3 APRIL 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 510, AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I have been informed that the U.S.S.R. will not take part in the ILO Conference in Philadelphia. It is generally believed here that the absence of Russia will have bad effect upon prestige of ILO both here and among labor in occupied areas.

In order to offset possible loss of prestige by the conference and to strengthen such agreements as may be arrived at, I am convinced that it is essential that Bevin come to the conference as a British Government delegate. His presence will be evidence of the importance placed upon the conference by the British Government.

I trust that it will be possible for him to come even though it may not be possible for him to stay throughout the entire period of conference, and personally I should much like to meet him even if he could come to Washington for only a day. I hope to get back from my trip about April 24th.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 11:39, EWT, 3 April 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date: NOV 1 1971

03/16/71 MCR 45-76

0245
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL #510 DATE 3 April 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER 031627 NCR 4576

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT International Labor Organization conference.

ACTION

(For correspondence between the President and Stalin, and for complete action on ILO conference, see "MK 210 INT. LABOR ORGANIZATION")

Proposed message prepared by Dr. Lubin (See background in "MK 210 INT. LABOR ORGAN."); approved by President with alterations, 3 Apr 44. Paraphrased copy to Dr. Lubin.

Approved by FM #652, 19 Apr 44.

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<tr>
<td>Dr. Lubin</td>
<td>3 Apr 44</td>
<td>The President</td>
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ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

20 Int. Labor Org
(This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.)

FOR THE SECRETARY

APR 3 1944

U.S. URGENT NO DISTRIBUTION

AMBASSADY

LONDON

2591

PERSONAL AND FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Please deliver the following message to Prime Minister Churchill from the President:

QUOTE I have discussed with Secretary Hull your message of March 19 on the further steps which you contemplate in relation to Ireland. We believe that you are pursuing the right line in taking the security measures mentioned without, however, adopting measures of coercion designed only to harm Ireland.

QUOTE We wonder, however, if measures forbidding Irish ships to go to all foreign ports from Ireland might not be interpreted as economic sanctions. Would not your purpose be accomplished by limiting the prohibition to Irish shipping going to any part of the continent? I realize that, as you say, a ship can start in one direction and turn in another, but any ship violating the prohibition could be dealt with in an appropriate manner. This would leave Ireland free to send its ships to North America to carry wheat and other essential supplies. The fact that no ban was made on Irish shipping to Canada and the United States would in itself constitute proof that the measures against shipping were not in the nature of economic sanctions.

QUOTE For our part we are considering a further message to Mr. de Valera once more making plain that the continued presence of Axis representatives in Ireland constitutes a danger to our forces and their operations for which the Irish Government cannot escape responsibility. We shall let you see it in advance. UNQUOTE

HULL

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By Stewart

Date Nov 1 1971
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</table>

**TOR MAP ROOM**: VIA

**SUBJECT**: Restrictions against Ireland.

**ACTION**

Answers PM #628, 19 Mar 44.

Sent through State Department channels to Ambassador Winant for delivery to Prime Minister.

Answered by PM #649, 7 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 511. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

My trip has again been postponed and still other researches and studies are being made. I do not approve of this for the principal reason that I do not understand it all. I hope to get off in four or five days and will let you know. The place I am going has full equipment for our lines of communication, and messages ought not to take more than ten minutes longer than in the White House itself.

Congratulations on your splendid vote in the House. Results here would be almost as good if we operated under your system.

Curtin will get here about April twenty-sixth and Fraser approximately the same time. Let me know if there is anything you want me to stress.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1915, EWT, 4 April 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.C. Feindt
Date NOV 1 1971
TO:    THE PRIME MINISTER
FROM:  THE PRESIDENT

My trip has again been postponed and still other researches and studies are being made. I do not approve of this for the principal reason that I do not understand it all. I hope to get off in four or five days and will let you know. The place I am going has full equipment for our lines of communication, and messages ought not to take more than ten minutes longer than in the White House itself.

Congratulations on your splendid vote in the House. Results here would be almost as good if we operated under your system.

Curtin will get here about April twenty-sixth and Fraser approximately the same time. Let me know if there is anything you want me to stress.

ROOSEVELT

April 4, 1944.
PROPOSED REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Your 635 received. Congratulations on your successful bout with the House of Commons.

While on vacation our line of communication will be open all the time and as speedy as usual. I hope the wires will not burn out.

ROOSEVELT

Written in Map Room, a.m., Sunday, 2 Apr 44, by Admiral Leahy. Sent to the President, 021130Q via usher for his approval.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
FROM: The President

TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL: 511

DATE: 4 Apr 44

DATE/TIME ON FILE NUMBER:

FOR MAP ROOM: 041850Q

VIA: Miss Tully

SUBJECT: President's trip and communications; Prime's vote of confidence; visit of PM's Curtin and Fraser.

ACTION: Answers PM #635, 1 Apr 44, which was referred to Admiral Leahy for action. Adm Leahy prepared draft reply in Map Room, Sunday a.m., 2 Apr 44; taken to President via usher. This was not used by the President, however; President dictated message to Miss Tully, 4 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

0252
4 April 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 512. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I have studied with considerable care your message Number 631 of March 30 with regard to our negotiations with Spain concerning wolfram. I am most reluctant to accept any compromise on this matter with the Spanish Government. It can hardly be helpful in the present wolfram negotiations with the Portuguese. At the same time I appreciate that in the absence of full agreement between us on the measures to be adopted we cannot anticipate an early successful conclusion of these negotiations. I am therefore asking the Department of State to work out with your Embassy a mutually agreeable line to take with the Spanish.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1915, EWT, 4 April 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date NOV 1 1971
I have studied with considerable care your message no. 631 of March 30 with regard to our negotiations with Spain concerning wolfram. I am most reluctant to accept any compromise on this matter with the Spanish Government. It can hardly be helpful in the present wolfram negotiations with the Portuguese. At the same time I appreciate that in the absence of full agreement between us on the measures to be adopted we cannot anticipate an early successful conclusion of these negotiations. I am therefore asking the Department of State to work out with your Embassy a mutually agreeable line to take with the Spanish.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to the memorandum of the White House dated March 31, 1944, enclosing message no. 631 of March 30, 1944 from Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the current wolfram negotiations in Madrid, there is submitted herewith a draft reply for the President's consideration.

The Prime Minister's message referred to is returned herewith.

Enclosures:
1. Message from Prime Minister Churchill.
2. Draft reply.
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<td>TO</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Miss Tully</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Wolfram exports from Spain</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

Answers PM #631, 30 Mar 44, which was sent by the President to the State Dept for preparation of reply.

Draft of reply sent directly to President by State; approved without change by the President, 4 Apr 44; sent to PM 4 Apr 44.

Answered by PM #639, 6 Apr 44.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON, NUMBER 513.

Referring to your 634 of April first, it seems to me the essential consideration in the Polish-Russian controversy at the present time is to get the Polish military power, including the underground, into effective action against the Nazis.

It would therefore appear that your proposed reply to Uncle Joe's explosion of 23 March is correct in its purpose and considerate beyond reasonable expectation. I do not see how he can find any fault therewith.

I am considering the advisability of having a visit from Mikołajczyk after my return from vacation.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1130, EWT, 5 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date

0257
PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #513

Referring to your 634 of April first, it seems to me the essential consideration in the Polish-Russian controversy at the present time is to get the Polish military power, including the underground, into effective action against the Nazis.

It would therefore appear that your proposed reply to Uncle Joe's explosion of 23 March is correct in its purpose and considerate beyond reasonable expectation. I do not see how he can find any fault therewith.

I am considering the advisability of having a visit from Mikolajczyk after my return from vacation.

Presidential

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.G. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
FROM The President

TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL #513

DATE 5 April 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Msg to Stalin on Russian-Polish relations.

ACTION

Answers Pa #63, which see for action.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

052 Russian-Polish relations
7 April 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 514. PERSONAL AND
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 637. I agree on the submarine statement as proposed by
you for release on 10 April.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1915, EWT, 7 April 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
Your 637. I agree on the submarine statement as proposed by you for release on 10 April.

ROOSEVELT
FROM  The President  TO  The Prime Minister

SERIAL  514  DATE  7 April 1944

DATE/TIME  OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT March Submarine Warfare Statement.

ACTION

Answers Pd #637, which was sent by memo to OWI and Navy Dept. for approval of statement as suggested by PM. Both agencies approved statement without change; draft message written by Captain Wood; approved by the President.

COPIES TO:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

000.7 (3) Sec 2.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 515. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 638 my thought in authorizing an O.S.S. Mission to the Mihailovic Area was to obtain intelligence and the mission was to have no political functions whatever.

In view however of your expressed opinion that there might be misunderstanding by our Allies and others, I have directed that the contemplated mission be not repeat not sent.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1230, EWT, 8 April 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD
Captain, U. S. Navy

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.G. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
April 8, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: 5

Your 638 my thought in authorizing an O.S.S. Mission to the Mihailovic Area was to obtain intelligence and the mission was to have no political functions whatever.

In view however of your expressed opinion that there might be misunderstanding by our Allies and others, I have directed that the contemplated mission be not repeat not sent.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: NOV 1 1971
FROM: The President  
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL: 515  
DATE/TIME: 8 Apr 44.

OR FILE NUMBER: 

TOR MAP ROOM: 
VIA: 

SUBJECT: Intelligence Mission to Mihailovic.

ACTION: Answers PM #638, which was sent to Admiral Leahy for action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reply drafted by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 8 Apr 44. Answered by PM #642, 9 Apr 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF: 

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED: 210 055
FROM: OPHAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 516, PERSONAL AND FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In view of prospective change in plans for ANVIL I believe that U.J. should be fully informed at once when we reach decision in regard to ANVIL on recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1232, EWT, 8 April 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, USN.
April 8, 1944

RESIDENT TO PRIME: # 5/6

In view of prospective change in plans for ANVIL I believe that U.J. should be fully informed at once when decision in regard to ANVIL is reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by me.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.G. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971
FRO!! The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 516 DATE 8 Apr 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Informing Stalin of changes of plans in ANVIL.

ACTION Written by Admiral Leahy; approved by President with minor alterations.

0268
8 APRIL 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALJUNA, LONDON

THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON, AND
PERSONAL, NUMBER 517.

For your information I have today sent the follow-
ing quoted letter in reply to the Canadian Prime Minister's
letter of March 10 regarding participation of Canadian
forces in Allied operations. He sent you an identical
message.

QUOTE. Upon receipt of your communication dated
March 13, 1944, and transmitting a letter from the Prime
Minister of Canada in regard to the command of Canadian
troops with the Allied forces overseas, I referred the
questions therein contained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff this date have given me
the following report with which I am in agreement:

'We have examined the message addressed to you
on 10 March 1944 by the Canadian Prime Minister, in
which he informed you of his government's consideration
of the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission
in London. In the same message he proposed that appro-
priate formal announcements be made to clarify the command
authority exercised by Generals Eisenhower and Wilson
over the participating forces of the United Nations.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By Date, NOV 1 1974
Although the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London is a question for decision by the governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, military implications involved make it necessary that, should such a Mission be established, the appropriate channel of communications between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly through the Mission, to the Supreme Commands, as proposed by the Canadian Prime Minister. We feel that there is no need from the military standpoint, to make any announcement clarifying command authority since the chain of military command is well established. There is no objection, however, to such an announcement if other than military considerations warrant it. An announcement should make clear that the Supreme Commanders derive their authority from the Governments concerned through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly from the governments, as suggested in the letter from the Canadian Prime Minister. We recommend that if any announcement is made, it be general in scope and cover all participating nations.'

UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1320, EWT, 8 Apr 44.

ROBERT MYE. S.,
Lieutenant (jg). USNR.
April 8, 1944

PRESIDENT TO PRIME: #517

For your information I have today sent the following quoted letter in reply to the Canadian Prime Minister's letter of March 10 regarding participation of Canadian forces in Allied operations. He sent you an identical message.

QUOTE. Upon receipt of your communication dated March 13, 1944, and transmitting a letter from the Prime Minister of Canada in regard to the command of Canadian troops with the Allied forces overseas, I referred the questions therein contained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff this date have given me the following report with which I am in agreement:

"We have examined the message addressed to you on 10 March 1944 by the Canadian Prime Minister, in which he informed you of his government's consideration of the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London. In the same message he proposed that appropriate formal announcements be made to clarify the command authority exercised by Generals Eisenhower and Wilson over the participating forces of the United Nations.

"Although the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London is a question for decision by the governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, military implications involved make it necessary that, should such
a Mission be established, the appropriate channel of communications between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly through the Mission, to the Supreme Commands, as proposed by the Canadian Prime Minister.

"We feel that there is no need from the military standpoint, to make any announcement clarifying command authority since the chain of military command is well established. There is no objection, however, to such an announcement if other than military considerations warrant it. An announcement should make clear that the Supreme Commanders derive their authority from the governments concerned through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly from the governments, as suggested in the letter from the Canadian Prime Minister. We recommend that if any announcement is made, it be general in scope and cover all participating nations."

UNQUOTE.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date NOV 1 1971
FROnT
The President

TO
The Prime Minister

SERIAL 517

DATE 8 Apr 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Letter to Canadian Prime Minister re participation of Canadian forces in Allied operation; command.

ACTION

Message drafted by Admiral Leahy from letter written by President to Canadian Ambassador.

Answered by PM#654, 20 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:

2/C Canadian III Staff Mission
8 April 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 518. PERSONAL AND PRIVATE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am a good deal concerned by the French National Committee's demands in regard to military matters. The tone of these communications verges on the dictatorial, especially when we consider the simple facts.

Personally I do not think that we can give military information to a source which has a bad record in secrecy. The implied threat to stay out of operations in France would, if carried out, do the Committee and its leader irreparable harm.

If De Gaulle wants to come over here to visit me I shall be very glad to see him and will adopt a paternal tone, but I think it would be a mistake for me to invite him without an intimation from him that he wants to come.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1700, EWT, 8 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.E. Stoudt
Date NOV 1 1971

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff
April 8, 1944.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I am a good deal concerned by the French National Committee's demands in regard to military matters. The tone of these communications verges on the dictatorial, especially when we consider the simple facts.

Personally I do not think that we can give military information to a source which has a bad record in secrecy. The implied threat to stay out of operations in France would, if carried out, do the Committee and its leader irreparable harm.

If de Gaulle wants to come over here to visit me I shall be very glad to see him and will adopt a paternal tone, but I think it would be a mistake for me to invite him without an intimation from him that he wants to come.

ROOSEVELT
April 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel McFarland:

Attached is a paraphrase of a message from the President to the Prime Minister, dated April 8, 1944, presenting the President's views in regard to telegram No. 1109 of 4 April, 1944 (CM-IN-4944, 7 April 1944) from Algiers to the State Department, the subject of which is the PCNL reaction to the views of the C.C.S. on employment of French troops and method of dealings with the PCNL.

It is forwarded to you for appropriate distribution to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.,
Aide.
PARAPHRASE

April 8, 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

The French National Committee's demands in regard to military matters concern me a good deal. Especially when we consider the simple facts, the tone of these communications verges on the dictatorial.

Personally I do not think that we can give military information to a source which has a bad record in secrecy. If carried out, the implied threat to stay out of operations in France would do the Committee and its leader irreparable harm.

I shall be very glad to see de Gaulle if he wants to come over here to visit me and will adopt a paternal tone, but I think that without an intimation from him that he wants to come it would be a mistake for me to invite him.

F. D. R.
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**ACTION**

Dictated by the President, 8 Apr 44, after reading State Depart cable #1109, 4 Apr 44, from Chapin in Algiers.

Answered by PM #643, 12 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

07/17 0278 PNC.

**FILED:**
8 April 1944

SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALJSENA LONDON

AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT. NO. 519.

Your 641. While I remain of the opinion that it would be
humane and wise to provide such relief as is practicable to the
under-nourished women and children of friendly people in Nazi
occupied Europe, I am in complete agreement with you that nothing
should be done that will interfere with or hamper forthcoming
operations.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2115 E.W.T. 8 April 1944

Boyce P. Price
Captain, C.E.
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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**ACTION**

Answer Pm #641, 8 Apr 44.

Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by President 8 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**  
**ACTION COMPLETED:**  
**FILED:**
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 520. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your Number 636, I have today received a report from the U. S.
Chiefs of Staff on the possibility of increased American production
of LST in order to provide for anticipated British operations in the
Pacific in 1945.

Our program has recently been increased, as you know, to take
care of the large needs for OVERLORD and the impetus thus acquired
will continue for some time after June so that the drop you mention
does not occur so soon. It is not possible further to accelerate or
increase our program without interference with other programs which
have already been reduced to the limit to permit going ahead with the
present landing craft program.

In view of the gains made in accelerating our building schedule
for OVERLORD, in view of the larger number of U. S. survivors now ex-
pected on the basis of experience in European operations, and in view
of a better knowledge as to U. S. requirements in the Pacific, the
United States Chiefs of Staff believe that the combined needs for pro-
secuting the war against Japan can be met under present programs and that
allocations should not be made until operations have been definitely de-
cided upon.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1605, EWT, 13 April 1944.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff
**FROM** The President  
**TO** The Prime Minister  

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**DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER**

**FOR MAP ROOM VIA**

**SUBJECT** LST requirement and production.

**ACTION**

Answers Wm's #636, which was referred to Admiral Leahy for study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 Apr 44. Reply received from President at Washington as BLACK 12, 13 Apr 44.

Answered by OM #645, 14 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**  
**DATE:**  
**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

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**FILED:**
PRIORITY

13 APRIL 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 521, CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 643. The questions therein presented necessitate consultation with the State Department and my Chiefs of Staff when I return to Washington, but at this distance all seems well.

I have no objection to a visit from De Gaulle but I should like to have your opinion of the action of the Committee in dismissing General Giraud. Some time ago I was asked if I would receive De Gaulle in Washington if he came over and I replied in the affirmative. I think it should remain in this situation. I would be glad to see him if he asks to see me but I will extend no formal or informal invitation.

In addition to a probability of compromising the security of our plans for operations which might have disastrous effects, it does not appear to me that any military advantage could result from divulging confidential information to the Committee.

I agree with you that no reply should be made to the unwarranted demand for Italian ships.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1610, EWT, 13 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date: Nov 1, 1971

RICHARD PAKA, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.
FROM: The President
TO: The Prime Minister

SERIAL: 521
DATE/TIME: 13 Apr 44
OR FILE NUMBER: 

TOR MAP ROOM: VIA

SUBJECT: French National Committee

ACTION:
1. Answers PM #643, 12 Apr 44, which was sent as White 22, 130245Z, to the President at Waccamaw.
2. President's reply received as Black 13, 131915Z.
3. Sent to the PM as this #521.
4. Further discussed in PM #653.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED:

FILED:
16 April 1944

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

FROM: Opnav

TO: Alusna, London

NUMBER 522. PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Replying to your 644, as the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched a
message on April 6th to General Burrows, head of your Mission in Moscow,
and General Deane, who heads our Mission, with instructions to inform the
Soviet General Staff that in accordance with the agreement reached at
Teheran, it is our firm intention to launch OVERLORD on the agreed date
(which date was furnished in a succeeding message) I do not believe we
should repeat U.S. information which has already been given to the
Russian Military authorities. In this same message, Deane and Burrows
were instructed to pay a handsome tribute to the magnificent progress of
the Soviet Armies and to ask the Soviet General Staff to confirm, that
they, for their part, would fulfill the undertaking given at Teheran by
Marshal Stalin to organize a large scale offensive at the appropriate
time to assist OVERLORD by containing the maximum number of German di-
visions in the East.

With reference to paragraph two of your proposed message, it would
be better to wait until our Chiefs of Staff have come to a firm agreement
on the scope and timing of operations in the Mediterranean.

As to the question regarding the scale of the Soviet effort raised
in paragraph three of your proposed message, U.S. made a definite commit-
ment at Teheran, and I believe he meant it. The C.C.S. message to Deane
and Burrows directed them to ask for confirmation of the Soviet Teheran
undertaking.

The British Chiefs of Staff did not consider it advisable to ask directly for Soviet plans or scale of effort because the Soviet decisions must depend on the development of their operation between now and the middle of May. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff took the same view. I am inclined to agree that U.S. should not be asked this specific question unless you have strong reasons to the contrary.

If you feel it timely to dispatch a message, I suggest the following redraft to which you may attach my signature if you concur:

1. Pursuant to our talks at Teheran, the general crossing of the sea will take place around a date which Generals Leane and Burrows have recently been directed to give the Soviet General Staff. We shall be acting at our fullest strength.

2. We are launching an offensive on the Italian mainland at maximum strength about mid May.

3. Since Teheran your Armies have been gaining a magnificent series of victories for the common cause. Even in the months when you thought they would not be active, they have gained these great victories. We send you our very best wishes and trust that your Armies and ours, operating in unison in accordance with our Teheran agreement, will (soon) crush the Hitlerites.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1715, EWT, 16 April 1944

Ogdens S. Collins, Jr.
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
17 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

The following message was received in the White House Map Room yesterday, 16 April 1944:

"For General Marshall from Admiral Leahy.

"Your draft reply to Former Naval Person's #644 is sent today unchanged."

The message referred to above was sent as the President's #522 to the Prime Minister, 16 April 1944.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the Prime Minister's 644. As a result of acceptance by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff of a proposal made by the British Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff on April 6 sent General Deane and General Burrows, the Heads of the American and British Missions in Moscow, the information given in Paragraph One of the Prime Minister's proposed message to Marshal Stalin. Deane and Burrows were instructed to pass this information to the Soviet General Staff. Deane and Burrows were also directed to pay a handsome tribute to the progress of the Russian armies and to ask the Soviet General Staff to confirm that they, the Russians, for their part, will fulfill the undertaking given by Marshal Stalin at Teheran to organize at the appropriate time a large scale offensive to assist OVERLORD. Further, that any information that the Soviet General Staff can give us regarding their plans will be welcome.

I doubt if the Prime Minister knew of the above CCS action when he made his proposal to you. Under the circumstances it would not appear appropriate for Stalin to receive from you and the Prime Minister information which our military missions had already given the Russian military authorities.

Paragraph Two of the Prime Minister's proposed message might be taken as containing an inference that ANVIL has been cancelled. Discussions going on now between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff have not as yet resulted in a firm agreement as to Mediterranean operations in support of OVERLORD. I question the advisability of your concurring in the dispatch of this paragraph as worded until this matter has been finally settled.

In the third paragraph of the message the Prime Minister proposes to ask Marshal Stalin what scale the effort of the Soviet armies will be after D day of OVERLORD. The CCS message referred to above asked for confirmation of the Soviet-Teheran undertaking. The British Chiefs of Staff did not consider it advisable to ask directly for Soviet plans or scale of effort, and we acquiesced in that view after having previously proposed a question somewhat similar to the Prime Minister's.

Attached is a proposed message.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff
Proposed message from President to Prime Minister

As the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched a message on April 6th to General Burrows, head of your mission in Moscow, and General Deane, who heads our mission, with instructions to inform the Soviet General Staff that in accordance with the agreement reached at Teheran, it is our firm intention to launch OVERLORD on the agreed date (which date was furnished in a succeeding message), I do not believe we should repeat to Uncle J information which has already been given to the Russian military authorities. In this same message, Deane and Burrows were instructed to pay a handsome tribute to the magnificent progress of the Soviet armies and to ask the Soviet General Staff to confirm that they, for their part, would fulfill the undertaking given at Teheran by Marshal Stalin to organize a large-scale offensive at the appropriate time to assist OVERLORD by containing the maximum number of German divisions in the east.

With reference to Paragraph two of your proposed message, would it be better to wait until our Chiefs of Staff have come to a firm agreement on the scope and timing of operations in the Mediterranean.

As to the question regarding the scale of the Soviet effort raised in Paragraph three of your proposed message, Uncle J made a definite
Deane and Burrows directed them to ask for confirmation of the Soviet Teheran undertaking. The British Chiefs of Staff did not consider it advisable to ask directly for Soviet plans or scale of effort because the Soviet decisions must depend on the development of their operation between now and the middle of May. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff took the same view. I am inclined to agree that Uncle J should not be asked this specific question unless you have strong reasons to the contrary.

If you feel it timely to dispatch a message, I suggest the following redraft to which you may attach my signature if you concur:

1. Pursuant to our talks at Teheran, the general crossing of the sea will take place around a date which Generals Deane and Burrows have recently been directed to give the Soviet General Staff. We shall be acting at our fullest strength.

2. We are launching an offensive on the Italian mainland at maximum strength about mid-May.

3. Since Teheran your armies have been gaining a magnificent series of victories for the common cause. Even in the months when you thought they would not be active, they have gained these great victories. We send you our very best wishes and trust that your armies and ours, operating in unison in accordance with our Teheran agreement, will soon crush the Hitlerites.
THO PRESIDEN TO THE PRIME MINISTER

SBRJ. 22

16 APRIL 1944

IN TIME OR FILE

VIA

SUbJECT Informing Stalin of date of OVERLORD.

ACTION Answers Pa-Pres #544, 14 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WITN 28, 14/1330Z. In March 17, 14/1840Z Apr, the President directed message be referred to Gen Marshall for preparation of reply.

General Marshall’s suggested reply sent to the President via courier, 15 Apr 44. In March 27, 16 Apr 44, the President sent General Marshall’s message, unchanged, to the Map Room for transmission to the PA. Sent to PA as this #522.

In March 28, 16 Apr 44, the President directed General Marshall be informed that his message (March 27 above) had been sent without change. See attached memo fr Capt Wood to Gen Marshall.

Answered by Pa-Pres #650, 18 Apr 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 310 OVERLORD.

FILED: 0291
17 April 1944

FROM: O'Neill
TO: Alusma, London

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSONNEL, NUMBER 523.

Your 648, thank you for the information regarding recent difficulties encountered in Greek participation in our Allied effort.

I join with you in a hope that your line of action toward the problem may succeed in bringing the Greeks back into the Allied camp and to a participation against the barbarians that will be worthy of traditions established by the heroes of Greek history.

Frankly, as one whose family and who personally have contributed by personal help to Greek independence for over a century, I am unhappy over the present situation and hope that Greeks everywhere will set aside pettiness and regain their sense of proportion. Let every Greek think of their glorious past and show a personal unselfishness which is so necessary now. You can quote me if you want to in the above sense.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 0200, EWT, 18 April, 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.
MESSAGE THAT FOLLOWS TO BE TRANSMITTED BY CRESCEENT TO SENTINEL FROM
CITADEL. QUOTE YOUR SIX FOUR EIGHT, THANK YOU FOR THE INFORMATION.

REGARDING RECENT DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN GREEK PARTICIPATION
IN OUR ALLIED EFFORT. PARA. I JOIN WITH YOU IN A HOPE THAT YOUR

LINE OF ACTION TOWARD THE PROBLEM MAY SUCCEED IN BRINGING THE GREEKS
BACK INTO THE ALLIED CAMP AND TO A PARTICIPATION AGAINST THE

BARBARIANS THAT WILL BE WORTHY OF TRADITIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE
HEROES OF GREEK HISTORY. SIGNED ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE. TARFON

SEND THIS.

Released: 1600, April 17, 1944.

William H. Rigdon,
Lieut(jg), USN.

I am happy over the present situation
and hope that things every where will hit
a more settled and regular tone of production
yet every thought of their friends down here
when a personal message from you is so necessary
now. I am quite well. If you want to in
the above sense.
25 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

At the request of Mr. Gray, Office of the Secretary of State, the attached message #523 from the President to the Prime Minister, dated 17 April 1944, is forwarded for the information of the State Department.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

1 Incl.
From: The President  
To: The Prime Minister  
No.: 523

Thank you for your #648 and the information about difficulties in Greek participation in our Allied effort recently encountered.

With you I join in the hope that your line of action toward the problem may succeed in bringing back the Greeks into the camp of the Allies and to a participation that will be worthy of the traditions established by the heroes of the history of the Greeks against the barbarians. As one whose family and who personally has contributed by personal help for over a century to Greek independence, frankly I am not happy over the situation as it is at present and hope that everywhere Greeks will retain their sense of proportion and will set aside pettiness. Let every Greek show a personal unselfishness which is so necessary now and think of their glorious past.

If you want to, you can in the above sense quote me.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 523 DATE 18 Apr 44

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Greek disturbances.

ACTION
1. Answers Ps #648, 16 Apr 44, which was sent to the President as White 49, 16/2300Z.
2. In Black 32, 18/0405Z, the President sent reply to Map Room for transmittal to Ps.
3. Sent as this #523.
4. Answered by Ps-PRESS #651, 18 Apr 44, which was sent to the President as White 62, 18/1605Z. In Black 44, 20 Apr 44, informed, "No acknowledgment or reply will be made to White 62."

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

300 Jones
18 April 1944

FROM: Opnav
TO: Aluena, London

PERSONAL AND

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 524.

Your number 647 received and delivered to Hull and Morgenthau
for their information.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 0200, EWT, 18 April, 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C. E.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

180659
NR 7212
FROM The President
SERIAL 524
DATE 18 Apr 1944
TO The Prime Minister
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER
TOR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT Post-war economic collaboration.

ACTION
1. Answers Ps #647, 15 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as W.H.E 44, 1520:00.
2. In BLACK 26, 16000, Adm Leahy requested copies of messages referred to in Ps #647 (Ps #’s 476 & 477) be sent by telegraph; sent as W.H.E 45 & 46, 1613:00.
3. In BLACK 33, 1800:05, President directed following be sent to Ps: "Yr #647 read and delvd to Hull and Morgenthau for information." This was sent as attached #524.
4. BLACK 34, 1800:05, directed that copies of Ps #’s 476 & 477, and Ps #647 be given to Sec’s State and Treasury for their information. Paraphrased copies sent by memo, 18 Apr 44.

COPY TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

0298
18 April 1944
Midnight

3112

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Please transmit to the Prime Minister the following message from the President in reply to his No. 646 of April 15:

"The situation here is so different from that in the United Kingdom that restrictions here would have to be handled differently. We are nevertheless considering what can be done to tighten up, and are consulting our military people on the point."

HULL
SPECIAL TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT - NO. 1

I suggest, if you agree, that following be sent to Winant:

QUOTE Please transmit to the Prime Minister the following message from the President in reply to his No. 646 of April 15:

INNER QUOTE The situation here is so different from that in the United Kingdom that restrictions here would have to be handled differently. We are nevertheless considering what can be done to tighten up, and are consulting our military people on the point. END INNER QUOTE. END QUOTE.

Winant has been authorized to send messages from the Foreign Office to British missions in any country which may retaliate and to convey to our missions in such countries authorization to send messages for the British missions there.
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<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>STATE DEPT #3112</td>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>18 Apr 44</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Ban on diplomatic traffic from England.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answers PM-PRES #646, 15 Apr 44, which was sent as WHITE 41, 15/2010Z, to the President at Wassaw.
2. In BLACK 25, 16/0300Z, Adm Leahy directed, "Give copy of PM #646 to Sec State for advice. President is inclined to agree with suggestion contained in Para 6."
3. In WHITE 65, 18/1945Z, Sec State sent draft reply to be sent thru Amb Winant to PM.
4. President, in BLACK 41, 19/0230Z, stated, "Your message proposed to Winant in WHITE 65 is approved."
5. State Dept immediately informed by Capt Price via telephone. Confirming memorandum sent to Sec State 19 Apr 44.
6. This message, State Dept #3112, was sent via State Dept channels to Winant for delivery to PM.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

"See Ireland."
18 April 1944

PRIORIT\t
To: Alusna, London
From: Opnav

PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 525.

Your 650 received and your message to Uncle J. reported therein has my approval.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2300, EWT, 18 April 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C.E.
CORRECT MESSAGE SERIAL NO 191325 TO READ "NUMBER 525".

YOUR 191633 REFERS.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DALE MEYER 8200.8 (9/27/58)

Date- NOV 1 1971
Signature- PAKES

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

191342  NCR 7429
DECLASSIFIED

RECEIVED THE PRESIDENT'S NUMBERED MESSAGES TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON 524 AND 526.

WHERE IS 525?

Yours ever best, etc. -
Sincerely yours -

5-13-37 = 50

5a read 50 - 51
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL #525 DATE 18 April 1944

ACTION Answers PM #650, which was sent to President at Wacosmaw as WHITE 60, 18/12452.

Answered by President in BLACK 39, 18/0230Z, which was sent to PM as this #525.

FROM President TO Prime Minister

DATE 18 April 1944

ACTION Answers PM #650, which was sent to President at Wacosmaw as WHITE 60, 18/12452.

Answered by President in BLACK 39, 18/0230Z, which was sent to PM as this #525.

FROM President TO Prime Minister

DATE 18 April 1944

ACTION Answers PM #650, which was sent to President at Wacosmaw as WHITE 60, 18/12452.

Answered by President in BLACK 39, 18/0230Z, which was sent to PM as this #525.

FROM President TO Prime Minister

DATE 18 April 1944

ACTION Answers PM #650, which was sent to President at Wacosmaw as WHITE 60, 18/12452.

Answered by President in BLACK 39, 18/0230Z, which was sent to PM as this #525.

ACTION COMPLETED: 310 OVERLORD

FILED:
20 April 1944

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND [BLANK] FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR

THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 526.

Replying to your number 652, I am sorry that Bevin
finds it impossible to attend International Labor Confer-
ence in Philadelphia but the need for his services at home
is understood and I am sure that Mr. Tomlinson with his
assistants will prove to be welcome.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2330 EWT 20 April 1944

Robert W. Bogue
Lt (jg) USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By [Signature]
Date [NOV 1 1971]
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 526 DATE 20 Apr 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT British representation on International Labor Conference.

ACTION
1. Answer PM #652, which was sent to the President at Nassau 72, 19/15352.

2. President's reply received in map room as S.L.A.D. 46, 21/03002. Sent to PM as this #526.

FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 526 DATE 20 Apr 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT British representation on International Labor Conference.

ACTION
1. Answer PM #652, which was sent to the President at Nassau 72, 19/15352.

2. President's reply received in map room as S.L.A.D. 46, 21/03002. Sent to PM as this #526.
20 April 1944

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV

TO: ALUSNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND TENTATIVE FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 527.

Your 653. Owing to accumulation of work here I
think it would be much better not to have the inquiry
of a visit made at present. It would be much better
timing from my standpoint to have the question raised about
a month from now by the French Representative in Washington.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room

at 2330 EWT 20 April 1944

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1, 1971

Robert W. Bogue
Lt (jg) USNR
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<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>527</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>20 April 1944</td>
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<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>French National Committee; visit of De Gaulle.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answer to PM #653, 20 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Washington as White 77, 200130Z.

2. President's reply received in Map Room as Black 47, 210300Z; sent to the PM as this #527.

3. Answered by PM #656, 22 Apr 44.

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

800.9

**FILED:**

0309
21 April 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluana, London

NUMBER 528. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 654 is received and I am in full agreement with your telegram to MacKenzie King quoted therein.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EWT, 21 April, 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM
Captain, A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By

Date

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<th>FOR MAP ROOM</th>
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<tr>
<td>The President</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>21 April 1944</td>
<td>212259 NCR 8036</td>
<td></td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Canadian Joint Staff Mission to London; letter to Canadian Prime Minister</td>
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</tbody>
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**ACTION**

1. Answers Fm 654, 20 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw via pouch as unnumbered White, 20 Apr 44.
2. President's reply received in the Map Room as BLACK 52, 21 Apr 44. Sent to the PM as this #528.
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

21 April 1944

NUMBER 529. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 649. As you say, the only point which divides us on Spanish policy is whether to resume oil shipments concurrently with the resumption of wolfram shipments from Spain to Germany to the extent of 60 tons over the three months of April, May and June, or whether to do all in our power by a united effort to continue the suspension of wolfram shipments until July 1 in the hope and belief that thereafter shipments in the second half of the year in the amounts agreed to will not be practicable. It seems to us that to agree to the resumption of wolfram shipments prior to July 1st would frustrate the efforts which we are jointly making in Sweden and Turkey and would impair our position in dealing with Switzerland and Portugal. To these negotiations we attach great importance, as I know you do also.

Furthermore, our public attaches the greatest importance to Spanish shipments of wolfram and is most critical of oil supplies going to that country while these shipments continue. They are most insistent upon a policy of firmness in this matter and a contrary course on the eve of military operations would, I believe, have the most serious consequences.

The Duke of Alba's repudiated proposal to which you refer required shipments of only half the wolfram now proposed for the rest of 1944 and even in that case we said that only as a last resort would we consent to shipments before July 1st.
We have gone a very long way to meet your difficulties as you describe them in your long cable to me. Will you not, therefore, reconsider an instruction to our two Ambassadors to join in a determined effort to settle the matter upon the basis of a suspension of shipments during the first half year. I do not believe that we have yet done all that is possible along this line.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1830, EWT, 21 April 1944

HENRY W. PUTNAM
Captain, A.C.
22 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

This memorandum will confirm telephone conversation this morning between Lieutenant Collins, White House Map Room, and Mr. Gray, Secretary of State's Office.

By direction of the President, the message on wolfram drafted in the Secretary of State's Special Telegram No. 2 was sent unchanged to the Prime Minister on 21 April 1944, as #529.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.
As you requested, I am submitting herewith a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's message to you, No. 649, of April 17, 1944.

Our discussions with the British regarding oil shipments to Spain and Spanish shipments of wolfram to Germany have reached a most difficult point. After the last message to you from the Prime Minister we informed the British Embassy, as you directed, that we would withdraw from the position of demanding a total wolfram embargo by Spain and would agree to resume oil shipments provided the Spanish would agree to continue the suspension of wolfram shipments until July 1 and thereafter, for the second half of the year, ship only 300 tons, the same amount which they shipped in January, 1944. The Spanish continue to insist that they must have the right to ship 60 tons before the first of July. The Prime Minister wishes us to agree to this.

As I have explained at length to Lord Halifax, I believe that this concession would have the most disastrous results.
results. Our position in insisting upon suspension of shipments until July 1 is based on the belief that in view of pending military operations we must do everything in our power to prevent shipments from neutrals to the enemy of essential war materials until such time as the success of the military operations may render shipments impossible. Upon our success in maintaining this position will depend, I believe, our ability to eliminate or drastically reduce ball bearing shipments from Sweden, chrome shipments from Turkey, and also our success in negotiations with Switzerland and Portugal to reduce their contribution to the enemy.

I also pointed out that the response which has come from all quarters to the statements made in my address on April 9 on the subject of neutral trade with the enemy shows that this position represents the unanimous attitude of the American people and that to act in any way counter to it would weaken the widespread support of our foreign policy which has become increasingly manifest.

The Prime Minister stresses the danger that the Spaniards may permit wolfram to go to the enemy if our negotiations break down. My belief is that a strong and united effort to obtain a settlement with the Spanish on the
the basis which we have put forward has considerable chance of success and even greater chance of keeping the matter in suspension until it may be determined by the progress of events. Ambassador Hays has just reported that he feels that the risks to us, emphasized by the British, grow smaller as time goes on and that inversely the risks to Spain of failure to reach an agreement with us are greater as time goes on.

I also said to Lord Halifax that if they believe, contrary to our view, that oil shipments should be resumed concurrently with wolfram shipments from Spain to Germany, they should undertake the responsibility and sponsorship for the oil movements. I have not yet had a reply from him on this latest discussion.

In view of the foregoing, I believe that the best course is to continue to urge our view upon the British and the reply is drafted in this sense. Would you let me know whether you approve this course.
DRAFT REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER

As you say, the only point which divides us on Spanish policy is whether to resume oil shipments concurrently with the resumption of wolfram shipments from Spain to Germany to the extent of 60 tons over the three months of April, May, and June, or whether to do all in our power by a united effort to continue the suspension of wolfram shipments until July 1 in the hope and belief that thereafter shipments in the second half of the year in the amounts agreed to will not be practicable. It seems to us that to agree to the resumption of wolfram shipments prior to July 1 would frustrate the efforts which we are jointly making in Sweden and Turkey and would impair our position in dealing with Switzerland and Portugal. To these negotiations we attach great importance, as I know you do also.

Furthermore, our public attaches the greatest importance to Spanish shipments of wolfram and is most critical of oil supplies going to that country while these shipments continue. They are most insistent upon a policy of firmness in this matter and a contrary course on the eve of military operations would, I believe, have the most serious consequences.

The Duke of Alba's repudiated proposal to which you refer required shipments of only half the wolfram now proposed
proposed for the rest of 1944 and even in that case we said
that only as a last resort would we consent to shipments
before July 1.

We have gone a very long way to meet your difficulties
as you describe them in your long cable to me. Will you
not, therefore, reconsider an instruction to our two Ambas-
sadors to join in a determined effort to settle the matter
upon the basis of a suspension of shipments during the first
half year. I do not believe that we have yet done all that
is possible along this line.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>529</td>
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<tr>
<td>DATE/TIME</td>
<td>DATE 21 Apr 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Spanish wolfram</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ACTION

1. Answered Fm #549, 17 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Washington as WHTZ 51, 171315Z.
2. In batch 36, 180105, President directed that Fm #649 be sent to Sec State for draft reply. Sent by memo, 18 Apr 44.
3. Draft reply sent to the President via pouch, 20 Apr 44, as Special Telegram #2 from Sec State to the President.
4. President's reply, quoting verbatim Sec State's Special Telegram #2, received in Map Room as batch 53, 2121354, sent to FM as this message #529.
5. Sec State notified by telephone evening 21; confirmed by memo 22 Apr 44.
6. Answered by FM #655, 22 Apr 44.

### COPIES TO:

- 

### DATE:

- 

### BY DIRECTION OF:

- 

### ACTION COMPLETED:

601 Wolfram
23 April 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT, PERSONAL AND NUMBER 530.

Your number 656, I do not have any information that leads me to believe that DeGaulle and his Committee of National Liberation have as yet given any helpful assistance to our Allied war effort. It seems to me that the "forces including naval forces and the Richelieu" were placed at our disposal before De Gaulle.

While it is impossible for me to make at this time a definite commitment to a visitation from him at a later date, I have no objection to his being informed that a request from him made about the end of May will receive such favorable consideration as is permitted by the conditions then existing.

Circumstances are so often misconstrued later that I will not ever have it said by the French or by American or British commentators that I invited him to visit me in Washington. If he asks whether I will receive him if he comes, I will incline my head with complete suavity and with all that is required by the etiquette of the 18th Century. This is farther than the Great Duke would have gone, don't you think so.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1915, EWT, 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C.E.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached message from the President to the Secretary of State was received today in the White House Map Room.

Your attention is invited to the fact that the message to Prime Minister Churchill is a true copy and should therefore be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

1 Incl.
Mag, Pres to Sec State,
25 April 1944.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE

25 APRIL 1944

With reference to your memorandum dated 24 April I sent the following message to Churchill on April 23:

"1. Your Number 656, I do not have any information that leads me to believe that DeGaulle and his Committee of National Liberation have as yet given any helpful assistance to our Allied war effort. It seems to me that the 'forces including naval forces and the Richelieu' were placed at our disposal before DeGaulle.

"2. While it is impossible for me to make at this time a definite commitment to a visitation from him at a later date, I have no objection to his being informed that a request from him made about the end of May will receive such favorable consideration as is permitted by the conditions then existing.

"3. Circumstances are so often misconstrued later that I will not ever have it said by the French or by American or British commentators that I invited him to visit me in Washington. If he asks whether I will receive him if he comes, I will incline my head with complete suavity and with all that is required by the etiquette of the 18th Century. This is farther than the Great Duke would have gone, don't you think so."

- 1 -
The President

FROM

The Prime Minister

TO

SERIAL

530

DATE/TIME

DATE 23 Apr 44.

OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT Visit of De Gaulle.

ACTION

1. Answers Pa #656, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as Unit 92, 2220002.

2. President's reply received in the Map Room as

3. In Black 68, 2517152, the President directed copy

4. Answered by Pa #657, 24 Apr 44.

ACTIONS COMPLETED:

FILLED:

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Copies to: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

Sec State 25 Apr 44 The President - Black 68.

---

0324
PRIORITY
25 APRIL 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 531, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring to your 655, I have today authorized Hull
to accept Halifax’s proposal to restrict shipments of
wolfram from Spain.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1400, EWT, 25 April 1944.

ROBERT W. ROGUE
ROBERT W. ROGUE,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By R. STEWART
Date NOV 1 1971

TOP SECRET
25 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

This memorandum confirms telephone conversation between Captain Price, White House Map Room, and Mr. Gray, Secretary of State's Office, this date.

The following message from the President for the Secretary of State was received today in the White House Map Room:

"With reference to your Special Telegram Number 3 of 23 April, your acceptance of the British proposal regarding shipments of wolfram from Spain is approved.

"Roosevelt"

Very respectfully,

ROBERT W. BOGUE,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR.
SPECIAL TELEGRAM NO. 3 FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the Prime Minister's letter to you, I believe and the FEA concurs, that the wisest course is to agree to the latest Spanish offer which restricts their wolfram shipments for May and June to 20 tons a month and thereafter 40 tons a month for the remainder of the year, a total of 280 tons. We all fear that to announce that the British are going ahead alone would result in repercussions detrimental to our united front with the neutrals. Unless you instruct otherwise I am prepared to so inform Halifax tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 4-31-74
By [Signature] Nov 1 1974

Sent to President at Waccamaw as White 113, 24 Apr 44. Answered by Black 66, 25 Apr 44.
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<td>OR FILE NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Spanish wolfram</td>
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**ACTION**

1. Answer PM #655, 22 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 91, 221840Z.
2. In BLACK 55, 230145Z, referred to Sec State for preparation of reply.
3. Sec States proposal sent to the President as WHITE 113, 250100Z.
4. BLACK 66, 2 1715, approves WHITE 113.
5. BLACK 67, 2 1715, forwards to Map Room President's reply to PM. Sent as this #531.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:**

[Signature]
25 April 1944

PRIORITY

From: Oppen
To: Atan, London

SUBJECT: PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 657, 658 and 660. I am very pleased indeed by your success
in handling the Greek naval and military mutiny.

I will hope for a similar success in your efforts with the
Egyptian political problem.

Our prospects of assisting OVERLORD by vigorous action in Italy
do look much better with a fixed date upon which we may expect all-
out pressure against the enemy. In view of our postponement of ANVIL
a real success in Italy now seems essential.

Referring to your 659, I will upon my return look into the matter
of Rear Admiral Low's talk about submarine warfare and will endeavor
to prevent in the future any publicity regarding submarines that might
properly be included in our monthly statement.

Everything goes well here in my vacation residence. The doctor
agrees with me that I am better.

Your 661, I have received from Uncle Joe an identical message.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2:00, EDT, 25 April 1944

F. H. GRAHAM,
1st Lt., AGD.
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<td>TOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Greeks; Wogs; Admiral Low's speech; vacation; msg fr UJ re OVERLORD; operations in Italy.</td>
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**ACTION**

2. Received in Map Room as Black 69, 2602302Z.
3. Answered by Pa 664, 26 Apr 44.

**COPIES TO:**

**DATE:**

**BY DIRECTION OF:**

**ACTION COMPLETED:** 0301: May 5, 1944.
29 April 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

NUMBER 533. PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 666. Thank you very much for your sympathetic message of condolences on the loss of Secretary of the Navy Knox.

I think it would be an added kindness if you should release your message for publication.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2359, EWT, 29 April 1944

H.W. PUTNAM, Capt., A.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By WILLIAM J. STUART
Date NOV 1 1971

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 533 DATE 29 April 1944

DATE/TIME 300430 NO 9575

OR FILE NUMBER

FOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Statement on Secretary of Navy Knox's death.

ACTION
1. Answers Pa #666 and #667, 29 Apr 44, which were sent to the President at Waccamaw as Wheel 147 and 146 respectively.
2. Answer received from the President as Block 83, 3002402.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

140

0332
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 534: PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I propose the following joint statement regarding U-boat warfare in April for release on May 10:

QUOTE. The following Joint Anglo-American statement on submarine and anti-submarine operations is issued under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister.

In April 1944, the United Nations anti-submarine activity continued at a highly satisfactory level. Again for another month the extraordinary fact continues that the number of enemy submarines sunk exceeds the number of Allied merchant ships sunk by submarines. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1630, EST, 5 May 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD, Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971

05-038 NCR GIF
FROM The President
TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 534
DATE 5 May 1944

DATE/TIME 05/2038
OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT April monthly sub statement.

ACTION
1. Statement drafted by Navy Department, sent to the President at Waccimaw as WHITE 173, 4 May 1944.
2. BLACK 98, 041935Z, the President sent his preferred wording of the statement for approval of Navy and OWI.
3. Navy approved President's draft 5 May 44, statement sent to the PA as #534.
4. Answered by PA #672, 8 May 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and secret, Number 535, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 671. I will be very glad to see Sir W. Citrine and I am planning to do so.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1900, EWT, 8 May 1944.

OGDEN COLLINS, JR.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. By
Date: NOV 1 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL #535 DATE 8 May 1944

VIA

SUBJECT Visit of Sir W. Citrine.

ACTION

1. Answers Fa #671, 8 May 44.
2. This reply given to Captain Wood by the President, 8 May 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

000.9
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Number 596, personal and secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

I believe we should inform Marshal Stalin that ANVIL will not be launched in conjunction with the OVERLORD assault. If you agree to the following message, will you send it as being from both of us.

"In order to give maximum strength to the attack across the sea against northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle, makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France in conjunction with the OVERLORD assault. We are expecting to make such an attack later. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from northern France and the eastern front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1205, EWT, 10 May 44.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I believe we should inform Marshal Stalin that ANVIL will not be launched in conjunction with the OVERLORD assault. If you agree to the following message, will you send it as being from both of us.

In order to give maximum strength to the attack across the sea against northern France, we have transferred part of our landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. This, together with the need for using our Mediterranean land forces in the present Italian battle, makes it impracticable to attack the Mediterranean coast of France in conjunction with the OVERLORD assault. We are considering such an attack at a later date. In order to keep the greatest number of German forces away from northern France and the eastern front, we are attacking the Germans in Italy at once on a maximum scale and, at the same time, are maintaining a threat against the Mediterranean coast of France.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By: [Signature]
Date: Nov 1, 1971
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 536 DATE 10 May 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TO OR MAP ROOM VIA
SUBJECT Inform Stalin that OVERLORD will not be launched.

ACTION

1. Message proposed by JCS, Submitted to the President by Admiral Leahy. Approved with minor changes by the President. (See also Memo-PW #516, 8 Apr 44, in which President first suggested sending message to Stalin about cancellation of ANVIL.)

2. Answered by PW #673, 11 May 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

3/10 April.
From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, London  

Number 537, secret and personal, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Replying to your 669 and 670, I share fully with you your distress at the loss of life among the French population incident to our air preparations for OVERLORD.

I share also with you a satisfaction that every possible care is being and will be taken to minimize civilian casualties. No possibility of alleviating adverse French opinion should be overlooked, always provided that there is no reduction of our effectiveness against the enemy at this crucial time. The message from your Ambassador at Algiers referred to the good psychological effect to be obtained if a French transport expert were consulted by the target committee. This matter should be referred to the responsible military commanders for their decision.

However regrettable the attendant loss of civilian lives is, I am not prepared to impose from this distance any restriction on military action by the responsible commanders that in their opinion might militate against the success of OVERLORD or cause additional loss of life to our Allied Forces of invasion.

Roosevelt

Released from the White House Map Room at 1200, EWT, 11 May 1944.

Richard Park, Jr.,  
Colonel, General Staff.
May 10, 1944

#537

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

Replying to your 669, I share fully with you your distress at the loss of life among the French population incident to our air preparations for OVERLORD.

I share also with you a satisfaction that every possible care is being and will be taken to minimize civilian casualties. No possibility of alleviating adverse French opinion should be overlooked, always provided that there is no reduction of our effectiveness against the enemy at this crucial time. The message from your Ambassador at Algiers referred to the good psychological effect to be obtained if a French transport expert were consulted by the target committee. This matter should be referred to the responsible military commanders for their decision.

However regrettable the attendant loss of civilian lives is, I am not prepared to impose from this distance any restriction on military action by the responsible commanders that in their opinion might militate against the success of OVERLORD or cause additional loss of life to our Allied Forces of invasion.

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date Nov 1, 1971

116126 NCR 1752
FROM  The President  
TO  The Prime Minister  

SERIAL  #537  
DATE  11 May 1944  

DATE/TIME  111626 NOR 1752  

TO MAP ROOM  VIA  

SUBJECT  Bombing of French civilian population incident to OVERLAND.  

ACTION  

1. Answer PA #669 and #670, 7 May 44, which were sent by direction of the President to Admiral Leahy, 8 May 44, for preparation of reply.  
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy and approved by President as submitted.  

COPY TO:  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  

FILED:  

342
12 May 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALISNA LONDON

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON. NUMBER 538.

Your 673 meets with my approval. Please send it as being from both of us.

Your 674. I have no objection whatever to your inviting De Gaulle and others of the French Committee to discuss your association in military or political matters; however, you must consider in the interest of security keeping De Gaulle in the United Kingdom until the Overlord landing has been made.

It is my understanding that General Eisenhower now has full authority to discuss with the Committee all matters on a military level. I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level and I am unable at this time to recognize any government of France until the French people have an opportunity for a free choice of government.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2100 E.W.T. 12 May 1944

Robert W. Bogue
Lt (jg) USNR
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 538 DATE 12 May 1944

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Msg to U/J re AMVIL: Pre-OVERLORD meeting with representatives of French National Committee.

ACTION

1. Answers PM #673 & #674. Full action recorded on these status slips.
2. Answered by PM #675, 13 May 44.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

310 AMVIL:

0344
From: Opnav  
To: Alusna, London  

Number 539, personal and from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Replying to your Number 663, I am informed that the Ban of Croatia is now in England. I am generally opposed to any kind of ban but have no objection to this variety.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By: J. Stinton  
Date: NOV 1 1971

Released from the White House Map Room at 1320, EWT, 13 May 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.,  
Lieutenant, U. S. N. R.
13 May 1944

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Replying to your Number 663, I am informed that the Ban of
Croatia is now in England. Generally opposed to any kind of ban, but have
no objection to this action.

[Signature]

[Handwritten note: GENERAL]
FROM The President  TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 539  DATE 13 May 44.

DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER

TO OR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Ban of Croatia.

ACTION 26 Apr 44.

1. Answer PM #663, which see for action.

2. Answered by PM #676.

FROM The President  TO The Prime Minister

DATE:  DATE:  BY DIRECTION OF:

COPIES TO:

ACTION COMPLETED:  FILED:

0347  Yugoslavia
18 May 1944

From: O'knav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 540. PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am delighted with your telegram to Marshal Tito and I wish you would tell King Peter that I am heartily in accord. I sent him yesterday a letter in reply to a very nice letter I had from him.

Incidentally, do you remember my telling you over a year ago of my talk with Peter in which I discussed the possibility of three nations in place of the one, he to be the head of a reconstituted Serbia. This created no excitement on his part or that of Pouritch.

The King, with real fire in his eyes, remarked that he was a Serb. I think that you and I should bear some such possibility in mind in case the new government does not work out. Personally I would rather have a Yugoslavia, but three separate states with separate governments in a Balkan confederation might solve many problems.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2000, EWT, 18 May 1944.

OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant USNR

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J. J. Stonum
Date Nov 1 1974
TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

I am delighted with your telegram to Marshal Tito and I wish you would tell King Peter that I am heartily in accord. I sent him yesterday a letter in reply to a very nice letter I had from him.

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ROOSEVELT

Brought in by Mrs. Brady.
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>Mail Room</td>
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<td>VIA</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>King Peter's new government; plans for reconstruction of Yugoslavia.</td>
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<td>ACTION</td>
<td>1. Answers PM #677, 18 May 44.</td>
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<td>2. President's reply brought to the Map Room evening 18 May 44.</td>
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ACTION COMPLETED: 0351 Yugoslavia  
FILED:
DECLASSIFIED

From: Opnav
To: Alusma, London

NUMBER 541. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Instead of a tripartite statement to be issued by the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Governments, and in place of a Message to the Congress, what would you think of a statement by me alone along these lines, to be issued after D DAY?

QUOTE. It has been suggested that the Allied Governments join in a general statement to the German people and their sympathizers emphasizing the landings recently made on the Continent of Europe. I have not been in agreement with this because it might over-emphasize the importance of these landings. What I want to impress on the people of Germany and their sympathizers is the inevitability of their defeat. What I want to emphasize to them is their continuation of the war from now on is unintelligent on their part. They must know in their hearts that under their present leadership and under their present objectives it is inevitable that they will be totally defeated.

Every German life that is lost from now on is an unnecessary loss. From a cold-blooded point of view it is true that the Allies will suffer losses as well, but the Allies so greatly outnumber the Germans in population and in resources that on a relative basis the Germans will be far harder hit — down to every family — than the Allies. And in the long run mere stubbornness will never help Germany. The Allies have made it abundantly clear that they do not seek the total destruction of the German
people. They do seek total destruction of the philosophy of those Germans who have announced that they could subjugate the world.

The Allies are seeking the long range goal of human freedom -- a greater true liberty -- political, religious and intellectual; and a greater justice, social and economic.

Our times are teaching us that no group of men can ever be strong enough to dominate the whole world.

The Government and people of the United States -- with nearly twice the population of Germany -- send word to the people of Germany that this is the time to abandon the teachings of evil.

By far the greater part of the world's population of nearly two billion people feel the same way. Only Germany and Japan stand out against all the rest of humanity.

Every German knows this in his heart. Germany and Japan have made a terrible and disastrous mistake. Germany and Japan must atone reasonably for the wanton destruction of lives and property which they have committed; and they must give up an imposed philosophy the falsity of which by now must be very clear to them.

The more quickly the end of the fighting and the slaughter the more quickly shall we come to a more decent civilization in the whole world.

The attacks which are now being made in the European theatre by the Americans, by the British, by the Russian armies and their associates will, we hope, continue with success, but the German people can well realize that they are only a part of a series of attacks which will increase in number and volume until the inevitable victory is completed. UNQUOTE.
Released from the White House Map Room at 1550, EWT, 19 May 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By J.S. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971
May 18, 1944.

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

Instead of a tripartite statement to be issued by the U. S., U.K. and Soviet Governments, and in place of a Message to the Congress, what would you think of a statement by me alone along these lines, to be issued after D DAY?

QUOTE It has been suggested that the Allied Governments join in a general statement to the German people and their sympathizers emphasizing the landings recently made on the Continent of Europe. I have not been in agreement with this because it might over-emphasize the importance of these landings.

What I want to impress on the people of Germany and their sympathizers is the inevitability of their defeat. What I want to emphasize to them is their continuation of the war from now on is unintelligent on their part. They must know in their hearts that under their present leadership and under their present objectives it is inevitable that they will be totally defeated.
Every German life that is lost from now on is an unnecessary loss. From a cold-blooded point of view it is true that the Allies will suffer losses as well, but the Allies so greatly outnumber the Germans in population and in resources that on a relative basis the Germans will be far harder hit -- down to every family -- than the Allies. And in the long run mere stubbornness will never help Germany.

The Allies have made it abundantly clear that they do not seek the total destruction of the German people. They do seek total destruction of the philosophy of those Germans who have believed, perhaps honestly, that they could subjugate the world.

The Allies are seeking the long range goal of human freedom -- a greater true liberty -- political, religious and intellectual; and a greater justice, social and economic.

Our times are teaching us that no group of men can ever be strong enough to dominate the whole world.
The Government and people of the United States -- with nearly twice the population of Germany -- send word to the people of Germany that this is the time to abandon the teachings of evil.

By far the greater part of the world's population of nearly two billion people feel the same way. Only Germany and Japan stand out against all the rest of humanity.

Every German knows this in his heart. Germany and Japan have made a terrible and disastrous mistake. Germany and Japan must atone reasonably for the wanton destruction of lives and property which they have committed; and they must give up the false philosophy which by now must be very clear to them.

The more quickly the end of the fighting and the slaughter the more quickly shall we come to a more decent civilization in the whole world.
The attacks which are now being made in the European theatre by the Americans, by the British, by the Russian armies and their associates will, we hope, continue with success, but the German people can well realize that they are only a part of a series of attacks which will increase in number and volume until the inevitable victory is completed. UNQUOTE

ROOSEVELT
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 542. [REDACTED] AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Replying to your 678 it seems to me that your proposed course in handling the De Gaulle visitation after D-day is the most promising solution.

Whether or not Koenig or Vienot should be permitted to send code messages from U.K. to Algiers can be safely left to your discretion.

I have no objection to the Committee's sending agents to France after D-day as Eisenhower now has authority to utilize their services at his discretion for the advantage of our military effort. I also have no objection to the Supreme Commander Mediterranean consulting with the Committee about the battle of Italy.

I have no official information in regard to the self constituted provisional government of France alleged in press reports to have been announced in Algiers. We will have to take a joint interest in that when and if it officially comes to our attention. I hope we and the Soviet can come to a common agreement before action is taken by any one of us. You are familiar with my repeated announcements that in America's opinion the French people in France should have a free choice of their own government and I really cannot go back on my oft repeated statement that this has been their aim for months. the Committee and De Gaulle have aimed

1. Deleted by President, BLUR 4, 20 May 44.
to be recognized as the provisional government of France without
any expression or choice by the people themselves and that I
could not recognize it.

Our battle in Italy seems to be progressing favorably and
I am hopeful of a major military success in the near future.
Best of luck.

Roosevelt.

Correction to copy released from
the White House Map Room at 1315, EWT,
20 May 1944.

2Underlined portion added by President, BLUE 4, 20 May 44.
To : Algiers, London

NUMBER 542. PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Following is corrected text of paragraph 4 of my number 542.

QUOTE. I have no official information in regard to the self constituted provisional government of France alleged in press reports to have been announced in Algiers. We will have to take a joint interest in that when and if it officially comes to our attention. I hope we and the Soviet can come to a common agreement before action is taken by any one of us. You are familiar with my repeated announcements that in America's opinion the French people in France should have a free choice of their own government and I really cannot go back on my oft repeated statement that the Committee and De Gaulle have aimed to be recognized as the provisional Government of France without any expression or choice by the people themselves and that I could not recognize it. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1315, EWT, 20 May 1944.

ROBERT H. MYERS,
Lieutenant, USNR.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date NOV 1 1971
REDS 21  
20 May 1944

ADMIRAL LEARY TO THE PRESIDENT.

London has requested verification and repeat of your message to the Prime Minister (REDS 17, BLUE 3) from the words "you are familiar" to "recognize it."

I suggest the following change in clarification. For the following words "this has been their aim" substitute the words "this reported action has been the aim of the Committee" so that the last sentence in paragraph 4 will read as follows:

"You are familiar with my repeated announcements that in America's opinion the French people in France should have a free choice of their own government, and I really cannot go back on my oft repeated statement that this reported action has been the aim of the Committee for months and that I could not recognize it."

RECD Hyde Park 20/1335Z.

BLUE 4  
20 May 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR ADMIRAL LEARY

Re REDS 17 and 21 and BLUE 3. Paragraph 4 RED 17 should be further amended by inserting after oft repeated statement "that the Committee and De Gaulle have aimed to be recognized as the provisional Government of France without any expression or choice by the people themselves."

RECD Map Room 20/1620Z.
Replying to your 678 it seems to me that your proposed course in handling the De Gaulle visitation after D-day is the most promising solution.

Whether or not Koenig or Vienot should be permitted to send code messages from U.K. to Algiers can be safely left to your discretion.

I have no objection to the Committee's sending agents to France after D-day as Eisenhowcr now has authority to utilize their services at his discretion for the advantage of our military effort. I also have no objection to the Supreme Commander Mediterranean consulting with the Committee about the battle of Italy.

I have no official information in regard to the self constituted provisional government of France alleged in press reports to have been announced in Algiers. We will have to take a joint interest in that when and if it officially comes to our attention. I hope we and the Soviet can come to a common agreement before action is taken by any one of us. You are familiar with my repeated announcements that in America's opinion the French people in France should have a free choice of their own government and I really cannot go back on my oft repeated statement that France has been their own. I have been so inclined to be recognized as the Provisional Government of France without any expression or choice by the French people themselves.

Our battle in Italy seems to be progressing favorably and I am hopeful of a major military success in the near future. Best of luck.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1815, EWT, 19 May 1944
FROM  The President  
TO  The Prime Minister  

SERIAL  542  
DATE  19 May 1944  

DATE/TIME  192254  
OR FILE NUMBER  NCR 3561  

TOR MAP ROOM  
VIA  

SUBJECT  OVERLORD discussion with FNC; Italian campaign.  

ACTION  
1. Answered PM #676, which was sent to the President at Hyde Park as RED 16, 19 May 44.  
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy sent at same time, RED 17, 19 May 44.  
3. President approved RED 17 with minor changes (SLUB 3). Sent to PM at 192254. Admiral Leahy notified.  
4. At 20 May, Navy Code Room, upon request for service of message from London, called Map Room to see whether wording of last sentence in Para 4 was correct as sent; meaning of sentence was not clear. Checked with Hyde Park; no error in transmission from there.  
5. Message, prepared by Admiral Leahy and sent to the President as RED 21, suggested revised wording of last sentence, Para 4, to clarify meaning.  
6. President's correction received in Map Room as SLUB 4, 20 May 44, sent to Prime Minister as addition to #542.  

COPIES TO:  
DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  01/31/44  
FILED:  

0363
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 543. PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 680. In view of your comments on my 541 and the attitude of your Cabinet, I am in agreement with you that a statement along the lines suggested by me is not necessary and I shall therefore not make any statement at that time to the German people.

I am informing U.J. of this decision.

Conditions here will not permit of my visiting the U.K. shortly after D-day, and after consultation with my Joint Chiefs of Staff I do not believe that a full staff meeting at that time is necessary.

Small staff conversations can and will be conducted immediately after the attack is launched.

At a later date after our forces are established on the Continent it does appear necessary to have a full Staff meeting to decide upon our future moves, and I hope and expect that it will then be possible for me to be present.

I join you in a hope that the present magnificent performance of our Forces in Italy will continue and inflict a major disaster upon the enemy. Things look well at this moment.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, 27 May 1944

DECLASSIFIED BY Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

0364
May 27, 1944

Your 630. In view of your comments on my 541 and the attitude of your Cabinet, I am in agreement with you that a statement along the lines suggested by me is not necessary and I shall therefore not make any statement at that time to the German people.

I am informing U. J. of this decision.

Conditions here will not permit of my visiting the U.K. shortly after D-day, and after consultation with my Joint Chiefs of Staff I do not believe that a full staff meeting at that time is necessary.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>The Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>543</td>
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<td>DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER</td>
<td>27 May 1944</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOR MAP ROOM</td>
<td>VIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Statement by President to German people on D-day; Italian battle; Joint conference.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION**

1. Answers Ps #679 and #680, which see for complete action on this subject.
2. Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 27 May 44.
3. Answered by Ps #685, 28 May 44.

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**COPIES TO:**

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**DATE:**

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**BY DIRECTION OF:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:**

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**FILED:**
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 544. SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 682 received. I am in complete agreement with you that the French National Spirit should be working with us in OVERLORD to prevent unnecessary loss of American and British lives.

You are fully informed in regard to my belief that Allied military power should not be used to impose any particular group as the Government of the French people.

At the present time I am unable to see how an Allied establishment of the Committee as a Government of France would save the lives of any of our men.

Any assistance that the Committee or any other Frenchmen can give to our Army of liberation is of course highly desirable from our point of view as well as to the interest of France.

I am hopeful that your conversations with General De Gaulle will result in inducing him to actually assist in the liberation of France without being imposed by us on the French people as their Government. Self determination really means absence of coercion.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, 27 May 1944.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U.S. Navy.
May 27, 1944

PRESIDENT TO prime:

Your 682 received. I am in complete agreement with you that the French National Spirit should be working with us in OVERLORD to prevent unnecessary loss of American and British lives.

You are fully informed in regard to my belief that Allied military power should not be used to impose any particular group as the Government of the French people.

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I am hopeful that your conversations with General de Gaulle will result in inducing him to actually assist in the liberation of France without being imposed by us on the French people as their Government.
FROM The President TO The Prime Minister

SERIAL 544 DATE 27 May 1944

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT Discussions with De Gaulle and FNC.

ACTION
1. Answers PM #682.
2. Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 27 May 44.
3. Answered by PM #685, 28 May 1944.

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

Oll France.
27 May 1944

From: Opnav
To: Aluena, London

NUMBER 545. SECRET AND PERSONAL. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be directed by both of us to send the following message to Eisenhower:

QUOTE. You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U.S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine Province.

It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria, and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet Forces. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1300, EWT, 27 May 1944.

CHESTER C. WOOD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date NOV 1 1971
PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

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QUOTE. You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U. S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine Province.

It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet Forces.

UNQUOTE.
The President

TO

The Prime Minister

SERIAL 545

DATE 27 May 1944

DATE/TIME

OR FILE NUMBER

TOK MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT Occupation of Germany and occupied countries.

ACTION

1. (See PRES #457, 7 Feb 44; PM #589, 23 Feb 44; Ltr fr PRES to PM, 29 Feb 44; ltr PRES to PM 21 Mar 44, all filed "MR 371 GERMANY AND OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.)

2. On 23 Apr 44, BLACK 61, while the President was at Waccamaw, President directed Gen Marshall to prepare a draft directive to Gen Eisenhower.

3. Draft directive prepared by Gen Marshall, sent to the President as WHITE 116, 25 Apr 44.

4. On 25 May 44, after the President had returned to Washington, Gen Marshall was instructed to send the directive to Eisenhower. The statement was not sent to Eisenhower, but returned by Gen Marshall with recommendation that it be sent to the PM first for his approval. President approved, sent to PM as this #545.

5. Answered by PM #636, 31 May 44.

COPIES TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: FILED:

371 GERMANY AND OCCUPIED COUNTRIES.
DECLASSIFIED

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

NUMBER 546. PERSONAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 684 and 685 received.

I do want to make this deGaulle matter clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

Less than a week ago, on May twenty-fifth, Admiral Fenard said goodbye on his way to see deGaulle in Algiers. We had a very satisfactory talk and I think he is a first class man in every way, besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy.

He asked me if I had any message for deGaulle. I told him that I had been hoping for a message from deGaulle to me asking if I would see him if he came over here and that he could tell deGaulle that if I received such a message my answer would be an immediate and cordial affirmative.

I explained to him, as I thought I had made the whole matter clear to many people before, that as the head of the Government and the head of the State I could not well invite deGaulle to come, as the latter is only the head of a Committee and is not the head of the French Government or the French State. Fenard was in complete accord, and that message ought to have been delivered to deGaulle by now.

I feel very strongly that in his position he, in person and through nobody else, should ask if he will be received. This is simple, straightforward, and the reply would be expressed in cordial terms.

Now as to your 682, in further reply, of course, you and I must do everything possible to encourage the French national spirit and to get it working.
with us at top speed in the immediate future.

We do not know definitely what the state of that French spirit is and we will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

Marshall will be with you about D plus 4. We cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with deGaulle singly or with you and deGaulle jointly, because this is wholly a matter in the political and not in the military field. Marshall can, of course, talk about all military matters.

My suggestion is that after you talk with deGaulle that he should ask me whether I would see him if he came here direct from London. Meanwhile you could send me a summary of your talks with him and we can be in complete accord by the time he reaches here.

As a matter of practical fact, the French military strength could not be used on OVERLORD until then anyway. All plans are for later than D-DAY.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the deGaulle conversations with you.

I should like very much to accept Dr. Churchill's advice to make a sea voyage in your direction and I hope to do so at a later date. Conditions here will not permit it shortly after D plus fourteen as suggested by you.

Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined Staff is necessary. I think we had best await developments of OVERLORD before making a decision as to the next full Staff meeting.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1920, EWT, 31 May 1944.

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C.E.
May 29, 1944

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J. Stewart
Date NOV 1 1971

PRESIDENT TO PRIME:

Your 634 and 605 received.

I will instruct General Marshall who will arrive
U.K. about June 3 to express my views at your meeting
with de Gaulle in regard to the utilization by General
Eisenhower of all services that can be provided by the
French Committee.

I am in full agreement with the feeling expressed
by you that France should be with us in its liberation.
I have no doubt whatever that France will be with us and
I hope that General de Gaulle and his Committee will do
whatever is within their capacity to expel the invaders
from France. We should expect General de Gaulle to be
enthusiastic in this effort of ours to aid his countrymen
in their distress.

I should like very much to accept Dr. Churchill's
advice to make a sea voyage in your direction and I hope
to do so at a later date. Conditions here will not permit
it shortly after D plus fourteen as suggested by you.

Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point
with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined
Staff is necessary. I shall await developments of
OVERLORD before making a decision as to the next full Staff
meeting.

[Signature]
TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I do want to make this deGaulle matter clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

Less than a week ago, on May twenty-fifth, Admiral Fenard said goodbye on his way to see deGaulle in Algiers. We had a very satisfactory talk and I think he is a first class man in every way, besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy.

He asked me if I had any message for deGaulle. I told him that I had been hoping for a message from deGaulle to me asking if I would see him if he came over here and that he could tell deGaulle that if I received such a message my answer would be an immediate and cordial affirmative.

I explained to him, as I thought I had made the whole matter clear to many people before, that as the head of the Government and the head of the State I could not well invite
deGaulle to come, as the latter is only the head of a Committee and is not the head of the French Government or the French State.

Fenard was in complete accord, and that message ought to have been delivered to deGaulle by now.

I feel very strongly that in his position he, in person and through nobody else, should ask if he will be received. That is simple, straightforward, and the reply would be expressed in cordial terms.

Now as to your 682, of course, you and I must do everything possible to encourage the French national spirit and to get it working with us at top speed in the immediate future.

We do not know definitely what the state of that French spirit is and we will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

Marshall will be with you about D plus 4. We cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with deGaulle singly or with you and deGaulle jointly, because this is wholly a matter in the political and not the military field.
Marshall can, of course, talk about all military matters.

My suggestion is that after your talk with deGaulle that he should ask me whether I would see him if he came here direct from London. Meanwhile you could send me a summary of your talks with him and we can be in complete accord by the time he reaches here.

As a matter of practical fact, the French military strength could not be used on OVERLORD until then anyway. All plans are for later than D-DAY.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the deGaulle conversations with you.

ROOSEVELT
I have received your 684 and 685.

I should like to make this matter of de Gaulle clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

On May 25, less than a week ago, I said goodbye to Admiral Fenard, who is on his way to Algiers to see de Gaulle. We had a very satisfactory talk. Besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy, he impresses me as being in every way a first-class man.

When he asked if I had any message for de Gaulle, I replied that I had been hoping that de Gaulle would send me a message asking if I would see him if he came over here. I said that de Gaulle could be told that if such a message were received by me, my answer would be an immediate and cordial affirmative.

I explained to Fenard, as I thought I had made my stand clear to many people before, that I, as head of the Government and the head of the State, could not well invite de Gaulle to come, as he is not the head of the French Government or the French State, but only the head of a Committee. Fenard completely agreed; by now de Gaulle should have this message.

Considering de Gaulle's position, I very strongly feel that he in person and through no one else, should ask if he will be received. This is simple, straightforward, and my answer would be expressed in cordial terms.

Further replying to your 682. We must, of course, do everything we possibly can to encourage French national spirit, and to get it working immediately with us at top speed.

Paraphrase to Miss Bullo
5 June 1944.
What the state of this French spirit is, we do not definitely know. We will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

General Marshall will be in London about D plus 4. However, since this de Gaulle matter is wholly in the political and not in the military field, we cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with you and de Gaulle jointly, or with de Gaulle singly. General Marshall can, of course, talk about all matters in the military field.

I suggest that after you have finished your talks, de Gaulle should ask me whether I would receive him if he came here direct from London. You could, in the meantime, send me a summary of your talks with him, and by the time he reached here, we could be in complete accord.

The French military strength could not, as a matter of practical fact, be used on OVERLORD until then anyway, since all plans are for later than D-day.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the conversations between de Gaulle and you.

I hope at a later date to accept Dr. Churchill's advice to make a sea voyage in your direction, which I should like to do very much. Conditions here will not permit it shortly after D plus fourteen as you suggested.

We had best await developments of OVERLORD, I think, before making a decision as to the next meeting of the full staffs. Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined Staff is necessary.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

For your eyes only and will you return for my files.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 546, 31 May 1944.

I have received your 684 and 685.

I should like to make this matter of de Gaulle clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

On May 25, less than a week ago, I said goodbye to Admiral Fenard, who is on his way to Algiers to see de Gaulle. We had a very satisfactory talk. Besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy, he impresses me as being in every way a first-class man.

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Considering de Gaulle's position, I very strongly feel that he in person and through no one else, should ask if he will be received. This is simple, straightforward, and my answer would be expressed in cordial terms.

Further replying to your #682. We must, of course, do everything we possibly can to encourage French national spirit, and to get it working immediately with us at top speed.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. K. Stewart
Date Nov 1 1971

0382
What the state of this French spirit is, we do not definitely know. We will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

General Marshall will be in London about D plus 4. However, since this de Gaulle matter is wholly in the political and not in the military field, we cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with you and de Gaulle jointly, or with de Gaulle singly. General Marshall can, of course, talk about all matters in the military field.

I suggest that after you have finished your talks, de Gaulle should ask me whether I would receive him if he came here direct from London. You could, in the meantime, send me a summary of your talks with him, and by the time he reached here, we could be in complete accord.

The French military strength could not, as a matter of practical fact, be used on OVERLORD until then anyway, since all plans are for later than D-day.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the conversations between de Gaulle and you.

I hope at a later date to accept Dr. Churchill's advice to make a sea voyage in your direction, which I should like to do very much. Conditions here will not permit it shortly after D plus fourteen as you suggested.

We had best await developments of OVERLORD, I think, before making a decision as to the next meeting of the full staffs. Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined Staff is necessary.

ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 1, 1944

I am enclosing for your information a copy of telegram no. 1799 of May 31 from Mr. Chapin at Algiers reporting the conversation on May 30 between Mr. Duff-Cooper, the British representative to the French Committee, and General de Gaulle, in which the latter indicated his desire to obtain assurances that the proposed conversations in London should be of a tri-partite character between representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and himself. In other words, he wished assurances that after reaching agreement with the British Government it would not be necessary for him to discuss the same matters again separately with the United States.

Mr. Chapin added that in his conversation with Monsieur Massigli on May 31 the latter likewise stated that he regarded it as essential to obtain these assurances. In replying Mr. Chapin stated that he was without instructions on the point but would telegraph Washington.

I shall appreciate receiving an indication of the nature of a reply which should be made to Mr. Chapin’s request for instructions.

Enclosure:
Copy of telegram no. 1799,
May 31, 1944.
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Algeria

Dated May 31, 1944

Recl'd 9:10 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

U.S. URGENT.

1799, May 31, 3 p.m.

Duff-Cooper informed me this morning that he had called on de Gaulle yesterday afternoon to say that he had heard the various rumors circulating around to the effect that de Gaulle after having accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to London now appeared to be hedging and demanding that some special representative of the United States should be sent to London to participate in the conversations. Duff-Cooper stated that he had decided that he would take the initiative in this case rather than permit de Gaulle to complain to him. Duff-Cooper added that he had stated frankly that all arrangements including the privilege of communications between London and Algiers in French cipher had been made following an acceptance given and that he was afraid that if de Gaulle now was making new conditions it might upset everything at this critical juncture.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By__ Date, NOV 1 1971

De Gaulle
De Gaulle said that perhaps the rumors had been exaggerated and that the only point upon which he desired assurances was that he proposed London conversations should be Tripartite between representatives of Great Britain the United States and himself. In other words said he, he wished assurances that after reaching an agreement with the British Government he would not have to take up the matters discussed again separately with representatives of the American Government.

Duff-Cooper replied that as he had informed de Gaulle in transmitting the invitation he was quite convinced that the conversations would be truly Tripartite as the invitation had been extended with full approval of President Roosevelt. He pointed out that American representatives in London included General Eisenhower on a military and Ambassador Winant and Mr. Phillips on a political plane and that there were few persons in the United States who could be better qualified. He asked specifically whether the General would be satisfied if he obtained a statement to the effect that the conversations would be Tripartite and that General Eisenhower and Ambassador Winant would participate. De Gaulle replied in the affirmative.

Duff-Cooper
Duff-Cooper fully reported the conversations to the Foreign Office last night and asked for instructions.

This afternoon when I called on Massigli he referred to de Gaulle's conversation yesterday with Duff-Cooper and said that he felt it was essential that assurances be given that the conversations be truly Tripartite. He reiterated the point made by de Gaulle that the French wished to avoid the delay contingent upon referring any agreement reached in London between the British and French representatives for new discussions with the American authorities in Washington.

As I have received no instructions or background information I stated that while I felt sure that the conversations were intended to be Tripartite I would cable the Department for instructions which I hope can be expedited to me.

Sent to the Department as 1799, repeated to London as 188.

CHAPIN

HTM
The copy of the PM message which you asked Rigdon for he has left in the Map Room. Admiral Brown advises that if it is being referred to anyone it should, of course, be paraphrased first.

dot

Paraphrase going to the Sec'y of State
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<th>FROM</th>
<th>The President</th>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>De Gaulle conference; visit to London; Staff meeting.</td>
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**ACTION**

1. **Answered** PM #682, 686, and 688.
2. Written by the President from a draft message prepared by Admiral Leahy.
3. **Answered** by PM #688, 1 June 44.

**COPIES TO:**

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**ACTION COMPLETED:** OIL FRANCE; 000.9; 210 PRES-PM

**FILED:**