CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

have been removed from this file:

The following Office of Strategic Services document is closed:

G. Edward Buxton to Roosevelt, 1/10/44, attached to Roosevelt to Churchill, 1/14/44

Permission to examine classified documents must be obtained from the department or agency of origin. The reference archivist will advise you which department or agency has jurisdiction of classified documents in this file.
FROM: CPHAV
TO: ALIBNA, LONDON

NUMBER 433, SECRET AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED JANUARY TENTH STATEMENT ON THE SUBMARINE SITUATION. I CONCUR.

"1. OUR MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE LOST DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER TO U-BOAT ACTION WAS RELATIVELY LOW. FEWER U-BOATS WERE DESTROYED DURING THE MONTH BY OUR AIR AND SEA FORCES BECAUSE OF SEVERAL FACTORS: NAMELY, A SHIFT IN U-BOAT AREAS OF OPERATION AND ALTED U-BOAT TACTICS. IN THE MAIN, HOWEVER, OUR SUPPLY ROUTES CONTINUE TO BE REASONABLY SECURE.

"2. IN 1943 U-BOATS SANK BUT 40% OF THE MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE THAT THEY SANK IN 1942. ON THE OTHER HAND, UNITED NATIONS MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED IN 1943 APPROXIMATELY DOUBLED THE TONNAGE DELIVERED IN 1942. NEARLY HALF OF OUR TONNAGE LOST FOR THE YEAR 1943 WAS DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS: 27% WAS LOST DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1943, AND ONLY 28% WAS LOST DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS."

DO YOU AGREE?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1815, EWT, 4 January 1944.

ODEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R. Date

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart

SECRET

-1-
OP PRIORITY

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALISNA, LONDON

NUMBER 435, AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT HAS PREPARED THE FOLLOWING DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED JANUARY TENTH STATEMENT ON THE SUBMARINE SITUATION. I CONCUR.

"1. OUR MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE LOST DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER TO U-BOAT ACTION WAS RELATIVELY LOW AND AT A PROBABLEMILITARY MODERATE LEVEL. FEWER U-BOATS WERE DESTROYED DURING THE MONTH BY OUR AIR AND SEA FORCES BECAUSE OF SEVERAL FACTORS: NAMELY, A SHIFT IN U-BOAT AREAS OF OPERATION AND ALTERED U-BOAT TACTICS. IN THE MAIN, HOWEVER, OUR SUPPLY ROUTES CONTINUE TO BE RELATIVELY SECURE.

"2. IN 1943 U-BOATS SANK BUT 40% OF THE MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE THAT THEY SANK IN 1942. ON THE OTHER HAND, UNITED NATIONS MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED IN 1943 APPROXIMATELY DOUBLED THE TONNAGE DELIVERED IN 1942. NEARLY HALF OF OUR TONNAGE LOST FOR THE YEAR WAS DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS; 27% WAS LOST DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1943, AND ONLY 20% WAS LOST DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS."

DO YOU AGREE?

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By D. L. Stewart
Date Nov 1, 1971

SECRET

-1-
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<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>December Sub statement.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>See Sub Statement Folder.</td>
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Statement prepared by Navy Department and OWI. Approved by President with minor changes, sent to PM for his concurrence.

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<tr>
<td>&quot;Sub Statement&quot;</td>
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</table>
5 January 1944

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusma, London

Number 454, personal and , from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Referring to your 551 and 552 I fully approve of your selection of Air Marshal Slessor for Baker's Deputy in the Mediterranean Air and command of the R.A.F. and of your moving Sholto Douglas to the British Coastal Command.

I am also in complete agreement with General Wilson's taking over with full powers upon his arrival in Algiers.

I have seen Eisenhower this morning and he left a note for General Wilson telling him to take over at any date satisfactory to him (Wilson).

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date ________

Released from the White House Map Room at 1505, EWT, 5 January 1944.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.W.
January 5, 1944.

Referring to your 531 and 532 I fully approve of your selection of Air Marshal Slessor for Eaker's Deputy in the Mediterranean Air and command of the R.A.F. and of your moving Sholto Douglas to the British Coastal Command.

I am also in complete agreement with General Wilson taking over with full powers upon his arrival in Algiers.

I have seen Eisenhower this morning and he left a note for General Wilson telling him to take over at any date satisfactory to him.

Roosevelt
W.H.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By  L.J. Sturgis
Date  NOV 1 1971
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<td>TO</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Admiral Leahy</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Command changes</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

Answers PM 551 and 552.

Prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by President.

Acknowledged by PM in his #535, 6 January 1944

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

"Command"

**FILRD:**
5 January 1944

FROM: Opnav  
TO: Alusna, London  

Personal and Number 435, from the President to the Former Naval Person.

Referring to your personal message of 5 January to Hopkins I will endeavor to have our people use the word "invasion" only in reference to crossing the German Frontier, and to use the words "enter for the liberation of Europe" in referring to operations in other European Countries than Germany.

Harry is temporarily on the sick list with flu, but I think he will be in the Naval Hospital only a few days. This epidemic is very widespread but while it is not serious it makes you feel the way an Italian soldier looks. My best to Clemmie and Sarah.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W.P. Stewart  
Date Nov 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 1310, EWT, 5 January 1944.

[Signature]

GEORGE M. ELSEY,  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
From: The Prime Minister  
To: Mr. Harry Hopkins  

Unnumbered, 5 January 1944.

I should be glad if you would put these points of nomenclature to the President when convenient.

1. Our object is "the liberation of Europe from German tyranny". We "enter" the oppressed countries rather than "invade" them. The word "invasion" must be reserved for the time when we cross the German frontier. There is no need for us to make a present to Hitler of the idea that he is the defender of a Europe which we are seeking to invade. He is a tyrant and an ogre from whom we are going to free the captive nations.

2. I raise these points because of some of the expressions used in the directives we have received from the Combined Staff. I am quite sure we shall be in agreement about this.

I am getting much stronger every day and am thinking now only of Shingle.
January 5, 1944.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Referring to your personal message of 5 January to Hopkins I will endeavor to have our people use the word "invasion" only in reference to crossing the German Frontier, and to use the words "enter for the liberation of Europe" in referring to operations in other European Countries than Germany.

Harry is temporarily on the sick list, but I think he will be in the usual hospital only a few days. This is decline in very understandable, but while it is not serious it makes one feel the way an Italian soldier looks. My best to Eleanor and Sarah.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Nov 1 1971
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Use of terms &quot;invasion&quot; and &quot;enter&quot; in speaking of cross channel operations.</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers message PM-HOPKINS, unnumbered, 5 January 1944 (copy attached.) Mr. Hopkins was ill at the Bethesda Hospital when this came. Shown to the President; draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, amended by President, sent to C2 at 1810.
From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

PERSONAL AND NUMBER 436, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your 5\(\frac{3}{8}\) of 2 January.

I made the following public announcement on 24 December:

"The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we must certainly emphasize the word "respectable" for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "Master Race"."

It is my opinion that at the present time it is best to permit our understanding of unconditional surrender to rest upon that.

If we should at the present time make any number of specific conditions for the surrender we might probably omit or leave open for discussion some other conditions that are now or that may in the future become of equal importance from our point of view.

In view of all the above I prefer to leave things as they are for the time being and we really do not know enough about opinions within Germany itself to go on any fishing expedition there at this time. I hope you and Anthony will agree.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EST, 6 January 1944.

GEORGE M. ELSLEY, Lieut., USNR
January 5, 1944.

I made the following public announcement on 24 December: quote The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most certainly emphasize the word "respectable" for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "Master Race". unquote.

It is my opinion that at the present time it is best to permit our understanding of unconditional surrender to rest upon that.

If we should at the present time make any number of specific conditions for the surrender we might probably omit or leave open for discussion some other conditions that are now or that may in the future become of equal importance from our point of view.

In view of all the above I prefer to leave things as they are for the time being, and will really do not know enough about opinion within Germany itself to go on any fishing expedition there at this time. I hope you will agree.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you get out of the files for me the message I sent to the Prime Minister about "unconditional surrender" two or three days ago?

F. D. R.

The President said and asked if P.M. had not replied — i.e., to 486 — he was told that no comment yet received from P.M.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Statement on &quot;Unconditional surrender&quot; of Germany.</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers PM 550, 2 January. (Also printed A-3, unnumbered, 3 January 44.)

Prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by President with minor changes, to PM at 1215/06Q.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

"Unconditional surrender"
8 JANUARY 1944
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and Number 437. For the Former Naval Person from
the President.

As I told you in my 422, Harriman requested information on the action
we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to
the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with
Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate
one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort begin-
nning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available.

Harriman then reminded me that Stalin's request at Teheran was a
reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October
(namely for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four sub-
marines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant ship-
ning for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran
of the Russians' getting additional ships up to one-third of those cap-
tured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being
for his information and he has not discussed the question of one-third
with Molotov.

Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our
pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his
opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the
firmness of other commitments made at Teheran.

On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff have raised numerous objections
to the transfer based on probable effects that this course would have on
pending operations. They fear a loss of Italian naval and military cooperation, and the scuttling or sabotage of valuable ships which we need for ANVIL and OVERLORD. They foresee no material benefit to the Russian war effort at this time since the warships are presently quite unsuited for Northern waters and the Black Sea is closed to merchant vessels.

The very wise provisions of the modified Cunningham Agreement give the United Nations the right to make disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. It is of importance that we shall acquire and maintain the confidence of our Ally and I feel that every practicable effort should be made to arrive at a solution whereby the Italian ships requested by the Soviets be turned over to them beginning about February first.

Do you believe it wise to present to U.J. the possible effect on OVERLORD--ANVIL as expressed by our Staffs, and suggest a delay in assigning Italian ships to him until after the launching of OVERLORD--ANVIL.

I am particularly desirous of having an expression of your opinion in view of the present British command of the Mediterranean theater and in order that we may reach a complete agreement as to the action to be taken. It is patently impracticable for either of us to act singly in this matter, but I think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told U.J.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1140, EWT, 8 January 1944.

L. MATHEWSON, Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Date

DECEPT

- 2 -
January 3, 1944.

As I told you in my 422, Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort beginning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available.

Harriman then reminded me that Stalin's request at Teheran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October (namely for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of the Russians getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information and he has not discussed the question of one-third with Molotov.

Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Teheran.

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DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date  NOV 1 1971
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Think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told you.

Pavone

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.P. Stuart
Date NOV 1 1971
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**ACTION**
Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy and Lt. Elsby. Approved by the President. Sent to OR at 1140/08Q.

(See also HARRIMAN-POTUS 301823 Dec 1943 and POTUS-HARRIMAN 08 January 1944.)

Answered by PM in lieu #543. Further answered in PM #545, 16 January 1944.

**COPIES TO:**
**DATE:**
**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**
"Italian shipping."

**FILED:**
0659
From: Opmav
To: Alusna, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person. Personal and

Subject. Number 438.

If no answer to my No. 438 relative submarine situation can be
transmitted in time to be received here by 1600 E.W.T. Sunday, 9
January, recommend twenty-four hours delay in agreed time of release.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stuart
Date Nov 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1720, E.W.T, 8 January 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U.S.N.
The President

TO
The Prime Minister

SERIAL
436

DATE/TIME

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT
December Submarine Warfare statement.

ACTION
Admiral Brown, on morning of 8 January, obtained President’s permission to send dispatch to PM if no reply to the President’s #433 were received by evening.

Captain Wood, after telephone conversation with Elmer Davis, prepared message which was sent to Navy Department at 1720, EWT, 8 January 1944 as POTUS 438.
From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

From the President for the Former Naval Person. Personal and
Number 439.
Your 542.
I concur in your paragraph one which we shall issue 24 hours
after the original release time. The Canadians are being informed
of the change.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1135, EWT, 10 January 1944.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 439 DATE 10 January 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 101609 NCR 612

TOR MAP ROOM -- VIA --

SUBJECT December monthly statement on submarine warfare.

ACTION

Answers PM #642, 9 Jan 44. (See also POTUS #433 and 438).

Prepared by Lt. Elsey. OWI and Navy Department notified by Memorandum.

(See "OOO.7 (5) - Monthly submarine warfare statement.")

COPIES TO: "OOO.7 (5) Sec 1"

DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

"Sub-statement"
From: Oprav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND NUMBER 440 FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Replying to your message to Harry unnumbered of 11 January, I have no intention whatever of withdrawing support from Giraud. He is a fine old fellow and represents certain decencies which I still like. Harry is still in the hospital with influenza but is improving.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1355, EST, 12 January 1944.

George M. Elsey
Lieutenant, U.S.N.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date: Nov 1, 1977
From: The Prime Minister  
To: Mr. Harry Hopkins  

Unnumbered, 11 January 1944.

1. There is a certain amount of talk at the present time against Giraud and Eisenhower had a parting reconciliation with DeGaulle. No one would propose to use Giraud as a commander for great operations, but I feel that his being discarded now would alter in an adverse way the balances which we have tried to establish. Giraud at any rate, is as the President has always said, an honest French Gentleman and Soldier, and there could be no danger of his stabbing us in the back, which is always something. Therefore I hope you will let me know if any abandonment of him is in contemplation.

2. DeGaulle is coming to see me here on the 12th and I shall do my utmost to make him realize the disservice he does to France by his known hostility to our two countries, by whose arms alone France can be liberated and restored. From various quarters I have derived the impression that DeGaulle is much more involved in the collective strength of the committee and the assembly and that he may well become more reasonable. Certainly desire to make the best of him for the common cause, and I will report to the President the upshot of my talks but "I should like to know" about where he stands before we find ourselves shut up alone with him through the disappearance of Giraud, on whom many military loyalties are centered.

3. I do hope you are better from your flu. I am gathering strength every day. Kindest regards.
Replying to your message to Harry unnumbered of 11 January I have no intention whatever of withdrawing support from Giraud. He is a fine old fellow and represents certain forces which I still like. Harry is still in the hospital with influenza but is improving.
Prio to Prime #440

Replying to your message, to Harry on number 11 January I have no intention whatever of withdrawing support from Giraud. Harry is still in the hospital with influenza but is improving.
FROM The President
TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 440
DATE 12 January 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Giraud--De Gaulle relations.

ACTION Answers message from PM to Hopkins, unnumbered, 11 January 1944 (copy attached.). Mr. Hopkins was ill at the Bethesda Hospital when this came. President saw; reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, amended by President, sent to CN at 1406/12.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

0668
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 441, personal and confidential from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 536. It is my understanding that in Teheran U.J. was given a promise that OVERLORD be launched during May and supported by strongest practicable ANVIL at about the same time and that he agreed to plan for simultaneous Russian attack on Eastern front.

I do not believe that we should make any decision now to defer the operations, certainly not until the responsible commanders (Eisenhower and Wilson) have had full opportunity to explore all possibilities and make factual reports. In the meantime no communication should be sent to U.J. on this subject.

I think the psychology of bringing this thing up at this time would be very bad in view of the fact that it is only a little over a month since the three of us agreed on the statement in Teheran.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1135, EWT, 14 January 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By

Date NOV 1 1971

14/630 NCR 1446
Your 536. It is my understanding that in Teheran U.J. was given a promise that OVERLORD be launched during May and supported by strongest practicable ANVIL at about the same time and that he agreed to plan for simultaneous Russian attack on Eastern front.

I do not believe that we should make any decision now to defer the operations, certainly not until the responsible commanders (Eisenhower and Wilson) have had full opportunity to explore all possibilities and make factual reports. In the meantime no communication should be sent to U.J. on this subject.

I think the psychology of laying this thing up at this time would be very bad in view of the fact that it is only a little over a month since the thing was agreed on in the statement in Teheran.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
by W.J. Boyce
Date NOV 1 1971
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>14 Jan 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAT/TIME</td>
<td>141630 NCR 446</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Admiral–Leahy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Scope and timing of OVERLORD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

Answers PM–POTUS #636, 7 Jan 44.

Leahy prepared draft answer; approved by President 14 Jan 44.

Answered by PM in file # 546.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

Overlord
14 January 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND NUMBER 442 FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Office of Strategic Services reports to me, through their intelligence channels, the following:

1. That Von Papen learned air bases in Turkey would be ready by February fifteenth for receiving twenty United Nations air squadrons and that in the event these squadrons go there, two programs called "Accolade" and "Anvil" would be put into effect and Allied submarines would be permitted to enter the Black Sea.

2. That German agents secure British reports on Turkish-British relations.

3. That on December ninth, Marshal Graziani urged Hitler to hold Cassino at any cost and that the time had come to try to throw us back to the Sangro by a very large counter-attack along the Adriatic. He claimed the Eighth Army is short of reserves.

This information comes from a good but not sure source. I am merely passing it on to you for what it is worth.

ROOSEVELT
January 14, 1944.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

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1. That Von Papen learned air bases in Turkey would be ready by February fifteenth for receiving twenty United Nations air squadrons and that in the event these squadrons go there, two programs called "Accolade" and "Anvil" would be put into effect and Allied submarines would be permitted to enter the Black Sea.

2. That German agents secure British reports on Turkish-British relations.

3. That on December ninth, Marshal Graziani urged Hitler to hold Cassino at any cost and that the time had come to try to throw us back to the Sangro by a very large counter-attack along the Adriatic. He claimed the Eighth Army is short of reserves.

This information comes from a good but not sure source. I am merely passing it on to you for what it is worth.

ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN

Will you please show this memorandum from the Office of Strategic Services, together with copy of my message to the P.M., to Marshall?

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note: Colonel Matthews, please have carried out and also show to Admiral Leahy.
The following Office of Strategic Services classified document is closed:

G. Edward Buston to Roosevelt, 1/10/44 attached to Roosevelt to Churchill, 1/21/44
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>14 January 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>141658 NCR 1447</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Admiral Brown</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
<td>SUBJET</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Service intelligence reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**
President prepared message to PM from memorandum sent to him by O.S.S.

Answered by PM in his #548.

**COPIES TO:**
General Marshall

**DATE:**
14 Jan 44

**BY DIRECTION OF:**
The President

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
17 January 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. PERSONAL AND
NUMBER 443.

On December 31, 1943 Salazar in an interview with the U. S.
Minister in Lisbon agreed to the use of Lagens Field, Terceira by
an American V.L.R. Squadron of Navy planes under British operational
control.

In a subsequent interview with the U. S. Minister on January
12, Salazar stated that upon reflection he cannot grant permission
for the Navy Squadron to operate from Lagens.

If you agree it is my desire to send the Squadron at an
early date as planned disregarding Salazar's change of mind, the
Squadron to operate under British operational control as already
approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In view of the fact that plans for the departure of our
Squadron of planes are complete do let me hear from you.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1125, EWT, 17 January 1944

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1, 1971]
On December 31, 1943 Salazar in an interview with the U. S. Minister in Lisbon agreed to the use of Lagens Field, Terceira by an American V.L.R. Squadron of Navy planes under British operational control.

In a subsequent interview with the U. S. Minister on January 12, Salazar stated that upon reflection he can not grant permission for the Navy Squadron to operate from Lagens.

If you agree it is my desire to send the Squadron at an early date as planned disregarding Salazar's change of mind, the Squadron to operate under British operational control as already approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In view of the fact that plans for the departure of our Squadron of planes are complete an early reply to this message is requested.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U. S.
By [Signature]
Date [NOV 1 1971]
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

#445 DATE 17 January 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM -- VIA --

SUBJECT Air squadrons to Azores.

ACTION Message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President; sent to the PM at 1126, 17 Jan.

Tentatively answered by PM in his #647, Para 2.

Answered by PM in his #649, 19 Jan 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
19 January 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

NUMBER 444. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Replying to your No. 545 I propose the following message to Uncle Joe:

QUOTE: With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance.

Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be
undertaken.

We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages.

The British battleship, Royal Sovereign, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with Radar for all types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser available at approximately the same time.

His Majesty's Government and the United States are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions.

These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet and would fly the Soviet flag until without prejudice to military operations the Italian vessels can be made available.

His Majesty's Government and the United States will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can be obtained without prejudice to projected essential operations OVERLORD – ANVIL.

An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships 3 destroyers and 4 submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U.S. ships.
This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if our efforts should take a favorable turn with Turks and the Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal.

UNQUOTE.

It is my opinion that the Italian Government and the Italian Navy might not seriously object to joining with us in providing the Soviet with ships "needed" in the war effort.

If we cannot get this contribution by Italy to the common effort an alternative is suggested as follows:

The British Navy furnish 8 destroyer escorts from the U. S. production which vessels are now in Halifax or Bermuda waiting for crews.

I do not know where we can get any submarines except from Italy, or possibly from the French Committee of Liberation.

It would seem that even a beginning of the delivery of ships to Russia in the near future as suggested above would meet the Soviet request for early action on their Teheran understanding of this problem.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 19 January 1944

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date Nov 1 1971
Replying to your No. 545 I propose the following message to Uncle Joe:

QUOTE: With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance.

Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which
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These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet and would fly the Soviet flag until without prejudice to military operations the Italian vessels can be made available.

His Majesty's Government and the United States will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can be obtained without prejudice to projected essential operations.
OVERLORD - ANVIL.

An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships 8 destroyers and 4 submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U. S. ships.

This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if our efforts should take a favorable turn with Turks and the Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal. UNQUOTE.

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[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.H. Stewart
Date: NOV 1 1971
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>19 January 1944</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Transfer of Italian ships to Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Answers PM #646, which was referred to Admiral Leahy by President for preparation of reply. Reply approved by President, sent to PM 19 Jan 44. Answered by PM's 550.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTION COMPLETED:  
FILED:
19 January 1944

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna, London

Personal and Number 445, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 545. If you are in agreement with my 444 it is suggested that "our immediately following telegram" referred to therein be as follows:

QUOTE. Our Combined Chiefs of Staff have made the following positive recommendation with supporting data:

(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

(b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, would interfere with assistance now being given by Italian repair facilities, it might cause the scuttling of Italian war ships and result in loss of Italian cooperation thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL.

(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels may proceed. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1210, EWT, 19 January 1944.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date 1-1977
January 18, 1944

President to Prime

Your 545. If you are in agreement with my \( \frac{4}{4} \) it is suggested that "our immediately following telegram" referred therein \( \frac{545}{545} \) be as follows:

QUOTE: Our Combined Chiefs of Staff have made the following positive recommendation with supporting data:

(a) The Present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

(b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, would interfere with assistance now being given by Italian repair facilities, it might cause the scuttling of Italian war ships and result in loss of Italian cooperation thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL.

(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels may proceed. UNQUOTE.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 445 DATE 19 January 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Russia

ACTION Answers PM #545 which was referred to Admiral Leahy by President for preparation of reply. Reply approved by President, sent to BM 19 Jan 44.

Answered by PM’s 550.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

[Signature]
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London.

NUMBER 446 PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am so glad to learn from your number 547 of your safe
return home and that you have benefited by your stay at Flower
Villa. Harry is also making steady progress so that I think
we may hope that all of us will be over our various complaints
in the near future.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1200, EWT, 19 January 1944

L. MATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
PRESIDENT TO PRIME

I am so glad to learn from your number 547 of your safe return home and that you have benefited by your stay at Flower Villa. Harry is also making steady progress so that I think we may hope that all of us will be over our various complaints in the near future.

[Signature]

19 January 1944
19 January 1944

UNNUMBERED

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

AS A POSSIBLE CLUE TO ORIGIN PRAVDA STORY REFER TO YOUR MAGIC
OF DECEMBER 23 LAST JAA NUMBER 1342 PART ONE OF A TWO PART MESSAGE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1815, EWT, 19 January 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

SECRET
- 1 -
For former Naval Person from the President as a possible clue to origin. Refer to your Magic of Dec. 23, last, A number 1342 Part 1 of a two part message.

Roosevelt
PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 447. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 550. I agree to your suggestion that the following paragraph in my 444 be omitted from your message to U.J.

QUOTE: An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U.S. ships. UNQUOTE.

Please let me know when your message is sent and ask your Ambassador to inform Harriman.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1100, ENT, 22 January 1944.

L. MATHEWSON, Colonel, General Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
FROM ADMIRAL TO THE PRESIDENT:

REFERRING TO PRIME'S 550, THE FOLLOWING REPLY IS SUGGESTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME. YOUR 550. I AGREE TO YOUR SUGGESTION THAT THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IN MY 444 BE OMITTED FROM YOUR MESSAGE TO U.S. QUOTE AN EFFORT WILL BE MADE AT ONCE TO MAKE AVAILABLE FROM THE SURRENDERED ITALIAN WAR SHIPS EIGHT DESTROYERS AND FOUR SUBMARINES TO BE TAKEN OVER BY THE SOVIET AS SOON AS THEY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE UNDER CONDITIONS STATED ABOVE FOR THE BRITISH AND U.S. SHIPS, UNQUOTE.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN YOUR MESSAGE IS SENT AND ASK YOUR AMBASSADOR TO INFORM HARRIMAN, UNQUOTE MESSAGE.

MAP ROOM NOTE: NUMBER 550 WAS SENT OVER TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND WE THINK HE HAD READ IT. IF NOT, OR IF HE IS NOT CLEAR ON IT, WE WILL SEND IT UP ON REQUEST.

NOSIG.

1400Z JAN 22/44
LEAHY TO PRESIDENT:

Referring to Prime# No. 550, the following reply is suggested for your consideration:

PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

Your 550. I agree to your suggestion that the following paragraph in my 444 be omitted from your message to U.J.

QUOTE: An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U.S. ships. UNQUOTE.

Please let me know when your message is sent and ask your Ambassador to inform Harriman.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date
NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 447 DATE 22 Jan 44

DATE/TIME 221628 NCR 2741

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM -- VIA --

SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet

ACTION Answers PM #550.

Above message drafted by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President at Hyde Park at 22/1400Z as WHITE 1; approved by President at 22/1443Z in his BLACK 1; sent to PM at 22/1500Z (221628 NCR 2741).

Answered by PM #551.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

"460 ITALY (2) Sec 1"

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

John Studebaker

0698
PRIORITY

22 January 1944

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna, London

Number 448, personal and

for the Former Naval Person from the President.

Replying to your 549, it appears preferable to delay sending our V.L.R. squadron to Lagens Field pending further efforts to obtain Salazar's agreement for the American squadron to use the field under British operational control.

I hope you can succeed in influencing Salazar to permit your air command in the Azores to utilize in its anti-submarine campaign an American squadron under British operational control.

ROOSEVELT

 Released from the White House Map Room at 1530, EWT, 22 Jan 1944.

[Signature]
OGDEN S. COLLINS, Lieutenant (jg), USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM LEAHY TO THE PRESIDENT:

REFFERING TO PRIME'S NO. 549 IN WHICH HE SUGGESTS THAT THE AMERICAN BOMBING SQUADRON PREPARED FOR SERVICE IN AZORES SHOULD OPERATE AS A BRITISH UNIT WITH BRITISH MARKINGS, ETC., I HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSAL WITH KING WHO SAYS HE PREFERENCES TO USE THE SQUADRON ELSEWHERE THAN FROM THE AZORES RATHER THAN MASQUERADING AS A BRITISH SQUADRON, THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRIME IS SUGGESTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

"PRESIDENT TO PRIME: REPLYING TO YOUR 549 IT APPEARS PREFERABLE TO DELAY SENDING OUR VLR SQUADRON TO LAGENS FIELD PENDING FURTHER EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SALAZAR'S AGREEMENT FOR THE AMERICAN SQUADRON TO USE THE FIELD UNDER BRITISH OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

I HOPE YOU CAN SUCCEED IN INFLUENCING SALAZAR TO PERMIT YOUR AIR COMMAND IN THE AZORES TO UTILIZE IN IT'S ANTI-SUBMARINE
Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

-2-

CAMPAIGN AN AMERICAN SQUADRON UNDER BRITISH OPERATIONAL CONTROL."
NO SIG

221640Z

[Signature]

0701
**The President**

**TO**

**The Prime Minister**

**SERIAL**

448

**DATE**

22 Jan 44

**ACTION**

Answers PM #649, 19 Jan 44, copy of which was given to Admiral Leahy to prepare reply.

Draft reply sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 4, 22/1640Z, for his approval; BLACK 2, 221920Z, gave President's approval; sent to CR at 22/1950Z.

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

Paraphrased copy sent to Allen King by Allen King, 1/12/44

**Filed:**

0702
24 January 1944

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusma, London

Number 449, **secret and personal, for the Former Naval Person from the President.**

Your S52. I am glad to say that the Argentine picture has changed since receipt of your telegram of January 23. This morning our Ambassador in Buenos Aires telephoned urgently that the Argentine Government gave its solemn word of honor that it would break relations with Germany before Saturday noon of this week. At long last the Argentine Government apparently has suddenly discovered that the German Embassy is carrying on espionage and subversive activities in flagrant violation of assurances made to the Argentine Government.

The contemplated Argentine action is convincing proof that what I have been saying all along is correct, namely, that Argentina is a base of operations for activities dangerous both to our common war effort and to the peace of the Americas. I think it is clear that the Argentines got word of what was up and are taking this action in an endeavor to stave off moral and possible economic sanctions against her. Although it is of real military advantage to have the German Embassy out of the way, Argentina will have to do much more in the way of house cleaning of undesirable elements and of compliance.
with her inter-American commitments to convince me of the sincerity of her conversation. Now is the time for us to press forward and insist that Argentina put an end to the encouragement of sinister activities that menace the conduct of the war and internal peace within several of the American republics.

If you and I should refuse to deal energetically with the situation, the subversive forces in Argentina and elsewhere would construe this as a backward step and would be greatly heartened. This would prejudice our joint war effort. In addition, it would tend to destroy inter-American solidarity and place the lower part of the continent in the power of elements unfriendly to us. Our friends there would lose faith in us.

Argentina’s present willingness to break with Germany shows that we here had correctly diagnosed the situation and that Argentina would not have fought back in the way you feared against the action which we earlier contemplated. We believe that that action together with any assistance which you may be willing to render should not be abandoned but merely held in abeyance pending developments.

For the present, we are merely issuing a statement to the effect that we are not recognising the Bolivian Revolutionary Junta. A similar statement from you would be useful.

ROOSEVELT
Mr. Richardson notified that attached message BR 9 to send to Map Room for transmission. This for Admiral Brown's files.
(In reply to the Prime Minister's message to the President #682)

TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

January 24, 1944.

I am glad to say that the Argentina picture has changed since receipt of your telegram of January twenty-third. This morning our Ambassador in Buenos Aires telephoned urgently that the Argentine Government gave its solemn word of honor that it would break relations with Germany before Saturday noon of this week. At long last the Argentine Government apparently has suddenly discovered that the German Embassy is carrying on espionage and subversive activities in flagrant violation of assurances made to the Argentine Government.

The contemplated Argentine action is convincing proof that what I have been saying all along is correct, namely, that Argentina is a base of operations for activities dangerous, both to our common war effort and to the peace of the Americas.

I think it is clear that the Argentines got word of what was up and are taking this action in an endeavor to stave off moral and possible economic sanctions against her. Although it is of real military advantage to have the German Embassy out of the way, Argentina will have to do much more in the way of housecleaning of undesirable elements and of compliance with her inter-American commitments to convince me of the sincerity of her conversion. Now is the time for us to press forward and insist that Argentina put an end to the encouragement of sinister activities that menace the conduct of the war and internal peace within several of the American Republics.
If you and I should refuse to deal energetically with the situation, the subversive forces in Argentina and elsewhere would construe this as a backward step and would be greatly heartened. This would prejudice our joint war effort. In addition it would tend to destroy inter-American solidarity and place the lower part of the Continent in the power of elements unfriendly to us. Our friends there would lose faith in us.

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For the present, we are merely issuing a statement to the effect that we are not recognizing the Bolivian revolutionary Junta. A similar statement from you would be useful.

ROOSEVELT
URGENT
Map Room
The White House

January 24, 1944

The following message has been approved by President Roosevelt to be sent to Prime Minister Winston Churchill:

"...I am glad to say that the Argentine picture has changed since receipt of your telegram of January 23. (52)"

This morning our Ambassador in Buenos Aires telephoned urgently that the Argentine Government gave its solemn word of honor that it would break relations with Germany before Saturday noon of this week. At long last the Argentine Government apparently has suddenly discovered that the German Embassy is carrying on espionage and subversive activities in flagrant violation of assurances made to the Argentine Government.

The contemplated Argentine action is convincing proof that what I have been saying all along is correct, namely, that Argentina is a base of operations for activities dangerous both to our common war effort and to the peace of the Americas. I think it is clear that..."
the Argentines got word of what was up and are taking this action in an endeavor to stave off moral and possible economic sanctions against her. Although it is of real military advantage to have the German Embassy out of the way, Argentina will have to do much more in the way of house cleaning of undesirable elements and of compliance with her inter-American commitments to convince me of the sincerity of her conversion. Now is the time for us to press forward and insist that Argentina put an end to the encouragement of sinister activities that menace the conduct of the war and internal peace within several of the American republics.

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which you may be willing to render should not be abandoned but merely held in abeyance pending developments.

For the present, we are merely issuing a statement to the effect that we are not recognizing the Bolivian Revolutionary Junta. A similar statement from you would be useful. END QUOTE.

S:CH

C. H.
FROM | The President
---|---
TO | The Prime Minister

SERIAL | 449
DATE/TIME | 24 January 1944
OR FILE NUMBER | 
TOR MAP ROOM | --
VIA | 
SUBJECT | Argentine situation.

ACTION

Answers PM #652, 23 Jan 44, copy of which was sent to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Hughes of State Department sent to the Map Room the draft of reply, saying that it had been OK'd by the President by phone conversation between Miss Tully and himself (Mr. Hughes). Sent to CR at 2055, EWT.

Answered by PM's #655, 25 Jan 44.

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

FILED:  

Argentina
FROM: OPMNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 450, AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARA 6, NO. 545, NO. 553, AND 555.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Howard
Date NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 1240, EWT, 25 January 1944.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
**FROM** The President  
**TO** The Prime Minister  
**SERIAL** 450  
**DATE/TIME**  
**OR FILE NUMBER** 26/1722 NCR 3209  
**FOR MAP ROOM** --  
**VIA** --  
**SUBJECT** Acknowledgment of PM’s Para 6, #645 (Italian situation); #653 (Retention of Badoglio and King); and #665 (Argentine situation).  
**ACTION** Answers Para 6, #645 (This was a "magic" message, and was not transmitted by usual channels.); #653, and #665.  

Admiral Leahy, in WHITE 19, 26/1646Z, suggested that the above PM messages be acknowledged without comment. The President approved in his BLACK 8, 26/1646Z. Sent to CR at 1840Z.

Question concerning Para 6 PM #645 arose in unnumbered message from London, 25 Jan 44. For explanation, see memorandum attached to this message.

**COPIES TO:** 
**DATE:** 
**BY DIRECTION OF:** 

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**ACTION COMPLETED:** Argentine situation  
**FILED:**

0713
SECRET

PRIORITY

27 January 1944

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London.

NUMBER 451. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Replying to your 556, I am highly pleased with Anthony's statement about Bolivia. I am delighted to have your and his support.

Now that Argentina has broken relations with Germany and Japan, I trust we can both press forward with the Argentine Government to bring about full cooperation by Argentina in the suppression of activities inimical to the cause of the United Nations.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1430, EMT, 27 January 1944

GEORGE W. ELSEY
Lieutenant, USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J.F. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971

0714
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ADM. LEAHY:

IN REPLY TO BLACK NUMBER SIX THE FOLLOWING IS IN REPLY.

FOLLOWING REPLY TO PRIME'S 556, (WHITE 22) IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, STATE DEPARTMENT APPROVES AND SUGGESTS THE SECOND PARAGRAPH PRESIDENT TO PRIME REPLYING TO YOUR 556 I AM HIGHLY PLEASED WITH ANTHONY'S STATEMENT ABOUT BOLIVIA.

HELPFUL SUPPORT, IN THIS MATTER IS APPRECIATED.

NOW THAT ARGENTINA HAS BROKEN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND JAPAN,

I WRITE AGAIN THAT WE PRESS FORWARD WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO BRING ABOUT FULL COOPERATION BY ARGENTINA IN THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO THE CAUSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

NOSIO.

2714502.
27 January 1944

WHITE 26 IN REPLY TO BLACK 6

LEAHY TO PRESIDENT:

The following reply to Prime's 556 (WHITE 22) is submitted for your consideration. State Department approves and suggests the second paragraph:

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #451

REPLYING TO YOUR 556, I am highly pleased with Anthony's statement about Bolivia. Your helpful support in this matter is appreciated.

Now that Argentina has broken relations with Germany and Japan, I trust we can both press forward with the Argentine Government to bring about full cooperation by Argentina in the suppression of activities inimical to the cause of the United Nations.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: Nov 7 1971

SECRET

- 1 -
DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The President has directed that the attached message be referred to you for preparation of a reply in coordination with the Secretary of State.

L. Mathewson,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Inc.
PM-POTUS #656

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date

NOV 1 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

January 26, 1944.

It is suggested that a reply along the following lines be made to the Prime Minister's message to the President with regard to Anthony Eden's declaration in the House of Commons on Bolivia:

"I thought that Eden's statement on Bolivia was excellent. I am most grateful to you for your cooperation. Now that Argentina has broken relations with Germany and Japan, I urge again that we press forward with the Argentine Government to bring about full cooperation by Argentina in the suppression of activities inimical to the cause of the United Nations."

For your information I attach hereto a cable from our Embassy at London transmitting the text of Mr. Eden's statement.

Laurence Duggan
Secretary of State,
Washington.

666, 25th

Following is the text of the statement made by Mr.
Eden in the House of Commons this morning in reply to
a question concerning Bolivia:

"On December 20, 1943 the Bolivian Government, under
General Penerenda, which had declared war on Germany and
signed the United Nations declarations some months
previously, was overthrown by force, and replaced by a
revolutionary Junta. Information which is available
to us indicates that this development was connected with
activities of subversive groups hostile to the cause of
the United Nations, which are at work in the Western
Hemisphere. His Majesty's Government have been in the
closest consultation on this subject with the United
States Government. His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom do not recognize the Junta as the legal
government of
government of Bolivia. His Majesty's Minister designated to La Paz will not therefore now proceed to take up his post.

The Governments of the United States, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela have all declared officially that they do not recognize the revolutionary Junta at La Paz.

A member asked if British Government would take not only diplomatic action, but same economic action as United States towards Bolivia. Mr. Eden replied: "If you will look at the answer, you will see we are in step with the United States Government". Asked by another member if there was Fascist infiltration through the German Embassy in Spain, and whether he would "find out what was being done not merely in Bolivia but in other parts, including Uruguay and Brazil", Mr. Eden said: "There are no German Embassies in Uruguay or Brazil, but there is a German Embassy in South America. I hope one day we shall see that go. When that happens I think the position will improve". Answering an inquiry as to whether the Falangists were active in all South American countries, Foreign Secretary said he believed these activities were being organized in the main by German agents.

VINANT

BB
The President

TO

The Prime Minister

SERIAL

481

DATE

27 Jan 44

DATE/TIME

271843 NCR 3578

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT

Argentine and Bolivian situation.

ACTION

Answers PM #666, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 22, 261415Z. President, in his BLACK 6, 261640Z, directed message be referred to Admiral Leahy and Sec of State for preparation of reply.

Draft reply prepared by Adm Leahy; sent to the President as WHITE 26, 271460Z; approved by President with minor changes in BLACK 7, 271649Z; sent to PM at 271843Z.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 554. Harry is improving slowly following a severe attack of influenza. This however was complicated by a recurrence of his old digestive disturbance. I hope he will be on deck again in a month's time, but it is a slow job.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1735, EWT, 29 January 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
TO THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL BROWN:

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, NUMBER 554. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR MORE NEWS OF HARRY. ADMIRAL MCINTIRE SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING REPLY. "HARRY IS IMPROVING SLOWLY FOLLOWING A SEVERE ATTACK OF INFLUENZA. THIS WAS COMPLICATED BY A RECURRENT OF HIS OLD DIGESTIVE DISTURBANCE. HE SHOULD BE READY FOR FULL ACTIVITY IN A MONTH'S TIME, BUT IT IS A LONG JOB."

NOSIG.

Your 554.
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>29 Jan 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Hopkins' illness</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers PM 554, which was sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 18, 25/1548Z, together with suggested reply prepared by Admiral McIntire.

Approved by President upon his return to Washington, 29 Jan 44, with minor changes, and sent to PM at 292135Z.

Answered by PM in his #559
29 January 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 453. PERSONAL ANS FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I should be very much interested in hearing about your talk with General DeGaulle at Marrakech.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1735, EWT, 29 January 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date
      Nov 1 1974
FROM ADMIRAL BROWN TO THE PRESIDENT:

MR. HOPKINS HAS SUGGESTED THAT YOU MIGHT WISH TO SEND THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

QUOTE I SHOULD BE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN HEARING ABOUT YOUR TALK WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE AT MARRAKECH UNQUOTE.

NOSIG.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Conversations between Churchill and De Gaulle at Marrakech.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Message given to Lt. Elsey by Mr. Hopkins for transmission to the President at Hyde Park for his approval. Suggested memo to PM sent to Hyde Park as WHITE 24, 26/2144Z. President approved upon his return to Washington, 29 Jan 44. Sent to the PM at 292136Z.</td>
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Answered by PRO # 557.

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Handwritten note: "Hand Hall Committee"
29 January 1944

FROM: Opnav
TO: Aluana, London

NUMBER 454, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL TO Aluana, London

OPERATIONS OF THE AIR TRANSPORT LINE FROM INDIA INTO CHINA AND OPERATIONS IN BURMA HAVE, FROM THE OUTSET, BEEN EMBARRASSED BY A LACK OF VIGOROUS MANAGEMENT OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION. EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT FOR IMPROVEMENT HAVE PRODUCED DISAPPOINTING RESULTS WHICH ARE NOW DIRECTLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE SUPPORT OF U.S. AIR FORCES IN CHINA AT A CRITICAL MOMENT. UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, STEPS LEADING TO MILITARY CONTROL HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS EXCEPT FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF AMERICAN RAILWAY BATTALIONS ON BENGAL-ASSAM RAILROAD. THESE TROOPS ARE NOW PROGRESSIVELY TAKING OVER PORTIONS OF THAT LINE. THIS, HOWEVER, HAS NOT PREVENTED A BREAKDOWN ELSEWHERE ON THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION WHICH HAS PUT THREE OF OUR CHINA AIR FERRY FIELDS IN ASSAM OUT OF ACTION BECAUSE OF LACK OF AVIATION GASOLINE. CONGESTION BEGINS IN CALCUTTA ITSELF WHERE MANY VESSELS ARE SERIOUSLY DELAYED THROUGH LACK OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATING CONTROL OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PORT AND ON THE BARGE LINES LEADING THEREFROM.

I FEEL THAT ONLY YOUR PERSONAL INTERVENTION WILL SECURE THE PROMPT ADOPTION OF THOSE FORCEFUL MEASURES WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS IN HANDLING THE PORT OF CALCUTTA, RAILWAY AND BARGE LINES LEADING FROM THAT PORT INTO ASSAM. I URGE THAT ALL OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, FROM CALCUTTA INCLUSIVE, INTO ASSAM BE PLACED AT ONCE UNDER FULL MILITARY CONTROL.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date

0728
control and that officers of outstanding competence who will tolerate neither failure nor delay be assigned to this work. The United States stands ready to assist in furnishing expert personnel should you desire this. I am sure that Mountbatten would agree that the situation is serious.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1815, EWT, 29 January 1944.

OODEN KNIPFIL
Captain, C.E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J.L. Glant
Date NOV 1 1971
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

29 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Failure of Calcutta-Assam Line of Communications.

The situation on the Calcutta-Assam Line of Communications feeding our bases in Northeast India is precarious. Civil administration directs and controls all transportation in India. The Indian authorities have failed to operate the means at their disposal efficiently; the Port of Calcutta is tied up, the broad gauge railroad connecting Bengal with Assam has been interrupted, the barge lines most inexpertly handled.

At this time three of our Air Transport Command fields in Assam are without gas, hump operations have been discontinued from those fields. Levels of supply are at a dangerously low level at all bases in Assam.

Military control of Calcutta-Assam Lines of Communications is the only solution to this problem. Both British and U.S. military in India have been pressing for this to no avail. The problem has also been presented to Marshal Dill.

It is therefore my recommendation that you take this matter up with the Prime Minister. A proposed message is attached.

Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of ORDER SEC

ARMY BY TAG PER 720214
By

Date APR 10 1972
Operations of the Air Transport line from India into China and operations in Burma have, from the outset, been embarrassed by a lack of vigorous management of the lines of communication. Efforts on the part of the civilian management for improvement have produced disappointing results which are now directly and adversely affecting the support of U.S. air forces in China at a critical moment. Up to the present time, steps leading to military control have been fruitless except for the acceptance of American railway battalions on Bengal-Assam Railroad. These troops are now progressively taking over portions of that line. This, however, has not prevented a breakdown elsewhere on the lines of communication which has put three of our China Air ferry fields in Assam out of action because of lack of aviation gasoline. Congestion begins in Calcutta itself where many vessels are seriously delayed through lack of effective coordinating control over the activities of the port and on the barge lines leading therefrom.

I feel that only your personal intervention will secure the prompt adoption of those forceful measures which are essential to success in handling the port of Calcutta, railway and barge lines leading from that port into Assam. I urge that all of the lines of communication, from Calcutta inclusive, into Assam be placed at once under full military control and that officers of outstanding competence who will tolerate neither failure nor delay be assigned to this work. The United States stands ready to assist in furnishing expert personnel should you desire this. I am sure that Washington means not that the situation is serious.
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<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Operations of Air Transport line from India into China.</td>
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**ACTION**

Message drafted by Chiefs of Staff's office, approved by the President; sent to PM as #454, 292218Z.

(Answered tentatively by PM 561)

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:** China