1 January 1944

From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number 529  Filed: 01/17522

Colonel Warden to President personal

and [redacted] number 529 your 430.

1. I am so sorry about your influenza. I earnestly hope you will defer to McIntyre's advice and show that attitude of submission to the Medical Faculty which you have so sedulously enjoined on me.

2. Flower Villa is perfect. The doctors want me to stay here for the next 3 weeks. The weather is bright though cool. The cook is a marvel. We go for picnics to the mountains. Last night Eisenhower was with us on his way to you, and I had long talks with him. Montgomery is here now on his way to England. I think we have a fine team, and they certainly mean to pull together.
3. I have not yet been able to arrange the contest in the tower. The Red is in better training than the Black.

4. Accept all my best wishes for a new year which will not only be marked by triumph but will open wider doors to our future work together.

Clemmie and Sarah also send their salutations.

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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
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<tr>
<td>THE PRIME MINISTER</td>
<td>THE PRESIDENT</td>
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<td>1 Jan 1944</td>
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<th>DATE/TIME ON FILE NUMBER</th>
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<td>01/17522</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<th>TOR MAP ROOM</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>011900Z</td>
<td>President's influenza; comments on Flower Villa; wishes for a Happy New Year.</td>
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<th>ACTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>To President via usher, 011905Z.</td>
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(Answered by last sentence, last paragraph, Potus # 435.)

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From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 530, 2nd January 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Hull tells Eden that you have no recollection of any remarks by UJ about unconditional surrender. I certainly heard, with great interest, him saying something to the effect that he thought it might be well to consider telling the Germans at some stage what unconditional surrender would involve, or perhaps what it would not involve. After that we began talking about the 50,000 and your compromise and my high saluting, and I finished up by no means certain that the Germans would be reassured if they were told what he had in mind.

Find also Anthony telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 30 as follows:

"Last night (November 29th) Marshal Stalin spoke to the President about unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin said he considered this bad tactics vis-a-vis Germany and his suggestion was that we should together
work out terms and let them be made known generally to the people of Germany.

Perhaps this may give you a cue to what Anthony and I had in our memories and you may feel inclined to join with us in asking UJ whether he would care to develop his theme to us. If however you prefer we can of course leave things where they are for the time being.

No Sig

Regd. 03/13/72

Dato MAY 6 1972

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972
ACTION

To the President via the Ushers.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, amendments made by President and answer sent as POTUS #530.436.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No. 531,Filed 04/2209Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and No. 531.

1. I wish to announce Air Marshal Slessor who you know as Eaker's deputy in the Mediterranean Air and in command of all the RAF as I am moving Sholto Douglas from the Mediterranean to the British Coastal Command to replace Slessor. I hope you will not mind my putting on record the fact that after having made the most careful and searching enquiries in every direction I am absolutely convinced that there is no foundation for the suggestions which have been made that this most capable officer has shown lack of goodwill and loyalty towards The United States or its officers. General Marshall has only to ask Brereton and Eaker and he will find how strongly this view is confirmed by them.

No Sig

FILE COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0739
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<th>FROM</th>
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<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>4 January 1944</td>
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<td>04/2209Z</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Command changes and announcement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>To President via usher.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Answered by POTUS #434, 5 Jan 1944.</td>
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From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 532, 5th January 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Original date agreed for handing over of command in the Mediterranean was 10th. It is now suggested it should be 18th. Considering that we are in the birth throes of a very serious battle, I trust you will agree that Churchill Wilson should take over with full powers from the date he returns to Algiers, namely January 8th. Pray let me know whether you agree. I am very anxious about the present situation.

No Sig
FROM | Prime Minister | TO | The President
---|---|---|
SERIAL | 532 | DATE | 5 January 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER | 05/1205Z | VIA | Army Code Room
TOP MAP ROOM | 05/1205Z | VIA | Army Code Room
SUBJECT | Command changes and announcement.

ACTION
To President via usher.

Answered by POTUS #434, 5 Jan 1944.

COPIES TO: | DATE: | BY DIRECTION OF:
---|---|---

ACTION COMPLETED: | FILED:
---|---
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 533

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Your A35.

Para 1. Am grieved that Harry has got the flu. He stood up
wonderfully to SEXTANT. I am most grateful to you for all you have
done for my comfort and safety here. Cleennie and Sarah are enjoying
themselves greatly and send their warmest greetings. The weather is
lovely, both bracing and bright. We set out every day to the foot
of the Atlas and have a picnic in olive groves by some mountain stream.
You would enjoy it very much.

Para 2. The L.S.T. position here is very difficult to under-
stand and at general desire I am holding a conference on the 8th at
which Maitland Wilson, Bedell Smith, Devers, Alexander and representatives
of the Fifth Army and Admiral John Cunningham and Tedder will attend.
I do not doubt things can be straightened out in a satisfactory manner.
I will report to you direct.

Para 3. Benes has been here and is very hopeful about the
Russian situation. He may be most useful in trying to make the Poles
see reason and in reconciling them to the Russians, whose confidence
he has long possessed. He brought a new map with pencil marks by U.J.

FILE COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R.H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0743
showing the eastern frontier from Königsberg to the Curzon line
giving the Poles Lomza and Bialystok regions in the north but not
Lemberg at the southern end. For their western frontier he offers
the line of the Oder including the major part of Oppeln. This gives
the Poles a fine place to live in more than 300 miles square and
with 250 miles of seacoast on the Baltic. As soon as I get home I
shall go all out with the Polish government to close with this or
something like it and having closed they must proclaim themselves
as ready to accept the duty of guarding the bulwark of the Oder against
further German aggression upon Russia and also they must back the
settlement to the limit. This will be their duty to the powers of
Europe who will twice have rescued them. If I can get this tidied up
early in February a visit from them to you would clinch matters.

Para 4. The Russians are quite agreeable to Benes having his
old Pre-Munich frontier back with a slight military adjustment along
the northern crests of the mountains and a little territory to the
eastward linking them with Russia.

No Sig
FROM: The Prime Minister

TO: The President

SERIAL: 533

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: O621552

TOR MAP ROOM: 2130 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: (1) LST position in Mediterranean  
(2) recent visit with FM in which Polish-Russian borders were discussed.

ACTION: To the President via Ushers. Acknowledgment of POTUS #435.

President desires to take no action.

(For further dispatches on LST and SHINGLE operation, see PM-POTUS #639, #40, and #41.)
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 534
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Thank you so much for the delightful copy of your manuscript
addresses which was delivered to me on New Year's day and which I
deeply value.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY
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<th>THE PRESIDENT</th>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Center</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>his</td>
<td>Thanking President for copy of manuscript addresses.</td>
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**ACTION**

To the President via ushers.

*No action.*

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 535

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Your 434. Thank you very much.

No Sig

Rec'd 06/03/72
To Premier website

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>2130, EWT</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Center</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Acknowledgement of President's Message.</td>
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**ACTION**

To the President via Ushers. Acknowledges POTUS #434 – (Selection of Sessor for Bakkers Deputy, General Wilson taking command upon his arrival in Algiers).

**No action**

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

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0749
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 536 Filed: 07/0927 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Bedell, Smith and Devers came through here morning
of 5th. Bedell told me that he and Montgomery are con-
vinced that it is better to put in a much heavier and
broader OVERLORD than to expand ANVIL above our pre-
Teheran conception and that he is putting this to Eisen-
hower and your Chiefs of Staff. I have always expected
that when the Commanders took the matter into their hands
they would make alterations in the plans which nevertheless
have proved invaluable as a basis for future decisions.
As you know I have always hoped that the initial assault
at OVERLORD could be with heavier forces than we have
hitherto mentioned.

It also seems to me from what I heard very probable
that the Y Moon (see my immediately following) will be at

REGRADED UNGLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date 6-1972

0750
the earliest practicable date. I do not see why we should resist this if the Commanders feel they have a better chance then. At Teheran, however, C.O.S. recommendation was YI or one day earlier which you and I agreed to express more agreeably as "during May". In conversation with U.J. we never mentioned such a date as May 5th or May 8th but always spoke to him around 20th. Neither did we at any time dwell upon the exact phase of the operation which should fall on any particular day. If now the Y date is accepted as final I do not feel that we shall in any way have broken faith with him. The operation will anyhow begin in May with feints and softening bombardments and I do not think U.J. is the kind of man to be unreasonable over 48 hours.

On the other hand, the ground will be drier for U.J.'s great operations by Y. We shall make a much heavier attack and with much better chances of success. I am making you suggestions through Leathers for running another Arctic convoy for which we can provide the escorts if you can provide the ships and cargoes, we have practically finished our quotas.

I do not think it necessary to make any communication to U.J. at the present time but in a few weeks after Eisenhower has presented his final conclusions to us we should do doubt tell him all the story in all its strength.
including any modification of ANVIL with the authority of the responsible Commanders behind our statement.

I will report to you further about the whole situation after our conference on the 8th.

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<th>The President</th>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>7 January 1944</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>070927Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>0803</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Conference with Bedell Smith and Devers on 8th re OVERLORD</td>
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**ACTION**

To President via Usher.

Leahy prepared draft reply; approved by President 14 Jan 44. Sent to PM as #441.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
7 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 537

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and Private. Number 537.
Reference FROZEN 1121. Y date is June 24.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1977

 секрет

Reid 071310 Z
071370 9 *Prepared under
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL 537

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 7/nf

FOR MAP ROOM 0910 Z VIA Army Code Center

SUBJECT Reference to PM 536.

ACTION

To the President via Ushers.

President desires to take no action.

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ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

"Annull."
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

Number 538

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

Unless I hear to contrary from you I propose that we issue following statement synchronized from Monday's papers.

Begins: General Sir Harry Maitland-Wilson assumed his duties as Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief, in the Mediterranean Theatre as from 8th January. General Devers, United States Army, assumed the duties of Deputy Supreme Commander. Lt General Gammell is appointed Chief of Staff in the Mediterranean. Major General Bedell Smith, United States Army will become Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower in the United Kingdom.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Goyt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY

0756
9 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

The President directs the following statement be released by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations to the Press for publication Monday morning, January tenth. British newspapers have been authorized to make this release on the same day.

"General Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson assumed his duties as Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theatre as from 8th January. General Devers, United States Army, assumed the duties of Deputy Supreme Commander. Lieutenant General Gammell is appointed Chief of Staff in the Mediterranean. Major General Bedell Smith, United States Army, will become Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower in the United Kingdom."

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C.E.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
From: The Prime Minister  
To: The President  

Serial: 538  
Date: 08 January 1944  

Date/Time: 082245Z  
OR File Number:  

TOR Map Room: 09/00400  
VIA: Army Code Room  

Subject: Issuance of statement of command changes--Maitland-Wilson assumed command on 8 Jan, etc.  

Action:  
To Pres via usher 09/00500.  
President approved. Memo sent to Sec, General Staff, directing announcement be made by War Dept Bureau of Pub Relations.  

See also unnumbered message from PM's office to President's office, stating announcement will be released at 0030, Jan 10th.  
(Filed with #658)  

[Signature]  

[Note: Important to PM, see P0005's 441, 14 Jan 44.]  

Copies To:  
Date:  
By Direction Of:  

Action Completed:  
Filed:
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Unnumbered
Prime Minister's Office to President's Office.
Personal and
Reference Prime Minister's telegram number 538.
Statement is accordingly being issued for release at
0030 BST Monday January 10th.

7:30 PM EUT / 9th

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date  MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 539

Prime Minister to President personal and:

Para 1. As you will see from my immediately following a unanimous agreement for action as proposed was reached by the responsible officers of both countries and of all services as a result of our two conferences. Everyone is in good heart and the resources seem sufficient. Every aspect was thrashed out in full detail by sub-committees in the interval between the two conferences.

Para 2. You will see that all plans are related to the X date and if as I think increasingly probable the Y date prevails there is a lot of rope to veer and haul on.

No Sig.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Conference on SHINGLE operation; D-day.</td>
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**ACTION**

To President via usher 09/0060Z. (See also PM's 533, 540, and 541).

President desires to take no action.

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**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 540

Prime Minister to President personal and confidential

Following is telegram referred to in my immediately preceding.

Begins: From Prime Minister to General Ismay for Chiefs of Staff committee, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence committee.

Para 1. Meetings on SHINGLE were held here 7th and 8th January under my chairmanship attended by Lord Beaverbrook, General Wilson, Admiral John Cunningham, General Alexander, General Devers, General Bedell Smith and Brigadier General Timberlake and others.

Para 2. It was decided unanimously to proceed with SHINGLE on D day, weather permitting (see my immediately following telegram).

Para 3. Intention is to land a corps of two divisions for the assault and to follow up with AA mobile striking force based on the elements of a third division to cut enemy's communications.

Para 4. It should be possible to do this barring accident without conflicting with requirements of OVERLORD

FILE COPY

MAY 6 1972

0762
or ANVIL on SEXTANT scale and X date, and still have
sufficiency of landing craft to maintain the force up
till the end of February weather permitting and God being
with us.

Para 5. General Wilson, who today assumes duty as
Supreme Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean, has issued
instructions to give effect to the above to subordinate
commanders. He is also informing Combined Chiefs of Staff.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

[Handwritten note]

To MAC via usher 09/04/72

[Handwritten note]

0763
The Prime Minister  | The President
---|---
**SERIAL** | 540  
**DATE/TIME** | 082300Z  
**DATE** | 08 January 1944  
**OR FILE NUMBER** |  
**TOR MAP ROOM** | 09/0040Z  
**VIA** | Army Code Room  
**SUBJECT** | Conference on SHINGLE operation; D-day.

**ACTION**

To President via usher at 09/0050Z. (See also PM's 533, 559, 541)  
President desires to take no action.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
**FILED:**
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President personal and
My immediately preceding. D day is 22nd January.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
FROM
The Prime Minister

TO
The President

SERIAL
541

DATE
08 January 1944

OR FILE NUMBER
082306Z

TOR MAP ROOM
090040Z

VIA
Army Code Room

SUBJECT
D-Day for SHINGLE operation.

ACTION
To President via usher 09/0050Z. (See also PM's 533, 539, 540)

President desires to take no action.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

"Shingle"
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 542 Filed: 09/16/45
Prime Minister to President personal and number 542. U-Boat statement. Your number 438.

1. Admiralty propose an alternative for all paragraph 1 which on the whole I prefer as follows. Begins.

Total merchant shipping tonnage lost by U-Boat action in December was again low despite an extension of operating areas. Fewer U-Boats were destroyed during the month by our air and sea forces owing to several factors including increased caution by enemy. Our supply routes were, however, well secured against U-Boat attack. End.

We much like saying so plain that a change in U-Boat tactics has been successful from their point of view. (As received. This sentence is being checked and any correction will follow). I think, also, we are entitled to remember that our supply routes were "well secured". Paragraph 2 is excellent.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY

0767
From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 542

2. Pray settle it as you think best and to save time, will you kindly inform the Canadians? We agree to 24 hours delay in time of release.

No Sig

Rcd 09/1835E

To: Under with copy of President's # 433
C: (original statement) attached 09/1860E
1960E - Natjul CFFK wind.
1965E - Informed OWI and heavy pub. Pol. div. delay

REGRARED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 2:28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

SECRET
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
No number
Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret.
Correction to message number 542 today's date: for "We much like saying so plain" read "We do not much like saying so plainly".
No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-89-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0769
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President.

SERIAL 542 DATE 09 January 1944

DATE/TIME 09/1845Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 09/1835Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT December monthly submarine warfare statement.

ACTION Answers POTUS 433 and 438.

To President by usher, 09/1850Z. Navy and ONI notified of delay in issuance of statement.

President approved. Answer sent to PM as POTUS #542.

Captain Lovette and Elmer Davis notified by memorandum.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
9 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 543 091705Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Number 543. Your 437.
I entirely agree with you that we must not
break faith with Stalin about the ships. I have been
for a week in correspondence with Anthony on subject
and hope to submit a proposal to you for a joint
communication from you and me in a day or two.

No Sig

Rec'd 09/1835Z
To usha - 09/1850Z.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

SECRET

0771
FROM The Prime Minister

TO The President

SERIAL 543

DATE 09 January 1944

DATE/TIME 09/1706Z

OR FILE NUMBER

TO OR MAP ROOM 09/1686Z

VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Transfer of ITALIAN ships to SOVIET UNION.

ACTION Answers POTUS #437.

To usher for President at 09/1660Z.

President desires to take no action.

COPIES TO: "450 ITALY (2) Sec. 1"

DATE: ____

BY DIRECTION OF: ____

ACTION COMPLETED: ____

FILLED: ____
10 January 1944

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No Number Filed: 10/1625Z
Time of origin 1720 hours 10th January '44.
Prime Minister's Office to President's Office.
Personal and U-Boat statement. May we assume alternative proposal in paragraph one of telegram number 542 is acceptable?

No Sig

Red - 10/1120Z

No action or reply. Crossed Presidents # 439 which agreed to change in Para 1 of monthly sub statement.
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States

Number 544

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

Para 1. I have sent following letter to Tito by
our mission who are parachuting in in next few days. I
send you this for your personal information only. Begins
Africa, 8th January 1944.

Sir,

I thank you very much for your kind message
about my health from yourself and the heroic patriot and
Partisan Army of Yugoslavia. From Major Deakin, who is a
friend of mine, I learnt all about your valiant efforts.
It is my most earnest desire to give you all aid in human
power by sea supplies, by air support and by commandos help-
ing you in the islands fighting. Brigadier Maclean is also
a friend of mine and a colleague in the House of Commons.
With him at your headquarters will soon be serving my son,
Major Randolph Churchill, who is also a member of Parliament.

One supreme object stands before us: namely, to
cleanse the soil of Europe from the filthy Nazi Fascist

REDUCED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0774
taint. You may be sure that we British have no desire to
dictate the future government of Yugoslavia. At the same
time we hope that all will pull together as much as possible
for the defeat of the common foe, and afterwards settle the
form of government in accordance with the will of the people.

I am resolved that the British government will
give no further military support to Mihailovic and will only
give help to you, and we should be glad if the Royal Yu-
goslavian Government would dismiss him from their councils.

King Peter The Second however escaped as a boy from the
treachery of the Regent, Prince Paul, and came
to us as the representative of Yugoslavia and as a young
prince in distress. It would not be chivalrous or honorable
for Great Britain to cast him aside. Nor can we ask him to
cut all his existing contacts with his country. I hope
therefore that you will understand we shall in any case re-
main in official relations with him while at the same time
giving you all possible military support. I hope also that
there may be an end to politics on either side, for these
only help the Germans.

You may be sure I shall work in the closest
contact with my friends Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date  MAY 6 1972

0775
and I earnestly hope that the military mission which the Soviet Government are sending to your headquarters will work in similar harmony with the Anglo-American mission under Brigadier Maclean. Please correspond with me through Brigadier Maclean and let me know anything you think I can do to help, for I will certainly try my best. Looking forward to the end of your sufferings and to the liberation of all Europe from tyranny. Believe me, Yours faithfully,

Winston S. Churchill
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN:

I do not think this calls for
any answer?

F.D.R.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 644 DATE 10 January 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 10/2216Z

TOR MAP ROOM 11/0046Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT PM's letter to Tito.

ACTION To President via usher.

(For message on Tito's congratulations to PM, see PM #638.)

No action.

(Further mentioned in PM's #647, Para 5.)

COPY TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

#545

Admiral Leahy now
working on answer.
Hold off until
reply despatched.

FDR
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 545  
F iled 1611202  
Prime Minister to President. Personal and  
No. 545.

I. Further to my reply to your 437. Would you please see the memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff to us both about transference of Italian ships to Russia. My recollection is clear that nothing was said at Teheran about "one third" but that promise was made to meet the Russian claim put forward at Moscow to have transferred to them one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping.

On the other hand, the main difficulties raised by C.O.S. are solid and I think very likely that once Stalin is convinced of our intentions and our good faith he will leave us to handle the matter in smoothest and swiftest way possible.

I suggest, therefore, that we now signal him jointly to the following effect.

1. With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet
Government at the Moscow conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance.

2. Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be undertaken.
II. We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages.

1. The British battleship, Royal Sovereign, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with Radar for all types of armament. Great Britain has also a cruiser available. His Majesty's Government are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over during February at British ports by Soviet crews, and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions. These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet Government and would fly the Soviet Flag until, without prejudice to the military operation the necessary transfer of Italian vessels could be arranged.

III. This alternative has advantage that Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much
earlier date than if they had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if even it should take a favourable turn with Turks and the Straits become open, these vessels would be ready to operate if desired in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal.

IV. The above message the line of which I venture to suggest to you would be of course incomplete without a statement of what the United States will do. If, for instance, you could find the cruiser instead of our having to do so, we should be relieved. We cannot do anything about eight destroyers but perhaps you may be able to supply this need. Otherwise we must say we have absolutely not got them until after OVERLORD and ANVIL. As to the forty thousand tons of merchant shipping I should think that with your great supply and vastly improved sinkings you might supply these but we should be willing to share fifty-fifty.

V. I hope, my dear friend, you will consider all these possibilities and let me know how you feel. In my opinion, Stalin will be moved in a favourable manner by this handsome proposal. At any rate, it shows our faith and our goodwill. I doubt whether having this alternative
before him he will press for the premature raising of Italian problem but we shall have done the right thing.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL #545 DATE 16 January 1944

DATE/TIME 161120Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 16/1436Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet Union.

ACTION Further answers POTUS #437, 8 Jan 44. (First answered in FM's #645.)

TPVU 16/1446Z. Referred to Admiral Leahy by President for preparation of reply, 18 Jan 44. Reply approved by President, 19 Jan 44; sent to FM as POTUS #444 and 445, 19 Jan 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF:

"450 ITALY (2). Sec. 1"

ACTION COMPLETED: 

FILED:

Italy ships
From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States
Number: 546, Filed 16/2057Z

Prime Minister to President. Number 546. Personal and
Your number 441. I am very glad to see that we
are in complete agreement.

No Sig

Reid - 16/2155Z
TPUU - 16/2230 - with copy of President's #441

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>#546</td>
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<td>16/21552</td>
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<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Date of OVERLORD and ANVIL.</td>
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ACTION

Replies to POTUS #441.

Sent to the President by usher, 16/2230Z.

President does not desire to answer.

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ACTION COMPLETED: OVERLORD

FILED:
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 547

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and confidential

I have now got home again safely and am all right except for being rather shaky on my pins. I must thank you for the delightful stay we had at Flower Villa and for the princely hospitality which you extended to me through the American Army. I was very much tempted to remain another fortnight but thought it my duty to return on account primarily of SHINGLE.

Para 2. I will see Anthony tonight about your No. 443 and will reply tomorrow. Salazar is a pedant as well as a dictator but I have no doubt in the end we shall get what we want. I am also examining the cases of the Poles, the Turks and the Argentines.

Para 3. I hope you liked my letter to Tito. Maclean and Randolph hope to jump with it tomorrow.

Para 4. We thought your message to Congress splendid.

Para 5. I hope Harry is going on well. This protracted temperature must be a strain. I am making him a signal.

No Sig

RIGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Dated May 6, 1972

FILE COPY 7/1141 Jo Pres and Col M. 10/15/52
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<th>FROM</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>#547</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>18 January 1944</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>18/2142Z</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>(1) Safe arrival in England; (2) Air squadrons to Azores; (3) Letter to Tito; (4) Congressional message; (5) Hopkins' illness.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Taken to President by Colonel Mathewson, 18/2150Z. Answered by POTUS's #446, which was dictated in the Map Room by Admiral Brown and approved by the President. In para 2, see further remarks in PM's 549.</td>
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</table>
19 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 548

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and Number 548.

Your number 442.
Thank you for drawing my attention to this matter.
I am assured that our respective intelligence
services are closely collaborating on this subject and
an investigation has been ordered.

No Sig

President 1939
17 Jan 19

Acid 19/20322

FILE COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-99-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0790
FROM: The Prime Minister
TO: The President

SERIAL: #548
DATE: 19 January 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 1919242

FGR MAP ROOM: 19/20822 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Office of Strategic Services intelligence reports.

ACTION: Answers POTUS's #442.

To President via Captain Wood, 19 Jan 43.

No answer.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

For preparation of reply
for my signature, if you think one
is necessary.

F.D.R.

PM 549
From: M. A. London  
To: The President of the United States  
Number 549,  
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and number 549.

1. We are convinced that it was a misunderstanding that Salazar agreed to the use of Lagens Field by an American V. L. R. squadron of Navy planes. Apparently the Germans making a virtue of necessity have said that they respect Salazar's age long engagements under the Anglo-Portuguese treaty but that this would not cover United States forces. At the same time Salazar is prepared to lend himself to any fiction or camouflage which would give the results we both desire.

2. At our talks in Washington in May 1943 we thought the prize was great and you will remember that I in particular was ready to use force if necessary to obtain it. I was for a long time sceptical of the Foreign Office view that Salazar could be made to meet our needs through the invocation of the old treaty. However he has
done so to a very great extent in spite of the fact that we gave no guarantee to send an army to defend Portugal at a time when things looked much more dangerous for him than they do now. All the arrangements for the ferry service are now agreed and in hand, and my impression is that the only other matter immediately outstanding is that of your Liberator squadron. Although we possess overwhelming strength it would be as you yourself felt rather inconsistent with our general attitude towards small powers to over-ride them roughly in matters of neutrality. I feel we have been spared a very difficult decision and I should not like to upset things for the sake of a single squadron.

3. I am told that there would be no difficulty if your squadron would operate as a British unit with British markings but with American crews wearing some badge to indicate that they are temporarily incorporated in the RAF on the analogy of the Eagle Squadron. Commander Huff U. S. Navy who has been advising the American Legation in Lisbon on U. S. Naval facilities in the Azores and is now returning to Washington favours this idea. In judging this please
remember that we were quite ready to put large numbers of
troops into American uniforms at the time of TORCH if that
would help. This is the course I would recommend. It
seems to give all we want in fact.

4. I would at the same time send a message to
Salazar pointing out to him the great importance of meet-
ing your wishes in every way compatible with his own secu-
rity. I should invoke the "Friends to friends" phrase in
our treaty of 1373 as a reason for his making things agree-
able to you in every way and I should emphasize the extra-
ordinary unwise of any abrupt step on his part which
would lead to a breach with the United States which would
certainly entail a change in our relations too.

No Sig

Reid 0030Z - osc
To Prev Jnl 0030Z
Copy unread 1503Z. Dellcan does not certify 111940
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL  549  DATE  19 Jan 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER  19/2155Z

FOR MAP ROOM  20/0230Z  VIA  Army Code Room

SUBJECT  Air Squadrons to Azores.

ACTION

Answers POTUS #443, 17 Jan 44.

To President via usher, 20/0220Z.

Copy to Adm Leahy 21/1940Z for preparation of reply; draft sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 4, 22/1640Z for his approval; BLACK 2 (221928Z) gave President's approval; sent to FM as #448 (22/1930Z).

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:
21 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 550

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and confidential. Number 550. Your numbers 444 and 445.

1. I deplore the inclusion in the second of the alternatives we are putting before U.S. of an offer to obtain at once eight Italian destroyers and four Italian submarines. My idea in suggesting that Royal Sovereign and a cruiser should be offered was to avoid any immediate approach to the Italians and thus escape the dangers stressed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We fear that the second alternative as formulated in your draft may give us the worst of both worlds.

2. I, therefore, hope you will agree to the omission from the message of the following passage in your draft:

"An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U.S. ships."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By H. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY

0797
Let me know if I may despatch the message as amended and the accompanying telegram on behalf of us both. The British Ambassador in Moscow has just been reminded by the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that the delivery date is February 1st.

3. The eight destroyers could not be found from British resources since all the ships in Halifax and Bermuda are now manned and we expect to man every ship completing according to programme and will assuredly need them all to meet our huge commitments for "OVERLORD" and the battle of the Atlantic.

No Sig

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
The Prime Minister  | The President
--- | ---
**SERIAL** | **DATE** 21 Jan 44
**250** | **21/17542**

**TO MAP ROOM** 21/19432 | **VIA** Army Code Room

**SUBJECT** Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet

**ACTION** To President via Miss Tully, 21/19502.

Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President at Hyde Park at 22/1400Z as WHITE 1; approved by President at 22/1442Z in his BLACK 1; sent to PM at 22/1500Z as POTUS 4447 (22/15282 SRC 2747).

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**ACTION COMPLETED:** | **FILED:**
From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States
Number 551

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
No. 551.

I thank you so much for your No. 447. I have dis-
patched joint messages tonight and Harriman is being
informed.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6, 1972

Red: 22/2300 Am
sent to Nipkow Plank
White 7, 23/01PZ

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<th>The President</th>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>23 Jan 44.</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>22/23002</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet</td>
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**ACTION**

Answer POTUS 447.

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 7, 23/1308Z.

No answer.

---

**COPIES TO:**

"650 ITALY (2) Sec 1"

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

0801
From: M. A. London
To: The President of the United States
Number 552,

Prime Minister to President personal and
No. 552.

1. We shall help all we can about the Argentine and
above all avoid any public divergence. I beg you however

to look into the formidable consequences which would follow
from our losing their meat, hides and other supplies. One
third of our meat supply comes from them. How are we to
feed ourselves plus the American Army for "OVERLORD" if
this is cut? The joint examination of the supply aspects
by the Combined Boards in Washington will show you how much
these people have us in their hands. Our Chiefs of Staff
consider that an immediate cessation of Argentine supplies
will rupture military operations on the scale planned for
this year. I cannot cut the British ration lower than it
is now. We really must look before we leap. We can always
save up and pay them back when our hands are clear. I must
enter my solemn warning of the gravity of the situation which will follow an interruption of Argentine supplies.

Even recall of Ambassadors only means that the field is left open to the Germans. These rascals have calculated very carefully and know the hold they have over us for the time being.

No Sig
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 562 from the Prime Minister be furnished for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

L. MATHEDSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Inc1-
PM 562, 25 Jan 44.
23 January 1944

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 552

Regarding the Argentine situation, we shall help all we can and above all avoid any public divergence. However, I beg you to look into the formidable consequences which would follow our losing their hides, meat and other supplies. We get from them one-third of our meat supply. If this is cut out, how are we to feed ourselves plus the American Army for OVERLORD? The joint examination by the Combined Boards in Washington of the supply aspects will show you how much these people have in their hands. An immediate cessation of Argentine supplies, our Chiefs of Staff consider, will disrupt military operations on the scale planned for this year. I cannot cut the British ration lower than it is now. Before we leap, we really must look. We can always pay them back when our hands are clear. I must inject my solemn warning of the gravity of the situation which will follow if the Argentine supplies are interrupted. To recall our Ambassadors means only that the field is left open for the Germans. These rascals know the hold they have over us for the time being and have calculated very carefully.

REGRADDED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel.: 3-28-78
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 6 1972
FROM | The Prime Minister | TO | The President
---|---|---|---
SERIAL | 552 | DATE | 23 January 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER | 23/0104Z | VIA | Army Code Room
TOR MAP ROOM | 22/2300Z | SUBJECT | Argentine situation.

**ACTION**

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 9, 23/1520Z.

President in his BLACK 3, 23/1707Z, directed that copies be furnished the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State. Paraphrased copies sent to these 3 agencies.

Mr. Hughes of State Department sent to the Map Room the draft of reply, saying that it had been OK'd by the President by phone conversation between Miss Tully and himself (Mr. Hughes.)

Answer sent to PM as #449, 23 Jan 44.

**COPIES TO:**

Jt and Com Chs of Staff | 24 Jan 44 | By Direction of: | The President (BLACK 3)
Secretary of State | 24 Jan 44 | The President (BLACK 3)

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

"President situation."

**FILLED:**
23 January 1944

From: M A London
For: The President of the United States
Number 553 Filed 231550Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Private also. Number 553.

I should like you to see the following telegram I have sent to Harold MacMillan which is of course one of our internal messages, so I send it to you quite informally.

Text begins.

"Prime Minister to Mr. Harold MacMillan. Most secret and personal.

"1. I have talked over the whole position with the Foreign Secretary and we are both agreed that we should hold on to Badoglio and the King till we can be sure of something better and more effective for our purpose. It would follow, therefore, that we should do nothing to weaken them in the interval. On the contrary, should we become masters of Rome in the near future the early return to the Capital of Badoglio and the King would be beneficial. Thereafter at leisure we can survey the scene and see what other alternatives are in sight. No doubt the Vatican would play a part in this.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FILE COPY
From: M A London
For: The President of the United States
Number 553  Filed 2315502

"2. You should be on your guard against the kind of views put forward by Massigli. President Roosevelt has misgivings about our having let the French in on this Italian business on account of the hatred prevailing between the two nations. I too was chilled by Massigli's views. Vyshinsky seems to chop and change. You are quite right to keep in close touch with him but it does not follow we have to obey everything he says."

No Sig
24 January 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copies of messages No. 552 and 553 from the Prime Minister be furnished for the information of the State Department.

L. MATHESON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides,

2 Incl-
Incl 1 - PM 552, 23 Jan 44.
Incl 2 - PM 553, 25 Jan 44.

SECRET

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copies of messages No. 552 and 553 from the Prime Minister be furnished for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

L. MATHESON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls-
Incl 1 - PM 552, 23 Jan 44.
Incl 2 - PM 553, 23 Jan 44.

ENCYCLIC

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 6 1972
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 555

23 January 1944

I have sent the following telegram to Harold MacMillan which I should like you to see. It is of course one of our internal messages so I send it to you quite informally. The text follows:

"Prime Minister to Mr. Harold MacMillan. Most secret and personal.

1. I have talked over the whole position with the Foreign Secretary and we are both agreed that we should hold on to Badoglio and the King till we can be sure of something better and more effective for our purpose. It would follow, therefore, that we should do nothing to weaken them in the interval. On the contrary, should we become masters of Rome in the near future the early return to the Capital of Badoglio and the King would be beneficial. Thereafter at leisure we can survey the scene and see what other alternatives are in sight. No doubt the Vatican would play a part in this.

2. You should be on your guard against the kind of views put forward by Massigli. Present Roosevelt has misgivings about our having let the French in on this Italian business on account of the hatred prevailing between the two nations. I too was chilled by Massigli's views. Vyshinsky seems to chop and change. You are quite right to keep in close touch with him but it does not follow we have to obey everything he says."

SECRET
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 583 DATE 23 Jan 44

DATE/TIME 23/1550Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 23/1335Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Retention of Badoglio and King in Italian government.

ACTION

Sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 11, 23/1335Z.

President in his BLACK 4 directed that copies be sent to Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State.

President acknowledged in his #450, 25 Jan 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

Joint Chiefs of Staff 24 Jan 44 The President (BLACK 4)

Secretary of State 24 Jan 44 The President (BLACK 4)

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 554
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
I should be grateful for more news of Harry.
No Sig

Read 2/4/45 2

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Sent to President, also Hyde Park as White 18, with Mr. Lentini's suggested reply.
FILE COPY

0813
MEMORANDUM - from Admiral McIntire

Subject: Mr. Harry Hopkins

Harry Hopkins is improving slowly following a severe attack of influenza. This was complicated by a digestive disturbance. He should be ready for full activity in a month's time.

R.T. MoI

For: Colonel L. Mathewson, USA
The White House, Map Room
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The President</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>24 Jan 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>24/1442Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>24/1545Z VIA Army Code Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Requests news of Hopkins' illness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Referred to Admiral McIntire for preparation of reply.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PM 554, together with McIntire's suggested reply, sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 18, 261545Z; President approved upon his return to Washington. Answer sent to PM as #482, 282138Z.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral McIntire</td>
<td>24 Jan 44</td>
<td>Col Mathewson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTION COMPLETED:  
FILED:
25 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 555   Filed 251035Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 555. Your number 449.

1. I am very glad that the Hellmuth disclosures and your pressure have produced so good an effect upon the Argentine.

2. I have asked Eden to make a statement to the House this morning backing you up about Bolivia. I hope this will be satisfactory to you.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Hellmuth Confesses
He Was a Nazi Spy
By United Press
PORT OF SPAIN, Trinidad, Jan. 30—British authorities announced today that Oscar Alberto Hellmuth, Argentine consular official arrested here recently, had confessed that he was a member of a Nazi spy ring in Argentina.

To Hyde Park as White is at 251414Z.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message number 555 from the Prime Minister, in reply to the President's message of 24 January prepared by the State Department, be furnished for the information of the Department.

L. MATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.
From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 555

Reference your 449.

I have asked Eden to make a statement to the House this morning backing you up about Bolivia. I hope this will be satisfactory to you.

I am very glad that the Hellmuth disclosures and your pressure have produced so good an effect upon the Argentine.
**FROM** The Prime Minister  
**TO** The President  

**SERIAL** 565  
**DATE** 25 January 1944  

**DATE/TIME** 25/10552  
**OR FILE NUMBER**  

**TOR MAP ROOM** 25/12052  
**VIA** Army Code Room  

**SUBJECT** Argentine situation.  

**ACTION** Answer POTUS #449.  

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 16, 25/14142. Admiral Leahy in WHITE 19 suggested that message be acknowledged without comment. President approved in his BLACK 5, 25/16242. Sent to the PM as #450.

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<th>BY DIRECTION OF</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>25 Jan 44</td>
<td>Admiral Leahy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION COMPLETED**

**FILED**
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

The President, in his #450 to the Prime Minister, acknowledged receipt of Para 6 of the PM's #454. Para 6 was a "magic" message concerning the Italian situation, and was transmitted separately from the rest of PM #645. The copy of Para 6, for some reason, was delivered to Admiral Leahy, who sent it to the President at Hyde Park via pouch.

At 2315Z last evening, the attached unnumbered message from London was received, which said that the Prime Minister's copy of #645 contained no Para 6, and requested a copy of it.

It was presumed in the Map Room that the copy of #645 held by the Prime Minister's secretary did not have Para 6, since it was not transmitted through the usual channels. It was also presumed that the secretary had not shown the message to the Prime Minister, but had immediately sent the request for a copy of Para 6.

The War Department was requested to send a message to London, asking that the President's #450 be delivered to the Prime Minister, who would understand the reference to Para 6. This was done, and at 2430Z a message was received from London stating that the message had been delivered, and that the Prime Minister understood.

L. MATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
From: London
To: President of the United States

Unnumbered, 25th January 1944

Prime Minister tonight received President's message number 450. This message from the President refers to Paragraph six of the Prime Ministers telegram number 545. The Prime Minister does not have paragraph six on his copy of telegram. Can you obtain and forward by this channel paragraph six of Prime's cable number 545? This is most urgent.

No Sig

Regarded unclassified by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File copy
26 January 1944

From: London
To: The President of the United States
Number 556 Filed: 26/1023Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Personal and secret. Number 556.
I hope you liked Anthony's answer today about Bolivia.

No Sig

Rec'd 26/1/52.

Sent to H.O. as White 22, 26/1/45
Given to AID Seabury for reply with Sec. of State per Black 6, 26/1/51.
26 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The President has directed that the attached message be referred to you for preparation of a reply in coordination with the Secretary of State.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl -
PM-POTUS #556, 26 Jan 44.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

666, 25th

Following is the text of the statement made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons this morning in reply to a question concerning Bolivia:

"On December 20, 1943, the Bolivian Government, under General Penaranda, which had declared war on Germany and signed the United Nations declarations some months previously, was overthrown by force, and replaced by a revolutionary Junta. Information which is available to us indicates that this development was connected with activities of subversive groups hostile to the cause of the United Nations, which are at work in the Western Hemisphere. His Majesty's Government have been in the closest consultation on this subject with the United States Government. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognize the Junta as the legal government of Bolivia. His Majesty's Minister designated to La Paz will not therefore now proceed to take up his post.

The Governments of the United States, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela have all declared officially that they do not recognize the revolutionary Junta at La Paz."

A member asked if British Government would take not only diplomatic action, but some economic action as United States towards Bolivia. Mr. Eden replied: "If you will look at the answer, you will see we are in step with the United States Government."

Asked by another member if there was Fascist infiltration through the German Embassy in Spain, and whether he would "find out what was being done not merely in Bolivia but in other parts, including Uruguay and Brazil", Mr. Eden said: "There are no German Embassies in Uruguay or Brazil, but there is a German Embassy in South America. I hope one day we shall see that go. When that happens I think the position will improve."

Answering an inquiry as to whether the Falangists were active in all South American countries, Foreign Secretary said he believed these activities were being organized in the main by German agents.

WINANT
ACTION

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 22, 26/1415Z, with short resume of Eden's speech.

President in his BLACK 6, 26/1640Z, directed message be referred to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply in coordination with Secretary of State.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President as WHITE 26, 27/1405Z. President made minor changes in his BLACK 7, 27/1649Z. Answer sent to PM as #451, 27 Jan 44.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 557.
28 Jan 44.
Prime Minister to President. Personal.

After much thought and talk I have sent the following signal to U J.

1. On Thursday last, accompanied by the Foreign Secretary and with the authority of the War Cabinet, I saw representatives of the Polish Government in London. I informed them that the security of the Russian frontiers against Germany was a matter of high consequence to His Majesty's Government, and that we should certainly support the Soviet Union in all measures we considered necessary to that end. I remarked that Russia had sustained two frightful invasions with immense slaughter and devastation at the hands of Germany, that Poland had had national independence and existence restored after the first world war, and that it was the policy of the Great Allies to restore Poland once again after this war. I said that although we had gone to war for the sake of Poland, we had not gone to war for any particular frontier line but for the existence of a strong, free, independent Poland, which Marshal Stalin had also declared himself supporting. Moreover, although Great Britain would have fought on in any case for years until something happened to Germany, the liberation of Poland from the German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous sacrifices and achievements of the Russian armies. Therefore Russia and her Allies had a right to ask that Poland should be guided to a large extent about the frontiers of the territory she would have.

2. I then said that I believed from what had passed at Tehran that the Soviet Government would be willing to agree to the Eastern frontiers of Poland conforming
to the Curzon line subject to discussion of ethnographical considerations, and I advised them to accept the Curzon line as a basis for discussion. I spoke of the compensations which Poland would receive in the North and in the West. In the North there would be East Prussia; but here I did not mention the point about Königsberg. In the West they would be free and aided to occupy Germany up to the line of the Oder. I told them it was their duty to accept this task and guard the frontier against German aggression towards the East in consequence of their liberation by the Allied Forces. I said that in this task they would need a friendly Russia behind them and would, I presumed, be sustained by the guarantee of the Three Great Powers against further German attack. Great Britain would be willing to give such a guarantee if it were in harmony with her Ally, Soviet Russia. I could not forecast the action of the United States, but it seemed that the Three Great Powers would stand together against all disturbers of the peace, at any rate until a long time after the war was ended. I made it clear that the Polish Government would not be committed to the acceptance of the Curzon line as a basis of examination except as part of the arrangement which gave them the fine compensations in the North and to the West which I had mentioned.

3. Finally I said that if the Russian policy was unfolded in the sense I had described, I would urge the Polish Government to settle now on that basis and His Majesty’s Government would advocate the confirmation of such a settlement by the Peace Conference or by conferences for the settlement of Europe following the destruction of Hitlerism, and would support no territorial claims from Poland which went beyond it. If the Polish ministers were satisfied that agreement could be reached upon these lines, it would be their duty at the proper time not merely to acquiesce in it but to commend it to their people with courage, even though they ran the risk of being repudiated by extremists.

4. The Polish ministers were very far from rejecting the prospects thus unfolded, but they asked for time to
consider matters with the rest of their colleagues, and as a result of this they have asked a number of questions, none of which seems to me to be in conflict with the general outline of my suggestions to them. In particular they wish to be assured that Poland would be free and independent in the new home assigned to her; that she would receive the guarantee of the Great Powers against German revenge effectively; that these Great Powers would also assist in expelling the Germans from the new territories to be assigned to Poland; and that in regions to be incorporated in Soviet Russia, such Poles as wished would be assisted to depart for their new abodes. They also inquired about what their position will be if a large part of Poland West of the Curzon line is soon occupied by the advancing Soviet armies. Will they be allowed to go back and form a more broad based government in accordance with the popular wish and allowed to function administratively in the liberated areas in the same way as other governments who have been overrun? In particular they are of course deeply concerned about relations between the Polish underground movement and the advancing Soviet forces, it being understood that their prime desire was to assist in driving out the Germans. This underground movement raises matters important to our common war effort.

5. We also attach great importance to assimilating our action in the different regions which we hope to liberate. You know the policy we are following in Italy. There we have taken you fully into our counsels, and we want to do the same in regard to France and other countries to whose liberation we look forward. We believe such uniformity of action is of great importance, now and in the future, to the cause of the United Nations.

6. The earliest possible agreement in principle on the frontiers of the new Polish State is highly desirable to allow of a satisfactory arrangement regarding these two very important points.

7. While however everyone will agree that Soviet Russia has the right to recognize or refuse recognition
to any foreign government, do you not agree that to advocate changes within a foreign government comes near to that interference with internal sovereignty to which you and I have expressed ourselves as opposed? I may mention that this view is strongly held by His Majesty's Government.

3. I now report this conversation which expresses the policy of His Majesty's Government at the present time upon this difficult question to my friend and comrade, Marshal Stalin. I earnestly hope these plans may be helpful. I had always hoped to postpone discussions of frontier questions till the end of the war when the victors would be round the table together. The dangers which have forced His Majesty's Government to depart from this principle are formidable and imminent. If, as we may justly hope, the successful advance of the Soviet armies continues and a large part of Poland is cleared of the German oppressors, a good relationship will be absolutely necessary between whatever forces can speak for Poland and the Soviet Union. The creation in Warsaw of another Polish government different from the one we have recognized up to the present, together with disturbances in Poland, would raise issues in Great Britain and the United States detrimental to that close accord between the Three Great Powers upon which the future of the world depends.

9. I wish to make it clear that this message is not intended to be any intervention or interference between the governments of the Soviet Union and Poland. It is a statement in broad outline of the position of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain in regard to matters in which they feel themselves deeply concerned.

10. I should like myself to know from you what steps you would be prepared to take to help us all to resolve this serious problem. You could certainly count on our good offices, for what they would be worth.

11. I am sending a copy of this message to the President of the United States with a request for complete secrecy.

No Sig
FROM Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 557 DATE 28 Jan 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 28/2325Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Letter to U. J. re Russian-Polish border dispute.

ACTION
Sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 33, 290020Z.

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action, 29 Jan 44.

Acknowledged without comment in POTUS-PM 459, 7 Feb 44.

(See also PM’s 566, 568, and 569)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Polish-Russian situation
30 January 1944

From: London
To: The President of the United States

Number 558  Filed 300923Z

To President Roosevelt. Personal. Number 558.
Many many happy returns of the day. Winston and Clementine Churchill.

No Sig
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>30 Jan 44.</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>30/0923Z</td>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Birthday Greetings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>To President via usher.</td>
<td></td>
<td>No answer, per Miss Kelly, 21 Feb 44.</td>
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From: Ambyssadry London
To: The President of the United States
Number 559
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Para 1. Your 452: I am sorry to hear Harry has been so ill, and shall be grateful for any further news.

Para 2. Your 453: Talk took place in Garden of Flower Villa after lunch, Max, Duff Cooper, our Consul general and two of De Gaulle's followers also being present. It consisted mainly of a prolonged complaint and lecture by me, in good manners and bad French, upon his many follies. I explained how foolish he was to create needless antagonisms with you and me and that he hindered the interests of France thereby.

Para 3. I spoke of Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, saying that we had entered into obligations towards the first two and that these must be respected by the French committee. About Flandin I said that if they were going to draw the line of impurity at Flandin they would be making so wide a schism in France that the resultant friction in any territory that might be liberated would hamper our military operations and
was therefore a matter of concern to us.

Para 4. De Gaulle in reply showed me the report of the bitter debate in his Assembly the day before printed in the local newspaper, and certainly there is no doubt that the pressure comes from there and also by messages from France. I remarked that it was an odd way to restore the greatness of France by proving how many Frenchmen had behaved badly. I then complained to him about the Lebanon, etc. How unwise it was for a nation having great colonies to act in this high-handed manner at a time when two of her principal Allies had no colonial possessions worth speaking of and could therefore afford to take a very detached view. I spoke also of my regret that General Georges, who was an old friend of mine, had been dismissed, and made it clear to him that we had confidence that General Giraud would not allow French troops to be used for our detriment but that we had not yet the same confidence in the French committee nor, by implication, in its head. He seemed upset by this. The impression I tried to create was that they would have to work their passage in order to regain from us that confidence which might be of marked advantage to them. I made no commitments of any kind.

Para 5. Duff Cooper, who began De Gaullist, formed an
unfavourable view of the General's attitude and thought that I had been very patient with him. He promised to send a record of the conversation but it has not yet arrived and I have telegraphed for it today. When it comes I will send it to you. I would have reported earlier had anything occurred of significance.

Para 6. Since then, both at Marrakesh and here in London, I have seen Monsieur Dastier De La Vigerie who is De Gaulle's Minister of the Interior. This is a remarkable man of the Scarlet Pimpernel type and fairly fresh from France, which he has revisited three or four times. He has made very strong appeals to me to drop more arms by air for their resistance movements. I hope to be able to do more in February. He says that in Haute Savoie, south of Geneva between Grenoble and the Italian frontier, he has over 20,000 men all desperate, but only one in five has any weapon. If more weapons were available, very large numbers more would take to the mountains. As you know, I am most anxious to see a Guerrilla A La Tito started up in Savoy and the Alpes Maritimes.

Para 7. I also spoke to Dastier about Boisson, Peyrouton and Flandin, and the great delay in giving effect to the promises made through Ambassador Wilson, USA, to you.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. Int., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

0835
He is a fine fellow, very fierce and bitter but one of the best Frenchmen I have struck in these bleak times. He said that De Gaulle might seem unreasonable to us but felt the humiliation of his country so deeply that he had an inferiority complex, to which I replied sententiously that to have suffered great disasters was no excuse for committing great follies.

Para 8. I was sorry in a way for De Gaulle, who is a bigger man in his own way than any around him. We were personally quite friendly. I attended his review. I am satisfied that he is being increasingly caged and tamed by the committee and the Assembly and that there is no longer any danger of a one-man show. Naturally it was to his interest to make as much of our meeting as possible, but I do not think this has done any harm and my outlook is unchanged except that I realize that a great deal of power is passing to the committee and the assemble while military personalities decline.

No Big
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL: 689  
DATE: 30 January 1944  

DATETIME: 30/1800Z  
OR FILE NUMBER:  

TOR MAP ROOM: 30/1800Z  
VIA: Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Hopkins' illness; Talk with De Gaulle at Marrakech.  

ACTION: Answers POTUS 462 and 463.  
To President via usher, 30/1948Z.  
No action or acknowledgment, per Admiral Brown, 7 Feb 44.  
(See also PM #683, 1 Feb 44)

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ACTION COMPLETED:  
FILED:
From: Amembassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 560

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and confidential.

Thank you for consulting me about the representation of France on the Control Commission for Italy (your memorandum of December 31). (Sent to PM by mail. Mrs. Brady has retained copy in confidential file).

My own feeling is that this is not a particularly important point. I am assured by MacMillan that all that is involved is the performance of Liaison work and that the French (like the Soviet) representative would have no effect on the structure or the working of the Control Commission.

After all, we both agreed to French representation on the Advisory Council for Italy on the same basis as the United States, British and Soviet representative. I myself would regard the present French request as a gnat compared with this fairly substantial camel.

It would be rather a smack in the face for the French if their candidature were now turned down, since their man sat on the Advisory Council for Italy when the recommendation was made. They have got a corps in action fighting well.

So my view is that we ought to let it go.
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL 580
DATE 30 January 1944
DATE/TIME 30/1640Z
OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM 30/1605Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT French representation on the Control Commission for Italy.

ACTION Answers Memorandum from the President to the Prime Minister, 31 December 1943. This was sent directly to the Prime Minister by pouch; no copy is available in the Map Room.

To President via usher, 30/1946Z.

Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President; sent to PM as 4488, 14 Feb 44.
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 561

Prime Minister to President personal and

Para 1. Your No. 454: I am giving this immediate
personal attention.

gasoline supply difficulties No Sig
on Burma-Irisan route

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Read 30/1565 2
To 30/1565 2
To 30/1565 2

0840
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>30 January 1944</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
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<td>30/1704Z</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>30/1805Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Operations of Air Transport line from India and China.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

Answers POTUS 454.

To President via usher, 30/1946Z.

No answer.

**COPIES TO:**  

**DATE:**  

**BY DIRECTION OF:**  

**ACTION COMPLETED:**  

China  

**FILED:**