ROOSEVELT TO CHURCHILL
MARCH 1944
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 484. FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your Number 597. In view agreement for alternate origination
and your origination last month, I propose the following statement
for release March 10th:

QUOTE. Despite the increasing traffic of United Nations shipping
in the Atlantic, February 1944 was the lowest month as to tonnage
of Allied merchant ship losses to enemy U-boat action since the
United States entered the war; and February was the second lowest
month of the entire war.

Again there were more U-Boats destroyed than merchant vessels
sunk, so the exchange rate remains favorable to the United Nations.
In actual numbers a few more U-Boats were sunk in February than in
January.

The lack of aggressiveness on the part of the U-Boat continues.

UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 17:20, E.T., 2 March 1944:

[Signature]

GEORGE M. ELLEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

SECRET

022155 NCR 9378
2 March 1944

TO PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT. PERSONAL AND

Your Number 597. In view agreement for alternate origination
and your origination last month, I propose the following statement
for release March 10th:

QUOTE: Despite the increasing traffic of United Nations shipping
in the Atlantic, February, 1944 was the lowest month as to tonnage
of Allied merchant ship losses to enemy U-Boat action since the
United States entered the war; and February was the second lowest
month of the entire war.

Again there were more U-Boats destroyed than merchant
vessels sunk, so the exchange rate remains favorable to the United
Nations. In actual numbers a few more U-Boats were sunk in February
than in January.

The lack of aggressiveness on the part of the U-Boat
continues. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.H. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
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**SUBJECT**
February monthly Submarine Warfare Statement.

**ACTION**

Answers PM 597.

Statement prepared by Navy Department; dispatch dictated by Captain Wood in Map Room; approved by President in Doctor's office.

**FILTED:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:** Submarine Warfare Statement
3 March 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 485. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 591, 592 and 595 received.

Referring to 591, I am having the oil question studied by the Department of State and my oil experts, but please do accept my assurances that we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran. I cannot hold off the conversations much longer.

Referring to 592, we also are concerned about the apparent concentration of enemy forces at Singapore and uncertain as to enemy intentions in that area.

We are sending our best carrier with a destroyer escort to join your naval force in the Indian Ocean.

Referring to 595, Uncle Joe's attitude toward your suggested compromise on the Polish problem is very disappointing.

I have Stalin's message of February 26th addressed to both of us in regard to the loan of eight destroyers and requesting that at least half of them be of a modern type. It would seem that the destroyers you agreed to deliver would be very useful to the Soviet Navy. I find them highly efficient for escort duty.

Can you suggest anything that would assist in making a reply to U.J.'s message regarding the destroyers?

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1150, EST, 3 March 1944.
Your 591, 592 and 593 received.

Referring to 591, I am having the oil question studied by the Department of State and my oil experts.

Referring to 592, we also are concerned about the apparent concentration of enemy forces at Singapore and uncertain as to enemy intentions in that area.

We are sending our best carrier with a destroyer escort to join your naval force in the Indian Ocean.

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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Oil conference; enemy forces at Singapore; Polish-Russian relations; transfer of Italian ships to Russia.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Answers PM's 591, 592, and 595.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prepared by Admiral Leahy, approved by President 3 Mar 44.</td>
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<td>Oil answered by PM 001.</td>
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| ACTION COMPLETED: | Italian ships | FILED: | |
|-------------------|---------------|--------|
URGENT

3 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 486, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

In reply to insistent questioning at a press conference today I stated that Italian merchant ships and war ships are now being used in our war effort by the Allied Mediterranean command and that some of the Italian ships or substitutes therefor from the British and American tonnage will be allocated to the Soviet Navy to assist in their requirements for their war effort.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1204, EWT, 3 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date: NOV 1, 1974

-1-
SECRET

March 3, 1944.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

In reply to insistent questioning at a press conference today I stated that Italian merchant ships and war ships are now being used in our war effort by the allied Mediterranean command and that some of the Italian ships or substitutes therefor from the British and American tonnage will be allocated to the Soviet Navy to assist in their requirements for their war effort.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Scott
Date NOV 1 1971
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<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Transfer of Italian ships to Russia.</td>
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**ACTION**

Prepared by Admiral Leahy.

Identical message sent to Marshal Stalin, 3 Mar 44.

Answers PM's #599 and #600. See action slip on these messages for detailed story.

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ACTION COMPLETED: [Signature]

FILED: [Signature]
PRIOlT

FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSKA, LONDON

NUMBER 487, PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Referring your 596. In agreement with your suggestion we have
instructed Jadwin Mission to inform Minister of Bulgaria that re-
presentatives of the three Allies are prepared to confer in Cairo
with a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission. Jadwin also directed to
telegraph immediately to Washington any reply that he may receive.

In view of the inclusion of the Balkans in General Wilson's
area it seems to me that he is the correct official to control any
mission to discuss surrender terms of Bulgaria.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1206, EWT, 3 March 1944.

I. MATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date

- 1 -

03/16/43 NCR 00467
March 3, 1944.

Referring your 596. In agreement with your suggestion we have instructed Jadwin Mission to inform Minister of Bulgaria that representatives of the three allies are prepared to confer in Cairo with a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission. Jadwin also directed to telegraph immediately to Washington any reply that he may receive.

In view of the inclusion of the Balkans in General Wilson's area it seems to me that he is the correct official to head any mission to discuss surrender terms of Bulgaria.

P.S.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date 1971
FROM: The President

TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL: 487

DATE: 3 March 1944

DATE/TIME: 031643

OR FILE NUMBER: NCR 9467

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: Surrender of Bulgaria

ACTION:

Answers PM #696, which was sent to President at Hyde Park as WHITE 44, 292226Z. In BLACK 9, 292337Z, the President directed that Mr. Stettinius be furnished copy for necessary action. Sent to State Department on 1 March 1944.

Jadwin Mission given instructions by OSS message #26264, from Donovan to Toulmin. (Filed "370 Bulgaria."

Answer to Prime Minister prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President.

Answered by PM #487, 5 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: StateDept for intr. 6 Mar 44. The President

COPY OF PM # 607.

C: "MR-370 Bulgaria"

ACTION COMPLETED: Bulgaria

FILED:
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 488. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Thank you for your message Number 606. We will issue the statement without repeat without the last sentence.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EWT, 6 March 1944.

GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant, USNR
PROPOSED MESSAGE — ROUGH DRAFT

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUSHA LONDON

PERSONAL AND — FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER —

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 606. WE WILL ISSUE THE STATEMENT WITHOUT REPEAT WITHOUT THE LAST SENTENCE.

ROOSEVELT.
FROM  The President

TO  The Prime Minister

SERIAL  488

DATE  6 March 1944

DATE/TIME  062326

OR FILE NUMBER  NOH 9996

TOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT  February monthly submarine warfare statement.

ACTION

Answers Par 606.

Admiral Brown draft this reply after consultation with the President.

For complete action on February submarine warfare statement, see "AR 000.7 (3) Sec. 2"

---

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

FILED:  

[Signature]
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 489. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Receipt is acknowledged of your messages 598 to 607 inclusive.

Thank you for your very kind message to Mrs. Roosevelt.

Reference your 601, I agree with your proposed joint message to U.S. about destroyers to be sent.

I am sending you by the following message (690) my recommendation about the Italian Government.

In order to try to put at rest the concern of the Italian Navy about their ships what do you think of sending the following to General Wilson and to the Naval Commanders in the Mediterranean for confidential information of Italian officials:

QUOTE. At Teheran it was agreed that ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be employed most effectively against the common enemy. It was also agreed in principle that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied Naval strength resulting from the surrender of the Italian Fleet. Russia is now in urgent need of additional Naval strength. For the present Great Britain and the United States will lend some of their ships to Russia to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy. It is not intended to transfer any Italian ships to Russia at present. UNQUOTE.
Your 608 has just come after what appears above had been prepared. I do not think there is any essential conflict. I will wire you again in a short time.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1315, EWT, 7 March 1944

L. WATHEISON,
Colonel, General Staff.
RECEIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 489.

RECEIPT IS ACKNOWLEDGED OF YOUR MESSAGES 598 TO 605 INCLUSIVE.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY KIND MESSAGE TO MRS. ROOSEVELT.

REFERENCE YOUR 601 I AGREE WITH YOUR PROPOSED JOINT MESSAGE TO U.S. DESTROYERS, TO BE SENT.

I AM SENDING YOU BY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, MY RECOMMENDATION ABOUT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. IN ORDER TO TRY TO PUT AT REST THE CONCERN OF THE ITALIAN NAVY ABOUT THEIR SHIPS WHAT DO YOU THINK OF SENDING THE FOLLOWING TO GENERAL WILSON AND TO THE NAVAL COMMANDERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF ITALIAN OFFICIALS:

"AT TEHERAN IT WAS AGREED THAT SHIPS OF THE ITALIAN NAVY SHOULD BE USED WHERE THEY COULD BE EMPLOYED MOST EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY. IT WAS ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT RUSSIA IS ENTITLED TO HER SHARE IN THE INCREASE OF ALLIED NAVAL STRENGTH RESULTING FROM THE SURRENDER OF THE ITALIAN FLEET. FOR THE PRESENT GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WILL LEND SOME OF THEIR SHIPS TO RUSSIA TO COMPENSATE FOR THE HELP THEY ARE RECEIVING FROM THE ITALIAN NAVY. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO TRANSFER ANY ITALIAN SHIPS TO RUSSIA AT PRESENT."
Your boot has just come off. But after it had been perceived, I do not think there is any essential conflict. I will meet you at two o'clock tomorrow.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 489 DATE 7 March 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Transfer of Italian ships; Italian political situation.

ACTION

Acknowledges PM msgs 598 thru 607.

Answers PM 601 & 608. Draft prepared by Admiral Brown after discussion with Admiral Leahy; approved by President.

(PM #608 was received just as this message was being sent. Last para added; #608 further answered in POTUS #492.)

Answered by PM #612.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Italian Shipping
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 490. PERSONAL AND ""FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Our advice from Italy indicate that the political situation there
is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision
in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six
opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the
anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a sit-
uation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the
anti-Fascist leaders and groups.

One of General Wilson's telegrams of February 29 (NAF 634) reports
that the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of
Allied policy with regard to their respective plans. I would like to give
General Wilson an immediate reply. As you know, we prefer the program put
forward by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of
Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a
QUOTE Lieutenant UNQUOTE of the realm, acceptable to the six political
parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wil-
son and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and
are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the
earliest opportunity the active cooperation of the liberal political groups
by bringing them into the Italian Government.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1973
If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1315, EWT, 7 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
FROM: \*OPNAV TO: \*ALUSHA, LONDON

NUMBER: ND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Our advices from Italy indicate that the political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups. I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.

One of General Wilson's telegrams of February 29 (DAF 634) reports that the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of Allied policy with regard to their respective plans. I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply. As you know, we prefer the program put forward by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a QUOTE Lieutenant UNQUOTE of the realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Groce has been mentioned as their probable choice.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: H. R. Stewart
Date: NOV 1, 1971
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If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1030, EWT, 6 March 1944.

L. MATHIESON,
Colonel, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Cable to the Prime Minister on the Italian Political Situation.

In compliance with your memorandum of March 4, I have prepared a proposed cable to the Prime Minister for your consideration and dispatch if you approve. In view of the rapid political developments of the past two weeks in Italy, we feel that General Wilson is in urgent need of guidance. As far as we are aware he has not had any reply to his several telegrams, at least in which this Government participated.

Enclosure:

Draft cable to the Prime Minister.
PROPOSED CABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Our advice from Italy indicate that the political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups. I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.

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If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Italian political situation</td>
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**ACTION**

(See PM #593; POTUS #483; PM #594 for previous correspondence.)

By memo to the President dated 2 Mar 44, the State Department sent their comments on Italian situation as described by Gen Wilson in NAF's 634 and 635. On 4 Mar, the President directed State Dept to prepare draft msg to PM. Draft msg sent to President on 4 Mar; approved; given to Map Room on 6 Mar for transmission.

Admiral Brown directed that message be held up until he and Admiral Leahy could discuss it with the President. Message finally sent, with changes by the President, on 7 Mar 44.

Answered by PM #610.

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C. "370 Italy"

**ACTION COMPLETED: Italian Government**

**FILED:** 0027
8 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 491. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONAL, NAVY AND PERSONAL.

Your 607.

Mr. MacVeagh will act for us, his instructions at this stage being only to listen to what the Bulgarians have to say. He is being informed that Mr. MacMillan will be the British representative, and directed to keep in touch with him.

We agree that General Wilson, who will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs in matters pertaining to the activities of the Bulgarian Mission, should be kept fully informed of developments, and that he be directed to have a military representative present.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1205, EWT, 8 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON, Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

NOV 1 1971

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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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**ACTION**

Answer PM #607, which was sent by direction of the President to State Department for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Proposed reply given to President by Admiral Leahy, 8 Mar 44; approved; sent to CR at 1205 q.

Acknowledged in PM #611.

**Background**

376 Bulgaria

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 492. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring to your 608, I can find no fault in your proposed statement to Parliament contained in the last paragraph thereof.

Please give me your reaction to the message proposed in my 489 to be sent to General Wilson and to our naval commanders in the Mediterranean for confidential information of Italian officials.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1210, EWT, 8 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date

DECLASSIFIED

08/16/46 NCR 2440

0030
March 8, 1944.

SECRET

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Referring to your 608, I can find no fault in your proposed statement to Parliament contained in the last paragraph thereof.

Please give me your reaction to the message proposed in my 409 to be sent to General Wilson and to our naval commanders in the Mediterranean for confidential information of Italian officials.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By [Signature]

Date [Handwritten Date] 1977
Transfer of Italian ships.

ACTION

Answers PM #608. (PM #608 was acknowledged in POTUS #489.)

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President.

Acknowledged in PM #611.

Answered in PM #612, which approves message suggested in POTUS #489.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 493, SECRET AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 609. The reply to U.J. contained therein seems
to be a very clear and concise statement of the British
attitude in the Polish controversy.

It will be of assistance to me in handling our Polish
complications here.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1215, EWT, 8 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
March 8, 1944.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Your 609. The reply to U.J. contained therein seems to be a very clear and concise statement of the British attitude in the Polish controversy.

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<td>493</td>
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<td>8 March 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Polish-Russian relations.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

Answers Pa #609.

This reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 8 Mar 44; sent to CR at 1215.

Acknowledged in Pa #611.
8 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 494. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.  CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL.

Your 610. My Number 490 was sent with the purpose of attempting to meet the difficult situation reported by General Wilson in his NAF 634.

I wish much you would send me suggestions as to a method that will be acceptable to your Government of correcting the serious situation reported by General Wilson.

It is my strongest wish that you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others. We may differ on timing but things like that can be worked out, and on the big objectives like self-determination we are as one.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1217, EWT, 8 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By L. Stewart  
Date Nov 1 1971

L. MATHESON,  
Colonel, General Staff.
PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

Your 610. My Number 490 was sent with the purpose of attempting to meet the difficult situation reported by General Wilson in his No. 634.

I will be very pleased to receive suggestions as to a method that will be acceptable to your Government of correcting the serious situation reported by General Wilson.

It is my strongest wish that you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others. We may differ on timing but things like that can be worked out, and the big objectives like self-determination are at one.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971
Post to 6 Princ.

Your 610 - my number 490 was sent with the purpose of attempting to meet the difficult situation reported by General Wilson and his recommendation in regard thereto in his 634.

I will be very pleased to receive from you suggestions as to a method of that will be acceptable to yours government of correcting the serious situation reported by General Wilson.
It is my strongest wish that you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 494 DATE 8 March 1944

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Italian political situation.

ACTION Answers PM #610.

Draft of this message prepared in Map Room by Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown; approved by President with minor changes; sent to CR at 1217Q.

Acknowledged in PM #611.

Answered by PM #618.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED FILED:

Italian Government
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 495. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 615. Congratulations, well done.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1900, EWT, 9 March 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1974
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<td>DATE 9 Mar 44.</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Russian convoy; sinking of 4 U-boats.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

Answers PM #615.  
written by President.

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**  

**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
**FILED:**  

---
PRIORITY
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

NUMBER 496. PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 616. Harry has gone to the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota. He stood the trip well, feels reasonably well but has not gained weight. He is to be fattened up for the next three or four weeks and then they will decide whether an operation is necessary.

As soon as I get your inscription I will send it out to him. I know it will do him much good.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1920 E.W.T., 11 March 1944

Robert W. Bogue
Lt (jg) U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date

SECRET

190012 44R 898

0043
March 11, 1944.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

Harry has gone to the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota. He stood the trip well, feels reasonably well but has not gained weight. He is to be fattened up for the next three or four weeks and then they will decide whether an operation is necessary.

As soon as I get your inscription I will send it out to him. I know it will do him much good.

ROOSEVELT
PROIl The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 496 D A T E 11 March 1944

DATE/TIME 120012 NCR 888

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Inscription to Mr. Hopkins about Stephen. Mr. Hopkins' illness.

ACTION

Answer PM #616.

This message prepared by the President, brought to the Map Room by Miss Tully.

(Also see message sent to Miss Tully by the Prime Minister's Secretary, requesting that the PM be informed when inscription was delivered to the President and to Mr. Hopkins. Filed "MISC. OTHER THAN PRESIDENTIAL")

Further answered in POTUS-Pm #500, 15 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

100 Hopkins, Stephen.
13 March 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusa, London

NUMBER 497. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 617, in specific reply to paragraph 3 thereof:

(a) There will be no specific operation in the Pacific during 1944 that would be adversely affected by the absence of a British Fleet Detachment.

(b) It is not at the present time possible to anticipate with sufficient accuracy future developments in the Pacific to be certain that a British Fleet Detachment will not be needed there during the year 1945, but it does not now appear that such a reinforcement will be needed before the Summer of 1945.

In consideration of recent enemy dispositions it is my personal opinion that unless we have unexpected bad luck in the Pacific your naval force will be of more value to our common effort by remaining in the Indian Ocean.

All of the above estimates are of course based on current conditions and are therefore subject to change if the circumstances change.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

Released from the White House Map Room at 12:15, EWT, 13 March 1944

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. Archival
Date 1 NOV 1979

R. H. MYERS
Lieut.- (Jg), USNR
March 13, 1944.

President to Prime

Your 617, in specific reply to paragraph 3 thereof

(a) There will be no specific operation in the Pacific during 1944 that would be adversely affected by the absence of a British Fleet Detachment.

(b) It is not at the present time possible to anticipate with sufficient accuracy future developments in the Pacific to be certain that a British Fleet Detachment will not be needed there during the year 1945, but it does not now appear that such a reinforcement will be needed before the Summer of 1945.

In consideration of recent enemy dispositions it is my personal opinion that unless we have unexpected bad luck in the Pacific your naval force will be of more value to our common effort by remaining in the Indian Ocean.

All of the above estimates are of course based on current conditions and are therefore subject to change if the circumstances change.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1971
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<th>FROM</th>
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<td>612/ 497</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>13 March 1944</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Pacific and Indian Ocean operations.</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers PM 617.

Message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with alterations.

---

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

300 Japan

---

0048
13 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 498, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

With further reference to your No. 610, I am sorry if my earlier messages were not clear. I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken. The political situation in Italy has developed rapidly since our earlier messages; the military situation has not kept pace. The capture of Rome is still remote and major political decisions must be taken.

I do not like having to use stern measures against our friends in Italy, except for good reason. In the present situation the Commander-in-Chief and his political advisers, both British and American, have recommended that we give immediate support to the program of the six opposition parties. Thus we have, happily for once, our political and military considerations entirely in harmony.

We do not need to intervene beyond informing the Executive Junta of our support of their program, as described in NAF 622, 624 and 628, and confirm this to the King if necessary. The Italians can present the solution to the King and work out the program among themselves.
I cannot for the life of me understand why we should hesitate any longer in supporting a policy so admirably suited to our common military and political aims. American public opinion would never understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, 13 March 1944.

OODEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 11, 1944

SUBJECT: Proposed Cablegram to the Prime Minister on the Italian Political Situation.

Thank you for your memorandum of March 3 to Mr. Stettinius enclosing a copy of Mr. Churchill's message no. 610, and your acknowledgment, on the Italian political situation. You may consider it advisable to answer some of the points raised in his telegram and I have drafted the proposed cablegram for your signature and despatch to the Prime Minister, if you approve.

Enclosure:

Draft reply.
Proposed Cablegram from the President to the Prime Minister in Reply to the Latter's No. 610.

With further reference to your No. 610, I am sorry if my earlier messages were not clear. I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken. The political situation in Italy has developed rapidly since our earlier messages; the military situation has not kept pace. The capture of Rome is still remote and major political decisions must be taken.

I do not like having to use stern measures against our friends in Italy, except for good reason. In the present situation the Commander-in-Chief and his political advisers, both British and American, have recommended that we give immediate support to the program of the six opposition parties. Thus we have, happily for once, our political and military considerations entirely in harmony.

We do not need to intervene beyond informing the Executive Junta of our support of their program, as described in NAF 622, 624 and 628, and confirm this to the King if necessary. The Italians can present the solution to the King and work out the program among themselves.

I
I cannot for the life of me understand why we should hesitate any longer in supporting a policy so admirably suited to our common military and political aims. American public opinion would never understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel.
Further reply to Pa #610. (Answered also by Pa #494.)

Prepared by State Department; approved by President; shown to Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown.

Answered by Pa #619.
15 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 499, RAND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 620. I am thrilled by the news of our success under Wingate. If you wire him please give him my hearty good wishes. May the good work go on. This marks an epic achievement for air-borne troops, not forgetting the mules.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1255, EWT, 15 March 1944.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1974

SECRET

151739
NCR 1363

-1-
March 15, 1944.

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I am thrilled by the news of our success under Wingate. If you wire him please give him my hearty good wishes. May the good work go on. This marks an epic achievement for air-borne troops, not forgetting the mules.

ROOSEVELT
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 499 DATE 15 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Flying of two of Wingate's Long Range Penetration Brigades into enemy territory in North Burma.

ACTION Answers PM #520.

Draft reply was written by Admiral Leahy but was not used by the President. President wrote dispatch; sent 15 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

MR 300 G.B.I.
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 500, PERSONAL AND ____, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Inscription for Harry received and forwarded to Rochester.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1310, EWT, 15 March 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart
Date NOV 1, 1974
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1944.

TO THE PRIME MINISTER
FROM THE PRESIDENT

Inscription for Harry received
and forwarded to Rochester.

ROOSEVELT
Subject: Inscription for Mr. Hopkins on Stephen's death.

ACTION

Furthur answers PM-FOTUS, #616, 10 Mar 44. (See also FOTUS-PM #496, 11 March 1944.)

Written by the President.

FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 500 DATE 15 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 151746 NCR 1367

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

ACTION

Copies to: Date: By Direction of:

ACTION COMPLETED: Filed:

Hopkins, Stephen.
15 March 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aliena, London

NUMBER 501. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

We have lately been giving further thought to the matter of limited feeding programs for children and nursing and expectant mothers in the German-occupied countries of Europe. Ambassador Winant will shortly take up with your Government a proposal under which such programs might be put into effect initially in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Norway.

I bespeak your most earnest consideration of this proposal. I am convinced that the time has arrived when the continued withholding of food from these categories of the populations of the occupied countries is likely to hurt our friends more than our enemies and consequently to be injurious to the United Nations cause.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1555, EWT, 15 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.

By J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1977
Dear Winston:

We have lately been giving further thought to the matter of limited feeding programs for children and nursing and expectant mothers in the German-occupied countries of Europe. Ambassador Winant will shortly take up with your Government a proposal under which such programs might be put into effect initially in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Norway.

I bespeak your most earnest consideration of this proposal. I am convinced that the time has arrived when the continued withholding of food from these categories of the populations of the occupied countries is likely to hurt our friends more than our enemies and consequently to be injurious to the United Nations cause.

Very sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable
Winston Churchill, M.P.
Prime Minister,
London.
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Mr. Renschel of the State Department called and asked if this message should go out through the Map Room channels. He said Secretary Hull had brought it to the White House the morning of the 15th and the President had okayed it and suggested it go by telegram or radiogram. Captain Wood said that we should send it out.

R. R. Myers,
Lieut., (jg) USNR

Answered by PM-PMO #641, 8 Apr 44.

(On this same subject, see POTUS #243, 22 Dec 42, and PM #259, 1 Jan 43.)
17 March 1944

PRIORITY
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT. NUMBER 502.

Thank you for your Number 621, March 15, reporting the
decisions of the War Cabinet with respect to the Italian political
situation. I am in full agreement with you and them that we should
not permit our divergent views to become known publicly particularly
at this time.

However, I still feel that if the pressure of the Six
Opposition Parties comes to a point where it will have an adverse
effect on the situation, we should support their program. I think
that we should watch political developments carefully in Italy
for the present with that in mind and keep the matter continually
before the Advisory Council.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By D.R. Snell
Date Nov 1, 1971

Released from the White House Map Room,
1700 E.W.T., 17 March 1944

L. Mathewson
Colonel, General Staff
Thank you for your no. 631, March 15, reporting the decisions of the War Cabinet with respect to the Italian political situation. I am in full agreement with you and them that we should not permit our divergent views to become known publicly particularly at this time.

However, I still feel that if the pressure of the Six Opposition Parties comes to a point where it will have an adverse effect on the situation, we should support their program. I think that we should watch political developments carefully in Italy for the present with that in mind and keep the matter continually before the Advisory Council.

This draft was prepared by State Dept.

[Signature]

18 Mar
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 502 DATE 17 Mar 44

TOP MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Italian political situation

ACTION

Answers PM #621, 15 Mar, copy of which was sent to the Sec of State for preparation of reply. Draft prepared by State, approved by the President 17 Mar 44; sent to PM.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

370 Italy
19 March 1944

From: Opanv
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 503. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Receipt is acknowledged of your 622 and 623. The American
Chiefs of Staff have issued instructions authorizing the diversion
of 30 C-47's or the equivalent C-46 aircraft from the hump
program to meet Mountbatten's immediate necessity with instruc-
tions to the American Commander of the Air Forces, India-Burma
Sector, that these planes should be returned to the Air Trans-
port Command at the earliest possible time.

The American Chiefs of Staff have advised the Commanding
General, American Army Air Forces and the Commanding General,
American Army Forces in that area that Mountbatten should re-
quest the British Chiefs of Staff to provide the additional trans-
port aircraft which he needs to support his operations during the
remainder of this dry season.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1245, EWT, 19 March 1944.

L. MATHERSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: Nov 1, 1971
Receipt is acknowledged of your 622 and 623. The American Chiefs of Staff have issued instructions authorizing the distribution of 30 C-47's or the equivalent C-46 aircraft from the hump program to meet Mountbatten's immediate necessity with instructions to the American Commander of the Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, that these planes should be returned to the Air Transport Command at the earliest possible time.

The American Chiefs of Staff have advised the Commanding General, American Army Air Forces and the Commanding General, American Army Forces in that area that Mountbatten should request the British Chiefs of Staff to provide the additional transport aircraft which he needs to support his operations during the remainder of this dry season.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: W.R. Stewart
Date: May 1, 1971

GEORGE
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers Fm 622 and 621. (See status slip on PM #622 for complete action.)

Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Mar 44.

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**ACTION COMPLETED**

300 Burma, India, China.
SECRET

FROM: Opnav
TO: Alusna, London

NUMBER 504. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

For your information I have today sent the following message to Harriman:

QUOTE. Your L42215. The Milwaukee can be delivered at a North Russian Port. Please inform Admiral Stark port at which delivery is desired and inform us by telegram what arrangements can be made for an early return of Milwaukee's personnel. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1255, EWT, 19 March 1944

L. MATHENSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By:
Date: NOV 1 1971
FROM | The President
---|---
TO | The Prime Minister

| SERIAL | 504 |
| DATE/TIME | 
| OR FILE NUMBER | 
| SUBJECT | Delivery of MILWAUKEE to north Russian port. |

**ACTION**

HARRIMAN-POTUS 142215, 15 Mar 44, forwarded request from Russian Govt that MILWAUKEE be delivered to Russian port instead of a British port. President approved and directed that MILWAUKEE be sent to Russian port.

Reply to Ambassador Harriman drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 19 Mar 44; sent to Harriman 19 Mar 44. This message to the PM is a quote of the message to Harriman.

**COPIES TO:**

---

**DATE:**

---

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

---

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

MAR 450 ITALY (2)

**FILED:**

---
20 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 505, PRIORITY AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Replying to your No. 626, I have read SEACOS 117 and 118 with much interest. On 17 March I telegraphed to the Generalissimo an urgent request that he utilize his Yunnan troops to assist the effort reported in SEACOS 117 and 118. I have as yet received no reply.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1240, EWT, 20 March 1944.

Ogdens S. Collins, Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.
DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971

SECRET
PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Replying to your No. 626, I have read SEACOS 117 and 118 with much interest. On 17 March I telegraphed to the Generalissimo an urgent request that he utilize his Yunnan troops to assist the effort reported in SEACOS 117 and 118. I have as yet received no reply.
March 17, 1944

FROM: SACSEA
TO: Chiefs of Staff
RPTD.: Joint Staff Mission, Washington
SEACOS: 117

Following for Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff from Mountbatten.

I have just returned from visiting General Stilwell on the Ledo front and I thought you might like to have a brief account of our activities in the main areas.

2. Hukaung Valley. I have already reported to you the recent striking successes of the Chinese-American Combat Force in the Hukaung Valley in my telegram SAC 977 of the 9th March. General Stilwell is most optimistic that he will advance some distance to the southward even to Mogaung and Myitkyina. I hope it is appreciated that the advanced element of this force are supplied practically entirely by air on the same lines as Wingate is which accounts to some extent for the speed of their advance.

3. If the Chinese-American Combat Force advances as far as Mogaung and Myitkyina, General Stilwell has warned me that a fourth division will be essential. In view of the manpower situation I consider this extra division should be a Chinese one and the more so as it will be the easiest way from the logistic point of view of assimilating the fourth division into this force. The

CM-IN-13579 (19 Mar 44)
Viceroy and C. in C. India concur in this proposal which I am making separately in SEACOS 118. I hope therefore it will be acceptable to you and the President and that the Generalissimo will be pressed strongly to agree.

4. L.R.P.G. Wingate’s operations have already been reported during my absence in SEACOS 111. At a total cost of 120 casualties approximately 12,000 men and 1200 animals of the Third Indian Division are now within a circle of fifty miles radius centre Indaw area.

5. BROADWAY Airfield latitude 24° 40” North, Longitude 96° 45” East, is now occupied by British and American fighters and defended by one troop of Field Artillery and one troop of A/A Artillery with a dug in stronghold which will be held.

6. Of the three brigades, 77 Bde. under Calvert is intending to block permanently all road and rail communications to the north, 111 Bde. under Lentaigne will operate against road and railway Mandalay-Indaw and will block Mandalay-Bhamo communications. 16 Bde. under Ferguson which is descending on Banmauk and Indaw via the Upper Mesa Valley has already encountered and ambushed successfully several enemy patrols.

7. Strongholds are to be established as soon as possible by 111 and 16 Bdes. The enemy has been completely surprised and the situation is promising. In fact, it may well turn out to have been fortunately timed in relation to the Japanese attack on the 4th Corps area.
8. Number one Air Commando has now been working with Wingate for about 4 weeks and during this period its aircraft have flown all over Burma, obtaining information invaluable for the successful launching of the operation. For example, intrusion of P-51 for three days in succession over Mandalay revealed heavy concentrations moving on certain routes and constant photographing and strafing on the railway from Shwebo to Mohynin revealed numerous locomotives and stocks. Again it was photographs by this Commando which revealed the blocking of Piccadilly by the enemy in time to prevent a disaster.

9. This force has worked out a new technique of close support of L.R.P. forces with 75 mm. guns and bazookas and in addition they have carried out the only successful experiment of which I know of drenching an area with fuel and setting it alight in support of Infantry.

10. The light planes of this force have flown continuously over Burma in the hours of daylight and have already evacuated over 100 sick and wounded men.

11. The outstanding feat however of this force is the construction of the BROADWAY Airfield. Great credit must go to Colonel Cochran and his force who accomplished this striking effort of preparing and bringing into use an airfield so far inside the enemy's lines.

12. The spirit of Number one Air Commando is splendid and I consider the great value of this type of air support for L.R.P. operations of the Wingate type has already been demonstrated during the past few weeks. I very much hope that we shall see the production of further Air Commandos at an early date.

13. I need hardly say that the Troop Carrier Command deserve great credit in connection with the flying of Wingate's forces. This hazardous operation was carried out with an efficiency beyond praise.

By Authority of JCS
CM-IN-13579 (19 Mar 44)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN DECLASSIFIED
14. 4th Corps: On the front the Japanese have been massing three divisions with the intention of capturing the Imphal Plain where they would find abundant food and all weather landing grounds thereby constituting a direct threat to the HUMP traffic route. I have set out details of the operations in full together with the air supply problem in my telegram SEACOS 112 and 113.

15. Arakan. 15th Corps one week after successful defensive battle has resumed the offensive in Arakan. The two outlying bastions of the Japanese main positions at Razabil and Sinobin have been captured after severe fighting. Hand to hand struggles in deep dugouts and chambers inside hills resulted in heavy Japanese casualties. Prisoners state they were ordered to hold to the last and Japanese officers committed suicide.

16. In Kaledan Valley West Africans who supplied by air had advanced well against slight opposition met with setback when first encountering stronger enemy resistance and have withdrawn to west of Kaledan village where they are reorganising and will resume offensive. They have succeeded in one of their objects which was to draw Japanese forces from main front in Arakan.

17. Request J.S.M. pass copies of this signal to AXION.

Time of Origin 172313Z

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: OPD
         General Bissell
         General Arnold
         Admiral King
         Colonel Mathewson
Log

CM-IN-13579 (19 Mar 44) 1744Z mem

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of (signature)

COPY No. 0077
TO: British Chiefs of Staff

Info: Joint Staff Mission, MACHIN

From: SACSEA

SEACOS 118

March 17, 1944

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated JSH Washington, MACHIN from Mountbatten.

General Stilwell has reported to me that if his advance continues as he confidently expects he will require another division to afford relief for some part of his existing 3 divisions and sustain the effort. He would prefer this additional division to be Chinese in order to have a homogeneous force and that it should come from the Yunnan Force whose officers have already received some American training. I strongly support this request and would much prefer the fresh division to be Chinese. Not only would it be extremely difficult to find a British or Indian division but also the maintenance of a Chinese division would throw much less additional strain on the lines of communication.

The increase would amount to about 12,000 men over the present total of 58,000 now in Nagpur and operating in Burma. There should be no difficulty in moving the personnel and light equipment out of China by returning ATC aircraft.

The difficulties which previously held good in your COS (India) 194 do not seem now to apply. I have consulted the Viceroy and C-in-C India both of whom agree to the proposal.

General Stilwell thinks that the Generalissimo may hesitate to release a division from the Yunnan Force unless the approach is made to him by the Prime Minister and President acting through General Carton de Wiart and General Hoern jointly. I hope therefore that this method of approach will be adopted.

The American LRP Group (5307 composite unit) has done admirable work and General Stilwell is very anxious that a second similar unit should be provided to provide reliefs in rotation. The intention is to use this unit in conjunction with the Ledo Force.

CM-IN-13580 (19 March 44)
and not with British Forces. I am confident of the operational need for this second unit and trust that the American Chiefs of Staff will agree to provide it.

Request JSM pass copies of this signal to AXIOM and MACHIN to General Carton de Wiart.

No sig

Time of Origin 172310FG

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: General Bissell
      General Arnold
      Admiral King
      Colonel Mathewson
      Log
      OPD

CM-IN-13580 (19 March 44) 1746Z lbw

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
SM-522-71
By [Signature] Date APR 10 1972

COPY No. 0079
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

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<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>505</th>
<th>DATE 20 Mar 44</th>
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DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Re Mountbatten's SEACOS 117, and possibilities of operations in Far East.

ACTION

Answers PM #626, 19 Mar 44.

This message dictated by Admiral Leahy in Map Room 20 Mar 44; approved by the President.

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<td>AR 300 Burma, India, China</td>
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20 March 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 506. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am very angry with myself. The old attack of grippe having hung on and on, leaving me with an intermittent temperature,Ross decided about a week ago that it is necessary for me to take a complete rest of about two or three weeks in a suitable climate which I am definitely planning to do beginning at the end of this month. I see no way out and I am furious.

It will therefore be impossible for me to get to a staff meeting in early April. I believe that such a meeting on the Teheran scale in early April would be most useful and if you agree I will send my Chiefs of Staff to Bermuda for that purpose at any time that suits your convenience.

I am glad you feel hardened about OVERLORD. Its accomplishment may synchronize with a real Russian break-through.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EWT, 20 March 1944.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1977
March 20, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

I am very sorry with myself. The old attack of grippe.

Replying to your 621 and in reference to your
saying being informed me, having an illness with an intermittent
fever and temperature. I have decided about a break up so that it
it is now possible for me to meet that date.

Not having had any opportunity for relaxation
since my recent attack of grippe which has not been
completely eliminated leaves me from time to time
with a temperature.

My doctor considers it necessary for me to
take a complete rest of about two weeks in a suitable
climate which I am definitely planning to do beginning
at the end of this month.

It will therefore be impossible for me to attend a staff meeting in early April. I believe that such a
meeting on the Teheran scale in early April would be
most useful and if you agree I will send my Chiefs of
Staff to Bermuda for that purpose at any time that
suits your convenience.

I can find you feel hard and about...extend
its accomplishment may synchronize with
its real Russian breakthrough.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By J. Stuart
Date NOV 1 1974
March 20, 1944

#506 (Stamp by Admiral Leahy)

PRESIDENT TO PRIME.

Replying to your 624 and in reference to your suggestion that we have a staff meeting on the Teheran scale in Bermuda about the fifth of April, it is not now possible for me to meet that date.

Not having had any opportunity for relaxation since my recent attack of grippe which has not been completely eliminated leaves me from time to time with a temperature.

My doctor considers it necessary for me to take a complete rest of a week or two in a suitable climate which I am definitely planning to do beginning at the end of this month.

Other fixed engagements will necessitate my presence in Washington at least until 20 April. I suggest therefore that we have a meeting in Bermuda about 25 April if you can make your arrangements suit that date.

It will therefore be impossible for me to attend a staff meeting in Early April. I believe that such a meeting on the Teheran scale in Early April would be most useful and if you agree I will send my staff to Bermuda to that purpose.

W. J. STUART

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
**FROM**  The President  | **TO**  The Prime Minister  
---|---
**SERIAL**  506  | **DATE**  20 March 1944  
**DATE/TIME**  |  **OR FILE NUMBER**  202308 NCR 2340  
**TOR MAP ROOM**  | **VIA**  
**SUBJECT**  Proposed Bermuda meeting.  

**ACTION**  
Answers PM #624, 18 Mar 44.  
This message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with alterations;  
Answered by PM 629, 21 Mar 44.

**COPIES TO:**  | **DATE:**  | **BY DIRECTION OF:**  
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**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
MH 210 Bermuda  
**FILED:**  
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22 March 1944

SECRET

PRIOIITY

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 507. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 629 received and my Chiefs of Staff have been told.

I join you in hoping that we may arrange to have a meeting before the great event is launched.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1225, EWT, 22 March 1944.

ROBERT H. MYERS
Lieut.(jg), USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stupart
Date NOV 1971
March 22, 1944.

PRESIDENT TO PRIME # 507

Your 629 received and my Chiefs of Staff have been informed of your opinion that has been expressed.

I join you in hoping that we may arrange to have a meeting before or at about the time the great event is launched.

Parvin

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [Nov 1 1971]
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<th>FROM</th>
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<td>Bermuda meeting</td>
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**ACTION**

Results Pa #629, 21 Mar 44.

Draft of this message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 22 Mar 44.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 508, PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL OR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your 630, thank you for the information as to the present status of the Anglo-Soviet disagreement about Poland. I hope your strategy will accomplish the best possible advantage to both of us.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1210, EWT, 22 March 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
March 22, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME. #508

Your 630, thank you for the information as to the present status of the Anglo-Soviet disagreement about Poland. I hope your strategy will accomplish the best possible advantage to both of us.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.G. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1974
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**ACTION**

Reply#630, 21 Mar 44.

Draft of this message prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved without change by the President.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

052 Russian-Polish relations
24 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 509, AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

1. Thank you for your reply contained in your cables 613 and 614 of March 9. The points you raised have already been brought to my attention several times by Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Hull.

   I am sorry if my message caused you anxiety. There is no dispute as to the understanding on the handling of questionable items under Lend-Lease which was reached between Mr. Crowley, Secretary Hull, Secretary Morgenthau and Lord Halifax, and to which I had given my prior approval. As Secretary Morgenthau stated at the meeting, this understanding did not deal with the dollar position question and did not preclude the possibility of our reopening that question in the future should the situation seem to call for it.

   I raised this dollar position question since it is a troublesome one of continuing concern with us here and doubtless with you. I hope that we may be able together to find some reasonable solution to this problem before it becomes more troublesome.

2. In any further discussion of these matters the
Treasury would be the normal center of such conversations. The agenda which Stettinius has of topics to be discussed in London does not include the question of British dollar balances.

3. The question to which you refer in paragraph two of 614 may be withdrawn, although the Congressman concerned and the entire Foreign Affairs Committee are now alerted to the issue. We will let you know as soon as a definite decision is reached, and will consult fully before any information is proffered.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1515, EWT, 24 March 1944.

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant (Jg), U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By \[\text{Signature}\]
Date Nov 1 1971
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

In pursuance of your memorandum of March 10 to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury, there is attached a suggested cable to be sent to the Prime Minister in reply to his cables 612 and 614 of March 9.

This suggested reply has been approved by Secretary Hull and Mr. Crowley.
#509 24 May 44

To: Prime Minister Churchill
From: The President

1. Thank you for your reply contained in your cables 613 and 614 of March 9. The points you raised have already been brought to my attention several times by Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Hull.

I am sorry if my message caused you anxiety. There is no dispute as to the understanding on the handling of questionable items under Lend-Lease which was reached between Mr. Crowley, Secretary Hull, Secretary Morgenthau and Lord Halifax, and to which I had given my prior approval. As Secretary Morgenthau stated at the meeting, this understanding did not deal with the dollar position question and did not preclude the possibility of our reopening that question in the future should the situation seem to call for it.

I raised this dollar position question since it is a troublesome one of continuing concern with us here and doubtless with you. I hope that we may be able together to find some reasonable solution to this problem before it becomes more troublesome.
2. In any further discussion of these matters the Treasury would be the normal center of such conversations. The agenda which Stettinius has of topics to be discussed in London does not include the question of British dollar balances.

3. The question to which you refer in paragraph 2 of 614 may be withdrawn, although the Congressman concerned and the entire Foreign Affairs Committee are now alerted to the issue. You will be advised as soon as a definite decision is reached, and consulted fully before any information is proffered.

Roosevelt
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

The President has directed that the attached paraphrase of the message on dollar balances, sent to the Prime Minister on 24 March 1944, be furnished to you.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

1 Incl.
Mem No 509 from President to
Prime Minister, 24 Mar 44.
I want to thank you for your reply in your No. 613 and No. 614 of 9 March. Secretary Hull and Secretary Morgenthau have several times brought to my attention the points you raise.

If my message caused you anxiety I am sorry. As to the understanding on the handling of questionable items under Lend-Lease reached between Lord Halifax and Secretary Hull, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. Crowley, and to which I had previously agreed, there is no dispute. This understanding, as Secretary Morgenthau pointed out at the meeting, did not deal with the dollar position question, and did not preclude the future reopening of that question should the situation seem to call for it.

This dollar position question was raised by me because it is troublesome and of continuing concern with us here, and doubtless with you as well. Before it becomes more troublesome, I hope that we may be able together to find some reasonable solution to the problem.

Stettinius' agenda of topics to be discussed in London does not include the British dollar balance question. The Treasury would be the normal center of conversations in any further discussion of these matters.

Although the entire Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congressmen concerned are alerted, the question to which you refer in paragraph
two of 614 may be withdrawn. As soon as a definite decision is reached, we will let you know; and before any information is preferred, will consult fully.
FROM  The President  

TO  The Prime Minister  

SERIAL #509  

DATE  24 Mar 44  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER  

FOR MAP ROOM VIA  

SUBJECT Dollar balances.  

ACTION Answers Ps #613 and #614, 9 Mar 44. By direction of the President, these two messages were sent to the Secretaries of State and Treasury on 10 Mar 44 for comment and recommendations. Draft reply, approved by Sec State, Sec Treasury, and Mr. Crowley approved by the President 24 Mar 44.  

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

WR 002  

FILED: