventional denominations which you propose to use in the correspondence concerning this meeting."

Prime

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>4437</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>5 Oct 43</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>5 Oct 43</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill conference</td>
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ACTION

To President via Colonel Hammond, 5 Oct.

Prime suggests another meeting place in his #454 & 457, 14 Oct. President replied to Prime in his #388, 14 Oct 43, which quotes a message the President sent to Marshal Stalin on 14 Oct 43.
Mr. W. B. To take up with Joint Staff & prepare reply & be ready.

The President

Remember that Overlord is paramount.

JFK

White House Map Room Dec 06 1970
Para 1. I am much concerned about the situation developing in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the collapse of Italy we pushed small detachments from Egypt into several of the Greek Islands especially Kos which has a landing ground and Leros which is a fortified Italian Naval Base with powerful permanent batteries. We ran this risk in the hope that the Italian garrisons which welcomed us would take part in the defense. This hope appears vain and Kos has already fallen except for some of our troops fighting in the mountains. Leros may well share its fate. Our enterprises against Rhodes have not yet succeeded.

Para 2. I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan Peninsulas are militarily and politically united and that really it is one theatre with which we have to deal. It may indeed not be possible to conduct a successful Italian campaign ignoring what happens in the Aegean. The Germans evidently attach the utmost importance to this Eastern sphere and have not hesitated to divert a large part of their straitened air force to maintain themselves there. They have to apprehend desertion by Hungary and Roumania and a violent schism in Bulgaria. At any moment Turkey may lean her weight against them. We can all see how adverse to the enemy are the conditions in Greece and Yugoslavia. When we remember what brilliant results have followed from the political reactions in Italy induced by our military efforts should we not be shortsighted to ignore the possibility of a similar and even greater landslide in some or all of the countries I have mentioned? If we were able to provoke such reactions and profit by them our joint task in Italy would be greatly lightened.

Para 3. I have never wished to send an army into the Balkans but only by agents supplies and Commandos to stimulate the intense guerrilla prevailing there. This may yield results measureless in their consequence at very small cost to main operations. What I ask for is the capture of Rhodes.
and the other islands of the Dodecanese. The movement northward of our Middle Eastern Air Forces and their establishment in these islands and possibly on the Turkish shore which last might well be obtained would force a diversion on the enemy far greater than that required of us. I would also offer the opportunity of engaging the enemy's waning air power and wearing it down in a new region. This air power is all one and the more continually it can be fought the better.

Para 4. Rhodes is the key to all this. I do not feel the present plan of taking it is good enough. It will require and is worth at least up to a first class division which can of course be replaced by static troops once the place is ours. Leros which for the moment we hold so precariously is an important naval fortress and once we are ensconced in this area air and light naval forces would have a most fruitful part to play. The policy should certainly not be pursued unless done with vigour and celerity requiring the best troops and adequate means. In this way the diversion from the main theatre would only be temporary while the results may well be of profound and lasting importance.

Para 5. I beg you to consider this and not let it be brushed aside and all these possibilities lost to us in the critical months that lie ahead. Even if landing craft and assault ships on the scale of a division were withheld from the build up of OVERLORD for a few weeks without altering the zero date it would be worth while. I feel we may easily throw away an immense but fleeting opportunity. If you think well would you very kindly let General Marshall see this telegram before any decision is taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

No Sig
**FROM** Prime Minister  
**TO** President

**SERIAL** 4210  
**DATE/TIME** October

**FILE NUMBER**  
**TOR MAP ROOM** 2210  
**VIA** Army Message Center  
**SUBJECT** Situation developing in the Eastern Mediterranean

**ACTION**

President saw in Map Room at 2215 on his way out to Hyde Park. Left note to Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown (on envelope) to take matter up with Joint Chiefs to prepare reply to send to H.P.

Admiral Leahy sent suggested reply to Prime Minister, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Pres. as WHITE 6.

President corrected and approved as BLACK 2, which was received at 1600; released to Navy Code Room at 1625 as President-Prime #8440, 7 Oct., a copy of which was also sent to General Eisenhower via War Department.

**COPIES TO:**  
Admiral Leahy  
**DATE:** 7 Oct 43  
**BY DIRECTION OF:** The President

**ACTION COMPLETED:** 7 October 1943  
**FILED:** PM-Pres Folder.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 1,39, 7 October 1943 Filed: 07/1500Z
Former Naval Person to President personal.

1. Following is draft of proposed joint statement regarding U-Boat warfare in September. I shall be glad to receive your comments as early as possible. Begins:

(1) Until the 3rd week in September no Allied merchant ship was lost by German U-Boat attack. Then, on the 19th September, the U-Boats ended the 4 months lull in the North Atlantic, and a pack of at least 15 U-Boats concentrated on a westbound convoy. The combat lasted 4 1/2 days. The loss of 3 escort vessels has already been announced. A small number of merchant ships were sunk. As a result of vigorous counter attacks by the surface and air escorts a larger number of U-Boats were sunk or damaged.

(2) In spite of the increase in U-Boat activity at the end of the month, the average merchant ship losses from all causes in September and August together are the best record of the war.

(3) Nevertheless this resumption of pack tactics is evidence of the enemy's intention to spare no efforts to turn the tide of the U-Boat war and the utmost exertion and vigilance will be required before its menace is finally removed. Ends.

2. I suggest that as originally intended this and future statements should be headed "Issued under the authority of the President and the Prime minister". Do you agree?

Prime
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>September monthly submarine warfare statement.</td>
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**ACTION**

Telegraphed to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 4, 7 Oct 43.

Sent to Admiral King and Mr. Elmer Davis by direction of Admiral Brown. President notified as WHITE 5.

President approved and corrected as BLACK 1, received in the MR at 1337, 7 Oct. Admiral King's favourable reply received approximately 1415 was not transmitted to Hyde Park. Mr. Davis' reply not received. Admiral Brown directed President's approval be sent to PM. Sent as #378 7 Oct 45.

Elmer Davis directed by Colonel Hammond's letter to him to arrange time of release with London (1730 via War Dept courier).

Davis contacted Admiral Brown by phone from New York 0945Q 8 Oct and suggested several changes, which were sent to President as WHITE 14, at 1017/08 Oct.

(Over)

**COPIES TO**

Admiral King 7 Oct 43

Admiral Brown 7 Oct 43

Mr. Elmer Davis 7 Oct 43

"Monthly Submarine Warfare Statement" 7 Oct 43

**ACTION COMPLETED**

7 Oct 43

PM-Pres Field
President, on reading, said that there was "no answer". Mr. Hoyt, Mr. Davis' assistant, was informed that the Prime's original message would stand, and he (Mr. Hoyt) said he would inform Mr. Davis. This was by direction of Admiral Brown.

Memorandum

Change suggested by PM in his #447 approved by President.

Elmer Davis informed by Mr. Hopkins' memo of 9th Oct.

Statement released to Press at 1950 WST, 9 Oct 45.

(For complete action on the September Sub-Warfare Statement, see TAR-167TP in "Monthly Sub-Warfare Statement" folder.

(A2)
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 440, 7 October 1943. Filed 0717012

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Confidential. Number 440.

1. Your number 377. It is good that U J agrees. On second thoughts, we are not, however, convinced that dropping Article 1 (A) of the long terms as Eisenhower has suggested may not weaken our power over the Italian fleet. I shall be telegraphing you further about this.

2. I think we ought to go straight ahead now and force an immediate declaration of war by the King of Italy and synchronize release in Washington, London, and Moscow of our triple declaration. If you agree, will you please act in this matter (para 2) without further reference to me.

No Sig

send to President at Hyde Park or White House
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Prime suggests changes in &quot;Document of the Capitulation of Italy&quot;</td>
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**ACTION**

Sent to the President at Hyde Park on 7 October 43 as WHITE 7.

Continued in FM's 462, which see for full action and reply.

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08 October 1943

From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States

No. FILED 08/0322Z

Prime Minister to President personal and

Para 1. Your No. 379. I earnestly pray that my views may receive some consideration from you at this critical juncture, remembering how fruitful our concerted action has been in the past and how important it is for the future.

Para 2. I am sure that the omission to take Rhodes at this stage and the ignoring of the whole position in the Eastern Mediterranean would constitute a cardinal error in strategy. I am convinced also that if we were round the table together that this operation could be fitted in to our plan without detriment either to the advance in Italy of which as you know I have always been an advocate, or to the build-up of OVERLORD which I am prepared faithfully to support.

Para 3. May I remind you of my anxiety at Quebec when we were informed that the build-up in Italy could not exceed 12 divisions ashore by the first December. There are now by the 9th October over 15 divisions ashore, of which about 12 are in action. We know from Boniface that the enemy is withdrawing to the north, fighting rearguard actions and carrying off booty. We cannot yet tell whether it is in October or November that we can occupy Rome: But it is certain that we shall not come in contact with the main German forces at the top of the leg of Italy till December or even later and we certainly have control of the rate of advance.

Para 4. There is therefore plenty of time to provide a division for the conquest of Rhodes and restore it to the battlefront in Italy before we reach the German fortified line.

Para 5. We must find some means of resolving these difficulties and making sure of what is the right thing...
to do. I am willing to proceed to Eisenhower's headquarters with the British Chiefs of the Staff immediately, if you will send General Marshall, or your personal representative, to meet me there and we can then submit the results of a searching discussion to you and your Chiefs of Staff. We can be there Sunday afternoon.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister

TO The President

SERIAL #441

DATE/TIME 08/03222

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Operations in Eastern Mediterranean

ACTION

Sent to PRESIDENT at Hyde Park as WHITE 12 (08/0748Q)
Further comments in PRIIME's No. 443 (08/1035Q)
MR. HOPKINS spoke to PRIIME on phone and informed him that there would be no immediate answer.

Copy delivered personally to ADMIRAL LEAHY at 080600Q.
Suggested answer sent to the PRESIDENT as WHITE 23 (08/1630Q); approved by PRESIDENT in BLACK 11 (08/2020Q).
Sent to PRIIME as #381 (08/2030Q)
(For complete action see PRIIME's #443)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: 8 Oct 43 Pres-PM Folder
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

No. 442 Filed: 08/0953 Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and

Your number 370 of October 5th.

Para 1. I agree with your proposed answer to Molotov.

Para 2. Since we are in fact rejecting the Soviet proposal it would be a good thing to tell Molotov that we understand the Soviet Governments desire to play their part in the control of Italy, and that we hope to propose a scheme to them in the near future which we trust will meet their requirements.

Para 3. I suggest that Eisenhower should be asked to submit a scheme for consideration. I understand from MacMillan who is here that this could be done without undue difficulty.

No Sig.

Sent to President at Hyde Park as White 13.
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL: 6442
DATE: 8 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 080968Z

TO: MAP ROOM --- VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Reply to Molotov re two Commissions in Mediterranean

ACTION:

Replies to PRESIDENT'S #370, 5 Oct 43.

Sent to PRESIDENT at Hyde Park as WHITE 13 (080745Q).

WHITE 16, prepared by Admiral Leahy, and sent to the PRESIDENT at 081040Q, suggests proposed message be sent to Molotov, and that action be withheld on Paras 2 and 3 till later time.

PRESIDENT in BLACK 10, 8 Oct 43, requested Leahy to have State Dept send message to Molotov; also to ask Eisenhower to submit scheme for consideration as requested in Para 3. Also that gist of this be sent to Churchill.

Message sent to Molotov via State Department, 9 Oct 43; Eisenhower not asked to submit scheme for reasons stated in WHITE 31 to PRESIDENT (081220Q); gist sent to PM as #382, 9 Oct 43.

COPY TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 9 Oct 43

FILED: Pres-PM Folder
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 463  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.  
Personal and Number 463.  

Further to my 461.

1. I should have added that my estimate of the effect on OVERLORD to which I referred is limited to a delay of about six weeks in sending home nine landing craft which were to have started from the Mediterranean this month, nearly six months before they would actually be needed for OVERLORD. There ought, I think, to be some elasticity and a reasonable latitude in the handling of our joint affairs.

2. The QUADRANT decision to send four landing ships with the craft they carry from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal also for training purposes has turned out ill. This decision should have been reviewed in the light of the new circumstances opened by the surrender of Italy. Unhappily this was not done, and in consequence the Middle East was stripped bare at a moment when great prizes could be cheaply secured.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL 443
DATE 6 October 43

DATE/TIME 081255Z
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 09/1035Q VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Operations in Eastern Mediterranean

ACTION (Further Comments of PRIME's 441, 8 Oct 43.)

To PRESIDENT at Hyde Park as WHITE 16 (08/1050Q)

PRESIDENT, in BLACK 8 (08/1315Q) to Adm Leahy, requested it be
sent to JCS for preparation of reply.

Suggested reply to PRIME sent to PRESIDENT as WHITE 23 (08/1650Q)

Approved by PRESIDENT in BLACK 11 (08/2000Q)

Sent to PRIME as 4881, (08/2030Q).

(Before BLACK 11 was received, Mr. Hopkins contacted the PRES-
IDENT on the phone, and was verbally given corrections to the mes-
 sage. 4881 had actually left Map Room for Navy Code Room before
BLACK 11, confirming corrections as given to Mr. Hopkins, was re-
ceived. Since corrections as given in BLACK 11 were slightly
(COVER)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
Admiral Leahy 8 Oct 43 The President

ACTION COMPLETED: 8 Oct 43

FILED: Pres-724 folder

0283
different from those given to Mr. Hopkins, Navy Code Room was contacted and given revised corrections by Lt. Graham.

The PRIME’s Secretary had, in the meantime, sent two unnumbered messages to Mr. Hopkins; one asking prospects of receiving message that night, and the other advising that the PRIME would stay up until 2 a.m., London time, for answer. Lt. Graham sent "flash" message to PRIME advising that answer was being sent.)
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No. 1444

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Your number 376. Number 1444.

1. I fully recognise all the advantages set forth. Our forces were admitted to these islands on October 3rd, and publicity will be given on the 12th. It will be necessary to see what the German reaction is. If, as I expected, it is merely abusive, Salazar will be reassured and I will then immediately ask Salazar, either by a direct message or through our ambassador, that you should have the necessary facilities for the ferry service, which is of vital consequence, and I will explain or have explained the full force of the argument to him.

2. I shall of course argue that Salazar has taken the plunge and to a large extent joined the Allies, and that he runs no greater risk by your being in the islands too. On the contrary, by so doing he gets the added support and friendship of the United States, and the American guarantee about respecting Portuguese colonies similar to that which we have given. I assume I may make full play with this argument since we already informed the Portuguese last June, on your authority, that we understood the United States Government would associate itself with our colonial guarantees. I have also received Mr. Winant's message that your charge d'affaires at Lisbon has been instructed to communicate such guarantees only if requested to do so by Dr. Salazar. It should therefore be possible to keep this card in our hand for the present, and it should assist us materially in playing our game.

3. I am communicating through the State Department a Portuguese communication showing that they contemplate eventually taking an active part in the war, at least in the Far East. Our task will be much easier if and when Portugal joins us as a belligerent, and it is very much better in these matters to work things up gradually.
4. Supposing that Salazar refuses, being afraid that you will stay there after the war and of the ambitions of Pan American Airways, I will immediately report to you. Then is the moment for your ambassador to come forward or for you to address Salazar personally, it being of course understood that we shall give you the fullest help and support by every means. We have in any case already provided under our own agreement with the Portuguese for the arrival of the first mixed convoy early in November, to which you refer in your number 375. I agree with the detailed arrangements proposed in that telegram, which should not give rise to any difficulties. I hope that the Portuguese may be brought along in a friendly way and that they will listen to the many good reasons we can both advance for their doing so.

5. Pray let me know how you view this programme.

No Sig
**FROM** The Prime Minister  
**TO** The President  
**SERIAL** 444  
**DATE** 8 October 1943  
**DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER** 081835Z  
**TOR MAP ROOM** 1600Q  
**VIA** Army Code Room  
**SUBJECT** Occupation of Azores

**ACTION**
- Answers PRESIDENT'S No. 376, 6 Oct 43.
- Sent to PRESIDENT at Hyde Park as WHITE 24, 8 Oct 43.
- PRESIDENT, in BLACK 12, requests Adm Leahy and JCS to prepare reply.
- Leahy's draft of reply sent to HP as WHITE 35, 9 Oct 43.
- Corrected and approved by PRESIDENT in BLACK 16, 9 Oct 43.
- Reply sent to PRIME MINISTER as PRESIDENT'S #384.

**COPIES TO:**  
Admiral Leahy

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**
Black 12 (PRESIDENT)

**ACTION COMPLETED:**
9 Oct 43  
**FILED:** Pres-PM Folder
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 445 Filed 091321Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most immediate Nr. 445.

1. Thank you very much for your kindness in giving so much of your time and thought to the views which I ventured to set before you. At your wish, and as you cannot send General Marshall, I have cancelled my journey which I told Harry on the telephone I would never undertake without your blessing.

2. I agree with the end of your nr 381, namely, that we should await the result of the conference scheduled for today in Tunis, which could then be considered and adjusted by us through the Combined COS Committee.

3. I am afraid, however, that your number 379 of Oct 6th to me, a copy of which was sent to Eisenhower, will be taken as an order from you and as closing the subject finally. This I should find it very hard to accept. I hope, therefore, that you will make it clear that the conference is free to examine the whole question in all its bearings and should report their conclusions to you and me through CCS. I ask that the conference shall give full, free, patient and unprejudiced consideration to the whole question after they have heard the Middle East point of view put forward by its representatives.

Part 2 which is less urgent follows.

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. S-39-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Sent to President at Hyde Park as White # 28,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>445 (Part 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>9 October</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>091020Q</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Operations Eastern Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

Sent to PRESIDENT at HP as WHITE 28, 9 Oct 43 (1040Q)

PRESIDENT, in BLACK 13, 9 Oct 43 (1208Q) requested Hopkins and Leahy to prepare reply to EISENHOWER.

Proposed draft to EISENHOWER and PRIME MINISTER sent to PRESIDENT as WHITE 34, 9 Oct 43 (1410Q).

PRESIDENT approved in BLACK 14, 9 Oct 43 (1607Q)

Sent to EISENHOWER via War Department as Freedom #9763 (2128Q)

Sent to PRIME MINISTER as #383, 9 Oct 43 (1753Q).

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

9 Oct 43

**FILED:** Pres-PM File
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 445 (Part 2) Filed 9/14/36Z
Following is part 2 of my nr. 445.

1. At the present time, General Wilson is preparing to attack Rhodes on the 23rd, with forces from his own command, or which have been assigned to him by General Eisenhower. He thinks these forces are sufficient, but I am doubtful whether they are not cut too fine. When I questioned him upon this, he replied:

"Advisable not to change Division now assault loading as time is all important and we cannot afford to postpone date owing to weather, soon, and possible enemy reinforcement. Increase in shipping to allow more of our armour to be carried and provision of an extra brigade from Central Mediterranean to arrive on night of 23rd/24th would greatly accelerate completion of operation."

The question to my mind, therefore, is whether he should have this modest reinforcement or whether the operation should be cancelled.

5. Cancellation will involve loss of Leros even if they can hold out so long and the complete abandonment by us of any foothold in the Aegean, which will become a frozen area, with most unfortunate political and psychological reactions in that part of the world instead of great advantages.

6. I fully agree with all you say about the paramount importance of the build up in Italy, and I have given every proof of my zeal in this matter by stripping the British Middle Eastern Command of everything which can facilitate General Eisenhower's operations, in which we also have so great a stake.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number LI (Part 2) Filed 9/1/38Z

Page 2

7. I am sending you for your information a report which I have received from General Wilson of the operations he has undertaken so far which shows at once their difficulty and their small scale. I also send a report of the fighting in the islands and in the Balkans which may be of interest. These will follow as part 3.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-73
By R. H. Parks 266a MAY 5 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL: 445 (Part II)  
DATE: 9 Oct 43  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: --  
TOR MAP ROOM: 1220 EWT  
VIA: Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Operations in Eastern Mediterranean  

ACTION: Sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 32. 
For action, see PM's 445 (Part I).  

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED: 9 Oct 43  
FILED: Pres-PM Folder
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 445 (Part 3) Filed 9/1730Z

Following is part 3 of my telegram number 445.

Paraphrase of General Wilson's summary of events connected with Kos, dated 8th October, is as follows.

"We took great risks in trying to draw enemy forces from the main area of operations, and to exploit a favourable situation. We succeeded, in that we have been opposed by German Air Forces nearly as great in strength as those opposing us in Italy and North Africa. We managed to build up forces in the Dodecanese in excess of our expectation; but in view of difficulty on line of communication and of unloading at Kos, and in view of shortage of craft of the right type, our forces were lightly equipped, and were intended primarily to encourage and stiffen Italian resistance. We fully realized that not much value could be placed on the quality of the Italians in the Islands, but we thought they would put up more of a fight. We asked for some reinforcements, but we accepted the limitation that we could only get what could be spared from the main theatre.

"Naval reinforcements consisted of one flotilla of Fleet destroyers, which was unfortunately withdrawn to escort King George V and Howe to Malta. This left only one British and two Greek Hunt-class destroyers for offensive use in the whole Levant Station at the time of the German attack on Kos.

"We, of course, foresaw the possibility of a seaborne attack but all our intelligence made it seem most probable that the reinforcement of Rhodes would take place first, and our dispositions were made accordingly. There was nothing at the time to lead us
to foresee that the enemy would be able to collect and launch at such short notice an expedition of the size which assaulted Kos. Our naval dispositions were such that the three destroyers referred to above had to be withdrawn after a period of patrol south of Rhodes, but special air measures were taken to deal with what we thought was a convoy for the reinforcement of Rhodes when we received through the Senior British Naval Officer at Leros a somewhat obscure and delayed report. This convoy was not located, and in the end no attack was made on it until after the landing at Kos had begun. Two submarines which were on patrol were disposed offensively in the northern and western Aegean and they were not able to reach Kos until the transports had withdrawn.

"Our battalion in Kos was moved in, two thirds by air and one third by destroyer, and could only take the ordinary battalion scale of three inch and two inch mortars, with no anti-tank or other artillery. We had to risk relying on Italian artillery already in the Island, though in the event we received little or no help from this. The initial situation and the changes which caused the build-up to be slow, and which forced us to give low priority to infantry support weapons were as follows. At first:

A. Italian forces had to be bolstered up on the assumption that they would comply with armistice terms.

B. No major air threat then existed.

C. The Levant station at that time had naval forces which could deal with a seaborne attack as long as there was no major air threat.

D. It seemed likely that Spitfires on Kos would be able to give sufficient fighter cover.

"The enemy's build-up of air strength in Greece and the Aegean, which first became apparent about 25th September, radically altered the position. A.A. guns for Kos became of paramount importance, and were given..."
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 445 (Part 3) Filed 9/1750Z

priority. They were sent in as soon as possible via Leros, where they had to be transferred to smaller craft. A further build-up was arranged in the City of Lille, which was to have sailed on 5th October, provided air cover and an adequate warning system had been installed at Kos. The radar equipment for the latter was afloat at the time of the German attack. Moreover, City of Lille would have taken six days to unload in Leros, and in view of the loss of three destroyers which had already taken place there, air cover was considered essential. Meanwhile, there was no alternative but reliance on Italian co-operation, as they alone had adequate heavy weapons on the Island. Although these were actually sited to cover beaches where landings took place, there is no evidence that their guns fired a shot, and the Italian resistance seems to have been variable, and generally ineffective.

"German seizure of Kos was therefore directly attributable to the rapid build-up of his air strength in Greece and the Aegean, against which we could not take counter measures owing to lack of air resources. An adequate build-up in Kos was impossible in the first days owing to shortage of ships and craft, and in the later stages owing to the naval and air situation which developed in the Aegean.

"The following measures are being taken to secure our position in the Aegean pending our attack on Rhodes:

"Naval.

"A force of two cruisers, two or three Fleet destroyers, and two Hunts, is being maintained nightly in the South Aegean, withdrawing out of close range of air attack during the day. This force has already had a success at the cost of one cruiser damaged, and will be favourably disposed to move in to attack any enemy convoy.

"Army.

A. Observation posts are established on possible lines of approach of enemy convoys, and have already proved of value.

B. The reinforcement of Castelrosso as an advanced base for operations with garrison of half a battalion and A.A. defence.
C. If possible reinforcement of Leros with certain specialists to supervise Italians, and with parties evacuated from Kos. Weapons likely to assist in repelling an assault will be dropped, and attempts will be made by propaganda to stiffen Italian morale.

D. Patrols with wireless sets have been put into Kos to make contact with British troops still in the island and to arrange air supply. Arrangements are also being made to collect stragglers.

"Air.

"Heavy and medium bombers operating from Cyrenaica, Tunisia, and Italy will attack airfields in Greece, Crete and Rhodes. Two groups of Lightnings which have been given to Middle East as reinforcements will protect the movement of surface craft.

"Our naval forces yesterday destroyed an enemy eastbound convoy and escorts off Stampalia which was probably conveying a large number of enemy troops. The steps we have taken have so far proved satisfactory and we hope to administer the same treatment again by maintaining the utmost vigilance."

Paraphrase of General Wilson's latest situation report timed 1445 hours on 8th October is as follows:

"At 0600 hours on the 7th October, a convoy moving south-east from the north point of Kythnos and consisting of one tank landing craft and five small ships was sighted by a long-range desert group observation post. Another of three ships and sixteen aircraft was sighted at 1300 hours on the same day moving east from Naxos. After the naval action (in which the first mentioned convoy was destroyed) one enemy landing craft and one small escort vessel both badly damaged arrived at Stampalia and were captured by the garrison who took eighty prisoners.

"About 0600 hours 7th October, eighty Germans landed at Eidi Bay on Semi. Helped by the Italians the British counter-attacked and killed sixteen, wounded thirty and took seven prisoners. Forty five Germans withdrew in a caïque. These Germans are from the
Sevastopol Division in Rhodes and are reported to be young with poor morale. The British strength on Semi is about forty and Italian morale there is reported as high. Reports of action on the mainland are as follows:

"3rd October. Partisans took Ludbreg capturing four hundred prisoners and much material, and beating back a relief column. Other partisans captured Cacinci destroying the railway station and two armoured trains.

"4th October. Partisans engaged the enemy near Karlovac, Generalski Stol, Ostarije, and Ogulin. They were forced to evacuate Generalski Stol by strong German column from Karlovac. Other partisans captured six towns from the Ustashi. The British liaison officer reports that Tuxla was recently captured and cleared of the enemy, twenty guns being captured. Population warmly welcomed partisans who had destroyed the power station at Karka and three coal mines. They suffered about one hundred casualties.

"The following is the record of the activity of one Croatian partisan battalion from the 28th August to 28th September:

1. One attack on the railway Zagrab-Karlovac which delayed traffic for 24 hours.

2. Six attacks on the railway Karlovac-Ljubljana which delayed traffic for 26 hours.

3. Sixteen attacks on the railway Karlovac-Susak destroying one KM. of the line and fourteen block houses. Delayed traffic 182 hours. Two armoured trains and one goods train derailed and the railway station Dubrava burnt.

"Between the 29th September and the 2nd October there was fierce fighting between partisans and Germans. In the area Skradin-Kistanje eighty Germans and Ustashis were killed, thirty captured, and the power station which supplies Sibenik and Drnis was captured.

"In the Aegean cruiser Carlisle with destroyers and M.T.B's were near Leros on the night 7th/8th October, and are standing by for another anti-shipping sweep.
tonight if thought necessary. Baltimores, Wellingtons and Husdowns searched the Aegean and attacked two ships, damages unobserved.

"On 7th October, twenty four American Liberators bombed Pediada aerodrome (Crete) and eleven bombed Maritza aerodrome (Rhodes). No fighter opposition. Beaufighters and Lightnings covered naval units returning from the Aegean and shot down one Ju. 88 and damaged two. A reconnaissance Baltimore sighted a convoy of one merchant vessel 1,000 tons, one merchant vessel 5,000 tons, one F.-boat and three escort vessels eastbound between Kythnos and Syros and damaged one of the three Ju. 88's escorting it.

"On the 7th October there were three enemy bombing attacks on Leros."

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 446 (Part III) DATE 9 Oct 43

DATE/TIME 09/1730Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM -- VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Operations in Eastern Mediterranean

ACTION Sent to President at Hyde Park via pouch, 9 Oct 43.

For action, see PM's #445 (Part I).

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
Admiral Leahy 10 Oct Col Hammond

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
10 Oct 43 Pres-PM Folder
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 4/6 Filed 9/15102
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Immediate personal and
Number 4/6.
I send you the following message which has just been received from the British Vice Consul at Horta.
"Shore operations successfully carried out evening October 7th."
"2. Commander Colville and all ships arrived morning of October 8 and proceeding according to plan."
"3. Cable communication with Terceira has been established."
No Sig

REGRADING UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. Tel., 3-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

Send to President at Hyde
Park as White 933
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 446 DATE 9 Oct 45

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 09/1220 EWT VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Occupation of Azores

ACTION Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 33.

No direct answer. See last paragraph of President's 384, 9 Oct 45.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

9 Oct 45 Pres-PM Folder
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 447. Filed 9/15/1942
Immediate Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and [redacted] Number 447. Your number 376.

1. The answer to your question is "no."
2. Our estimate is that at least three U boats were sunk and six seriously damaged. Three escort vessels and six merchant vessels were sunk.
3. The statement is intended to compare the number of U boats sunk or damaged with the number of merchant ships sunk.
4. To meet your point, however, we are altering the last two sentences of Paragraph 1 (inter) of my number 439 to read "A small number of merchant ships were sunk but as a result of vigorous counter attacks by the surface and air escorts a larger number of U boats were sunk or damaged." We are issuing this statement here at the agreed time of 2330 GMT 9th October.

No Sig

DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 33-29-72
By R. B. Parks Date MAY 5 1942
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL #447
DATE 9 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER --

TOR MAP ROOM 09/1220 EWT VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Monthly sub warfare statement for September

ACTION
(See PM's 439 and Pres's 578.)

For complete action on the September Sub Warfare Statement, see "Monthly Submarine Warfare" folder.

This message was shown by Col. Hammond to Harry Hopkins, who said that it should not be sent to the President; that the President desired him to handle the joint submarine statement. Therefore, this message, with references, was turned over to Mr. Hopkins,

COPIES TO:

HPKINS
"Monthly Sub Warfare Statement" folder

DATE: 9 Oct 44

BY DIRECTION OF: Mr. Hopkins

ACTION COMPLETED: 9 Oct 43

FILED: Pres-PM Folder

0303
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No.: 448 0921032

Most immediate Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

1. Anthony on his way to the Foreign Office Conference at Moscow
is passing through Tunis tomorrow Sunday. He will of course not attend the
Conference should it still be in progress but I have told him that he is
free to talk informally with General Eisenhower and of course with any of
our officers whom he may meet about the political and military background
in the Mediterranean and Aegean. I do not imagine you will have any ob-
jection to this but if you have pray let me know.

2. Many thanks indeed for the intimation I have received through
Harry that you wish the Conference to be free to discuss the whole matter
on the merits and for our joint interest.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., S-56-79
By R. H. Fiske Date MAY 5 1972

SECRET
FROM Prime Minister
TO President

SERIAL #448
DATE 9 October 1943

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 092103Z

TOR MAP ROOM 091840Q VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Anthony Eden on way to Foreign Office Conference at Moscow - stopping off in Tunis to talk informally with Eisenhower or other officers about political & military background in Med. & Aegean.

ACTION

Sent to Hyde Park (to President) as White 39.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

9 Oct '43 PM - PRES FOLDER
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 449
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.  Personal and

1. Many thanks for your number 383. I have now read
General Eisenhower's report of the meeting. The German
intention to reinforce immediately the South of Italy and to
fight a battle before Rome is what General Eisenhower rightly
calls "a drastic change within the last forty eight hours." We
have always trusted this kind of evidence and I therefore
agree that we must now look forward to very heavy fighting
before Rome is reached instead of merely pushing back rear-
guards. I therefore agree with the conclusions of the
conference that we cannot count on any comparative lull in
which Rhodes might be taken and that we must concentrate
all important forces available on the battle, leaving the
question of Rhodes, etc. to be reconsidered as General
Eisenhower suggests after the winter line north of Rome
has been successfully occupied.

2. I have now to face the situation in the Aegean. Even
if we had decided to attack Rhodes on the 23rd Leros
might well have fallen before that date. I have asked Eden
to examine with General Wilson and Admiral Cunningham whether
with resources still belonging to the Middle East anything
can be done to regain Cos on the basis that Turkey lets us
use the landing grounds close by. If nothing can be worked
out on these lines and unless we have luck tonight or to-
morrow night in destroying one of the assaulting convoys,
the fate of Leros is sealed.

3. I propose, therefore, to tell General Wilson that
he is free if he judges the position hopeless, to order the
garrison to evacuate by night taking with them all Italian
officers and as many other Italians as possible and destroying
the guns and defences. The Italians cannot be relied upon to
fight and we have only twelve hundred men, quite insufficient
to man even a small portion of the necessary batteries, let
alone the perimeter. Internment in Turkey is not strict and
may not last long: gr they may get out along the Turkish coast.
4. I will not waste words in explaining how painful this decision is to me.

5. I am repeating this telegram to General Eisenhower.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister

TO The President

SERIAL 449

DATE 10 Oct 43

DATE/TIME

OR FILE NUMBER 10/1450 Z

TOR MAP ROOM 1230 HWT

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Aegean operations.

ACTION Copy to Pres as WHITE 42 (10/1252 Q)

The President, in his BLACK 17, directed copy be given General Marshall.

(See also Pres-FM #’s 379, 381, & 383; PM-Fres #’s 438, 441, 445, 446, 448, 449.)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: Pres-FM File
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 450  Filed 1018302

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 450. Further to my 449.

I must add my congratulations upon the brilliant
exploits of the last few days performed by the United States
Air Forces in this country in spite of heavy losses unflinch-
ingly borne. This vindication of the daylight bomber must
be most pleasing to you and General Arnold. I had your General
Anderson dining with me last night and he is convinced that
the saturation argument is overwhelmingly sound. For instance,
if he had had another two or three hundred bombers, as he will
have in a short time, he could yesterday have gone to any place
in Germany in broad daylight without any opposition except from
the local flak. This is very far reaching in its implications.
I propose to send a message of compliments to General Eaker
for your people and also one to our own bombers who have had
a very heavy and prosperous week.

No Sig

REOGRADER UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 1972
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President

SERIAL #450
DATE 10 Oct 43

DATE/TIME 10/1610Q
OR FILE NUMBER 1018302

TOR MAP ROOM 10/1610Q
VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Congratulations on air operations over Germany

ACTION
Sent to PRESIDENT at Hyde Park as WHITE 43 (10/1620Q)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 10 Oct 43
FILING: Pres-PM Folder
10 October 1943

From: Milattache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 451

Former Naval Person to President personal and

I have had an encouraging telegram from General Wilson and
it is possible we may still save something from the wreck. The
matter is being dealt with by Anthony on his journey.

No Sig
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL: 461
DATE: 10 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 10/2318 Z

TO: MAP ROOM: 2000 EWT
VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Aegean operation

ACTION:
Sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 46, 10/2010 EWT.

This is merely a commentary on the Aegean operation, and was not answered.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 10 Oct 1943 FILED: Pres-PM File
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 1452 Filed: 1036Z/11
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

My No. 1440 of October 7th.

The important thing is to amend the draft agreement
between the Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean and
the Italian Minister of Marine (NAF 361) so as to safe­
guard the right of the United Nations to dispose freely
and without restriction of all Italian vessels, both war­
ships and merchant ships, as the needs of the United
Nations may dictate.

The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the necess­
ary amendment to the United States authorities.

But even assuming that the "Cunningham Agreement" is amended accordingly, there is a risk that we may get
landed in an argument with the Italian Government if we
omit the unconditional surrender clause in the full
armistice. The Italian Government could argue that we
had changed our minds about the unconditional surrender
of the fleet, since we first made then sign this clause
and then withdrew it. By retaining the clause we should
certainly further safeguard the position.

I much hope therefore that you will tell Eisenhower
that we cannot agree to omission of Article 1 (A).
Uncle Joe will certainly not mind us having second thoughts
about it on the stern side.

No Sig

0313
FROM The Prime Minister TO the President

SERIAL 452 DATE 11 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 11/1038Z VIA Army Code Room

TOR MAP ROOM 0750Q VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Suggested revision of Italian Surrender terms.

ACTION (Continuation of $440 of FM, 7 Oct 43.)

1. To PRESIDENT at Hyde Park as WHITE 46 (0750Q).

2. Admiral Leahy read in Map Room at 1030, 11 Oct, and directed that a draft message to Eisenhower, quoting this $452, be prepared for the PRESIDENT's approval when he returned to Washington on Tuesday morning, 12 Oct. Message paraphrased by Captain Price.

3. PRESIDENT, in BLACK 18 (11/1152), directed that copy be furnished Admiral Leahy & Joint Staff.

4. Admiral Leahy on Oct 12 directed message prepared for Eisenhower (Para 2) be sent. Sent to Eisenhower as FREEDOM #919 (1645Q).


6. Message to FM incorporating Eisenhower's suggestions, which were approved by the President, prepared by Colonel Hammond; sent to Admiral Leahy evening of 15 Oct; taken by Leahy to President for approval (over)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

Admiral Leahy 11 Oct The President (Black 18)

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED
morning of 14th Oct, President approved; returned by Leahy to Map Room at 1130 EWT, 15 Oct; sent to PM as #586, 14/16191E.
October 18, 1943
8 p.m.

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

MOSCOW.

1014

AMDEL 22

There is transmitted herewith by direction of the President the text of a message which Prime Minister Churchill transmitted simultaneously on October 12 to the President and Premier Stalin with a view as to whether "something like it might not be issued over our three signatures"

The President would like you to consider the text of some such statement to be issued at the close of the Moscow conversations as an indication to the world that the fate of these unhappy people under German control has not been overlooked at this Tripartite meeting. Should such an action meet with your approval and a text in its general character agreed upon with your British and Russian colleagues, the President suggests the statement to be issued in Moscow should be a joint statement as by the three governments.

It is believed that without prejudice to any action we may take against past offenders, this warning should refer specifically to present and future atrocities in order to avoid in so far as is possible driving to desperation those cornered rats who have in the past murdered their helpless victims and to whom we can and will apply the same punishment without any notice.

In due course I shall look for some indication of your decision.

The text is contained in the telegram immediately following.

HULL

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. LPREP, 111-72
MAY 5 1972
This cable was sent in code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

This cable was sent in code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. A-1

October 18, 1943
9 p.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

1015

QUOTE Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union (in whatever order is thought convenient, we being quite ready to be last) have received from many quarters evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of the Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst forms of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that, in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties.

Accordingly the foresaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare, and give full warning of their declaration, as follows:

INNER QUOTE At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party, who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to the invaded parts of Russia, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia, Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy. Thus Germans who take part in the wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of
French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Republic which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back, regardless of expense, to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done. END INNER QUOTE

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localization. Signed Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, UNQUOTE

HULL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

15 October 1943

The President desires your comments and recommendations with reference to the attached message from the Prime Minister to the President and Marshal Stalin.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Inc.,

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
Message to the President and Premier Stalin from the Prime Minister, dated 12 October 1943.

Please consider the following with a view as to whether something like it might not be issued over our three signatures:

"Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union (in whatever order is thought convenient, we being quite ready to be last) have received from many quarters evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerites in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of the Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst forms of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that, in their desperation, the recollecting Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties.

"Accordingly the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare, and give full warning of their declaration, as follows:

"At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party, who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to the invaded parts of Russia, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia, Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy. Thus Germans who take part in the wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Republic which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back, regardless of expense, to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done."

"The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localization. Signed Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill."

I am not particular about the phraseology, but if this, or something like this, were issued over our three signatures, I believe it would make some of those villains reluctant to be mixed up in butcheries now they realize they are going to be defeated. We know, for example, that
the severities inflicted on the Polish people were mitigated by our threats of reprisals. Use of the terror-weapon by the enemy without doubt imposes on our armies an additional burden. Moral scruples may be developed by many Germans if they know they are to be brought back to the country, and perhaps the very place, where their cruelties were inflicted. This principle and policy of the localization of judgment has been endorsed by the British Cabinet, and I strongly commend it to you as likely to deter enemy terrorism.
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 453, 12 October 1943

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin. Personal and.

Would you very kindly consider whether something like the following might not be issued over our three signatures.

"Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union (in whatever order is thought convenient, we being quite ready to be last) have received from many quarters evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of the Nazi domination are no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst forms of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that, in their desperation, the recouping Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties.

"Accordingly the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare, and give full warning of their declaration, as follows:

"At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party, who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to the invaded parts of Russia, to Poland and Czechoslovakia; to Yugoslavia, Greece,
including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy. Thus Germans who take part in the wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages, or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Republic which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back, regardless of expense, to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

"The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localization. Signed Roosevelt Stalin Churchill."

If this, or something like this (and I am not particular about the wording) were put over our three signatures, it would I believe, make some of these villains shy of being mixed up in butcheries now that they know they are going to be beat. We know, for instance, that our threats of reprisals about Poland have brought about a mitigation of the severities being inflicted on the people there. There is no doubt that the use of the terror-weapon by the enemy imposes an additional burden on our armies. Lots of Germans may develop moral scruples if they know they are going to be brought back and judged in the country, and perhaps in the very place, where their cruel deeds were done. I strongly commend to you the principle of the localisation of judgment as likely to exert a deterrent effect on enemy terrorism. The British Cabinet endorse this principle and policy.
ACTION

Taken to President by Admiral Brown. (This message also sent to Marshal Stalin by Churchill).

The President directed copy be sent to Undersecretary of State for his comments and recommendations. Taken to Room 204 by Cornelius at 1040, 18 Oct 43.

Sent to Hull in Moscow by State Dept (State's 1015 & 1015, 18 Oct 43, AMDEL 22) for consideration at conference.

President, in his 392, 21 Oct 43, advises PM that it was sent to Hull in Moscow.

PM's 469, 22 Oct 43, says "Many thanks".

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<tr>
<th>COPIES TO:</th>
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<th>BY DIRECTION OF:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Undersecretary of State</td>
<td>18 Oct 43</td>
<td>The President</td>
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</table>

ACTION COMPLETED: 21 Oct 43

FILED: 26 Oct 43
From: London, England
To: The President of The United States
Number 454  13th October 1943

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal.

Your Nr 385.*

We have received exactly the same reports as you have. They emanate from the Polish Secret Service, with variations from the Belgians. We are with you in thinking they are totally unfounded and that the German Secret Service are aware of them. I will send you any further information which comes to hand.

No Sig

*MAP ROOM NOTE - Your #385 refers to the activities of General Von Falkenhausen in Portugal.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72.
By R. H. Parks  Date MAY 5 1972
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
No. 455

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal
and

Your telegram 373 on October 5th.

An investigation has been made into this leakage. Your telegram containing Stalin’s reply was dated October 2nd and reached me on that day. Kuh’s cable was filed on evening of October 1st. Although the Soviet Embassy here are not generally so promptly and fully informed by Moscow these facts suggest that they were on this occasion told the terms of Stalin’s reply before that reply reached you and that they gave its contents to Kuh.

The censor who passed Kuh’s cable made an error of judgment and has been reprimed. He was influenced by the statement in Kuh’s cable that its contents came from “Trustworthy American sources”. This may have been a device to disguise its real origin.

Kuh’s messages frequently show him to be in possession of information to which he is not entitled. He often causes us trouble. We are trying to track down his sources. Any help your people can give would be welcome.

No Sig
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL: 455  
DATE: 13 October 43  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 13/2035Z  
TOR MAP ROOM: 13/1740 EWT  
VIA: Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Publishing of Stalin's message refusing to change place of meeting by Frederick Kuh of the Chicago Sun.  

ACTION:  
Answers Pres-FM #373, 4 Oct 43.  
To President by Admiral Brown.  
PM in Doc. 3 of #273, says he will investigate leakage.  
See also Winant's message to President, unnumbered 13 Oct 43, on this subject.  

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED: 09 Oct 43  
FILED: 

[Signature]

0327
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 456. Filed 14/1305Z

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and
Number 456.

I have a new idea about "EUREKA" which I have asked Anthony to try on U J for subsequent submission to you if U J agrees. There is a place in the desert which I now call CYPRUS but whose real name is in my immediately following. This would be a much easier journey for you from Cairo than "Cairo Three" and very little longer for U J. We could put up three encampments and live comfortably in perfect seclusion and security. I am going into details on the chance of agreement in the Trinity. See also meanwhile St. Mathew Chapter 17 Verse 4.

No Sig

MAP ROOM NOTE - Quotation referred to follows:
* St. Mathew Chapter 17 Verse 4. - "Then answered Peter, and said unto Jesus, Lord, it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.

SECRET RECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0328
FROM  The Prime Minister  
TO  The President  

<table>
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<th>DATE/TIMEx FILE NUMBER</th>
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<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14/0250 EWT</td>
<td>Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting</td>
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</table>

ACTION  (Continuation of PM's #457, 5 Oct 45.)

Sent to the President via usher.

Continued in PM's #457; President answered in his message to Prime #388, 14 Oct, which quoted unnumbered message to Stalin of 14 Oct 43.

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ACTION COMPLETED: 14 Oct 45  
FILED: Pres-PM Folder

0329
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 457

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Confidential. Number 457.

My immediately preceding telegram, the word is "Habbaniya."

No Sig

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-30-72
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 5 1972

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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>TO OR MAP ROOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin Conference.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

(Continuation of 466.)

To President via Admiral Brown.

See President's message to Prime 466, 14 Oct; also unnumbered message to Stalin, 14 Oct 43.
16 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President there is furnished you herewith the attached paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, 4468, dated 16 October 1943.

The President desires that you carry out the action called for in the attached message with our Charge d’Affaires in Lisbon on Monday, 18 October, if at that time Germany has not taken action against Portugal.

Very respectfully,

CHRISTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Inc.

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Steward, Date MAY 5 1972
16 October 1943

From the Prime Minister to the President. Number 458.
Your Number 387.

Make your own request to the Portuguese Government by all means. Quoting particularly the "Friends to Friends" phrase in the Treaty of 1373, we will support you to the fullest extent. With your man now taking the lead, our two ambassadors should play the hand together.

The one remaining question open is whether you should allow them a few more days to judge the reaction of the Germans. This decision will be yours.
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 458  
Filed 1517392  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 458. Your number 387.

By all means make your own request to the Portuguese Government. We will back you to the full, quoting particularly the "Friends to Friends" phrase in the Treaty of 1573. Our two ambassadors should play the hand together, your man now taking the lead.

The only question open is whether you should give them a few more days to watch the German reaction. We leave this to you.

No Sig

A parody even to say Stimson with instructions to carry out with our change of Affaire on Monday 1st & if at that Time the action in that Baltic action against Finland.
FROM PRIME | TO POTUS
---|---
SERIAL 458 | DATE 15 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 161739Z
TOR MAP ROOM 1420 EWT | VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Air facilities in Azores.

**ACTION**

Answers Pres' 387.

Delivered to Miss Tully for the President.

Chronological order of dispatches on this subject:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pres' 376, 6 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>PM's 441, 8 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>Pres' 384, 9 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>Pres' 387, 12 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>PM's 458, 15 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>PM's 466, 19 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>PM's 468, 21 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>Pres' 377, 24 Oct 43.</td>
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<td>PM's 458, 29 Oct 43.</td>
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**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:** 25 Oct 45
October 16, 1943

From:  London
To:    The President of the United States
No:    459    Filed 160950Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

1. Please see my Nr. 429 about Russian convoys. I have now received the immediately following telegram from Uncle Joe which I think you will feel is not exactly all one might hope for from a gentleman for whose sake we are to make an inconvenient, extreme and costly exertion. I have sent the following suggested answer to Anthony for him to handle as he thinks best.

2. I think or at least I hope this message came from the machine rather than from Stalin as it took 12 days to prepare. The Soviet machine is quite convinced it can get everything by bullying and I am sure it is a matter of some importance to show that this is not necessarily always true.

3. I entirely agree with the telegram you have sent to Uncle Joe about Eureka. Let me know what he replies.

4. Please also see Saint Mark 9 verses 5 and 6 especially sixth verse.

Saint Mark 9

5. And Peter answered and said to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here; and let us make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.
6. For he wist not what to say; for they were sore afraid.

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0336
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<th>FROM</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM: 16/0716 EWT</td>
<td>VIA Army Code Room</td>
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</table>

**Subject:** Russian convoys.

**Action:** Continuation #429.

Sent to President on his breakfast try, 16 Oct 43.

(See PM #460 and 461)

No answer.

**Copies to:**

**Date:**

**By direction of:**

**Action completed:** 3 Nov 1943

**Filed:**
From: London
To: President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and confidential. Nr. 460.

My Nr. 459. Following is telegram received from Uncle Joe. Begins.

"Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill.

"1. I received your message of Oct 1st informing me of the intention to send four convoys to the Soviet Union by the Northern Route in November, December, January, and February. However, this communication loses its value by your statement that this intention to send northern convoys to the USSR is neither an obligation nor an agreement, but only a statement which, as it may be understood, is one that the British side can at any moment renounce regardless of any influence it may have on the Soviet Armies at the front. I must say that I cannot agree with such a posing of the question. Supplies from the British Government to the USSR, armaments and other military goods, cannot be considered otherwise than as an obligation which, by special agreement between our countries, that British Government undertook in respect of the USSR, which bears on its shoulders, already for the third year, the enormous burden of struggle with the common enemy of the Allies—Hitlerite Germany.

"It is also impossible to disregard the fact that the Northern Route is the shortest way which permits delivery of armaments supplied by the Allies within the shortest period to the Soviet-German front, and the realisation of the plan of supplies to the USSR in appropriate volume is impossible without an adequate use of this way. As I already wrote to you earlier, and as experience has shown, delivery of armaments and military supplies to the USSR through Persian ports cannot compensate in any way for those supplies which were not delivered owing to the absence of delivery of equipment and materials by the Northern Route which, as it can be well understood, were taken into account..."
when planning the supplies for the Soviet Armies. By the way, for some reason or other, there was a very considerable decrease in the delivery of military goods sent by the Northern Route this year in comparison with those received last year: and this makes it impossible to fulfill the established plan of military supplies and is in contradiction to the corresponding Anglo-Soviet protocol for military supplies. Therefore, at the present time, when the forces of the Soviet Union are strained to the utmost to secure the needs of the front in the interests of success of the struggle against the main forces of our common enemy, it would be inadmissible to have the supplies of the Soviet Armies depend on the arbitrary judgment of the British side. It is impossible to consider this posing of the question to be other than a refusal of the British Government to fulfill the obligations it undertook, and as a kind of threat addressed to the USSR.

"2. Concerning your mention of controversial points allegedly contained in the statement of M. Molotov, I have to say that I do not find any foundation for such a remark. I consider the principle of reciprocity and equality proposed by the Soviet side for settlement of the visa question in respect of personnel of the military missions to be a correct and indeed a just one. The reference to the difference in the functions of the British and Soviet military missions to exclude the usage of that principle, and that the numbers of the staff of the British Military Mission must be determined by the British Government only, I consider to be unconvincing. It has already been made clear in detail in the previous Aide Memoires of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on this question.

"3. I do not see the necessity for increasing the number of British service men in the North of the USSR since the great majority of British service men who are already there are not adequately employed, and for many months have been doomed to idleness, as has already been pointed out several times by the Soviet side. For example, it can be mentioned that owing to its non-necessity, the question of the liquidation of the 126th British Port Base in Archangel was put forward several times, and only now the British side have
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 460
Page 3
Filed 161030Z

agreed to liquidate it. There are also regrettable facts of the inadmissible behaviour of individual
British service men who attempted, in several cases, to recruit, by bribery, certain Soviet citizens for
intelligence purposes. Such instances, offensive to Soviet citizens, naturally gave rise to incidents
which led to undesirable complications.

"4. Concerning your mention of formalities
and certain restrictions existing in northern ports,
itis necessary to have in view that such formalities
and restrictions are unavoidable in zones near and at
the front, if one does not forget the war situation
which exists in the USSR. I may add that this applies
equally to the British and other foreigners as well
as to Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, the Soviet authori-
ties granted many privileges in this respect to the
British service men and seamen, about which the British
Embassy was informed as long ago as last March. Thus,
your mention of many formalities and restrictions is
based on inaccurate information.

"Concerning the question of censorship and
prosecution of British service men, I have no objection
if the censorship of private mail for British personnel
in northern ports would be made by the British authori-
ties themselves on condition of reciprocity, and also
if cases of small violations committed by British ser-
vice men which did not involve court procedure, would
be given to the consideration of the appropriate military
authorities."

No Sig
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
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<th>POTUS</th>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>16 Oct 43</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>16/1030Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>160940 EWT</td>
<td>SUBJET</td>
<td>Russian convoys. Quotes message from Uncle Joe.</td>
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**ACTION**

To President via usher at 0940.

(See PM §459 and 461)

No answer.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:** 3 Nov 1943
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 461  Filed 1610-12
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 461.

My number 159. Following is suggested answer sent to Anthony for him to handle. " Begins.

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

"1. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to guarantee that the four convoys mentioned can be run irrespective of the military situation on the seas. Every effort and heavy loss and sacrifice would, however, be made to do so if the Soviet Government attaches importance to the receipt of their cargoes. I cannot undertake to do more than my best and His Majesty's Government must remain the judge of whether any particular operation or war to be carried out by their forces is in fact practicable or not.

"2. The running of these four convoys would be a very great burden to the Royal Navy and involves the diversion of much needed flotillas from the anti-U-boat war and from the escorting of troop and other important convoys. It also exposes the main units of the fleet to serious risks. His Majesty's Government would be very glad to be relieved of the task of running the convoys if the Soviet Government do not attach importance to them.

"3. In particular the refusal of the request of the British Government in respect of the reliefs and small increases in the few hundreds of British service men in the North of the USSR and in particular the Signals personnel on which the safety of these convoys to some extent depends, raises an insuperable obstacle. His Majesty's Government would be very glad to withdraw the handfuls of service personnel from North Russia and will do so as soon as they are assured that it is not the desire of the Soviet Government to receive the convoys under the modest and reasonable conditions which the British Government consider necessary."

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 5 0779

0342
TO POTUS

SERIAL 461

DATE 16 Oct 43

OR FILE NUMBER 1610442

16/0940 WNT

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Russian convoy. Quotep message to Uncle Joe.

ACTION

To President via usher at 0940.

(See PM #459 and 460).

No answer.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

3 Nov 1943
From: London  
To: The President Of the United States  
Number 462  
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt  
personal and  

1. I agree that General Eisenhower’s proposals will meet the points raised in my nr 452, provided the Cunningham Agreement is amended in the manner suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff. Unless this agreement is so amended, I do not believe that the right of the United Nations to dispose of Italian vessels as they wish would be safeguarded and I could not agree to a protocol being signed on the lines of that proposed by General Eisenhower, unless this condition is fulfilled.

2. I have seen a telegram suggesting that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that the Cunningham Agreement ought not to be amended so soon after having been presented to the Italians. Surely this is a mistaken idea since we are in fact contemplating amending the armistice terms themselves. If you would arrange for instructions to be sent to General Eisenhower to have the Cunningham Agreement amended straight away as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, I would then be glad to instruct Macmillan to sign a protocol on the lines proposed by General Eisenhower.

3. There is, however, one further point. The Russians have suggested a rewording of Article 29 about war criminals and a rewording of the preamable to the armistice terms to make it clear that the armistice was signed on their behalf as well as on behalf of our two governments. The Foreign Office have suggested a form of words to the State Department to put these proposed changes into effect.
I think it would be a mistake to ask the Italians to sign two protocols, one to take care of the changes proposed by General Eisenhower and the other to cover the Soviet proposals. Would it not be better that they should all form the subject of one protocol? If the State Department will agree to the form of words which the Foreign Office have suggested or to something like it to meet the Soviet proposals and if directions could accordingly be sent to General Eisenhower, his protocol could be redrafted accordingly.

I should like to emphasise once more that I cannot agree to the protocol being signed unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended simultaneously.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 462 from the Prime Minister to the President be furnished the State Department for its consideration and recommendation.

This same message has also been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and recommendation.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.
PM-POTUS #462.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
16 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN ROYAL

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 462 from the Prime Minister to the President be furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and recommendation.

This same message has also been referred to the State Department for its consideration and recommendation.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Inc1.
PH-POTUS #462.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. H. Stewart Date MAY 5 1972
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 452, 16 October 1943.

Your Number 286.

1. Provided the Cunningham Agreement is amended in the manner proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, I agree that General Eisenhower's suggestions (See CM-IN-7694 13 Oct 43) will meet the points brought up in my No. 452. I do not believe, unless this agreement is amended accordingly, that the right of the United Nations to dispose of Italian shipping as they desire would be protected. Unless this condition is fulfilled, I could not agree to a protocol being signed on the lines of that proposed by General Eisenhower.

2. A telegram has been brought to my attention, suggesting that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that the Cunningham Agreement should not be amended so soon after having been delivered to the Italians. This is surely a mistaken idea, since we are in fact thinking of amending the actual armistice terms. If you would make arrangements to instruct General Eisenhower to have the Cunningham Agreement amended immediately as suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, I would then be happy to direct MacMillan to sign a protocol of the type advocated by General Eisenhower.

3. However, there is one further point to be considered. A rewording of Article 29 about war criminals and a rewording of the preamble to the armistice terms have been suggested by the Russians in order to make it plain that the armistice was signed for their benefit as well as for the benefit of our two governments. A form of words to put these proposed changes into effect has been suggested by the Foreign Office to the State.
SECRET

Department. It would be an error, in my opinion, to request the Italians to sign two protocols, one to cover the chances proposed by General Eisenhower and the other to take care of the proposals made by the Soviets. Would it not be more satisfactory if they all were to form the subject of a single protocol. If the Department of State will agree to the form of words suggested by the Foreign Office, or to something similar, and if General Eisenhower could be accordingly instructed, his protocol could be redrafted to conform.

4. I should like to reiterate once more that, unless the Cunningham Agreement is amended at the same time, I cannot agree to the protocol being signed.
FROM: FM
TO: POTUS

SERIAL: 462
DATE/TIME: 16/1519Z
OR FILE NUMBER: 16/1240
VIA: Army
SUBJECT: Amendment of Italian surrender terms.

ACTION:
Sent to President at Shangri La as WHITE 1.

President directed it be sent to JCS and State for "Consideration and recommendation".

Captain Royal personally delivered to Admiral Brown, 23 Oct 43.
JCS suggested reply to FM, which embodied a suggested message to Eisenhower. Approved by President and sent to FM as #595, 231135 Oct.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:
State Department 10/16/43 Admiral Brown
Joint Chiefs of Staff 10/16/43 Admiral Brown

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
23 Oct 43

0350
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 463

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 463.

Molotov's proposed amendment, making the Mediterranean Commission what is virtually an executive and governing body, goes far beyond what we had in mind. I am not prepared to agree to this extension of Russian and, as it would now be, De Gaulist powers of interference in a theatre where they have no troops and where all the burden is borne by us. We are also advising you officially through the State Department.

No Sig

16 October 1943
FROM     PRIME     TO     PRESIDENT
SERIAL   463       DATE   16 Oct 43
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 16/1803Z
TOR MAP ROOM 16/1445Q VIA Army
SUBJECT Central Commission - French participation in. Molotov's proposed amendment.

ACTION  Sent to Shangri-la as White 3, 16 Oct 43.

For Molotov's proposal mentioned by the PM, see "Central Commission" folder, 15 Oct 43. His proposal re French representation was forwarded to the President at HP as WHITE 2, together with a proposed message to Stalin. President approved; message sent to Marshal Stalin on 16 Oct 43; sent to FM as Pres' #290, 16 Oct 43.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: 26, Oct 43.
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 464  

It seems to me that it is becoming very necessary to have a decision about the high command. Unless there is a German collapse the campaign of 1943 will be far the most dangerous we have undertaken and personally I am more anxious about its success than I was about 1941, 1942 or 1943.

No Sig

17 October 1943

REGRADING UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-39-72 
By R. H. Parks Date: May 5 1972
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Decision on high command.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Sent to &quot;hangri-La as WHITE 6.</td>
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<td>See also PM's #464, 17 Oct 43.</td>
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From: London
To: The President of the United States
No.: 465 191525Z

Prime Minister to President personal and number 465.

1. Your number 389. Though the Quadrant decision that operations in upper Burma should be given priority will inevitably result in a moderate decrease in the air lift to China, I agree that there must be ceaseless effort to build up your air force there and on the air route.

2. Our joint staffs have recently considered this problem and as a result have informed Generals Stilwell and Auchinleck of their anxiety that the reduction in lift to China should not be greater than is necessary to implement the Quadrant decision, and have instructed them to submit an agreed recommendation as to the minimum air lift that should be maintained to support the 14th Air Force in China and the Yunnan advance.

3. I feel that this is not a matter which can be examined in detail either in Washington or London, and that we should await the report from Stilwell and Auchinleck before taking further action.

4. Latest figures show an increase in September from four three eight zero tons in August to six seven four zero tons.

5. I grieve to say that Wingate is down with typhoid fever. All his work and plans are being vigorously pressed forward and I have every hope that he will resume his duties early in December.

No Sig

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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**ACTION**

Answers Pres' 589.

Copy to President by General Watson. Admiral Leahy saw at 19/1800.

No answer.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

FILED:

27 Oct 45.
19 October 1943

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 1456, Filed 1922152

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and
I fear there may be some misunderstanding about your proposed direct approach to Portuguese concerning use of Azores.

When you told me you had received information from Lisbon that Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with your Government on this subject, I encouraged you to go ahead, thinking that all you had in mind were the facilities for the ferry service referred to in my number 1441, because in reply you said you were delighted with these arrangements.

Now I learn from Lisbon that you are instructing your Charge D'Affaires to put the demands formulated by United States Chiefs of Staff on September 8th. Difficulties inherent in these were telegraphed from here to Joint Staff Mission on September 18th.

I cannot help feeling that we could not obtain these for you immediately, and I wonder whether you have any definite information from Lisbon that you would be able to obtain them by direct approach.

No Sig
FROM PRIME TO POTUS

SERIAL 466 DATE 19 Oct 43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 19/2215Z

TOR MAP ROOM 20/0015Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT American use of Azores.

ACTION To President via usher, 2020.

See memorandum from Admiral Leahy to Secretary of State, requesting that the Legation take no comprehensive action at the present time on our request for air facilities in the Azores.

Action 319, 29 Oct 43.

Chronological order of dispatches on this subject:

Pres. 376, 6 Oct 43.
PM's 444, 8 Oct 43.
Pres. 384, 9 Oct 43.
Pres. 387, 12 Oct 43.
PM's 468, 15 Oct 43.
PM's 466, 19 Oct 43.
PM's 379, 26 Oct 43.

Copies to: Date: By direction of:

Action completed: Filed: 25 Oct 43
20 October 1943

From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

No. 467

File 200050Z

Former Naval Person to President personal and secret.

Para 1. In view of the changes that have taken place since QUADRANT we have had prolonged discussions here about our existing plans for the campaign of 1944. On these the British Chiefs of Staff and War Cabinet are deeply concerned. We ask for a full conference of the Combined Staffs in North Africa in the first or second week of November, that is between the end of the foreign secretaries conference at Moscow and EUREKA. We ask this irrespective of whether EUREKA takes place or not. It would be best however if this took place on our way to EUREKA.

Para 2. We will go wherever you wish, but is there any reason why we should not meet again at ANFA? I recognize that the date should be fixed in relation to EUREKA. We must wait to decide our own movements till we hear from U J. But the Combined Staffs should begin their discussions not later than about November 10. I beg most earnestly that you will consider this request in a favourable sense.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 29-29 1972
SERIAL 

DATE/TIME 20/1050Z

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 20/0215Z VIA Army Code Center

SUBJECT Proposal for meeting of combined staffs in North Africa prior to Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill conference.

ACTION

To President via usher 2220.

Answered by Pres to PM #394.

COPY TO: Admiral Leahy

DATE: 10/20

ACTION COMPLETED: 10/22 1943

FILED: 10/22 1943
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 468 Filed: 20/0808 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
No. 468.

Your 390. Thank you very much. More important to me than the composition of the Commission is whether it should have executive and administrative powers. To this I should find constitutional difficulties in the House of Commons as well as personal objections. Our memorandum, which by agreement with Hull has now been communicated to the Soviet, proposes that the scope of the Commission should in the first instance be confined to Italian problems and its functions to making joint or several recommendations to Governments. I hope I may count on your support in urging the Soviet to accept these proposals.

If scope and functions of Commission are limited in this way, I would like to accord France full membership, as I understood was your intention when we discussed this in Washington in September. If, however, scope of Commission is subsequently enlarged I agree that French representation should then be altered to correspond to that accorded to other United Nations.

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**SUBJECT**
French Representation on Control Commission.

**ACTION**
To President via usher 0800.

Answer President's #390.

(This was finished by action of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No executive authority was given to the French representative. This per Admiral Leahy.)

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22 October 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 469

Filed 22/nft

Person to President. Number 469.

1. Your 391. I am instructing Eden to back you up to the full but I do not think Ankara would be possible; first, because of security, and secondly, because there are the Taurus Mountains to cross.

2. Your 392. Many thanks about my 453. They are shooting hostages more ferociously and on a larger scale than ever.

3. Admiral Andrew Cunningham on return from the Mediterranean told me that the impending changes in command were known or accurately guessed at there. I am hoping this can be settled soon. To give OVERLORD the best chance the commanders should be at it now. The eye of the master maketh the horse fat.

4. Whatever happens we have got to meet soon.

No Sig

REGRADED UNGRADE41 by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 9-08-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972
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**SUBJECT**

1. "EUREKA";
2. Atrocities;
3. Change in high command;
4. Meeting of Combined Staffs.

**ACTION**

Answers President's 391 & 392. Sent to the President via Usher by direction of Admiral Brown.

**COPIES TO:DATE:BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

FILED:

Oct 23, 1943

0364
23 October 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 470. Filed 231500Z

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Number 470.

Your number 393.

1. In spite of the vexatious broils between the followers of Tito and Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia and those that have broken out between the two sets of Greek guerillas, the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is grievous for the enemy. It is at present being managed by General Wilson from Cairo, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have impressed upon General Eisenhower the urgent need of passing in supplies by ship as well as by air. We British have about eighty separate missions under General Wilson's control working with Partisans and Patriot bands scattered over these immense mountainous regions 900 miles by about 300 miles in extent. Some of our officers there of brigadier's rank are very capable and have in numerous cases been there for two years. I have great admiration for Donovan, but I do not see any centre in the Balkans from which he could grip the situation. It would take a long time to move from one of the many centres of guerilla activity to another. If however you would like him to go to Cairo and meet General Wilson, he will be given the fullest information on the spot about the whole scene and can report to you. The fighting is of the most cruel and bloody character with merciless reprisals and execution of hostages by the Huns. But the enemy also is suffering heavily and is now consuming not less than twenty five German and eight Bulgarian divisions in the theatre without being able to control more than key points and with increasing difficulty in maintaining railway traffic. We hope soon to compose the Greek quarrels and the differences between Tito's Partisans and Mihailovitch's Serbs are very deep seated.
2. Eden tells me that Stalin was quite agreeable to the bombing of Sofia by us. I consider this is most important and that no previous warning should be given to make the task of our airmen harder. Also that leaflets should be dropped to say that the dose they will receive is only a foretaste of what will follow if they do not withdraw their divisions from their neighbours lands.

No Sig
25 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEXANY

The President stated to Admiral Brown, on reading the Prime Minister's message No. 470, that General Donovan should proceed to General Wilson's headquarters to ascertain if he can be of any assistance.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
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**SUBJECT** Sending Donovan to the Balkans - guerrilla fighting

**ACTION**

Answers Pres's #395, 22 Oct 45.

Original to President via Mr. Hopkins 23/2137Q

President, upon reading, remarked to Admiral Brown that General Donovan should proceed to General Wilson's headquarters to ascertain if he could be of any assistance. Memo to Admiral Leahy 25 Oct 45.

No answer to Prime.

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**  

**ACTION COMPLETED:** 25 Oct 43  
**FILED:** 25 Oct 43
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 471

Personal and Number 471. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your number 394.

1. The Russians ought not to be vexed if the Americans and British closely concert the very great operations they have in hand for 1944 on fronts where no Russian Troops will be present. Nor do I think we ought to meet Stalin, if ever the meeting can be arranged, without being agreed about Anglo American operations as such.

2. I would be content with Nov 15th if this is the earliest date for your staffs. I thought the staff would work together for a few days before you and I arrive, say 18th or 19th, and we could then go on together to BUREKA. I do not yet know whether it is to be Nov 20th or 25th. I had not imagined that BUREKA would take more than 3 or 4 days or that large technical staffs would take part in it.

3. Nov 15 would be 90 days from the beginning of QUADRANT. In these 90 days events of first magnitude have occurred. Mussolini has fallen; Italy has surrendered; its fleet has come over; we have successfully invaded Italy, and are marching on Rome with good prospects of success. The Germans are gathering up to 25 or more div in Italy and the Po Valley. All these are new facts.

4. Our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects. We are to put 15 American and 12 British Divs into OVERLORD and will have about 5 American and 16 British or British controlled divs on the Italian front. Unless there is a German collapse Hitler, lying in the center of the best communications in the world, can concentrate at least 40 to 50 divs against either of these forces while holding the other. He could obtain all the necessary forces by cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to the Sava and the Danube without necessarily weakening his Russian front. The disposition of our forces between the Italian and the Channel theatres has not been settled by strategic needs.
but by the march of events, by shipping possibilities, and by
arbitrary compromises between the British and Americans. The
date of OVERLORD itself was fixed by splitting the difference
between the American and British view. It is arguable that
neither the forces building up in Italy nor those available
for a May OVERLORD are strong enough for the tasks set them.

5. The British Staffs and my colleagues and I all
think this position requires to be reviewed, and that the
commanders for both fronts should be named and should be
present. In pursuance of QUADRANT decisions we have already
prepared two of our best dive, the 50th and 51st now in Sicily,
for transfer to OVERLORD. Thus they can play no part in the
Italian battle to which they stood near, but will not come
into action again for 7 months and then only if certain hypo-
thetical conditions are fulfilled which may very likely not
be fulfilled. Early in Nov a decision must be taken about
moving landing craft from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD.
This will cripple Mediterranean operations without the said
craft influencing events elsewhere for many months. We stand
by what was agreed at QUADRANT but we do not feel that such
agreements should be interpreted rigidly and without review
in the swiftly changing situations of war.

6. Personally I feel that if we make serious mistakes
in the campaign of 1944, we might give Hitler the chance of
a startling come back. Prisoner German General Von Thoma was
overheard saying "Our only hope is that they come where we can
use the army upon them". All this shows the need for the
greatest care and foresight in our arrangements, the most
accurate timing between the two theatres, and the need to
gather the greatest possible forces for both operations, par-
ticularly OVERLORD. I do not doubt our ability in the conditions
laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply con-
cerned with the build up and with the situation which may arise
between the 30th and the 60th days. I feel sure that the
vast movement of American personnel into the United Kingdom
and the fighting composition of the units requires to be search-
ingly examined by the commander who will execute OVERLORD. I
wish to have both the high commands settled in a manner agreeable
to our two countries, and then the secondary commands which are
of very high importance can be decided. I have the greatest
confidence in General Marshall and that if he is in charge of
OVERLORD we British will aid him with every scrap of life and strength we have. My dear friend, this is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted, and I am not satisfied that we have yet taken the measures necessary to give it the best chance of success. I feel very much in the dark at present, and unable to think or act in the forward manner which is needed. For these reasons I desire an early conference.

7. All that you say about the plans for Eisenhower and the commanders in the Pacific which are due to be submitted on Nov 1st would harmonise with a meeting on Nov 16th at latest. I do not know how long you consider is required for the long term overall plan for the defeat of Japan to be completed by the combined planners and studied by our respective Chiefs of Staff. I do not consider that the more urgent decisions to which I have referred above ought to be held up for this long term view of the war against Japan which nevertheless should be pressed forward with all energy.

8. I hope you will consider that these reasons for a meeting are solid. We cannot decide finally until an answer is received from Uncle Joe. Should NUREKA not be possible it makes it all the more necessary that we should meet in the light of the information now being received from the Moscow Conference. I am expecting Anthony to start home before the end of the month and am ready myself to move any day after the first week in Nov.

9. You will I am sure share my belief that Leros has so far managed to hold out. "The dogs under the table eat of the childrens crumbs".

10. I send you in my immediately following extracts from a telegram I have sent to Eden who asked for guidance about the Russian wish to bring Turkey and Sweden immediately into the war. I wonder what you think on these subjects?

No Sig
25 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

The President directed that message No. 471 from the Prime Minister be referred to you for appropriate action.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Reasons for new meeting (Sextant)</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers POTUS #304.

Original to President 23/2137.

Admiral Leahy directed by President to take action on this.

Answered by subsequent messages on "SEXTANT" conference.

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**ACTION COMPLETED**

FILED: 4 Nov 1943
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 472

President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person Number 472

and personal my immediately preceding telegram.

Following are extracts from telegram I have sent to Eden.

(begins) Your space number 48.

1. Para 5: Turkey. If we force Turkey to enter the war she will insist on air support etc., which could not be provided without detriment to main operations in Italy. If however Turkey enters on her own initiative, perhaps moving through a phase of non belligerency, we should not have the same obligation and yet great advantages might be reaped. Obviously timing is vital and dependent upon what is the aggressive strength of the enemy in Bulgaria and Thrace. The prize would be to get into the Black Sea with supplies for Russia, warships and other forces. This is what I call giving Russia the right hand. Such a movement by Turkey is not impossible, especially if the Germans who begin to cut their losses in the Balkans and withdraw towards the Danube and the Sava.

2. Finland and Sweden. It would be a great advantage to bring Sweden into the war. We do not think the Germans have the strength to undertake a heavy invasion of Sweden. We should gain a new country and small but good army. Our gains in Norway would be far reaching. Valuable facilities would be afforded to Russian Air Forces. For ourselves, we can do far better bombing of German from East Anglia where we are mounted on a vast scale than from Sweden where everything would have to be improvised and imported by air. Our range from England over Germany is just as good as from Sweden. In fact with present British facilities plus those we hope to acquire North of Rome there is no part of Germany we cannot reach with great weight.

3. Personally I would like to see Turkey come in on her own and also Sweden. I do not think either of them would be overrun, and every new enemy helps Hitler's ruin. I suggest however that the first step is to find out what we and the Russians want and what will help both of us most in both quarters, and then as a second step go into ways and means immediately thereafter. Try this, and let me know. (ends)

No Sig
FROM  PRIME
SERIAL  472
DATE/TIME  23805 P (231805 P ?)
OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM 1845 VIA ARMY
SUBJECT  SUGGESTION S TO EDEN ON TURKEY AND SWEDEN

ACTION  Held until morning

Original to President 23/2/37
No answer.

0375
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 473.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Personal
and Official No. 473.

Your No. 395. Thank you so much.

Am much concerned to hear you have influenza. I trust
you will soon be better.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., S-99-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 3 1972
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<td>24/1252Q</td>
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<td>Sorry to hear you have influenza. . . .</td>
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**ACTION**

To be held until the President feels better. Might be shown this evening.

Shown to President evening of 24 October by Adm. McIntyre.

President replied in his 396, 25 Oct 43.

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

25 Oct 43
MEMORANDUM:

Dear Captain Strauss,

Will you please return the enclosed message to me after you have read it, together with any comments you may have.

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President.

Captain Lewis L. Strauss, U.S.N.,
Bureau of Ordnance,
Room 3004, Navy Department.
25 October, 1943.

From: The Prime Minister.
To: The President.

1. From many sources evidence has continued to accumulate during the last six months that the Germans are making very long range rockets which may possibly weigh 60 tons and carry an explosive charge of 10 to 20 tons and which are being prepared for an attack on England, particularly London. On account of this we have raided their main experimental station at Peenemunde. Watten near St. Omer, where construction work is proceeding the purpose of which we could not determine, was also demolished. In the Pas de Calais and the Cherbourg Peninsula there are at least seven such locations and there may be many more which we have not detected.

2. The opinion of scientists differs as to the practicability of making this type of rocket, but personally I am not convinced that they cannot be made. All possible work is being done and we are in close touch with your people who are ahead of us in rocket impulsion, which they have studied for giving airplanes a send-off. This business is being followed by an expert committee which thinks it possible that the main attack will be attempted in the new year but that a heavy though premature and short-lived attack might be made in the middle of November. The Germans are naturally benefitted by spreading talk of new weapons to encourage their troops, their satellites, and neutrals. And it may be in this case that their bark will be much worse than their bite.
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 474  
Filed 251919Z  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and number 474.

1. I ought to let you know that during the last six months evidence has continued to accumulate from many sources that the Germans are preparing an attack on England particularly London by means of very long range rockets which may conceivably weigh 60 tons and carry an explosive charge of 10 to 20 tons. For this reason we raided Peenemunde which was their main experimental station. We also demolished Watten near St Omer which was where a construction work was proceeding the purpose of which we could not define. There are at least seven such points in the Pas de Calais and the Cherbourg Peninsula and there may be a good many others we have not detected.

2. Scientific opinion is divided as to the practicability of making rockets of this kind but I am personally as yet unconvinced that they cannot be made. We are in close touch with your people who are ahead of us in rocket impulsion which they have studied to give airplanes a send off and all possible work is being done. The expert committee which is following this business thinks it possible that a heavy though premature and short lived attack might be made in the middle of November and that the main attack would be attempted in the new year. It naturally pays the Germans to spread talk of new weapons to encourage their troops their satellites and neutrals and it may well be that their bite will be found less bad than their bark.

3. Hitherto we have watched the unexplained constructions proceeding in the Pas de Calais area without (except Watten) attacking them in the hopes of learning more about them. But now we have decided to demolish those we know of which should be easy as overwhelming fighter protection can be given to bombers. Your airmen are of course in every way ready to help. This may not however end the menace as the country is full of woods and quarries and slanting tunnels can easily be constructed in hilly sides.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British  
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72  
By R. H. Parks  
Date MAY 5 1972.
4. The case of Wattan is interesting. We damaged it so severely that the Germans after a meeting two days later decided to abandon it altogether. There were 6,000 French workers upon it as forced labour. When they panicked at the attack a body of uniformed young Frenchmen who are used by the Germans to supervise them fired upon their countrymen with such brutality that a German Officer actually shot one of these young swine. A week later the Germans seem to have reversed their previous decision and resumed the work. Three thousand more workmen have been brought back. The rest have gone to some of those other suspected places thus confirming our views. We have an excellent system of intelligence in this part of Northern France and it is from these sources as well as from photographs and examination of prisoners that this story has been built up.

5. I am sending you by air courier the latest report upon the subject as I thought you would like to know about it.

No Sig
FROM: PRIME  

TO: PRESIDENT  

SERIAL: 474  


DATE/TIME: 251919Z  

OR FILE NUMBER:  

TOR MAP ROOM: 25/1740 EWT  

VIA: Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Rocket bombs.  

ACTION: To President via Colonel Mathewson.  

Message sent to Captain Strauss in the Navy Department for comments.  

Answered by POTUS 414, 8 Nov, which was prepared by Lt. Elsey from various sources of information, approved by the President, and sent to the PM at 082355 NCR 626 November.  

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

FILED: 9 Nov 1943
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 475

Former Naval Person to President personal and number 475 your number 396.

1. I shall be delighted to meet you anywhere in North Africa, but I hope we need not wait till the twentieth. Strongly recommend sea voyage to ANFA which we know, moving on to Pyramids if and when convenient. By all means ask Chiang. If UJ refuses, then Molotov with a Russian military mission would do. It seems to me fine progress has been made by Hull and Eden at Moscow and still more on the Russian southern front.

2. But you will have seen by now Eisenhower's number NAF 486 setting forth the condition into which we are sinking in Italy. We must not let this great Italian battle degenerate into a deadlock. At all costs we must win Rome and the airfields to the north of it. The fact that the enemy have diverted such powerful forces to this theatre vindicates our strategy. No one can doubt that by knocking out Italy we have enormously helped the Russian advance in the only way in which it could have been helped at this time. I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander must have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what effect is produced on subsequent operations.

3. I am so grieved to worry you with these matters while you are still suffering from influenza.

Prime
FROM PRIME TO PRESIDENT

SERIAL 475 DATE 26/Oct/43

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 26/1648Z

TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT (1) SEXTANT conference; (2) Alexander's comments in NAF 486; (3) "Sorry about influenza."

ACTION Answers President's #396.

(1) Further discussed in PM #477. Answered by POTUS #400.

(2) No answer.

(3) No answer.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: 5 Nov 1943
From: London  
To: The President of the United States  

Number 476  
Filed: 27/15102Z  

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt  

Your No. 397.  

1. Like you, I rejoice in the good progress made at Moscow, and I greatly hope we may arrange EUREKA.

2. I deprecate the idea of inviting a Russian military representative to sit in at the meetings of our joint staffs. Unless he understood and spoke English, the delays would be intolerable. I do not know of any really high officer of the Russian Army who can speak English. Such a representative would have no authority or power to speak except as instructed. He would simply say for an earlier second front and block all other discussions. Considering they tell us nothing of their own movements, I do not think we should open this door to them as it would probably mean that they would want to have observers at all future meetings and all discussions between us would be paralyzed. We shall very soon have six or seven hundred thousand British and American troops and airmen in Italy and we are planning the great operation of OVERLAND. There will not be a Russian soldier in any of these. On the other hand, all our fortunes depend upon them. I regard our right to sit together on the movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. Hitherto, we have prospered wonderfully, but I now feel that the year 1944 is loaded with danger. Great differences may develop between us and we may take the wrong turning. Or, again, we may make compromises and fall between two stools. The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our high staffs. If that were broken, I should despair.
of the immediate future. A formal triple conference with the Russians is another thing. Then, they have to be represented by plenipotentiaries, or at any rate, persons having wide discretionary powers. I need scarcely say the British Chiefs of Staff fully share these views. I must add that I am more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other with which I have been involved.
FROM: PRIME
SERIAL: 476
DATE/TIME: 27/1810Z
TOR MAP ROOM: 27/1210Q
SUBJECT: Russian representative on Anglo-American staff conferences. Also "EUREKA".

TO: PRESIDENT
DATE: 27 Oct 45.

VIA: Army Code Room

ACTION:
Answered Pres' #397, 26 Oct 45.

To President via Admiral Brown. Not acknowledged.

Further comments by PM in his #460, 3 Nov. Answered indirectly in message to PM #410; to Stalin, Opnav 082350, NCR 627.


copies to:

DATE:

by direction of:


ACTION COMPLETED: 28 Oct 45
FILED: 28 Oct 45
29 October 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 477. Filed 16452/29

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and

1. Earnestly hope you are making good progress.

2. It is very awkward waiting about for an answer from Uncle Joe. It is urgent to get dates settled and preparations made. Anyhow, I hope you and I can meet at ANFA between 15th and 20th November. I have a great wish and need to see you. All our troubles and toils are so much easier to face when we are side by side.

3. Propose code name see my immediately following msg.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

President via
Mrs. Judy 29/350
To President via Miss Tully. (Continued in FM's #478)

Answer first prepared by Admiral Leahy, together with Mr. Hopkins and Admiral Brown, in the Map Room. It was rewritten by the President in the Doctor's office.

Answer sent to FM as #400, 29 Oct 43. See also Pres' #401, which answers FM's #478.
29 October 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 478.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Nr. 478.
My immediately preceding telegram. SEXTANT.

No Sig

REGRARED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-28-72
By R. H. Yarke Date MAY 5 1972

111

To President
Miss Sally - 3/1350
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**ACTION**

To President via Miss Tully. (Continuance of PM's 477)

Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy in the Map Room, 29 Oct. Taken to President. President approved; returned to Map Room for sending by Admiral Brown.

Answer sent to PM as #401. (See also PM 477, Pres 400, PM 479.)

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

31 Oct 43
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 479.
Prime Minister to President.

1. I will meet you in Cairo on the 20th as you suggest and will, if you will allow me, assume responsibility for making all arrangements for your general security and comfort which would fall upon us as the occupying power. Casey has been lent a beautiful villa which I have seen myself and am sure would be in every way suitable for you. It is a mile or two from the Pyramids and surrounded by woods affording complete seclusion. It can be reached from the airfield in twenty minutes without going through any towns. The whole area can be easily cordoned off by British troops. There are some very interesting excursions into the desert which we could make together. I have no doubt Casey would be delighted to place the villa at your disposal. I should probably myself stay at the British Embassy in Cairo, which is perhaps twenty minutes away, but it may be that arrangements could be made for us both to be in the Pyramids area. I believe your Mr. Kirk also has a very fine house. Every facility exists in Cairo for the full staffs to be accommodated and to meet for business, and they can easily come out to your villa whenever desired. If you like this plan, which knowing the layout I consider far the best, I will immediately make all preparations and perhaps you would send an officer to make sure everything is arranged to your liking.

2. Do you propose to go through the Mediterranean in your ship? I should have thought this was more risky than flying on account of the danger of air attack by glider bombs. Our convoys are frequently attacked. I shall myself very possibly go to Gibraltar or Oran by ship and fly on from there by easy hops. I too propose to have a few days in the Mediterranean.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 1479

Theatre before SEXTANT begins, and would probably start from home around the twelfth. I could make preliminary contact with you wherever you first land or alight. It would be good to have a short preliminary meeting of us two and then separate for a few days before SEXTANT.

3. I am quite game to go on to Basra, but I gather Joe will not come beyond Teheran. If it is only Molotov and the Russian generals, I see no reason why they should not come to Cairo. Excellent arrangements can be made for Chiang in Cairo though not at the same moment. Shall we send him a joint invitation or would you prefer to wait till we know about whether we go to Basra? I repeat, I will do whatever you wish.

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**ACTION**

Answers Pres' No. 400.

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 9.

Admiral Leahy in WHITE 14 (30/2220Z Oct) submitted proposed reply to the FM. President sent back reply to FM in his BLACK 4 (this was different from Leahy's proposed draft). **SEND to FM as 4404, (310415 MOR 2203).**

*See further reply by President in this week 411, 8 Nov.*

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:** 31 October 43
From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 460  Filed 3018102

Prime Minister to President. Personal and No. 460. Your No. 402.

1. I was not aware you had been rushed at the last minute on any occasion, and I am very sorry if any inconvenience was caused and if I am to blame. In any case the date of the tenth was not a fixture and a day or two's delay could always have been obtained. In fact we did delay three or four days so as to settle it at Hyde Park in August.

2. I will await your draft instead of submitting one myself. Please send it to me, as the Admiralty have to express their view and I promised to keep Mackenzie King in on it.

3. We have had a magnificent month, barely 100,000 tons of sinkings and at least twenty two certain kills and nine probables. In fact, taking both sinkings and killings together, it is an all time high for the Firm.

No Sig

SECRET

30 October 1943

AGED 10

GOVERNMENT PHILIPPINES

SECRET

RERADGED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 5-69-78
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

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**SUBJECT:** October Anti-submarine statement.

**ACTION:** Answers POTUS #402, 29 Oct.

Sent to POTUS at Hyde Park as White 10 (30/2118Z)

Proposed statement prepared by Navy Department; concurred to by CI; sent to POTUS as White 31 (01/1914Z) requesting POTUS's approval and authorization to send to FM.

POTUS approved in Black 8 (02/0206). Sent to FM as POTUS #405, (020308 NCR 9442).

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
31 October 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 481  Filed 3114552

Prime Minster to President. Secret and personal. Number 481.

1. Everything will be ready for operation SEXTANT from 20th onwards and Colonel Warden will await Admiral 4. and also CELESTES (see my immediately following) at rendezvous. No difficulty about accommodation for staffs.

2. Your number 403. Can you give me a firm date when Marshall will be available, as I see great difficulties in the various stop gap arrangements proposed? The press this morning publishes reports from Washington correspondents that Marshall will be succeeded by Eisenhower and Eisenhower by Alexander. This is of course largely assumed throughout the Mediterranean, but the uncertainty is harmful. If you still hold to your opinion, which I share, about the three chief commands, why cannot we make the announcement jointly and add that the dates of the changes of commands will be fixed in relation to operations? We could then at SEXTANT settle together the consequent reactions, which are complicated and important.

3. Thank you very much for the Quebec film, which I saw and enjoyed last night.

No sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Gttr., State Dept. tel., 5-29-78
By R. M. Parks Date MAY 5 1972

0397
ACTION

Answers Pres’ #403. Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 20 (3117402).

President, in BLACK 20 (3121852) directed Admiral Leahy to prepare answer. Leahy, in conjunction with General Marshall, prepared answer which was sent to President as WHITE 28 (0118342) for his approval.

President did not send Leahy’s draft reply. According to Admiral Leahy this is to be taken up at SEXTANT conference.
31 October 1943

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President. Number 482.

My immediately preceding telegram, para 1: Your humble servant, yourself and the Generalissimo respectively.

No Sig

"Colonel Tarden" "Admiral 2" "Celates"
FROM | PRIME
---|---
TO | POTUS

SERIAL | 482

DATE/TIME | 31 Oct 43

OR FILE NUMBER | 31/14692

FROM MAP ROOM | 31/1210Q

VIA | Army Code Room

SUBJECT | SEPTANT conference; Code words for Prime, President, and Generalissimo.

ACTION | Continuation of Para 1, PM #481, 31 Oct.

| Sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 21, 31 Oct.

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