From: Embassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 597

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Here is a suggested item for your draft of our monthly anti U-boat war statement. Provided later information about sinkings in February 1944 does not considerably increase the figure shown below:

February 1944 was the best month since the United States entered the war. The total sinkings of all Allied shipping in February by enemy action only were less than one fifth of the sinkings in February 1943, and less than one ninth of the sinkings in February 1942.

The figures in British notation are:

February 1944, 70,000 tons;
February 1943, 378,400;
February 1942, 659,500.

We have a very good haul of U-boats, too.

No Sig
The Prime Minister  

TO The President  

SERIAL 597  

DATE 2 March 1944  

DATE/TIME 02/1028Z  

OR FILE NUMBER  

TOR MAP ROOM 02/1220Z VIA Army Code Room  

SUBJECT February monthly Submarine Warfare Statement.  

ACTION  

To President via usher, 02/1240Z.  

Statement prepared by Navy Department, dispatch dictated by Captain Wood in Map Room; approved by President in Doctor's office; answer sent to PM as #484.
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Your 454.

I have now received a report by air mail from the Viceroy on the working of the Port of Calcutta and the Bengal-Assam lines of communication. The Chiefs of Staff have reported to me as follows:

Para 1. As regards the Port of Calcutta, a man of unquestioned standing and ability will shortly be appointed as Port Director to control the whole working of the Port and all the Agencies therein. He will have working under him two deputies, one of whom will be American.

Para 2. Operational control of the metre gauge section of the Bengal-Assam Railway is being taken over by the U.S. Army Railway Units. Machinery, which will be linked with that set up under the Port Director at Calcutta, is being established for the allocation of priorities and the control of movement over all sections of the lines of communication. The allocation of priorities will be determined after consultation with representatives of all interests.

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0102
concerned, including those of the U.S. Forces. The allotment of traffic and the energetic implementation of this allocation will be the responsibility of picked executives.

Para 3. These measures have been worked out with the personal collaboration of the Viceroy and have been agreed with the United States Authorities in India. No effort will be spared to gain the maximum efficiency on the Bengal-Assam lines of communication which is fully recognized to be vital to our joint operations in Burma and the U.S. Army Air Forces operating in China.

I trust this will be satisfactory to you.

No Sig
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<th>The Prime Minister</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>598</td>
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<td>021220Z</td>
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<td>Army Code Room</td>
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| SUBJECT       | Working of port of Calcutta and the Bengal-Assam line of communication. |

**ACTION**

Further reply to POTUS #545, 29 Jan 44.
To President via usher.

*Acknowledged in POTUS #489: no further action.*

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

Cheney

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**FILED:**

0104
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 599 Filed: 3/1805Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
Most Secret.
Reuter announces the message in my immediately
following. Can this be true?

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 599 DATE 3 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 03/1805Z

TOR MAP ROOM 03/1926Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Release to press of Italian ship transfer.

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully,

The President’s msg #486, informing the PM that the story on transfer of Italian ships to Russia had been released to the press, was dispatched from Washington at 1636Z, 3 Mar 44. The PM’s #599 and #600, requesting information on the same subject, were received in the Map Room at 1926Z. The messages crossed in transition. Therefore, this message (PM 599) is answered in POTUS 486.

"(Msg identical to POTUS 486 sent to Stalin, 3 Mar 44)"

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

No. 600  Filed: 3/1805Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Washington Friday from Reuter. Time of receipt 1720 3rd March. Msg begins:

President Roosevelt today announced that Italian warships are ready to be sent to the Russian Navy. Discussions for transferring roughly 1/3 of the Italian Fleet to Russia, the President said, were about half completed.

President Roosevelt said that the U.S. and Britain are already using some Italian tonnage. Efforts are now being made to determine how many of these ships or their equivalent can be turned over to the Russian Navy. Marshal Stalin had raised the question through his Ambassador in Washington.

President Roosevelt stressed that so long as the war lasted the Allies will use everything afloat against the enemy. After the war something more permanent would have to
be decided. Asked whether the ships would be manned by Italians, the President replied that some may and some may not. Italian ships which had escaped to the Balearic Islands, he said, were a Spanish problem.

President Roosevelt explained that since Italy surrendered to the U.S., Britain and Russia, it was thought advisable to distribute the Italian Fleet roughly on the basis of 1/3 each. He would not say how much tonnage was involved.

No Sig
The Prime Minister

TO
The President

SERIAL 600

DATE 3 March 1944

DATE/TIME 03/1805

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM 03/1926Z VIA army Code Room

SUBJECT Release to press of Italian ship transfer.

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully.

The President's msg #486, informing the PM that the story on transfer of Italian ships to Russia had been released to the press, was dispatched from Washington at 1636Z, 3 Mar 44. The PM's #599 and #600, requesting information on the same subject, were received in the Map Room at 1926Z. The messages crossed in transition. Therefore, this message (PM 600) is answered by POTUS 486.

(Msg identical to POTUS 486 sent to Stalin, 3 Mar 44)

FROM

The Prime Minister

TO
The President

SERIAL 600

DATE 3 March 1944

DATE/TIME 03/1805

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM 03/1926Z VIA army Code Room

SUBJECT Release to press of Italian ship transfer.

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully.

The President's msg #486, informing the PM that the story on transfer of Italian ships to Russia had been released to the press, was dispatched from Washington at 1636Z, 3 Mar 44. The PM's #599 and #600, requesting information on the same subject, were received in the Map Room at 1926Z. The messages crossed in transition. Therefore, this message (PM 600) is answered by POTUS 486.

(Msg identical to POTUS 486 sent to Stalin, 3 Mar 44)

FROM

The Prime Minister

TO
The President

SERIAL 600

DATE 3 March 1944

DATE/TIME 03/1805

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM 03/1926Z VIA army Code Room

SUBJECT Release to press of Italian ship transfer.

ACTION

To President via Miss Tully.

The President's msg #486, informing the PM that the story on transfer of Italian ships to Russia had been released to the press, was dispatched from Washington at 1636Z, 3 Mar 44. The PM's #599 and #600, requesting information on the same subject, were received in the Map Room at 1926Z. The messages crossed in transition. Therefore, this message (PM 600) is answered by POTUS 486.

(Msg identical to POTUS 486 sent to Stalin, 3 Mar 44)
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and

Your number 485. Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheep's eyes at our oilfields at Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by giving you the fullest assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia. My position on this, as in all matters, is that Great Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or otherwise, as the result of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause—at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of her affairs. I will bring the matter before the Cabinet on Monday and hope to telegraph you immediately thereafter.

About the India Ocean situation. I hope the enemy
fleet will stay at Singapore, as this should give you fine opportunities in the main Pacific theatre. Thank you very much for the carrier. I shall be sending you a signal shortly on the wider aspects of our joint action against Japan.

About U.J. and the Poles. I am waiting to receive the official answer of the Soviet Government before attempting to make up my mind whether there is anything else we can do.

About the Italian ships et cetera. I was much startled by the press accounts of your talk with them. The Russians have never asked for one-third of the Italian ships. But only for the specific vessels mentioned at Moscow and agreed to by us at Teheran. See list which follows. We have never agreed, as you know, to anything beyond this. We shall now see what the Italian reaction will be and whether the Combined Chiefs of the Staff were right in their apprehensions set forth in J.S.M. 1372 dated 28th-12-43. From your 483 I infer that we are to go on with the policy of loaning U.J. some British and American ships till we can get the Italians. I therefore suggest the following joint message to U.J. from you and me:

Begins.

Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you that the destroyers we are lending you were old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. There are only 7 fleet destroyers in the whole...
Italian Navy, the rest being older destroyers and torpedo boats. Moreover these Italian destroyers, when we do get them, are absolutely unfitted for work in the North without very lengthy refit. Therefore we thought the 8 which the British Government have found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to you. The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the present time. He lost 2 last week, one in the Russian convoy, and for the landing at OVERLORD alone he has to deploy, for close inshore work against the batteries, no fewer than 42 destroyers, a large proportion of which may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The movement of the Japanese fleet to Singapore creates a new situation for us both in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in the Anzio bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the Atlantic with the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are being run up to the last minute before OVERLORD with very heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is OVERLORD itself. The President's position is similarly strained, but in this case mainly because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the Pacific. Our joint intentions to deliver to you the Italian ships agreed upon at Moscow and Teheran remain unaltered, and we shall put the position formally to the Italian Government at the time when it is broadened and the new ministers take over their
responsibilities. There is no question of our right to
dispose of the Italian Navy, but only of exercising that
right with the least harm to our common interests. Mean-
while, all our specified ships are being prepared for delivery
to you on loan as already agreed. Signed: Roosevelt.
Churchill. Message to Stalin ends.

I must send you my warmest congratulations on the
grand fighting of your troops, particularly the United States
Third Division in the Anzio bridgehead. I am always deeply
moved to think of our men fighting side by side in so many
fierce battles and of the inspiring additions to our history
which these famous episodes will make. Of course I have been
very anxious about the bridgehead where we have so little
ground to give. The stakes are very high on both sides now
and the suspense is long-drawn. I feel sure we shall win
both here and at Cassino.

We certainly do have plenty to worry us now that our
respective democracies feel so sure the whole war is as good
as won.

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**SUBJECT**
- Oilfields at Iran and Iraq; Indian ocean situation;
- Polish-Russian relations;
- Transfer of Italian ships.

**ACTION**
To President via usher. Answers PRES #485, 3 Mar 44.

Answer prepared by Admiral Brown; approved by President 7 Mar 44; sent to Fm as #489, 7 March 44.

See message from Winant, 6 Mar 44, containing memo from Prime Minister.

**COPIES TO:**
- Copy of joint POTUS-Fm message to Stalin filed in POTUS-STALIN file.
From: MA London
For: The President of the United States

Number 602 Filed 041925Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Number 601. Number 602.

My immediately preceding telegram. The Admiralty state that one third of the Italian ships in our possession would amount to:

1.7 battleships
2 6 inch cruisers
0.7 5.3 inch cruisers
3.3 destroyers
7.7 torpedo boats
6.7 corvettes
7.3 submarines

Whereas what the Russians ask for and what the British agreed to was:
1 battleship
1 cruiser
6 destroyers
4 submarines

40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Transfer of Italian ships to Russia; press release.</td>
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**ACTION**

(Further to Pa #601.)

To President via usher.

Answer prepared by Admiral Brown; approved by President 7 Mar 44; sent to PM as #489, 7 March 44.

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**COPIES TO:**

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**DATE:**

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**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

Italian Shipping

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**FILED:**

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0116
From: London  
For: The President of the United States  
Number 603  
Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret. Number 603.

I have just received the following from Mountbatten which I forward to you knowing the interest you take in these parts.

"At one time, I had every hope even after the cancellation of 'FIGSTICK' that advance in Arakan would be pressed to the south of Mayu Peninsular in time to give a sporting chance of taking Akyab. Japanese counter offensive has imposed a vital three weeks delay which I fear will prevent us from reaching the south of Mayu Peninsular in time to cover the passage of landing craft round Foul Point into river before swell conditions which become rapidly worse from now on prevent it. Wingate's operations are proceeding to plan as follows:

"A. 16 Brigade has crossed the Upper Chindwin about 30 miles southwest of Taro and will operate against communications of 18 and 31 Divisions."
"B. 77 Brigade due to be flown into Okkyi Valley between March 6 and March 9 to operate against communication of 18 Division.

"C. 111 Brigade due to be flown into same air strip as 77 Brigade between March 10 and March 13 to operate in area Wuntho Katha against communications of 15 Division."

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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Burma operations, Quotes letter from Mountbatten</td>
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**ACTION**

To President via usher.

Acknowledged in POTUS #489, 7 Mar 44; no further action.
4 March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 604

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

1. I have now received Stalin's reply about
Poland which I send in my immediately following. I find
it most discouraging. I will send you a copy of my answer
as soon as it has been approved by the Cabinet.

2. There is now no reason in my opinion why the
Polish Prime Minister should not visit the United States
as you invited him to do. It may at any rate make the
Russians more careful if they see that Poland is not en-
tirely without friends.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister
TO The President
SERIAL 604
DATE 4 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 04/2310Z
TOR MAP ROOM 05/0130Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Forwards Stalin's reply on Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION To President via usher. (See also 605)

Acknowledged by POTUS 189: further reply in POTUS 609.

COPIES TO:
DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Polish-Russian relations
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 605 — Filed 0423102

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Number 605.

Following is Stalin's reply referred to in my number 604.

"I received both your messages of the 20th February on the Polish question from Sir A. Clark Kerr on the 27th February.

"I have studied the detailed account of your conversations with the members of the Emigre Polish Government and have come more and more to the conclusion that such people are not capable of establishing normal relations with the USSR. Suffice it to point to the fact that not only do they not wish to recognize the Curzon Line but they still lay claim to Lvov as well as Vilna. As regards designs to place under foreign control the administration of certain Soviet territories, we cannot accept for discussion such aspirations since we consider even the very raising of a question of such a kind insulting for the Soviet Union."

Regraded unclassified by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

File Copy
"I have already written to the President that the solution of the question of Soviet-Polish relations has not yet matured.

"It is necessary once more to affirm the justness of this conclusion. 3d March, 1944."

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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Stalin's reply on Russian-Polish relations.</td>
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**ACTION**

To President via usher.

(Continuation of PM #604.)

Acknowledged by POTUS 489; Further reply in

(See further PM #609)

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

Polish-Russian Relations
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 606, Filed 05/1822Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.
Your number 484. We agree. We should prefer
to leave out the last sentence but we do not press the
point.

No Sig

Last sentence -
The lack of aggressiveness on the part
of the U-boat continues.
The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 606 DATE 5 March 1944

DATE/TIME 05/1822Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 05/1900Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT February submarine warfare statement.

ACTION

To President via usher.

Answers POTUS L64. After consultation with the President, Admiral Brown draft reply; sent to Pa as #L88.

For complete action on February submarine warfare statement, see "AR 000.7 (3) Sec. 2"

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Submarine Statement
5 March 1944

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Number 607

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most
and personal. Number 607.

Your number 487.

We agree about this being in General Wilson's sphere. But I think that the mission should in the first place be received by representatives of the three Allies and a military representative of General Wilson and the first contacts established through diplomatic channels. General Wilson would, of course, be kept informed and would be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff if and when it came to dictating armistice terms. No doubt you will instruct your representative to keep in touch with Mr. MacMillan who will act for us. I think it most important, however, that you and I should watch this from day to day and settle on the highest level, of course in conjunction with U.J.

No Sig

[Redacted]

Re: 0522402-08

RPW

Paraphrase receipt to State Dept to War
Dpt to inform them President's 487-
preparation strongly after consultation.
6 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 607 from the Prime Minister be furnished to the Department of State for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order that you may be fully informed, a paraphrased copy of the President's message No. 487 to the Prime Minister is also furnished.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.
Incl 1-PM-President #607,
5 March 1944.
Incl 2-President-PM. #487,
6 March 1944.
FROM: The Prime Minister TO: The President

SERIAL: 607 DATE: 5 March 1944

DATE/TIME: 052002Z OR FILE NUMBER: 05/2240Z

TOR MAP ROOM: 05/2240Z VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Bulgarian surrender.

ACTION:

To President via usher. Answers POTUS #487, 3 Mar 44.

By direction of the President, copy sent to State Department, together with copy of POTUS #487, for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Proposed reply given to President by Admiral Leahy 8 Mar 44; approved; sent to POTUS #491, 8 Mar 44.

(See "MR 370 BULGARIA (1)"

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

State Department 6 Mar 44 The President

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Bulgaria
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 608 Filed: 071236 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and
About the Italian ships.

1. I have never agreed nor have you ever asked me
to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet into 3 shares.
If this claim were to be based on the fact that we 3 Powers
signed the Italian Armistice together, what about all the
other Powers that fought Italy? Greece for instance would
have an irrefutable claim. It was not until after the Cairo
conference that I heard you had mentioned about the 1/3 for
Russia. Averell was however able to assure you that nothing
of the sort had been said to the Russians. See your number
437. You are therefore quite uncommitted so far as they are
concerned.

2. His Majesty's Government would not be able to
agree to a division of the Italian Fleet by 1/3 or a pro rata
division among signatories to the Armistice. We hold very
strongly that losses entailed in the Italian war must be

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Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date: MAY 6 1972

0130
considered. We bore the whole weight of that war from
1940 onwards until British and American troops entered
Tunisia as the result of "TORCH". Our Naval losses alone
have been very heavy indeed. For instance, from Italy's
declaration of war until her unconditional surrender, the
Royal Navy lost in the Mediterranean the following major
warships:

1. Battleship
2. Aircraft Carriers
1. Monitor
14. Cruisers
48. Destroyers
13. Escorts
3. Fast Minelayers
2. Depot Ships
40. Submarines

and the following merchant shipping: 129 vessels of
780,000 gross tonnage. We certainly feel that we are en-
titled to have our claims for replacements duly considered
by our closest Ally.

3. Here I must mention that excepting only Vanguard
we have suspended our whole battleship programme including
the four 16-inch battleships authorized by Parliament even
before the war began in order to concentrate upon short-term
war necessities freely expended in the common cause. We have
borne the whole burden of warship losses in the Russian con-
voys, to wit:

2. Cruisers
5. Destroyers
3. Minesweepers
1. Fleet Oiler.

4. Up to the present I have been content to leave

REGRADED, UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 8 '72

0131
these matters for adjustment at the end of the war when His Majesty's Government would certainly have represented that they were justly entitled to the 2 surviving Littorines on account of their heavy battleship losses. I do not wish to prejudge this question at the present time. We must however bear in mind that about 100 Italian Warships have been and up to the present moment are still doing useful and important work for both our countries. I therefore suggest that all further discussion of a division of the Italian Fleet apart from what we agreed with Stalin at Teheran, stand over till the end of the war, when no doubt the Japanese Fleet will also come into consideration.

5. At the Moscow conference the Russians asked for certain specified types of Italian ships, namely

1  Battleship
1  Cruiser
8  Destroyers
4  Submarines

and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping. At Teheran we assented to this. The Combined Chiefs of Staff subsequently became alarmed lest the announcement that we meant to turn over Italian ships to the Soviets should impair cooperation by the Italian Naval Forces and possibly lead to scuttling. You and I then agreed to propose to Russia that we lend her the same quantity of ships until the matter could be adjusted with the Italians after the present critical stage of the war in Italy and in the Mediterranean was over. This was accepted by the Russians. I am sure you will recognize that
the British Admiralty made a generous contribution to the plan by providing in fact 13 warships out of 14 and half the merchant tonnage. This plan is in actual process of being carried out.

6. Our relations with the Italian Government in this matter must also be considered. They surrendered their fleet and there is no doubt of the ultimate right of the Allies to dispose of it as they may decide. However Admiral Andrew Cunningham, with General Eisenhower's full assent, made an agreement at Taranto in consequence of which the Italian Fleet, which had bravely escaped from the clutches of the Germans, not without heavy loss, thenceforward became actively employed in the Allied interest. A relationship has been established between the Italian Fleet and the British and American Fleets alongside of whom they are operating which certainly implies that we should treat them properly and with due consideration. A prisoner of war is one thing but once you accept a man's services and he fights at your side against the common enemy, a different status and relationship are established. I hope this may be patiently looked into because at present the British Admiralty feel uncomfortable about the position into which we have got.

7. I shall no doubt have to make a statement to Parliament in the near future and would propose, subject to your agreement, something as follows:

As President Roosevelt has said the question of
the future employment and disposal of the Italian Fleet has been the subject of some discussion. In particular consideration has been given to the immediate reinforcement of the Soviet Navy either from Anglo-American or Italian resources. On these discussions I have no statement to make other than to say that at present no change is contemplated in the arrangements with the Italian Naval Authorities under which Italian ships and their crews take part in the common struggle against the enemy in the theatres where they now operate. It may well be found that the general question of enemy or ex-enemy fleet disposal should best be left over till the end of the war against both Germany and Japan, when the entire position can be surveyed by the victorious Allies and what is right and just can be done.

No Sig

RE GRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
By H. H. Parks       Date MAY 6 1972
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  
SERIAL: 608  
DATE: 7 Mar 1944  
DATE/TIME: 07/1236Z  
CONTAINMENT NUMBER: 071610Z  
VIA: Army Code Room  
SUBJECT: Transfer of Italian ships.

ACTION: (See "AR 450 ITALY")  

To President by Admiral Brown.

Acknowledged in last paragraph of POTUS #482 (see action sheet). Further answered in POTUS #492.

(Statement to Commons mentioned in PM #608 was made on morning of 9 Mar 44.)

COPY TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  
FILED:  
Italian Ships
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 609 Filed: 071730 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal

Following is text of reply which I have sent, at the desire of the War Cabinet, to UJ in reply to his message of March 3rd repeated to you in my No. 605.

1. I thank you for your message of March 3rd about the Polish question.

2. I made it clear to the Poles that they would not get either Lwow or Vilna and the references to these places, as my message shows, merely suggested a way in those areas in which the Poles thought they could help the common cause. They were certainly not intended to be insulting either by the Poles or by me. However since you find them an obstacle pray consider them withdrawn and expunged from the message.

3. The proposals I submitted to you make the occupation by Russia of the Curzon Line a de facto reality in agreement with the Poles from the moment your armies reach it.
and I have told you that, provided the settlement you and we have outlined in our talks and correspondence was brought into being, His Britannic Majesty's Government would support it at the armistice or peace conferences. I have no doubt it would be equally supported by the United States. Therefore you would have the Curzon Line de facto with the assent of the Poles as soon as you get there, and with the blessing of your Western Allies at the general settlement.

4. Force can achieve much but force supported by the goodwill of the world can achieve more. I earnestly hope that you will not close the door finally to a working arrangement with the Poles which will help the common cause during the war and give you all you require at the peace. If nothing can be arranged and you are unable to have any relations with the Polish Government, which we shall continue to recognize as the Government of the Ally for whom we declared war upon Hitler, I should be very sorry indeed. The War Cabinet asks me to say that they would share this regret. Our only comfort will be that we have tried our very best.

5. You spoke to Ambassador Clark Kerr of the danger of the Polish question making a rift between you and me. I shall try earnestly to prevent this. All my hopes for the future of the world are based upon the friendship and cooperation of the western democracies and Soviet Russia.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 609 DATE 7 Mar 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 071730Z

TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT PM's msg to Stalin on Polish-Russian relations.

ACTION

(Further to PM #604 and 605.)

To President via Miss Tully.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 8 Mar 44; sent to PM as #493.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

"052 Polish-Russian relations."

Polish-Russian relations.
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 610, Filed 08/1244Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

1. Your number 490 causes me concern. It is a departure from your agreement with me of February 11 (your 464) which you kindly reaffirmed in your number 483 describing the matter as "finished business". On the strength of the first assurances I made my statement to Parliament.

2. My advices do not lead me to believe that any new facts of importance have arisen or that the Allied forces are not capable of maintaining order in the regions they have occupied as the result of the "unconditional surrender" of Italy. It would in my opinion be a very serious mistake to give way to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of office seeking politicians. We should then be liable to set up in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but which would endeavour to make its position with the Italian people by standing...
up to the Allies. In fact we should have another but more intractable version of the De Gaullist Committee. Meanwhile in the midst of a heart-shaking battle we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of the King and Badoglio, which is doing its utmost to work its passage and aid us in every way.

3. I readily admit that the course you recommend would be the more popular and would have at least a transitory success. But I am sure that for the victorious conquerers to have their hands forced in this way by sections of the defeated population would be unfortunate. So also would be the obvious open division between you and me and between our two governments. I gave you and the State Department loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair. Unity of action between our two governments was never more necessary than at the present time considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead.

4. I am quite ready to take up with you now the proposals put forward by General Wilson set out in his number 634, whereby the Crown Prince becomes lieutenant of realm. I have no confidence in either Croce or Sforza for
this job. MacMillan tells me Croce is a dwarf professor about 75 years old who wrote good books about aesthetics and philosophy. Vyshinsky who has tried to read the books says they are even duller than Karl Marx. Sforza has definitely broken his undertakings given in his letter to Mr. Berle of September 23. I hope therefore we may open discussions with you on the basis of the Foreign Secretary's telegram number 1783 to Halifax. I repeat I am most anxious to see a broadly based government assume power in Italy, but this ought not to be done under duress by the Allies and can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or, best of all, when Rome is taken. MacMillan is returning at once.

No Sig

Red. 1423Z
Pen Col Mackerson

Paraphrased copy to State. RMB

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED by Brit
Govt., State Dept. tel., 8-26-73
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

0141
FROM | The Prime Minister
---|---
TO | The President
SERIAL | 610
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER | 08/1244Z
TOR MAP ROOM | 08/1423Z
VIA | Army Code Room
SUBJECT | Italian Political situation.

ACTION
Answers POTUS #490.

To President by Col Mathewson. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leeshy and Admiral Brown in Map Room; approved by President with minor changes; sent to PM as POTUS #494.

Copies of POTUS #490 and PM #610 sent to State Department, 8 March 1944. Further reply draft by State Department, approved by President; sent to PM as #498.

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<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>8 March 1944</td>
<td>The President</td>
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</table>

ACTION COMPLETED: 37 Italy
FILED: 0142
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 611 Filed 090100Z
Prime Minister to President. Personal and
No. 611.
* I am most grateful to you for all your four tele-
grams just received.

No Sig

Four messages referred to are:

1. POTUS #491 - Mr. MacVeagh to represent us in Bulgarian surrender
negotiations.

2. POTUS #492 - Transfer Italian ships.

3. POTUS #493 - Polish-Russian relations.

4. POTUS #494 - Italian political situation.
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 611 DATE 9 March 1944

DATE/TIME 090100Z OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 09/0210Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Acknowledgment of message #491 thru #494.

ACTION

Acknowledged messages #491 (Mr. MacVeagh to represent us in Bulgarian surrender negotiations); #492 (Transfer of Italian ships); #493 (Polish-Russian relations); #494 (Italian political situation).

To President via usher.

No answer.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: Italian surrender; Italian ships; Polish-Russian relations; Italian government;
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 612, Filed 09/1620Z
Prime Minister to President. Personal.
Your 489 for confidential information of Italian
officers. We entirely agree and have signalled Wilson
accordingly as from Combined Chiefs of Staff for use at
his discretion.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt. State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
<table>
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>09/1620Z March 44</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>09/1700Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Transfer of Italian ships; statement for confidential information of Italian officials.</td>
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**ACTION**

Answers POTUS #489.

To President via Miss Tully. Memorandum sent to Vice Admiral H. S. Edwards to be sent to our commanders in Mediterranean. (See "MR 450 ITALY (2) Sec 1")

No answer.

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ACTION COMPLETED: Italian shipping

FILED: 0146
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 613 Filed 092000Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 613. Personal and Your 474.

1. You will remember that we discussed the dollar balances in Cairo on December 8th and that I gave a memo-

randum to Harry. I certainly understood that you felt we ought not to be treated worse than France or Russia in these matters. France has at least two billions and no overseas liabilities against them. So has Russia. These dollar balances are not, as your telegram might suggest, a particular part of our assets which is available in the United States, but our total reserves. Against these reserves we have incurred for the common cause liabilities of at least ten billions on the other side of the account.

2. Since our talk, Lord Halifax met Mr. Hull and Mr. Morgenthau as recently as January 8th, when the matters mentioned in the first paragraph of your telegram under reply were discussed. Lord Halifax reported to us that Mr. Morgenthau stated to him that it was not at present intended to reduce our dollar balances in any other way, and in reliance on this personal assurance to Lord Halifax,
we agreed to the exclusion of the politically difficult item from Lend-Lease.

3. Will you allow me to say that the suggestion of reducing our dollar balances, which constitute our sole liquid reserve, to one billion dollars would really not be consistent either with equal treatment of Allies or with any conception of equal sacrifice or pooling of resources. We have not shirked our duty or indulged in an easy way of living. We have already spent practically all our convertible foreign investments in the struggle. We alone of the Allies will emerge from the war with great overseas war debts. I do not know what would happen if we were now asked to disperse our last liquid reserves required to meet pressing needs, or how I could put my case to Parliament without it affecting public sentiment in the most painful manner and that at a time when British and American blood will be flowing in broad and equal streams and when the shortening of the war even by a month would far exceed the sums under consideration.

4. I venture to put these arguments before you in order that you may be fully armed with our case, for my confidence in your sense of justice and, I may add, in
that of the American people is unshakable.

5. But see also my immediately following.

No Sig

Pd: 092245Z
De Ps: via Ad. Brown in Mr's office.

Parasprances check to Rector, State &Tag
1014152
14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Furnished herewith are copies of references made in the Prime Minister's message No. 613 of 9 March 1944 to the President which you requested.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.
Incl 1 - Msg, Pw-President, #474, 22 February 1944.
Incl 2 - Memo, Cherwell to Prime Minister, 12 Nov 1944.
10 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached messages from the Prime Minister, dated 9 March 1944, be referred to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury for comment and recommendation.

L. MATHERSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls -
Incl 1. Prime Minister to President,
#613, 9 March 1944.
Incl 2. Prime Minister to President,
#614, 9 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
PARAPHRASE
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 613, 9 MARCH 1944.

1. In Cairo on December 8th, you will recall, we had a discussion on the dollar balances and I gave Harry a memorandum. In these matters I surely understood that you felt that we should not be treated worse than Russia or France. France has against her at least two billions and no overseas liabilities, as has Russia. These dollar balances are our total reserves and not, as your telegram might suggest, a certain part of our assets which is available in the United States. On the other side of the account, we have incurred for the common cause liabilities of at least ten billions against these reserves.

2. Following our discussion, Mr. Hull and Mr. Morgenthau met with Lord Halifax as recently as January 8th, at which time the matters dealt with in the first paragraph of your telegram under reply were considered. According to Lord Halifax's report to us, Mr. Morgenthau stated that at present there was no intention to reduce our dollar balances by any other means. Our agreement to the exclusion of the politically difficult item from Lend-Lease was based on this personal assurance to Lord Halifax.

3. Will you permit me to state that the proposal to reduce our dollar balances, which form our only liquid reserve, to one billion dollars really would not be consistent either with any conception of
pooling of resources or equal sacrifice or with equal treatment of Allies. Our duty has not been shirked nor have we indulged in an easy way of life. Already in this struggle we have expended almost all our convertible foreign investments. Of the Allies, we alone will emerge from the war with heavy war debts overseas. If we were now requested to disperse our final liquid reserves needed to meet urgent requirements, I do not know what would happen or how I could report to Parliament without affecting public feeling most adversely at a time when the shortening of the war by even a month would far outweigh the sums under discussion and when American and British blood will be flowing in broad and equal streams.

4. So that you may be fully informed of our case, I venture to bring these arguments to your attention, for I have unshakable confidence in your sense of justice, and I may add, in that of the American people.

5. My immediately following message continues.
FROM  The Prime Minister  
TO       The President

SERIAL  613
DATE/TIME  09/2000Z
OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT  Dollar balance. (Continued in #614)

ACTION

Answers POTUS #474.

Shown to President by Admiral Brown; President directed that paraphrased copies be sent to the Sec of State and Sec of Treasury for comment and recommendations. Referred by memo on 10 Mar 44, with copy of PM #614.

Draft message, approved by Sec State, Sec Treasury, and Mr. Crowley approved by President 24 Mar 44; sent to the PM as PRES's #509, 24 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Dollar balance
9 March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 614

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 614. Personal and confidential.

1. Further to my number 613. I have laid before you our case about dollar balances in its full strength, but from the informal way in which you refer to it in your number 474, I have wondered whether you might be meaning only that we should search for some arrangement to enable us to put a portion of our balance less conspicuously in the limelight. If this is so, and if you desire it, we will go into this very carefully with Stettinius when he visits us.

2. Since we received your telegram, we now learn that Mr. Crowley on March 8th promised to give Congress the amount of our dollar balances now and at the outbreak of war. This raises serious dangers. I am confident in the justice of our case if it could be stated as a whole, and of course if the matter becomes public property, we shall have to justify ourselves in public. The disclosure

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-28-72
By R. H. Parks Date
MAY 6 1972

File Copy

0155
of the vast debit balance which is growing up against us outside the United States would certainly have most injurious effects upon our Sterling position, and consequently upon the whole strength of the Allies at this period. We therefore ask that there shall be no disclosure. If this is not possible, that the disclosure shall be in strict confidence, and also that the substance of our case should be stated to the body to whom the disclosure is made.

No Sig
10 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

The President has directed that the attached messages from the Prime Minister, dated 9 March 1944, be referred to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury for comment and recommendation.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

2 Incls - 
Incl 1. Prime Minister to President,
#613, 9 March 1944.
Incl 2. Prime Minister to President,
#614, 9 March 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 614, 9 MARCH 1944

1. In addition to my number 613. I have presented to you our complete point of view about dollar balances, but from the informal manner in which you allude to it in your number 474, I have been wondering whether your meaning might be only that we should seek some means to make it possible to place a portion of our balance less strongly in the spotlight. If this be true, and if you wish it, when Stettinius visits us we shall consider this most carefully.

2. We have learned since we received your telegram that on March 8th Mr. Crowley promised to present to Congress the amount of our dollar balances at the start of the war and now. The dangers of this are serious. If our case could be stated as a whole, I am confident of the justice of it, and of course we shall have to justify ourselves in public if the matter becomes the property of the public. To reveal the large debit balance which is mounting up against us outside the United States would surely affect our Sterling position most injuriously, and would consequently affect the whole strength of the Allies at this point. We request, therefore, that no disclosures be made, and if this is impossible, that the content of our case should be presented to the group to whom the disclosure is made and that the information shall be in strict confidence.
1. In addition to my number 613, I have presented to you our complete point of view about dollar balances, but from the informal manner in which you allude to it in your number 474, I have been wondering whether your meaning might be only that we should seek some means to make it possible to place a portion of our balances less strongly in the spotlight. If this be true, and if you wish it, when Stottinus visits us we shall consider this most carefully.

2. We have learned since we received your telegram that on March 8th Mr. Crowley promised to present to Congress the amount of our dollar balances at the start of the war and now. The dangers of this are serious. If our case could be stated as a whole, I am confident of the justice of it, and of course we shall have to justify ourselves in public if the matter becomes the property of the public. To reveal the large debit balance which is mounting up against us outside the United States would surely affect our Sterling position most injuriously, and would consequently affect the whole strength of the Allies at this point. We request, therefore, that no disclosures be made, and if this is impossible, that the content of our case should be presented to the group to whom the disclosure is made and that the information shall be in strict confidence.
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>614</td>
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Dollar balance.</td>
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<td>(Continuation of #613)</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
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**Answers POTUS #474.**

Shown to President by Admiral Brown; President directed that paraphrased copies be sent to the Sec of State and Sec of Treasury for comment and recommendations. Referred by memo on 10 Mar 44, with copy of PM #613. Draft message, approved by Sec State, Sec Treasury, and Mr. Crowing approved by President 24 Mar 44; sent to the PM as Faco's #509, 24 Mar 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

Dollar balance
9 March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 615  Filed 092155Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 615. Personal and secret.

You will be glad to hear that the latest Russian convoy has now got safe home, and that four U-boats out of the pack that attacked it were certainly sunk on the voyage by the escort.

No Sig

Your 615. Congratulations. Well done.

R. H. Parks

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-22-72
Red: 092250Z
To: (redacted)

By R. H. Parks Date: May 6 1972

Read in President's office.

Approved in President's office.

0161
The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL 615 DATE 9 Mar 44

DAT/HIME OR FILE NUMBER 092155Z

TOR MAP ROOM 0922502 VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Russian convoy; sinking of 4 U-boats.

ACTION

To President in Dr's office by Admiral Brown.

Answered in POTUS 495.
From:  Embassy London

To:  The President of the United States

Number 616  Filed 10/0906Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and

I am sending you to-day by courier an inscription I
have had drawn up for Harry about his boy who was killed.
It would be very kind of you to have it sent him wherever
he is recuperating. How does the operation stand now?

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks  Date  MAY 6 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Pink dispatch from the Prime
March 10 - No. 616
FROM: The Prime Minister

TO: The President

SERIAL: 616

DATE: 10 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER: 10/0906

TOR MAP ROOM: 10/1010Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Inscription to Mr. Hopkins about Stephen. Requests information on Mr. Hopkins' illness.

ACTION:

To the President on tray, 0845.

Answer prepared by the President; brought to the Map Room by Miss Tully; sent to the PM as POTUS #496.

(Also see message sent to Miss Tully by the Prime Minister's Secretary, requesting that the PM be informed when inscription was delivered to the President and to Mr. Hopkins. Filed "Misc. Other Than Presidential")

President acknowledged receipt, and informed PM that inscription was being forwarded to Rochester in POTUS-Pm #500, 15 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

100 Hopkins, Stephen
From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No: 617  
Filed: 101706 Z  

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.

1. In the final report of the Cairo conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported that they had "Approved in principle as a basis for further investigation and preparation" an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. This plan contemplated the despatch to the Pacific of a detachment of the British Fleet which was provisionally scheduled to become operational in the Pacific in June 1944. Although you and I both initialled the final report, neither of us had had the opportunity of going into these matters personally as we were concerned with affairs of more immediate urgency. Since then the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff have been "investigating" and we have not so far reached united conclusions. Meanwhile the Japanese Fleet has arrived at Singapore which constitutes in my mind a new major fact.

2. After the surrender of the Italian Fleet in September 1943 I was very keen on sending a detachment of
our fleet as quickly as possible to the Pacific, but when I opened this to Admiral King he explained to me how very strong the United States Navy was already in those waters compared to the Japanese, and I formed the impression that he did not need us very much. I have also seen several telegrams from our Naval representatives in Washington which tend to confirm the above impression. On the other hand, I am told that Admiral King has informed the First Sea Lord that he would like to have our detachment, provided it did not arrive until August or September, when its logistic requirements could more easily be met. I am, in the upshot, left in doubt about whether we are really needed this year.

3: Accordingly I should be very grateful if you could let me know whether there is any specific American operation in the Pacific

(A) Before the end of 1944 or

(B) Before the summer of 1945

which would be hindered or prevented by the absence of a British Fleet Detachment.

4. On the other hand the movement of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore, which coincided inter alia with their knowledge of the movement of our battleship squadron into the Indian Ocean, seems to show their sensitiveness about the Andamans, Nicobars and Sumatra. It would surely be an advantage to you if, by keeping up the threat in the Bay of
Bengal, we could detain the Japanese Fleet or a large portion of it at Singapore and thus secure you a clear field in the Pacific to enable your by-passing process and advance to develop at full speed.

5. General Wedemeyer is able to unfold all Dickie’s plans in the Indian Theatre and the Bay of Bengal. They certainly seem to fit in with the kind of requests which Chiang Kai-Shek was making which you favoured but which we were unable to make good before the monsoon on account of the Mediterranean and OVERLORD operations. I am personally still of opinion that amphibious action across the Bay of Bengal will enable all our forces and establishments in India to play their highest part in the next 18 months in the war against Japan. We are examining now the logistics in detail and prima facie it seems that we could attack with two or three times the strength the islands across the Bay of Bengal and thereafter the Malay Peninsula than we could by prolonging our communications about 9000 miles round the south of Australia and operating from the Pacific side and on your southern flank. There is also the objection of dividing our fleet and our effort between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and throwing out of gear so many of our existing establishments from Calcutta to Ceylon and way back in the Suez Canal zone.

6. Before however reaching any final conclusions in
my mind about this matter, I should like to know what answer you would give to the question I posed in paragraph three, namely, would your Pacific operations be hindered if, for the present at any rate and while the Japanese Fleet is at Singapore, we kept our centre of gravity in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal and planned amphibious operations there as resources come to hand.

No Sig
To President via Miss Tully.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with alterations; sent to the PM as #497.
13 March 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 618

Prime Minister to President. Personal and
Number 618. Your number 494.

1. I should be most grateful if you would read
Eden's number 1783 to Halifax, which shows the kind of
policy we should like to embark upon. I am entirely at
one with you in the big objective of self-determination.
All I plead for is "timing". I do not believe the ambi-
tuous wind-bags, now agitating behind our front that they
may themselves become the government of Italy, have any
representative footing. I fear that if we drive out the
King and Badoglio at this stage, we shall only have com-
plicated the task of the armies.

2. I see that this is also the Soviet view. They
are certainly realistic but of course their aim may be a
Communist Italy, and it may suit them to use the King and
Badoglio till everything is ready for an extreme solution.
I can assure you that this danger is also in my mind. My
idea remains that we should try to construct a broadly-based government, taking into account the opinion of the democratic North of Italy and seeking representatives from there. Of course, if we cannot get Rome for several months, we shall have to act earlier, but without the favourable conditions which will be open to us once we are in possession of the capital. We shall then have much better chances of finding a really representative footing.

No Sig

13/22552
To President via Adm. Brown

President directed send facsimile copy to State with copy of his 494.

This has been sent already (1 Feb 72)

REGRDED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Enclosed herewith is a paraphrased copy of a message dated 13 March 1944 from the Prime Minister to the President. The President has directed that this message be delivered to the Secretary of State. On 8 March the Secretary of State was furnished with a paraphrased copy of the President's message Number 474, referred to by the Prime Minister.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

L. MATHESON
Colonel, General Staff.

Enc: PM to Pres. #613
Number 618 to the President from the Prime Minister dated 13 March 1944.

Eden's number 1783 to Halifax shows the kind of policy we should like to embark upon. I should be most grateful if you would read it. I am in complete agreement with you in the big objective of self determination. "Timing" is all I plead for. The ambitious wind-bags, now agitating behind our front that they may themselves become the government of Italy, I do not believe have any representative footing. We shall only have complicated the task of the armies, I fear, if we drive out the King and Badoglio at this stage.

This is also the Soviet view, I see. They are certainly realistic but of course their aim may be a Communist Italy, and it may suit them to use the King and Badoglio till everything is ready for an extreme solution. That this danger is also in my mind I can assure you. My idea remains that, taking into account the opinion of the democratic North of Italy and seeking representatives from there, we should try to construct a broadly-based government. If we cannot get Rome for several months of course, we shall have to act earlier, but without the favourable conditions which will be open to us once we are in possession of the capital. Chances of finding a really representative footing will then be much better.
FROM: The Prime Minister TO: The President

SERIAL: 618 DATE: 13 March 1944

DATE/TIME: 132118Z OR FILE NUMBER: 12/22552

TOR MAP ROOM: 12/22552 VIA: Army Code Room

SUBJECT: Italian political situation.

ACTION: Answers POTUS #194.

To President by Admiral Brown

By direction of the President, paraphrased copy sent to Secretary of State, 14 Mar 44. (See State already has copy of POTUS #194.)

Answered by POTUS #502.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:


ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

By State
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 619, Filed 14/1148Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Your 498 has crossed my 618. Meanwhile the Russians have announced that they have sent a fully-accredited ambassador to the present Italian Government with whom we are still technically at war. I do not think it would be wise, without further consideration, to accept the programme of the so-called six parties and demand forthwith the abdication of the King and the installation of Signor Croce as Lieutenant of the Realm. I will however, consult the War Cabinet upon what you justly call a "major political decision". Our war with Italy has lasted since June 1940 and we have suffered 232,000 casualties in men, as well as the losses in ships which I mentioned in my number 608. I feel sure that in this matter our view will receive consideration from you. We ought to make every effort to act together. Pray remember that on the strength of your number 464 I committed myself in public and that any divergence will certainly become known.

No Sig
14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In accordance with the telephone conversation this morning with Mr. Benchard, there is enclosed herewith a paraphrased copy of the Prime Minister’s message Number 619 to the President dated 14 March 1944 which is being forwarded to you upon the instructions of the President.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

Robert H. Myers,
Lieut. (jg) USNR
FROM  The Prime Minister  

TO   The President  

SERIAL  619  

DATE  14 Mar 44  

DATER/TIME OR FILE NUMBER  14/1148Z  

TOR MAP ROOM  14/1300Z  

VIA   Army Code Room  

SUBJECT  Italian political situation  

ACTION  

Answers POTUS #428.  

To President via usher. By direction of the President, copy sent to the Secretary of State by memorandum 14 Mar 44.

Answered by POTUS #504.

COPIES TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

FILED:  

37° Italy
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 620       Filed: 141622 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.
I feel you will be interested to hear about the operation just completed to fly two of Wingates Long Range Penetration Brigades into enemy territory in North Burma. Landing strips in two areas were selected, one 60 miles north of Katha and one 20 miles south of it, from which the Brigades could advance westwards primarily to interrupt the Japanese lines of communication and so assist the American/Chinese operations taking place further north. The strips were 100 miles inside enemy territory and 260 miles from the transport base.

First landings were made by gliders whose occupants then prepared the strips to receive transport aircraft. Between March 6th and March 11th, 7500 men with all their gear and with mules were successfully landed. The only losses were a number of gliders, and some of these should be repairable. The Brigades have now started their advance but a

REGRADeD UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks    Date

MAY 6 1972
small holding party has been left at one of the strips to receive a flight of Spitfires and a squadron of Hurricane fighter/bombers which were to fly in to protect the base and provide air support.

Only serious mishap occurred on the first night. One of the strips in the northern area was found to have been obstructed by the Japanese, and surface of remaining strip was much worse than expected, causing crashes which blocked the strip and prevented further landings that night. A few of the gliders had to be turned back in the air and failed to reach our territory. Another strip was immediately prepared in this area and was ready for landings two days later. The total of killed, wounded and missing is at most 145.

The operation appears to have been a complete surprise for Japanese. There has been no enemy air action against the strips in the northern area, and the one in the south was only bombed on 10th March after our men had left it. As it happened, the enemy were concentrating aircraft at airfields in the Mandalay area as part of their own plans. In consequence, the strong air forces we had collected to protect the landings had a very good bag, and in 2 days destroyed 61 enemy aircraft for the loss of only 3 of our own.

We are all very pleased that Wingates venture has started so well, and the success of this flying-in operation augurs well for the future. Your men have played an important
part both in the transport squadrons and in the supporting air operations.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The Prime Minister</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>620</td>
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Flying of two of Wing.tes Long Range Penetration Brigades into enemy territory in North Burma.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>President saw with evening news, 14 Mar 44. Draft reply written by Admiral Leahy, but was not used by the President. President wrote dispatch, which was sent to the PM as #1499, 15 Mar 1944.</td>
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From: MA London  
To: The President of the United States  
No. 621  
Filed: 151507 Z  

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

1. I consulted the War Cabinet this morning on the proposal that the British and American Governments should accept the six party programme without further delay. The War Cabinet asked me to assure you that they agree fully with your wish to establish a more broadly based government in Italy and that the future form of government of the Italian people can only be settled by self determination. They also agree with you that the point to consider is the timing. On this they have no doubt that it would be far better to wait till we are masters of Rome before parting company with the King and Badoglio, because from Rome a more representative and solidly based administration can be constructed than is possible now. They feel that nothing could be worse for our joint interests and for the future of Italy, than to set up a weak democratic government which flopped. Even a settlement reached at Rome could not be final because it would be necessary to review it when the northern provinces...
and great industrial centres favourable to us and essential to a democratic solution, like Milan and Turin have been liberated. They do not consider that the six parties are representative in any true sense of the Italian democracy or Italian nation or that they could at the present time replace the existing Italian government which has loyalty and effectively worked in our interests.

2. In reaching these conclusions the War Cabinet have of course had before them the telegrams sent by the Allied Commander in Chief whose views on this subject they do not share. Meanwhile we should be quite ready to discuss the suggestions put to the State Department in Paragraph 3 of the Foreign Secretary's number 1783. It is also of course recognised that should the capture of Rome be unduly protracted, say for 2 or 3 months, the question of timing would have to be reviewed.

3. Finally they ask me to emphasize the great importance of not exposing to the world any divergencies of view which may exist between our two governments, especially in face of the independent action taken by Russia in entering into direct relations with the Badoglio government without consultation with other Allies. It would be a great pity if our respective viewpoints had to be argued out in Parliament and the press when waiting a few months may make it possible for all three governments to take united action.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you talk with Cordell about this and prepare a reply?

F. D. R.

Prime Minister's No. 621 to the President, dated March 15, 1944, re future form of government for Italy.

Answered by our 502.
16 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the State Department be furnished with the attached copy of message No. 621 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 15 March 1944.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to this message be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

1 Incl.
Mag., PM-POTUS, #621,
15 March 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
SO: 621, 15 MARCH 1944

The proposal that the American and British Governments should accept without further delay the Six Party programme was taken up by me this morning with the War Cabinet. The Cabinet asked me to give you my assurance that they are in full agreement that the future Italian government can only be settled by self-determination and also agree with your wish to establish a more broadly based government in Italy. They also agree with you that timing is the point to consider, but on this they have no doubt that before parting company with Badoglio and the King it would be far better to wait until we have taken Rome. From Rome a more representative and solidly based administration can be set up than is possible to construct now. The Cabinet feels that nothing could be worse for our joint interests and for the future of Italy than to set up a weak democratic government which flopped. Because it would be necessary to review it when the provinces in the north and great industrial centers favorable to us and essential to a democratic solution, like Milan and Turin, have been liberated, even a settlement reached at Rome could not be final. The Cabinet does not think that the six parties could now replace the existing Italian government, which has worked in our
interests loyally and effectively, nor that they are in any true sense representative of the Italian democracy or Italian nation.

The telegrams sent by the Allied Commander in Chief were before the War Cabinet while reaching these conclusions, but they do not share his views. Meanwhile we are quite ready to discuss the suggestions put to the State Department in paragraph 3 of the Foreign Secretary's number 1783. Also it is of course recognized that the question of timing would have to be reviewed if the capture of Rome should be unduly delayed, say for two or three months.

They ask me, finally, to emphasize the great importance of not exposing any differences of opinion between our two governments to the world, especially now that Russia has taken independent action without consultation with other Allies in entering into direct relations with the Badoglio government. When waiting a few months might make it possible for all three governments to take united action, it would be a great pity if our respective viewpoints had to be argued out in Parliament and the Press.
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>151645Z</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Italian political situation</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Army Code Room</td>
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**ACTION**

Further to PM #618 & 619.

By direction of the President, copy to State Dept 16 Mar 44. Draft reply prepared by State Dept; approved by the President 17 Mar 44; sent to the PM as #592, 17 Mar 44.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

370 Italy

**FILED:**

0189
From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 622 Filed 170100Z

Prime Minister to President, personal. Number 622.

We have had a most immediate telegram from Mountbatten operative part of which I am sending you in my immediately following.

2. Upshot is that Japanese are staging an offensive with the apparent object of capturing Imphal plain. Mountbatten thinks he has a good chance of inflicting a sharp defeat on the enemy greater than that achieved in recent Arakan operations.

3. Everything depends on flying up from Arakan the operational portion of 5 Division, ordering the troops to stand fast in places where they cannot be supplied by ordinary means and supplying them by Ving any opportunity offered to use Wingate's two remaining brigades to harass the enemy in the rear. These brigades also would have to be supplied by air.

\[\text{Note: With reference to continuity of this portion of text and spelling of VING, checked with Army Code, they informed me that they had requested a service on this and message, exactly as was verified. However, obvious error in line 2. p. also stated to be correct in attempt to verify. Possibly good.}\]
4. To do this, Mountbatten needs 30 C47's or the equivalent in load carrying capacity of C46's to be diverted from the Hump for about a month starting 18 March. He is going ahead unless contrary instructions are issued. The stakes are pretty high in this battle and victory would have far reaching consequences.

5. British Chiefs of Staff have telegraphed their entire agreement with Mountbatten's proposals to Washington. We trust that US Chiefs of Staff will agree.

No Sig
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEARY

When I showed the attached message (CM-OUT-6853, dated 16 March 1944) to the President last evening, he asked if its contents had been made known to the Prime Minister. I interpreted his remark to mean that the action recommended in this message should be used as a basis for reply to the Prime Minister's No's. 622 and 623.

Attachment: CM-OUT-6853, 16 March 1944.
Attachment: PH-POTUS #622, 17 March 1944.
Attachment: PH-POTUS #623, 17 March 1944.

L. Mathewson,
Colqnel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972
COMMANDING GENERAL
ARMY AIR FORCES
INDIA BURMA SECTOR
NEW DELHI, INDIA

COMMANDING GENERAL
US ARMY FORCES
CHINA, BURMA & INDIA
FORWARD ECHELON
CHUNGKING, CHINA

From Arnold to Stilwell action Stratemeyer signed
Marshall, reference SEACOS 112 and 113.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff are recommending action sub-
stantially as follows:

1. That Admiral Mountbattan should be authorized
immediately to divert 30 C 47 or equivalent C 46 aircraft
(at discretion of General Stratemeyer) with crews from the
Air Transport Command and directed to return them at the
earliest possible time.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff should be urged to
provide immediately the additional transport aircraft re-
quired by the SEAC to support operations during the remain-
der of this dry season and

3. In view of the provisions of paragraph 2, the
US Chiefs of Staff should not agree to grant Admiral Mount-
battan authority to divert aircraft from the ATC without

AC/AS Plans AFALP
Operational Plans Division
Colonel Loutzenheiser

March 16, 1944

NUMBER: 5043

NUMBER: 4755

CM-OUT-6853 (16 Mar 44)
reference to the US Chiefs of Staff, since the transport aircraft supplied from British sources should meet his normal requirements and you are authorized to take appropriate action on these instructions and communicate substance of this message to Admiral Mountbatten and advise Sultan.

New subject. Reference our message 5021 March 13, the first squadron of ATC aircraft for attachment to the 20th Bomber Command will be expedited as much as possible in an effort to assist in making good MATTERHORN target dates.

No sig

ORIGINATOR: General Arnold 
INFORMATION: OPD General Bissell JCS Adm King Col. Mathewson Log 
CM-OUT-6853 (16 Mar 44) 2258Z mem
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Answered 9 March

[Signature]

[Cover note]

622
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADmiral LeaHy:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Pink No. 822 from the PM to the President March 17th.

Answered by Pres's No 503,
19 March 44.
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL 622  
DATE 17 March 1944  

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 170100Z  
TOR MAP ROOM 170404Z  VIA Army Code Room  

SUBJECT Jap offensive at Imphal; reassignment of 30 C47's.  

ACTION  
(This message is continued in Pa 623.)  

Refereed to Admiral Leahy by memo from Col. Mathewson to Admiral Leahy, 18 Mar 44, which pointed out that the President wished War Dept message CAM-OUT-6853 (Copy attached) to be used as basis for reply.  

Message drafted by Admiral Leahy in the Map Room 18 Mar; approved by President on 19 Mar; sent to the PM as POTUS #503, 19 Mar 44. (POTUS #503 answers both Pa #622 and #623.)  

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED: MR 300 Burma, India, China  
FILED:
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 623
Prime Minister to President.

Following is extract referred to in Para 1 of my immediately preceding telegram. Begins.

"Transport aircraft.

1. Japanese offensive intentions on the IV Corps front have been previously reported in my SECAGOS 93 and 96. Enemy has concentrated three divisions with presumed intention capturing Imphal Plain. First phase of offensive has already begun with encircling movement to east and west of 17 Division threatening to cut Tiddim Road and there are now indications that main offensive may start about 20 March. Capture of Imphal Plain would give enemy abundant food and two all weather landing grounds and would:

A. Constitute direct threat to traffic on air ferry route and Assam L of C and
B. Jeopardise whole air position in northern Burma.

FILE COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date

MAY 6 1972

0198
"2. The Japanese plan appears to be similar to his plan for Arakan in that he is exploiting ability of Japanese troops to advance carrying own supplies for several days and gambling on defeating our forces and reaching food supplies in Imphal Plain quickly. There is thus an opportunity which I welcome of inflicting on him a defeat similar to that he has sustained in the Arakan but on a much larger scale. Enemy does not yet appear to have appreciated the size of Wingate forces behind him which should prove additional factor in achieving his defeat.

"3. Our success in Arakan was due to our ability to order troops to stand fast because we could supply them by air even when encircled. Lethbridge mission emphasised supply by air as essential factor in MacArthur's successes against Japanese and successes of Stilwell's advance from the Ledo area support this view. It is relevant to note that during February Ledo combat troops had over 10,000,000 pounds dropped while total for Arakan and Kaladan together was some 6,500,000 pounds.

"4. Best answer to present Japanese move to Tiddim area would be to order 17 Division to stand fast and to..."
supply them by air. I cannot, however, afford to do this as I have insufficient reserves within striking distance of Tiddim to enable me to make the necessary counter attacks, nor have I sufficient transport aircraft both to supply troops holding Tiddim area and fly reserves up. 17 Division have therefore been ordered to withdraw northwards about half way towards Imphal. Much as I dislike this, I do not consider it essential to protection of ferry route to hold so far forward as Tiddim and do not therefore consider that I should be justified in asking for diversion of aircraft from the ferry route for this purpose alone.

"5. I do, however, regard it as vital to the ferry route and to the Assam L of C by which it is nourished, and indeed to our whole position in Assam to hold the Imphal Plain. Immediate requirement is to fly up from Arakan ASP reinforcements essential operational portion of 5 Division. This fly in should be started 18 March. It may also be necessary to order troops to stand fast in places where they cannot be supplied by ordinary means and to supply them by US air. At the same time, an opportunity may offer of using Wingate's two remaining brigades of his second wave behind Japanese formations. These two must of course
be supplied by air.

"6. The dangers of Japanese successes and the magnitude of the defeat which we may inflict upon them are both greater than in the case of Arakan. Troop carrier command are already committed to support of Kaladan Division three LRP brigades and Ledo force and cannot carry out the requirements indicated in my Para 5 without the addition of up to 30 C-47's or the equivalent in load carrying capacity of C-46's with combat and maintenance crews from 18 March for about a month. All the aircraft borrowed from ATC for Arakan emergency were returned with least possible delay but since the emergency is even greater than in the case of the Arakan and since it is clear that Imphal attack and Arakan are both part of one Japanese plan I think it is justifiable to regard the period of emergency as continuing. I should be glad to receive your confirmation that my interpretation is correct. Unless I receive instructions to the contrary from you, aircraft will have moved by March 18."

No Sig
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Answered 19 March

Incl
#623.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR THE NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.

Pink No. 623 from the FM to the President

Answered by Pres’s #503,
19 March 44.
FROM: The Prime Minister  
TO: The President  

SERIAL 623  
DATE 17 March 1944  

DATE/TIME 170122Z  
OR FILE NUMBER  

TOR MAP ROOM 170404Z  
VIA Army Code Room  

SUBJECT: Jap offensive at Imphal; reassignment of 30 C47's.  

ACTION:  
This message is continuation of PM # 622, which see for complete action.  

Answered by POTUS #503, 19 Mar 44.  

---

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

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ACTION COMPLETED: MR 300 Burma, India, China  
FILED:  

0204
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 624 Filed: 181715 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt most secret and personal.

1. Winant gave me your letter this morning. As you are so keen for the company of Inonu, I wonder whether you would care to spend Easter with me at Bermuda. I can arrive there on the 5th and we could separate on the 11th or earlier if you are pressed. I would not suggest bringing the great staffs but only the principals on the scale with which we went to Teheran. It is not so much that there are new departures in policy to be taken but there is a need after more than 90 days of separation for checking up and shaking together.

2. I am hardening for OVERLORD as the time gets nearer. Perhaps Marshall will show you a telegram I sent him.

No Sig
FROM The Prime Minister TO The President

SERIAL #624 DATE 18 Mar 44

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 181715Z

TOR MAP ROOM 18/2010Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Conference at Bermuda.

ACTION

To the President via Admiral Brown.

Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with changes; sent to the PM as POTUS #406, 20 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: AR 210 BERMUDA.

FILED:
From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal.

Following is latest from UJ about Poland. No leakage has occurred for which we are responsible. We did not tell the Poles anything. On the other hand the "Observer" newspaper was unduly well informed about Stalin's attitude. This we think could only have come from the Russian Embassy. The matter is of relative unimportance. What matters is that our talks with him on this subject are at an end. He has definitely avoided seeing Ambassador Clark Kerr. Presently I shall have to make some statement in Parliament which I do not expect he will like very much. Meanwhile I do not propose to send any answer. Telegram from UJ begins

I received from Sir A Clark Kerr on March 12th your message of March 7th on the Polish question.

Thank you for the explanations which you made in this message.

In spite of the fact that our correspondence is
considered secret and personal the contents of my letter to you have for some time begun to appear in the English press, and, moreover, with many distortions which I have no possibility of refuting.

I consider this to be a breach of secrecy. This fact makes it difficult for me to express my opinion freely. I hope that you have understood me.

Telegram from UJ ends.

No Sig

[Handwritten note]

This does not come to answer

[Signature]

[Handwritten note]

Read 1820102 on
J. Aden Brown

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date May 6 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be furnished with the attached copies of messages Numbers 625 and 630 from the Prime Minister to the President for its information.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,
Captain, USN,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Enc: Msg. Prime Minister to President, #625.
   Msg. Prime Minister to President, #630.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
March 18, 1944

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 625

The latest from Stalin concerning Poland is as follows:

QUOTE: On March 12 I received your message of March 7 on the Polish situation from Ambassador Kerr. Thank you very much for the explanations which you made in this message. The contents of my letter to you have been appearing in the English press for some time despite the fact that our correspondence is considered personal and secret. Moreover there are many distortions which I have no possibility of refuting. This in my opinion is a breach of secrecy and makes it hard for me to express freely my opinion. I trust that you have understood me. UNQUOTE.

We have told the Poles nothing. No leakage has occurred for which we are responsible. The "Observer" however, was too well informed on Stalin's attitude. We think that this information could have come only from the Russian Embassy. However it is of relative unimportance. The chief matter is that our discussions with him on this subject are now concluded. Stalin has definitely avoided seeing our Ambassador, Clark Kerr. In the near future I shall be required to make some sort of a statement in Parliament which I do not think Stalin will like very much. In the meantime, I do not propose to send a reply.
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<th>FROM</th>
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<th>The President</th>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Russian-Polish relations.</td>
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**ACTION**

To President by Admiral Brown.

"President does not care to answer this" -- Colonel Mathewson, 20 Mar 1944.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

WR 052 Polish-Russian (1)
19 March 44

To: The President of the United States

Nr. 626 Filed 19/1130Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and

SEACOS 117 from Dickie repeated to Joint Staff Mission
will show you all the possibilities that are open in this
theatre and the enormous power of air transportation applied
to actual fighting.

No Sig

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British
Gov't., State Dept. tel., 3-20-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

*For SEACOS 117 and 118, see POTUS #505.
FROM | The Prime Minister | TO | The President
---|---|---|---
SERIAL | 626 | DATE | 19 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER | 19/1130Z | VIA | Army Code Room
TOR MAP ROOM | 19/1215Z | SUBJECT | Re Mountbatten's SECRET 117, and possibilities of operations in Far East.

ACTION

To President via Admiral Leahy.

Admiral Leahy dictated reply in Map Room, 20 Mar 44; approved by the President; sent to the PM as POTUS #505, 20 Mar 44.

COPIES TO: | DATE: | BY DIRECTION OF:
---|---|---

ACTION COMPLETED: | FILED:
AW 300 Burma, India, China
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 627 Filed: 191700 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

I have consulted Eden on your proposed message to President Inonu. He says: Begins:

We are already studying how best to induce Turks to limit the supply of chrome to Germany. Question is very complicated one owing to existing Turco-German agreements and I doubt whether personal appeal to Turkish President would help at present stage. As you know Turks are at present in a very selfish and obstinate mood and an appeal to their better feelings might have the opposite effect to what we desire. It is all a question of timing and I would suggest that the President's message should be kept in reserve until we have decided what we actually want the Turks to do and have found out how far they are likely to go. Above all there is danger that they will regard a friendly a message at this juncture as a sign of weakening on our part.

Perhaps your point of view.

No Sig
20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached messages be sent to the Department of State for preparation of reply.

OGDEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

3 Incls.
PM-POTUS, #627, ✓
19 March 1944.
PM-POTUS, #628,
19 March 1944.
WINANT-POTUS, #191700,
19 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAY 6 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date

SECRET
- 1 -

0215
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 627, 19 MARCH 1944

As a result of a conference on your proposed message to Inonu, Eden has these comments:

"We are even now studying the best way to induce Turkey to limit the supply of chrome to Germany. I doubt whether a personal appeal to Inonu would help at the present stage as the question is a very complicated one owing to existing Turco-German agreements. An appeal to their better feelings might have the opposite effect to what we desire since as you know the Turks at present are in a very selfish and obstinate mood. It is all a question of timing. Until we have decided what we want the Turks to do and have ascertained how far they will go, I would suggest that the President's message should be held in reserve. At this juncture there is a danger that they will regard such a friendly message as an indication of weakening on our part."

Possibly you will give this point of view some consideration.
TO The President

The Prime Minister

SERIAL 627 DATE 19 Mar 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 191700Z

FOR MAP ROOM 191850Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT Chrome to Germany.

ACTION

(See PM-POTUS #624, Para 1; WINANT-POTUS, Unno, 19 Mar 44; WINANT-POTUS, Unno, 19 Mar 44 (2nd msg).)

To President via usher.

By direction of the President, sent to State Department 20 Mar 44 for preparation of reply.

On 15 Apr 44, Map Room called Sec State's office for check on action. Following information given: State Department embassies in Moscow, London, and Ankara have been informed that the letter referred to in #627 will be indefinitely withheld. The British Ambassador in Washington was informed that it would not be sent; and it was assumed by the State Dept that he would inform the Prime Minister. The State Dept considers this matter closed, and has filed the message.

((OVER))

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

ac 601

0217
On 29 Apr 44 Admiral Leahy stated, "In view of turn of events, believe no reply now necessary or appropriate."

See news release, 20 Apr 44, quoting Prime Minister Naman Menemenioglu of Turkey as announcing that his country would stop chrome exports beginning 21 Apr 44.
From: MA London England
To: The President of the United States
No. 628 Filed: 191830 Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.
See State Department's message through Winant dated March 14.

1. We have followed Gray's lead in Ireland and it is early days to start reassuring De Valera. There is not much sense in a doctor telling a patient that the medicine he has just prescribed for his nerve troubles is only colored water. I think it would be much better to keep them guessing for a while.

2. I do not propose to stop the necessary trade between Britain and Ireland or to prevent anything going into Ireland. I do propose to stop ships going from Ireland to Spain and Portugal and other foreign ports until OVERLORD is launched. One must remember that a ship may start out in one direction and turn off in another. There is no difficulty in stopping ships. The above also applies to outward bound airplanes which we shall try to stop by every means in our power. The object of these measures is not
spite against the Irish but preservation of British and American soldiers' lives and against our plans being betrayed by emissaries sent by sea or air from the German Minister in Dublin. Since the beginning of 1943 only 19 Irish ships have left Irish ports, some several times, so the evil is not very great. We are also cutting off telephones and restricting communications to the utmost and also stopping the Anglo-Irish Air Line from running.

I repeat, all our actions will be taken from motives of self preservation and none from those of spite.

3. If however the Irish retaliate by doing something which in no way helps them but merely annoys us, such as stopping the Foynes Airport facilities, I should feel free to retaliate on their cross channel trade. They would have opened a new chapter and economic measures of retaliation would be considered. I would tell you about these before we took them.

4. It seems to me that so far from allaying alarm in De Valera's circles we should let fear work its healthy process. Thereby we shall get behind the scenes a continued stiffening up of the Irish measures which even now are not so bad to prevent a leakage.

5. I gather that the State Department will probably not disagree with the above, for Mr Hull says in the message

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972

0220
above quoted: Begins.

I am inclined to believe however that for the time being at least we should not make any statement to the press or commit ourselves to the Irish Government that we have no intention of instituting economic sanctions. Ends.

And I hope this may also be your view.

No Sig

Revd 192005205C
TFU
20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached messages be sent to the Department of State for preparation of reply.

OGDEN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

3 Incls.
PM-POTUS, #627,
19 March 1944.
PM-POTUS, #628,
19 March 1944.
WINANT-POTUS, #191700,
19 March 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 6 1972

SECRET
- 1 -
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO.: 628, 19 MARCH 1944

Refer to message of 14 March from State Department through Winant.

1. Gray's lead in Ireland has been followed by us and it is too soon to begin reassuring De Valera. A doctor telling his patient that medicine prescribed for his nerve trouble is only colored water is senseless. To keep them guessing for a while would be much better in my opinion.

2. My proposal is not to prevent anything going into Ireland or to stop the necessary trade between Britain and Ireland. Until OVERLORD is launched I do propose to stop ships from going to Spain, Portugal and other foreign ports from Ireland. It must be remembered that a ship can start in one direction and turn in another. We have no trouble stopping ships. Outward bound airplanes are also included in the above which we shall do our utmost to stop. Spite against the Irish is not the intention of these measures but rather provision against our plans being betrayed by emissaries sent by sea or air from the German Minister in Dublin and preservation of British and American soldiers' lives. The evil is not very great. Since the beginning of 1943 only 19 Irish ships, some several times, have left Irish ports. Also we
I am inclined to believe however that for the time being at least we should not make any statement to press or commit ourselves to the Irish Government that we have no intention of instituting economic sanctions."

It is my hope that this is your view also.
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>To the President via usher.</td>
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<td>By direction of the President, copy sent to State Department 20 Mar 44 for preparation of reply.</td>
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<td>Reply sent from State Department to Ambassador Winant for delivery to Prime Minister (State #259), 3 Apr 44, filed herein by date.</td>
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0225
21 March 1944

To: The President of the United States
Number 629

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.
Number 629 and personal. Your 506.

1. I am indeed grieved and trust rest will do you good.

2. I do not think the staff meeting worthwhile without our being there.

3. I hope you are still planning your visit here for the great event after you are fully recovered.

No Sig

Reed r116552

File Copy
FROM The Prime Minister  TO The President
SERIAL 629  DATE 21 Mar 44
DATE/TIME 21/1516Z
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM 21/1655Z VIA Army Code Room
SUBJECT Bermuda meeting.

ACTION Answers POTUS #506.
To President via usher.
Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with alterations; sent to PM as POTUS #507.
22 Mar 44.

COPY TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

AUK 210 BERMUDA
March 21, 1944

From: MA London, England
To: The President of the United States
No. 630, Filed 211052Z.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Reference my telegram number 625.

I have today sent following reply to Uncle J.

So what!

Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. "Personal and

most secret.

Your telegram of March 16th.

1. First of all I must congratulate you again
on all the wonderful victories your Armies are winning and
also on the extremely temperate way in which you have dealt
with the Finns. I suppose they are worried about interning
the nine German Divisions in Finland for fear that the nine
German Divisions should intern them. We are much obliged to
you for keeping us in touch with all your action in this
Theatre.

2. With regard to the Poles, I am not to blame
in any way about revealing your secret correspondence. The
information was given both to the American Herald Tribune
correspondent and to the London Times correspondent by the Soviet Embassy in London. In the latter case it was given personally by Ambassador Gusev.

3. I shall have very soon to make a statement to the House of Commons about the Polish position. This will involve my saying that the attempts to make an arrangement between the Soviet and Polish Governments have broken down; that we continue to recognize the Polish Government, with whom we have been in continuous relations since the invasion of Poland in 1939; that we now consider all questions of territorial change must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious powers; and that in the meantime we can recognize no forcible transferences of territory.

4. I am repeating this telegram to the President of the United States. I only wish I had better news to give him for the sake of all.

5. Finally, let me express the earnest hope that the breakdown which has occurred between us about Poland will not have any adverse effect upon our cooperation in other spheres where the maintenance of our common action is of the greatest consequence”.

No Sig.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The President has directed that the Department of State be furnished with the attached copies of messages Numbers 625 and 630 from the Prime Minister to the President for its information.

It is requested that a copy of any reply made or action taken by the Department of State to these messages be forwarded to the White House Map Room for the information of the President.

Very respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,
Captain, USN,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President

Enc: Msg. Prime Minister to President, #625.
Msg. Prime Minister to President, #630.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date May 6, 1972
March 21, 1944

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No.: 630

See my number 625. Today I made the following reply to Stalin.

So what!

QUOTE. Reference your telegram of March 16, let me congratulate you once more on the very temperate way in which you have dealt with the Finns and also on the marvelous victories your Armies are winning. The internment of the 9 German Divisions in Finland worries you, I imagine, because you fear that the Finns might be interned by the 9 German Divisions. We must thank you very much for keeping us up to date on all your actions in this theater.

With reference to the Poles, you cannot blame me in any way concerning the revealing of your secret correspondence. The Soviet Embassy in London gave the information to both the London Times correspondent and the American Herald Tribune correspondent. In the case of the London Times correspondent, Ambassador Gusev gave this information personally.

Very soon I shall be required to make a statement concerning the Polish situation to the House of Commons. In this statement I shall be obliged to say that attempts to negotiate an arrangement between the Soviet and Polish Governments have broken down; that we now consider all questions of territorial change must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious powers; that we continue to recognize the Polish Government with whom we have been in continuous relation since

[REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72]

By R. H. Parks Date MAY 6 1972
the invasion of Poland in 1939; and that we can recognize no forcible transfers of territory prior to an armistice or peace conference.

Since a copy of this telegram is being sent to the President, I wish for the sake of all I had better news to give him.

Lastly I earnestly hope that the breakdown which has occurred between us on the Polish situation will not affect adversely our cooperation in other spheres where the maintenance of our common action is of the greatest importance. UNQUOTE.
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To President via usher. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President without change; sent to PA as POTUS #508, 22 Mar 44.

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To: The President of the United States
Number 631, Filed 30/23252
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. 

and personal.

Para 1. In the messages we exchanged last month about Spain, ending with your Nr. 478 of February 23rd, you indicated your agreement with my view that we should reach a rapid settlement with the Spanish Government on a basis which would obtain for us the political and military requirements to which we have always attached great importance, and at the same time secure in effect a cessation of Spanish wolfram exports to Germany for the first half of this year.

Para 2. In the subsequent negotiation conducted by our two ambassadors at Madrid, in which Sir S. Hoare has given the strongest support to your representations, it has become clear that, while we can still obtain full satisfaction of our other requirements, we cannot within the next few months obtain a complete embargo on Spanish wolfram exports for the whole of this year, which is what I understand you are now expecting of the Spanish Government. There
has, however, been a temporary embargo since early January.

Para 3. We have, therefore, reached a situation in which we must either accept some slight compromise over wolfram or prolong the present deadlock. This would mean running certain serious risks, quite apart from postponing our enjoyment of such valuable benefits as the closing of the German consulate at Tangier and the cleaning up of the German espionage system throughout Spanish territory.

Para 4. I have no doubt that by increasing our economic pressure we can eventually bring Spain to heel. In fact, with reasonable people the mere threat should be enough. The Spaniards are not, however, reasonable and they have a capacity for tightening their belts in resistance to foreign pressure. This would, I am convinced, postpone any settlement for several months. Meanwhile, we should run the following serious risks:

(1) Between 700 and 1000 tons of wolfram representing Spanish stocks now on the Pyrenees, might be handed over to the Germans in exchange for important supplies, including gasoline, which the Germans are now offering to Spain. This would be a far greater help to the German war effort than the 100 or 200 tons on which our present dis-
cussions are centered;

(2) The Spaniards will clearly apply economic counter measures. This would mean that we should lose the Spanish iron ore which at present provides 42% of British requirements at a great economy in shipping and fuel. We should also lose Spanish potash, which is essential for the maintenance of British agriculture. Finally, our purchases in Spain are only made possible by Spanish financial facilities, without which we should run out of funds in a few weeks. Although these considerations have been put to your government I am not aware of any satisfactory method by which these essential needs could be replaced from other sources.

Para 5. I understand that the State Department have suggested that the Spaniards might be brought to accept a total wolfram embargo now by the offer of a long term economic agreement. Our view which is, I understand, shared by all our experts in Madrid, is that such a prospect is illusory. Such a settlement would mean replacing the very important supplies which Spain now gets from German-controlled Europe, including in particular machinery and arms. It would, in any case, take several months to negotiate during which we should run all the risks I have mentioned above. Nor do I think we should be well advised to enter into any long term commitments with the present Spanish Regime. Surely what we should
aim at is a short term arrangement which will secure important tangible benefits now at a very small cost in wolfram exports to Germany. When we have, as we hope, established the second front successfully, the whole picture will change. The supply of even 50 tons of wolfram a month to Germany meanwhile, which is what is now in question, can be of little real assistance to the German war effort and can certainly not be balanced against the much greater advantages Germany would probably obtain if we fail to break the deadlock now.

Para 6. I hope, therefore, you will agree that, having tried unsuccessfully to obtain a total wolfram embargo but having nevertheless made more satisfactory progress than might originally have been expected, we should now authorize our ambassadors to secure immediately the most favourable wolfram settlement they can obtain. This should be on the basis of not more than 50 tons of wolfram a month being allowed through to Germany during the next few vital months.

Para 7. In making this proposal I would venture to remind you that we have gone along with you in Argentina and that we feel entitled to ask you to take our views seriously into account in the Iberian Peninsula, where our strategic
and economic interests are more directly affected than are those of the United States.

Para 8. It seems to me that we should make a fatal mistake if we risk throwing these 750 to 1000 tons of wolfram into German hands as well as losing all the other advantages which are now open. I earnestly hope that you will give your consideration to our appeal without which we shall be in very serious difficulties. Among other things Ambassador Hoare who has held most of our offices of state and is a member of Parliament now evidently wishes to resign. I could not support in public the policy which is now being enforced upon us. Do please consider the arguments of this telegram.

No Sig

And: 310300 Z AIB
To: Bremer 312200 Z AIB

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED by British Govt., State Dept. tel., 3-29-72
By R. H. Forks Date MAY 6 1972

0238
31 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached message No. 631 from the Prime Minister, dated 30 March 1944, be forwarded to the State Department for preparation of reply.

Very respectfully,

ODIN S. COLLINS,
Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R.

1 Incl.
Prime Minister to President,
#631, 30 March 1944.
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 631, 30 March 1944

1. You indicated your agreement with my view in the messages we exchanged about Spain last month, ending with your No. 478 of February 23, that we should reach with the Government of Spain a rapid settlement on a basis which would obtain the military and political requirements for us to which we have always attached great importance, and secure at the same time in effect a stoppage of exports of Spanish wolfram to the Germans for the first six months of 1944.

2. It has become clear in the subsequent negotiation conducted by our two ambassadors at Madrid, during which the strongest support to your representations has been given by Sir S. Hoare, that, although we can still obtain complete satisfaction of our other requirements, we cannot obtain within the next few months a complete embargo on exports of Spanish wolfram for the whole of this year, which I understand is what you are now expecting of the Government of Spain. Since early in January there has been, however, a temporary embargo.

3. Therefore we have reached a situation in which we must either accept some slight compromise over wolfram or we must prolong the present deadlock. Quite apart from postponing our enjoyment of such valuable benefits as the closing at Tangier of the German consulate and the cleaning up throughout Spanish territory of the German espionage system, this would mean running certain serious risks.

4. That we can, by increasing our economic pressure, eventually bring Spain to heel, I have no doubt. With reasonable people, in fact, the mere
threat should be enough. However, the Spanish are not reasonable, and in resistance to foreign pressure they have a capacity for tightening their belts. I am convinced this would postpone for several months any settlement. Meanwhile, the following serious risks should be run by us:

(1) Spanish stocks of wolfram now on the Pyrenees, totalling between 700 and 1000 tons, might to the Germans be handed over in exchange for important supplies, gasoline included, which are now offered to the Spanish by Germany. This would be a far greater help to the German war effort than the 100 or 200 tons on which are centered our present discussions.

(2) Economic counter-measures will clearly be applied by the Spanish. This would mean that the Spanish iron ore which provides at present, at great economy in shipping and fuel, 42% of British requirements; and Spanish potash, which is essential for the maintenance of British agriculture, we should lose. Finally, purchases which we make in Spain are made possible only by financial facilities of the Spanish, without which, in a few weeks, we should run out of funds. Although to your government these considerations have been put, I am not aware of other sources from which these essential needs could be replaced by any satisfactory method.

5. That the Spaniards might be brought to accept a total wolfram embargo now by the offer of a long term economic agreement, I understand has been suggested by the State Department. Such a prospect is illusory in our view, which I understand is shared by all our experts in Madrid. Such a settlement would mean replacing the very important supplies, including in particular arms and machinery, which the Spaniards now get from German-controlled Europe. In any case, it would take several months to
negotiate, during which time we should run all the risks mentioned above. Nor do I think we should be well advised to enter into any long term commitments with the present Spanish regime. Surely a short term arrangement which will secure important tangible benefits at this time at a very small cost in exports of wolfram to Germany is what we should aim at. The whole picture will change when we have, as we hope, successfully established the second front. Meanwhile, the supply of even 50 tons of wolfram to Germany a month, which is what is now in question, can be of little real assistance to the war effort of the Germans and can certainly not be balanced against the much greater advantages Germany would probably obtain if we fail to break the deadlock now.

6. Therefore, I hope you will agree that we should now authorize our ambassadors to secure immediately the most favorable settlement on wolfram they can obtain, now that we have tried unsuccessfully to obtain a total embargo on wolfram but nevertheless having made a more satisfactory progress than might have been expected originally. During the next few vital months we should put this on the basis of not allowing more than 50 tons of wolfram to be shipped monthly to Germany.

7. I would venture to remind you, in making this proposal, that we have gone along with you in Argentina and that we feel entitled to ask you to take our views seriously into account in the Iberian Peninsula, where our economic and strategic interests are affected more directly than are those of your country.

8. To me it seems that a fatal mistake should be made by us if we risk throwing these 750 to 1000 tons of wolfram into the hands of the Germans as well as losing all of the other advantages now open to us. I earnestly hope that to our appeal you will give your consideration, without
which we shall be in very serious difficulties. Ambassador Hoare, among other things, now evidently wishes to resign. He has held most of our offices of state and is a member of Parliament. Do please consider the arguments of this telegram. I could not support in public the policy which is now being enforced upon us.
FROM  The Prime Minister  TO  The President

SERIAL  631  DATE  30 March 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER  30/2325Z

TOR MAP ROOM  31/0300Z  VIA  Army Code Room

SUBJECT  Wolfram exports from Spain

ACTION  
(For previous exchange of msgs on this subject, see PM #577; PRES #467; PM #586; PRES #478; PM #590)

To the President via usher.

By direction of President, copy sent to State Department, 31 Mar 44, for preparation of reply.

Draft reply sent directly to the President by State, 4 Apr 44; approved by President without change, 4 Apr 44; sent to PM as PM #512, 4 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  601 WOLF ROOM  FILED: