

National Archives and Records Service
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

CHURCHILL TO ROOSEVELT
FEBRUARY 1944

~~SECRET~~

WAT

WDCC
1 Feb
0131 Z

HH

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. ~~IMMEDIATE~~ 562 Filed: 01/0020 Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~.

The following has just arrived from U.J. and as I do not know whether you have a separate copy I repeat it to you with the following comment "What can you expect from a bear but a growl?"

From Premier Stálin to Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Personal and secret.

I received on the 23rd January both your joint messages, signed by you Mr. Prime Minister, and you, Mr President, regarding the question of the handing over of Italian shipping for the use of the Soviet Union.

I must say that, after your joint affirmative reply at Tehran to the question which I raised of the handing over to the Soviet Union of Italian shipping by the end of January 1944. I considered this question settled and the thought never entered my mind of the possibility of any kind of re-

*Rec'd 01/0305Z
President had returned. held for AM
B.P.P.
TR.V.H. 11/30 Z (C)*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29,72 By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1974

File Copy

0982

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

consideration of this decision which was taken and agreed between the three of us. All the more so since, as we agreed at the time, this question was to be completely settled with the Italians. Now I see that this is not so and that nothing has ever been mentioned to the Italians on the subject.

In order however not to complicate this question, which is of such great importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is prepared to accept your proposal regarding the despatch from British Ports to the USSR of the Battleship Royal Sovereign and one cruiser, and regarding the temporary use of these vessels by the Naval High Command of the USSR until such time as the appropriate Italian shipping is made available to the Soviet Union. Similarly we shall be prepared to accept from the USA and Great Britain 20,000 tons of merchant shipping which will also be used by us until such time as a similar tonnage of Italian shipping is handed over to us. It is important that there should be no delays now regarding the matter and that all the shipping indicated should be handed over to us during the month of February.

In your reply however there is no mention of the handing over to the Soviet Union of 8 Italian destroyers and 4 submarines, to the handing over of which to the Soviet Union at the end of January you, Mr Prime Minister, and you, Mr President, agreed in Tehran. Meanwhile, for the Soviet

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt.. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

Union this very question, the question of destroyers and submarines, without which the handing over of one battleship and one cruiser has no significance, is of capital importance, You understand yourselves that a cruiser and a battleship are powerless without escorting destroyers. Since the whole of Italy's fleet is under your control, to carry out the decision which was taken at Tehran to hand over for the use of the Soviet Union 8 destroyers and 4 submarines out of that fleet should present no difficulties. I am agreeable (literally "I agree") that, instead of Italian destroyers and submarines, a similar number of American or British destroyers and submarines should be handed over to the Soviet Union for our use. Moreover, the question of the handing over of destroyers and submarines cannot be postponed, but must be settled at one and the same time with the handing over of the battleship and cruiser, as was definitely agreed between us at Tehran.

No Sig

To pus via water - 011930Z. OK

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0984

~~SECRET~~

HH

1 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

No Number Filed 010940Z

Reference unnumbered message on Feb 1st fld
Feb 010020Z POTUS secret to President Roosevelt.
Source of this msg has just given information that
msg should have PM number 562.

No Sig

*Rec'd 01/1154 Z.
Retained R.P. Correction made on original 010020Z*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72.....
By R. H. Parks Date **MAY 6 1972**

~~SECRET~~

0985

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	562	DATE	1 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	01/0020Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	01/0305Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet. Stalin's reply to PM msg (Quoted in POTUS 444 & 445, amended by PM 550.)			

ACTION (Further to POTUS #'s 444 & 445; PM #550; Potus #447, PM #551.)
 To President 01/1230Z. Referred to Leahy for action.
Answer sent to PM as #456.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Italian Shipping</i>	

0986

~~SECRET~~

WAT
WB
5
HH

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No: 563, 1st February 1944

Prime Minister to President.

I have now received Duff Cooper's account of my talks with De Gaulle and am sending it by the next air courier.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. Secy Dept. tel., 8-29-78
By R. M. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Recd 01/2230z
As saw 01/240z (K)

~~SECRET~~

0987

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	563	DATE	1 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM	01/2230Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Talk with De Gaulle at Marrakech.			

ACTION

(Further to PM #559)

To President 01/2240Z.

No acknowledgment or answer, per Admiral Brown, 7 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>French National Committee</i>	FILED:
---	--------

0988

~~SECRET~~

WHL
WHL
WHL
WHL
AH

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 564

Filed 03/1405Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~SECRET~~

I earnestly hope that the existing regime in Italy will be allowed to function at least until the great battles now being fought by the soldiers of our two countries have resulted in our capture of Rome. I am sure that a disturbance now of such authority as remains in the Italian State and the attempt to create a new authority out of political groups with no real backing will add greatly to our difficulties. Moreover these groups when formed into a government, in order to win credit from the Italian people would feel it essential to assert Italian interests in a much stronger form than the King and Badoglio dare to do. I feel it would be a great pity if Badoglio threw in his hand, and our reports show that the Italian Navy might be powerfully affected by action against the King. Much British and American blood is flowing, and I plead that military considerations should carry weight.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

Recd: 031620Z

To Pres via Waker - 031630Z. RHB

File Copy

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	564	DATE	3 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	03/1405Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	03/1620Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Retaining of existing regime in Italy until capture of Rome.		

ACTION

To President via usher, 03/1630Z.

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Secretary of State informed of this by Admiral Leahy.

Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President; sent to PM as #468, 12 Feb 44.
464, 11

(See also PM #573).

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY:	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Italy</i>	

0990

~~SECRET~~

114

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 565

February
Filed 03/1418Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~SECRET~~

Para 1. Further to my 562. We could revert to the idea of asking the King and Badoglio to hand us over 8 destroyers and 4 submarines for transfer to the Russians. This might easily cause a mutiny in the Italian Fleet at the present very dangerous time. I am told that the Italian Navy is already worried by the attacks that are made on the government they have hitherto obeyed. I should think it quite likely that Badoglio would throw in his hand rather than agree to this demand. As he is so often being told that he is to be kicked out as soon as we get to Rome, he does not seem to have much to lose. There are only 7 Italian destroyers in the whole Italian Navy and these are all being used in the heavy operations now in progress in the Mediterranean.

Para 2. In these circumstances his Majesty's Government is prepared to find 8 destroyers for loan to the Russians pending delivery of the Italian vessels. These

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1977

File Copy

0991

will of course be old destroyers, most of them, those that we got from you in 1941. They are however serviceable and will steam and fight. The Russians will not use them in the same continuous sea service as we are accustomed to maintain. They will probably lie in harbour in Northern Russian Ports. Here they will be available for training the crews which can man the Italian destroyers when these are handed over and have been fitted for Arctic work. In view of the ungracious tone of Stalin's reply and evident Soviet refusal to try to understand our position which was so patiently and considerately explained, I have little doubt that they will reproach us upon the quality of these vessels. It is however the best we can do.

Para 3. It will be more difficult for us to find 4 old submarines, and we cannot spare any of the new ones which are in constant action. We should be glad therefore if you could supply these on loan until we can get the Italian craft.

Para 4. Let me know how you feel about all this, and I will then submit to you a draft from us both to Uncle Joe.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1.
Read: 03/0702
To Pus via Laker - 03/0302. *Pub*

0992

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President.
SERIAL	565	DATE	03 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	03/1418Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	03/1620Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet.			

ACTION Further to PM #565.

To President via usher 03/1630Z. Referred to Leahy for action.

Answer sent to PM as ##456.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Italian Shipping</i>		

0993

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

W.S.P.

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 566, 5th February 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

1. I have not yet received any answer from Uncle J to my telegram about Poland which was repeated to you in my Number 557. Ambassador Kerr has however had an encouraging interview with him about the questions posed on behalf of the Poles in my telegram. Uncle J replied that of course Poland would be free and independent and he would not attempt to influence the kind of government they cared to set up after the war. If Poland wished to ask for a guarantee she would get it. She could count upon all the help she needed in expelling the Germans. All Poles would be free to move out of the regions to be assigned to Russia and he would ask for the same freedom on behalf of the Ukrainians now west of the Curzon line. The Poles need have no anxiety about their position when Poland west of the Curzon line was occupied by the Red Armies. Of course the Polish Government would be allowed to go back and to establish the broad based kind of government they had in

*Hand: 0680303 - RUB
To Pres via usku - 045507*

File Copy

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

-2-

mind. Poland was their country and they were free to return to it.

2. On the other hand Uncle J continues to press for the expulsion from the Polish Government of Soznkowski, Kot and Kukiel, and I doubt very much whether he will deal with the Poles while they remain in. I am seeing Premier Mikolajczyk tomorrow and shall point out to him the very great advantages of regaining Russian recognition and obtaining a definite settlement now with Russia which can be approved by the Allies. The greatest inducement will be the possibility of his going back to Warsaw after the advance of the Russian Armies to the westward has passed it, and being able to constitute there a Polish Government and State.

3. I will report to you again after I have heard from Uncle J and have seen Premier Mikolajczyk. Meanwhile I am more hopeful than I have yet been. I can understand that you are unable to join in any guarantee other than those general arrangements for maintaining world peace which we have to make at the end of the war.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

0995

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	566	DATE	5th Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	--		
TOR MAP ROOM	06/0630Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish situation.		

ACTION

(Further comments on PM 557)

To President via usher, 06/1330Z.

Acknowledged without comment in POTUS-PM #459, 7 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

Polish-Russian Situation

0996

~~SECRET~~

5 February, 1944

URGENT

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 567 Filed 05/2158Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~SECRET~~ Number 567.

Your 456. Although we have a perfect right I still shrink from taking the four Italian submarines as it would seem to raise the whole issue we have been trying to avoid for such a small return. I will therefore provide four of ours to bridge the gap till we can take the Italians'. They are modern vessels and we shall want them later on against Japan. For the next six months we can spare them. I will therefore send on your telegram with the following amendments: -

About the 80th word for "Discussed" say "Agreed", and about 35 words further on insert "Four submarines will also be provided temporarily by Great Britain". On receipt of your OK I will dispatch signed "Roosevelt. Churchill."

No Sig

*Ref: 000030Z - RAB
To Pres via WLN - 061330Z*

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. Secy. Dep. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1971

File Copy

0997

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	#567	DATE	5 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	05/2188Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	06/0630Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Transfer of Italian ships to Soviets.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #456.

To President via usher, 06/1330Z.

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action; Leahy prepared draft reply; approved by President, answer sent to PM as POTUS #458, 7 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Italian Shipping</i>	FILED:
--	--------

0998

~~SECRET~~

100
200

WRL

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 568, 6th February 1944

Prime Minister to President. Matter ~~_____~~,
private and ~~confidential~~.

I have received the message in my immediately following signal from Stalin. It seems to me that it is by no means devoid of hope. Premier Mikolajczyk is coming here to luncheon tomorrow and I will report to you further after my conversation with him.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

Ad: 0606302 RAB
To Pres via waker - 0613307

~~SECRET~~

File Copy

0999

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	568	DATE	6 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	--		
TOR MAP ROOM	06/0630Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish relations. Meeting with Polish Premier; forwarding in immediately following msg reply from Stalin.		

ACTION

To President via usher, 060630Z.

Acknowledged without comment in POTUS-PM #459, 7 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Polish-Russian Situation</i>		

1000

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 569

Page 2

Filed 060204Z

evaded answering our proposal about the Curzon Line and continues in its official statements to declare that the frontier imposed on us by the Riga treaty is unalterable. One can infer from your letter that the Polish Government is ready to acknowledge the Curzon Line but as is known the Poles have nowhere made a declaration about this.

It is my opinion that the Polish Government ought to make an official declaration that the line of the frontier established by the Riga treaty admits of alteration and that the Curzon Line constitutes the new frontier between the USSR and Poland. It ought to make its declaration about this as officially as did the Soviet Government when it declared that the line of the 1939 frontier admitted of change and that the Curzon Line ought to be the Soviet Polish frontier.

As regards your statement to the Poles to the effect that Poland could move its frontier considerably to the west and north we are as you know in agreement with this subject to one amendment. About that amendment I spoke to you and the President at Teheran. We claim that the north eastern portion of East Prussia including the port of

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1002

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 569 Filed 060204Z

Page 3

Koenigsberg, as an ice free port, should go to the Soviet Government. That is the only portion of German territory which we claim. Without the satisfaction of that minimum claim of the Soviet Union the concession of the Soviet Government expressed in its acknowledgement of the Curzon Line loses all meaning as I have already told you at Teheran.

Finally about the actual composition of the Polish Government. You understand that we cannot renew relations with the present Polish Government and indeed what sense could there be in renewing relations with a government when there was no certainty that we should not tomorrow again be obliged to break off these relations as a result of some fresh Fascist provocation from their side such as the "Katyn story." During the most recent period the Polish Government where Sosnkowski sets the tone has not put an end to hostile statements against the Soviet Government. The statements extremely hostile to the Soviet Government of the Polish ambassadors in Mexico and Canada and of General Anders in the Near East, the publication of Polish underground papers on German occupied territory which overstep all bounds in hostility to the USSR, the destruction at the direction of

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 569 Filed 060204Z

Page 4

the Polish Government of Polish partisans fighting against the German occupying forces and many other pro-Fascist acts of the Polish Government are well known. In this situation without the fundamental improvement in the composition of the Polish Government it is impossible to expect any amelioration. The exclusion of pro-Fascist imperialist elements and the inclusion of people of democratic turn of mind, it might be hoped would provide the necessary conditions for the renewal of good Soviet Polish relations, the settlement of the question of the Soviet Polish frontier and generally for the regeneration of Poland as a strong free and independent state. In this improvement of the composition of the Polish Government the Poles themselves above all are interested and the broad layers of the Polish people. I remember, by the way, that in May last year you wrote to me that the composition of the Polish Government could be improved and that you would busy yourself in this direction. At that time you did not think that this would be interference in the internal sovereignty of Poland.

As regards the question put by the Polish ministers mentioned in the fourth point of your letter I do not think that it would be difficult to reach agreement.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1004

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	569	DATE	6 February 1944
DATA/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	060204Z		
TCR MAP ROOM	060630Z	VIA	The Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Quotes message from Stalin on Russian-Polish relations.		

ACTION

(Further to PM 568)

To President via usher C6/1330Z.

Acknowledged without comment in POTUS-PM #459, 7 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Colin-Russell S. Trotter</i>	

1005

~~SECRET~~

WHL

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 570, 6th February 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

In the swiftly changing course of events a number of questions have arisen since the Chiefs of Staff parted at Cairo. The Turkish problem, the great battle on the Italian front including SHINGLE, ANVIL - its place and scale, the preparations for OVERLORD which are on a gigantic scale, all require direct consultation. Could you send your Chiefs of Staff over here, or at any rate General Marshall, in the next few days? This will give a far better opportunity of coming to agreement than if they continue to correspond by telegraph. I am sure the time has come for a further talk on the highest staff level. The OVERLORD Commanders-in-Chief must know where they stand and every day counts.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Rec'd 06/21/40Z

F.N.R.

*To Pres via rubber
at 06/22/42 F.N.R.*

~~SECRET~~

File Copy

1006

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	570	DATE	6 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	6th/NPT		
TOR MAP ROOM	06/2140Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Combined Chiefs of Staff conference in London.		

ACTION

To President via usher at 06/2212Z.

To Leahy for action. Answer sent to FM as POTUS #461.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Referenced</i>	

1007

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

WAC

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 571

07/WPT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
~~_____~~

The following is our proposed draft for the monthly statement on the U-boat war. We have sent a copy to MacKenzie King and have asked him to communicate with you direct.

Statement begins.

The year 1944 has opened with a very satisfactory first month for the Allies in their continued campaign against the U-boat.

In spite of the limited opportunities to attack U-boats owing to the extreme caution now exercised by them, more were destroyed in January than in December. This has been accomplished by unrelenting offensive action of our surface and air forces.

The amount of merchant ship tonnage sunk by U-boats during January 1944, is amongst the lowest monthly figures for the whole war.

The German claims should, as usual, be ignored

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

File Copy
copy

1008

~~SECRET~~

-2-

as they are invariably grossly exaggerated and issued purely for propaganda purposes. Statement ends.

Prime

Received 071915Z

*President via agher, 1315Z
FNA.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

1009

FROM	The President	TO	The Prime Minister
SERIAL	571	DATE	7 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	07/NPT		
FOR MAP ROOM	07/1315Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	January Monthly Submarine Statement.		

ACTION To President via usher, 07/1315Z.

Copies for Mr. Elmer Davis and Captain Lovette for comment.
Answer sent to PM as POTUS #460.

(See "MR 000.7 (3) Sec. 2" for complete action on January Statement.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Mr. Elmer Davis	7 Feb 44	Admiral Brown
Captain Lovette	7 Feb 44	Admiral Brown
"MR 000.7 (3) Sec. 2"	8 Feb 44	ans

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Sub Statement</i>	

1010

~~SECRET~~

H.H.
2/10

7 February, 1944

"ONE"

URGENT

URGENT

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 572 Filed 07/2315Z

Prime Minister to President personal and
 Number 572.

Many thanks for your number 458. I have dis-
patched the message to U. J.

No Sig

approving his 567 re subs to U.J.
and stating will send cruises to U.K.
upon receipt of U.J.'s acceptance
of proposal

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Recd 080100 Z - Hul
to Pres via Under - 080105 Z Hul

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

FILE COPY

1011

2

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	572	DATE	7 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	07/2315Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	08/0100Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Transfer of Italian ships to Russia.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #455.

To President via usher 08/0105Z.

Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the PM as POTUS 462.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Italian Shipping</i>	

1012

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	575	DATE	8 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	09/0110Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	09/0257Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Support of Sforza and Italian Junta.		

ACTION
To President via usher, 09/0242Z.

To Admiral Leahy for action. Secretary of State informed by
Admiral Leahy. Answer sent to PM as #464, 11 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY:	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Italian Government.</i>	FILED:
---	--------

1014

~~SECRET~~

H. H. Parks
for

09 February 1944

From: M. A. London

To: The President of the United States

Number: 574,

Filed 09/1559Z

Prime Minister to President personal and
number 574.

Your number 460. It is nearly always better to cut out adverbs, and adjectives too. The combination "Invariably grossly" is cacophonous. I have advised the Admiralty accordingly.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Rec'd 09/1655Z
Holdings for P.M.
presentation
F.H.L.

~~SECRET~~

FILE COPY

1015

FROM The Prime Minister	TO The Prime Minister
SERIAL 574	DATE 9 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 09/1559Z	
TOR MAP ROOM 09/1655Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT January Submarine Warfare Statement	

ACTION

Answers POTUS #460.

To President with evening news, 9 Feb 44.

No answer necessary.

(For complete action on January Submarine Warfare Statement, see "MR 000.7 (3) Sec 2")

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
"000.7 (3) Sec 2"			amc

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Sub Statement</i>	FILED:
---	--------

1016

~~SECRET~~

*WSP up
han*

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 575, ^{February} Filed 10/2320

Prime Minister to President. Personal.

Eden and I are agreed here that the bombing of Bulgarian targets as weather permits should not be stopped because of the peace overtures. If the medicine has done good, let them have more of it.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*Reud: 110045Z - RUB
To Pres. via usher 110050Z - RUB*

~~SECRET~~

File Copy

1017

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	575	DATE	10 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	10/2520Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	11/0045Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Bombing of Bulgarian targets.			

ACTION *Answer POTL # 3*
 To President via usher 11/0060Z. *(See further PM # 576)*
 Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to PM as #465.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Outgoing</i>		

1018

*Admiral Brown
to file*

WAL

MLR-476

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated February 11, 1944

Rec'd 3:27 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1177, February 11, 11 a.m.

[REDACTED]

TO THE SECRETARY FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Your 952 of February 8, and my 1100 of February

9.

I have just received the following message for the President from the Prime Minister:

"I send you herewith the agreed record of our conversation with the Poles last Sunday. I will shortly send you a report on our further talks with them."

The record of the conversation mentioned by the Prime Minister in his message is as follows.

[REDACTED]

Record of a meeting held at Chequers on Sunday, sixth February 1944 at 3 p.m.

Present: The Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill, C H, M P Prime Minister, in the chair.

M Micolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date

The Right

MAY 6 1972

-2- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m. from London.

The Right Honorable Anthony Eden M C M P, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

M Romer, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Lord Cherwell, F R S, Paymaster General

Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador to Great Britain.

Sir Owen O. Malley, British Ambassador to the Polish Government.

Secretariat; Mr. J R Colville.

The Prime Minister read the text of his telegram to Marshall Stalin of the 28 January (No. 227 to Moscow), in which he had said that the Polish Ministers were far from rejecting the proposals put forward, but that after considering them, they had asked a number of questions which he had agreed to pass on to Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Churchill then referred to the American attitude, which he summarized as follows: There could be no legal bond, as far as the U.S. was concerned. This certainly did not mean that American aid would be withheld, and he asked the Poles to work on the basis that the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. would cooperate for many years to come in the task of
maintaining

-3- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

maintaining world order and unity.

Mr. Eden read out extracts from Sir A. Clark Kerr's telegrams numbers 281 and 282 of the third February, in which the Ambassador described his discussion with Marshal Stalin of the Prime Minister's message of the 28 January. He pointed out that Stalin had, without hesitation, answered the five questions put by the Polish Government and contained in the Prime Minister's message. Marshal Stalin had said:

(a) That, after the war, Poland would certainly be free and independent, as much so as Czechoslovakia, and he would not try to influence either country's choice of government.

(b) That, if Poland required a guarantee from Russia, one would be given.

(c) That Poland could count upon all Russian help in expelling the Germans.

(d) That all Poles would be free to move out of the former Polish territory assigned to Russia, and the same facilities should apply to Ukrainians at present west of the Curzon line.

(e) The Polish Government would be allowed to return

1021

-4- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

return to Poland and establish a broad based government, which could function administratively in the liberated areas.

The Prime Minister said that, as regards the underground movement, Stalin maintained that the Polish Government had directed it to refuse cooperation with the Russians. If the movement opposed the Russian troops and partisans, it would be attacked; if it did not, it would receive assistance. The matter would all depend on the attitude of the Polish Government.

M Micolajczyk said he wanted to clarify the Polish Government's position. He had shown to the British Government the instructions which had originally been sent to the Polish underground movement to the effect that, if relations with Russia were re-established, the movement should come into the open in support of the Soviet troops but that otherwise its members were to remain inactive. Orders to oppose the Russian troops had never been given.

You will now allow me, said M Micolajczyk, to place before you our information. Our former instructions to the Polish underground movement were to the effect

1022

-5- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London,
effect that in case Polish-Soviet relations had not been
renewed, at the moment of the entry of Soviet troops into
Poland our underground forces should not come into the open.

In the meantime, we acquired the conviction that the re-
establishment of mutual relations was most unlikely, and in
this situation the Polish Government addressed an enquiry to
the country as to the readiness of the underground movement
to disclose its identity even in the absence of Polish-
Soviet relations and without regard to the dangers which such
a step involved.

The answer received (dated the 28th November, 1943) was
that the underground army was ready to come into the open
and to meet the requirements of the Soviet commanders.

Mr. Eden attached great importance to this information
and asked whether it could be conveyed to the Soviet Government.

M Micolajczyk expressed his agreement with this. He
further explained that the local Polish Military Commander,
accompanied by the local civilian (underground) authority,
would receive orders to meet the commander of the incoming
Soviet troops and to declare that following the instructions
of the Polish Government, to which they remained faithful, they
were ready to join in the fight against the common foe.

The Prime Minister: This is very important. I agree
with this line of action.

M Micolajczyk:

-6- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

M Micolajczyk: There is only one essential reservation. Our underground forces are determined to preserve their own organisation and they are not prepared to join Polish formations created in Russia under the auspices of the so-called Polish patriots and placed under Berling's command. On the other hand, in order to secure friendly cooperation, Polish detachments, which had in the past had any friction with local Soviet "partisans" have been ordered to move to other districts and change places with other Polish forces free from such disability.

The country is anxiously expecting to receive an ample supply of arms indispensable in view of a general rising behind the lines of the retreating German armies.

M Micolajczyk handed to the Prime Minister a copy of the telegram received from Warsaw on the 22 January in reply to M Micolajczyk's speech to the country of the sixth January. He pointed out that the country's willingness to join with the Soviet forces in their fight against Germany was clearly shown in this telegram. But as regards the political aspect it equally clearly showed the country's
determination

1024

-7- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

determination to maintain Poland's territorial integrity. The reply was drafted before the country was informed of the last conversation between the Prime Minister and M Micolajczyk on the 20 January. The Polish Government withheld its publication in order to avoid difficulties, but the British Government must see in it an indication of the country's opinion.

The Prime Minister: In that case the situation is hopeless. No agreement could be reached on such a basis and the Soviets having occupied the whole of your country will impose their will.

M Micolajczyk handed over to the Prime Minister a copy of a telegram from Poland received in London on the 27th January 1944 announcing the setting up in Warsaw by the "Polish Workers Party" (Communist) of a "National Council" in opposition to the Polish underground movement. He considered his move as clearly indicating the real intentions of the Soviet Government with regard to Poland.

The Prime Minister: Yes, this danger exists and will only increase if no agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia is reached.

M Micolajczyk

-8- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

M Micolajczyk: I am only placing before you the information I possess: For the time being, i.e., before the "Curzon Line" is crossed by Soviet troops, the Soviets have in view the setting up of a "Committee of National Liberation," composed of Polish pro-Soviet elements in the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and, if possible, also the United Kingdom.

Later, after the Curzon Line is crossed the plan foresees the creation of a "Polish Government" by the "National Council" recently formed in Poland under Moscow's auspices. This information throws a revealing light on the cryptic sentence of Molotov addressed to Ambassador Harriman that the situation had not yet matured for the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations.

Mr. Eden said that this talk about a committee would automatically cease if agreement were reached on the lines of Stalin's latest telegram.

The Prime Minister said that if matters were allowed to drift, such a committee would undoubtedly be established and the Polish Government would have no say in the matter.

M Micolajczyk: The latest changes introduced in the constitution of the U.S.S.R. finally

complete

-9- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

complete the picture.

M Micolajczyk recalled the reply given by Mr. Eden on the first February to a letter which was addressed to him on the 23rd of January by Ambassador Raczynski on instruction of the Polish Government, and also the memorandum of the first February handed to Ambassador Ciechanowski in Washington in reply to the question put by him to the American Government and pointed out that the Polish Government was not offered guarantees which would protect Poland against imminent dangers and safeguard her independence and sovereignty as well as the life and property of her inhabitants.

He had already stated that he was willing to enter into discussion on all outstanding questions including frontiers. This in itself had caused serious concern in Polish circles. The acceptance of the "Curzon Line" as a starting point of any discussion would, in fact, constitute dictated terms and would preclude any real negotiation. Such a course could only undermine the Polish Government's authority with the Polish nation and also disrupt the latter's unique solidarity.

The Prime

1027

-10- #1177, February 11, 11 a.m., from London.

The Prime Minister said the Curzon Line was the best that the Poles could expect and all that he would ask the British people to demand on their behalf.

M Micolajczyk: the Soviet Government invokes the "Curzon Line of 1919". This is confusing. The "line" of 1919 did not extend to former Austrian Galicia.

WINANT

WGC

1028

FROM	AMBASSADOR WINANT	TO	SEC STATE FOR THE PRESIDENT.
SERIAL	1177	DATE	11 Feb 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT Russian-Polish relations. Forwards msg from the PRIME MINISTER to the PRESIDENT quoting minutes of meeting with POLISH PRIME MINISTER.			

ACTION

Received through State Department.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
INDEXED TO:			
"PRESIDENT-WINANT" file.			amo
"OS2 POLISH-RUSSIAN AFFAIRS"			amo
(1)			
ACTION COMPLETED:		FILED:	

1029

~~SECRET~~

WAT
AS

12 February 1944

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 576

12/NFT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal

and ~~██████████~~

Para 1. Many thanks for your telegram number 463 of February 9th.

Para 2. It seems to me most undesirable that a Bulgarian Mission should open conversations in ^{CONSTANTINOPLE} Convtantinoich. If the Bulgarian Government really mean business, they should be told to send a fully qualified mission to meet representatives of the Three Powers at a place which will be indicated and might be Cyprus or Cairo. Cyprus is absolutely secret and nearer.

Para 3. Our bombing of Sofia appears in fact to have had exactly the effect we hoped for, in that the Bulgarians are falling over each other in their haste to make contact with us. That being so, would it not be a mistake to suspend it at the request of the firstcomer who no doubt hopes for a respite during protracted conversations.

Para 4. If you agree, therefore, I hope we may send

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

~~SECRET~~

MAY 6 1972

File Copy

1030

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

-2-

identical instructions to our representatives in Moscow
on the above lines and get Molotov's agreement to our pro-
posed line of action.

No Sig

Thomas. Naval Person

*I initially agree with your 5-76. Let
the good work go on*

Person

Received 121355Z

To Pres via courier, 121355Z

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

1031

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	576	DATE	12 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	12/NPT		
TOR MAP ROOM	12/1355Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Bulgarian peace feelers; bombing of Bulgaria.		

ACTION *Answer POTUS #463*

To President via usher 12/1355Z.

To Leahy for action. Admiral Leahy prepared answer; approved by President; sent to PM as #465, 12 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Buly ma</i>	

1032

~~SECRET~~

No action
required
File
WS

13 February 1944

From: M. A. London

To: The President of the United States

Number: 577,

Filed 13/1810Z

Number 577. Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

1. Many thanks for your number 464. I fully agree we should review the whole scene after we are settled in Rome. We have not get there yet, and Lincoln's Birthday celebrations remind me about not crossing the Fox River till you got to it.

2. The present regime is the Lawful Government of Italy with whom we have concluded an armistice in consequence of which the Italian Navy came over and with some of the Italian Army and Air Force are fighting on our side. This Italian Government is tame and completely in our hands. It will obey our directions far more than any other that we may laboriously constitute. On the other hand, it has more power over the Fleet, Army, Officials, etc than anything else which can be set up out of the worn out debris of political parties,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1974

FILE COPY

1033

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

none of whom have the slightest title by election or pre-
scription. A new Italian Government will have to make its
reputation with the Italian people by standing up to us.
They will very likely try to wriggle out of the armistice
terms. As for being instrumental in handing over without
a mutiny part of the Italian Fleet to Russia, I cannot con-
ceive that they would do so or that, if they did, their
fleet would run with the Italian Navy. I hope therefore that
when the time comes we shall consult together. I gave strong
support to the State Department over Darlan. They seem rue-
ful about that episode now. Looking back upon it I consider
it was right. Several thousand British and American
soldiers are alive today because of it and it got us Dekar
at a time when we could ill have spared the large forces
needed for its capture.

3. About Spain. We have told Ambassador Hoare that
he is to align himself with your representative. When a
large, strong, healthy elephant (no reference intended to
GOP) comes into a garden and tramples down the flower beds
some perturbation is natural among the local gardeners. As
you know, we have had our own point of view about this. Now
however, that the United States has taken such decided action,

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. P. AS Date

MAY 6 1972

1034

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Page 3

I am of opinion that we must go on and we shall give you all the help we can. It will be tiresome if Germany gives the gasoline and Spain becomes even more definitely associated with the Nazis. I hope, however, that they will be more far sighted.

4. We have had a whole week with the Poles and there is still some hope that we may get something out of them which may prove the basis of a settlement. At the present time they are making more trouble about the Curzon Line than about changes in personnel. We have furnished them with the kind of telegram we should like to send to Stalin and they have promised to give us on Tuesday next their amendments to it or their alternative version. I will send you a copy of what results the moment I get it.

5. I have had a letter from Harry. He is an indomitable spirit. I cannot help feeling very anxious about his frail body and another operation. I should always be grateful for any news about him for I rate him high among the Paladins.

6. I have just heard that his son has been killed

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-7
By R. H. Parks, Dpts.

MAY 6 1972

1035

~~SECRET~~

Page 4

in the Marshall Islands battle. As I do not know whether his state of health will have permitted him to receive this news I am sending my immediately following through you.

No Sig

~~SECRET~~

*red 131612 G
incident via Usher 13/16309*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. Ref. 8-22-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1036

14 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has directed that the attached message #577 from the Prime Minister, dated 15 February 1944, be forwarded to the State Department for information.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl -
PM-POTUS #577,
14 Feb 44.

~~SECRET~~

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1944

Ambassador Hoare has been instructed by us to align himself with your representative in Spain. When a large, strong, healthy elephant (no reference intended to GOP) comes into a garden and tramples the flower beds some perturbation among the local gardeners is natural. We have had our own view about this, as you know. Since the United States has taken such decided action, however, I am of the opinion that we must go on and we shall give you all the help we can. I hope the Spanish will be more far sighted than to associate themselves with the Nazis even more definitely in case Germany should provide the gasoline.

I want to thank you for your 464 and say that I fully agree that after we are settled in Rome the whole scene should be reviewed. Since we are not yet there, Lincoln's Birthday celebrations remind me about not crossing the Fox River until you get to it.

The current regime is the lawful government of Italy. An armistice with them was concluded in consequence of which the Italian Navy came over and is fighting on our side along with some of the Italian Army and Air Force. This government is docile, in our hands completely, and will obey our directions far more than any other that we may construct. Moreover, it has more power over the Fleet, Army, Officials, etc., than any other government which might be constituted from the debris of

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1038

~~SECRET~~

political parties, none of whom have the slightest title by prescription or election. A new Italian Government will have to make its reputation by standing up to us. They will very likely try to wriggle out of the armistice terms. Nor can I conceive that they would be instrumental in handing over without mutiny a part of the Italian fleet to Russia, nor if they did that their writ would run with the Italian Navy. Therefore, I hope that we shall consult together when the time comes. I gave the State Department strong support over Darlan. They seem rueful about that episode now, but looking back upon it I consider it was right. Because of it several thousand British and American soldiers are alive today, and we got Dakar at a time when we could ill afford the large forces needed to capture that city.

After a week with the Poles there still is some hope that something which may prove a basis of settlement may be got from them. They are making more trouble about the Curzon line than about the changes in personnel at the present time. They have promised to give us on Tuesday next their amendments to or their alternate version of a telegram which we gave them and which is the kind we would like to send to Stalin. The moment I get the results I will send you a copy.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	#677	DATE	14 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA Army Code Room	
SUBJECT Policy re Italian government; Spanish and Polish situations; Mr. Hopkins' illness.			

ACTION

To President via usher 13/1630Q.

By direction of the President, paraphrased copy sent to the State Department.

Answered by POTUS #468, 15 Feb 44.

(See further PM # 593)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Copies 1-2 - Italian Government. Copy 3 - Hopkins Copy 5 - Hopkins illness</i>	FILED:
--	--------

1040

SECRET

File
WDL

"WDL"

13 February 1944

From: M. A. London

To: The President of the United States

Number: 578,

Filed 13/1813Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal. Number
578. Following for Harry if you so decide.

Dear Harry: Please accept our most profound
sympathy with you in your honour and grief.

Winston and Clementine


Received 13/1612Q
To PRESIDENT via Usher, 13/1630Q.

COPY filed "100 Hopkins"

FILE COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1041

14 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HARRY HOPKINS.

THE FOLLOWING HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON AND CLEMENTINE QUOTE PLEASE ACCEPT OUR MOST PROFOUND
SYMPATHY WITH YOU IN YOUR HONOUR AND GRIEF UNQUOTE.

1042

~~SECRET~~

15 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 579

Filed 150940Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Number 579. Your 466.

*(French representation on
Allied Control Commission
for Italy)*

Thank you so much.

No Sig

1

*Rec'd 151200Z-05C
Held for Adm B (ak)*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

File Copy

1044

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	579	DATE	15 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	150940Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	15/1200Z	VIA	Army Code Room .
SUBJECT	French representation on Allied Control Commission for Italy.		

ACTION Acknowledges POTUS #466.
 To President by Admiral Brown.
No answer or acknowledgment.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

Indexed to:
"MR 210 Control Commission" *am.*

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Allied Control Commission</i>	

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 580

February 4⁴
Filed 15/1631Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ██████████. Your number 465.

Para 1. I would propose to telegraph as follows
to Ambassador Clark Kerr:

"Your United States colleague, who will be receiving from Washington identical instructions to those contained in this telegram, will be able to furnish you with full details of proposals made on February 6th by Bulgarian Minister to Turkey on behalf of the Regent, the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the principal opposition leaders for the initiation of discussions with the USA with a view to Bulgaria joining the United Nations.

"These proposals have been considered by the President and the Prime Minister whose views are as follows: It is undesirable that a Bulgarian mission should open conversations in Constantinople. If the Bulgarian Government really mean business it would be a mistake to rebuff them because they do not at the outset offer unconditional surrender. They should be told to send a fully qualified

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

FILE COPY
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. N. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

1040

~~SECRET~~

-2-

mission to meet United States, Soviet and British representatives at a place which will be indicated and which might be Cyprus or Cairo. Advantage of Cyprus is that it is nearer to Bulgaria and absolutely secret.

"This Bulgarian peace feeler shows that the air bombing of Sofia appears to have had exactly the effect which was hoped for. In these circumstances it would be a mistake to suspend it at the request of the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey before it is known whether the Bulgarian proposals really are serious ones and when it is probable that the Bulgarian Government hope for a respite from bombing during protracted conversations. It is therefore proposed to continue with the bombing of Bulgarian targets.

"In concert with your United States colleague, please convey views of President and Prime Minister to Molotov and seek his agreement to proposed line of action."

Para 2. On hearing from you that you consider this message suitable, I would at once despatch it.

Para 3. Meanwhile you will no doubt have informed the Jadwin mission of our decision.

No Sig

Recd. 15/830
SENT TO POTUS VIA MISS TULLY

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 8 1972

1047

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	580	DATE	15 Feb 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	15/1631Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	151850	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Bulgarian Peace Feelers.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #465,

Referred to Admiral Leahy for preparation of reply; draft approved by President; sent to PM as #469. Instructions sent to Harriman as Opnav 161841 NCR 8790 (See POTUS-HARRIMAN folder.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Bulgaria</i>	

1048

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

16 February 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 581 Filed 161003Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and [redacted]. Number 581.

Eisenhower is not yet ready to meet our Chiefs of Staff on the main "OVERLORD/ANVIL" question, but there is a point which I must bring to your notice at once.

We are distressed at the prospect of two groups of fighter aircraft having to leave the Mediterranean at this juncture for China. We think it essential that the forces for "OVERLORD" and its supporting operations should be as strong as possible and this has been the policy accepted and the priority assigned in all our discussions. By abandoning our Aegean projects, which I most loyally do for the above object, we have freed eight fighter squadrons for operations to the Central and Western Mediterranean but it is most disheartening to find that this sacrifice in no way improves our chances in Italy and "ANVIL" since more than the equivalent of eight squadrons are now being taken away for the Far East. Moreover, we are expecting to have to send home from Mediterranean for "OVERLORD" three groups which may

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

File Copy

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: London

Page 2

For: The President of the United States

Number 581

Filed 161003Z

have to stay if China gets the two. Thus "OVERLORD" would be the loser in spite of its supreme priority.

No Sig

Recd 16/1120Z
TPUU 1245Z (k)
copy given to Adm L. (k)

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Dat MAY 6 1972

1050

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

No. 581 Prime Minister to the President

February 16, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Marshall:

The attached message, No. 581, is
received from the P.M.

Can you have somebody prepare for me
a draft reply?

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

1052

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	581	DATE	16 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	16/1003Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	16/1220Z	VIA	Army Code Room.
SUBJECT	Assignment of fighter groups to China and to OVERLORD/ANVIL.		

ACTION

To the PRESIDEN via the Usher, 16/1245Z.

Admiral LEAHY referred copy to General MARSHALL, 16 Feb 44, requesting draft of reply.

By memorandum dated 18 Feb 44, the PRESIDENT requested Admiral LEAHY to prepare reply. Admiral LEAHY had already received draft reply from General MARSHALL, which was approved by the PRESIDENT, sent to the PRIME MINISTER as #471, 18 Feb 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>China</i>	

~~SECRET~~

WDL

19 February 1944

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Number 582

Filed: 19/0851Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

Personal and ~~██████████~~. Number 582.

Your telegram number 455: New Delhi Emergency Propaganda Committee.

I am prepared to agree to the discontinuance of the New Delhi Committee. But, in that case, I think its main functions should be exercised in London. That is to say, that emergencies arising in the geographical area of the Southeast Asia Command should be dealt with by an Anglo-American Committee here, leaving all emergencies arising in China or India-China to be dealt with in Washington.

Do you agree?

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

Copy of this and of President's # 455 to Adm Leahy 19/1000 Q. B.P.P.

*Rec'd 19/0750 Q
To US via Lisher
Release copy of Pres. #455
and orig. of Adm. Leahy also
sent with this message P.D.*

~~SECRET~~

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	582	DATE	19 Feb 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	19/0851Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	19/0750Q	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Discontinuance of New Delhi Committee.		

ACTION Answers POTUS #455. To President via usher.

Copy of this message, together with POTUS #455, referred to Admiral Leahy for action. By memorandum, 19 Feb 44, Admiral Leahy forwarded paraphrased copies to Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and preparation of reply not later than Monday morning, 21 Feb 1944.

President approved Admiral Leahy's draft; sent to PM as #472.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

Paragunda Committee

FILED:

1055

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

*ask
Sullivan
then file*

*File
WHL*

From: Amembassy London

20 February 44

To: The President of the United States

Number 583

Filed 20/1500Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and [REDACTED]

Para 1. I have been watching lately with increasing misgiving the official telegrams about the oil business. I am very glad you have consented to delay for a few days the publication of a purely American statement. You may be sure I should only wish to arrive at what is fair and just between our two countries. Surely this can be patiently considered between us before it is flung into public discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. A wrangle about oil would be a poor prelude for the tremendous joint enterprise and sacrifice to which we have bound ourselves.

Para 2. Lord Halifax has explained to me the difficulties of the situation on your side. We too have our difficulties which may become very formidable in Parliament. There is apprehension in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our navy depends. This sensitiveness has of course been

Rec'd 20/1740Z

File Copy

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

1056

~~SECRET~~

-2-

greatly aggravated by the Five Senators. I am sure these suspicions are entirely unfounded so far as the Government of the United States is concerned. When however it is announced that you are to open a conference upon oil in Persia and the Middle East and that the Secretary of State is to be the leader of the American Delegation the whole question will become one of first magnitude in Parliament. It will be felt that they are being hustled and may be subjected to pressure. I am sure to be asked for an assurance that the question of no transfer of property will arise and I shall be unable to give such an assurance. Moreover great expectations will certainly be aroused in the United States by a conference on oil opened under your auspices. Will there not be unceasing pressure upon you from those elements in the United States which are least friendly to us to gratify those expectations at our expense?

Para 3. International conferences at the highest level should surely be carefully prepared beforehand and I would beg you to consider whether it would not be more advisable to proceed as a first step for official and technical talks on the lines which had, I understand, already been agreed between the State Department and ourselves.

~~SECRET~~

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1057

FROM	THE PRIME MINISTER	TO	THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL	585	DATE	20 Feb 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	20/1500Z		
FOR MAP ROOM	20/1740Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Conference on oil in Persia and Middle East.		

ACTION

To President via usher, 201740Z.

Answered by POTUS-PM message, dated 22 Feb 44, sent through State Department channels to Ambassador Winant for delivery to the Prime Minister. Copy filed in PRESIDENT-PM outgoing file, under date of 22 February 1944.

PM replied in his #591.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Oil</i>	

1058

~~SECRET~~

WRT

February 20, 1944

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 584, Filed 20/2159Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

My immediately following telegram to Uncle Joe has been textually agreed with the Poles. You will see that it achieves in essentials without actually saying so the settlement outlined at Teheran. Anything you can do to commend its acceptance to the Soviet Government will be of great assistance. I hope you will feel we have laboured helpfully.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1
Rec'd 20/23402
Z.H.L.
to Pres via radio

FILE
COPY

~~SECRET~~

1059


*Adv. Bureau
to file*

*Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]*

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.


CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

February 22nd, 1944. *(JND)*



My dear Mr. President,

I have just received a telegram from the Foreign Office instructing me to make a correction in a telegram sent to you by the Prime Minister on Polish-Soviet affairs. The telegram in question is No. 584 of February 20th, in which the Prime Minister stated that his immediately following telegram to Marshal Stalin had been textually agreed with the Poles. Mr. Eden now asks me to explain that this is not strictly accurate, and that the exact position is given in a message which the Prime Minister sent to Marshal Stalin in a telegram of February 21st through/



The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
of America,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of *British*
Govt, telegram 1/13/72
By *R472* Date MAY 6 1972

through Clark Kerr. In this telegram the Ambassador is instructed to deliver to Marshal Stalin the long telegram which was sent to you by the Prime Minister as his No. 585 of February 20th, with the explanation that it "has been seen by the Polish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been written in close consultation with them and is despatched with their agreement".

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	584	DATE	20 Feb 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	20/2159Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	20/2340Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish boundary question.		

ACTION

To President via usher.

(See further PM's #585 and 587)

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Message on above subject sent to STALIN, 21 Feb 44; quoted to PM in POTUS #473. (POTUS #473 answers PM's #584, 585, and 587)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

C- "552 Polish-Russian"

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Polish-Russian situation</i>	

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

W.S.I.

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 585, 20th February 1944

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of telegram which I have sent to Marshal Stalin.

1. The Foreign Secretary and I have had numerous long discussions with the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I shall not attempt to repeat all the arguments which were used but only to give what I conceive to be the position of the Polish Government in the upshot.

2. The Polish Government are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities and with our participation to discuss with the Soviet Government as part of the general settlement a new frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union together with the future frontiers of Poland in the north and west. Since however the compensations which Poland is to receive in the north and west cannot be stated publicly or precisely at present time the Polish Government clearly cannot make an immediate public declaration of their willingness to cede territory as

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

FILE
COPY

indicated above because the publication of such an arrangement would have an entirely one-sided appearance with the consequence that they would immediately be repudiated not only by a large part of their people abroad but by the underground movement in Poland with which they are in constant contact. It is evident therefore that the Polish-Soviet territorial settlement which must be an integral part of the general territorial settlement of Europe could only formally be agreed and ratified when the victorious Powers are gathered round the table at the time of an armistice or peace.

3. For the above reasons the Polish Government until it has returned to Polish Territory and been allowed to consult the Polish People can obviously not formally abdicate its rights in any part of Poland as hitherto constituted but the vigorous prosecution of the war against Germany in collaboration with the Soviet Armies would be greatly assisted if the Russian Government will facilitate the return of the Polish Government to the territory of liberated Poland at the earliest possible moment; and in consultation with their British and American Allies as the Russian Armies advance arrange

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

-3-

from time to time with the Polish Government for the establishment of the Civil Administration of the Polish Government in given districts. This procedure would be in general accordance with those to be followed in the case of other countries as they are liberated. The Polish Government are naturally very anxious that the districts to be placed under Polish Civil Administration should include such places as Vilna and Lwow, where there are large concentrations of Poles, and that the territories to the east of the demarkation line should be administered by the Soviet Military Authorities with the assistance of representatives of the United Nations. They point out that thus they would be in the best position to enlist all such able bodied Poles in the war effort. I have informed them and they clearly understand that you will not assent to leaving Vilna and Lwow under Polish administration. I wish on the other hand to be able to assure them that the area to be placed under Polish Civil Administration will include at least all Poland west of the Curson Line.

4. At the frontier negotiations contemplated in paragraph 2 above, the Polish Government, taking into

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

1065

~~SECRET~~

consideration the mixed character of the population of eastern Poland, would favour a frontier drawn with a view to assuring the highest degree of homogeneity on both sides while reducing as much as possible the extent and hardships of an exchange of populations. I have no doubt myself, especially in view of the immediate practical arrangements contemplated by the Polish Government as set out in paragraph 3 above, that these negotiation will inevitably lead to the conclusion you desire in regard to the future Polish-Soviet frontier, but it seems to me unnecessary and undesirable publicly to emphasize this at this stage.

5. As regards the war with Germany which they wish to prosecute with the utmost vigour, the Polish Government realise that it is imperative to have a working agreement with the Soviet Government in view of the advance of the liberating Russian Armies onto Polish soil from which these armies are driving the German invader. They assure me emphatically that they have at no time given instructions to the Underground Movement to attack "Partisans". On the contrary, after consultation with the leaders of their Underground Movement and with their accord they have issued orders to all Poles now in arms or about to revolt against

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-5-

the Hitlerite tyranny as follows: - when the Russian Army enters any particular district in Poland the Underground Movement is to disclose its identity and meet the requirements of the Soviet Commanders, even in the absence of a resumption of Polish-Soviet relations. The local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian Underground Authority, will meet and declare to the Commander of the incoming Soviet Troops that, following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remain faithful, they are ready to coordinate their actions with him in the fight against the common foe. These orders which are already in operation seem to me, as I am sure they will to you, of the highest significance and importance.

6. For the first time on February 6th I told the Polish Government that the Soviet Government wished to have the frontier in east Prussia drawn to include, on the Russian side, Königsberg. The information came as a shock to the Polish Government who see in such a decision a substantial reduction in the size and in economic importance of the German territory to be incorporated in Poland by war of compensation. But I stated that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government this was a rightful claim on the

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

1067

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

part of Russia. Regarding as I do this war against German aggression as all one and as a thirty years war from 1914 onwards I reminded Monsieur Micolajczyk of the fact that the soil of this part of east Prussia was dyed with Russian blood expended freely in the common cause. Here the Russian Armies advancing in August 1914 and winning the battle of Gumbinnen and other actions had, with their forward thrusts and with much injury to their mobilization, forced the Germans to recall two Army Corps from the advance on Paris, which withdrawal was an essential part in the victory of the Marne. The disaster at Tannenberg did not in any way undo this great result. Therefore it seemed to me that the Russians had an historic and well founded claim to this German territory.

7. As regards the composition of the Polish Government, the Polish Government cannot admit any right of a foreign intervention. They can however assure the Russian Government that by the time they have entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, they will include among themselves none but persons fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union. I am of opinion that it is much better that such changes should come about

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

naturally and as a result of further Polish consideration of their interests as a whole. It might well be, in my opinion, that the moment for a resumption of these relations in a formal manner would await the reconstitution of a Polish Government at the time of the liberation of Warsaw, when it would arise naturally from the circumstances attending that glorious event.

8. It would be in accordance with assurances I have received from you that, in an agreement covering the points made above, the Soviet Government should join with His Majesty's Government in undertaking vis a vis each other and Poland first to recognize and respect the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of the reconstituted Poland and the right of each to conduct its domestic affairs without interference: secondly, to do their best to secure in due course the incorporation in Poland of the free city of Danzig, Oppeln Silesia East Prussia west and south of a line running from Konigsberg and of as much territory up to the Oder as the Polish Government see fit to accept: Thirdly, to effect the removal from Poland, including the German territories to be incorporated in Poland of the German population: and fourthly, to negotiate the procedure for an

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. 161., 8-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

-8-

exchange of population between Poland the Soviet Union, and for the return to their mother country of nationals of the powers in question. All the above undertakings to each Kingdom should, in my view, be drawn up in such a form that they could be embodied in a single instrument or exchange of letters.

9. I informed the Polish Ministers that should the settlement which has now been outlined in the various telegrams that have passed between us become a fact and be observed in the spirit by all parties to it, His Majesty's Government would support that settlement at the conference after the defeat of Hitler, and also, that we would guarantee that settlement in after years to the best of our ability.

No Sig

Rec'd 21/03/52
F.H.S.
No Purs. in answer

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-78
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

1070


BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

My dear Miss Tully,

We have received from the Foreign Office a small correction to the Prime Minister's telegram No. 585 of February 20th to the President. As I am not certain whether you have already had this direct or not, I pass it on to you now, to make quite sure. ✓

In paragraph 8 line 10, after "East Prussia" remove the semicolon and insert the word "west", so as to read: "...East Prussia west and south of...".

Yours sincerely,



John W. Russell.

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govty telegram 1/12/72
By PHH Date MAY 6 1972

1071

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	585	DATE	20 Feb 1944.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	20/NFT		
TOR MAP ROOM	21/0315Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish boundary question. Quotes message from PM to STALIN.		

ACTION

To President via usher.

(See also PM's 584 and 587).

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Message on above subject sent to STALIN, 21 Feb 44; quoted to PM in POTUS #473. (POTUS #473 answers PM's #584, 585, and 587)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

C - "52. Polish-Russian"

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Polish-Russian Situation</i>	

1072

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

21 February 44. WJZ

From: London
To : The President of the United States

Nr : 586 Filed 21/0021Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.
Number 586. Your number 467 of 15th February.

1. Sir Samuel Hoare had already been instructed to give his fullest support to your Ambassador and I have now seen reports of the further representations made by our Ambassadors at Madrid.

These show that a settlement which I should myself regard as eminently satisfactory can now be reached on all points, if we act quickly. This settlement would include the complete cessation of Spanish wolfram exports to Germany for six months. If all goes as we hope, I do not think we need anticipate much difficulty in maintaining this position when the six months have elapsed.

The Foreign Secretary is telegraphing in greater detail to the State Department. I hope you will agree that we should immediately clinch matters on the above basis, which I am sure would represent a major political victory over the enemy.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

File Copy

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

-2-

2. We have just had a stick of bombs around 10, Downing Street and there are no more windows. Clemmie and I were at chequers and luckily all the servants were in the shelter. Four persons killed outside.

No Sig

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Rec'd 21/02/22
F. K. H.
Do not read unless.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. _____ Date MAY 6 1972

1074

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	586	DATE	21 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	21/0021Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	21/0212Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Wolfram exports from Spain; bombing of 10 Downing Street.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #467, 15 Feb 44.

To President via usher. Admiral Leahy prepared reply;
to PM sent as POTUS #478.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
-------------------	--------

~~SECRET~~

21 February 1944

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 587

Filed 21/0950Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~██████████~~

Para 1. My telegram number 585. While the Polish Ministers cannot formally authorise us to proceed on this basis, they are ready that we should do so on their behalf and assure us that they will not subsequently disavow our actions. For the reasons explained in my message they cannot however themselves come out formally and publically at this stage in the sense of this message. There is the further difficulty that three of the four parties represented in the Polish Government, i.e. all except the Peasant Party, refuse to authorise Monsieur Mikolajczyk to go as far as we would have wished. The present proposals therefore represent agreement with Monsieur Mikolajczyk, Monsieur Romer and Count Raczynski for which they would hope subsequently to secure the support of the Polish Government and the Polish underground movement in Poland if it proves acceptable to U.J.

Para 2. You will see that my message goes very far to meet Soviet requirements in so far as

(1) Orders have already been issued to

the Polish underground movement to

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

*Rec'd 21/1210 Z
OP?*

FILE
COPY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

-2-

cooperate with the Soviet forces (see paragraph 5 of my telegram):

(2) The Polish Government will accept a position under which the Soviet Government hand over to them for administration only those areas of Poland west of the Curzon Line (this abandonment of large Polish agglomerations in Vilna and Lwow areas means a great sacrifice to them):

(3) The Polish Government agree and are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities. They realise that while reserving their formal rights their acceptance of a demarkation line based on the Curzon Line in fact prejudices the future frontier about which they are ready and indeed anxious to open negotiations soon. It has been made very clear to the Polish Ministers in this connection that His Majesty's Government regard the Curzon Line as the appropriate future frontier and will support this at the postwar settlement.

Para 3. Clark Kerr has been instructed to emphasize the above points when communicating my message to U.J., and also to stress the necessity for reserving the formal settlement of future Polish frontiers until we are in a position to deal with the western and northern as well as the eastern

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parke Date

MAY 6 1972

1077

~~SECRET~~

frontiers.

Para 4. Clark Kerr has also been asked to draw Stalin's attention to the great public and parliamentary interest and anxiety here regarding Polish-Soviet relations, pointing out the importance of reaching some early practical arrangements on the lines suggested in my message to calm public anxiety and to avoid grave embarrassment to the United Nations war effort as a whole. Ambassador is to add that we also have to consider the effect of what we are now doing upon the Polish divisions which have now gone into action in Italy or are preparing to go into action from the United Kingdom and upon the Polish Air squadrons and Navy who have already rendered notable services to the United Nations.

Para 5. Instructions to Clark Kerr conclude:

The Polish Ministers have recently shown great restraint by refusing to enter into polemics as a result of the bitter and unjustified attacks upon them in the recent Pravda article. They are showing realism and courage in enabling us to proceed on the present basis despite the contrary view held by large sections of the Polish Government and population in Poland and abroad and despite their own misgivings regarding the overwhelming Soviet power. We doubt very much whether we can push them any further and we should feel alarmed

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. N. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

about the effect upon opinion here and in the USA, and therefore upon the United Nations war effort, of a Soviet refusal to give sympathetic consideration to the present proposals. You should make use of the above arguments in your representations to Marshal Stalin.

No Sig

*Red 220800
Lo Pres via kaku
100.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. E. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	587	DATE	21 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	21/0960Z		
TOP MAP ROOM	21/1210Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish boundary question.		

ACTION

To President via usher.

(See also FM's 584 and 585)

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Message on above subject sent to STALIN, 21 Feb 44; Quoted to PM in POTUS #473, (POTUS #473 answers PM's #584, 585, and 587.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

C. 652 Polish-Russian

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Polish-Russian Situation</i>	

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

22 February 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 588, filed 222145Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~SECRET~~ No. 588.

1. Your No. 473. I am so glad you approve of
our work with the Poles and thank you very much for giving
it a fair wind with Uncle J.

2. Your No. 472. O.K.

No Sig

*Recd: 222300Z. Delivered to Capt. Wood,
for the President, who was still with the doctor. RUB.*

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

Film Copy

1081

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	888	DATE	22 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	22/2146Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	22/2500Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Russian-Polish situation; discontinuance of New Delhi Propaganda Committee.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #473 and 475.

To President via Captain Wood in Doctor's office, 22 Feb 44.

No answer.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>Polish-Russian situation. Continuing Propaganda Committee</i>	FILED:
---	--------

~~SECRET~~

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

February

Number 589

Filed 23/1016Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
~~SECRET~~

✓ Para 1. Reference your telegram number 457 on the question of countries and areas to be occupied by British and US forces in RANKIN, or after OVERLORD, the position seems to me to be as follows.

✓ Para 2. GOSSACS original plan suggested three zones to be occupied by our forces, your forces and the Russians, respectively. Our sphere included NW Germany, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark: Your sphere southern Germany, France and possibly Austria. The Russian sphere lay to the east of the British area.

✓ Para 3. On the basis of this allocation which was approved in principle at QUADRANT, planning proceeded both for OVERLORD and RANKIN. At SEXTANT when plans were already far advanced, your Chiefs of Staff proposed that the allocation should be virtually reversed, but gave no reason.

✓ Para 4. I agree that your proposals might be military feasible for the true RANKIN case "C" (i.e. the collapse of Germany before the launching of OVERLORD). But even then

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1977

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
-2-

there would, from our point of view, be the following serious objections:-

1. The whole of the German coastline in the North Sea and a large part of their coastline in the Baltic, and therefore all the German naval establishments of any importance and the majority of the naval and shipbuilding yards, would be included in the United States area. The naval disarmament of Germany is a matter of peculiar interest to us and we are better equipped and situated than any other power to ensure that this process is carried out with the maximum thoroughness.

2. There is close liaison between the Royal Air Force and the Norwegian and Netherlands Air Force which we have trained and organized, and it is desirable that this should be continued after the war. It will be extremely difficult to maintain this association ^{if} of these countries ~~which~~ are outside our zone of responsibility. On the other hand, you have had the major responsibility for re-equipping the French land and air forces.

Para 5. If, however, the collapse of Germany occurs after Allied forces have been committed to the continent in OVERLORD, which seems almost certain, most serious practical objections must be added to those in 4 sub para 1 and sub

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1978

para 2 above. Our forces would be operating on the left flank of OVERLORD with their overseas bases in the Havre Cherbourg area, whilst the United States forces, on the right flank, would have their overseas bases in the Brittany ports.

✓ Para 6. Your proposals therefore would involve either the crossing of the land lines of communication of the two parts of the Allied force advancing on Germany, or the withdrawal and re-embarkation of the US forces. Both these would cause severe administrative difficulties and delays. It is obviously too late to replan OVERLORD with British forces on the right and US forces on the left.

✓ Para 7. In view of the serious objections which I have described and the fact that at this late stage all our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of OVERLORD, I consider that only reasons of overriding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed.

✓ Para 8. As I understand it your proposal arises from an aversion to undertaking police work in France and a fear that this might involve the stationing of US forces in France over a long period. I rather think, however,

~~SECRET~~
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-78
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

that I can put a different complexion on this matter.

✓ Para 9. I agree that our connection with France will be closer than yours and that it will be primarily our concern to see that she is if possible restored as a strong power, without whose cooperation the controlling of Germany is going to be much more difficult. But surely the question of policing does not arise? Under the new directive (which I hope is now agreed) we are, I think, going to recognise some provisional government as soon as we can, and we must hope that such a government will be able to establish its authority over the whole country.

Para 10. I recognise that you must protect your communications, but I hardly think that the mere fact that your communications pass through France would involve you generally in the policing of France against your will.

Para 11. I believe indeed that if you have the southern zone, the French, so far from holding more of your men in Europe for longer than you wish, may prove the means for releasing some of your men more quickly than you had hoped. If a satisfactory regime were set up in France and you were anxious to withdraw some of your troops from Germany there would probably be little difficulty in French troops being moved into the southern German zone to take

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. 241, 242-25
By R. M. Parke

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

-5-

over from your men; the French would in those circumstances be only too anxious to assume this responsibility.

✓ Para 12. All these reasons make it most undesirable to make a change which would alter the whole basis of our work and planning over the last 6 to 9 months and which must lead to serious complications in the future.

No 31g

16 Mar 44

Answered by personal letter to Prime Minister

of 29 Feb, 1944 (copy in Admiral Brown's file).

Rec'd 22/11/002

sent at White #1 at 12/172

LHC

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

1087

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	589	DATE	25 Feb 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	25/1016Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	25/1200Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Policing and occupation of liberated countries.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #457.

To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 1, 25/1245Z.

Copy to Admiral Leahy, to be taken up with General Marshall.

This was answered by personal letter to the Prime Minister to the President of 29 Feb 1944. For copy of this letter, together with correspondence on this subject, see "A16 - Warfare - Germany and German Occupied Countries", filed in Admiral Brown's files. Directive to Gen Eisenhower sent to the PM by personal letter from the President, dated 21 Mar 44, also filed in Adm Brown's files.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Admiral Leahy	23 Feb 44	Admiral Leahy

ACTION COMPLETED:

Policing France & Italy

FILED:

1088

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

WAT

23 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 590 filed 232300Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~██████████~~ Number 590.

Your 475. Delivery of our joint telegram to Stalin about the ships was delayed by the absence of Stalin from Moscow, it being hoped that the personal delivery of this information by the Ambassador would possibly evoke some expression of pleasure from the Potentate, which would cheer our way. However, I yesterday told Clark Kerr to hand it in. I am sorry there should have been some delay, he was expected back every day.

I am very glad to have your telegram about Spain.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel. 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 6 1972

*revised copy recd 24 0157 Z per
sent as White 9 240205Z HUP*

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

1089

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER	TO THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL 590	DATE 23 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM 240205Z	VIA
SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships to Soviet Union.	

ACTION

Answers POTUS-PM #475.

To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 9, 240205Z.

No answer, ^{To PM.} per Admiral Leahy, 24 Feb 44. *Rept see msg. to Stalin, 24 Feb 44*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED <i>Italian ships shipping</i>	FILED:
--	--------

1090

24 February, 1944

URGENT

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 591 Filed 24/1334Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
[REDACTED]. Number 591.

Your telegram of February 22nd was brought to me by Winant and I told him that I was much concerned at the way things were developing. Our cabinet are quite willing to have a technical enquiry into the oil position throughout the world. We should then know how we both stood.

The cabinet however has definitely expressed the following view, namely:

First, that the enquiry should be on the official level in the first instance in order to ascertain the facts.

Secondly, they would prefer that it should take place here in London, and

Thirdly, that we should be authorized to state to Parliament that no proposal will be made to change the existing ownership of oil interests in the Middle East on which, as you know, our Navy depends or elsewhere.

Your telegram dismisses all these points and if you will allow me to say so seemed to convey your decision on these matters.

When I read the telegrams to the cabinet this evening I found them also very much disturbed at the apparent possibility of a wide difference opening between the British and United States governments on such a subject and at such

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1091

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 591 Filed 24/1334Z

a time. I have called for reports from the Ministers particularly concerned and will bring the matter before the cabinet again in a few days. Meanwhile I trust you will not commit yourself to any public announcement because I am by no means sure that we could endorse it. Should the matter become public, otherwise than by agreement, debates will take place in Parliament at which all kinds of things would be said which would darken counsel and be resented on your side of the ocean.

I am deeply grieved that all these troubles should arise at a time when you have so many worries to contend with, and you may be sure that I will on every occasion do my best to be helpful. But I feel sure that to open up these matters with the maximum publicity without knowing where they will lead us might do real harm to Anglo-American relations.

No Sig

*Rec'd 24/1613Z
J.H.G.
Sent as White 24/1630Z
copy to Settlement 25/1600Z*

25 February 1944

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

Attached is a true copy of the Prime Minister's reply to unnumbered message despatched through State Department channels under date of 22 February 1944.

It is requested that, in the interests of security, the usual "true-copy" precautions be observed.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl -
PM-PRESIDENT, #591,
24 Feb 1944.

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

DECLASSIFIED
BY Royal Archivist of the U.S.
BY LL SA BROWN JSD MAY 6 1972

1093

FROM	THE PRIME MINISTER	TO	THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL	591	DATE	24 Feb 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	24/1354Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	24/1354Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT Conference on oil in Persia and Middle East.			

ACTION

Answers unnumbered POTUS-PM message of 22 Feb 44, sent through State Department channels to Ambassador Winant.

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 11, 24 Feb 44.

*Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy;
approved by President 3 Mar 44; sent to
PM as # 485.*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
Sec of State	25 Feb 44	Admiral Leahy
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
<i>Oil</i>		

1094

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

25 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 592 Filed 251900Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Number 592. Your numbers 479 and 480.

1. You will by now, no doubt, have seen Mountbatten's SEACOS 99 and will soon see British Chiefs of the Staff's number COS (W) 1175.

2. I can give you the most positive assurance that nothing will be withdrawn or withheld from the operations in North Burma for the sake of ^{operations against Sumatra.} ~~CULVERIN~~. I have telegraphed to Mountbatten emphasizing this. General Wedemeyer, who goes to you tomorrow by air, will be able to explain the position in detail. He will also unfold the facts about the Ledo Road which show that it cannot be open for traffic and then only limited traffic, before 1947.

3. We fear that General Stilwell has been giving a wrong impression both of the position in the South East Asia Theatre and of the views of Mountbatten. I earnestly hope that General Wedemeyer may be able to state Mountbatten's side of the case.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 592

Filed 251900Z

4. The arrival of the main Japanese fleet at Singapore is an event of the first order and we do not know what it portends so far as the Indian Ocean is concerned. From your point of view it should open fine opportunities in the Pacific to the American fleet. We must ourselves, however, review our naval dispositions CULVERIN and our communications with India and Australia without delay in the light of the new fact. I shall be cabling you soon about all this.

5. Your number 481. I am very glad to receive your approval of the agreement between the British Chiefs of Staff and Eisenhower. I will also cable you about the military situation in Italy which, I agree with you, is "tense." How I wish we could have a talk.

No Sig

*Recd 252135Z Hnd
sent to HP per Adm. Brown instructions 252250Z Hnd
as White 21*

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1096

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	592	DATE	25 Feb 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	251900Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	25/2135Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Burma-China campaign.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS-PM #479 and 480.

Sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 21, 25/2135Z.

*Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved
by President 3 Mar 44; sent to PM as # 485*

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>China Burma</i>	

1097

~~SECRET~~

25 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 593

Filed 252013Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Number 593.

1. Relying upon your 464 of 11/2/44, I made my statement in Parliament about the Italian Government with the full assent of the Cabinet. The statement was very well received by the House and no criticisms of any kind arose from Left Wing elements. I am, of course, now publicly committed.

^{2.} ~~SECRET~~ Meanwhile, on receipt of telegrams from General Wilson, numbers 622 and 624, you authorized on February 22 the telegram DON 170. I freely admit that General Wilson's attitude was a surprise to me and I did not and do not agree with the view he took. On the contrary, I think it would be very dangerous indeed to give way to threats from people who have so recently surrendered unconditionally. It was quite natural for you to telegraph as you did because you might well think I should be influenced by General Wilson's attitude and I am not making the slightest complaint.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-20-70
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1977

File Copy

[REDACTED]

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 593

Filed 252013Z

3. At the same time, I hope you will allow matters to rest where they were in your 464. This would not preclude reconsideration of the position if the fall of Rome is unduly protracted and after the crisis of the battle has passed. If the Italian political parties think they can play one of us off against the other, we shall have the worst of both worlds. Moreover, I gather that General Wilson acted in the sense of my public statement and it would be a great pity to throw things into the melting pot again.

No Sig

*Recd W 1135 Z and
sent as priority 2520013Z - osc*

[REDACTED]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

1099

~~SECRET~~

25 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

No number Filed 252110Z

What follows is correction to POTUS message Sr.

Mr. 593:

In Para 2 insert "NAP" before 622, which is number of telegram reference in message.

No Sig

*Read 20215Z Hyd
correction made on original*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

1100

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

WAI

27 February, 1944



From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 594 27/1920Z filed

Prime Minister to President. Personal and [REDACTED]
Number 594.

Your 483. (*white 25*)

I am really most grateful to you for the consideration with which you treat me.

No Sig

*Recd 272150Z - osc
Send white 33 at 272230Z - osc*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

File Copy

1102

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER	TO THE PRESIDENT
SERIAL 594	DATE 27 Feb 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 27/1920Z	
FOR MAP ROOM 27/2150Z	VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Italian political situation.	

ACTION

Answers POTUS #483.

To President as WHITE 33, 27/2230Z.

No answer.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

c. "370 Italy"	
ACTION COMPLETED <i>Italian Government</i>	FILED:

1103

~~SECRET~~

W.K. Kerr

W.K. Kerr

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 595, 29th February 1944 Filed 291934Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

I have received from Ambassador Clark Kerr the two following telegrams about Poland and the substitute Italian ships. They are not very pleasant. I will cable you later about them.

Telegram about Poland begins:

1. I saw Stalin tonight. It was not a pleasant talk. He attempted to dismiss with a snigger the position of the Polish Government as described in the Prime Minister's message.

2. He snorted from time to time as I made one by one the points contained in your telegram number 457. For instance when I said that the Polish Government had assured us that they would not disavow our actions he said: "Is that serious? How handsome of them!". When I got to point two of your paragraph two about Curzon Line he broke in

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

with "But the Polish Government do not want to give us Lvov and Vilna. If they did they should say so". When I explained that they well understood that they would have to do so, he replied that this was not clear from the message. Indeed in a recent official statement they had made it manifest that their view did not tally with the Prime Minister's. I countered this by drawing on your telegram number 526 but without much success.

3. At this stage Molotov confused the issue by evoking the bogey of Soznkovski, which haunted us throughout the talk and which I tried in vain to shoo away. A long wrangle followed during which Stalin said that he had little hope of settling the matter on basis of the Prime Minister's message. I said that you and the Prime Minister would be much discouraged by this and he replied that he must tell the truth. The Polish Government did not want a settlement. Its purpose was to embroil us with the Soviet Government. When I said that if this were so the Polish Government would fail, he said that he feared that it might succeed. It had indeed made a rift between the

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

Soviet Government and yourself and might do so later with the Prime Minister also. The Poles always had fresh demands. For instance they had had the effrontery to suggest something that ignored the sovereignty of the Soviet Government over territory which belonged to the Soviet Union, when they proposed that representatives of the United Nations should take a share in the administration of regions east of the demarcation line.

4. When I scouted all this Stalin said that until the Prime Minister had returned from Africa Polish affairs had been in your hands. You had offered mediation which he had been obliged to reject. This had been a score for the Poles and you had been displeased. He had been obliged to hurt your feelings. Why? Because of the Poles.

5. I did my best here to explain what was your position in this affair. To this he replied that the Russians and British shed their blood while the Poles sat on your back or hid behind the Prime Minister's.

6. When it became clear that Stalin was determined not to take the Prime Minister's as the basis of a settlement, I asked him to make some constructive suggestions.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

He replied that this was simple. He only asked for two things: the Curzon Line and the reconstruction of the Polish Government. If the Poles meant business they should clearly and openly accept the Curzon Line and he for his part would not tolerate any further demands from the Ukranians or White Russians. He dismissed the Polish contention that it was impossible for them to make such a declaration at present. If the government were to be reconstructed there could be no question of waiting until the recapture of Warsaw. But if a quick reshuffle were effected and genuine democratic elements were brought into the administration this would help. (At this point the Bogey of Soznkovski stalked across the stage again). But there arose the question of who would enter into a reconstructed government, and here to my surprise, he took up the old Molotov proposal to do some recruiting in America and in this country. About America I used the now well worn arguments which he finally admitted had some force, but not until he had tried to persuade me that dual citizenship was possible - witness Ex-President Moscicki who was both Polish and Swiss.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. 101., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

1107

7. He then suggested, if citizenship were a bar, a couple of Polish-Americans - for instance Professor Linge and Orlemansi (a Catholic priest) might come to Moscow to see what was going on here and advise on the choice of appropriate Poles. He did not know either of them, but he understood that they were "Good men, non-party men and not Communists." He said that he would like also to see some recruits from this country but he could not name any at the moment. He would not admit that all this presented any serious difficulty and he assumed that United States Government would put no obstacles in the way of its citizens coming to the Soviet Union. But it seemed to him that the Polish Government in London with its Soznkovskis and its Kots and their agents in United States and Canada was too firmly established to be shaken.

8. This dreary and exasperating conversation lasted for well over an hour. No argument was of any avail.

9. When he has consulted his government Stalin will be telegraphing his reply direct to the Prime Minister.

Second telegram begins:

1. Stalin assured me last night that he was satisfied that this matter had been put right. He made a sort of

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

1108

gruff apology for having had to keep me waiting explaining that he had been away.

2. He referred to his message to you of February 26th and pressed strongly for the four modern destroyers he had asked you to let him have. He claimed that it should be within reach of the two leading naval powers to find them.

3. In reply to a question from myself he said that in the North, the Baltic and Black Sea, the Red fleet since the beginning of the war had lost 32 destroyers including 3 Flotilla leaders. This represented more than half its whole strength in these vessels. He said that if you wished it he would give you full particulars.

No Sig

*Lead 292140 Z High
To Hyde Park as White 43, 292325Z.*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

~~SECRET~~

1109

[REDACTED]

To State Dept

29 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 596

Filed 292040Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and ~~most secret~~ Number 596.

Your last message about the peace feelers from
Bulgaria.

We have already had the same reply through Clark
Kerr and agree that Cairo is probably the best rendezvous.

I think the only thing to do now is for the Jadwin
mission to inform the Bulgarian Minister that representa-
tives of the three Allies are prepared to meet a fully
qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo. If the Bulgarians
send a mission, we can then listen to what it has to say.

The Foreign Office have already suggested that the
State Department should send the necessary instructions
to the Jadwin mission.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-23-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

*Recd 292140 Z HUK
Sent as White 44, 292225 Z. RAB
To State for action. 1 month*

[REDACTED]

File Copy

1111

FROM	The Prime Minister	TO	The President
SERIAL	596	DATE	29 February 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	292040Z		
TOR MAP ROOM	29/2140Z	VIA	Army Code Room
SUBJECT	Bulgarian peace feelers.		

ACTION

Answers POTUS #482.

To President at Hyde Park as WHITE 44, 292225Z. In BLACK 9, 292337Z, the President directed that Mr. Stettinius be furnished copy for necessary action. To State Department on 1 March 1944.

Jadwin Mission given instructions by OSS message #26264, from Donovan to Toulmin. (Filed "370 Bulgaria")

Answer to Prime Minister prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President; sent to PM as #487.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

Q - "370 Bulgaria"

ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:
<i>Bulgaria</i>	